THE ANSO REPORT -Not for Copy Or Sale

The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office Issue: 33 1-15 September 2009

ANSO and our donors accept no liability for the results of any activity conducted or omitted on the basis of this report. THE ANSO REPORT -Not for copy or sale-

Inside this Issue COUNTRY SUMMARY

3-6 Central Region AOG INITIATED ATTACKS (2006-2009) 1200 Northern Region 6-9 1091 Western Region 9-11 1000 800 Eastern Region 11-13 600 Southern Region 13-16 ANSO Info Page 17 400 200

YOU NEED TO KNOW

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MAR MAR MAR MAR • Possibility of demonstrations as election related 2006 2007 AUGUST2008 2009 tensions mount • Security worsens in the After recording a staggering 1091 attacks by Armed Opposition Groups (AOGs) in August, northern province of Kun- attack numbers have now fallen by almost half in early September. Although incident levels duz due to civilian casualties normally decline in September, the drop is not usually this sharp, which reinforces our as- • Another IMF incident re- sessment that AOGs expended much of their fighting resources on election day. Despite ported at an NGO clinic the current and likely temporary lull, significant AOG attacks and operations were reported in every region during the last 2 weeks. • Deputy Chief of Intelli- gence killed in the East In the Central Region, attacks against a military CENTRAL REGION—AOG INCIDENTS base and the airport in ANSO is supported by Kabul were the most significant this period; however, the worsening situation in Wardak, Logar, Bamyan, Kapisa, and Daykundi are more worrisome for NGOs. As explained in more detail on page 3, serious concerns and public frustration over the election process continue to fuel tensions in Kabul. The potential for demonstrations and civil unrest is perhaps at its highest since the start of the election. Important deci- sions and announcements are expected from election bodies and political parties in this next period and will likely have important security implications for NGOs. THE ANSO REPORT Page 2

Fighting in Kunduz drove incident levels in the Northern Region to record heights in August (see chart right*), but the NORTHERN REGION—AOG INCIDENTS situation was made much worse by two recent incidents: a U.S. airstrike ordered by the German forces reportedly killed and injured a large number of civilians, and a botched military operation by British forces that rescued a kidnapped British journalist killed his Afghan colleague and left several others dead. These two incidents, which are examined in detail on page 7, will no doubt turn local residents even further against international military forces, and probably foreigners and INGOs in the area as well. The increasing use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Herat City and the high casualty rates and collateral damage caused by these attacks are especially disconcerting because of the large number of NGO staff living in the city. A number of significant explosive and IED related seizures were reported in the last two weeks in districts around Herat WESTERN REGION—AOG INCIDENTS City, indicating AOGs’ intent to carry out more such attacks. In the coming period, there is a risk that AOG will attempt to target Government officials who normally attend public ceremonies during Eid since they are usually more difficult to protect in these areas. This has been the case in the western region in the past. More kidnapping threats are also in circulation in the west, as discussed on page 10. The assassination of the Deputy Head of Afghan intelligence and the Chairman of the Laghman Provincial Council made international headlines this month as it demonstrated the AOG ability to target one of the nation’s key security figures and a long-time opponent of the Taliban and HIG. The total number of AOG attacks in the East Region (see below) remain very high mostly due to intensive fighting in Kunar. As discussed on page 13, a change in AOGs’ effec- tiveness and coordination during attacks was noted during this reporting period because they resulted in significant casualties to international military forces.

EASTERN REGION—AOG INCIDENTS SOUTHERN REGION—AOG INCIDENTS

* Please note the scale difference among the charts. September data includes incidents up to Sept 8 only. THE ANSO REPORT Page 3

NGO Incidents KABUL KABUL Year to Date 8 50 This Report Period 0 Kabul continues to experience a 40 post-election lull in security inci- sult will be released before the 30 dents. In the last reporting period, patience of the politically mobi- 20 only a dozen security incidents lised becoming exhausted. 10 were recorded across the prov- The period also witnessed two 0 ince. Criminal activity has virtually high profile AOG attacks in Ka- halted as the population is divided bul City. The first occurred on 7 between those pre-occupied or September when two AOG in a KABUL AOG KABUL ACG totally ambivalent about the ongo- Toyota Corolla allegedly attacked ing post-election theatre. To date, Camp Phoenix along Jalalabad heavily secured area without detection and almost three thousand complaints Road. The engagement, using detonate causing significant casualties. Two have been received by the Elec- SAF and RPGs, is reported to rocket attacks also struck Kabul on 6 and 14 toral Complaints Commission, have lasted approximately one September; the first hit a house in District Five which has severely brought into hour and resulted in the death of and killed three civilians. question the legitimacy of the the two AOG. (Unconfirmed re- Other districts of Kabul Province have also election. Candidates have commit- ports of explosions at the rear of remained comparatively quiet. An ANP vehicle ted publicly to the legal process the heavily fortified compound struck an IED on 7 September in Chahar and, thus far, have been able to were also received.) The second Asyab, injuring two, and on 12 September in restrain supporters from using the incident occurred the following Khakki Jabbar, a dispute between an ANP and streets as an avenue of protest. morning when a SVBIED deto- his IMF mentor led to several shots being fired The question remains as to nated at the entrance to the Kabul and three people being injured, including the whether the certified election re- military airport. The explosion two said men. resulted in four fatalities and ap- Despite calls for restraint by candidates, the proximately fourteen wounded, possibility remains that demonstrations may KEY THREATS & CON- including IMF. The attack is simi- CERNS occur in the following weeks as frustration lar in nature to the 15 August with the post-election results increases. The  Election demonstrations SVBIED attack on ISAF HQ, concern is that any protests may be met with a  Complex attacks against high which killed almost a dozen peo- profile targets disproportionate response from ANSF. NGOs ple and left one hundred  Abductions should ensure that all staff avoid large gather- wounded. In both instances, a ings in the current uncertainty. vehicle was able to approach a

NGO Incidents DAYKUNDI DAYKUNDI Year to Date 1 50 This Report Period 0 40 Two arrests were made during the 30 last reporting period in relation to number of weapons as well as money were found. Acts of ran- 20 the robbery of a significant 10 amount of money from an IEC dom banditry occur irregularly 0 car travelling through the Shilan along the pass; however, violence Pass between Nili and Ishtarlay. is rarely used. Separately, there have been no reported encroach- Arrests were made in Lawran Val- DAYKUNDI AOG DAYKUNDI ACG ley on 3 and 11 September, and a ments on Nili from the known AOG strongholds in the districts in the local political power structure following of Kajran and Gizab. An informal the installation of any new regime in Kabul. In KEY THREATS & CON- consensus between elders on both the past, NGO activities have faced threats, CERNS sides of the divide seems to assure including a realised kidnapping, due to local  High AOG infiltration in Kiti, the continuance of the status quo Gizrab, and Kajran commanders attempting to gain leverage in for the immediate future. The political negotiations. Similar threats are liable  Low security presence throughout the province security situation in the province to be issued if local political dynamics suffer a is likely to be affected by a change significant change in the weeks ahead. THE ANSO REPORT Page 4

NGO Incidents LOGAR LOGAR Year to Date 2 50 This Report Period 0 40 Baraki Barak, Muhammad Agha, ments as well as from IEDs 30 and Charkh continue to be the 20 most hostile environments in planted by AOG along district roads. For the month of Septem- 10 Logar with IED attacks and am- 0 bushes, mainly directed at IMF ber alone, there were eleven dis- and ANSF, being the most fre- coveries of IEDs along district quently used AOG tactics. roads in the province, with an LOGAR AOG LOGAR ACG additional two premature detona- The main risk to NGO operations raki Barak, Kharwar, and Charkh, probably tions. An IED also struck an remains collateral exposure to due to reported effective AOG control. Fur- ANA vehicle on 5 September IMF/ANSF and AOG engage- thermore, unless an NGO has specific guaran- with two ANA soldiers being tees of support and evidence of acceptance, all wounded. A further IED strike KEY THREATS & CONCERNS of Logar should currently be considered hos- against an IMF convoy that left tile to NGO operations. With this, ANSO rec-  Abduction no casualties also occurred.  Collateral damage from attacks ommends complete suspension of travel by on security forces/police As mentioned above, the bulk of internationals or by local staff that might be recent incidents have been in Ba- identified as having an NGO link.

WARDAK NGO Incidents WARDAK Year to Date 5 100 This Report Period 2 80 Once again, Wardak dominates 60 demanding that the NGO work- the number of AOG initiated inci- 40 dents across the central region. ers inform IMF of any suspected 20 Wardak hosted double the AOG being admitted for treat- amount of reported security inci- ment. After the incident it was 0 dents compared to the seven learnt that IMF was in pursuit of other central provinces combined. an alleged AOG suspect. From a WARDAK AOG WARDAK ACG During the last two weeks, two security perspective, IMF opera- NGO incidents occurred in the tions of this nature serve to desta- believed to be missing, though.) The two inci- province. Firstly, and of relevance bilise long established community dents illustrate the importance of community for all NGO, was the 2 September relations, alter local perceptions of acceptance and impartial assistance in the de- IMF intrusion into an NGO hos- NGOs’ intent, invite possible livery of humanitarian and development aid. pital in Saydabad. During the eve- AOG retaliatory attacks on NGO Separately, AOG initiated attacks against ning, armed IMF entered the hos- facilities and/or staff and, of ANSF/IMF and logistical convoys continue pital without reportedly informing course, endanger the lives of unabated. AOG initiated incidents against staff of their intent. Four local NGO personnel during any intru- IMF, in the last reporting period, are four guards and two relatives of pa- sion. times as likely to assume the form of standoff tients were tied up while IMF The second NGO incident also attacks, such as IEDs or rockets, than a con- conducted a search of the hospi- occurred in Saydabad. On 6 Sep- ventional ambush using SAF or RPGs. The tal, forcing patients from their tember, a number of gunmen, reason, quite simply, is that IEDs are vastly wards and breaking two doors in believed to be AOG, stopped an more effective than a close range AOG assault the process. After approximately NGO vehicle along Highway One on the superiorly armed IMF. Of note is that two hours, IMF left the facility and detained two staff members the reverse is true for ANSF. Attacks against for several hours. As the NGO ANSF are almost four times as likely to com- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS was known in the area for its ac- prise close range ambushes as IEDs or rockets.  Abduction tivities, the subsequent vocal in- Salar Area in Saydabad remains the most risky  Rocket and IED attacks tervention of local villagers appar- for NGO operations with seven separate inci-  Intimidation ently played an important part in dents recorded for the month to date. their release. (The vehicle is still THE ANSO REPORT Page 5

NGO Incidents PARWAN Year to Date 1 PARWAN 50 This Report Period 0 On 12 September, an IED deto- 40 nated outside the residence of a capital is one of the first names 30 political leader in Chaharikar, kill- mentioned in rumours of election 20 ing one guard and wounding an- demonstrations, no protests or 10 other. No arrests have been made, gatherings have been reported to 0 as yet, and it is not clear whether date. Demonstrations, if they oc- the incident is politically or crimi- cur, will most likely take place in nally related. Although the provin- Kabul, where a national and inter- PARWAN AOG PARWAN ACG cial national audience is assured. joining district, Kohi Safi. The increase in Two rocket attacks, on 31 August rocket attacks in recent months, although from KEY THREATS & CON- and 14 September, targeted Ba- a low base, suggests that AOG have become CERNS gram Airbase, and in both in- increasingly adept at deploying and launching  Collateral damage, especially in stances, there were no reported standoff attacks. There remains a minimal risk the area of Bagram Airbase casualties. Only in the last three to NGO operations due to the vast majority of  NGO-targeted criminal abduc- months have rocket attacks tion attacks occurring at night and impacting in or against the airfield been noted,  Irregular IEDs targeting ANSF around the military base, without causing civil- in the Ghorband Valley possibly due to increased surveil- ian casualties. lance by ANSF/IMF of the ad-

NGO Incidents KAPISA KAPISA Year to Date 2 50 This Report Period 0 40

The security situation in Kapisa 30 shows increasing signs of insta- ing the usual pattern, an ANP bility. The increase in the num- check-post in Sher Khel, Tagab 20 ber of factional and AOG attacks District, was attacked twice by 10 in the west of the province re- AOG. Virtually all attacks in Ta- 0 mains a distinct concern due to gab occur against ANSF and IMF; the level of AOG operations. On however, recent feuding between 4 September, an IMF vehicle was different AOG has led to open KAPISA AOG KAPISA ACG struck by an IED in Shuhki Area conflict. On 31 August, reportedly of Mahmudi Raqi, killing two four senior members of HIG attack neighbouring provinces. The areas of IMF and wounded eight. Follow- were killed by the Taliban on the concern are Nijrab, Tagab, and Alasay. Also, way to a Shura. Several other such criminal activity is a concern along the main attacks have been undertaken in roads and sub-roads. All movements should be KEY THREATS & CON- recent weeks and threaten to pos- conducted only during daylight and with con- CERNS sibly destabilise the current AOG stant radio communication.  Collateral damage from attacks on police and security forces, leadership structure in the prov- Alasay and Nijrab—given periodic military especially in Tagab and Nijrab ince. operations and reports of heavy AOG infiltra-  Electoral related violence Kapisa province has a strategically tion—should also be considered unstable and  Collateral damage from rock- important location in the central potentially volatile. Mahmud Raqi is vulnerable ets, IEDs, and mines region. AOGs are using some of to periodic attacks as evidenced by recent its districts as logistical bases to rocket attacks directed at police and the DAC. THE ANSO REPORT Page 6

NGO Incidents ally insurmountable mountain ranges that have PANJSHIR Year to Date 0 kept the province largely immune from the This Report Period 0 rising tide of insecurity engulfing the rest of Even though Panjshir was host to the country. The security environment is an official ceremony to mark reported security incidents during highly unlikely to change in the weeks ahead. Great Ahmad Shah Masoud Day the last reporting period. Panjshir on 10 September, with many VIPs is ethnically homogenous, with a in attendance, there have been no strong sense of identity and virtu-

BAMYAN NGO Incidents BAMYAN Year to Date 1 50 This Report Period 0 40 The Ghandak Valley in Shibar 30 District again features promi- around the Ghandak Valley are 20 nently in any security reports less ideologically driven than con- 10 emerging from Bamyan. In the cerned with competition for lim- 0 latest incident, two trucks were ited resources. Attacks typically stopped by three gunmen who assume the form of rockets subsequently stole 200,000 Afs against ANP checkpoints or the BAMYAN AOG BAMYAN ACG from the drivers. AOG in and occasional ambush. Profiting from criminal activity is also not ance of the area will mitigate this risk. Al- though rumours persist of possible AOG re- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS uncommon. The Ghandak Valley taliatory attacks due to the arrest of Mullah  AOG/ACG threat around Ghan- and surroundings is the only ma- dak Valley, Shibar jor AOG risk for NGOs operat- Burhan on 2 August in Shinkari Valley, there ing in Bamyan, so simple avoid- have been no reported incidents to date.

NGO Incidents TAKHAR Year to Date 3 TAKHAR 50 This Report Period 1 An internal dispute amongst 40 INGO staff led to one employee shot a local), armed locals at- 30 being sent a threatening text mes- tacked the local police headquar- 20 sage. While this issue is reported ters in protest. The ANP re- 10 to have been resolved without sponded in kind, killing four civil- 0 incident, it serves as a reminder ians and injuring another. The JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG that human resources policy and entire confrontation is possibly TAKHAR AOG TAKHAR ACG management are integral parts of symptomatic of poor training (the an NGO’s security strategy. initial alleged brutality) and fraught relations between locals Elsewhere in Takhar, AOG-initiated activity A few incidents in Farkhar high- and the ANP, but in any event, continues to be a significant concern both lighted how problems with poor the likely outcome will be de- along the Amu River, between Yangi Qal’a and governance are having a signifi- creased trust between the ANP Khwajayi Ghar, and on the road from Taluqan cant effect in areas with little or and those they are meant to serve. leading west to Kunduz. In the former area, no AOG activity. In response to Thin governance also seems to be AOG attacks on ANSF, ANP, and ANBP in alleged police brutality (ANP had at issue in the normally pacific particular, occurred unabated. West of Talu- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS district of Rustaq where factional qan, IMF continue to be favourite AOG tar-  IEDs disputes led to the killing of a for- gets, though other high-profile vehicles should  AOG attacks on ANSF mer commander and apparent also be avoided. Yet again, an AOG shot up a drive-by shooting retaliation, fuel tanker whilst trying to hijack it in the vi-  Weak governance which left a few more locals dead. cinity of Aqmasjid. THE ANSO REPORT Page 7

NGO Incidents KUNDUZ KUNDUZ Year to Date 8 100 This Report Period 0 Two major incidents in Kunduz 80 captured global media attention Kunduz-based AOGs. The ab- 60 during this reporting period and duction was the first high-profile 40 are likely to expedite the current event of its kind in the NR and 20 subsequent reporting confirms vicious cycle powering the GoA’s 0 increasingly tenuous control over that the AOG required a wide and JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG the province. In the first instance, deep pool of local acceptance to an AOG captured, nearly within carry it off (this local acceptance is KUNDUZ AOG KUNDUZ ACG the main barrier to abduction in site of the PRT, two large fuel dence of increased attention on Kunduz by the North). Abductees and the tankers, with which they ab- outside AOGs was confirmed in ongoing spe- men necessary to conceal them sconded to the nearby AOG- cial forces operations which have succeeded in are quite noticeable and must be controlled district of Chahar Dara. capturing or killing multiple foreign AOG moved frequently, providing a Before moving very far, and under members who typically possess a greater myriad of opportunities for dis- circumstances which will continue amount of military experience and contribute covery and requiring potentially to be the subject of much ongoing to AOG organisation and coordination. investigation, a large number of passive supporters of AOG activ- Ironically, the increased level of control might AOG members and locals were ity to become active, as many of have provided a more favourable environment killed in an IMF airstrike. Shortly them will be asked to harbour the for local national staff whose projects still con- thereafter, a team consisting of a hostage or keep silent about their tinue to operate in Kunduz. Previously, local foreign and local journalist was movements. Of note, reporting AOG leaders fought amongst themselves as abducted by an AOG and held for indicates that the AOG was run- much as they did with IMF, and the recent a few days before the foreigner ning out of such support when escalation in the province seems to have was rescued in a raid which left the raid occurred, but it is also brought them into a more defined hierarchy. his associate, one IMF soldier, and unknown how long IMF were The end result is that AOGs have bigger fish two civilians dead. The two issues aware of the captives’ location and to catch than NGOs, and NGOs have a more are separated greatly in their cost the exact sequence of events that coherent structure with which to negotiate to human life, but both will play a led to the decision to undertake a access. In any event, entry into and passage great role in fuelling negative local rescue. through Kunduz is not recommended for or- perceptions towards IMF and AOG activity continued apace ganisations that do not already have operations probably foreigners in general. In throughout the province in other there (and the assumed concurrent degree of the first case the sheer volume of less attention-grabbing but equally acceptance/safe passage that has allowed them casualties speaks for itself, but in significant incidents. AOGs occu- to continue as such). Still, the risk of collateral the case of the raid, the obvious pied three major towns and a involvement for all NGO employees remains preferential treatment of abduc- number of smaller settlements in high given ongoing clashes between IMF/ tees because one of them was for- north-eastern Imam Sahib District ANSF and AOGs, which now include air- eign has also been the cause for a and at one point threatened to strikes on a fairly regular basis. Travel for ex- lot of resentment amongst locals capture Aqmasjid. While ANSF patriate staff is not recommended in any cir- who are aware that many of their did repel the AOGs from Aqmas- cumstance and only when absolutely essential politicians would not get similar jid itself, reporting indicates that for local staff after they have fully sanitised treatment. Moreover the abduc- AOGs are still in control of much themselves of any NGO links. tion provided a window into the of the surrounding countryside. capabilities and limitations of In Dashti Archi District, AOGs In Kunduz city, increasing AOG activity was continued harassing the ANP in complimented by ACG activity. A prominent their headquarters, which stands member of a local ACG sent threatening let- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS as the lone outpost of GoA con- ters to a number of people, one of whom was  Increasing AOG control trol in that district, and engaged in an IO employee, with the aim of extorting  IEDs some policing activity by con- money from them. In another instance of  Abduction fronting an ACG. Further evi- criminal activity, an NGO employee was impli- cated in the murder of his wife. THE ANSO REPORT Page 8

NGO Incidents BAGHLAN Year to Date 1 BAGHLAN This Report Period 0 50 The prime areas of concern with 40 regards to NGO security in Bagh- NGOs: one is detention or confis- 30 cation of property by an AOG, lan remain the Baghlani Jadid 20 and the other is collateral damage Corridor and the district of Daha- 10 nai Ghori to the west of Puli resulting from proximity to an AOG-ANSF confrontation. Re- 0 Khumri. In the case of Baghlani JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG Jadid, incidents cluster along the porting indicates that AOGs’ at- main Puli Khumri – Kunduz tention towards NGOs is mini- BAGHLAN AOG BAGHLAN ACG Road for the simple reason that mal, with their focus rather being and dramatically altered the area’s relationship that is the only place where the directed at GoA, ANSF, IMF, and with the GoA. The main road from Puli GoA chooses to confront AOGs. those affiliated therewith. Land Khumri to Mazar-e Sharif remains unaffected AOGs have shown themselves travel along this road north of (the area surrounding Chashmi Sher), but capable of frequent and well- Puli Khumri remains not recom- roads leading to the District Centre have been managed checkpoints which often mend for anyone, especially expa- subject to frequent illegal checkpoints. In one last a few hours before ANSF can triates; however, in the event that such instance, ANSF sent to disperse such a disperse them. Such checkpoints local staff travel this road, they checkpoint were involved in a three-hour fire- run the entire length of the district should be sanitized of all docu- fight which left 23 ANP wounded and 8 and present a twofold threat to mentation linking them to an AOGs dead; both sides seem to have retreated NGO as a precaution. with the AOG seizing a large cache of GoA The case of Dahanai Ghori is equipment. Travel off of the main road in KEY THREATS & CONCERNS proving to be the source of more Dahanai Ghori is not recommended barring  AOG checkpoints and more severe incidents. The established agreements of safe passage with the  AOG control root of discontent in this district local AOG, and even then the risk of collateral  Collateral involvement of NGOs involves local politics with certain damage remains significant. political shifts having suddenly

NGO Incidents FARYAB Year to Date 4 FARYAB 50 This Report Period 1 An AOG launched an apparent 40 attempted raid on an INGO tives are likely either local political 30 demining site near the village of rivalries or general AOG antipa- 20 Fayzabad located on the border of thy towards NGOs, with demin- 10 Dawlatabad and Shirin Tagab dis- ers often providing a soft target 0 tricts. The attackers were dis- because of their predictability and JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG persed by the NGO’s guards, immobility. The rest of the prov- FARYAB AOG FARYAB ACG managing to cause only light dam- ince experienced a continuation of age, but the motive for the attack patterns previously seen in the tinue to have a rather low rate of success, how- remains unresolved. Possible mo- province. The western districts ever, due to lower acceptance by local commu- continue to see regular attacks and nities and frequent detection by ANSF and engagements between ANSF and IMF. The main risk facing NGOs travelling KEY THREATS & CONCERNS AOGs, while north of Faryab, the ring road between Andkhoy and Maymana  IEDs AOGs continue to target ANSF remains collateral damage resulting from IED  Localised disputes and IMF with ever-popular cul- targeting of ANSF and IMF. vert-emplaced IEDs. These con- THE ANSO REPORT Page 9

BADAKHSHAN NGO Incidents BADAKHSHAN Year to Date 1 50 This Report Period 1 40 The first NGO-direct incident of 30 the year in Badakhshan consisted This incident, while AOG in in- 20 of a SAF attack on an NGO-run tent, typifies the sparse and spo- 10 clinic in the Khostak area of Jurm radic violence found in Badakh- shan. Due to geography, politics, 0 District. The two suspects were JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG later arrested by ANP, but not and hence grievances, play out on before they shot and killed a local the most local level, and anticipat- BADAKHSHAN AOG BADAKHSHAN ACG ing incidents requires the most civilian who may have gone to When and where violent activity does manifest investigate what was happening. specific situational awareness. Jurm, Baharak, and Warduj have in the future will likely depend heavily on local been known to harbour a certain dynamics and extremely local proximate KEY THREATS & CONCERNS amount of AOG sentiment due to causes. Other instances of violence in Badakh-  Localized disputes networks connecting them to con- shan included an RPG attack on a road con-  AOG sentiment between Fayza- servative madrasas in Pakistan, struction company compound in Kishim and bad and Warduj but such sentiment has so far an attack on an ANBP post in remote Kuran- translated into very few incidents. wa-Manjan District.

NGO Incidents FARAH FARAH Year to Date 2 50 This Report Period 0 40 AOG initiated ambushes on ANSF/IMF convoys were com- Along with attacks on ANSF ve- 30 monplace throughout Farah prov- hicles, it appears that logistic con- 20 ince along with IED and RCIED voys remain high value targets for 10 related incidents. Nevertheless, AOGs; one such attack occurred 0 during this reporting period their in Bakwa, for example, where an JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SVBIED targeted a PSC convoy intensity has increased signifi- FARAH AOG FARAH ACG cantly despite military operations carrying IMF materials, killing 3 led by security forces at the begin- PSC employees. However, the ning of the month. most significant incident took lasted a few hours, and IMF conducted an air- place on September 12th when an strike to support their troops on the ground. KEY THREATS & CONCERNS intense armed clashed occurred The exact number of casualties is not known at  Bullet point between AOG and ANSF/IMF this stage; still, this incident is extraordinary in  Bullet point following an AOG ambush on an its scale and duration. It also may serve as an IMF convoy that was also carrying example of increasing AOG organisation in  Bullet point logistic materials. The fighting the area.

NOTICE: Your input is invaluable for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation in your area. So please remember to call or email us regularly. Contact details of ANSO staff are provide on the last page.

ANSO: “..by NGOs for NGOs..” THE ANSO REPORT Page 10

NGO Incidents GHOR Year to Date 8 GHOR 50 This Report Period 1 On 10 September, an NGO- 40 related incident occurred when As was the case of a similar inci- 30 unknown armed men abducted a dent that occurred on 29 August 20 local NGO worker from his where an NGO worker was de- 10 house in Tulak District. Appar- tained for about 1 hour, the exact 0 ently, he was forced to follow the motivation behind this abduction JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG is not clear. Still, the effect of the armed group to Farsi District, GHOR AOG GHOR ACG Ghor Province; however, on the volatile security situation in some way to this district, during the areas may be benefiting criminals, night, he managed to escape. and NGOs can be seen as a soft the period. AOG attacked the District Gover- targets. nor’s convoy in Charsada, wounding his 2 se- The majority of the few recorded curity guards, and AOG fired two rockets to- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS AOG initiated incidents during wards the District Centre in Tulak, causing no  Roadside IEDs the last reporting period were injuries. Additionally, thanks to negotiations  Abduction confined to Pasaband, Tulak and led by village elders, the NGO staff’s motor-  AOG activities Charsada districts. With this, two bike which was stolen on August 29 was finally incidents of note occurred during returned.

NGO Incidents HERAT HERAT Year to Date 12 50 This Report Period 0 After an explosion that succeeded 40 in killing the Injil District Chief of Whether or not all these incidents 30 Police along with 13 ANP and 20 are AOG or ACG-related, they 20 should be considered as a re- civilians, Herat City witnessed 10 another major incident, however minder of the threat of collateral damage to NGOs from IEDs, 0 less deadly. JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG even if these attacks do not di- An RCIED exploded near the HERAT AOG HERAT ACG rectly target them. Masjed Jam-e Bozorg on Septem- ber 4th, wounding several civilians It is also worth noting that a wor- contractors and businessmen. Additional re- and apparently targeting a former rying trend is developing in the porting suggests that kidnappers may specifi- local commander. This incident area. Looking at the province as a cally target passengers along the airport road. was preceded by another IED whole, the election period was explosion which occurred, as well, characterized by an increase in During the last reporting period, the main area in Herat City in District 8 two IED seizures, whereas the current of AOG activity in the province remained Ka- days before. This time, though, period is dominated by significant rukh and Kushki Kuhna; however, Guzara the IED did not cause any casual- weapons/explosives cache discov- (where AOG fired two rockets targeting the ties. And on 15 September, Dis- eries throughout the districts District HQ) and Pashtun Zarghun districts trict 8 was, once again, targeted by neighbouring Herat City (Injil, also have witnessed AOG-initiated incidents. an IED in which 2 people were Karukh, Kushk, Adraskan and On a positive note, though, according to a wounded. Obe). This situation illustrates a recent announcement, an important AOG high level of AOG/ACG activity commander – influential in Shahrak District, and the willingness to conduct Ghor, and Chishti Sharif, Herat – has recon- offensive operations in the area. ciled with the government. This announce- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS Another characteristic feature of ment apparently has not yet been translated in  IEDs the security situation in Herat practice, however, because the said com-  Abduction province is the high level of crimi- mander did not lay down his arms, and it re-  Rocket attacks nality, with numerous cases of mains to be seen whether his activity will kidnap that have targeted mainly change. THE ANSO REPORT Page 11

NGO Incidents BADGHIS Year to Date 2 BADGHIS This Report Period 0 50 Badghis witnessed one indirect 40 NGO related incident. On Sep- staff abduction in Ghor, no prior 30 tember 7th, unknown gunmen threats or warning preceded this 20 killed 3 national staff that were incident. 10 employed by a for-profit interna- In Badghis, logistic convoys re- 0 JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG tional development organisation main also valuable targets for and stole their cash and motor- AOG operations. During this re- BADGHIS AOG BADGHIS ACG bikes. Reporting suggests that the porting period, two separate con- motivation behind this accident voys were attacked in Muqur and was most likely criminal. Of note, Murghab districts. also, that numerous cases of abduction of government employees have been recorded in as also seen in the recent NGO Besides these incidents, AOG Murghab and Muqur districts. initiated attacks continue against KEY THREATS & CONCERNS ANSF/GoA targets; for example, And in keeping with past activity in the tradi-  AOG assaults on ANSF two rockets that were fired to- tionally unstable area of Sabzak Pass, ANSF/  Abduction wards the Qala-i-Naw Airport IMF have been undertaking a series of operations which resulted in a reported 13 AOG  Rocket attacks landed in the vicinity of a residen- tial area. It should be underlined, fatalities.

NGO Incidents KHOST Year to Date 9 KHOST This Report Period 0 50 Khost continues to have a high 40 level of AOG incidents with 24 civilian vehicles and another two 30 reported this period, and IEDs small devices placed in shops in 20 remain their preferred tactic with the city centre. All AOG indirect 10 fire, which is still wildly inaccu- 11 detonated or located. Nearly 0 half of reported AOG incidents rate, occurred in Sabari District. occurred in Khost City with small Shamal District saw three attacks IEDs being common including on vehicles resulting in 10 casual- KHOST AOG KHOST ACG two magnetic mines attached to ties to civilians or PSC guards. Local tribal leaders have indicated security effort for the first election across east- KEY THREATS & CON- they are not interested in provid- ern region, so this does not bode well for a run CERNS ing security for a presidential run- -off if required.  IEDs off and are also not interested in Khost remains very dangerous for NGO op-  Kidnapping another vote. Community security erations, and NGO international staff area  Collateral damage from attacks forces were a large part of the advised to limit their travel to Khost City.

ANALYTICAL BYTE: Preliminary analysis of the IMF surge in the south suggests that the increase in forces has only further exasperated conflict levels as of yet. If trends persist, moreover, spiking incident levels will not likely lead to fractures in AOG cohesion; rather, the increase may instead be bolstering the Taliban in their attempt to reign in divergent AOGs. Additionally, rampant targeting of GoA officials at the district level—chiefs of police and governors—is likely to damage any semblance of GoA resolve or efforts at encouraging good governance at the micro level. Lastly, strife between IMF and civilians in contentious provinces, such as in Kunduz, will put NGO expatriate staff at risk and possibly erode communal acceptance. THE ANSO REPORT Page 12

NGO Incidents LAGHMAN LAGHMAN Year to Date 1 50 This Report Period 0 40 Laghman saw one of the most 30 significant incidents of the period Taliban and HIG and had been 20 nationwide; the assassination by the target of several previous plots 10 and is believed to have been the BBIED of Dr. Abdullah, Deputy 0 of NDS and Mr. Imadudin, Chair- target of this attack. NGOs man of the Laghman Provincial should take note of this failure to Council, along with at least 22 protect a high profile person even LAGHMAN AOG LAGHMAN ACG other people most of whom were when the threat was well known. with an even mix of IEDs, IDF aimed at IMF bodyguards. Dr. Abdullah was a Promises of local security at well bases, and direct attacks on police posts. All long time opponent of both the advertised events cannot be taken AOG incidents occurred in Mitharlam or Qar- seriously and high profile events ghayi Districts with only one incident on High- should be avoided. KEY THREATS & CONCERNS way 1: an attack on an ANA post.  Attacks along Highway 1 Other than the high profile bomb- The various supporters of presidential candi-  Continuing IED threat near DACs ing, the security situation in Lagh- dates are reported to be calm, and election re- man remained stable this period lated violence does not seem imminent.

NGO Incidents NANGARHAR Year to Date 8 NANGARHAR This Report Period 1 50 The security situation in Nan- 40 garhar remains stable with AOG clinic late at night, tied the two 30 guards up outside, and set fire to incidents spread out across the 20 the building. The motive is not province. Khogyani and Sherzad 10 clear, but the clinic had been used remain the provinces with the 0 greatest threat to NGO opera- as a polling station, and AOG had tions. The most significant inci- warned that they would punish dent for NGOs was an AOG at- locals for hosting polling sites. NANGARHAR AOG NANGARHAR ACG tack on an NGO clinic in Sherzad (NGO senior staff should not stay District. The attackers entered the overnight in the districts as the including a small IED found near a radio sta- chance of kidnap during one of tion and the occasional rocket fired ineffec- these late night AOG intrusions is tively at the Jalalabad Airfield. Highway 1 saw KEY THREATS & CON- CERNS high.) Any location that had been no incidents this period, and NGO travel to  Kidnap threat used as a polling station is a possi- Kabul and Torkham is within safe limits. ble target for assault or demoli-  AOG attacks on JAF and GOA The sense among NGO local staff in Jalalabad facilities tion. is that most people are not particularly con-  Attacks on polling stations Jalalabad City continues to be cerned about the presidential election and that quiet with a few minor incidents widespread violence is unlikely.

NGO Incidents NURISTAN Year to Date 1 NURISTAN 50 This Report Period 0 Nuristan remains volatile with 40 limited government control. 12 AOG incidents were reported 30 with the vast majority being direct 20 fire attacks on ANP posts in 10 KEY THREATS & CONCERNS Kamdesh District. The police in 0  Increased military operations Kamdesh appear to be under  Large numbers of AOG at large siege, and NGO operations in

Nuristan are not recommended. NURISTAN AOG NURISTAN ACG THE ANSO REPORT Page 13

NGO Incidents KUNAR KUNAR Year to Date 7 200 This Report Period 0 Kunar had a very violent period 150 with 63 AOG-initiated incidents. was a drawn out firefight between 100 With this, direct attacks on secu- an IMF/ANA/ANBP force and 50 rity forces were the most common AOG in Sirkanay District, during AOG tactic, ending in 54 such which 18 security force members 0 incidents. Seven indirect fire at- were killed and 24 injured after tacks were recorded, and only two being ambushed in a village. Addi- IEDs, both in Manogai, were re- tionally, eight AOG were reported KUNAR AOG KUNAR ACG ported. One IED attack against killed and four captured. This IMF is significant because it in- event is significant for three rea- wounded, and four trucks destroyed. Road volved three devices that severally sons: mentored ANSF/IMF do construction companies are also under heavy damaged three armoured vehicles not normally lose fire fights with pressure with four incidents that resulted in six and indicates a rare sophistication AOG, the AOG showed better security staff dead, 11 wounded and 18 ab- in IED use. The most violent inci- coordination and cunning than is ducted; another eight guards were abducted dent in the province, however, usual, and press reports indicate but quickly released after having their weapons that air and artillery support was stolen. denied to the security forces be- The Jalalabad- Asadabad Highway saw more KEY THREATS & CON- cause of concern over causing AOG activity near Patan area in Nurgal Dis- CERNS civilian casualties in the village. trict where AOG have been ambushing IMF  Spread of AOG operations onto the Jalalabad-Asadabad AOG attacks continue to focus convoys and attacking police posts very early Highway on IMF/ANSF facilities and con- in the morning. (NGOs should plan their  Indirect fire aimed at voys, but IMF supply contractors travel to Asadabad after mid-morning.) IMF/ANP are coming under increasing pres- The situation in Kunar is likely to get even  Increased combat operations sure with four separate attacks on worse. Consequently, NGOs are advised to convoys that resulted in 2 dead, 2 limit their activities to Asadabad City.

NGO Incidents PAKTYA Year to Date 1 PAKTYA 50 This Report Period 0 Paktya was relatively quiet this 40 period with only 12 AOG inci- Gardez District. Three IEDs were 30 dents of which six occurred in discovered or blew up on the 20 Gardez-Sayid Karam Road, and 10 the Gardez-Khost Road also re- 0 KEY THREATS & CON- mains a likely place for IED em- CERNS ployment.  Complex attacks in Gardez Local elders held a meeting in City Gardez on 6 September and indi- PAKTYA AOG PAKTYA ACG  High kidnap threat, especially cated that they will not supply along the Gardez-Khost Road whoever was elected. (The Arbaki were very Arbaki (tribal) security forces for a important in keeping attacks on polling sta-  IEDs, especially along Gardez- Khost Road presidential run-off and are not tions at very low levels in Paktya, so this not interested in voting again. They bode well for a run-off if required.) did agree that they would support THE ANSO REPORT Page 14

NGO Incidents KANDAHAR KANDAHAR Year to Date 5 200 This Report Period 0 AOG methods in the province are 150 diffuse, yet severe. Multiple sui- international organisation com- 100 pound in District 6. cide attacks were witnessed in the 50 region during this reporting pe- Whether for attention-getting pur- riod; for example, three suicide poses or out of necessity, AOG 0 BBIED attackers approached the appear to be favouring suicide NDS Sub-office in District 2 of attacks in the province; for exam- Kandahar City on 12 September. ple, in Spin Boldak District, a KANDAHAR AOG KANDAHAR ACG The initial BBIED attacker shot BBIED attacker riding on a mo- and killed the guard at the gate of torbike attempted to target an against ANP posts with RPGs and SAF in Dis- the NDS compound, but he was IMF convoy, but failed, prema- tricts 2, 3 and 6. This led to the deployment of then shot and killed on the spot turely detonating his vest; and ANSF/IMF and ended in 5 AOG fatalities. In by other NDS officials. Two other another BBIED attacker targeted another incident, AOG attacked the Shorbak BBIED attackers concurrently an ANP vehicle, wounding six DAC for several hours. Also of note, two mo- detonated their BBIED vests be- ANP and three civilians in the torcyclists shot and killed a local female in Dis- fore they could enter the com- Panjwayi Bazaar on 10 September. trict 2 on 7 September (She was an IEC chair- person for a polling centre during the recent pound, killing a child and wound- Despite the overwhelming lethal- elections). ing three NDS personnel. ity of AOG attacks, AOG efforts And as is typical for the province, at intimidation should not be ig- The pervasive IED threat persisted, also, de- uncorroborated reporting suggests nored. On 7 September, AOG spite an IMF airstrike that destroyed an IED that AOG are intent upon striking abducted a team of health workers factory in Zhari on 4 September. In sum, a high-profile target, possibly the (a nurse, vaccinator and a driver) twenty-two IED strikes occurred during the ANP HQ, NDS HQ, the Gover- whilst they were returning to Kan- reporting period. In a snapshot, an IED hit a nor’s office, or the Kandahar dahar City, but released them the patrolling IMF vehicle, killing 2 IMF soldiers Prison in the near future; and also following day due to the media- and wounding 5 others in Dand District on 6 a separate threat asserts that AOG tion efforts of tribal elders. And September while another IED hit a civilian are intent on assaulting a specific on 1 September, suspected AOG vehicle, killing 6 persons and wounding 3 oth- operatives warned a group of ers in Mirakhor of Maywand. To conclude, deminers to suspend their activity NGOs should expect the security situation in in Spin Ziyarat of District 6, Kan- Kandahar Province to further deteriorate, with KEY THREATS & CONCERNS dahar City, until the 24th of continual IED/rocket and suicide attacks be-  Kidnap Ramadan (14 September). ing conducted on targets by AOG residing  IEDs inside and outside of their respective target AOG also conducted diffuse ef-  Sensational attacks areas. forts to target GoA. On 7 Sep- tember, AOG orchestrated attacks

ANSO: “..by NGOs for NGOs..” THE ANSO REPORT Page 15

NGO Incidents HELMAND Year to Date 1 HELMAND 100 This Report Period 0 Helmand Province continues to 80 be volatile. During this reporting torbike was identified and shot 60 dead by ANP as he attempted to period, 2 suicide attacks occurred 40 enter their post, causing his vest in Nahri Sarraj District on 9 Sep- 20 tember. In the first, a suicide to explode and wound 2 ANP. 0 bomber wearing a BBIED vest As seen historically, tribal and JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG exploded himself in the vehicle communal elder efforts proved parking lot of an IMF base, killing fruitful, this time on 1 September, HELMAND AOG HELMAND ACG the suicide attacker and 2 civilian in securing the release of six de- riod: an IED struck an IMF patrol, killing one drivers and wounding 5 IMF sol- miners whom AOG had kid- IMF soldier in Baba Ji, Lashkar Gah, on 2 Sep- diers. The second occurred when napped on 29 August. With this, tember; and another IED hit an IMF soldier a BBIED attacker riding on a mo- kidnap is common in Helmand; whilst he was on a foot patrol, killing him, also for example, in Lashkar Gah City in Baba Ji but on 13 September. In another KEY THREATS & CON- on 13 September, ANP detained 2 incident, 3 civilians were killed during an IMF CERNS people for purportedly kidnapping airstrike in Karez, Musa Qala, on 3 September.  Suicide Attack a child and demanding a large ran- Of note, AOG are dominant in the centres of  Roadside IEDs som from the child’s family. 3 districts – Baghran, Deshu, and Washer –  Collateral damage from AOG- A number of IED strikes also where there is reportedly no GoA presence at IMF/ANSF clashes occurred during the reporting pe- all.

NGO Incidents GHAZNI Year to Date 2 GHAZNI This Report Period 0 100 On 10 September in Ghazni City, 80 ANSF opened fire, killing 4 dem- a demonstration consisting of 60 approximately 1,500 civilians took onstrators and wounding 24 oth- 40 place. The demonstrators moved ers, at a minimum. towards the Governor’s office to AOGs assaulted various district 20 voice their dissent concerning an centres during the period; for ex- 0 incident that happened the previ- ample, AOG attacked the Dih JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG ous night in Sar Karez when four Yak DAC on 3 September and the GHAZNI AOG GHAZNI ACG unknown armed men abducted a Rashidan DAC on the 6th, both mullah from his mosque and later for short durations. Also, in Qala- IMF operation that will seek to secure the cor- killed him. The mullah’s corpse e-Naw on 13 September, AOG ridor between Ghazni City and Gardez. was located in the morning in attacked a convoy of local trucks Several IED strikes also occurred during the Qala-e-Naw, Ghazni City. Report- carrying fuel to an IMF base, kill- period: in Giro District on 4 September, a ing further indicated that the dem- ing 4 PSC guards and burning 3 roadside IED hit an IMF vehicle, killing 1 IMF onstrators moved towards fuel tankers and 1 escort vehicle. soldier and wounding 5 others; and an IED Masoud Chowk area, and the Also, in Saeed Waal of Waghaz on killed one employee of a mobile phone com- demonstration turned violent. 14 September, AOG clashed with pany and wounded 4 others in Andar District Demonstrators reportedly began a group of armed robbers, result- on 5 September. throwing stones at ANSF, and ing in 3 thieves killed and another wounded. IMF also attempted to take the KEY THREATS & CON- CERNS initiative through an operation in Andar District on 11 September,  Abduction resulting in 1 IMF soldiers and 15  Collateral damage from IEDs or convoy ambushes AOG killed. And at the time that this report is being drafted, rumours persist of an impending THE ANSO REPORT Page 16

NGO Incidents URUZGAN Year to Date 2 URUZGAN This Report Period 0 100 An increase in IED strike was 80 September. Additionally, an reported during this period. Two 60 RCIEDs, in what was probably RCIED placed under a culvert in 40 meant to be coordinated detona- a crowded area detonated while an tions, exploded a distance of 100 ANP vehicle was passing through 20 meters and 60 meters from the the Janan Agha Market on 7 Sep- 0 compound of an international tember. The target was believed to JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG organisation (IO) in Tirin Kot on have been an ANP post com- URUZGAN AOG URUZGAN ACG 3 September. Tirin Kot experi- mander in the vehicle, but as is often the case, bystanders took enced many more IED strikes, for much less. In one example, though, AOG at- the brunt of the attack, with two example, one killing four civilians tacked an IMF patrol, killing 1 IMF soldier in children being killed and fifteen on 5 September and another Dihrawud District on 6 September. And in an other civilians being wounded wounding four IMF soldiers on 4 example of typical strife between armed par- (three ANP were also wounded). ties, on 14 September in Chora District, ANA In another blow to civilians, an clashed with PSC guards working for IMF spe- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS IED hit a civilian vehicle, killing cial forces, resulting in three ANA soldiers and  IEDs/BBIED twelve occupants and wounding 2 two PSC guards killed and one ANA and two  others in Chora District on 9 Sep- AOG opposition to NGO opera- PSC guards wounded. tions tember.  Clashes AOG are evidently favouring IED strikes and utilising armed assaults

NGO Incidents PAKTIKA PAKTIKA Year to Date 1 100 This Report Period 0 80 For Paktika, the most significant 60 incident occurred when a suicide On 12 September in Urgun Dis- 40 BBIED attacker targeted an ANP trict, IMF conducted an airstrike 20 patrol in Barmal District on 12 targeting an AOG hideout and 0 September. (The only casualty was killed twelve AOG, whilst two the death of the suicide attacker.) AOG were also purportedly killed Additionally, IMF/ANSF con- during another airstrike in Yosuf ducted several operations during Khel District on the same date. PAKTIKA AOG PAKTIKA ACG the period. Also, ANP/IMF conducted a joint operation in Sar Hawza on 3 IMF conducted an operation that reportedly September that concluded in eight killed 5 AOG, and in Ziruk District on 1 Sep- KEY THREATS & CON- AOG killed and four ANP in- tember, they assert that they killed a total of CERNS jured. Again in Sar Hawza District fourteen AOG in multiple clashes. (As is evi-  IEDs on the 3rd, ANSF/IMF claim to dent through the abovementioned information  Abductions have killed an additional seven and recent developments, NGOs should con-  AOG - IMF/ANSF clashes AOG. In another incident in Nika sider Sar Hawza to be a dangerous district.) District on 3 September, ANSF/

NOTE: Graphs in this report are current as of 8 September 2009. THE AFGHANISTAN NGO OFFICE - CONTACTS AND INFORMATION

CONTACT ANSO MISSING This report ANSO CENTRAL REGION OFFICE (KABUL) could not provide ANSO is hosted by Phil Priestley - [email protected] - 0799 323 792 Deutsche Welthungerhilfe analysis for the prov- Mukhtar Hussain - [email protected] - 0799 322 116 inces of:

NORTH REGION OFFICE (MAZAR) Scott Bohlinger - [email protected] - 0799 404 617 Samangan Firoz Fahez - [email protected] - 0799 408 252 Balkh To Register with ANSO Jawzjan contact: EAST REGION OFFICE (JALALABAD) Sar-e Pul [email protected] John Binns - [email protected] - 0799 248 362 Nimroz Shoar - [email protected] - 0798 778 014 Zabul

ANSO is managed by an NGO SOUTH REGION OFFICE (KANDAHAR) This is because we Board. If you have any Noori - [email protected] - 0700 492 550 do not know enough feedback, good or bad, let about the area to them know on: comment on the sig- [email protected] WEST REGION OFFICE (HERAT) nificance of the inci- Patrick Malach - [email protected] - 0799 322 192 dents occurring ANSO ACRONYMS Sayed Karim- [email protected] - 0707 474 135 there.

COUNTRY MANAGEMENT (KABUL) IMF-International Military If you can help us Forces / AOG-Armed Oppo- Sebastien Hogan - [email protected] - 0799 325 349 understand the prov- sition Groups / GOA- Ali Riazi - [email protected] - 0797 165 017 Government of Afghanistan ince better, please Vacant - [email protected] - 0797 414 100 / ACG-Armed Criminal contact us. Groups / ANA-Afghan Na- Vacant - [email protected] - 0797 093 073 tional Army / ANP-Afghan National Police / IED- Improvised Explosive De- vice / AEF-Afghan Eradica- TRAINING tion Forces / RPG-Rocket Propelled Grenade / IDF- Indirect Fire (ex: mortars) / Armadillo at Large will be providing training for the NGO community in Ka- VBIED-Vehicle Borne Impro- bul during October. For further information, please visit vised Exploding Device / PRP-Previous Reporting www.armadilloatlarge.com. Period / ANBP-Afghan Na- ANSO will be conducting a trial of its newly designed communications training tional Border Police / SAF- Small Arms Fire / NDS- in mid-October and hopes to unveil the session for regular provision in early National Directorate of Se- November. curity (intelligence) / PSC- Private Security Company / DC-District Centre