Introduction
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Co m ments
The Military and Egypt’s Trans- formation Process WP S Preservation of the Military’s Reserve Domains Chérine Chams El-Dine
The military’s withdrawal from Egypt’s day-to-day politics after it had assumed power in the wake of Hosni Mubarak’s ouster did not put an end to its role in the political process. A tacit agreement seems to have been reached between the President – affili- ated with the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), the political wing of the Muslim Brother- hood – and the military leadership. While the military institution keeps its reserve domains, it has also become a mainstay of Mohamed Morsi’s regime. This backdoor deal – confirmed by the new Egyptian constitution, signed into law by the President on 26 December 2012 – also poses a great challenge to Egypt’s transformation process, as it leaves the military unaccountable to elected civilian bodies.
On 12 August 2012, Mohamed Hussein assumption of office by Morsi – who would Tantawi, then Minister of Defence and support his intended reshuffling of the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, army command. These senior officers were and his Chief of Staff, Sami Anan, as well as unsatisfied with what they considered other senior military officials, were sent to Tantawi’s mismanagement of the transi- retirement. This incident is quite signifi- tional period, which damaged the mili- cant in understanding the nature of civil- tary’s national image, institutional inter- military relations in the aftermath of the ests, and affected the army’s performance. election of President Mohamed Morsi, in Exploiting an attack by some militant office since 30 June 2012. What looked like groups on an Egyptian border post in a return of the military to its barracks Northern Sinai that killed 16 Egyptian appears more like a negotiated arrange- security personnel, Morsi dismissed the ment upon closer examination. As a start- most powerful generals across the security ing point, President Morsi had reached out sector, namely the head of the Presidential to high-ranked members of the Supreme Guard (Naguib Mohamed Abdel Salam), the Command of the Armed Forces (SCAF) – in head of the General Intelligence (Murad power between the overthrow of President Muwafi), and the head of the Military Police Hosni Mubarak in February 2011 and the (Hamdy Badin). By removing these central
Dr. Chérine Chams El Dine is a Fellow in the project “Elite Change and New Social Mobilization in the Arab World” realized by the SWP Comments 6 Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP). The project is funded by the German Foreign Office in the framework of the transformation February 2013 partnerships with the Arab World and the Robert Bosch Stiftung. It cooperates with the PhD grant program of the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung and the Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung.
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security figures, he intended to secure the known as the “military’s economy”, which Presidency against possible reactions from grants him decision-making power over a the “street” orchestrated by the removed substantial part of Egypt’s economy. This Minister of Defence or his close associates. military’s economy consists of five main All senior officers sent to retirement with elements, namely: the annual defence Tantawi (almost 200 in total, 5 of them budget (EGP 25.5 billion or US$ 4.3 billion, SCAF members) had not been informed and around 5.2% of the 2011/2012 budget); ahead of time of such reorganisation of the US military assistance (US$ 1.3 billion military command. This reshuffling within received annually by the Armed Forces, the army command, on the one hand, com- usually in-kind since the aftermath of plied with the military institution’s inter- Egypt’s peace treaty with Israel in 1979); nal rules, as promoting Abdel Fatah al-Sisi – arms deals (import and limited export of former head of the Military Intelligence – weapons and ammunition); the factories to the rank of Minister of Defence and run by the Arab Organization for Industri- Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces alization (AOI) under the supervision of the mandated sending to retirement all more Ministry of State for Military Production; senior officers within the army command. and the National Service Projects Organiza- On the other hand, it was used as an occa- tion (NSPO), directly overseen by the Minis- sion to get rid of Tantawi’s supporters try of Defence. and some of the most unpopular military The official rationale behind the mili- figures involved in the crackdown of tary’s economic activity has been budget protests during the transitional period. relief, based on the argument that the The reorganisation of the military com- military’s self-sufficiency allows Egypt to mand and the appointment of a new and maintain large military structures without younger military leadership could have placing pressure on state finances. Initially been considered a fresh start, one in which created by President Anwar al-Sadat in the military would have accepted to be sub- 1975, the AOI provided a base from which ject to a gradual increase in civilian over- arms manufacturing, as well as household sight, a sine qua non feature of any transition appliances production, flourished in the towards a democratic system. Achieving 1980s. The NSPO, also established by Sadat, more democratic civil-military relations in 1979, runs exclusively civilian projects. would entail addressing some problematic Its budget is managed by the Minister of issues between civil and military actors, Defence and its profits are transferred to namely the military’s economy, military an undisclosed bank account. Such civilian trials of civilians, and questions related activities made the army an integral part to transitional justice as well as Egypt’s of Egypt’s development efforts through the national security/ foreign policy formula- armed forces’ involvement in the recon- tion. However, in all these areas, little pro- struction of Egypt’s infrastructure – dam- gress has been made towards more trans- aged by the war against Israel – under the parency and civilian oversight since Pre- late 1970s’ slogan “one hand builds and sident Mohamed Morsi assumed power. another carries an arm”. At the same time, Moreover, the new Egyptian constitution, it was Sadat’s strategy to reduce the army’s approved by 63.8 per cent of the voters in involvement in politics while rewarding it a highly controversial referendum, has con- through the expansion of its role in domes- firmed the military’s exceptional status. tic economic production. Thus Sadat, and Hosni Mubarak after him, transformed the military from an active protagonist in the The military’s economy Egyptian political arena into a power oper- The Minister of Defence retains supervisory ating in cooperation with the President to control over a wide variety of activities advance their respective interests.
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The Armed Forces started their civilian tary assistance. The military institution re- economic activities with agrarian projects, sponded harshly to such demands, stressing land reclamation, and civilian public works that the army’s economic projects are off- contracts. They then gradually expanded limits and expressed its readiness to fight and diversified their fields of activities for them. through a multitude of income-generating This stance was in line with the obvious enterprises to include tourism/hotels, con- resolve to keep significant decision-making struction, maritime transport, production powers over military matters that the SCAF of petrochemicals, as well as environmental had made explicit on more than one occa- projects such as wastewater treatment and sion during the transitional period. This renewable energy. The military institution was expressed most clearly in November is keeping the aforementioned activities 2011, when an official committee headed completely secret, using “national security” by Ali al-Selmi, then Deputy Prime Minister as a pretext. For example, none of these for political affairs, issued a document that companies is listed on the Egyptian stock would have established a number of “supra- market. constitutional principles”. In essence, the However, the activities of the AOI and so-called Selmi document would have given NSPO are ubiquitous and permeate Egyp- the SCAF the sole responsibility for all mat- tians’ daily lives, namely army-produced ters concerning the Armed Forces, espe- brands such as “Queen” pasta and “Safi” cially with regards to their budget, which mineral water, or the services provided by was supposed to be incorporated only as a “Wataniyya” petrol stations and military- single figure in the annual budget, and managed wedding halls. The military insti- would not be subjected to discussion in tution has thus developed a “grey econo- Parliament. These “supra-constitutional my” that is not subject to any parliamen- principles” were quickly dropped after tary scrutiny or the Central Auditing Office. strong criticism; however, the new consti- Given this lack of transparency, experts tution retained some of these provisions, come to very different assessments of the in particular with regards to the military’s military economy’s share, ranging from economy. 5 to 15 per cent of Egypt’s gross domestic While during the constitution drafting product. While these enterprises enjoy process, representatives of the opposition lucrative subsidies as well as tax and licens- proposed to keep some items of the defence ing exemptions, the revenues they generate budget secret for “national security” rea- are returned to the military’s own account sons and to discuss others in closed sessions rather than incorporated into the state’s by specialised parliamentary committees budget. (namely the Committee of Defence and After Egypt’s 25 January Revolution, National Security), none of these proposi- many voices called for civilian oversight of tions materialised in the new constitution. the military’s budget and economic activi- Moreover, in the constitutional text signed ties by the elected bodies. Others demanded into law, not a word is included on the mili- a merger of the army’s projects into Egypt’s tary’s economic activities, implying that – official public sector. This did not meet at least for the moment – they will remain with approval from the military – one rea- walled off from civilian oversight. son being that a portion of the revenue is spent on officers’ allowances, housing, and other improvements to their living stan- Military trials dards. The remainder is either reinvested or During the three months following the used to complement spending on mainte- revolution (January to March 2011), the nance, operations, and procurement not military used excessive force against civil- covered by the defence budget or US mili- ians and relied heavily upon military trials
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that imposed disproportionate sentences. ple, on 18 November 2012, Military Police These abuses were at least partially due arrested 25 civilians during an attempted to the military’s lack of experience in pre- compulsory eviction of al-Qursaya Island serving domestic order, as military insti- (on the Nile – Giza area). The military claim- tutions (military police, military prosecu- ed they were on military property, despite tion, and military courts) had replaced the a 2010 court verdict overruling previous respective civil state institutions in the eviction orders and recognising the inhabi- aftermath of the revolution. tants’ right to live and work on the island. Later on, military trials were used as a The prosecutor charged the civilians with political tool to intimidate opponents. assaulting the military and their properties, According to the head of the Military Judi- and the military trial started in early ciary, nearly 12,000 civilians were tried by December 2012. military courts from January to the end of This practice has been confirmed by the August 2011 – a figure confirmed by rele- constitutional text (article 198) in which vant civil society organisations. Most of the the military keeps its right to try civilians cases were related to ordinary crimes, but before military courts for crimes “harming hundreds of civilian activists were also the Armed Forces”. Such a vague formula- subject to military trials. Accusations varied tion leaves a wide margin for the legislator from looting to curfew violation, distur- to include various cases at the military’s bance of public traffic, sabotage of public discretion. In fact, the last constitutional and private properties, slander of the Armed draft, issued on 29 November 2012 and Forces, and offensive writings in social approved by popular referendum, back- media networks. The number of civilians tracked on earlier drafts, which clearly stat- referred to military courts has significantly ed that “no civilian shall be tried before decreased since the end of August 2011 as military courts”. a consequence of mounting pressure from civil society actors and wide media coverage of some cases. Obviously, the military took Transitional justice the decision to reduce confrontations with Popular demands have stressed the neces- civilians to improve the Armed Forces’ sity to hold military officials accountable image and reduce criticism. for serious human rights abuses committed On 6 May 2012, the Egyptian People’s during the revolution and its aftermath, Assembly approved the abolition of article including the killing of demonstrators, 6 of the Code of Military Justice. This article the excessive use of force in dispersing had allowed the President of the Republic protesters, torture during detention, cor- to directly refer civilians for trial in front of ruption, etc. To satisfy popular demands, military courts. The new text restricts the President Morsi formed in July 2012 a fact- President’s powers. However, the military finding committee to inquire into crimes retains its authority to try civilians. committed against protesters from January On different occasions, civilians tried 2011 to 30 June 2012. But the committee before military courts were granted am- was hastily formed. It is mainly made up of nesty, initially by the SCAF, and later, in representatives of the same security organs October 2012, by President Morsi, who that previously failed to provide evidence to granted a general amnesty for “crimes the court that would have made it possible committed to support the revolution” – to identify perpetrators during the 18 days a vague formulation allowing the Military of the revolution. Moreover, even though Prosecutor to exclude its application to the committee gathers evidence charging some civilians tried before military courts. military officials for crimes against peace- Despite official denials, military trials of ful protesters, according to the Code of civilians have since continued. For exam- Military Justice, all cases involving military
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personnel will be subjected to the Military tics in times of social unrest and political Prosecutor, which does not guarantee the instability. With regards to foreign policy transparency of the investigations. and national security, there is a consensus Likewise, the civilian General Prosecutor among analysts that the military institu- lacks the power to investigate allegations tion is eager to keep the country out of of corruption against army officials, as the costly wars with its neighbours, particu- SCAF amended the Code of Military Justice larly Israel, to maintain US military aid, (article 8A) on 10 May 2011 to limit pro- and to shield the army from any adventur- secution of members of the Armed Forces ous foreign policy initiatives that elected accused of “illicit gain” to military courts. civilian politicians may choose to advance. This includes retirees, which shows the par- In this respect, the situation on the Sinai ticular concern of former SCAF leaders. To Peninsula, which suffers from inadequate grant extra immunity to SCAF members, socio-economic development and has ex- President Morsi delegated, in November perienced a high level of penetration by 2012, his competencies regarding the less- Jihadist groups, is a matter of concern for ening and cancellation of sentences issued the military command. Following the against the military to al-Sisi, his Minister attack by some of these militant groups of Defence – a decision widely criticised by on an Egyptian border post in Northern opposition members, as it leaves the mili- Sinai on 5 August 2012, the military leader- tary leadership complete discretion over ship extended its anti-insurgency campaign the matter. (initially launched in August 2011 after Today, reporting about the prosecution militants’ attacks on Israel, first called of the military does not go beyond eclectic “Operation Eagle”, then “Operation Sinai”) official declarations and newspapers leaks. to crack down on militant groups in Sinai The latter were highly criticised by the and restore central authority over Egypt’s military leadership; it was dissatisfied and eastern governorate. Many Egyptian oppo- offended when a newspaper reported that sition leaders attribute Sinai’s increasing Tantawi and Anan “would be banned from lawlessness to the 1979 peace treaty with travel for charges of illicit gains”. To recon- Israel, which restricts Egypt’s military cile the army’s leaders, President Morsi presence in “Zone C” (stretching along the intervened to defend Tantawi and Anan, Israeli border) and only allows the deploy- and the head of the Supreme Press Council ment of a rather symbolic and lightly suspended the newspaper’s editor in chief. armed Egyptian police force, besides a Thus, while public pressure obliged Pre- multinational monitoring force. sident Morsi to initiate a process of transi- Parallel to the military campaign, Presi- tional justice, the measures concretely dent Morsi sent an official delegation in taken reveal a clear lack of will to push November 2012 to initiate a dialogue through these efforts and to take the risk with relatively moderate Jihadist groups. of a confrontation with the military. According to a local former Salafi MP, this dialogue failed, as the representatives of Sinai Jihadists considered the Islamist National security / foreign policy members of the delegation – negotiating orientation on behalf of the government – as “heretics” The SCAF has used a nationalist discourse – who “had made a pact with security agen- based on the Armed Forces’ “victory” in cies”. While some media reported that Pre- the 1973 war – to argue that foreign and sident Morsi asked the military command defence affairs cannot be left to civilian to stop the operations to give a chance leaders and to assert its special status as for negotiations, the military spokesman “custodian” of Egypt’s order and revolution, asserted the continuation of military opera- through its intervention in domestic poli- tions in Sinai and rejected any possibility
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for dialogue between the Armed Forces and ed by the President of the Republic and Jihadist groups. mainly composed of military figures (11 out At the same time, the Minister of De- of 16 members came from the army ranks), fence is currently engaging in a dialogue it could be viewed as a mini-SCAF. The com- with tribal leaders over land ownership in position of the National Defence Council in Sinai. Law 14 of 2012 gives the Minister of the new constitution is slightly different: Defence the responsibility of setting regu- It is still presided over by the President of lations concerning land attribution on the the Republic but composed of 14 members, Sinai Peninsula. Thus, on 24 December namely: the speakers of the People’s Assem- 2012, the Minister banned private owner- bly (lower house) and the Shura Council ship or rental of land and property in stra- (upper house); the Prime Minister; the Min- tegic locations of military importance in ister of Defence; the Minister of Foreign Sinai, which includes “Zone C” (according Affairs; the Minister of Finance; the Minis- to the 1979 Camp David peace treaty) and ter of Interior; the head of the General lands located within 5 km west of Egypt’s Intelligence Service (GIS); the Chief of Staff eastern border with Gaza/Israel. These of the Armed Forces; the Commanders of military bans would stop any land owner- the Navy, the Air Forces, and the Air De- ship by foreigners, which would seriously fence; the Chief of Operations for the affect the real estate market in the Sinai Armed Forces; and the head of Military Peninsula, where foreign investment is a Intelligence. This composition is more key factor. Moreover, this law would ban balanced than the one created by Tantawi, Palestinians and Israelis who obtain Egyp- as 6 out of 14 members are civilians. Still, tian nationality through mixed marriages the absolute majority of the military is from owning lands in the Peninsula. maintained, given that the head of the GIS Putting this land issue in the hands of the has traditionally (in the absence of a bind- Ministry of Defence highlights its crucial ing constitutional text) been a military role in the formulation of Egypt’s foreign figure, since its establishment by President policy and national security matters. Nasser in 1954. According to article 197 of the constitu- tion, the National Defence Council has the New institutional set-up exclusive prerogative to discuss the Armed Considering that for the first time since Forces’ budget, thus stripping the Parlia- 1952, the Supreme Commander of the ment – the civilian-elected body par excel- Armed Forces – the President of the Repub- lence – of the oversight over the state’s non- lic – is a civilian, the military was particu- elected entities. Hence, article 197 is highly larly keen on keeping the upper hand in controversial, as it confirms a status quo military affairs and to be consulted for all wherein the defence budget appears as one national security matters. This military single figure in the state’s budget – without claim was institutionalised by the creation, further details – not to speak of the mili- composition, and prerogatives of the Na- tary’s other economic activities, namely tional Defence Council, as well as a number their so-called economic empire, US mili- of other elements of the new Egyptian tary assistance, and arms deals. constitution. In addition to discussing the military Originally set up under President Gamal budget, the National Defence Council has Abdel Nasser and formally established by “military prerogatives”. The latter, which the 1971 constitution (article 182), the were detailed in law 86 of 1986, include National Defence Council rarely met or defining the national defence policy and exercised any discernible authority before it coordinating it with other relevant min- was revived on 14 June 2012 by Field Mar- istries’ policies; ensuring the country’s de- shal Tantawi, then head of the SCAF. Head- fence and troop mobilisation for war; and
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determining the number of troops as well constitutional text, and unchallenged by as their equipment in times of war and civilian control. peace. This council, which cannot convene or make decisions unless a majority of its members are present – that is, it can be Conclusions blocked by its military members – should For the time being, the military institution be consulted by the President before de- and the President have developed a sort of claring war or sending the Armed Forces symbiotic relationship – both cannot do outside state territory (article 146), and without each other. On the one hand, the should also be consulted for draft laws military needs the President’s support and related to the Armed Forces (article 197). cooperation to maintain its economic privi- The military’s resolve to secure its leges, its exceptional status as an almost autonomy in security and defence affairs unchecked entity, and its longstanding from civilian control was clearly expressed interest in controlling Egypt’s foreign and during the last discussions of the Constitu- security policy, at least to a certain degree. ent Assembly, which took place on 27 and On the other hand, the Muslim Brothers, 28 November 2012. Apart from insisting via the President, have been forging an alli- that the National Defence Council should ance with the military to face opposition be enshrined in the new constitution, from liberal actors, and to restore order and Mamdouh Shahin, the SCAF representative secure strategic locations in times of politi- in the Constituent Assembly, pushed for cal instability and social unrest. the creation of a second body, the National President Morsi’s affiliation with the Security Council. Muslim Brotherhood poses an extra chal- The National Security Council (article lenge that will deter him from a potential 193) is presided over by the President of the confrontation with the Armed Forces. Republic and composed of 12 members, While the FJP was founded in April 2011 namely: the Prime Minister; the speakers of to allow the Muslim Brotherhood to field the People’s Assembly and the Shura Coun- candidates in parliamentary elections and cil; the Minister of Defence; the Minister of to run for the Presidency, the Brotherhood Interior; the Minister of Foreign Affairs; the itself remains illegal. It has been banned Minister of Finance; the Minister of Justice; since 1954 but tolerated since the 1970s. the Minister of Health; the head of the GIS; Such a status of illegality means that the and the heads of the Committees of De- Brotherhood is not under any scrutiny fence and National Security in the People’s itself: Its members, its sources of funding, Assembly and the Shura Council. Among its trans-national activities, and its business the prerogatives of this predominantly empire remain unknown. The Brother- civilian council is adopting strategies for hood’s status puts President Morsi in a civil defence (article 193). rather awkward position: Attempts to sub- The creation of a National Security Coun- ject the military (or any other actor) to cil – a mostly civilian entity in charge of transparency and civilian supervision will civil defence (for example, preventing food lack credibility as long as he himself stems shortages or managing natural disasters), from a clandestine organisation. while keeping purely military prerogatives In this context, the military institution (for example, the Armed Forces’ size and proved successful in securing its interests: equipment, the military’s budget, approval The defence budget (as well as other mili- of war) in the hands of the predominantly tary affairs) is discussed in the National military National Defence Council – is an Defence Council, where the military has a indicator of the military’s will to institu- majority, and the constitution remains tionalise its control of military affairs and silent on the military’s economic projects, have its reserve domains guaranteed by the which are not subject to parliamentary
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scrutiny. The military leadership has also prehensive training in non-lethal riot-con- successfully resisted any questioning of its trol tactics, which should be provided to leaders with regard to excessive use of force police personnel. against protesters or corruption charges. Training in oversight for Egyptian parliamen- At this point, it has become apparent tarians and NGOs: The Europeans should that President Morsi and the Muslim offer specific training for parliamentarians, Brotherhood are unwilling to enter into as well as civil society groups engaged in confrontation with the military leadership security-sector monitoring to help in gradu- and thus keep the “transitional justice” file ally establishing oversight mechanisms © Stiftung Wissenschaft und on hold. The same holds for military trials, over the military institution. Politik, 2013 All rights reserved as the new constitution still gives the mili- Encouraging transparency and inclusive tary the right to try civilians before mili- national dialogue: European governments These Comments reflect tary courts in cases of harm to the Armed should encourage the Muslim Brotherhood solely the author’s views. Forces. Thus, till now President Morsi’s to legalise its status and to establish a clear SWP strategy of aiming at satisfying revolution- distinction between its resources and leader- Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik ary demands and accommodating the mili- ship and those of the FJP. They should also German Institute for tary has not worked out. Instead, inefficient encourage Egypt’s President to set up a International and Security Affairs half-measures have contributed to the accu- credible, inclusive, and transparent dia- mulation of frustration and heightened logue with different Egyptian political Ludwigkirchplatz 34 10719 Berlin popular demands. actors. Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 Addressing transitional justice and reconcilia- Fax +49 30 880 07-100 tion issues: Meeting people’s need for justice www.swp-berlin.org [email protected] Policy recommendations and accountability by addressing past Egypt needs the support of the interna- abuses and crimes committed against ISSN 1861-1761 tional community to carry on its transfor- civilians remains a highly challenging mation process, as the macro-economic issue. A failure by the Egyptian authorities picture continues to deteriorate and the to deal with it properly will plunge the budget deficit is expected to rise to EGP country into a cycle of violence and threat- 200 billion (US$ 31.5 billion) in the current en long-term stability. European Union These Comments are pub- fiscal year. While the European Union com- assistance, with regards to the transitional lished as part of the project Elite Change and mitted itself to concrete measures to boost justice file, could take the form of the pro- New Social Mobilization Egypt’s economy during the November vision of expertise and the sharing of “best in the Arab World. 2012 Task Force meeting in Cairo, little has practices” based on previous European For more information see
Stephan Roll extension of training programmes for Egyp- as well as establishing places of – or pro- The Military and the tian officers could be highly beneficial, if cedures for – remembrance. Muslim Brotherhood Will a Power-sharing these exchanges are geared towards spread- Agreement Be Reached ing democratic values. This could be a natu- in Egypt? SWP Comments 4/2012, ral entry point for stimulating gradual February 2012 military reforms. Revision of Police Academy’s training curricula and methods: Europeans should offer to sup- port a review with the aim of transforming the police into a body that serves society rather than acting as the state’s oppressive tool. This should be accompanied by com-
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