Introduction

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs

Elections in Political Infighting and Strategic Interests of Great Powers

Elkhan Nuriyev* SWP Comments

Two years after being elected President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, finds himself facing a mounting domestic political crisis. In the parliamentary election held on 6 November 2005, both the opposition and Western election observers recorded serious procedural violations and instances of election fraud. The government continues to maintain that all the conditions for fair, transparent, and democratic elections were fulfilled. After all, international organisations had made efforts to ensure that this was the case well in advance of the elections themselves. The , the most important external player in the region, let it be known that any attempt to tamper with the elections would prompt an unequivocal response on its part. But whereas international attention paid to the elections has focussed on the power struggles between the government and opposition forces, the dynamics within the ruling elite should not be neglected. Indeed, in the run-up to the elections, clear fault lines had formed within the government camp.

In October 2003, two months before his the Minister for Economic Development, death in December that same year, Heydar Farhad Aliyev, who—probably not only for Aliyev, who had ruled the country with an unselfish reasons—pushed for economic iron fist since 1993, made sure that his son reforms. So whilst foreign observers con- Ilham would succeed him. Ilham Aliyev’s tinued to focus largely on a confrontation rise to power triggered a fragmentation in between the government and the oppo- Azerbaijan’s political power structure with sition, the domestic political situation was some members becoming engaged in open actually being shaped more by the bitter conflict. Indeed, the ruling elite split up struggle between the various groupings more markedly than before into influential that had formed within the government groups, and battles ensued to gain the ear camp. of the President and his closest aides. There The tension mounted as the parliamen- was nothing subtle about the clash between tary election drew nearer. The leading the Chairman of the State Customs Com- opposition parties became more vocal and mittee of Azerbaijan, Kamalladin Heydarov, the divisions between government factions a known hardliner of the ‘old guard’, and grew ever clearer. The leaders of the oppo-

* The author, currently working as a DAAD-OSI Research Fellow at SWP, leads the Centre for International Studies SWP Comments 58 in Baku, Azerbaijan, where he is also Professor of Political Science at Western University December 2005

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Map of above’ than ‘from below’. In late October Azerbaijan 2005 there were growing indications of a power struggle within the government, culminating in a purge at the highest levels which came as a surprise to many. A joint declaration issued by the Ministry of National Security, the Ministry of the Interior, and the General Public Prosecu- tor’s Office spoke of ‘uncovering a plot’. The alleged leader of this conspiracy was identified as former Parliamentary Speaker Rasul Guliyev, a former brother-in-arms of who had fallen out with his one-time comrade and emigrated to the

Source: © Spiegel online, 2005. United States because the Azerbaijani authorities had issued a warrant for his sition threatened a ‘colour revolution’ if arrest on allegations of embezzlement and the government failed to guarantee fair and corruption. just elections. The ruling elite suppressed Along with Guliyev, other senior repre- all attempts by the opposition to stage anti- sentatives of the government and the government protests and rallies in central country’s most influential oligarchs were Baku, the capital of Azerbaijan. Some high- accused of having mounted a coup and ranking officials, who had publicly stated financing the opposition. This round-up of their loyalty to the President and supported troublemakers peaked when measures were the governing party, unofficially estab- taken against disloyal followers, including lished contacts with the opposition. The the dismissal and arrest of Minister for closer the day of the elections came, and Economic Development Farhad Aliyev (who the clearer it became that the population is not a relation of President Aliyev), Health was expecting a ‘colour revolution’ to take Minister Ali Insanov, Chief of Presidential place, the less these officials attempted to Affairs Akif Muradverdiyev, and Rafik conceal their sympathies for the opposition Aliyev, the CEO of Azpetrol, the biggest movement. Whilst the security forces oil company in the Southern Caucasus. did everything they could to prevent any In addition, the authorities in Azerbaijan destabilisation, the leaders of the opposi- tightened their control over domestic tion were convinced that a revolution was affairs and stepped up their surveillance the only way of toppling the Aliyev regime of all the country’s strategic assets. and gaining power for themselves. Many people were astonished to see Consequently, the political process in such a young President—who had pre- Azerbaijan cannot merely be characterised viously been thought of as weak—strike as a power struggle between the govern- so firmly. Some observers even found Ilham ment camp represented by the party “New Aliyev’s actions reminiscent of his father’s Azerbaijan” and the opposition block style of rule. There is the possibility that dubbed “Freedom”, but also as a conflict the President feared powerful ministers between factions within the ruling elite. and oligarchs since they had considerable amounts of capital at their disposal and enjoyed good standing within social and A Conspiracy political circles. Evidently he also feared within the Ruling Elite? that influential members of the govern- In actual fact, the latest turbulence in ment striving for more radical reforms Azerbaijan has more likely come ‘from might go over to the opposition. Indeed,

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Aliyev did find himself faced with a rather abroad. Azpetrol is one of the most success- tricky situation in which some prominent ful companies in the region and earns mas- figures might have been prepared, under sive dividends not just for its owners, but certain circumstances, to join the oppo- also for the state. Since the former Minister sition in a bid to force a ‘changing of the for Economic Development Farhad Aliyev guard’, or at least weaken the President’s and his brother Rafik Aliyev—who until powers. recently headed up Azpetrol—are now out At the same time, Aliyev’s preventive of the picture, the holding will probably measures against influential factions with- either fall into the hands of a new oligarch in the government shifted the balance of or be nationalised. power and upset the longstanding political Clearly, Aliyev felt that he had become equilibrium within Azerbaijan. So the a hostage of the representatives of his purge of individuals undertaken in October father’s ‘old guard’, who may have sought duly triggered a political crisis. Such major to topple him at the next best opportunity. political upheavals shortly before the par- In that sense, he can be viewed as the victor liamentary election, in addition to the in the first round of a power struggle, i.e., official accusations levelled against minis- as a President who managed to tighten ters and oligarchs supposedly out to seize his control over the top political echelons power, speak volumes about the relations in the period leading up to the elections. within the ruling elite. Those who stand Nonetheless, the ruling elite still contains accused of preparing a coup against the numerous representatives of the ‘old current President have probably already guard’, though they will have to step down been found guilty, and it is not difficult to sooner or later and make way for politi- imagine the methods that might be used cians belonging to a younger generation. to conduct the investigation or guess how objective they might prove to be. Having said that, the purge did enhance The Opposition the President’s public image and damaged In recent years the opposition in Azerbaijan the opposition parties by establishing links has become increasingly resolute in its between Guliyev, corrupt members of the attempts to induce radical change in the government, and opponents of the regime. country and has developed a scenario of a However, the standing of the government change of government by revolution. On party “New Azerbaijan” suffered a severe two occasions, once before and then also blow because all the high-ranking officials immediately after the presidential election who had been arrested had belonged to it. held in autumn 2003, opposition leaders In the end, when former Health Minister launched an unsuccessful bid to bring Insanov confessed to his involvement in the down the regime, but unlike the ‘Rose coup, many supporters of the ‘old guard’ Revolutionaries’ in neighbouring Georgia, were chased out of the governing party. they failed to garner any substantial sup- Now there is no ruling out the possibility port from outside the country. After the that ‘clean-up measures’ will continue until presidential election, which was manipu- all key posts in the country have been filled lated to ensure a smooth changeover and with new faces loyal to the President. maintain the ruling Aliyev regime, the Most likely, a new battle for the redistri- authorities smashed the opposition, which bution of the private property of the former had simply run out of time. Those in ministers and oligarchs will begin. The government used every conceivable method major holding, Azpetrol, will no doubt be at their disposal to gain influence over the the most sought-after prize, since it has domestic political situation in Azerbaijan. infrastructure and sells almost 70 per cent Subsequently, the leading opposition of all petroleum products in Azerbaijan and parties took a long time to get back on their

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feet again and barely managed to mount a acterised by widespread electoral fraud. challenge in the local elections held at the International organisations and leading end of 2004. Yet the defeat of the opposi- Western powers called upon the Azer- tion did not result in the disappearance of baijani authorities to make sure that the protest voters amongst the electorate. The election was “fair and free”. This encour- weakened opposition parties continued to aged the opposition to take an active role bide their time and saw their next oppor- in the political arena once again. Con- tunity in the parliamentary election sequently, the start of the election cam- scheduled for November 2005. paign was overshadowed by confrontation, Already long before the start of the with members of the opposition being election campaign, violent debates arose arrested, demonstrations in the streets within the opposition about the new being prevented, and protests being elections to the legislative assembly. The brutally suppressed. three most active opposition parties— Under pressure from the West, the the People’s Front, Musavat (Equality), and authorities softened their approach and the Democratic Party—formed the opposi- the tension dissipated somewhat, espe- tion bloc Azadliq (Freedom). Two of the cially after the President issued some parties are led by former parliamentary decrees in May 2005 aimed at improving speakers: Musavat by Isa Qambar and the electoral practices. But whilst the public Democratic Party by Rasul Guliyev, who generally welcomed these decrees, the lives in exile in the United States. In opposition remained distrustful and voiced October 2005 he was unable to return to substantial doubts about their actual Azerbaijan after being threatened with implementation. The regime managed to immediate arrest if he tried to enter the weaken the radical opposition by issuing country. The People’s Front is led by the those decrees, carrying out the aforemen- young, reform-minded opposition politi- tioned purge at the highest levels of power, cian Ali Kerimli. Together with their and above all by claiming that disloyal parties, these men constitute the radical government officials had financed the opposition to the governing elite. opposition and plotted to bring down A few prominent politicians have joined the government as well. All this diminished another opposition bloc which calls itself the threat of a ‘colour revolution’ in Azer- Yeni Siyaset (New Politics). These included baijan. the former , Ajaz The small, poorly organised, and insuffi- Mutalibov, who is living in Moscow, the ciently funded opposition proved no match former Chairman of the National Inde- for the ruling elite. At the same time, the pendence Party, Etibar Mamedov, and the opposition committed a serious error. Al- female leader of the National Unity Move- though it only had minimal resources at ment, Lala Shovket Hajiyeva. During the its disposal, it once again failed to put up election campaign, her movement decided a united front when it went into the elec- to work together with Azadliq. Yeni Siyaset tions and failed to thrash out a single moderately opposes the Aliyev regime, no political strategy for the elections that longer calling for the fall of the President, would have enabled it to propose a co- but insisting on sweeping political and herent, meaningful political platform. socio-economic reforms. Azadliq meanwhile For instance, the opposition forces find it is working towards a change of power and very hard to agree on the country’s ap- hoping for support from democratic forces proach to foreign policy, with some groups in the West. As early as at the start of the advocating closer ties with , and election campaign, some representatives others arguing in favour of a resolutely announced that there would be a ‘revolu- pro-Western policy, and in particular a pro- tion’ if the parliamentary election was char- American foreign and security policy. But

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opinions differ over domestic policy as well, less important than their actual outcome. especially as regards certain tactical aspects Whilst voting went off peacefully, the of the opposition’s policy. political situation already started hotting Another weakness of the opposition up the next day when the Central Election stems from its lack of an ideological basis Commission announced its preliminary which could assist in helping the electorate result, which gave the ruling party 63 view it as a convincing alternative to the of the 125 seats in parliament and the government currently in power. On top of opposition bloc Azadliq 7 seats, with the this, some prominent opposition leaders remaining seats going to independent like Isa Qambar and Rasul Guliyev are candidates and smaller pro-government burdened by their political track records, parties. This result would have given the for when they were in power in the early ruling party a solid majority and denied 1990s, Azerbaijan was in the throes of the opposition even a blocking minority. political and economic chaos, and the However, in 10 electoral constituencies, clash with over Nagorno-Karabakh the results of an exit poll conducted by the was characterised by military failures. Even American consulting company PA Govern- though the events of the early 1990s have ment did not tally with the official election already been forgotten by the majority of result. people and many young Azerbaijanis today The opposition immediately declared are mainly concerned about the spread of the results of the ballot a fraud and corruption in the country, the opposition demanded new elections. Their leaders has not managed to capitalise on opportu- publicly declared that they would fight nities to mobilise the people against the resolutely and jointly for their constitu- regime on any large scale. For even though tional rights, but employ only peaceful it is supported by pro-Western social groups means to do so. The authorities rejected inclined to mounting protests against the claims of widespread election violations government and demanding democratisa- and issued assurances that voting had gone tion and a pro-Western stance for Azer- off without any problems. Nonetheless, baijan, the opposition cannot fall back OSCE observers and observers from other on sufficiently broad popular support to international organisations that had closely prompt any potential ‘colour revolution’. followed the elections on 6 November also Furthermore, the situation in Azerbaijan voiced grave criticisms. After initially fundamentally differs from the conditions remaining silent, the US State Department in Georgia or Kyrgyzstan, where the also issued an unexpectedly scathing state- security forces shunned a violent confron- ment. American and European observers tation with the population, ultimately concluded that the proceedings had not forcing the ruling elite to step down. In complied with international electoral Azerbaijan the secret services and security standards and called upon the Azerbaijani structures are totally controlled by the authorities to investigate and report back government and determined to crack down on any violations that had occurred. Once as hard as they can on any attempted again the Election Observation Mission of uprising. the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) refused to comply and recognised the elections as democratic and in line with Election Day and legal requirements. International Reaction But in the end, the sheer mass of inter- The elections held on 6 November were a national criticism prompted the Central tough test for the Azerbaijani authorities. Election Commission to repeat the elections Right from the start it was clear that the in 10 constituencies where the official way the elections were held would be no results had proved particularly dubious.

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Only when major protests against the Caucasus, Azerbaijan has become a election results were organised in the geopolitical bridgehead for the United centre of the capital did the government States in a strategically important region take its first steps towards investigating where the spheres of influence of the major election violations. In addition, the Presi- powers overlap. Azerbaijan is particularly dent dismissed a few officials who had been important to the United States for several involved in manipulating the outcome of reasons: for use of the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan the ballot. Presumably, separate negotia- pipeline to secure oil exports from Azer- tions between the government and oppo- baijan and Kazakhstan, for helping to sition blocs will be launched, mediated by resolve the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, Western diplomats, to prevent any up- for setting in motion sweeping democratic heavals reminiscent of those that took processes, and for possibly stationing place in the winter of 2003. American mobile forces on Azerbaijani The more elements which contest the territory. official election result, the more encour- US interest in Azerbaijan intensified aged the opposition feels to form a nation- even more when American troops were wide democratic front against electoral ushered out of Uzbekistan. This incident fraud. But does Azerbaijani society really impacted on the balance of power in the want fresh elections? Judging from the region and also influenced President widespread apathy amongst the population Aliyev’s foreign policy course. Just recently, and the low level of democratic , two American radar stations in Azerbaijan the answer would appear to be negative. near the Russian and Iranian borders Both the pressure exerted on Aliyev’s became operational. What is more, a mili- government by the West and criticisms of tary centre has been set up in Baku that is his regime have clearly intensified. This, capable of monitoring all shipping and too, has prompted the opposition to appeal aircraft transport in and over the Caspian to voters to insist that they exercise their Sea. The growing dominance of the military legitimate rights. The serious errors com- component in US-Azerbaijani relations is mitted by the government and widespread also reflected in the frequent visits to Baku election violations associated with voting by US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld have left no other option to the opposition and other American officials. Most impor- leaders. If the opposition persists with its tantly, the Pentagon—which would like to demands, the authorities could very soon expand US military cooperation with Azer- find themselves in a complex situation that baijan—has nothing to gain from any could trigger a serious political crisis. change in the status quo in this South Future events will be determined not only Caucasian country. by what the opposition does, but also in- At the same time, Russia too is making creasingly by how the government con- major efforts to increase its influence in ducts itself. Another decisive factor will be Azerbaijan. In the post-Soviet territory, the political behaviour of the superpowers, Russia traditionally plays an ‘anti-revolu- for Azerbaijan is of strategic interest to tionary’ role, serving as ‘the power that both Russia and the United States. maintains the status quo’, and Azerbaijan is no exception. Moreover, Vladimir Putin and Ilham Aliyev enjoy cordial relations. An Positions and Interests of important principle for Russia is that Aliyev Great Powers should not allow the United States to have The United States in particular has any military bases on Azerbaijani territory extensive geopolitical and geo-economic that would serve to protect the Baku– interests in Azerbaijan. Just as Armenia Tbilisi–Ceyhan oil pipeline or exert pres- was always a Russian outpost in the sure on neighbouring Iran. The desire on

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the part of the leadership in Baku not to euphoria has evidently dwindled to sober spoil its relations with either Moscow or realisation. Consequently, Washington has Tehran places it in somewhat of a dilemma, no wish to see fresh chaos erupt in Azer- having to manoeuvre between Moscow and baijan, for that could cause serious prob- Washington on the one hand, and between lems with respect to the aforementioned Tehran and Washington on the other. oil pipeline and make already high oil It is surely no coincidence that in the prices even higher. What complicates the final phase of the election campaign, two situation further is the fact that since high-ranking foreign visitors travelled to Azerbaijan boasts extensive oil deposits, Baku. The first was Sergey Lebedev, the many observers view the United States’s Director of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence reluctance to tackle problematic events Service, and the second was US Assistant there as a political concession to oil Secretary of State Daniel Fried. Both men interests. conducted talks behind closed doors with President Aliyev in which it is alleged they discussed the domestic political situation. Outlook for the Future It does not take much imagination to guess It looks as though Azerbaijan is in for a that the ostensible reason for Lebedev’s turbulent end to the year. If the opposition visit was to support the President in his opts to set out on the political path taken attempts to prevent a ‘colour revolution’ in by the leaders of the ‘Orange Revolution’ in Azerbaijan, whereas Daniel Fried’s visit was Ukraine, for example, the situation will no doubt meant to dissuade Aliyev from escalate in early 2006. President Aliyev faces taking any further tough measures, at least two basic alternatives: either he can allow against the opposition, if not against dis- re-elections to be held in some constituen- loyal staff. By acting in this way, the US cies—which could result in the leaders of administration is not so much helping the opposition landing in parliament after the opposition as using it to influence the all—or he can make no concessions and run President. Given the intensified power the risk of provoking a fresh wave of struggle in the wake of the elections, confrontation and possible mass protests. Washington would like to retain its in- However, one thing is quite clear: fluence in Azerbaijan. To all appearances, Today’s Azerbaijan needs a new strategic the United States is striving to come up vision, aimed at bringing about drastic with an evolutionary model for inducing political change, extensive freedoms, and political change there. Under such a model, a radical reform of the government in the the opposition could receive one-third of post-election period. President Aliyev will the seats in parliament and work together manage to stay in power if he can persuade with the liberal members of the ruling strategic investors that nobody else can party to help the President liberalise the guarantee stability and initiate democratic political system and bolster the country’s reforms in Azerbaijan. At the same time, economic reforms. the opposition also has a chance of coming It is patently obvious that the United to power if its leaders can credibly convince States is not interested in any destabilisa- the United States and other Western tion of the domestic political situation in democracies that they have the broad sup- Azerbaijan. It may have sought to weaken port of the population and are therefore the authoritarian regime, but did not set in a position to guarantee stability in the out to overthrow the government. Just country. lately, Washington appears to have under- The most likely scenario at present is as stood that ‘colour revolutions’ can be follows: The political situation will develop destructive, as the events in Kyrgyzstan under the control of the current ruling have shown; the United States’s initial regime. If an internal battle is waged to

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redistribute power and property, with the corresponding political and economic con- sequences, both Washington and Moscow will actively intervene to end it and both will work together to shore up and con- solidate Azerbaijan’s stability. So far, in spite of growing European interest in Caspian energy sources and pipeline projects, the European Union has not yet played any particularly prominent role in Azerbaijan. Furthermore, the Euro- pean community needs to become more consistent in its deployment of political tools and be more connected to the activi-

© Stiftung Wissenschaft und ties of the EU member states there. If it Politik, 2005 managed to seize the full range of political All rights reserved opportunities open to it—ranging from

SWP diplomatic efforts to regional programmes Stiftung Wissenschaft und like TRASECA (Transportation Corridor Politik German Institute for Europe–Caucasus–Asia) and TACIS, and the International and provision of active support in resolving Security Affairs conflicts—such actions would go a long way Ludwigkirchplatz 3−4 towards fostering stability and encouraging 10719 Berlin Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 development in Azerbaijan and throughout Fax +49 30 880 07-100 the region. In the context of its neighbour- www.swp-berlin.org hood policy, the European Union should [email protected] make various efforts to ensure long-term ISSN 1861-1761 stability, for example: by implementing transnational economic projects, actively supporting far-reaching reforms designed to promote the rule of law, combating corruption and organised crime, and developing the market in Azer- baijan. To this end, it needs to back con- structive forces, both within the opposition and in the government, mainly counting on people who are prepared to cooperate to reform the country and ensure its integra- tion into the European community in the long run.

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