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THE EMERGENCE AND RISE OF ISIS A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES OF MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY BY NURAN HELVALI IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE IN THE DEPARTMENT OF MIDDLE EAST STUDIES FEBRUARY 2020 Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences Prof. Yaşar Kondakçı Director I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science. Assist. Prof. Dr. Derya Göçer Head of Department This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science. Assist. Prof. Dr. Derya Göçer Supervisor Examining Committee Members Prof. Dr. Meliha Altunışık (METU, IR) Assist. Prof. Dr. Derya Göçer (METU, MES) Assoc. Prof. Dr. A. Ömür Atmaca (Hacettepe, IR) PLAGIARISM I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work. Name, Last name: Nuran HELVALI Signature: iii ABSTRACT THE EMERGENCE AND RISE OF ISIS Helvalı, Nuran M.S., Department of Middle East Studies Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. Derya Göçer February 2020, 115 pages This thesis research will investigate an in-depth study of the ISIS. The purpose of this study is to provide a general literature review of ISIS’s history, ideology, politics and military movements in local, regional and international dimensions. It was also aimed to locate it in other Islamist movements and find out the interaction of its movements with the international interventions. The main research question of the thesis was the how ISIS emerged and rose other in the region. The analysis of this study had shown that there was a highly positive interaction between different fundamentalist Islamist groups which also played very important roles in the emergence and rise of ISIS. In addition, the military interventions of the foreign powers were another important determinant of the emergence of ISIS. According to many statements of the literature, ISIS became a model and gave courage to other groups to re-emerge in different forms. In addition to this, it is possible to find the impact of the ISIS in other parts of the world. There were groups especially in Africa and Asia, who started to act similar to ISIS although they had no official connections with the ISIS. ISIS’s impact was very much seen in different regions in the form of extreme radicalism. Although ISIS was iv announced as defeated after the end of the military interventions, it was still known that there was a high chance of the group’s resurgence because of its strong networks. Keywords: Fundamentalism, Islamic fundamentalism, radicalism, extremism v ÖZ IŞİD’İN ORTAYA ÇIKIŞI VE YÜKSELİŞİ Helvalı, Nuran Yüksek Lisans, Orta Doğu Araştırmaları Tez Yöneticisi: Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Derya Göçer Şubat 2020, 115 sayfa Bu tez araştırması, IŞİD’in derinlemesine çalışmasını araştıracaktır. Bu çalışmanın amacı IŞİD’in tarihini, ideolojisini, siyasetini ve askeri-harekâtlarını yerel, bölgesel ve uluslararası boyutlarda genel bir literatür taramasıyla sağlamaktır. Aynı zamanda, onu diğer İslamcı hareketlere yerleştirmek ve hareketlerinin uluslararası müdahalelerle etkileşimini bulmak da amaçlanmıştır. Tezin ana araştırma sorusu, IŞİD’in bölgede nasıl ortaya çıktığı ve nasıl yükseldiğidir. Bu çalışmanın analizi sonucunda, farklı köktendinci İslamcı gruplar arasında IŞİD’in ortaya çıkışında ve yükselişinde oldukça önemli roller oynayan bir etkileşim içinde olduğu anlaşılmıştır. Ayrıca, yabancı güçlerin askeri müdahaleleri IŞİD’in ortaya çıkışında bir başka önemli belirleyici faktör olduğu da görülmüştür. Literatürdeki birçok ifadeye göre, IŞİD bir model haline gelmiş ve diğer gruplara farklı şekillerde yeniden ortaya çıkma cesareti vermiştir. Bununla birlikte, IŞİD’in etkisini dünyanın diğer bölgelerinde de bulmak mümkündür. Özellikle Afrika ve Asya’da IŞİD ile resmi bir bağlantısı olmamasına rağmen IŞİD’e benzer şekilde hareket etmeye başlayan gruplar vardır. IŞİD’in etkisi farklı bölgelerde aşırı radikalizm şeklinde görülmüştür. Her ne kadar IŞİD askeri müdahaleler sonucunda yenilmiş olduğu ilan edilmiş olsa da güçlü ağları nedeniyle grubun yeniden diriliş şansının yüksek olduğu hala bilinmektedir. vi Anahtar kelimeler: Köktendincilik, İslami köktencilik, radikalizm, aşırıcılık vii To My Family… viii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS First of all, I would like to thank my thesis advisor Assist. Prof. Dr. Derya GÖÇER for her advisory and help during this long process. In addition, I would like to thank my jury committee: Prof. Dr. Meliha ALTUNIŞIK from Middle East Technical University and Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ayşe Ömür ATMACA from Hacettepe University. I would like to give my special thanks to my father Yüksel HELVALI and this work is a special dedication to him. My mother Hava HELVALI and my brothers, without their unconditional love and support it would not be possible to complete this tough and long work. And my friends, who are no different than family members, I thank them for their patients and support as well. I’m very grateful for all the inspirations that they had provided for me. ix TABLE OF CONTENTS PLAGIARISM ........................................................................................................... iii ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................ iv ÖZ ............................................................................................................................... vi DEDICATION……………………………………………………………………...viii TABLE OF CONTENTS………………………………………………………….….x ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .............................................................................................ix CHAPTER 1.INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................... 1 2.THE EMERGENCE OF ISIS ........................................................................................ 5 2.1. IDEOLOGICAL SEPARATION OF ISIS FROM AL-QAEDA IN BETWEEN 2003-2006 . 6 2.2. THE UNITED STATES INVASION OF IRAQ IN 2003 ............................................... 9 2.3. EMERGENCE OF THE SYRIAN CIVIL WAR IN 2011 ............................................. 16 2.3.1. The Parties Involved in the Conflict ......................................................... 18 2.3.2. Extra-Regional Powers ............................................................................ 20 2.4. THE EFFECT OF THE GLOBALIZATION ............................................................... 22 2.5. THE EFFECT OF SYKES-PICOT AGREEMENT ...................................................... 24 3.THE RISE OF ISIS .................................................................................................... 28 3.1. IDEOLOGY OF ISIS ............................................................................................ 28 3.1.1. The Sectarian Polarization ....................................................................... 32 3.1.2. The Structure of the Organization ............................................................ 34 3.1.3. ISIS’s Violent Strategy ............................................................................. 34 3.1.4. The Use of Violence .................................................................................. 37 3.2. THE DECLARATION OF ISIS’S INDEPENDENCE.................................................. 38 3.2.1. ISIS as the Claimed Caliphate ................................................................. 40 3.2.2. Invasions of ISIS………………………………………………………….41 3.2.3. ISIS’s Global Attacks ............................................................................... 46 4.THE RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL MILITARY INTERVENTIONS ....... 49 4.1. NON-MILITARY SOLUTIONS ............................................................................. 50 4.1.1. Economic Sanctions ................................................................................. 50 4.1.2. Preventing the Flow of Foreign Participants .......................................... 51 4.1.3. Negotiations ............................................................................................. 51 4.1.4. Counter Propaganda ................................................................................ 51 4.2. THE MILITARY INVOLVEMENT ......................................................................... 52 4.3. ISIS AND THE UNITED STATES ......................................................................... 56 4.4. ISIS AND THE RUSSIA ....................................................................................... 58 4.5. THE EFFECT OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY INTERVENTIONS ON ISIS ....... 59 4.6. THE EFFECTS OF THE SANCTIONS ON THE WAR ................................................ 64 4.7. THE FOREIGN FIGHTERS AFTER ISIS ................................................................ 65 4.8. CHALLENGES AND CRITIQUES .......................................................................... 66 5.THE EFFECT OF ISIS ON FUNDAMENTALIST ISLAMISTS .......................... 69 x 5.1. THE EFFECT OF THE SEPARATION BETWEEN THE RELIGION AND THE STATE ... 71 5.2. THE CAUSES OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM TO TURN INTO VIOLENT EXTREMISM ............................................................................................................
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