Popper, Induction and Falsification Author(s): Gary Jones and Clifton Perry Source: Erkenntnis (1975-), Vol. 18, No. 1 (Jul., 1982), pp. 97-104 Published by: Springer Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20010796 Accessed: 25-07-2017 12:43 UTC JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://about.jstor.org/terms Springer is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Erkenntnis (1975-) This content downloaded from 150.135.165.121 on Tue, 25 Jul 2017 12:43:25 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms GARY JONES AND CLIFTON PERRY POPPER, INDUCTION AND FALSIFICATION The typical Popperian response to the Duhemian problem concerning the impossibility of ever falsifying, and thus isolating, a scientific hypothesis is usually framed in terms of what we take as the hypothesis under test as opposed to theories assumed to be true for testing purposes. As such, Popper's response does not attack the logical problem posed by Duhem at the level of logical possibilities but rather at the level of scientific practice. Popper's response stands in curious contrast to the type of remarks prom? ulgated by Popper anent induction. Rather than speak of inductive prob? lems in the arena of scientific practice, Popper usually reverts to talk of the a priori possibility that positive or confirming evidence notwithstanding, a universal hypothesis might be falsified. In what follows we shall suggest that this contrast of attitudes towards the impossibility of falsifying and the possibility of verifying actually makes it impossible for Popper to effect a complete rout of Duhem's problem or of induction, that any stratagem taken to resolve the Duhemian problem enhances induction. Finally, it will be argued that the successful application of Popper's hypothetico-deduc tive method of explanation presupposes that nature is uniform. Hence for this reason as well, falsification and induction are of the same epistemic status. I According to Duhem, there obtains an intimate logical connection be? tween scientific theories and scientific hypotheses. Scientific theories con? ceived in terms of the "economy of thought", i.e., as abstractions of the set of germane laws, are such that they are presupposed in the deduction of any statement to be compared with observation statements.1 Not only is the entire theoretical system presupposed in the deduction of a given state? ment but also the comparison of the observation statement with the de? rived statement involves the use of instruments the intelligibility of which entails reference to theories not intentionally tested. Not only might such instruments be faulty but the theories which justify their employment may in fact be incorrect. Consequently any derived statement follows not from Erkenntnis 18 (1982) 97-104. 0165-0106/82/0181-0097 $00.80 Copyright ? 1982 by D. Reidel Publishing Co., Dordrecht, Holland, and Boston, U.S.A. This content downloaded from 150.135.165.121 on Tue, 25 Jul 2017 12:43:25 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 98 GARY JONES AND CLIFTON PERRY an isolated hypothesis but rather from the hypothesis conjoined with other general statements of the same nature. Any conflict between the derived statement and the observation statement only indicates that something is wrong, but not which hypothesis is at fault. To deny the consequent of a conditional is to deny the entire antecedent, even if the antecedent is a conjunction. It would, of course, be to no avail to argue that when conflict did arise, each hypothesis might be tested in turn so as to determine which one was faulty and thus responsible for the conflict. Such a proposal would, accord? ing to Duhem, be impossible to actualize as each hypothesis tested would be in exactly the same doubtful position suffered by the initial hypothesis. The test of each hypothesis would, that is, involve not only those other equally suspect hypotheses immediately associated with the initial hypoth? esis, but also those connected with the hypothesis in question by virtue of the instruments employed in the test. If, therefore, conflict between the derived statement and the observation statement indicates merely that some hypothesis is incorrect but not which hypothesis, then a given hypoth? esis can never, pace Popper, be falsified. If a given hypothesis can never be falsified, then falsificationism is for logical reasons inadequate as a methodology for getting us closer to the truth in science. Popper's defense admits that although it is logically possible to attribute responsibility anywhere within the system, it is not logically necessary to do so. Since logical possibility is only a necessary condition for attributing responsibility for the conflict between the description of the event and the predicted event, the sufficient condition must rest beyond mere considera? tion of logic. In other words it might well be argued that the formal possibility of not attributing responsibility for theoretical conflict to any given hypoth? esis does not necessitate theoretical indecision. It may very well be the case that we shall have to appeal to something beyond mere logical con? siderations in order to attribute responsibility, e.g., methodological con? siderations of the sort consonant with falsificationism. Thus, although there may obtain no logically conclusive reason for suspecting any given hypothesis responsible for a conflict between a derived statement and an observation statement because of the logical possibility that responsibility may reside elsewhere in the theoretical system, it does not follow that, on methodological grounds, good reasons as opposed to logically conclusive ones could not be proffered ascribing responsibility to a given hypothesis. This content downloaded from 150.135.165.121 on Tue, 25 Jul 2017 12:43:25 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms POPPER, INDUCTION AND FALSIFICATION 99 What, of course, constitutes good reasons will depend upon the particular methodological approach involved. It is, according to Popper, the prior determination of a priori improbability which methodologically designates one hypothesis rather than another as responsible for the conflict.2 This response acknowledges the logical possibility that the cause of the conflict may reside anywhere within the system but then narrows the field of rational or real candidates in terms of the prior determination of falsifi ability. Indeed, according to Lakatos, the sophisticated falsificationist ac? knowledges that logically the falsifying instance reflects negatively upon no one part of the body of science.3 Nevertheless, the sophisticated falsifi? cationist takes the 'modus tollens' to focus upon the most highly falsifiable portion of the antecedent. The methodologically accepted rule for replace? ment, in this case, specifies only that the newly employed hypothesis should not cause a degeneration (a reduction in empirical content) in the 'research program.' II Irrespective of whether or not the Popperian appeal to methodology would satisfy those troubled by Duhem's problem, the important point is that Popper takes the appeal to methodological considerations in response to a priori problems arising in scientific testing as being at least appropriate, if not adequate. The issue then becomes whether or not this attitude is con? sistent with that manifested in regard to another a priori problem arising within the context of scientific testing. The problem of induction has often been treated by Popper as an issue completely divorced from consider? ations of methodology. He has maintained that because of the universal nature of a general hypothesis, no finite quantity of evidence can ever serve to conclusively demonstrate the truth or even probable truth of the hypoth? esis.4 Nonetheless, an inductivist could surely admit that there obtains a log? ical gulf between the truth of a general hypothesis and that of evidence statements, and yet note that this fails to show that we cannot have 'good' reasons for supposing a given hypothesis to be true or probably true.5 It might be contended that positive evidence, in some pre-determined quan? tity, does serve as 'good', although not logically conclusive, reasons for accepting a given hypothesis. This content downloaded from 150.135.165.121 on Tue, 25 Jul 2017 12:43:25 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 100 GARY JONES AND CLIFTON PERRY III What constitutes 'good' reasons with respect to both problems of scientific testing, i.e., the problems of verification and falsification, are the same in both cases. With regard to the problem of falsification, although it might be admitted that no logical guarantee could be given that the responsibility for conflict did not rest elsewhere in the theoretical system, there obtained no empirical evidence to show that it might. The mere logical possibility that the cause of conflict could reside with something other than the hypoth? esis under test is not grounds for supposing that in fact the cause of conflict rests with something other than the hypothesis under test. Given that we either have some reasons for holding the hypothesis under test more suspect than the remainder of the theoretical system or that we have no sufficient grounds for doubting anything other than the hypothesis itself, we have good reasons for supposing the hypothesis responsible for the conflict. Similarly, in the case of induction although there is no logical guarantee that future testing of the hypothesis will not vitiate the hypothesis' good standing, the mere logical possibility that such a state might obtain is insufficient to cast doubt upon the truth or possible truth of the hypothesis.