POLITICAL SECTARIANISM POLICY FORUM In the past decade, political scientists have introduced various constructs to capture this S OCIAL SCIENCE nonideological type of polarization, includ- ing “affective polarization” (1) and “social polarization” (4). Scholars from psychology Political sectarianism in America and other disciplines have introduced con- structs, such as “tribalism” (SM), to flesh out A poisonous cocktail of othering, aversion, and moralization its social-psychological properties. We propose here a superordinate con- poses a threat to democracy struct, political sectarianism—the tendency to adopt a moralized identification with By Eli J. Finkel1, Christopher A. Bail2, Mina ward the in-party (see the figure, bottom one political group and against another. Cikara3, Peter H. Ditto4, Shanto Iyengar5, panel). Out-party hate has also become Whereas the foundational metaphor for trib- Samara Klar6, Lilliana Mason7, Mary C. more powerful than in-party love as a pre- alism is kinship, the foundational metaphor McGrath1, Brendan Nyhan8, David G. Rand9, dictor of voting behavior (2), and by some for political sectarianism is religion, which Linda J. Skitka10, Joshua A. Tucker11, Jay J. Van metrics, it exceeds long-standing antipa- evokes analogies focusing less on genetic re- Bavel11, Cynthia S. Wang1, James N. Druckman1 thies around race and religion (SM). latedness than on strong faith in the moral This aversion to opposing partisans might correctness and superiority of one’s sect.

olitical polarization, a concern in make strategic sense if partisan identity Political identity is secondary to religion Downloaded from many countries, is especially acrimo- served as a strong proxy for political ideas. in traditional forms of sectarianism, but it nious in the United States (see the But given that sectarianism is not driven pri- is primary in political sectarianism. In the first box). For decades, scholars have marily by such ideas (SM), holding opposing United States today, even though Democrats studied polarization as an ideologi- partisans in contempt on the basis of their and Republicans differ on average in terms cal matter—how strongly Democrats identity alone precludes innovative cross- of religious affiliation, their schism is funda-

Pand Republicans diverge vis-à-vis political party solutions and mutually beneficial com- mentally political rather than religious. It is, http://science.sciencemag.org/ ideals and policy goals. Such competition promises. This preclusion is unfortunate, as in this sense, quite distinct from the Sunni- among groups in the marketplace of ideas common ground remains plentiful. Indeed, versus-Shia sectarian schisms that character- is a hallmark of a healthy democracy. But despite the clear evidence that partisans have ize politics in some Muslim-majority nations. more recently, researchers have identified grown increasingly disdainful of one another, Political sectarianism consists of three core a second type of polarization, one focusing the evidence that they have polarized in ingredients: othering—the tendency to view less on triumphs of ideas than on dominat- terms of policy preferences is equivocal (3). opposing partisans as essentially different or ing the abhorrent supporters of the oppos- Along the way, the causal connection be- alien to oneself; aversion—the tendency to ing party (1). This literature has produced tween policy preferences and party loyalty dislike and distrust opposing partisans; and a proliferation of insights and constructs has become warped, with partisans adjust- mora lization—the tendency to view opposing but few interdisciplinary efforts to inte- ing their policy preferences to align with partisans as iniquitous. It is the confluence grate them. We offer such an integration, their party identity (SM). For example, a of these ingredients that makes sectarianism on November 9, 2020 pinpointing the superordinate construct recent experiment demonstrated that Re- so corrosive in the political sphere. Viewing of political sectarianism and identifying publicans exhibit a liberal attitude shift opposing partisans as different, or even as its three core ingredients: othering, aver- after exposure to a clip of President Don- dislikable or immoral, may not be problem- sion, and moralization. We then consider ald Trump voicing a liberal policy position atic in isolation. But when all three converge, the causes of political sectarianism and its (SM); there is little evidence to suggest that political losses can feel like existential threats consequences for U.S. society—especially Democrats are immune to analogous shifts that must be averted—whatever the cost. the threat it poses to democracy. Finally, in response to their own political leaders. we propose interventions for minimizing Overall, the severity of political conflict WHY SECTARIANISM IS SURGING its most corrosive aspects. has grown increasingly divorced from the Rising political sectarianism in the United magnitude of policy disagreement (4). States is multiply determined; here we con- ASCENDANCE OF POLITICAL HATRED Democrats and Republicans—t he 85% of U.S. citizens who do not identify as pure On American exceptionalism independents—have grown more contemp- tuous of opposing partisans for decades, A recent study offers valuable international perspective on political polarization, and at similar rates [see supplementary leveraging data from 1975 through 2017 in nine Western democracies to examine feel- materials (SM)]. Only recently, however, ings toward copartisans and opposing partisans. The study controls statistically for the has this aversion exceeded their affection number of parties and offers a valuable, albeit noncomprehensive, comparison set (13). for copartisans. On a “feeling thermome- Four nations—America, Canada, New Zealand, and Switzerland—exhibit increasing ter” scale ranging from cold (0°) to neutral sectarianism over time, with the rate steepest in America. By contrast, Australia, Britain, (50°) to warm (100°), affect toward copar- Norway, Sweden, and Germany exhibit decreasing sectarianism over time. The most tisans has consistently hovered in the 70° notable findings pertain to out-party hate [increasingly “frigid” evaluations of opposing to 75° range. By contrast, affect toward op- partisans, via a “feeling thermometer” (see main text)]. Across the eight other nations, posing partisans has plummeted from 48° the mean rate of change in out-party hate was 0.004° per year (range: –0.2° to +0.2°) in the 1970s to 20° today (see the figure, on the 0°-to-100° scale. In the United States, the rate of change was –0.6° per year. By top panel). And cold feelings toward the 2017, out-party hate was stronger in America than in any other nation. out-party now exceed warm feelings to-

SCIENCE sciencemag.org 30 OCTOBER 2020 • VOL 370 ISSUE 6516 533

Published by AAAS INSIGHTS | POLICY FORUM

The rise of out-party hate ducing cable news faltered with the launch With the exception of 2020, all data come from the American National Election Study (ANES), as reported in (1). of the conservative Fox News in 1996 and the To calculate the estimates for the lower panel, we used upper-panel estimates to compute, relative to the neutral liberal pivot of MSNBC a decade later. People point on the feeling thermometer, the strength of in-party love (in-party score – 50) and out-party hate (50 – who are already sectarian selectively seek out out-party score), and then took the difference of those two scores. See supplementary materials for details. congenial news, but consuming such content also amplifies their sectarianism (SM). Warmth toward the opposing party (out-party) has diminished for decades In recent years, social media companies In-party Out-party like Facebook and Twitter have played an 100° Warm influential role in political discourse, inten- sifying political sectarianism. Scholars from sociology, political science, economics, psy- 75° chology, and computational social science debate whether such web platforms create Neutral 50° polarizing echo chambers (7) (SM). However, a recent field experiment offers intriguing ev- idence that Americans who deactivate their 25° Facebook account become less politically po- larized (8). In addition, emotional and mor- Feeling thermometer ratings thermometer Feeling Cold 0° alized posts—those containing words like 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 “hate,” “shame,” or “greed”—are especially Downloaded from likely to be retweeted within rather than be- tween partisan networks (9). Social-media Out-party hate has emerged as a stronger force than in-party love technology employs popularity-based algo- 25° Mean = 19.2 rithms that tailor content to maximize user engagement, increasing sectarianism within 20° Mean = 11.3 homogeneous networks (SM), in part be- http://science.sciencemag.org/ 15° cause of the contagious power of content that elicits sectarian fear or indignation. 10° Third, i n contrast to the equivocal ideo- 5° logical-polarization trends among the pub- Mean = –4.5 lic, politicians and other political elites have 0° unambiguously polarized recently on ideo- -5° logical grounds, with Republican politicians moving further to the right than Democratic

In-party love – Out-party hate – Out-party love In-party -10° politicians have moved to the left (SM). This ideological divergence is driven in part by ex- -15° 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 treme economic inequality in America today, on November 9, 2020 especially in conjunction with candidates be- sider three crucial causes. First, in recent litically engaged, contemptuous, and unco- coming increasingly reliant on ideologically decades, the nation’s major political parties operative than is actually the case (5) (SM), extreme donors. As polit icians chase cam- have sorted in terms of ideological identity thereby exacerbating political sectarianism. paign dollars, these extreme voices garner and demography. Whereas self-identified For example, Republicans estimate that disproportionate influence (SM). liberals and conservatives used to be dis- 32% of Democrats are LGBT when in real- The ideo logical divergence of political tributed broadly between the two parties, ity it is 6%; Democrats estimate that 38% elites contributes to political sectarianism, es- today the former are overwhelmingly Dem- of Republicans earn over $250,000 per year pecially as these individuals increasingly use ocrats and the latter are overwhelmingly when in reality it is 2% (6). disciplined messaging to discuss their pre- Republicans (SM) . The parties also have Second, as Americans have grown more ferred topics in their preferred manner (SM). sorted along racial, religious, educational, receptive to consuming information slanted Such messaging leads the public to perceive and geographic lines. Although far from through a partisan lens, the media ecosys- sharper ideological distinctions between the absolute, such alignment of ideological tem has inflamed political sectarianism. The parties than actually exists, which inflames identities and demography transforms po- decline of the broadcast news era, during sectarianism (SM). In addition, Newt Gin- litical orientation into a mega-identity that which impartiality was prized, began in the grich and his followers achieved electoral renders opposing partisans different from, 1980s, driven in part by the Reagan admin- success with strongly moralized language in even incomprehensible to, one another (4). istration’s termination of the Federal Com- the 1980s and 1990s, inspiring political elites This meg a-identity can grow so powerful munications Commission (FCC) “fairness on both sides to double down on the rhetoric that it changes other identities, as when doctrine” in 1987. This doctrine, introduced partisans alter their self-identified religion, in 1949, required that broadcasters discuss 1Northwestern University, Evanston, IL, USA. 2Duke class, or sexual orientation to align with controversial topics in a manner that the FCC University, Durham, NC, USA. 3Harvard University, their political identity (SM). assesses as unbiased. Among th e first media Cambridge, MA, USA. 4University of California, Irvine, Irvine, CA ,USA. 5Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA. As disti nct as Democrats and Republi- figures to leverage the demise of the fairness 6University of Arizona, Tuscon, AZ, USA. 7University of SCIENCE cans actually are today, partisans neverthe- doctrine was Rush Limbaugh, whose influen- Maryland, College Park, MD, USA. 8Dartmouth College, less vastly overestimate such differences. tial conservative radio program went into na- Hanover, NH, USA. 9Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, USA. 10University of Illinois at Chicago, They view opposing partisans as more tional syndication in 1988 (SM). The ethos of Chicago, IL, USA. 11New York University, New York, NY, USA.

socially distant, ideologically extreme, po- impartiality that CNN espoused when intro- Email: [email protected]; [email protected] CARY/ N. GRAPHIC:

534 30 OCTOBER 2020 • VOL 370 ISSUE 6516 sciencemag.org SCIENCE

Published by AAAS of moral outrage (e.g., “disgraceful,” “shame- checks and balances, or civil liberties (11). gating climate change, reducing the federal ful”), further exacerbating sectarianism (SM). Voters’ decisions to support such a candidate debt, and safeguarding democratic rights. These th ree trends—identity alignment, may seem sensible if they believe the harm to America’s response to the coronavirus the rise of partisan media, and elite ideo- democracy from any such decision is small disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic high- logical polarization—have contributed to while the consequences of having the vile lights the perils of political sectarianism. An radically different sectarian narratives about opposition win the election are catastrophic. October 2019 report from Johns Hopkins American society and politics. Although the However, the accumulation of such choices University suggested that America was bet- content of these narratives is entirely differ- undermines representative democracy. And ter prepared for a pandemic than any other ent across the political divide, their structure a society that pretends to adhere to demo- nation (SM), but that report failed to account is similar: The other side cheats, so our side cratic principles but actually does not is one for the sort of political sectarianism that would be foolish to adhere to long-standing in which people who possess resources and would, months later, make mask-wearing a democratic norms. These narratives, which influence can leverage democratic gray zones partisan symbol, one favored more by Demo- partisans experience less as stories than as to impose their will on those who do not. crats than by Republicans. Democrat s were truth (SM), increase their willingness to sac- Sectarianism stimulates activism (SM), also more likely to prioritize stay-at-home rifice those norms in pursuit of partisan ends. but also a willin gness to inflict collateral orders despite their massive, immediate eco-

DARK CON SEQUENCES Rising political sectarianism has, not sur- Is motivated partisan cognition bipartisan? prisingly, increased the social distance between Democrats and Republicans. Com- The extent to which each side exhibits motivated partisan (or biased) cognition is a Downloaded from pared to a few decades ago, Americans today focus of ongoing debate. Some scholars argue for symmetry (SM). For example, a are much more opposed to dating or marry- recent meta-analysis demonstrates equivalent levels of motivated partisan cognition ing an opposing partisan; they are also wary across 51 experiments investigating the tenden cy to evaluate otherwise identical in- of living near or working for one. They tend formation more favorably when it supports versus challenges one’s political beliefs or to discriminate, as when paying an opposing allegiances (14). In an illu strative experiment, liberals and conservatives viewed a film clip of a political demonstration in which protestors clashed with police. Despite view- partisan less than a copartisan for identical http://science.sciencemag.org/ job performance or recommending that an ing the identical clip, liberals rated the protesters as more violent when they believed opposing partisan be denied a scholarship it was an anti-abortion protest (a conservative cause) rather than a gay-rights protest despite being the more qualified applicant (a liberal cause), whereas conservatives exhibited the opposite pattern (SM). (1). They are also susceptible to motivated Other scholars argue for asymmetry. For example, some evidence suggests that, partisan cognition—seeking out, believing, relative to Democrats, Republicans have a higher need for order and greater trust in and approving of information more readily their gut-level intuitions. Such tendencies appear to motivate them to favor explana- when it reflects positively on copartisans or tions that are straightforward and intuitive rather than complex and abstract, even negatively on opposing partisans (10) (SM)— when the latter types of explanation might be more accurate (15) (SM). Such findings although scholars debate whether such ten- are representative of the existing evidence, but conclusions remain tentative. dencies are equally strong among Democrats and Republicans (see the second box). on November 9, 2020 These ma nifestations of political sectari- damage in pursuit of political goals (SM) nomic cost—a pattern that was especially anism echo those that emerge from religious and to view copartisans who compromise prominent among highly sectarian partisans sectarianism. What is distinctive about po- as apostates (SM). As political sectarianism (SM). This schism, fomented in part by Presi- litical sectarianism—beyond its largely non- has surged in recent years, so too has sup- dent Trump, pushed toward a disequilibrium theological foundation—is the immediacy of port for violent tactics (SM). In addition , in which too few people engaged sufficiently its links to governance. Political sectarianism highly sectarian partisans are vulnerable to in commerce to stimulate economic growth compromises the core government function exploitation. In 2016, Russia sought to stoke while too few social-distanced sufficiently to of representation. Because sectarian parti- partisan outrage during America’s election contain the pandemic. The result has been sans almost never vote for the opposition, by creating fake social-media avatars with lethal and expensive for Americans across politicians lack the incentive to represent names like “Blacktivist” and “army_of_je- the political spectrum. all of their constituents. Straight-ticket vot- sus.” These efforts succeeded in duping sec- ing has grown increasingly widespread. In tarian extremists—especially those who were MITIGATING SECTARIANISM contested districts, the correlation of the older and more conservative than average— Politica l sectarianism is neither inevitable Democratic share of the House vote and the into amplifying the avatars’ memes about nor irreversible. When considering promis- Democratic share of the presidential vote— the depravity of opposing partisans (SM). In ing avenues for intervention, the goal is not the association of district-level with national doing so, these partisans served as pawns in to restore America to some halcyon republic representation—surged from 0.54 in the Russia’s efforts to weaken America. of yore. As exemplified by the 1870s transi- 1970s to 0.94 by the 2010s (2). Political sectarianism also undermines the tion from the relatively antiracist Reconstruc- Perhaps most troubling of all, the politi- core government function of competence— tion era to the deeply racist Redemption era, cal sectarianism of the public incentivizes of providing for and protecting the people. many historic episodes of partisan comity politicians to adopt antidemocratic tactics Members of Congress increasingly prioritize rested upon bipartisan support for (or at least when pursuing electoral or political victo- partisan purity over the sorts of compro- acquiescence to) antidemocratic institutions ries. A recent experiment shows that, to- mises that appeal to a large proportion of the and behaviors, including the marginalization day, a majority-party candidate in most U.S. population, a tendency that creates legisla- and disenfranchisement of women and racial House districts—Democrat or Republican— tive gridlock. Issues that are not inherently minorities. The current divide is so potent in could get elected despite openly violating partisan become politicized, impeding the part because battles surrounding sexism and democratic principles like electoral fairness, ability to make progress on goals like miti- racism have grown strongly partisan.

SCIENCE sciencemag.org 30 OCTOBER 2020 • VOL 370 ISSUE 6516 535

Published by AAAS INSIGHTS | POLICY FORUM

Rather, the goal of these interventions is for surging sectarianism, but simply tweak- fact-checkers and mobilizing sectarian loy- to move toward a system in which the public ing algorithms to show partisans more alists to believe “alternative facts.” forcefully debates political ideals and policies content from the opposition may aggravate As political sectarianism grows more ex- while resisting tendencies that undermine sectarianism rather than reducing it (7). treme, pushing strong partisans deeper into democracy and human rights. Given th at More promising are interventions that en- congenial media enclaves that reinforce substantial swaths of American society (in- courage people to deliberate about the accu- their narratives of moral righteousness, it cluding many who identify as Democrat or racy of claims on social media, which causes may also become self-reinforcing, rendering Republican) are fed up with surging sectari- them to evaluate the substance of arguments mitigation efforts more difficult. Scholars anism (SM), dedicated efforts to mitigate it and reduces their likelihood of sharing false have long argued that a shared threat can may well land in fertile soil. Such efforts or hyperpartisan content (12) (SM). Another bring people together; indeed, some suggest must circumvent the sectarian true believ- option is to use crowdsourcing to identify that rising sectarianism in America is due ers, profiteers, and chaos-seekers who ben- such content and the outlets that emit it, in part to the loss of the Soviet Union as efit from stoking sectarianism. These actors relying on users’ ratings of trustworthiness a unifying arch-nemesis. But such threats contribute directly to political sectarianism, to augment the efforts of professional fact- may do the opposite when sectarianism is and they leverage the government sclerosis checkers. Such information can be incorpo- extreme. COVID-19 offered a test case (SM). caused by political sectarianism to derail rated into algorithmic rankings to reduce the By the summer of 2020, 77% of Americans efforts to address structural sources of that presence of false or hyperpartisan content in believed that the nation had grown more sectarianism, such as economic inequities people’s news feeds (SM). divided since the pandemic arrived that and biased electoral procedures (SM). A third avenue involves creating incen- winter, a response 2.8 standard deviations

Nonetheless, scholars have begun to iden- tives for politicians and other elites to reduce higher than the mean of the 13 other na- Downloaded from tify procedures that can potentially mitigate their sectarianizing behaviors. People be- tions in the study and 1.6 standard devia- political sectarianism. These include efforts come less divided after observing politicians tions higher than the second-highest nation to help Americans comprehend opposing treating opposing partisans warmly, and (Spain). Such findings underscore the ur- partisans regardless of their level of agree- nonpartisan statements from leaders can re- gent need to counteract sectarianism before ment, such as by focusing on commonalities duce violence. Campaign finance reform may it grows more poisonous.

rather than differences (e.g., “we’re all Amer- help, especially by eliminating huge contri- Political sectarianism cripples a nation’s http://science.sciencemag.org/ icans”; SM) or communicating in the moral butions from ideological extremists (SM). ability to confront challenges. Bolstering language of the other side (e.g., when liberals Reducing partisan gerrymandering likely the emphasis on political ideas rather than frame the consequences of climate change in would make representation fairer, generate political adversaries is not a sufficient solu- terms of sanctity violations; SM). more robust competition in the marketplace tion, but it is likely to be a major step in the Here, we consider three avenues for in- of political ideas, and send fewer extremists right direction. The interventions proposed tervention that hold particular promise for to the House of Representatives (SM). above offer some promising leads, but any se- ameliorating political sectarianism. The first rious effort will require multifaceted efforts addresses people’s faulty perceptions or in- A FIERCE URGENCY to change leadership, media, and democratic tuitions. For example, correcting mispercep- In 1950, the American Political Science As- systems in ways that are sensitive to human tions of opposing partisans, such as their sociation issued a report expressing concern psychology. There are no silver bullets. j level of hostility toward one’s copartisans, that America was insufficiently polarized, a on November 9, 2020 reduces sectarianism (5) (SM ). Such correc- perspective that remained dominant in the REFERENCES AND NOTES 1. S. Iyengar, Y. Lelkes, M. Levendusky, N. Malhotra, S. J. tion efforts can encourage people to engage ensuing decades (SM). Ideological differen- Westwood, Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 22, 129 (2019). in cross-party interactions (SM) or to con- tiation is an essential feature of party-based 2. A. I. Abramowitz, S. Webster, Elect. Stud. 41, 12 (2016). 3. Y. Lelkes, Public Opin. Q. 80 (S1), 392 (2016). sider their own positive experiences with op- democracy, sharpening debates on impor- 4. L. Mason, Uncivil Agreement: How Politics Became Our posing partisans, especially a friend, family tant topics. Because most people lack the Identity (Univ. of Chicago Press, 2018). member, or neighbor. Doing so can reduce expertise required to make informed judg- 5. J. Lees, M. Cikara, Nat. Hum. Behav. 4, 279 (2020). 6. D. J. Ahler, G. Sood, J. Polit. 80, 964 (2018). the role of motivated partisan reasoning in ments on specific policies, divergent and in- 7. C. A. Bail et al., Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 115, 9216 (2018). the formation of policy opinions (SM). ternally coherent party platforms function 8. H. Allcott, L. Braghieri, S. Eichmeyer, M. Gentzkow, Am. Econ. Rev. 110, 629 (2020). A related idea is to instill intellectual hu- as helpful heuristics that voters can use to 9. W. J. Brady, J. A. Wills, J. T. Jost, J. A. Tucker, J. J. Van Bavel, mility, such as by asking people to explain prioritize their preferred policies and hold Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 114, 7313 (2017). policy preferences at a mechanistic level—for politicians accountable. 10. J. J. Van Bavel, A. Pereira, Trends Cogn. Sci. 22, 213 (2018). 11. M. H. Graham, M. W. Svolik, Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 114, 392 example, why do they favor their position on But the ideological polarization the (2020). a national flat tax or on carbon emissions. American Political Science Association 12. G. Pennycook, J. McPhetres, Y. Zhang, J. G. Lu, D. G. Rand, Psychol. Sci. 31, 770 (2020). Accordin g to a recent study, relative to peo- had in mind has, in recent decades, been 13. L. Boxell et al., “Cross-country trends in affective ple assigned to the more lawyerly approach eclipsed among the public by political polarization (no. w26669),” National Bureau of Economic of justifying their preexisting policy prefer- sectarianism. When politics becomes an Research; www.nber.org/papers/w26669 (2020). 14. P. H. Ditto et al., Perspect. Psychol. Sci. 14, 273 (2019). ences, those asked to provide mechanistic identity-based struggle against depraved 15. J. Baron, J. T. Jost, Perspect. Psychol. Sci. 14, 292 (2019). explanations gain appreciation for the com- opponents—when ideals and policies matter plexities involved (SM). Leaders of civic, re- less than dominating foes—government be- ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ligious, and media organizations committed comes dysfunctional. Viable political strat- We thank the Kellogg School of Management’s Dispute Resolution Research Center and the Institute for Policy to bridging divides can look to such strate- egies focus less on policy-based arguments Research, both at Northwestern University. We thank S. Matz gies to reduce intellectual self-righteousness and more on marginalizing the opposition, and A. Wilson for feedback on an earlier draft and T. Brader, that can contribute to political sectarianism. with false smears and antidemocratic tac- D. Costanzo, M. DeBell, L. Harbridge-Yong, E. Groenendyk, M. Levendusky, and S. Westwood for responding to questions. A second avenue involves altering social- tics if necessary. Insofar as politicians are media platforms, although some popular pursuing unpopular policies, they are in- SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS ideas along these lines may be counterpro- centivized to destroy the idea of objectivity science.sciencemag.org/content/370/6516/533/suppl/DC1 ductive. Echo chambers are widely blamed altogether, undermining the reputation of 10.1126/science.abe1715

536 30 OCTOBER 2020 • VOL 370 ISSUE 6516 sciencemag.org SCIENCE

Published by AAAS Political sectarianism in America Eli J. Finkel, Christopher A. Bail, Mina Cikara, Peter H. Ditto, Shanto Iyengar, Samara Klar, Lilliana Mason, Mary C. McGrath, Brendan Nyhan, David G. Rand, Linda J. Skitka, Joshua A. Tucker, Jay J. Van Bavel, Cynthia S. Wang and James N. Druckman

Science 370 (6516), 533-536. DOI: 10.1126/science.abe1715 Downloaded from

ARTICLE TOOLS http://science.sciencemag.org/content/370/6516/533 http://science.sciencemag.org/

SUPPLEMENTARY http://science.sciencemag.org/content/suppl/2020/10/28/370.6516.533.DC1 MATERIALS

REFERENCES This article cites 13 articles, 2 of which you can access for free http://science.sciencemag.org/content/370/6516/533#BIBL

PERMISSIONS http://www.sciencemag.org/help/reprints-and-permissions

on November 9, 2020

Use of this article is subject to the Terms of Service

Science (print ISSN 0036-8075; online ISSN 1095-9203) is published by the American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1200 New York Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20005. The title Science is a registered trademark of AAAS. Copyright © 2020, American Association for the Advancement of Science