MASARYKOVA UNIVERZITA
FACULTY OF SOCIAL STUDIES
The Kurdish Question in Turkey During the Rule of the Justice and Development Party
Bachelor's Thesis
KAROLÍNA KUČEROVÁ
Supervisor: Mgr. et Mgr. Vladimir Bizik
Department of International Relations and European Studies International Relations
Brno 2019
MUNI FSS
THE KURDISH QUESTION IN TURKEY DURING THE RULE OF THE JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT PARTY
Bibliographic Record
Author: Karolína Kučerová Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University Department of International Relations and Euro pean Studies
Title of Thesis: The Kurdish Question in Turkey During the Rule of the Justice and Development Party Degree Programme: International Relations
Supervisor: Mgr. et Mgr. Vladimir Bizik
Academic Year: 2019
Number of Pages: 54 Keywords: Kurds, Turks, Kurdish Question, Kurdistan, Tur key, AKP, PKK THE KURDISH QUESTION IN TURKEY DURING THE RULE OF THE JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT PARTY
Abstract
This thesis is focused on the Kurdish ethnic group, its position in Turkey and their chances of having their autonomy. The first part of this thesis briefly describes the historical development of this ethnicity and their effort to separate themselves from Turkey. The main aim is to describe the current situation of Kurds in Turkey and their separatist tendencies during the rule of the Justice and Development Party. After discussing the recent developments, the final part of the thesis outlines what are the likely challenges and possible paths forward for the Kurdish ethnic group in Turkey.
2 THE KURDISH QUESTION IN TURKEY DURING THE RULE OF THE JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT PARTY
Statutory Declaration
I hereby declare that I have written the submitted Bachelor's Thesis con cerning the topic of The Kurdish Question in Turkey During the Rule of the Justice and Development Party independently. All the sources used for the purpose of finishing this thesis have been adequately refer enced and are listed in the Bibliography.
In Brno May 8 2019
Karolína Kučerová
THE KURDISH QUESTION IN TURKEY DURING THE RULE OF THE JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT PARTY
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Mgr. et Mgr. Vladimir Bizik for being my advisor and academic supervisor across my journey of writing this thesis. And I would also like to thank my family for being my support during the whole time of my studies.
5
TABLE OF CONTENTS 7
Table of Contents
List of Images 9
1 Introduction 11
2 Methodology 12
3 Explanation of basic terms 13 3.1 Kurdistan 13 3.2 Kurdish question 14 3.3 Kurdish separatist movements 16
4 Origin of the question 19 4.1 Ethnic history of Kurds 19 4.2 Ethnic history of Turks 21 4.3 History of the question 22
5 Turkish-Kurdish conflict - recent historical background 25 5.1 War: August 1984 - March 1993 25 5.2 War: May 1993-August 1999 26 5.3 Ceasefire: September 1999 - November 2002 29
6 Turkish-Kurdish conflict during the rule of the AKP 31 6.1 Ceasefire: November 2002 - June 2004 31 6.2 War: June 2004-March 2013 32 6.3 Ceasefire: March 2013 - July 2015 36 6.4 War: July 2015-June 2018 38
7 Perspectives 41
8 Conclusion 43
Bibliography 45 Primary sources 45
7 8 TABLE OF CONTENTS
Secondary sources 45 Webpages and internet sources 48
8 LIST OF IMAGES 9
List of Images
Figure 1: Map of Kurdistan 13
9
INTRODUCTION 11
1 Introduction
The Kurdish ethnic group is the biggest minority in Turkey. But they had to face Turkish governmental oppression in the process of Turkification, for example, the Kurdish language was banned from being spoken in public and even in private conversations. And even if the Turkish state later started to make certain steps to lower the pressure on Kurds, such as allowing to speak the Kurdish language publicly, they are still not find• ing a common ground. A semi-open conflict has been going on between Kurds and Turks since 1984. But the roots of their conflict are deeper, starting at the end of the First World War. The conflict escalated in 1984 not only because of the Turkish oppression of the human rights of Kurds, but also because of the fact that the Turkish state is refusing the Kurdish national self-de• termination right This thesis provides an overview of the Kurdish-Turkish relations since 1984 with focus on the time of the rule of the "Justice and Develop• ment Party" (AKP). This paper is aimed at the Kurdish question, because it is a big topic lasting for decades, yet with no one being able to solve it. Not even the Kurdish separatist movements that are described in the third chapter. This thesis is also aimed at outlining the chances of gaining autonomy for Kurds. The third chapter aims to introduce the basic terms and concepts, such as Kurdistan and the Kurdish question. They are frequently used in this bachelor thesis, but sometimes they have different interpretations. It is therefore better to explain them for the purposes of this thesis. The fourth chapter describes the ethnic history of Kurds and Turks, because it is important for the further development of their relations. The beginning of the Kurdish question, that is connected with the end of the First World War, is also described. In the fifth anf sixth chapter, which is divided into war and ceasefire periods, it is described how the Kurdish-Turkish conflict developed in the last century and during the time of the rule of the AKP. The ideologi• cal shift of the Kurdish separatist movement PKK is discussed in this chapter as well. Possibilities and perspectives of creating an autonomous territory of Kurdistan are outlined in the chapter number seven. The whole thesis is summarized in the last chapter, conclusion.
11 12 METHODOLOGY
2 Methodology
This thesis is a literature summary and an interpretation of the topic of the Kurdish question. The method used for this thesis is the qualitative case study method. This inductive approach was chosen because it al• lows generating context-specific knowledge about the chosen topic. Moreover, this method made it possible to study the topic more deeply, more than it would be possible if the approach of dealing with more cases was chosen. (Gerring 2007,20) In the case of this thesis, where the ques• tion of possibility of establishing autonomous Kurdish territory within the Turkish state is being researched, the method is more than adequate. Regarding the causality, this research is based on the logic of under• standing. Meaning that the circumstances in Turkey regarding the Kurd• ish question were observed, and based on the observation the conclusion was made. (Osicka 2015, 332) However, the conclusion cannot be gener• alised and used in the neighbouring countries of Turkey, where Kurds also live. Thus the On the other hand, it is a disadvantage of this approach is that it is difficult to generalize from a single case. Hence, the fact that this thesis focused solely on Turkey is one of the limitations of the study of the Kurd• ish question. However, this thesis is focused on Turkey only, because in Turkey there live the majority of Kurds and the Kurdish question is more relevant than in other countries. Another limitation of this thesis is the fact that many relevant sources are in the Kurdish or Turkish language only and the author does not speak any of them. Another limitation is that there was no field research done. There are different variables that are studied in this thesis. One of them are Kurds. They are described in a separate chapter, as are Turks, or the Turkish government The third variable is the Kurdish question, that entails both of the aforementioned variables and which is described in a separate chapter as well as the origin of this question. The time frame used for this thesis is from the establishment of the "Justice and Development Party" (AKP) in 2001 until the Turkish presi• dential election in June 2 018. This time period is relevant for the Kurdish question, because during this time there were a lot of events that were changing the Kurdish-Turkish relations.
12 EXPLANATION OF BASIC TERMS 13
3 Explanation of basic terms
The aim of this chapter is to introduce a basic terms and concepts that are frequently used in this bachelor thesis, especially those with different interpretations. Unless stated otherwise, these terms will be used in this thesis as defined in this chapter.
3.1 Kurdistan
Figure 1: Map of Kurdistan1
Kurdistan (the land of Kurds) is a geopolitical name for an area histori• cally inhabited mainly by the Kurdish ethnic group. The area of what we call Kurdistan today has been more or less the same for centuries. As it was written:
1 (Review 2 015]
13 14 EXPLANATION OF BASIC TERMS
"Kurds are an Asian nation, situated in the west of Iran and the highlands around the Tigris and the Euphrates. Kurdistan continues from the Loristan region in Iran until Kharpoot (a current city in Turkey called Elazig), which is a point where both branches of the Euphrates connect. This is about 900Km long from north-west to south-west and 100km to 200km wide on the parallel lines 34 to 39 longitude and the parallel lines 37 to 46 latitude in the east. The main valleys of Kurdistan are the valley of the Bitlis river, both valleys ofAdham and Sherwan, and the highlands ofZagra. The lake of Wan and its citadel is the capital of this Asian and brave fighting nation." (Saeed2014, 79)
This area lies within the borders of four states - Iraq (Southern Kurdi• stan), Iran (Eastern Kurdistan), Syria (Western Kurdistan, sometimes also referred as Rojava) and Turkey (Northern Kurdistan). Even though there is no official state called Kurdistan recognized by any other state in the world, there are parts of countries that are called by this name. In Iraq, there is an autonomous area of Iraqi Kurdistan and in Iran, there is likewise an autonomous region called Kurdistan, inhab• ited mostly by Kurds. Even if there is not a state called Kurdistan, there is still a concept and a hypothetical state. The included map of Kurdistan shows the area mainly inhabited by Kurds and for which they claim to have a right to be their autonomous territory. Although the demands of Kurds have changed from an autonomous state to autonomous democratic confed- eralism that might become at the most developed point an autonomous territory, the concept remains the same. (White 2015,109) This thesis is aimed at the Turkish part of the area of Kurdistan, which lies in the south-east of Turkey.
3.2 Kurdish question
"The Kurdish question is a concept referring to a historical, political, so• cial, cultural and economic problem engulfing Iran, Turkey, Iraq and Syria; thus it beholds a regional character." (Gul 2014) In this thesis the
14 EXPLANATION OF BASIC TERMS 15 so-called Kurdish question is related only to the semi-open conflict be• tween the ethnic group of Kurds and the Turkish state. The Kurdish question, sometimes also a problem, is a concept made up by rulers of Western countries and authors from Western countries, during the last century. Most scholars do refer to Kurds in connection with these words. By using these words, it may feel that Kurds are caus• ing a problem or are themselves a problem that needs to be resolved. What is more, using these specific words can be seen as a way to express an opinion that the existence of Kurds as a distinct group is being ques• tioned. "British policy makers and administrators had the habit of speaking of'questions': there had been 'the Eastern Question' (concerning Greek aspirations for independence from Ottoman rule), 'the Armenian Ques• tion', and Kurds were the next to become a 'question.' Speaking of 'the Kurdish question' suggested that somehow the existence of Kurds caused a certain type of problems that needed to be resolved." (van Bruinessen 2004, 4) The opposite points of view the Kurdish and Turkish side have about resolving the Kurdish question are embodied in the dichotomy of "the Kurdish cause" or "the Kurdish problem." It perfectly shows how far from each other are the two sides, because for Kurds it is a struggle for their right to rule their own territory, while for Turks it is an obligation not to allow splitting of the state. (Jojic 2018, 60) The Kurdish journalist Baki Giil includes in his definition of the con• cept mainly economic problems. And writes that the Kurdish question has "a regional character". (Gul 2014) Different authors agree with him on the fact that this concept is also of an economic character but differ from his point of view that the Kurdish question is a local matter. For example, Malcolm Burr, a British scholar, or Morgan Phillips Price, a journalist and Labour member of parliament, say that the whole Kurdish problem is the fact of the economic situation of Kurds, or the Middle East in general, (van Bruinessen 2004) But Wadie Jwaideh, an American author of Iraqi background, has a different perception of this. He agrees with Giil that the "problem" is political, but above that he sug• gests that mostly only nationalism is the root of this "problem", (van Bruinessen 2004) Bahar Baser disagrees with the point that the "question" is only a local problem. He writes that Kurds make demands in Turkey, while
15 16 EXPLANATION OF BASIC TERMS
Kurdish diasporas in Europe make demands there. Thus the "question" is no more of a local character. He also adds that
"the "Kurdish question" has become one of the most protracted conflicts in Turkey's recent history, and per• haps even the most serious problem facing the Turkish Republic today. It is also one of the most pressing issues affecting Turkey's prospects for accession to the Euro• pean Union. Despite recent developments (Note: in 2013, when this text was written, there was a ceasefire between Kurds and Turks) in the Kurdish-Turkish bar• gaining process, considered by many to constitute sig• nificant leaps forward, Turkey still has a long way to go in reaching a stable, democratic resolution of the long• standing, deeply-embedded, and complex issues that concern the country's Kurdish minority." (Baser 2013)
Thus, the Kurdish question is a concept of a historical, political, social, cultural and economic character (all these points will be described later) with nationalistic roots, and it is no longer a local problem due to the Kurdish diasporas in Europe.
3.3 Kurdish separatist movements
"Separatist movements advocate for greater sover• eignty for their members, who are often part of a com• mon ethnic, religious, or territorial group, and who re• sist further incorporation into the larger polity, believ• ing instead that they should exercise more control over their political, economic, or cultural affairs than the na• tional states in which they live." (Gupta 2013)
There are several ways to express the separatist tendencies that are based on a nationalism. In Turkey, Kurdish separatist groups try to ne• gotiate with the Turkish government in a peaceful way and there are other groups that lead a guerrilla war against Turkey in order to gain an autonomy for Kurds.
16 EXPLANATION OF BASIC TERMS 17
The peaceful Kurdish groups in Turkey are political parties that have representation in a parliament At the moment it is primarily a po• litical party called "Peoples' Democratic Party" (HDP), established in 2012. They do notprofile themselves as a strictly pro-Kurdish party, but as a party that wants equal rights and peace for the minorities in Turkey, especially Kurds and Alewites. (HDP n.d.) HDP was accused by the gov• erning "Justice and Development party" (AKP), by president Erdogan specifically, to have a connection to the terrorist separatist group (PKK) that leads a guerrilla war against the Turkish state, but this assumption was never officially proven. (News 2015) Another pro-Kurdish political party that was accused of being connected to the PKK was "Democratic Society Party" (DTP). This party was banned in Turkey in 2009. (Aydinli 2009) In the history there were more pro-Kurdish political parties that were banned by the Turkish state. One of them was "People's Labor Party" (HEP), which was banned in 1993 due to the promotion of Kurdish culture. (Ozbudun 2013) Another separatist group that is not as peaceful as the aforemen• tioned political parties is the militant "Kurdistan Workers' Party" (PKK), that was during the Cold War influenced by Marxist-Leninist ideas. The PKK is based on a student organization, which had an aim to spread the Kurdish nationalist idea. (Jojic 2018, 51). Another aim was to achieve an (economic) equality between the Kurdish and Turkish parts of Turkey. (Kendal 1993) Such an organization could be formed thanks to the new Turkish institution from 1961 that brought more political freedoms and many student organizations were formed. (Jojic 2018, 51) Nowadays the PKK is said to be a terrorist organization (Bruno 2007) or "a mountain-based guerrilla." (Boell 2015) The PKK was estab• lished in 1978 by Kurdish and Turkish students. One of the founders, who was also behind the initial student organization, was Abdullah Ocalan, also known as Apo, who is considered to be a Kurdish separatist leader until the present day. It seems that he wants to persuade the PKK and sympathizers of the PKK that this violent form is not the way to suc• cess and to achieve the autonomy for Kurds in a less violent way than in previous decades is also possible. Ocalan also called upon the PKK to de• clare a ceasefire after his imprisonment in 1999 and was part of the peace negotiations in 2013. (White 2015) He describes the current (from 2009) aims of the PKK in this way. "I offer the Turkish society a simple solution. We (Kurds) demand a demo• cratic nation. We are not opposed to the unitary state and republic, we
17 18 EXPLANATION OF BASIC TERMS accept the republic, its unitary structure and laicism (secularism). How• ever, we believe that it must be redefined as a democratic state respect• ing peoples, cultures and rights. On this basis, Kurds must be free to or• ganize in a way that they can live their culture and language and can de• velop economically and ecologically." (Ocalan 2009, 39) But the PKK did not have such peaceful thoughts the whole time. In the 90s, when the conflict between Kurds and Turkish government was the most violent, there were thousands of deaths on both sides. (Zurcher 2017, 308) The PKK wants to achieve the goals of Kurds having equal human rights with Turks and an independent territory of Kurdistan (a part of this country would be in Turkey), even if the price for it is very high. (White 2015) The PKK was trying to gain supporters by eliminating other Kurdish political parties (Davis, Larson and collective 2012, 101) and was also persuading them by violence. Kurds in rural areas had to choose if they support the PKK and join their village guards, or they support the gov• ernment forces and would face the dire consequences of not supporting them. (Davis, Larson and collective 2012,105)
18 ORIGIN OF THE QUESTION 19
4 Origin of the question
The aim of this chapter is to introduce and explain the background of the rise of the Kurdish question and Kurdish nationalism. The ethnic history of Kurds is important for further developments in the last century. A brief ethnic history of Turks is introduced as well. Also, a short overview of the problem of the treaty of Sevres and Lausanne, that caused the later problems, is introduced in this part.
4.1 Ethnic history of Kurds
The Kurdish ethnic group, which numbers between 30- 40 million peo• ple, is the world largest ethnic group without an own state. (Saeed 2014, 79) Today they live mainly in Iraq, Iran, Syria, Turkey and other Middle Eastern states, such as Afghanistan or Lebanon. There are also big dias- poras in Europe. According to Institut Kurde de Paris there was no exact census carried out for members of Kurdish diasporas. However, accord• ing to this institut the biggest diaspora is in Germany, followed by France and the Netherlands. This information is based on the data from 1995, but the difference between the states was so big that it can be assumed that in these states there are still the biggest diasporas. (Paris n.d.) From a historical point of view "Kurds are the products of years of evolution stemming from tribes such as Guti, Kurti, Mede, Mard, Car- duchi, Gordyene, Adianbene, Zila and Khaldi, and the migration of In- doEuropean tribes to the Zagros mountain some 4,000 years ago." (Yildiz and Muller 2008, 4) This old ethnic group is mentioned in several "an• cient" works. The fist one of them is said to be a book Anabasis by Xeno- phon. He mentions there that he went through the area of Carduchians, who are living in the mountains, are brave and are good fighters in wars. (Xenophon n.d.) Even though in Yildiz and Muller's book it is written that Kurds are mixed up by all the mentioned tribes including Carduchi, Xen• ophon, resp. Heinrich Kiepert in his Manual of Ancient Geography writes that Kurds are actually Carduchians. Most probably the truth is some• where in the middle, because the origin of Kurds as mentioned dates 4000 years back, when there was no written evidence. In Kiepert's Manual he also mentions that the Kurdish ethnic group is divided into tribes. (Kiepert 1881) It is not only him, but also current
19 20 ORIGIN OF THE QUESTION authors mention the Kurdish tribes. Some of them suggest that even to• day the Kurdish society in the area of Kurdistan is still divided into tribes and that "it is estimated that there are over 800 tribes in the Kurdish re• gions." (Yildiz and Muller 2008, 4) At that time the Jwaideh's book was written, as well as today, Kurds occupy a very important area of the Mid• dle East, the stability of which stands also on the behaviour of Kurds. But their behaviour is important not only for the stability and the security of that particular area, but for the entire Middle East. (Jwaideh 2006, 5) The area of Kurdistan is a politically key area of the Middle East because of its geographical location. What is more, the area is also im• portant due to the fact that it is rich on natural sources, especially oil and water. For this reason, throughout the history and in the present was crucial to have power over this area. During the time of the Ottoman Em• pire, the area of Kurdistan was part of the emipre, but Kurds enjoyed a certain amount of freedom. (Jojic 2018, 50) Kurds were and still are an important "nation" of the Middle East It can be assumed that they were a dreaded nation, because they were given autonomy by the Ottoman Emperors. This was an expression of re• spect, but this arrangement was ruined by the First World War. After the war when it came to the establishment of new states, no one was paying attention to Kurds. After the First World War, when the Turkish nationalists won in the newly established republic of Turkey, they were treating Kurds as "Mountain Turks" who forgot their "Turkishness". (Zeydanlioglu 2008, 7) There was a massive Turkification over the Kurdish people during the last century. While this process can seem easy to be done, it was a very difficult one with Kurds, because a product of the Turkification is for ex• ample the PKK (Saeed 2014, 98) Butthis pressure during the whole cen• tury brought results. Some Kurds were assimilated and do not think about themselves as Kurds anymore, and some of them are afraid to ex• press their Kurdishness, because it could result in economic, social or po• litical consequences. (Saeed 2014, 81) However, there are Kurds who were not assimilated and who do not fear to express their Kurdishness. They still believe in the idea of their own autonomous country, or at least area, and they are seeking so• lutions for their nation to achieve that goal. Many of them are Kurds liv• ing mainly in the Kurdish diasporas in Europe. They are also important for the solution of the Kurdish question, because they spread in Europe the idea of free Kurdistan within the Turkish state.
20 ORIGIN OF THE QUESTION 21
Although "in unstable states, Iraq and Syria, Kurds managed to achieve and increase their autonomy, in the case of the strong Turkish state, their reach is quite limited. Moreover, Turkey is willing not only to limit Kurdish efforts domestically, but also to decisively involve into Kurdish attempts in neighboring states." (Jojic 2018, 60)
4.2 Ethnic history of Turks
Ancestors of today's Turkish people who belong to the group of Turkic peoples, were nomads, living in the area of what we call now Anatolia. (Coene 2009, 77) Some authors suggest, that the nomadic tribes of Tur• kic people came to this area from China. (Leiser 2006, 837) The majority of the Turkic people were followers of Tengrism, a central Asian religion characterized by shamanism, although there were also followers of Nes- torian Christianity and Buddhism. For this reason, as non-believers, Turks were sold to the Muslim world as slaves, during the Muslim con• quests. (Leiser 2006, 837) The term "Turks" with the connotation as we know it today, can be used approximately since the establishment of the republic of Turkey in 1923. Before that time the word "Turk" or "Turk" was meant "by the elite city-dwelling Ottomans as a socionym to refer to the rural Turkish-speaking populations of Rumelia and Anatolia with the strong connotations of class-based disdain." (Szurek 2013) When the heterogenous Ottoman Empire became "a prison of na• tions", the movement of the Young Turks was formed. They have formed in order to call for reforms of the system in the Ottoman Empire. Their goal was to be a liberal opposition to the Ottomans absolutism. (Ergil 1975, 26) They wanted to be closer to Europe. What is important to note, that not everyone who lived in Ottoman Empire was Muslim and not every Ottoman Muslim was a Turk. How• ever, after the new republic of Turkey was established, the vast majority of people living inside the borders of the new Turkish republic identified themselves as Turks. Also, it is written in the Turkish constitution that "everyone bound to the Turkish State through the bond of citizenship is a Turk." (Constitution of the Republic of Turkey Article 66) However, the fact that the majority of the people identified themselves as Turks, might be the result of a massive Turkification that started in 1913. (Jwaideh 2006,104)
21 22 ORIGIN OF THE QUESTION
4.3 History of the question
Kurds were living together with other nations under the Ottoman Em• pire for centuries. However, they enjoyed a certain amount of freedom given by the Ottoman emperors, because Kurdistan (at that time a prov• ince of the Empire) had an important geographic and natural resources situation and the emperors wanted to have a good relationship with them. Another reason for this was the fact that Kurds guarded the bor• ders of the Empire, and in return they received this "benefit". (Arakon 2014,140) Although the relations of Kurds and the rulers were primarily neu• tral, after 1839 the emperor started to move Kurds to the different parts of the empire, because he thought that by dispersing the population around the empire he might help to solve the economic problems of the empire. Also, their semi-autonomy was abolished. After this act Kurds started to realize that they should not be treated like that. There was also "the Revolt of Sheikh Ubeydullah of 1880, which can be considered as one of the first nationalist awakenings of the Kurdish movement" (Ara• kon 2014,141) Even though Kurds were inlateryears issuingtheir own nationalist newspaper called "Kurdistan", thus showing their national• ism, their other revolts from that time can not be, from today's perspec• tive, labelled as nationalist, but rather ethno-nationalist or religious. However, while it might be called ethno-nationalism, the principles remain the same. This kind of nationalism occurs during the first years of democratization of a non-democratic country, when the ethnic group did not have a chance to create its own political and administrative insti• tutions, such as political parties. And in this case the only thing that moves the nationalistic groups forward is a common base of ethnic tra• ditions. (Snyder 2000,112) This was the case of Kurds. The factor, that was slowing down the process of the Kurdish na• tionalist awakening was religion. "The Kurds had been part of the Sunni Muslim core -along with Turks and Arabs- of the multiethnic empire." (Arakon 2014, 140) This "roof" above all the nations was holding them together. But it did not last forever, because after the Young Turk revo• lution in 1908 religion was being pushed backwards. In the first 20 years of the 20th century a part of Kurds supported the Young Turks, a political reform movement, because they saw in their liberal ideas a chance to achieve a goal of gaining more autonomy.
22 ORIGIN OF THE QUESTION 23
However other segments of Kurdish society were not satisfied with the recent developments, because the Young Turks wanted a secular liberal state, while the Kurds preferred a non-secular state. Sadly, those who supported the Young Turks were disappointed, because soon after the revolution, the Young Turks started to imprison Kurds. (Arakon 2014, 142) During the First World War, the religious Kurds started to spread nationalistic ideas among the rural areas of Kurdistan. At the same time, they demanded reforms from the Young Turks movement, so that the Kurdish language would be accepted as an official language or that they would gain more autonomy. (Arakon 2014, 143) But instead of this, the Young Turks started the process of Turkification that was ongoing through the whole last century. The process intensified in the time be• tween the two world wars, when in Europe there was a strong fascist movement with the slogan "one state, one nation, one party, one leader." This "motto" impressed the Turkish leaders, especially Mustafa Kemal. (Arakon 2014,145) After the First World War, the allied powers were not sure about how to proceed in the question of the now former Ottoman Empire and the newly created territories, because each of the allied powers wanted to have an influence in this region. However, in 1920, the Treaty of Sevres was signed by allied powers and Turkey, and this treaty was in accord• ance with Woodrow Wilson's 14 points. Based on this treaty, specifically articles 62 - 64, Kurds should have "the right to a homeland and (later with full) self-determination in government". (Durham 2010,252) It was agreed that Kurds will "remain under the Turkish flag with complete au• tonomy granted." (Durham 2010, 81) Even if it seemed that Kurds might be satisfied with what they will gain based on the Treaty of Sevres, not all of them wanted to have their autonomy. "When European imperialists tried to create a Kurdish state at Sevres, many Kurds fought alongside Ataturk to upend the treaty." (Danforth2015) Nevertheless, the Treaty of Sevres was never ratified. The national• ist war of independence was going on in Turkey and a new government was formed. The new government with Mustafa Kemal in the leading position, also referred to as Ataturk, did not agree with the conditions of the treaty. The allied powers wanted to resolve the problem of the Mid• dle East as quickly as possible, thus they sought a new solution for the
23 24 ORIGIN OF THE QUESTION treaty. Finally, they came up with a new treaty of Lausanne. (Durham 2010,90) The terms of the treaty of Lausanne were not as favourable as the terms of Sevres. (Jojic 2018, 50) "The (Turkish) interpretation of the Treaty of Lausanne did not recognize any groups other than non-Mus• lims as minorities. Thus, the new republic essentially rejected the exist• ence of the Kurds." They actually considered all Muslims to be the same nation. Therefore, Kurds can not be distinguished from Turks, even though there was a difference in language and in ethnic and cultural fea• tures. (Arakon 2014,143) Turks referred to Kurds as "Mountain Turks" who forgottheir "Turkishness." (Zeydanlioglu 2008, 7) Turks made their own interpretation of the Lausanne treaty, because "Lausanne's provi• sions concerning language rights (art 39/4, 5) have largely been ignored or violated in connection with Muslim linguist minorities such as the Kurds." (Kuru and Stepan 2012, 68) Concerning the Kurdish language, it was not affected only by the Treaty of Lausanne, but also by the Turkish constitution. It prohibited the "expression, dissemination, and publication of opinions in any lan• guage other than those of the first official language of the states recog• nized by the Turkish state." It can be seen as aimed at Kurds, because the Kurdish language is not an official language of any state in the world. However, it is the second official language in Iraq. (Kuru and Stepan 2012,151) This part of the constitution was abrogated in 2001. Thus, the Kurdish question began with the establishment of the Turkish republic and the treaty of Sevres and the treaty of Lausanne re• spectively, and continues on since that time.
24 TURKISH-KURDISH CONFLICT - RECENT HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 25
5 Turkish-Kurdish conflict - recent historical background
In this chapter it will be described how the relations between Kurds and Turks developed throughout the years. Important events of the last 20 years of the last century will be introduced as well as events until the begin of the rule of the AKP in 2002. This chapter is divided into war and peace (ceasefire) time periods based on the ceasefire declared by both sides, but mainly unilaterally by the PKK The division is inspired by the book PKK: Coming Down from the Mountains by Paul White. (White 2015) The starting point of this chapter is a year 1984, when the first attacks against the Turkish armed forces occurred. The final point is the general election in November 2002.
5.1 War: August 1984 - March 1993
In 1980 there was a military coup in Turkey. This coup was the result of a long economic crisis, that led to the constitutional crisis. For a short time, the country was without a president, and this opportunity was seized by the Turkish Army, led by Kemal Evren. The parliament was dis• solved, the constitution was abolished, only to be replaced by a new one in 1982, according to which Evren was to be pronounced president. (Grewal2018,12) Opponents of the new military regime, as well as Kurdish activists, were imprisoned. This behaviour led to the rise of the PKK. "Analysing the rise of the PKK in the 1980s, Kurdish intellectual Altan Tan claims thatthe brutal 1980 coup was the primary factor explaining popular sup• port for the PKK." (Tezcur 2009) The repression of Kurds was supported by the new constitution is• sued in 1982. Based on this constitution certain civil rights of the minor• ities were restricted, such as a right of free speech. The Kurdish language was banned from being spoken in public as well as in private conversa• tion, and freedom of assembly was curtailed. (Zürcher 2017, 306) How• ever, according to the constitution Kurds had the same rights as Turks did. But this could happen only in the case that Kurds do not claim their cultural and ethnic/linguistic rights. Therefore, they could be equal only in the case that Kurds are denied rights. (Taspinar 2005, 97) This
25 26 TURKISH-KURDISH CONFLICT - RECENT HISTORICAL BACKGROUND repression led to the series of protests and self-immolations that were aimed to raise the attention of the public to what is happening to the mi• norities in Turkey. However, in 1991 as part of the liberalization of the political system and democratization, it was allowed by the government to speak the Kurdish language in private conversations again. (Zürcher 2017, 296) In August 1984, the PKK, at this time already a guerrilla organiza• tion, started an attack on Turkish gendarme stations in the south-east part of Turkey. According to a former commander of the attacks, "the goal was not to kill soldiers, but instead to break the link between the soldiers and the people". (Marcus 2007, 81) By people he meant the local people, who had a connection to the army. The former commander also stated that by these attacks they, the PKK, wanted to gain respect from those people and wanted to give those people a trust in them. (Marcus 2007, 81) This event is taken as the start of the armed conflict between Kurds, the PKK specifically, and the Turkish government. In this period the Soviet Union, that was an inspiration for the leftist PKK, collapsed. In 2001 Öcalan said that this was the time when he thought about the need of bringing a new concept of understanding the state. (Öcalan 2011, 56) Therefore, the movement decided to come up with a new approach in understanding the nation state and national struggle. They were slowly moving from their demands of a fully inde• pendent Kurdish state to the Kurdish autonomy without stating what form it should take. (White 2015) However, the idea of the ideal solution was made up by Öcalan while being in a prison, after he was imprisoned in 1999. In March 1993 Öcalan announced the unilateral ceasefire, be• cause he understood that the violent solution for the Kurdish question is not the path Kurds should take. (White 2015)
5.2 War: May 1993 - August 1999
The ceasefire was ended in May 1993 with killing of 33 unarmed Turkish soldiers. (White 2015) They were traveling unarmed in an unmarked bus through the remote areas controlled by the PKK. The bus was not marked because the Turkish army had a fear that the soldiers might be killed, but it still happened. Some of Kurds suggested that bus was sent on purpose to provoke the PKK guerrilla to action, and to break the ceasefire.
26 TURKISH-KURDISH CONFLICT - RECENT HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 27
However, Ocalan made it clear that this event was not authorized by the leadership of the PKK. (Marcus 2007, 214) The area of the PKK operation grew into Europe, in order to raise awareness of the public. In June 1993 pro-PKK Kurds, some of them even armed, stormed the Turkish consulates in Bern (where one Kurd was shot dead), Marseille and Munich, where they took embassy personnel hostage. (Crawshaw 1993) The hostage-takers demanded that the Ger• man chancellor give a speech on the TV, in which he will condemn the Turkish war against the Kurds, otherwise they shoot the hostages. (Spigel 1993) "More or less simultaneously, many Turkish banks and travel agen• cies were attacked in major German cities, causing heavy damage. Per• haps realizing that it had gone too far, the PKK's front organization in Europe claimed that these actions had all occurred 'spontaneously'. Nev• ertheless, strong suspicions arose that these actions had been orches• trated by the PKK from outside Germany." (White 2015) After these incidents, the French and German governments banned the PKK in November 1993. In addition to the PKK, a pro-PKK cultural centre in Frankfurt was closed under the ban. These steps pro• voked more demonstrations, as well as an occupation of the aforemen• tioned centre. (White 2015) In July 1993 the Kurdish political party "People's Labour Party" (HEP) was banned because "HEP's aims resembled those of the terror• ists." (Marcus 2007, 7) But other authors suggests the party was banned, because they promoted the Kurdish culture. (Ozbudun 2013) However, the ban was not done based on the events in Europe, as this issue had been discussed at the court for nearly a year. Also, during this period, by 1994, "Turkish state officials had real• ized that an exclusively enemy-centric approach would never succeed." (Plakoudas 2015) They decided to try to disconnect the PKK from its sup• porters among Kurds. The way they did it was, that "villages in the moun• tains were evacuated and then destroyed in an effort to cut off the PKK from its bases. Some 500 villages were emptied by the end of 1993 and, in 1994,900 more followed. By 1996 the total was 3000." (Zurcher 2017, 308) The Turkish officials also tried to break the PKK - Kurdish network by giving Kurds "the official recognition and conceded limited cultural rights" by Turkish state, so the Kurds do not need to support the PKK in the fight for the Kurdish rights anymore. (Plakoudas 2015) The new Turkish government, elected in December 1995, promoted major
27 28 TURKISH-KURDISH CONFLICT - RECENT HISTORICAL BACKGROUND reconstruction programs in Eastern and Southeastern parts of Turkey, where the majority of Kurds live. "At the same time, however, the state sought to obliterate the PKK" (Plakoudas 2015) In December 1995 elections in Turkey were scheduled. In order to give a newly elected government time to express the (hopefully peaceful) attitude towards the Kurdish question, the PKK declared a unilateral ceasefire. (Gunes 2012,134) However, despite positive approach by the PKK, the ceasefire was not honoured by the Turkish side. The Turkish army continued with at• tacks against the PKK and the Kurdish civilians. During this time, there were also pro-Kurdish campaigns supported by the human rights organ• isations. (Gunes 2012,134) Itis now well-known that Turkey was break• ing the the European Convention on Human Rights. (McDowall 2007, 444) This was also one of the reasons why Turkey could not enter the European Union at that time. (McDowall 2007, 445) It is important to note that not only the Turkish side was breaking the ceasefire. The Kurdish side also did not stick to it. A PKK female sui• cide bomber blew herself up in June 1996. (White 2015) Although some sources suggest that she was a member of the PKK, her letter, which she earlier wrote to Abdullah Ocalan, looks like she was only a supporter of the PKK rather than a member. Therefore, it is not easy to say if it was an action managed by the PKK. She blew herself up during a Turkish mili• tary parade and she killed 10 Turkish soldiers. (PKK n.d.) Even though the supporters of Kurds and the idea of their auton• omous territory, as well as the supporters of the PKK, brought an inter• national interest to this topic at the events such as a demonstration in Dortmund in 1996. (White 2015), (Cowell 1996) But it sadly did not bring any positive change in the actual Turkish - Kurdish conflict. After 1996 the PKK found itself loosing the conflict with the Turk• ish government. The Turkish strategy to disconnect the PKK from its sup• porters worked. The movement as well as the Turkish side were experi• encing massive casualties as a consequence of the conflict It was esti• mated that until 1999 there were more than 35,000 deaths on both sides. (McDowall 2007, 442) The movement was already banned in Germany and in 1997 the PKK was labelled as a terrorist group by the US government. (State n.d.) In February 1999 the PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan was caught in Kenya in what he called "an international plot" (White 2015) In March of the same year, he was imprisoned and sentenced to death. In August 1999
28 TURKISH-KURDISH CONFLICT - RECENT HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 29 he called his followers in the PKK to come to the ceasefire and end the armed struggle. (Marcus 2007, 286) On 1 September 1999 a PKK unilat• eral ceasefire began as Ocalan ordered from his prison cell. (White 2015)
5.3 Ceasefire: September 1999 - November 2002
The ceasefire that started on 1 September 1999, was ordered by Ocalan from the prison. In 2002 it was decided that the verdict over Ocalan will be changed and he will be sentenced to life-imprisonment instead of death. It was done as part of Turkey's legal reforms to prepare for Euro• pean Union membership. (Marcus 2007, 296) During the time Ocalan spent in the prison, he thought of new ideas about how the Kurdish autonomy may look like. He was introduced to ideas of the radical municipalism theorist Murray Bookchin, and while reading his work Ocalan became enthusiastic about the idea of "demo• cratic confederalism". Ocalan came to the conclusion that "democratic confederalism" offers an answer to the Kurdish question, because this way it may help to "establish Kurdish national rights, while sidestepping the elusive, bloodstained goal of Kurdish statehood." (White 2015) Ocalan stated in 2010 that, 'whereas Marx accepted the nation-state, I do not The reason for the crisis in Europe is the nation-state structure and its mentality.' (Ocalan 2010) As a consequence, Abdullah Ocalan started debates about democratic confederalism among Kurds. According to Joost Jongerden this was a real 'paradigm shift in (Kurdish) politics.' (Jongerden 2012, 4) What was interesting on Bookchin's theories for Ocalan was the fact that they were in fact leftist, similar to Ocalan's polit• ical thinking. According to Bookchin, the system of community organiza• tion is highlighting its societal aspect When the confederalism is in the most developed form, it will become a full 'autonomy', where factories and farms are in local municipal hands. In this way, the community is in• dependent and manages its economic resources, thus these resources are not controlled by the state, but by the confederal councils. Therefore, things and resources are "neither collectivized nor privatized, it is com• mon." (Bookchin 1990) These theories are attractive for Kurds, because it might solve their problem of not having their own territory. The theories are leftist, be• cause according to them, everything is common, and everyone is
29 30 TURKISH-KURDISH CONFLICT - RECENT HISTORICAL BACKGROUND responsible for the run of the community. What was also attractive for Ocalan is the fact that gaining autonomy can be done in a non-violent way. The fact that Ocalan, at that time still head of the Kurdish separatist movement, came up with a new strategy on how to achieve the Kurdish autonomy, affected the PKK In the first five years of Ocalan's imprison• ment, and the ceasefire period simultaneously, the PKK underwent "a profound ideological and political transformation." (Plakoudas 2015, 9) The "committee of senior politico-military officials" ruling in the name of Ocalan had accepted Ocalan's ideas and followed them. It meant that the PKK "abandoned earlier maximalist ideas (such as separatism) and em• braced the idea of "democratic autonomy" (democratic confederalism, autonomy was the highest stage of it). (Plakoudas 2015, 9) Some of the PKK members did not believe in the new direction of the PKK and wanted to leave the movement However, it was dangerous for them because they were under a threat of possibly being killed. (Marcus 2007, 289), (White 2015)
30 TURKISH-KURDISH CONFLICT DURING THE RULE OF THE AKP 31
6 Turkish-Kurdish conflict during the rule of the AKP
The aim of this chapter is to introduce the Turkish - Kurdish conflict dur• ing the rule of the AKP. This chapter begins with the success of the AKP in the elections in 2002 and ends with the presidential elections in 2018. The division of this chapter is inspired by the book PKK: Coming Down from the Mountains by Paul White as well as the previous chapter. (White 2015)
6.1 Ceasefire: November 2002 - June 2004
In 1999 Turkey was recognized as a candidate for the EU-member- ship, but in the next years the status was not about to be changed, also due to the financial crisis. In 2 002 it was clear that the EU is not going to accept Turkey as its member in 2004. (Zürcher 2017, 339) However, in 2004 the EU started the accession talks with Turkey. (Cengiz and Hoff• mann, Introduction 2014,2) Even though in May 2002 the PKK was listed as a terrorist group by the EU, it did not have any relation to the fact that Turkey will not be accepted to the EU. In May 2014 the PKK brought a legal action against the EU for adding them to the terrorist list and wanted to annul the EU decision. However, in November 2018 the EU General court came to a conclusion that the PKK should remain on the terrorist list (The PKK vs. Council of the European Union 2018) During this period the "Justice and Development party" (AKP) was established. It was founded as a democratic and conservative movement in 2001. (Britannica 2019) In 2002 the party won the election, even though the leader of the parly and later the prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan was in a prison for inciting religious hatred, because he had re• cited a poem from the Young Turks era that compared mosques to bar• racks, minarets to bayonets. (Zürcher 2017, 338) The parly won the election with the majority of popular votes and therefore "gained an absolute majority in parliament." (Zürcher 2017, 338) There are two reasons for such a success of a relatively new parly. Firstly, the fact that people in Turkey wanted to punish the previous gov• ernment with the involved parties. They wanted to punish them because they blamed them for the deep economic crisis of 2000/2001. And
31 32 TURKISH-KURDISH CONFLICT DURING THE RULE OF THE AKP secondly, the AKP had a charismatic leader, with whom many people could identify. (Zürcher 2017, 339) The new government with the AKP wanted to enter the EU, but for this they needed to meet the so-called 'Copenhagen criteria'. For this rea• son, they passed new laws that would democratize the country. (Zürcher 2017, 340) One of the reforms in 2004 was that education in Kurdish language would be allowed, but only in private schools. (Zürcher 2017, 361) However not many Kurds were able to attend these schools, be• cause they could not afford the classes or adults did not have time for it So, the schools were closed a few years after they were opened. (Marcus 2007, 294) What is more, the demands of Kurds are to nationally recog• nize and accept the Kurdish language without any restrictions. Thus, the step of only allowing to teach Kurdish language in private schools was not satisfying. (Marcus 2007, 294) Therefore, the PKK, which during this period underwent an ideolog• ical change and changed names several times as well, was not satisfied with the dialogue between the Turkish and Kurdish side and was frus• trated by the slow political movement on the Kurdish question. There• fore, Ocalan called an end of this ceasefire. (Marcus 2007, 295)
6.2 War: June 2004-March 2013
The ceasefire was ended by the PKK due to the lack of dialogue between Kurds and the Turkish government, and due to the fact pronounced by the PKK, that the state was continuing to attack their forces. (White 2015) "Armed clashes between Kongra-Gel2 and Turkish security forces recommenced in late 2004, proceeding on an escalating scale into 2005." (White 2015) The number of clashes between Kurds and Turks, and attacks on public had an increasing tendency. From 2006, there was a sharp in• crease not only in the number of clashes, that were reported weekly, and in the number of dead on both sides, but also of bomb attacks in Turkish big cities. Hitherto an unknown organization, the Freedom Falcons of Kurdistan (TAK), possibly a PKK offshoot (Marcus in her book states that
2 Kongra-Gel (Kurdistan People's Congress) is the name that PKK adopted in October 2003, before they return to the name PKK in April 2005. (Marcus 2007, xii]
32 TURKISH-KURDISH CONFLICT DURING THE RULE OF THE AKP 33
TAK and the PKK are linked), claimed responsibility for those bomb at• tacks. (Zürcher 2017, 361), (Marcus 2007, 295) The level of violence was still increasing, and it did not affect only the armed forces but also civilians. "In March 2006, after 14 rebels were killed by Turkish soldiers, masked youth rioted in Diyarbakir (south-east Turkey), shutting down much of the city for three days with stones, Molotov cocktails, and burning tires." (Marcus 2007, 295) On the one hand, some former sympathizers of the PKK were horrified by the violence, which was aimed not only at state offices but also at local shops and banks; on the other hand, they were not surprised, because they thought this could had been expected. (Marcus 2007, 295) Even though Kurds are consistent in their demands (autonomy, language recognition), in 2006 they added one more. When a Turkish court turned down Ocalan's request for a new trial in 2006, his supporters claimed that without Ocalan being free, there can be no solution to the Kurdish problem. (Marcus 2007, 297) Part of the Kurdish question is an economical gap between Kurds and Turks, that is caused by the fact that the state investments do not flow into the south-east of Turkey, where the majority of Kurds live. This problem grew bigger during the economic crisis of 2008/2009. The Kurdish part of Turkey was "under-underdeveloped" and it was about to remain the same for the next years due to the crisis. (White 2015) After the crisis, in 2010, in several factories the workers went on strike. Thanks to this strike they were guaranteed a pay rise. (White 2015) As it was mentioned, the Kurdish south-east part of Turkey is economicaly disadvantaged. However, after these strikes, when the region became more stable, the (corporate) investments started to flow into this part of Turkey. Thus, it is not easy to say if it is a mistake only of the state that money does not flow into this region, or if it is caused by more factors, such as the unstability of the region. As it was mentioned, the number of conflicts between Kurds and the government was since 2006 increasing. Even if Turkey was waiting for the EU membership, thus should be trying to make their conditions better, the opposite was true. According to the EU annual reports released after 2006, the reform process in Turkey has slowed down tremendously. (Cengiz and Hoffmann, Introduction 2014, 2) Because of the facts that the AKP reforms were stagnating and the dialogue between Kurds and Turks was not going on, Kurds were dissapointed, the AKP lost out to the Kurdish "Democratic Society Party"
33 34 TURKISH-KURDISH CONFLICT DURING THE RULE OF THE AKP
(DTP) in the 2009 local elections. Perhaps due to the loss and will to gain the popularity again, perhaps due to the EU requirements for the membership, the AKP started the so-called "Kurdish Opening." The first step of this initiative was that "34 PKK members were officialy allowed to enter Turkey from their Iraqi bases in November 2009." (Cengiz 2014, 170) But in the following years the repression of Kurds and Kurdish organizations continued unabated. In the spring of 2009 criminal investigation was launched, followed by several waves of arrests of 8000 people (according to Cengiz it was only 5000 people), against the Union of Communities in Kurdistan (KCK) and its members. The arrested people, among them were intellectuals, members of parliament or journalists, were accused of being the members of the PKK, because the government considers the KCK as a part of the PKK. And they were arrested under the anti-terror legislation. (Cengiz 2014, 170), (Zürcher 2017, 361) "In the same year, 2009, the Kurdish party DTP was banned for pursuing separatist aims, after which its former members joined the new "Peace and Democracy Party" (BDP) in 2010." (Zürcher 2017, 361) But not only that the party was banned, but the members of it were arrested, in total it was around 1400 arrested members. (White 2015) It only can be argued, if it is a coincidence that the DTP was banned in the same year when they won the election over the AKP. Even though the Kurdish question might be debated on the political level, regarding this topic the public was polarised. It was mainly because of the secularism-religion cleavage, as well as the Kurdish-Turkish cleavage. According to a KONDA (Turkish company specialised in public opinion polling) study from 2010 "57.6 percent of Turks do not wish to have a Kurdish bride or spouse, 53.3 percent a Kurdish business partner, and 47.4 percent a Kurdish neighbour." Among the Kurds the numbers were also considerable "26.4 percent do not want a Turkish bride or spouse, 24.8 percent a Turkish business partner, and 22.1% a Turkish neighbour." (Ozbudun 2013, 94) Such a behaviour and intolerance among the public will definitely not lead to a peaceful solution of the Kurdish question. (Ozbudun 2013, 94) Although the Kurdish Opening was declared only two years back, in 2011 the prime minister Erdogan "refused to acknowledge the existence of the Kurdish problem in Turkey, advocating instead that there was a terror issue caused by extremist Kurds." (Cengiz 2014, 170) But Kurds were not represented only by the extremist Kurds, but also by the
34 TURKISH-KURDISH CONFLICT DURING THE RULE OF THE AKP 35 peaceful parry BDP. It was also their effort that in November 2011 Erdogan recognized the Dersim massacre3 on the anniversary of this event. (Aylin 2012, 23) This step was a positive move forward in the Kurdish-Turkish relations. At the same time as part of the Kurdish Opening it was allowed to BDP members to visit Ocalan regularly in prison to receive his instructions for the negotiations with the Turkish government Even if in Turkey Ócalan was described as a terrorist and mass murderer, the AKP government stuck to this peace orientation and got Ócalan to support the Kurdish Opening as well. As already mentioned, the AKP wanted to make a progress in the Kurdish question, because they thought that such a progress might help them to gain a significant power for the government Even if the fighting still continued with shortperiods of truce, in the years 2012 to 2014 it became clear that the ceasefire might come. (Zurcher 2017, 361), (Cengiz 2014,168) Even though some authors mark the whole Kurdish Opening initiative as ill-fated (Cengiz 2014, 172), others can see the success that the Kurdish opening brought. It brought changes in several rights for Kurds:
"1) the use of formerly Kurdish titles for districts was permitted; 2) legal barriers for speaking Kurdish during prison visits were eliminated; 3) Kurdish language and literature departments at various universities were established; 4) giving Kurdish names to Kurdish children was permitted; 5) TV channels broadcasting in the Kurdish language were allowed" (Aylin 2012,17)
3 Dersim massacre is a series of Kurdish rebellions during 1937 and 1938 that were brutaly suppressed by the Turkish government This massacre resulted with thou• sands of deaths. (Kieser 2011]
35 36 TURKISH-KURDISH CONFLICT DURING THE RULE OF THE AKP
6.3 Ceasefire: March 2013 - July 2015
At the end of 2012 started the peace process, but the negotiations about it went secretly for longer time. On 4 January 2013 the prime minister's adviser on Kurdish affairs pronounced that the government has a goal of a 'final settlement' with Kurds. However, few weeks later it was also published that military operations against the PKK would continue until it disarmed. The official ceasefire started by Abdullah Ocalan's declara• tion on 21st May 2013, when the Newroz (Kurdish New Year) is cele• brated. (White 2015) Even if the Turkish government was involved in the peace process, it seemed that not all the segments of the government accepted it. In January 2013 there were three prominent members of the PKK shot dead in Paris. The later investigation showed that these deaths were assasinations and might have served as a provocation to provoke the PKK action. Indeed, it provoked the PKK action, but it did not ruin the ongoing peace process. (White 2015) Other event, that served as a provocation and as a possible obstacle on the way to the peaceful solution of the Kurdish question, was a bomb attack in Ankara. The target of the bomb attack in March 2013 was the AKP building where prime minister Erdogan has his office. Some authors suggest that this attack was a revenge for three killed members of the PKK in Paris. Other suggest that it was done by the same group of people that killed the PKK members in Paris. But the attack was done with intenstions to damage relations between Kurds and Turks. (Agency 2013 ), (B. News 2013) However, none of these events influenced the peace process and the ceasefire started on the Newroz. In March 2014 there were municipal elections in Turkey. The AKP won them with almost half of the votes. The campaign of the AKP continued until August of the same year, when there were first direct presidential elections. The AKP candidate Erdogan won the elections with more than 50 percent in the first round, giving no chance to his two rivals (one of them was a Kurdish candidate). In this elections Erdogan gained the votes from Kurds as well, because they saw in this a chance to solve the Kurdish problem. They saw him as a chance, because in that time his rhetoric was still slightly pro-Kurdish. (Zurcher 2017, 359), (Ozbudun 2014)The fact that he gained votes from the Kurdish voters was a result of his previous campaign of the Kurdish opening. His
36 TURKISH-KURDISH CONFLICT DURING THE RULE OF THE AKP 37 presidential campaign was targeted at the future, with unspoken promise that he will continue the same way with the same orientation he did until that time. (Seymour 2014) Even if there was a success of the Kurdish political parties at the mu• nicipal level, in the general elections they were never successful. What was a problem for them to be elected into the parliament, was the Turk• ish electoral proportional representation system with a national thresh• old of 10 percent of the popular vote for parties. This system heavily dis• criminates minor parties, especially those ones which are elected region• ally (in this case in the south-east of Turkey). (Ozbudun 2013,131-132) However, this system was adopted in 1990s to reduce a chance of nation• alist political parties to be elected into the parliament The d'Hondt method allows to form stable governments, because it neither favours the party with the majority of votes, nor gives smaller parties dispropor• tionate power. However, the problem of this method is that it prefers big• ger parties against small ones, who usually do not have enough votes to cross the electoral threshold for entering parliament In Turkey, a party is currently required to get more 4.6 million votes to enter the parlia• ment; although it makes most voters to prefer larger parties to the smaller ones. "For Turkey, the system traditionally had the dual benefits of preventing a fragmented parliament and locking the Kurds out of the political system." (Sazak 2015) Although the electoral system is not favourable for (pro-)Kurdish parties, in the general elections in June 2015, the pro-Kurdish party HDP, with alleged link to the PKK, gained seats in the parliament It was the first time ever that the Kurdish party entered the parliament. (Zürcher 2017, vii) Due to the gain of the HDP, the AKP lost seats and did not have the required amount of them to form a one-party government. (Sazak 2015) Erdogan, at this time already a president, saw the success of the HDP as a betrayal. Although he standed for the peaceful solution of the Kurdish question since 2009, after the AKP lost the majority of seats in the parliament, he denounced the Kurdish politics. (Zürcher 2017, vii) One of the reasons of the HDP success was the behaviour of the Turkish government that truly exasperated the Turkish public, especially Turkish Kurds. Earlier that year, when the mostly Kurdish town of Kobani in Syria was under attack of the Islamic State, the Turkish government did not help to defence this town even though it is almost at the Turkish-Syrian borders. (Zürcher 2017, vii)
37 38 TURKISH-KURDISH CONFLICT DURING THE RULE OF THE AKP
In July, month after the elections, the Kurdish-Turkish relations started to escalate again. There was a bomb attack on Kurds going to help to rebuild Kobani of whom 34 were killed. The crime was commited by the Turkish (some sources suggest that Kurdish) Islamic State militant As a revenge the PKK killed two Turkish policemen. The Turkish reaction came soon afterwards, Erdogan "ordered the Turkish Air Force to start bombing both IS positions in Syria and PKK positions in northern Iraq." (Zürcher 2017, viii) However, some sources accused the AKP that they caused the conflict on purpose, so they will gain more votes from voters of other parties in order to instal the ceasefire again. (Girit 2015) After this event, that was the end of the ceasefire, the war between the PKK and the Turkish government escalated quickly. The war was no longer limited only to the mountains, but the fighting was done mostly in the cities in the south-east part of Turkey, where the majority of Kurds live. (Zürcher 2017, viii)
6.4 War: July 2015 - June 2018
Even if the pro-Kurdish party HDP gained seats in the parliament, there was almost no possibility of creating a coalition. On the one hand, the d'Hondt method is useful, because it prevents the situation when the parties are not able to make a coalition, but on the other hand it is discrimination against small parties, such as Kurdish ones. Moreover, the attempts to create a coalition were sabotaged by the AKP. This sabotage was ordered by the president, even though he was supposed to be above party concerns. (Zürcher 2017, viii) The other parties did not want to create a coalition, because it was not clear if the HDP had a connection to the PKK or not, or the orientation of the parties was far distant from the orientation of the HDP. Due to the inability, supported by the president, to form a new government, the new elections were announced to be held in November 2015. It was no wonder that people voted the AKP more than in the previous elections, because in the time of the war escalation and the general political instability, the AKP was a sign of stability. (Zürcher 2017, viii) However, the pro-Kurdish HDP party still managed to get enough votes to enter the parliament. The newly formed government did not incline to solve the Kurdish question. In the parliament there was a coalition of the "Nationalist
38 TURKISH-KURDISH CONFLICT DURING THE RULE OF THE AKP 39 movement party" (MHP) and the AKP created. Even though the MHP highlights in their program, that they will secure the basic rights and freedoms (MHP n.d.), they extremely refuse the Kurdish demands on the own territory, because those basic rights apply to Turks only. Their program promotes the "great Turkish Nation," saying that "Nationalist Movement never accepts any goals that are not for the benefit of the nation." (MHP n.d.) The party is also admiring the politics of Mustafa Kemal, whose politics was not favourable in terms of Kurds as well. After the AKP won the November elections with the majority of votes, the rhetoric of president Erdogan became more hostile towards Kurds. When there was a possibility of creating an independent Kurdish area in Syria, almost at the Turkish borders, Erdogan was not excited by it. He was postponing chances of creating an autonomous area of Kurds in Turkey, so an autonomous area almost at the borders was almost a nightmare for him. Since the first elections in July 2015 the violence in Turkey was rising. Almost everyday in the following months there was someone killed in this conflict. (Pearson and Tuysuz 2015) However, the numbers of casualties are changing according to the source. According to the International Crisis Group there were 1,761 people killed on both sides during one year of the conflict since July 2015. (Mandiraci 2016) However, the same source states that both, the PKK and the government, are exaggerating the numbers of people they killed. According to the government and the PKK there would be almost 7,000 casualties. (Mandiraci 2016) But the conflict between Kurds and Turks did not stay only within the borders. Turkey admitted that in July, they attacked the PKK base camps in Iraq (Yeginsu 2015) as well as they attacked the PKK in Syria. (Zurcher 2017, viii) The fact, that the government was fighting against the PKK, caused that every time there was a bomb attack the PKK was the one to be blamed. Even if there was an attack on Kurds, the PKK was marked as an offender. (B. News 2015) After the further escalation, when south-east of Turkey turned into a war zone, Erdogan and his regime became very unpopular in the West due to the repression of Kurds. But he did not mind, because during the year after the November elections his political orientation, and consequently orientation of the AKP and the pro-government media, turned against the West. (Zurcher 2017, x)
39 40 TURKISH-KURDISH CONFLICT DURING THE RULE OF THE AKP
The AKP approach towards the Kurdish question prior the November 2015 elections was that the conflict needs to be "desecuritize through non-military means." (Hughes 2015) This approach changed after the elections and the government started again the open conflict Even though the result of both 2015 elections showed, that the Kurdish question needs to be solved on the political level and not by the military means, the government used the force anyway. A mistake by the AKP was that they thought giving certain rights to Kurds will solve the whole problem. However, it was not truth, because giving Kurds their rights was only a small part from their demands. The fact that in both elections the pro-Kurdish HDP gained more than the required 10% of votes showed that people do not think that their demands were fullfiled and that they support the peaceful way of solving the problem. (Hughes 2015) In 2018 during the presidential elections campaign, Erdogan made a massive campaign in European countries, trying to convince Turks living there to vote for him. Altough during his previous presidential campaign, his main slogan was "unity" and after he was elected, he stated that he "will be the president of 77 million" (Letsch 2014), his rhetoric changed until the 2018 campaign. He proclaimed that it is necessary to fight with Kurdish separatists as well as with the Islamic state. With these words he put both of them on the same level. (Jazeera 2018) He left his pro-Kurdish politics, because the coalition with the nationalistic MHP brings stability, thus it brings him more political influence than if he would insist on a support of solving the Kurdish question.
40 PERSPECTIVES 41
7 Perspectives
During the 21st century Turkey tried to make positive steps towards the Kurdish ethnic group in Turkey. This approach was done mainly because of the two factors. First, that Turkey wanted to join the European Union and to be able to join it, Turkey needs to have the minority groups issues solved along with other problems. And second, the ruling AKP can see that they might gain political points by being a party for masses (including Kurds). However, since the accession talks with Turkey were suspended in 2016 (Parliament 2016) and since the AKP is in a government coali• tion with a nationalist party, they do not need to try to solve the minority groups problems, even if solving those problems might help the Turkish economy as money would not have to be invested in the military to fight with the PKK It is estimated that until 1999 the Turkish government in• vested more than 10 billion US dollars annually in the war with the PKK. (McDowall 2007, 444) Also, even if the ruling party AKP would agree on the aim to help to solve the Kurdish question in order to gain political points, there are also other parties in the government to (dis-)agree with it Party such as the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) is not interested in solving this issue, because it is not part of their programme. Who also is not interested in solving the Kurdish question are the United States and Russia, because they have allies and certain power over this region, while making a new arrangement might destroy it. (Shen 2018) In the book Modern History of Kurds from 2004, David McDowall expresses an opinion that at "that time" it was the best chance for Turkish Kurds to achieve a federal arrangement (democratic confederalism) with "the benefits of self-rule with the advantages of remaining part of a larger economy and society." (McDowall 2007, 462) However, this was written during the longest period of the ceasefire be• tween Turks and Kurds ever. Also, it was during the time when Turkey wanted to join the European Union, nevertheless that changed with the freeze of the EU accession talks. Today, in 2019, it seems that the possibility of having autonomous Kurdish territory is not high. To the contrary, the chance is almost zero because in the last years there was no progress in the Kurdish-Turkish relations, even if both sides showed that they are able to negotiate about
41 42 PERSPECTIVES their topic. However, during last fewyears the behaviour of Turkish state towards Kurds became more hostile again and it seems that in the near future it will not change. (Ozcan 2019)
42 CONCLUSION 43
8 Conclusion
The Kurdish question is a problem between Kurdish ethnic group and states they live in, but mainly Turkey. The question, that is based on a historical, political, social, cultural, economic and nationalistic background, had begun with the end of the First World War, when the new map of the world was being created. In the new arrangement of the world there was supposed to be a place for Kurdistan, that Kurds had right to create based on the right of the national self-determination. This should had been sealed by the Treaty of Sevres, which was however never ratified. Instead of this treaty was created a new Treaty of Lausanne, which did not recognize the rights of Kurds. Thus, Kurds remained trapped in the newly established republic of Turkey. During the second half of the last century, the pressure on Kurds was rising until the point when the Kurdish separatist movement PKK became a militant guerrilla group and in 1984 started a semi-open conflict against the Turkish government. During the 1990s the conflict became international, because the conflict was transferred also to Europe, where are big Kurdish diasporas. This decades long conflict is still going on with short periods of ceasefire. Even if the AKP government is since 2002 doing certain positive steps towards Kurds, such as allowing to use the Kurdish language at the court, they are still not successful in finding a solution for the Kurdish question. Both of sides are actually not capable of finding the common ground and making a deal. Kurds are not raising their demands, they are still consistent regarding this topic. But it seems unacceptable for the Turkish state to leave their territory for Kurds, so they can create a democratic confederalism. When Turkey was endeavouring to gain the EU membership, it was the time when Kurds were closest to the solution of the Kurdish question ever. However, solution for Kurds is a long way off as well as the Turkish EU membership.
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