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ARAC AAWG Widespread Fatigue Damage Final Report

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ARAC AAWG Widespread Fatigue Damage Final Report A REPORT OF THE AIRWORTHINESS ASSURANCE WORKING GROUP RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REGULATORY ACTION TO PREVENT WIDESPREAD FATIGUE DAMAGE IN THE COMMERCIAL AIRPLANE FLEET FINAL REPORT March 11, 1999 Revision A June 29, 1999 SIGNED BY Jack McGuire Jim Foucault Co-Chairperson, AAWG Co-Chairperson, AAWG Boeing Commercial Airplanes United Parcel Service A REPORT OF THE AAWG RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REGULATORY ACTION TO PREVENT WIDESPREAD FATIGUE DAMAGE IN THE COMMERCIAL AIRPLANE FLEET REVISION PAGE LTR DATE CHANGE PAGES PAGES PAGES APPROVED ADDED DELETED CHANGED BY - 3-11-99 Initial Release - - - - A 6-29-99 TAEIG Requested Change 0 0 1, 2, 10, AWH 128 June 29, 1999 PAGE 2 A REPORT OF THE AAWG RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REGULATORY ACTION TO PREVENT WIDESPREAD FATIGUE DAMAGE IN THE COMMERCIAL AIRPLANE FLEET TABLE OF CONTENTS REVISION PAGE....................................................................................................2 TABLE OF CONTENTS..........................................................................................3 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.....................................................................................6 REFERENCES .......................................................................................................7 1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY..............................................................................8 1.1 CONCLUSIONS .......................................................................................8 1.2 RECOMMENDATIONS ..........................................................................10 2.0 AVIATION RULEMAKING ADVISORY COMMITTEE TASKING ...............11 3.0 AIRWORTHINESS ASSURANCE WORKING GROUP .............................13 4.0 BACKGROUND .........................................................................................14 4.1 AFFIRMATION 1993 ARAC RECOMMENDATIONS .............................15 4.1.1 1993 ARAC Recommendations.......................................................15 4.1.2 1999 Adjustments to the 1993 Recommendations ..........................16 4.2 ADVISORY CIRCULAR 91-56A .............................................................19 4.2.1 Text Changes ..................................................................................20 4.2.2 Interpretation of Text .......................................................................21 4.2.3 Additional ATA/AIA Comments........................................................22 4.3 DEFINITIONS.........................................................................................22 4.4 MONITORING PERIOD..........................................................................25 4.5 PROPRIETARY DATA ISSUES .............................................................31 5.0 TECHNICAL ISSUES.................................................................................32 5.1 AUTHORITIES REVIEW TEAM ISSUES AND ACTION .......................32 5.2 AREAS SUSCEPTIBLE TO MSD/MED .................................................34 5.3 DSD COMBINED WITH MSD................................................................44 5.3.1 Background .....................................................................................44 5.3.2 Technical Approach.........................................................................44 5.3.3 Analytical Procedure........................................................................46 5.3.4 Environmental and Accidental Damage...........................................47 5.4 CERTIFICATION STANDARDS .............................................................49 5.4.1 Fail-Safe Analysis Damage Sizes....................................................51 5.4.2 Damage Tolerance Analysis Damage Sizes ...................................51 5.4.3 Survey of Certification Damage Size ...............................................51 5.4.4 Safety Enhancements .....................................................................53 5.4.5 Conclusions ..........................................................................................53 5.5 MANAGEMENT OF MSD/MED IN THE FLEET .....................................55 5.6 SUPPLEMENTAL TYPE CERTIFICATES.............................................56 5.6.1 Background .....................................................................................56 5.6.2 Discussion .......................................................................................56 5.6.3 Recommendations...........................................................................57 5.6.4 Compliance Time for STC WFD Assessment..................................58 5.6.5 Summary .........................................................................................58 5.7 COMBINATION OF MSD/MED SCENARIOS ........................................59 6.0 TECHNOLOGY READINESS ....................................................................60 6.1 1998 ASSESSMENT OF TECHNOLOGY AVAILABLE ..........................60 6.1.1 1993 Recommendations..................................................................60 June 29, 1999 PAGE 3 A REPORT OF THE AAWG RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REGULATORY ACTION TO PREVENT WIDESPREAD FATIGUE DAMAGE IN THE COMMERCIAL AIRPLANE FLEET 6.1.2 1998 Status .....................................................................................61 6.1.3 Future Research..............................................................................62 6.1.4 Research Proposal ..........................................................................63 6.1.5 Residual Strength ............................................................................64 6.2 1998 AND NEAR FUTURE INDUSTRY NDI CAPABILITIES .................65 6.2.1 NDI Round-Robin ............................................................................65 6.2.2 NDI Round-Robin Results ...............................................................69 6.3 NDI Improvements with Regard to the Challenge of MSD......................74 7.0 AIRPLANE SPECIFIC EVIDENCE OF MSD/MED.....................................76 7.1 HEALTH OF FLEET WITH REGARD TO WIDESPREAD FATIGUE DAMAGE SOURCES .............................................................................76 7.1.1 Background -- The Communication Process Today. .......................76 7.1.2 Additional Operator Actions.............................................................77 7.1.3 Additional OEM Actions...................................................................78 7.1.4 OEM/Operator Improved Communication Improvements................78 7.1.5 Role of the STG...............................................................................78 7.2 VALUE OF SERVICE DIFFICULTY REPORTS .....................................79 7.2.1 Evaluation Process..........................................................................79 7.2.2 Results and Conclusions .................................................................79 7.3 AIRPLANE SPECIFIC EVIDENCE OF MSD/MED .................................80 7.3.1 Evaluation Process..........................................................................80 7.3.2 Results and Conclusions .................................................................80 7.3.3 Airplane Specific Instances Of MED / MSD.....................................81 8.0 OVERVIEW OF OEM METHODOLOGIES ................................................83 8.1 AIRBUS INDUSTRIE ..............................................................................83 8.1.1 Probabilistic Assessment of Structure Susceptible to MSD/MED....83 8.1.2 Calculation Procedure .....................................................................83 8.1.3 Monitoring Period ............................................................................85 8.2 BOEING COMMERCIAL AIRPLANES ...................................................87 8.2.1 Initiation / Threshold Determination.................................................87 8.2.2 Crack Growth...................................................................................89 8.2.3 Residual Strength ............................................................................89 8.2.4 Inspection Programs........................................................................90 8.3 LOCKHEED-MARTIN AERONAUTICAL SYSTEMS ..............................90 8.3.1 Crack Growth...................................................................................91 8.3.2 Residual Strength ............................................................................92 8.3.3 Inspection Programs........................................................................92 8.4 OVERVIEW OF DELTA AIR LINES METHODOLOGY ..........................92 8.4.1 Initiation ...........................................................................................93 8.4.2 Crack Growth...................................................................................93 8.4.3 Residual Strength ............................................................................94 8.4.4 Inspection Threshold/Interval Determination ...................................94 8.5 ROUND ROBIN EXERCISES.................................................................95 8.5.1 Round-Robin Exercise Number 1 .........................................................95 8.5.2 Round-Robin Exercise Number 2 .........................................................96 8.5.3 Scatter Factors And Mean Life Tendencies For MSD Crack Initiation .........................................................................................102 June 29, 1999 PAGE 4 A REPORT OF THE AAWG RECOMMENDATIONS
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