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1 TICOM and the Intelligence Corps DRAMATIS PERSONAE TICOM TEAM 1 PERSONNEL *Oeser, O. Wing Commander RAFVR. (Chief TRO) A Cambridge psychologist and friend of Winterbotham, he had joined Hut 3 in the summer of 1940. In 1941 he was Hut 3 Dep. Air Advisor. By June 1942 was Head of Hut 3(Air) and by late 1942 he was head of the newly formed Hut 3(L) where he made Enigma and Fish priority decisions. He became professor of psychology at the University of Melbourne. By the age of 27 he had graduated from four universities in three countries and had gained doctorates in two disciplines. *Campaigne, H. Lieutenant Commander USNR (Deputy Chief) As a young man with a PhD in mathematics he had sent the navy a homemade design for an encryption device which was rejected. He gained his commission in December 1941. He was eventually to become NSA research chief as head of REMP (Research, Engineering, Math & Physics). Barringer, H. Capt AUS. (US Army). Carter, T. Captain IC (Intelligence Corps) A Lieutenant though there was a Captain TM Carter at the time in the Corps working in ‘Special employment’ which usually referred to serving in MI5, MI6, MI8; there is no record of his working at B.P.. Cockerell, H. Lieutenant RNVR He served in the Naval Section of B.P. where he was department head of N.S.111J Administration and Manning. After TICOM, he and Pickering stayed on in Germany in search of various wanted persons Coolidge, J. Lieutenant (J.G) USNR Crowe, R. Major AUS. Donahue, O. Major AUS From Yale, Sent to B.P.. together with Gwynne Evans from Harvard and Howard Porter from Columbia he worked in Hut 3 Eldridge, J. Major AUS Together with Formantak (below) he accompanied Major Tester to Pfunds 40 miles SW Tester had single-mindedly been trying to track down the actual equipment after all his efforts to break it blind. Formantak, C. Capt. AUS Lawrance, I. Captain IC. Again, a Lieutenant although there was a Captain LW Lawrance at the time in the Corps working in ‘special employment’ there is no record of his serving at B.P.. He is not listed in Special Duties & the Intelligence Corps Levensen, A. 1st Lieutenant. AUS. A New Yorker and mathematician he had spent time on code problems before transferring to the UK and Bletchley Park As a cryptographer, He was in Block D(6) and Block F, & Hut 6 in the research sub- section. Later he was in both the Testery and Newmanry. Together with Whitaker, Norland and seven other cryptologic officers he had come to the UK in July 1943 on 1 2 the Aquitania, the first US codebreakers to be assigned to B.P. where he worked from July 1943 to Jan 1946. He was secretary of the B.P.. chess club. B.P..’s chess and bridge clubs must have been awesome, including as it did, at one time, the entire British bridge team and the leading chess player. Lively, J. First Lieutenant AUS. Maxwell, I. Pilot Officer. RAFVR. Pilot Officer Maxwell worked in Hut 6 at B.P. *McIntosh, A. Major IC Originally coming to B.P. from the Tank Corps, a linguistics expert whose speciality was Middle English, he held degrees from both Oxford and Harvard. He worked at B.P.. in the Newmanry & Testery 1941–1945 where he was involved in the design of the Dragon machine for testing cribs against enciphered messages. He was later to have a distinguished academic career in English language and linguistics. *Norland, S. 1st Lieutenant AUS. He was one of the earliest US recruits to B.P. Before entering the Army in 1942 he taught history and German in a local high school. He worked in Hut 3 with Whitaker as a translator Pickering; F. Lieutenant Colonel IC. There is no Lieutenant Colonel Pickering shown as working at B.P. nor in the Army List of that time in the Intelligence Corps. It is 100% certain that it was Dr Frederick Pickering who was at B.P.. 1941–46. He worked in Hut 3, Block D(3) and specialised in the analysis of the German Signal Intelligence organisation. Porter Howard. He came from Columbia University. A notable linguistics scholar, he worked in Hut 3. He returned to become professor of linguistics in the Department of Greek & Latin at Columbia University Rood, l. Lieutenant Colonel AUS. He was with the SLU* at the first Tactical Airforce and was critical of B.P. strategy post-D-Day in ‘Piercing the Fog Intelligence and Army Air Force Operations in WWII which he co-authored. He was very critical of *Winterbotham’s ‘Special Liaison Units’ *Rushworth, E. Major IC. Major Edward (Rush) Rushwort worked in Hut 3 and Hut 6 Fusion Room & SIXTA on the long-term analyses of enemy order of battle and operations *Sayres, G. Flight Lieutenant RAFVR. It is possible but unlikely that this is Pilot Officer P.N. Sayers who worked in Hut 3 seconded from Air Section. There is no one of the name Sayres recorded as being at B.P. *Stone, l. Capt AUS Capt (Lou) Stone represented the US Special Branch. By this time, US Military Intelligence was presenting a far more unified picture than previously with G-2 having won the fight to take over the Signal Security Agency from the Signal Corps *Tester, R. Major IC. Major Ralph Tester worked in Hut 5 and then the ‘Testery’ and was one of the very few heads of departments to have it named after him (the other was Newman and the Newmanry) He had joined the Military Research team in 1940, becoming head of Testery, breaking Fish codes by hand methods, the only method available until the arrival of Heath Robinson and Colossus 2 3 *Whitaker, P. 1st Lieutenant AUS. For two years he had been assigned to Hut 3. Before joining the army in 1942 he had studied and taught German in the USA, Germany and Austria. At 38 he was considerably older than his fellow junior officers. It is thanks to his diaries and photographs that we know so much detail about TICOM teams other than from the NSA report. * Original Team 1 personnel, the others were attached for varying periods. TICOM Team 2 personnel: Major Charles J. Donahue, AUS (chief TRO) See above Team 1 Capt Thomas M. Carter, IC (deputy chief) He worked at B.P. in the Military Section and then SIXTA. Lieutenant Hugh A. L. Cockerell, RNVR This is presumably the same person as served in Team 1 Capt Leslie W. Lawrence, IC Capt L.W. Lawrence is not recorded as having been employed at B.P. but he served in Special Employment. See above Team 1 Capt Henry C. Barringer, AUS Dr Barringer went on to serve with the US Foreign Service in Burundi, Colombia, Congo, Denmark, Germany and Greece. In 1970 he founded the US National Peace Academy and was the co-creator of the Center for Conflict Resolution Captain James K. Lively, AUS First Lieutenant Arthur J. Levenson, AUS See above Team 1 Pilot Officer Ian C.M. Maxwell, RAFVR He worked in Hut 6 Corporal J.W. Biggin, w/t operator Lance Corporal l. Tyler, w/t operator Corporal Ralph H. Brazel, driver T/5 Fredrick Muzer, driver TICOM Team 3 personnel: Lieutenant Colonel Paul E. Neff Major Paul E Neff had worked at B.P. 1943-44 in the Military Section specialising in Italian traffic Lieutenant Colonel Geoffrey H. Evans Almost certainly this was Major G.H. Evans of the Intelligence Corps who worked in Military Section B.P.. from1940. He was head of No 4 Intelligence School and then sub-section B. In Feb 1945 he was head of the German police sub-section. Post-war he went on to write the ‘History of Interception’. Major William P. Bundy 3 4 He trained as a lawyer at Harvard but left to join the Army Signal Corps, working at B.P.. During the 50’she worked as an analyst for the CIA and was chief of staff at the Office of National Estimates. Captain R.W. Adams Captain D. M. MacIntyre A US Army officer. He worked at B.P. in the Military Section and SIXTA Sergeant I. Loram Sergeant F.A. Marx Corporal Schnabel TICOM Team 4 personnel: Lieutenant Commander Howard Campaigne, USNR. Lieutenant Evelyn Talbot-Ponsonby, RNVR Served at B.P. 1940-45 in Hut 4 and Block B. In Naval Section IV(GO), Block B, Room 7 and Hut 4 (Naval Section(historical) Lieutenant Christopher Huntington, USNR He worked in B.P. Naval Section Corporal A.G. Abel. Royal Signals, SCU. 8. SCU units were MI6’s main radio conduits Captain M.A.G. Wingate, of the Intelligence Corps, later joined them. He worked in Hut 6, Block D(6) SIXTA and the Military Section whilst at B.P. until 1945 TICOM Team 6 personnel: Commander A.M.S. Mackenzie, RNVR, C.O. Lieutenant Commander served at B.P. from June 1940 to 1946 46, He worked in Hut 4 & Block B Naval Section NS VIII, Records and NS IV submarines and hydrography. Lieutenant John Nuelsen, USNR, X.O. He worked at B.P. in the naval section. Lieutenant Commander Leonard A. Griffiths Lieutenant Commander RNVR joined B.P. in the spring 1941 to 1946 and worked in Hut 4 and Block A. In late 1943 he was Head of NS VII (surface vessels & General Intelligence), by mid-1944 was Head of Naval Section Research. Post-war he joined the Foreign Office and continued to work at GCHQ Lieutenant Howard J.
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