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Which Islam-Ism? Diversity in Islamic Society and Its Implications for Democracy

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Western Michigan University ScholarWorks at WMU Master's Theses Graduate College 4-2006 Which Islam-Ism? Diversity in Islamic Society and Its Implications for Democracy Christopher M. Ebsch Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/masters_theses Part of the Political Science Commons Recommended Citation Ebsch, Christopher M., "Which Islam-Ism? Diversity in Islamic Society and Its Implications for Democracy" (2006). Master's Theses. 5060. https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/masters_theses/5060 This Masters Thesis-Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate College at ScholarWorks at WMU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at WMU. For more information, please contact [email protected]. • WHICH ISLAM-ISM? DIVERSITY IN ISLAMIC SOCIETY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR DEMOCRACY by Christopher M. Ebsch A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of The Graduate College in partial fulfillmentof the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts Department of Political Science WesternMichigan University Kalamazoo, Michigan April2006 © 2006 Christopher M. Ebsch WHICH ISLAM-ISM? DIVERSITY IN ISLAMIC SOCIETY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR DEMOCRACY Christopher M. Ebsch, M.A. Western Michigan University, 2006 This study aims to refuteclaims ofIslamic exceptionalism in the midst ofrecent waves of democratization, thereby disproving assumptions of any incompatibility between democracy and Islam. My research will show that such sweeping assumptions gloss over significant, developmental democratic movements within Muslim nations as well as several uniquely Islamic supports for democratic ideals and institutions. I begin by examining recent political activities conducive to democracy in Muslim states, by distinguishing between divergent principles in the Qur' an, some of which have been used by moderate, democratically-oriented Islamists, and by realizing the historical, political antecedents leading to a rise in radical Islamism in the 20th century, disaggregating the political versus religious causes fornon-democratic elements in several Islamic lands. I then proceed with a quantitative analysis ofcontemporary conditions in all 46 Muslim-majority nations. I attempt a revision ofindices used to measure democracy by focusing on institutional components and by averaging my Institutional Democracy Index (IDI) with other existing indices to create a more reliable Aggregated Democracy Index (ADI). Finally, a lack of correlation is shown between ADI ratings and measures ofreligiosity and Muslim population demographics, indicating the need to focusthe discipline's attention on other causal factors ofdemocratization. TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF TABLES........................................................................... V LIST OF FIGURES......................................................................... Vll CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION.................................................................. 1 DEMOCRACY IN THE ISLAMIC WORLD: FRAMING A COMPARATNE POLITICAL ANALYSIS............................ 1 A WORD ABOUT ISLAMIC EXCEPTIONALISM................... 3 THE CENTRAL PROBLEM-RECOGNIZING DEMOCRACY IN THE ISLAMIC WORLD................................................ 20 MEASURING DEMOCRACY: A LITERATURE REVIEW......... 24 A MODEL FOR MEASURING DEMOCRACY........................ 32 DEMOCRATIC CULTURE IN THE ISLAMIC WORLD............ 39 WHAT LIES AHEAD: A CHAPTER OUTLINE....................... 44 II. THE ROOTS OF BOTH LIBERALISM AND RADICALISM IN THE QUR'AN: IMPLICATIONS FOR MUSLIM POLITICS...................... 46 INTRODUCTION........................................................... 46 DISPELLING COMMON CONJECTURES ABOUT THE QUR'AN AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR MUSLIM POLITICS.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 49 Assumption A: "Islam is intolerant of non-Muslims"............ 53 Assumption B: "Islam requires an autocratic theocracy"......... 54 Assumption C: "Muslims use the doctrine of jihad to justify their aggressive and war-like foreignpolicy"........... ........... 56 11 Table of Contents-Continued CHAPTER Assumption D: "Islam is not compatible with liberal democracy"............................................................. 59 REMARK.S....................................... _.................... ........ 66 III. MEASURING DEMOCRACY IN THE LANDS OF ISLAM................ 75 INTRODUCTION........................................................... 75 THE INSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY INDEX (IDI)............... 82 THE AGGREGATED DEMOCRACY INDEX (ADI)................ 98 RELIGIOSITY AND DEMOCRACY.................................... 128 REGIME LABELS IN ISLAMIC LANDS.............................. 141 IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.............................. · 143 ' A SUMMARY OF WHERE WE'VE BEEN............................ 143 RECOMMENDATIONS OF WHERE TO GO FROM HERE....... 151 FINAL REMARKS......................................................... 154 APPENDICES A. Table A-Muslim-Majority Nations' Ratings by Three Existing Indices... 156 B . Table B-Muslim-Majority Nations' Ratings on Three Indices, Converted to IO-Point Scale....................................................... 159 C. Table C-Rank:ings of Muslim-Majority Nations Within Three Existing Indices (Converted to a IO-Point Scale).............................. 162 D. Table D-Muslim-Majority Nations' Average Ratings & Rankings by Three Select Indices.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 165 E. Table E-Institutional Democracy Index Component Variables (Raw Scores)........................................................................ 167 lll Table of Contents-Continued APPENDICES F. Table F-Revised Institutional Democracy Index............................. 172 G. Table G-Revised Aggregated Democracy Index (Raw Scores)............ 177 H. Table H-Aggregated Democracy Index Ratings for Lijphart's Consolidated Democracies........................................................ 180 IV LIST OF TABLES 3.1- Institutional Democracy Index Component Variables: Establishing a Baseline Score with Lijphart's Consolidated Democracies.......... 86 3.2- Institutional Democracy Index Component Variables for Muslim States.......................................................................... 90 3.3- Aggregated Democracy Index Component Variables for Muslim States........................................................................... 99 3.4- Aggregated Democracy Index Variable Conversions to a 10-Point Scale............................................................................ 101 3.5- Aggregated Democracy Index Ratings & Rankings forMuslim- Majority States............................................................... 103 3.6- Aggregated Democracy Index & Muslim Demographics.............. 105 3.7- Correlation CoefficientsAmong the Institutional Democracy Index & Its Component Variables......................................... 107 3.8- Correlation CoefficientsAmong the Aggregated Democracy Index & Its Component Variables................................................. 108 3.9- Correlation Coefficients Among Muslim Demographics & the Aggregated Democracy Index............................................. 109 3.10- Revised Aggregated Democracy Index (Scores Converted to a 10- Point Scale)..... .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 113 3.11- Revised Aggregated Democracy Index (Mean Scores & Muslim Demographics)............................................................... 115 3.12- Correlation Coefficients Among the Revised Institutional Democracy Index & Its Component Variables........................... 117 3.13- Correlation Coefficients Among the Revised Aggregated Democracy Index, Its Components, & Muslim Demographics................................................................ 118 V List of Tables-Continued 3.14- 2000 World Values Survey-Measures of Religiosity: Muslim-Majority States..................................................... 131 3.15- Measures of Religiosity and the Aggregated Democracy Index...... 133 3 .16- CorrelationCoefficients Among the Religiosity Index & ItsComponent Variables................................................... 134 3.17- CorrelationCoefficients Among Mean Religiosity Scores & Aggregated Democracy Index Ratings................................... 135 3.18- Two-by-Two Matrix of Muslim Demographics and the Aggregated Democracy Index............................................. 139 3.19- Two-by-Two Matrix of Religiosity and the Aggregated Democracy Index............................................................ 139 Vl LIST OF FIGURES 1.1- Democratic Institutions Index-Explanation of Variable Rating Scheme........................................................................ 34 1.2- Thirteen Indicators of Religiosity-World Values Survey (2000).... 42 3.1- Freedom House (CONY.) Ratings of Muslim Majority Nations, n = 46.......................................................................... 77 3.2- Polity IV (CONY.) Ratings of Muslim Majority Nations, n = 46.. ... 78 3.3- World Bank Governance Indicators-Voice & Accountability (CONY.) Ratings of Muslim Majority Nations, n = 46.. .. ... .. ... ... 79 3.4- Average Rating of Muslim Majority Nations by Three Selected Indices (FH, P-IV, WB-VA), n = 46..... .. ...... ..... ... ..... .... ....... 80 3.5- Average Rankingof Muslim Majority Nations by Three Selected Indices (FH, P-IV, WB-VA), n = 46. ... ... ...... ... ...
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