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Unmanned Aircraft Systems in the National Airspace System: Establishing Equivalency in Safety and Training Through a Fault Tree Analysis Approach

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Unmanned Aircraft Systems in the National Airspace System: Establishing Equivalency in Safety and Training Through a Fault Tree Analysis Approach Unmanned Aircraft Systems in the National Airspace System: Establishing Equivalency in Safety and Training Through a Fault Tree Analysis Approach A thesis presented to the faculty of the Russ College of Engineering and Technology of Ohio University In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Master of Science Jessica A. Belzer April 2017 © 2017 Jessica A. Belzer. All Rights Reserved. 2 This thesis titled Unmanned Aircraft Systems in the National Airspace System: Establishing Equivalency in Safety and Training Through a Fault Tree Analysis Approach by JESSICA A. BELZER has been approved for the Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science and the Russ College of Engineering and Technology by Frank van Graas Fritz J. and Delores H. Russ Professor of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science Dennis Irwin Dean, Russ College of Engineering and Technology 3 Abstract BELZER, JESSICA A., M.S., April 2017, Electrical Engineering Unmanned Aircraft Systems in the National Airspace System: Establishing Equivalency in Safety and Training Through a Fault Tree Analysis Approach (325 pp.) Director of Thesis: Frank van Graas With approval of UAS for civilian use in the National Airspace System, comes the need for formal integration. Manned and unmanned aircraft will share the same volumes of airspace, for which the safety standards must be upheld. Under manned aircraft operations, certain implicit assumptions exist that must be made explicit and translatable to the unmanned aircraft context. A formal system safety assessment approach through a fault tree analysis was used to identify assumptions contingent on a pilot’s presence inside the fuselage and areas of weakness in operational equivalency of UAS. The UAS fault tree framework developed is applicable to unmanned aircraft systems of different sizes and complexity, while maintaining a semblance to the framework accepted within the manned aircraft community. In addition, a database of UAS incidents and accidents occurring internationally 2001-2016 was developed from published materials and databases of various sources. Database events were categorized according to the UAS Fault Tree Framework Level 1 Subsystems, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Aviation Occurrence Categories, and the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS). ICAO Aviation Occurrence Category specific fault trees were constructed for the three most commonly occurring categories in the database results. Significant sources of risk for UAS operations lie in Aircraft/System and Flight Crew/Human Factors failures. Commonly occurring Occurrence Categories in the results of the UAS database were different than those identified for fatal accidents occurring in manned commercial aviation operations. Increased system reliability and 4 standardization is needed to ensure equivalent levels of safety for UAS operations in the NAS. Additionally, needs of UAS pilots are different than those for manned and model aircraft. Training requirements must be approached independently and formally evaluated for their effectiveness in risk mitigation. 5 Dedication To my friends, colleagues, and family 6 Acknowledgments Thank you to the committee members and my advisor, Dr. Frank van Graas, for serving on my committee and making my thesis possible. Additionally, I would like to thank the Joint University Program for their contribution to making this research possible. This research was funded in part through the JUP sponsored by the Federal Aviation Administration. Funding was received Fall 2014- Spring 2015 and quarterly presentations on this research were performed during November 2013, February 2014, and January 2015 at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and the Federal Aviation Administration Technical Center respectively. 7 Table of Contents Page Abstract . 3 Dedication . 5 Acknowledgments . 6 List of Tables . 11 List of Figures . 12 List of Terms and Abbreviations . 13 1 Introduction . 15 1.1 The Origins of UAS . 15 1.2 UAS and the NAS . 16 2 Background . 20 2.1 The National Airspace System and Operations within It . 20 2.1.1 UAS Operations in the NAS . 22 2.2 Problems Presented by the Introduction of Civil Small Unmanned Aircraft System Use . 24 2.2.1 Accidents and Incidents . 24 2.2.2 Privacy Concerns and the Expectation of Privacy . 26 2.2.3 Liability Concerns for UAS Operations in the NAS and Responsi- bility of the UAS Operator . 29 2.3 UAS and Model Aircraft . 32 2.4 Concerns for Civil Unmanned Aircraft System Integration into the National Airspace System . 35 2.4.1 Avoiding Other Aircraft . 35 2.4.2 Environmental Concerns . 37 2.5 System Safety Assessments and Fault Tree Analyses . 38 2.5.1 The System Safety Assessment . 38 2.5.2 The Fault Tree Analysis . 39 2.5.3 System Safety Assessments, Fault Tree Analyses, and Unmanned Aircraft Systems . 41 2.6 The Path Toward Integration of Unmanned Aircraft Systems into the National Airspace System Through a System Safety Assessment . 43 2.6.1 Achieving an Equivalent Level of Safety in UAS Operations and The UAS System-Level Fault Tree Analysis . 43 8 2.6.2 Additional ICAO Aviation Occurrence-Specific Fault Tree Analyses 45 2.6.3 Introduction to Scope and Assumptions . 49 2.7 Recent UAS Integration Developments and Operational Requirements for Flight in the National Airspace System . 50 2.7.1 UAS Developments and Flight . 50 2.7.2 Manned Aircraft Flight Requirements and Airmen Qualification . 52 2.7.2.1 Equipage Requirements . 52 2.7.2.2 Pilot Qualification and Training . 54 3 Literature Review . 58 3.1 Target Levels of Safety for Operations in the NAS: System Safety Assessments and Certifying Part 23 Airplanes . 58 3.2 On Integrating Unmanned Aircraft Systems into the National Airspace System: Dalamakidis et al. 60 3.3 Safety Considerations for Operation of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in the National Airspace System . 64 3.4 An Evidence Theoretic Approach to Design of Reliable-Low Cost UAVs . 67 4 Methods . 70 4.1 Fault Tree Analysis . 70 4.1.1 Scope of the Fault Tree Analyses . 71 4.1.2 Assumptions for the Fault Tree Analyses . 71 4.1.3 Fault Tree Development Procedure, References, and Objective . 73 4.1.4 Introduction to the Fault Tree Analysis Results . 75 4.1.5 ICAO Aviation Occurrence Category-Specific Fault Tree Analyses: Selection and Objectives . 77 4.1.6 General Resolution Objectives for the Fault Tree Analyses . 81 4.2 Database Creation and Categorization . 83 4.2.1 Database Categorization Taxonomy 1: UAS Fault Tree Framework Subsystem Level 1 Category, and the UAS Fault Tree Framework . 84 4.2.2 Database Categorization Taxonomy 2: ICAO Aviation Occurrence Categories . 88 4.2.3 Database Categorization Taxonomy 3: Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) Unsafe Acts . 89 4.2.4 Definition of Accident and Incident Terms in the Context of the Database . 92 4.2.5 Data Sources, Collection Procedure, and Data Boundaries . 94 5 Results . 100 5.1 Database Results . 100 5.1.1 The Database at a Glance . 100 5.1.1.1 Results by Year . 100 5.1.1.2 Results by Criticality . 102 9 5.1.2 Accidents and Incidents by UAS Type . 103 5.1.3 Accidents and Incidents by Human Error Involvement . 105 5.1.4 Database Categorization Results . 105 5.1.4.1 Taxonomy 1: The UAS Fault Tree Framework Level 1 Subsystems . 105 5.1.5 Taxonomy 2: ICAO Aviation Occurrence Categories . 107 5.1.6 Taxonomy 3: HFACS Unsafe Acts . 110 5.1.6.1 Categorized by Entity at Fault: Definitions of Formal and Other UAS Operators . 111 5.2 Fault Tree Analyses . 113 5.2.1 FT1: System Wide Fault Tree . 113 5.2.1.1 Aircraft/System Level 1 Subsystem . 114 5.2.1.2 Flight Crew/Human Factors Level 1 Subsystem . 115 5.2.1.3 Maintenance Level 1 Subsystem . 117 5.2.1.4 Weather/Environmental Factors Level 1 Subsystem . 117 5.2.1.5 Air Traffic Control and Miscellaneous Level 1 Subsystems118 5.2.2 FT2: ICAO Occurrence Category 1: System/Component Failure or Malfunction (Non-Powerplant) . 119 5.2.3 FT3: ICAO Occurrence Category 2: AIRPROX/TCAS Alert/Loss of Separation/Near Midair Collisions/Midair Collisions (MAC) . 121 5.2.4 FT4: ICAO Occurrence Category 3: Navigation Errors (NAV) . 124 6 Discussion . 128 6.1 Interpreting the Results . 128 6.1.1 Accidents and Incidents by UAS Type . 128 6.1.2 Accidents and Incidents by Human Error Involvement . 129 6.1.3 Taxonomy 1: The UAS Fault Tree Framework Level 1 Subsystems . 129 6.1.4 Taxonomy 2: ICAO Aviation Occurrence Categories . 131 6.1.5 Taxonomy 3: HFACS Unsafe Acts . 132 6.2 Challenges and Areas of Need in UAS Integration . 133 6.2.1 UAS Aircraft System Needs . 134 6.2.2 UAS Flight Crew/Operator Needs . 135 6.2.3 Aircraft Development and Certification Needs . 137 6.2.4 UAS Hobbyist Community Development . 138 7 Summary and Conclusions . 139 8 Recommendations . 143 References . 145 Appendix A: Fault Tree Analysis Results at a Glance . 153 10 Appendix B: Fault Tree Analysis: General UAS System Framework . 171 Appendix C: Fault Tree Analysis: ICAO Aviation Occurrence 1: System/Component Failure or Malfunction (Non-Powerplant) (SCF-NP) . 233 Appendix D: Fault Tree Analysis: ICAO Aviation Occurrence 2: AIRPROX/TCAS Alert/Loss of Separation/Near Midair Collisions/Midair Collisions (MAC) . 268 Appendix E: Fault Tree Analysis: ICAO Aviation Occurrence 3: Navigation Errors (NAV) . 300 11 List of Tables Table Page 2.1 Summary of Current Requirements for Operation of Unmanned Aircraft Systems in the National Airspace System, Based on Application. This table is a reproduction from the Federal Aviation Administration ’Getting Started’ webpage [23]. 23 5.1 Glossary of ICAO Aviation Occurrence Category Abbreviations Which Occur in the UAS Accidents/Incidents Database . 109 12 List of Figures Figure Page 2.1 Official Federal Aviation Distributed Diagram of the Characteristics of Different Classes of Airspace Within the National Airspace System.
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