DOCSLIB.ORG

Popper, Induction and Falsification Author(S): Gary Jones and Clifton Perry Source: Erkenntnis (1975-), Vol

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Popper, Induction and Falsification Author(S): Gary Jones and Clifton Perry Source: Erkenntnis (1975-), Vol Popper, Induction and Falsification Author(s): Gary Jones and Clifton Perry Source: Erkenntnis (1975-), Vol. 18, No. 1 (Jul., 1982), pp. 97-104 Published by: Springer Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20010796 Accessed: 25-07-2017 12:43 UTC JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://about.jstor.org/terms Springer is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Erkenntnis (1975-) This content downloaded from 150.135.165.121 on Tue, 25 Jul 2017 12:43:25 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms GARY JONES AND CLIFTON PERRY POPPER, INDUCTION AND FALSIFICATION The typical Popperian response to the Duhemian problem concerning the impossibility of ever falsifying, and thus isolating, a scientific hypothesis is usually framed in terms of what we take as the hypothesis under test as opposed to theories assumed to be true for testing purposes. As such, Popper's response does not attack the logical problem posed by Duhem at the level of logical possibilities but rather at the level of scientific practice. Popper's response stands in curious contrast to the type of remarks prom? ulgated by Popper anent induction. Rather than speak of inductive prob? lems in the arena of scientific practice, Popper usually reverts to talk of the a priori possibility that positive or confirming evidence notwithstanding, a universal hypothesis might be falsified. In what follows we shall suggest that this contrast of attitudes towards the impossibility of falsifying and the possibility of verifying actually makes it impossible for Popper to effect a complete rout of Duhem's problem or of induction, that any stratagem taken to resolve the Duhemian problem enhances induction. Finally, it will be argued that the successful application of Popper's hypothetico-deduc tive method of explanation presupposes that nature is uniform. Hence for this reason as well, falsification and induction are of the same epistemic status. I According to Duhem, there obtains an intimate logical connection be? tween scientific theories and scientific hypotheses. Scientific theories con? ceived in terms of the "economy of thought", i.e., as abstractions of the set of germane laws, are such that they are presupposed in the deduction of any statement to be compared with observation statements.1 Not only is the entire theoretical system presupposed in the deduction of a given state? ment but also the comparison of the observation statement with the de? rived statement involves the use of instruments the intelligibility of which entails reference to theories not intentionally tested. Not only might such instruments be faulty but the theories which justify their employment may in fact be incorrect. Consequently any derived statement follows not from Erkenntnis 18 (1982) 97-104. 0165-0106/82/0181-0097 $00.80 Copyright ? 1982 by D. Reidel Publishing Co., Dordrecht, Holland, and Boston, U.S.A. This content downloaded from 150.135.165.121 on Tue, 25 Jul 2017 12:43:25 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 98 GARY JONES AND CLIFTON PERRY an isolated hypothesis but rather from the hypothesis conjoined with other general statements of the same nature. Any conflict between the derived statement and the observation statement only indicates that something is wrong, but not which hypothesis is at fault. To deny the consequent of a conditional is to deny the entire antecedent, even if the antecedent is a conjunction. It would, of course, be to no avail to argue that when conflict did arise, each hypothesis might be tested in turn so as to determine which one was faulty and thus responsible for the conflict. Such a proposal would, accord? ing to Duhem, be impossible to actualize as each hypothesis tested would be in exactly the same doubtful position suffered by the initial hypothesis. The test of each hypothesis would, that is, involve not only those other equally suspect hypotheses immediately associated with the initial hypoth? esis, but also those connected with the hypothesis in question by virtue of the instruments employed in the test. If, therefore, conflict between the derived statement and the observation statement indicates merely that some hypothesis is incorrect but not which hypothesis, then a given hypoth? esis can never, pace Popper, be falsified. If a given hypothesis can never be falsified, then falsificationism is for logical reasons inadequate as a methodology for getting us closer to the truth in science. Popper's defense admits that although it is logically possible to attribute responsibility anywhere within the system, it is not logically necessary to do so. Since logical possibility is only a necessary condition for attributing responsibility for the conflict between the description of the event and the predicted event, the sufficient condition must rest beyond mere considera? tion of logic. In other words it might well be argued that the formal possibility of not attributing responsibility for theoretical conflict to any given hypoth? esis does not necessitate theoretical indecision. It may very well be the case that we shall have to appeal to something beyond mere logical con? siderations in order to attribute responsibility, e.g., methodological con? siderations of the sort consonant with falsificationism. Thus, although there may obtain no logically conclusive reason for suspecting any given hypothesis responsible for a conflict between a derived statement and an observation statement because of the logical possibility that responsibility may reside elsewhere in the theoretical system, it does not follow that, on methodological grounds, good reasons as opposed to logically conclusive ones could not be proffered ascribing responsibility to a given hypothesis. This content downloaded from 150.135.165.121 on Tue, 25 Jul 2017 12:43:25 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms POPPER, INDUCTION AND FALSIFICATION 99 What, of course, constitutes good reasons will depend upon the particular methodological approach involved. It is, according to Popper, the prior determination of a priori improbability which methodologically designates one hypothesis rather than another as responsible for the conflict.2 This response acknowledges the logical possibility that the cause of the conflict may reside anywhere within the system but then narrows the field of rational or real candidates in terms of the prior determination of falsifi ability. Indeed, according to Lakatos, the sophisticated falsificationist ac? knowledges that logically the falsifying instance reflects negatively upon no one part of the body of science.3 Nevertheless, the sophisticated falsifi? cationist takes the 'modus tollens' to focus upon the most highly falsifiable portion of the antecedent. The methodologically accepted rule for replace? ment, in this case, specifies only that the newly employed hypothesis should not cause a degeneration (a reduction in empirical content) in the 'research program.' II Irrespective of whether or not the Popperian appeal to methodology would satisfy those troubled by Duhem's problem, the important point is that Popper takes the appeal to methodological considerations in response to a priori problems arising in scientific testing as being at least appropriate, if not adequate. The issue then becomes whether or not this attitude is con? sistent with that manifested in regard to another a priori problem arising within the context of scientific testing. The problem of induction has often been treated by Popper as an issue completely divorced from consider? ations of methodology. He has maintained that because of the universal nature of a general hypothesis, no finite quantity of evidence can ever serve to conclusively demonstrate the truth or even probable truth of the hypoth? esis.4 Nonetheless, an inductivist could surely admit that there obtains a log? ical gulf between the truth of a general hypothesis and that of evidence statements, and yet note that this fails to show that we cannot have 'good' reasons for supposing a given hypothesis to be true or probably true.5 It might be contended that positive evidence, in some pre-determined quan? tity, does serve as 'good', although not logically conclusive, reasons for accepting a given hypothesis. This content downloaded from 150.135.165.121 on Tue, 25 Jul 2017 12:43:25 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 100 GARY JONES AND CLIFTON PERRY III What constitutes 'good' reasons with respect to both problems of scientific testing, i.e., the problems of verification and falsification, are the same in both cases. With regard to the problem of falsification, although it might be admitted that no logical guarantee could be given that the responsibility for conflict did not rest elsewhere in the theoretical system, there obtained no empirical evidence to show that it might. The mere logical possibility that the cause of conflict could reside with something other than the hypoth? esis under test is not grounds for supposing that in fact the cause of conflict rests with something other than the hypothesis under test. Given that we either have some reasons for holding the hypothesis under test more suspect than the remainder of the theoretical system or that we have no sufficient grounds for doubting anything other than the hypothesis itself, we have good reasons for supposing the hypothesis responsible for the conflict. Similarly, in the case of induction although there is no logical guarantee that future testing of the hypothesis will not vitiate the hypothesis' good standing, the mere logical possibility that such a state might obtain is insufficient to cast doubt upon the truth or possible truth of the hypothesis.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Would ''Direct Realism'' Resolve the Classical Problem of Induction?
    NOU^S 38:2 (2004) 197–232 Would ‘‘Direct Realism’’ Resolve the Classical Problem of Induction? MARC LANGE University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill I Recently, there has been a modest resurgence of interest in the ‘‘Humean’’ problem of induction. For several decades following the recognized failure of Strawsonian ‘‘ordinary-language’’ dissolutions and of Wesley Salmon’s elaboration of Reichenbach’s pragmatic vindication of induction, work on the problem of induction languished. Attention turned instead toward con- firmation theory, as philosophers sensibly tried to understand precisely what it is that a justification of induction should aim to justify. Now, however, in light of Bayesian confirmation theory and other developments in epistemology, several philosophers have begun to reconsider the classical problem of induction. In section 2, I shall review a few of these developments. Though some of them will turn out to be unilluminating, others will profitably suggest that we not meet inductive scepticism by trying to justify some alleged general principle of ampliative reasoning. Accordingly, in section 3, I shall examine how the problem of induction arises in the context of one particular ‘‘inductive leap’’: the confirmation, most famously by Henrietta Leavitt and Harlow Shapley about a century ago, that a period-luminosity relation governs all Cepheid variable stars. This is a good example for the inductive sceptic’s purposes, since it is difficult to see how the sparse background knowledge available at the time could have entitled stellar astronomers to regard their observations as justifying this grand inductive generalization. I shall argue that the observation reports that confirmed the Cepheid period- luminosity law were themselves ‘‘thick’’ with expectations regarding as yet unknown laws of nature.
    [Show full text]
  • Truth, Rationality, and the Growth of Scientific Knowledge
    ....... CONJECTURES sense similar to that in which processes or things may be said to be parts of the world; that the world consists of facts in a sense in which it may be said to consist of (four dimensional) processes or of (three dimensional) things. They believe that, just as certain nouns are names of things, sentences are names of facts. And they sometimes even believe that sentences are some- thing like pictures of facts, or that they are projections of facts.7 But all this is mistaken. The fact that there is no elephant in this room is not one of the processes or parts ofthe world; nor is the fact that a hailstorm in Newfound- 10 land occurred exactIy I I I years after a tree collapsed in the New Zealand bush. Facts are something like a common product oflanguage and reality; they are reality pinned down by descriptive statements. They are like abstracts from TRUTH, RATIONALITY, AND THE a book, made in a language which is different from that of the original, and determined not only by the original book but nearly as much by the principles GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE of selection and by other methods of abstracting, and by the means of which the new language disposes. New linguistic means not only help us to describe 1. THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE: THEORIES AND PROBLEMS new kinds of facts; in a way, they even create new kinds of facts. In a certain sense, these facts obviously existed before the new means were created which I were indispensable for their description; I say, 'obviously' because a calcula- tion, for example, ofthe movements of the planet Mercury of 100 years ago, MY aim in this lecture is to stress the significance of one particular aspect of carried out today with the help of the calculus of the theory of relativity, may science-its need to grow, or, if you like, its need to progress.
    [Show full text]
  • The Demarcation Problem
    Part I The Demarcation Problem 25 Chapter 1 Popper’s Falsifiability Criterion 1.1 Popper’s Falsifiability Popper’s Problem : To distinguish between science and pseudo-science (astronomy vs astrology) - Important distinction: truth is not the issue – some theories are sci- entific and false, and some may be unscientific but true. - Traditional but unsatisfactory answers: empirical method - Popper’s targets: Marx, Freud, Adler Popper’s thesis : Falsifiability – the theory contains claims which could be proved to be false. Characteristics of Pseudo-Science : unfalsifiable - Any phenomenon can be interpreted in terms of the pseudo-scientific theory “Whatever happened always confirmed it” (5) - Example: man drowning vs saving a child Characteristics of Science : falsifiability - A scientific theory is always takes risks concerning the empirical ob- servations. It contains the possibility of being falsified. There is con- firmation only when there is failure to refute. 27 28 CHAPTER 1. POPPER’S FALSIFIABILITY CRITERION “The theory is incompatible with certain possible results of observation” (6) - Example: Einstein 1919 1.2 Kuhn’s criticism of Popper Kuhn’s Criticism of Popper : Popper’s falsifiability criterion fails to char- acterize science as it is actually practiced. His criticism at best applies to revolutionary periods of the history of science. Another criterion must be given for normal science. Kuhn’s argument : - Kuhn’s distinction between normal science and revolutionary science - A lesson from the history of science: most science is normal science. Accordingly, philosophy of science should focus on normal science. And any satisfactory demarcation criterion must apply to normal science. - Popper’s falsifiability criterion at best only applies to revolutionary science, not to normal science.
    [Show full text]
  • Study Questions Philosophy of Science Spring 2011 Exam 1
    Study Questions Philosophy of Science Spring 2011 Exam 1 1. Explain the affinities and contrasts between science and philosophy and between science and metaphysics. 2. What is the principle of verification? How was the logical positivist‟s view of verification influenced by Hume‟s fork? Explain. 3. Explain Hume‟s distinction between impressions and ideas. What is the relevance of this distinction for the empiricist‟s view of how knowledge is acquired? 4. Why was Hume skeptical about “metaphysical knowledge”? Does the logical positivist, such as A. J. Ayer, agree or disagree? Why or why not? 5. Explain Ayer‟s distinction between weak and strong verification. Is this distinction tenable? 6. How did Rudolf Carnap attempt to separate science from metaphysics? Explain the role of what Carnap called „C-Rules‟ for this attempt. Was he successful? 7. Explain one criticism of the logical positivist‟s principle of verification? Do you agree or disagree? Why or why not? 8. Explain the affinities and contrasts between A. J. Ayer‟s logical positivism and Karl Popper‟s criterion of falsifiability. Why does Popper think that scientific progress depends on falsifiability rather than verifiability? What are Popper‟s arguments against verifiability? Do you think Popper is correct? 9. Kuhn argued that Popper neglected what Kuhn calls “normal science.” Does Popper have a reply to Kuhn in his distinction between science and ideology? Explain. 10. Is Popper‟s criterion of falsifiability a solution to the problem of demarcation? Why or why not? Why would Gierre or Kuhn disagree? Explain 11. Kuhn, in his “Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?” disagrees with Popper‟s criterion of falsifiability as defining the essence of science.
    [Show full text]
  • Corkett a Note on the Aristotelian Origin
    1 A NOTE ON THE ARISTOTELIAN ORIGIN OF POPPER’S DEMARCATION CRITERION TOGETHER WITH ITS APPLICATION TO ATLANTIC CANADA’S FISHERIES Christopher J. Corkett* *Christopher is a retired Instructor from the Biology Department of Dalhousie University. He is currently applying Karl Popper’s non-inductive theory of method to the management of the world’s commercial fisheries. Abstract It has not always been realised that Karl Popper’s demarcation criterion, the criterion he uses to distinguish an empirical science from its ‘metaphysical’ complement involves an interpretation of the classical theory of terms. From the beginning Popper’s criterion never was an attempt to distinguish some subject matter called ‘science’ from some subject matter called ‘metaphysics’. His criterion of falsifiability always was an attempt to distinguish the logical strength of a universal law from the logical weakness of its complement, a complement that can bear no fruit. For example: if the falsifiability criterion is applied to the management of the fisheries of Atlantic Canada we can distinguish the bold and sound management of Atlantic lobster from the weak and unsound management of Atlantic groundfish. In the early 1990s Newfoundland’s fishery for Atlantic cod suffered a major collapse that has become one of the world’s most prominent case studies of failure in fisheries management. Under Popper’s analytic theory of demarcation a weak management with no problem solving potentiality is to be held responsible for the collapse of Newfoundland’s Atlantic cod fishery. 2 1. Introduction Logic is one of the most ancient of all disciplines. It was founded by the Greek scientist and philosopher Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) before even the Hellenistic development of mathematics.
    [Show full text]
  • Notes on Hume's Problem of Induction 1748 - Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding
    1740 - Treatise of Human Nature Notes on Hume's Problem of Induction 1748 - Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding Recall: Subject of confirmation = How scientific claims are justified. This assumes that they are capable of justification in the first place. Hume asks: Is there a rational basis for inductive inferences? Hume response: No! Consequence: To the extent that scientific claims are based on inductive inferences, they cannot be justified. Example: All observed ravens are black. Hume asks, Can we ever be justified in believing the conclusion? All ravens are black. Two types of objects of knowledge, according to Hume (I) Relations of ideas = Products of deductive (truth-preserving) Ex: 2 + 2 = 4 inferences; negation entails a contradiction. (II) Matters of fact = Products of inductive inferences; negation does Ex: All ravens are black. not entail a contradiction. Outline of Hume's Argument (1) Matters of fact can only be known through experience ("a posteriori"). (2) Therefore matters of fact can only be justified by recourse to experience. (3) But any attempt to do so is circular. ∴ There is no justification for inductive inferences. ASIDE 1. Hume is not just saying that we can never be certain about inductive inferences (i.e., we can never be 100% certain that all ravens are black). This would be uncontentious: Most people would agree that there's always room for error in making an inductive inference. However, most people would at the same time claim that we are justified in making (some) inductive inferences, even though they aren't 100% guaranteed to work (i.e., we think there are standards by which we can judge good inductive inferences from bad ones).
    [Show full text]
  • Hume's Problem of Induction and the Universalization Of
    In Defense of Newtonian Induction: Hume's Problem of Induction and the Universalization of Primary Qualities Ori Belkind November 1, 2018 Abstract This paper aims to advance two claims. First, it aims to show that Hume's argument against the rationality of induction is sound. However, I claim that the conclusion does not follow merely from the self-defeating attempts to justify the rule of induction, unlike traditional readings of the argument. Rather, the skeptical conclusion must also take into account Hume's argument that the secret powers that are present in bodies and give rise to sensible qualities are unknowable. The paper's second aim is to show that Newtonian induction escapes Hume's secret powers argument, given that it includes a transductive inference, from observable phenomena to the powers present in the ultimate parts of matter. Consequently Hume's argument against the rationality of induction does not demonstrate the non-rational nature of Newtonian induction. 1 Introduction This paper articulates a certain reading of Hume's argument against the rationality of induction. Unlike traditional interpretations of Hume's argument, mine takes his argument to involve two distinct sub-arguments; the first is that inductive inferences lack rational support. I term this sub-argument the No Rational Support Argument (NRSA) (Section 2). I also argue that Hume uses a second sub- argument, one I term the Secret Powers Argument, or SPA, to undermine our belief in the rationality of induction. According to the SPA (examined in Section 3), we do not have access to the secret powers of bodies.
    [Show full text]
  • The Problem of Induction
    The Problem of Induction Gilbert Harman Department of Philosophy, Princeton University Sanjeev R. Kulkarni Department of Electrical Engineering, Princeton University July 19, 2005 The Problem The problem of induction is sometimes motivated via a comparison between rules of induction and rules of deduction. Valid deductive rules are necessarily truth preserving, while inductive rules are not. So, for example, one valid deductive rule might be this: (D) From premises of the form “All F are G” and “a is F ,” the corresponding conclusion of the form “a is G” follows. The rule (D) is illustrated in the following depressing argument: (DA) All people are mortal. I am a person. So, I am mortal. The rule here is “valid” in the sense that there is no possible way in which premises satisfying the rule can be true without the corresponding conclusion also being true. A possible inductive rule might be this: (I) From premises of the form “Many many F s are known to be G,” “There are no known cases of F s that are not G,” and “a is F ,” the corresponding conclusion can be inferred of the form “a is G.” The rule (I) might be illustrated in the following “inductive argument.” (IA) Many many people are known to have been moral. There are no known cases of people who are not mortal. I am a person. So, I am mortal. 1 The rule (I) is not valid in the way that the deductive rule (D) is valid. The “premises” of the inductive inference (IA) could be true even though its “con- clusion” is not true.
    [Show full text]
  • 1 Phil. 4400 Notes #1: the Problem of Induction I. Basic Concepts
    Phil. 4400 Notes #1: The problem of induction I. Basic concepts: The problem of induction: • Philosophical problem concerning the justification of induction. • Due to David Hume (1748). Induction: A form of reasoning in which a) the premises say something about a certain group of objects (typically, observed objects) b) the conclusion generalizes from the premises: says the same thing about a wider class of objects, or about further objects of the same kind (typically, the unobserved objects of the same kind). • Examples: All observed ravens so far have been The sun has risen every day for the last 300 black. years. So (probably) all ravens are black. So (probably) the sun will rise tomorrow. Non-demonstrative (non-deductive) reasoning: • Reasoning that is not deductive. • A form of reasoning in which the premises are supposed to render the conclusion more probable (but not to entail the conclusion). Cogent vs. Valid & Confirm vs. Entail : ‘Cogent’ arguments have premises that confirm (render probable) their conclusions. ‘Valid’ arguments have premises that entail their conclusions. The importance of induction: • All scientific knowledge, and almost all knowledge depends on induction. • The problem had a great influence on Popper and other philosophers of science. Inductive skepticism: Philosophical thesis that induction provides no justification for ( no reason to believe) its conclusions. II. An argument for inductive skepticism 1. There are (at most) 3 kinds of knowledge/justified belief: a. Observations b. A priori knowledge c. Conclusions based on induction 2. All inductive reasoning presupposes the “Inductive Principle” (a.k.a. the “uniformity principle”): “The course of nature is uniform”, “The future will resemble the past”, “Unobserved objects will probably be similar to observed objects” 3.
    [Show full text]
  • The Falsifiabtlity Criterion and the Cognitive Statws Of
    The falsifiability criterion and the cognitive status of religious belief Item Type text; Thesis-Reproduction (electronic) Authors Gettman, Gary Lee, 1942- Publisher The University of Arizona. Rights Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author. Download date 29/09/2021 14:06:51 Link to Item http://hdl.handle.net/10150/317923 THE FALSIFIABTLITY CRITERION AND THE COGNITIVE STATWS OF RELIGIONS BELIEF by Gary Lo Gettmm A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements ■ ■ For the Degree of MASTER OF ARTS In the Graduate College THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA 19 6 6 STATEMENT BY AUTHOR This thesis has been submitted in partial fulfill­ ment of requirements for an advanced degree at The Uni­ versity of Arizona and is deposited in the University Library to be made available to borrowers under rules of the Libraryo Brief quotations from this thesis are allowable without special permission, provided that accurate acknow­ ledgment of source is made. Requests for permission for extended quotation from or reproduction of this manuscript in whole or in part may be granted by the head of the major department or the Dean of the Graduate College when in his judgment the proposed use of the material is in the inter­ ests of scholarship* In all other
    [Show full text]
  • The Problem of Induction
    The Problem of Induction Patrick Maher Philosophy 471 Fall 2006 Introduction The problem of induction is a problem about the justification of inductive reasoning, attributed to David Hume. This is an original lecture, not a presentation of something that has been published. However, I’ll refer to Laurence Bonjour’s article “Problems of Induction,” in A Companion to Epistemology, Blackwell 1992. The problem For concreteness, I’ll focus on a particular inductive inference. Suppose a person has observed the sun to rise every day for many days, and has no other relevant evidence. The problem: Show that the person is justified in having a high degree of belief that the sun will rise tomorrow, and explain why. I’ll assume that a person’s degree of belief in H is justified (in the relevant sense) iff it equals the inductive probability of H given the person’s evidence. The problem becomes: Show that the inductive probability that the sun will rise tomorrow, given only that the sun has risen every day for many days, is high; and explain why. Symbolism: Let ip(A|B) be the inductive probability of A given B. Let Si be that the sun rises on day i. The problem: Show that ip(Sn+1|S1 ... Sn) is high, and explain why. My solution Almost everyone agrees that ip(Sn+1|S1 ... Sn) is high. Since inductive probability is logical in Carnap’s sense, an error in this matter would be an error about a simple application of a concept of ordinary language. People are not usually mistaken about simple applications of concepts of their language.
    [Show full text]
  • An Analysis of the Demarcation Problem in Philosophy of Science and Its Application to Homeopathy
    AN ANALYSIS OF THE DEMARCATION PROBLEM IN PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND ITS APPLICATION TO HOMEOPATHY Alper Bilgehan YARDIMCI ABSTRACT This paper presents a preliminary analysis of homeopathy from the perspective of the demarcation problem in the philosophy of science. In this context, Popper, Kuhn and Feyerabend’s solution to the problem will be given respectively and their criteria will be applied to homeopathy, aiming to shed some light on the controversy over its scientific status. It then examines homeopathy under the lens of demarcation criteria to conclude that homeopathy is regarded as science by Feyerabend and is considered as pseudoscience by Popper and Kuhn. By offering adequate tools for the analysis of the foundations, structure and implications of homeopathy, demarcation issue can help to clarify this medical controversy. The main argument of this article is that a final decision on homeopathy, whose scientific status changes depending on the criteria of the philosophers mentioned, cannot be given. Keywords: Demarcation Problem, Scientific Status of Homeopathy, Falsifiability, Puzzle-solving, Anarchist Method, Pseudoscience BİLİM FELSEFESİNDE SINIR ÇİZME SORUNUNUN ANALİZİ VE HOMEOPATİYE UYGULANMASI ÖZ Bu makale, bilim felsefesinin önemli konularından biri olan sınır çizme sorunu açısından homeopatinin bir ön analizini sunmaktadır. Bu bağlamda, Popper, Kuhn ve Feyerabend'in sınır çizme sorununa yönelik çözümleri sırasıyla verilecek ve onların ölçütleri, homeopatinin bilimsel durumu üzerindeki tartışmalara ışık tutacak şekilde uygulanacaktır. Homeopatinin Feyerabend tarafından bilim, Popper ve Kuhn açısından ise sözde bilim olduğu sonucuna varmak amacıyla, homeopati sınır çizme ölçütleri çerçevesinde incelenmektedir. Sınır çizme tartışması homeopatinin temellerini, yapısını ve sonuçlarını analiz etmek için yeterli araçları sunarak bu tıbbi tartışmayı netleştirmeye yardımcı olabilir.
    [Show full text]