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EASO Informazioni Sui Paesi Di Origine Iraq Soggetti Che Offrono Protezione

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EASO Informazioni Sui Paesi Di Origine Iraq Soggetti Che Offrono Protezione European Asylum Support Office EASO Informazioni sui paesi di origine Iraq Soggetti che offrono protezione Novembre 2018 SUPPORT IS OUR MISSION European Asylum Support Office EASO Informazioni sui paesi di origine Iraq Soggetti che offrono protezione Novembre 2018 Né l’EASO né chiunque agisca a suo nome può essere considerato responsabile dell’uso che potrebbe essere fatto delle informazioni qui contenute. Numerose altre informazioni sull’Unione europea sono disponibili su Internet (http://europa.eu). ISBN 978-92-9476-489-8 doi: 10.2847/825811 © Ufficio europeo di sostegno per l’asilo (EASO), 2018 La riproduzione è autorizzata con citazione della fonte, tranne quando diversamente indicato. Per i materiali di terze parti riprodotti in questa pubblicazione, si fa riferimento alle dichiarazioni dei diritti d’autore delle rispettive terze parti. Foto di copertina: Dipartimento della Difesa degli Stati Uniti, addestramento della polizia federale irachena come parte di Operation Inherent Resolve nel febbraio 2018, di dominio pubblico, (url) RELAZIONE COI DELL’EASO – IRAQ: SOGGETTI CHE OFFRONO PROTEZIONE — 3 Ringraziamenti La presente relazione è stata redatta dal settore COI dell’EASO, con contributi di ricerca dell’unità COI del ministero rumeno degli Interni. La relazione è stata inoltre riveduta dai seguenti servizi nazionali per l’asilo e la migrazione, unitamente all’EASO: Estonia, consiglio estone della polizia e delle guardie di frontiera; Slovacchia, Ufficio migrazione, dipartimento Documentazione e cooperazione estera. Inoltre, la presente relazione è stata riveduta anche dal seguente esperto individuale: dottor Geraldine Chatard, storico contemporaneo e antropologo sociale La revisione effettuata dai servizi, dalle organizzazioni o dagli esperti menzionati contribuisce alla qualità complessiva della relazione ma non implica necessariamente una loro approvazione formale del contenuto finale del documento, per il quale l’EASO ha piena responsabilità. 4 — EASO RELAZIONE COI DELL’EASO – IRAQ: SOGGETTI CHE OFFRONO PROTEZIONE Indice Ringraziamenti ................................................................................................................................... 3 Indice ................................................................................................................................................. 4 Clausola di esclusione della responsabilità ....................................................................................... 7 Glossario e abbreviazioni .................................................................................................................. 8 Introduzione .................................................................................................................................... 10 Metodologia e fonti .................................................................................................................... 10 Struttura e uso della relazione .................................................................................................... 10 Carta ................................................................................................................................................ 11 1. Dati di base ............................................................................................................................. 12 2. Contesto ................................................................................................................................. 13 3. Struttura statuale e governance ............................................................................................. 15 3.1 Ramo esecutivo .............................................................................................................. 15 3.2 Ramo legislativo .................................................................................................................... 16 3.3 Ramo giudiziario .................................................................................................................... 16 3.4 Sistema federale e regione del Kurdistan iracheno .............................................................. 17 3.4.1 Consigli provinciali ......................................................................................................... 17 3.4.2 Regione del Kurdistan iracheno ..................................................................................... 17 3.4.3 Territori contesi ............................................................................................................. 18 3.5 Elezioni, partiti politici, liste elettorali e coalizioni ............................................................... 19 3.6 Elezioni nazionali del maggio 2018 ....................................................................................... 20 3.7 Nuovo governo iracheno del 2018 ........................................................................................ 22 3.8 Corruzione ............................................................................................................................. 23 3.8.1 Impegno anti-corruzione ............................................................................................... 24 3.8.2 Proteste del 2018........................................................................................................... 24 4. Quadro giuridico ..................................................................................................................... 25 4.1 Costituzione e panoramica dei diritti fondamentali ............................................................. 26 4.2 Diritto penale e leggi antiterrorismo .................................................................................... 27 4.3 Procedure di arresto e trattenimento .............................................................................. 28 4.4 Autorità preposte all’arresto e al trattenimento .............................................................. 30 5. Istituzioni dedicate alla sicurezza ........................................................................................... 31 5.1 ISF: comando e struttura ...................................................................................................... 31 5.2 Ministero della Difesa ed esercito iracheno ......................................................................... 32 5.2.1 Mandato e struttura ...................................................................................................... 32 RELAZIONE COI DELL’EASO – IRAQ: SOGGETTI CHE OFFRONO PROTEZIONE — 5 5.2.2 Capacità ed efficacia ...................................................................................................... 34 5.2.3 Integrità ......................................................................................................................... 35 5.3 Ministero dell’Interno e polizia ............................................................................................. 36 5.3.1 Mandato, struttura, capacità......................................................................................... 36 5.3.2 Efficacia .......................................................................................................................... 40 5.3.3 Integrità ......................................................................................................................... 41 5.3.4 Divisione di risposta alle emergenze (furqa ar-red as-suriya) ....................................... 43 5.4.5 Battaglioni di polizia di emergenza provinciali .............................................................. 43 5.4.6 Guardie di frontiera (haras hadud al-Iraq), servizio di protezione delle infrastrutture e polizia preposta alla protezione dei campi di petrolio ........................................................... 44 5.4 Unità o forze di mobilitazione popolari (al-hashd al-sha’abi) .............................................. 44 5.4.1 Mandato e struttura ...................................................................................................... 44 5.4.2 Capacità ......................................................................................................................... 47 5.4.3 Efficacia .......................................................................................................................... 48 5.4.5 Integrità ......................................................................................................................... 49 5.5 Servizio antiterrorismo (CTS) (jihaz mukafahat al-irhab) ..................................................... 51 5.5.1 Mandato e struttura ...................................................................................................... 51 5.5.2 Capacità ......................................................................................................................... 52 5.5.3 Efficacia .......................................................................................................................... 52 5.5.4 Integrità ......................................................................................................................... 53 5.6 Servizio di sicurezza nazionale (NSS) (jihaz al-amn al-watni) ............................................... 54 5.7 Condotta professionale ......................................................................................................... 54 5.7.1 Codice di condotta ......................................................................................................... 54 5.7.2
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