The Evolution of Economics: Where We Are and How We Got Here by Peter J

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

The Evolution of Economics: Where We Are and How We Got Here by Peter J THE LONG TERM VIEW The Evolution of Economics: Where We Are and How We Got Here By Peter J. Boettke, Peter T. Leeson, and Daniel J. Smith This paper suggests that contemporary economics is characterized by three key fea- tures. First, it is focused on “big questions” in political economy and is willing to look out- side economics to search for these questions and their answers. Second, contemporary economics is empirically focused. “Grand theory” has taken a back seat to empirical explorations of institutions in particular. Third, modern economics has been dramatically influenced by “freakonomics”—the application of economic principles to unusual and unorthodox topics—and is increasingly directed at a popular lay audience. We argue that these particular areas of modern economics’ evolution are not unrelated. The devel- opment of each key feature is connected to the others. n the last decade or so, economics has been dramatically altered by the rise of undergone an impressive evolution. “freakonomics”—the application of economic IEconomic principles haven’t changed. But principles to unusual and unorthodox issues. economists’ applications of these principles Freakonomics is characterized not only by its have. There are three key features of contem- provocative applications of economic con- porary economics: cepts, but also by the fact that it is consumable First, economics has refocused its energies by a popular, lay audience, which is increas- on the “big questions” of political economy ingly exposed to the economic way of think- and, closely related, is increasingly turning to ing. insights from other social sciences to search These three trends are not separate and for these questions and their answers. independent evolutions within economics. Second, economics has largely abandoned Rather, they are interrelated in several “grand theorizing” for more empirically- respects. These changes are positive ones for minded projects. Although formalism is still economic science. prominent in economics, increasingly this for- malism manifests itself via empirical tech- Economics and the Hourglass niques as opposed to novel theory. In particu- In his excellent paper on the state of econom- lar, the empirical focus of contemporary eco- ics in 1997, David Kreps draws on Paul nomics is driven by the renewed importance Romer’s hourglass analogy to explain the evo- attached to understanding institutions. lution of economics from Adam Smith to the Finally, the face of modern economics has Peter J. Boettke and Peter T. Leeson are professors in the department of economics at George Mason University. Daniel J. Smith is a graduate research assistant, also in the department of economics at George Mason University. Dr. Leeson can be contacted at [email protected]. 14 BOETTKE, LEESON, & SMITH present.1 See Figure 1. even “boundedly rational”) agents respond deterministically to relative price changes to Political Economy & Moral Philosophy, 1776-1900 optimize consumption or production deci- Economics as technical sions, had not yet taken form. Instead of “eco- science & tool of social nomics,” there was “political economy,” in control, 1930-1980 which history, morality, and psychology—in a Economics & political word, “humanity”—was at the center of economy, 1990- analysis. Unlike “economics,” “political economy” Figure 1: The Hourglass Shape of Economics cannot do without these essential, if often intractable, features of the world. To go along In Adam Smith’s day, “economics” was with imperfect and socially-embedded man, part of a much broader social science inquiry classical political economy emphasized the that included and drew heavily upon sister importance of institutions, coping mecha- disciplines such as history, politics, philoso- nisms that emerge to facilitate the ability of phy, and sociology. This is the top of the hour- imperfect actors to coordinate their activities. glass, which is wide, representing the interdis- In creating the “rules of the game” that govern ciplinary nature of economic study and the interaction, institutions were central for those “big picture”-type questions that this study studying political economy because they not asked, most famously, why are some nations only shaped social outcomes, but also because rich while others are poor? they reflected—i.e., were shaped by—social Nowhere is this broad approach more evi- outcomes. The classical political economists dent than in the work of Smith himself.2 Like were thus first and foremost concerned with his fellow Scottish moral philosophers, Smith these institutions and the features of man’s was fundamentally concerned with the con- reality that give rise to them. nections and relationships between morality F. A. Hayek provides perhaps the best sum- and the market. Even in his Wealth of Nations, mary of this tradition and its motivations. As which endeavored to answer a specifically he put it: “economic” question, Smith could not explore Smith’s chief concern was not so this question without thoroughly understand- much with what man might occasion- ing the foundational animating forces of ally achieve when he was at his best human beings, historically and in his own but that he should have as little oppor- time. Those who built in the Smithean tradi- tunity as possible to do harm when he tion, such as J.S. Mill, David Hume, and oth- was at his worst. It would scarcely be ers, also applied this fundamentally interdisci- too much to claim that the main merit plinary approach to economic inquiry. of the individualism which he and his Indeed, it is safe to say that “economics” in contemporaries advocated is that it is a the narrow sense that is used to describe eco- system under which bad men can do nomic study in the mid-20th century did not least harm. It is a social system which exist for these thinkers. Moreover, when does not depend for its functioning on Smith, Hume, or even Mill was writing, the our finding good men for running it, or “marginal revolution” had not yet taken place on all men becoming better than they in economics. A discipline of sterile rational now are, but which makes use of men choice, in which ends and constraints are in all their given variety and complex- taken as given, and perfectly informed (or 15 THE LONG TERM VIEW ity, sometimes good and sometimes of doing so, the neoclassical presentation of bad, sometimes intelligent and more the logic of choice and the logic of the market often stupid. Their aim was a system also established the use of formal methods— under which it should be possible to mathematics in particular—as the only way of grant freedom to all, instead of analyzing economic problems scientifically. restricting it, as their French contem- Questions of man’s foibles, fears, and stum- poraries wished, to “the good and the bling in his quest to better his condition and wise.” The chief concern of the great exchange with his brethren, let alone the vari- individualist writers was indeed to ety of informal and formal institutions that find a set of institutions by which men defined his environment of choice and inter- could be induced, by their own choice action, simply had to be put aside for reasons and from motives which determined of mathematical tractability. his ordinary conduct, to contribute as At the same time, the marginal revolution much as possible to the need of all oth- operated to sever “economics” from “political ers; and their discovery was that the economy” to a certain extent, or, perhaps system of private property did provide more accurately, to carve out of this social sci- such inducements to a much greater ence mish-mash the peculiarly “economic” extent than had yet been understood.3 elements, allowing them to be distinguished from the historical, philosophical, or psycho- logical elements that were not readily dis- Hayek’s interpretation of classical political posed to analysis using marginal utility theo- economy shows a concern with choosing ry. In this way economics began to pull away man, but one with foibles and fears, who, pre- from other social sciences, something that cisely because of his imperfections, requires was reinforced by the growing methodologi- institutional restraints and filters to steer his cal difference between “scientific econom- activity in a direction to achieve economic ics,” which required formal testable proposi- cooperation and realize the gains from trade tions, and increasingly actually testing these with his fellow man. propositions, in contrast to the historical or Following WWII, the narrowing of economics greatly accelerated, fueled in no small part by mathematical advances that soon defined what it meant to do “economics” versus other social sciences, which economists increasing- ly viewed with disdain. philosophical dimensions of political econo- This picture of the intellectual project of my that were not readily amenable to the classical political economy was transformed application of such methods. Thus, from the into the science of “economics” only as we marginal revolution onward, while ostensibly entered into the 20th century. The marginal more “scientific,” economics also became revolution solved the “diamond/water para- narrower, analogous to the narrowing of the dox” that had so troubled the classical politi- hourglass. cal economists, and later, equilibrium models Following WWII, the narrowing of eco- presented the logic of competitive economic nomics greatly accelerated, fueled in no small forces in a rigorous manner. But in the process part by mathematical advances that soon 16 BOETTKE, LEESON, & SMITH defined what it meant to do “economics” ver- back at the center of economic study. The suc- sus other social sciences, which economists cess of these authors is at least partly respon- increasingly viewed with disdain. The substi- sible for making it fashionable again to tution for Smith’s method of inquiry in 1776, engage in more broad-ranging work, closer to and indeed of the big questions he posed, by classical political economy.
Recommended publications
  • Public Choice and Public Health
    Public Choice https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-021-00900-2 Public choice and public health Peter T. Leeson1 · Henry A. Thompson1 Received: 3 March 2021 / Accepted: 12 March 2021 © The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2021 Abstract Public choice scholars have attended only modestly to issues in public health. We expect that to change rapidly given the Covid-19 pandemic. The time therefore is ripe for tak- ing stock of public-choice relevant scholarship that addresses issues in public health. That is what we do. Our stock-taking highlights three themes: (1) Public health regulations often are driven by private interests, not public ones. (2) The allocation of public health resources often refects private interests, not public ones. (3) Public health policies may have perverse efects, undermining instead of promoting health-consumer welfare. Keywords Public choice · Public health · COVID-19 · Interest groups JEL Classifcations D72 · I18 1 Introduction Public health is “The health of the population as a whole, esp. as monitored, regulated, and promoted by the state” (Oxford English Dictionary, 2020). Public choice is “the applica- tion of the principles of maximizing behavior…to institutions and behavior in the political world” (Tollison, 2004, p. 191).1 You might therefore think that public health has attracted major attention from public choice scholars. But then you would be wrong. The Elgar Companion to Public Choice (Reksulak et al. 2014), an “authoritative and encyclopaedic reference work” of more than 600 pages that “provides a thorough account of the public choice approach”, contains just six pages on which the term health (or a vari- ant) appears.
    [Show full text]
  • The Business Cycle and the Stock Market
    -1- THE BUSINESS CYCLE AND THE STOCK MARKET by Andrei S leifer A.B., Harv d University (1982) SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY at the MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY May 1986 Andrei Shleifer 1986 The author hereby grants to M.I.T. permission to reproduce and to distribute copies of this thesis document in whole or in part. Signature of author__ Department of Economics May 12, 1986 Certified by Peter A. Diamond / Thesis Supervisor Certified by Franklin M. Fisher / Thesis Supervisor Accepted by Richard S. Eckaus Chairman, Departmental Graduate Committee ARCHIVES MASSACHUSETT SIN!TiTUTE OF TCHNN N1'' JUN 1 3 198E LIBRA";. - - 2 ABSTRACT The three essays of this thesis concern the role of expectations in determining the allocation of resources, particularly in the macroecono- mic context. Specifically, all three papers are motivated by the propo- sition that private agents' beliefs are aggregated into stock market prices, which can therefore influence the allocation of investment. The first essay does not deal with financial markets explicitly, although it explores the role of animal spirits in determining invest- ment. The essay describes an artificial economy, in which firms in dif- ferent sectors make inventions at different times, but innovate simultaneously to take advantage of high aggregate demand. In turn, high demand results from simultaneous innovation in many sectors. The economy exhibits multiple cyclical equilibria, with entrepreneurs' expectations determining which equilibrium obtains. These equilibria are Pareto ranked, and the most profitable equilibrium need not be the most effi- cient.
    [Show full text]
  • Peter J. Boettke
    PETER J. BOETTKE BB&T Professor for the Study of Capitalism, Mercatus Center at George Mason University, & University Professor of Economics and Philosophy Department of Economics, MSN 3G4 George Mason University Fairfax, VA 22030 Tel: 703-993-1149 Fax: 703-993-1133 Web: http://www.peter-boettke.com http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=182652 http://www.coordinationproblem.org PERSONAL Date of birth: January 3, 1960 Nationality: United States EDUCATION Ph.D. in Economics, George Mason University, January, 1989 M.A. in Economics, George Mason University, January, 1987 B.A. in Economics, Grove City College, May, 1983 TITLE OF DOCTORAL THESIS: The Political Economy of Soviet Socialism, 1918-1928 PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE Academic Positions 1987 –88 Visiting Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, George Mason University 1988 –90 Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, School of Business Administration, Oakland University, Rochester, MI 48309 1990 –97 Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, New York University, New York, NY 10003 1997 –98 Associate Professor, Department of Economics and Finance, School of Business, Manhattan College, Riverdale, NY 10471 1998 – 2003 Associate Professor, Department of Economics, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA 22030 (tenured Fall 2000) 2003 –07 Professor, Department of Economics, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA 22030 2007 – University Professor, George Mason University 2011 – Affiliate Faculty, Department of Philosophy, George Mason University FIELDS OF INTEREST
    [Show full text]
  • ROGER W. GARRISON Curriculum Vitae (Fall 2011)
    ROGER W. GARRISON Curriculum Vitae (Fall 2011) BUSINESS ADDRESS AND PHONE: HOME ADDRESS AND PHONE: Department of Economics 2017 Country Squire Road Auburn University Auburn, AL 36830 Auburn, AL 36849 (334) 826-7416 (334) 844-2920 FAX: (334) 844-4615 PERSONAL DATA: Email: [email protected] Married: Karen Lynn (Harrison) Website: http://www.auburn.edu/~garriro One child: James Eric (1991) DEGREES: Ph. D. 1981 Economics University of Virginia M.A. 1974 Economics University of Missouri at Kansas City B.S. 1967 Electrical Engineering University of Missouri at Rolla FIELDS OF RESEARCH: Major Fields: Macroeconomics, Monetary Theory Minor Fields: Capital and Interest, History of Economic Thought PERMANENT ACADEMIC POSITION: Department of Economics September 1996 - Professor Auburn University September 1988 - September 1996 Associate Professor Auburn, Alabama September 1981 - September 1988 Assistant Professor September 1978 - December 1980 Instructor VISITING ACADEMIC POSITIONS: London School of Economics May/June 2003 First Visiting Hayek Fellow (Suntory London, England and Toyota International Centers for Economics and Related Disciplines) Department of Economics January-May 1981 Adjunct Assistant Professor New York University and Post-Doctoral Fellow NON-ACADEMIC POSITIONS AND MILITARY SERVICE: July 1973 - December 1974 Research Associate, Department of Bank Supervision and Structure, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Kansas City, Mo. April 1967 - April 1971 Commissioned Service (Captain), United States Air Force Rome Air Development Center, Griffiss AFB, Rome, New York. ROGER W. GARRISON PAGE 2 COURSES TAUGHT: TEACHING HONORS: Principles of Macroeconomics (mass lectures) 1988: Named Mortar Board Favorite Principles of Microeconomics (mass lectures) Professor Economics and Society Money and Banking 1989: Inducted into Omicron Delta Kappa History of Economic Thought Intermediate Macroeconomics 1997: Delivered Ludwig Lachmann Business Conditions Analysis (MBA program) Memorial Lecture (Johannesburg, Macroeconomics I (Ph.D.
    [Show full text]
  • ANDREI SHLEIFER 1 March 2019
    ANDREI SHLEIFER 1 March 2019 ANDREI SHLEIFER Department of Economics Harvard University M9 Littauer Center Cambridge, MA 02138 Date of Birth: February 20, 1961 Citizenship: U.S.A. Undergraduate Studies: Harvard, A.B., Math, 1982. Graduate Studies: MIT, Ph.D., May, 1986. Thesis Title: “The Business Cycle and the Stock Market” EMPLOYMENT: John L. Loeb Professor of Economics, Harvard University, 1991 - present. Professor of Finance and Business Economics, Graduate School of Business, The University of Chicago, 1989 - 1990. Assistant Professor of Finance and Business Economics, Graduate School of Business, The University of Chicago, 1987 - 1989. Assistant Professor of Economics, Princeton University, 1986 - 1987. OTHER AFFILIATIONS: Faculty Research Fellow and Research Associate, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1986- Associate and Advisory Editor, Journal of Financial Economics, 1988 - . Associate Editor, Journal of Finance, 1988 - 1991. Editor, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1989 - 1999, 2012 - Advisor, Government of Russia, 1991 - 1997. Principal, LSV Asset Management, 1994 - 2003. Editor, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2003 - 2008. ANDREI SHLEIFER 2 March 2019 AWARDS, FELLOWSHIPS, AND GRANTS: National Science Foundation Graduate Fellowship, 1983 - 1986. CRSP Distinguished Visiting Scholar, Graduate School of Business, The University of Chicago, March-June, 1986. Alfred P. Sloan Fellowship, 1990. National Science Foundation Grants, 1988 - 1989, 1990 - 1991, 19 94 - 1996, 1998 - 2000, 2001 - 2003. Presidential Young Investigator Award, 1989 - 1994. Bradley Foundation Grant, 1989, 1990, 1991 - 1992. Russell Sage Foundation Grant (with R. Vishny), 1988, 1991. Alfred P. Sloan Foundation Grant (with L. Summers), 1986, 1988 - 1990. Fellow, Econometric Society, 1993. Roger F. Murray Award of the Q-Group, 1994, and the Smith-Breeden Prize of the Journal of Finance for Distinguished paper, 1995, given to “Contrarian Investment, Extrapolation, and Risk.” Member, U.S.-Israel Joint Economic Development Group, 1995 - 1997.
    [Show full text]
  • Shleifer's Failure
    Shleifer’s Failure THE FAILURE OF JUDGES AND THE RISE OF REGULATORS. By Andrei Shleifer. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2012. 352 pages. $40.00. Reviewed by Jonathan Klick* I. Introduction Andrei Shleifer is undoubtedly among the world’s most important economists. By standard citation measures, no one else is anywhere close. For example, his nearly 19,000 citations in the RePEc rankings1 as of October 2012 place him ahead of Nobel Prize2 winners such as James Heckman (12,212),3 Joseph Stiglitz (11,431),4 and Robert Lucas (9,314).5 His work on corporate finance, behavioral finance, and transition economics earned him the American Economic Association’s prestigious John Bates Clark medal in 1999.6 Perhaps not even international scandal will keep Shleifer from taking his place among the Nobelists.7 Shleifer’s influence in legal scholarship is almost as large. With more than 1,000 Westlaw citations,8 Shleifer would compare favorably to most law and economics specialists in top U.S. law schools.9 Given all of this, the publication of Shleifer’s book The Failure of Judges and the Rise of Regulators10 as part of the MIT Press’s Walras-Pareto Lecture series is sure to be of interest to a wide range of legal scholars, students, and policy makers—and especially to those who do not have access to JSTOR11 and a * Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. 1. Top 5% Authors, as of October 2012, IDEAS, http://ideas.repec.org/top/top .person.nbcites.html. 2. Formally the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel, The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel, NOBELPRIZE.ORG, http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics, but only pedants note this, such as bloggers who disagree with a given Nobelist’s positions.
    [Show full text]
  • NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES a NORMAL COUNTRY Andrei
    NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES A NORMAL COUNTRY Andrei Shleifer Daniel Treisman Working Paper 10057 http://www.nber.org/papers/w10057 NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138 October 2003 We thank Anders Aslund, Olivier Blanchard, Maxim Boycko, David Cutler, Martin Feldstein, Sergei Guriev, Stephen Hanson, Simon Johnson, David Laibson, Dwight Perkins, Lawrence Summers, Judith Thornton, Katia Zhuravskaya, and participants at a seminar at the University of Washington. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the National Bureau of Economic Research. ©2003 by Andrei Shleifer and Daniel Treisman. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source. A Normal Country Andrei Shleifer and Daniel Treisman NBER Working Paper No. 10057 October 2003 JEL No. P2, P3, P5 ABSTRACT During the 1990s, Russia underwent an extraordinary transformation from a communist dictatorship to a multi-party democracy, from a centrally planned economy to a market economy, and from a belligerent adversary of the West to a cooperative partner. Yet a consensus in the US circa 2000 viewed Russia as a disastrous and threatening failure, and the 1990s as a decade of catastrophe for its citizens. Analyzing a variety of economic and political data, we demonstrate a large gap between this perception and the facts. In contrast to the common image, by the late 1990s Russia had become a typical middle-income capitalist democracy. Andrei Shleifer Harvard University Department of Economics M9Littauer Center Cambridge, MA 02138 and NBER [email protected] Daniel Treisman University of California, Los Angeles Political Science Department 3265 Bunche Hall Los Angeles, CA 90095-1472 [email protected] 1 Introduction During the 1990s, Russia underwent an extraordinary transformation.
    [Show full text]
  • Can Higher Prices Stimulate Product Use? Evidence from a Field Experiment in Zambia
    Can Higher Prices Stimulate Product Use? Evidence from a Field Experiment in Zambia Nava Ashraf James Berry Jesse M. Shapiro Working Paper 07-034 Copyright © 2006, 2007, 2008 by Nava Ashraf, James Berry, and Jesse M. Shapiro Working papers are in draft form. This working paper is distributed for purposes of comment and discussion only. It may not be reproduced without permission of the copyright holder. Copies of working papers are available from the author. Can Higher Prices Stimulate Product Use? Evidence from a Field Experiment in Zambia Nava Ashraf James Berry Harvard Business School Massachusetts Institute of Technology Jesse M. Shapiro University of Chicago and NBER August 14, 2008 Abstract The controversy over whether and how much to charge for health products in the developing world rests, in part, on whether higher prices can increase use, either by targeting distribution to high-use households (a screening e¤ect), or by stimulating use psychologically through a sunk-cost e¤ect. We develop a methodology for separating these two e¤ects. We implement the methodology in a …eld experiment in Zambia using door-to-door marketing of a home water puri…cation solution. We …nd that higher prices screen out those who use the product less. By contrast, we …nd no consistent evidence of sunk-cost e¤ects. JEL classi…cation: C93, D12, L11, L31 Keywords: chlorination, water-borne diseases, sunk-cost e¤ect, non-pro…t strategy, social marketing We are grateful to Gary Becker, Stefano DellaVigna, Dave Donaldson, Erik Eyster, Matthew Gentzkow, Jerry Green, Ali Hortaçsu, Emir Kamenica, Dean Karlan, Larry Katz, Michael Kremer, Stephen Leider, Steve Levitt, John List, Kevin M.
    [Show full text]
  • C:\Working Papers\7804.Wpd
    1%(5:25.,1*3$3(56(5,(6 7+(6/2:'2:12)7+((&2120,&638%/,6+,1*352&(66 *OHQQ(OOLVRQ :RUNLQJ3DSHU KWWSZZZQEHURUJSDSHUVZ 1$7,21$/%85($82)(&2120,&5(6($5&+ 0DVVDFKXVHWWV$YHQXH &DPEULGJH30$ -XO\ ,ZRXOGOLNHWRWKDQNWKH1DWLRQDO6FLHQFH)RXQGDWLRQ6%5WKH6ORDQ)RXQGDWLRQWKH&HQWHUIRU$GYDQFHG 6WXG\LQWKH%HKDYLRUDO6FLHQFHVDQGWKH3DXO(*UD\8523)XQGIRUWKHLUVXSSRUW7KLVSDSHUZRXOGQRWKDYHEHHQ SRVVLEOHZLWKRXWWKHKHOSRIDJUHDWPDQ\SHRSOH,DPYHU\JUDWHIXOIRUWKHHIIRUWVWKDWDQXPEHURIMRXUQDOVPDGHWR VXSSO\PHZLWKGDWD,QDGGLWLRQPDQ\RIWKHLGHDVLQWKLVSDSHUZHUHGHYHORSHGLQWKHFRXUVHRIDVHULHVRIFRQYHUVDWLRQV ZLWKRWKHUHFRQRPLVWV,ZRXOGHVSHFLDOO\OLNHWRWKDQN2UOH\$VKHQIHOWHU6XVDQ$WKH\5REHUW%DUUR*DU\%HFNHU-RKQ &RFKUDQH2OLYLHU%ODQFKDUG-XG\&KHYDOLHU.HQ&RUWV%U\DQ(OOLFNVRQ6DUD)LVKHU(OOLVRQ)UDQN)LVKHU'UHZ )XGHQEHUJ-RVKXD*DQV(GZDUG*ODHVHU'DQLHO+DPHUPHVK/DUV+DQVHQ+DUULHW+RIIPDQ-LP+RVHN$ODQ.UXHJHU 3DXOD/DULFK9LFN\/RQJDZD5REHUW/XFDV:DOO\0XOOLQ3DXO6DPXHOVRQ,O\D6HJDO.DUO6KHOO$QGUHL6KOHLIHUDQG .DWK\6LPNDQLFKZLWKRXWLPSOLFDWLQJWKHPIRUDQ\RIWKHYLHZVGLVFXVVHGKHUHLQ5LFKDUG&UXPS6LPRQD-HOHVFX &KULVWLQH.LDQJ1DGD0RUDDQG&DUROLQH6PLWKSURYLGHGYDOXDEOHUHVHDUFKDVVLVWDQFH7KHYLHZVH[SUHVVHGKHUHDUH WKHDXWKRUDQGGRQRWQHFHVVDULO\UHIOHFWWKRVHRIWKH1DWLRQDO%XUHDXRI(FRQRPLF5HVHDUFK E\*OHQQ(OOLVRQ$OOULJKWVUHVHUYHG6KRUWVHFWLRQVRIWH[WQRWWRH[FHHGWZRSDUDJUDSKVPD\EHTXRWHG ZLWKRXWH[SOLFLWSHUPLVVLRQSURYLGHGWKDWIXOOFUHGLWLQFOXGLQJQRWLFHLVJLYHQWRWKHVRXUFH 7KH6ORZGRZQRIWKH(FRQRPLFV3XEOLVKLQJ3URFHVV *OHQQ(OOLVRQ 1%(5:RUNLQJ3DSHU1R -XO\ -(/1R$ $%#% 2YHUWKHODVWWKUHHGHFDGHVWKHUHKDVEHHQDGUDPDWLFLQFUHDVHLQWKHOHQJWKRIWLPHQHFHVVDU\ WRSXEOLVKDSDSHULQDWRSHFRQRPLFVMRXUQDO7KLVSDSHUGRFXPHQWVWKHVORZGRZQDQGQRWHVWKDW
    [Show full text]
  • The Age of Milton Friedman
    Journal of Economic Literature 2009, 47:1, 123–135 http:www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jel.47.1.123 The Age of Milton Friedman Andrei Shleifer* Between 1980 and 2005, as the world embraced free market policies, living stan- dards rose sharply, while life expectancy, educational attainment, and democracy improved and absolute poverty declined. Is this a coincidence? A collection of essays edited by Balcerowicz and Fischer argues that indeed reliance on free market forces is key to economic growth. A book by Stiglitz and others disagrees. I review and com- pare the two arguments. 1. Introduction also embraced free market policies. All three of these leaders professed inspiration from he last quarter century has witnessed the work of Milton Friedman. It is natural, Tremarkable progress of mankind. The then, to refer to the last quarter century as world’s per capita inflation-adjusted income the Age of Milton Friedman. rose from $5,400 in 1980 to $8,500 in 2005. The association between free mar- Schooling and life expectancy grew rapidly, ket policies and social progress notwith- while infant mortality and poverty fell just standing, economists remain divided in as fast. Compared to 1980, many more coun- their assessments of this Age. Two recent tries in the world are democratic today. books illustrate the divisions. A collection The last quarter century also saw wide of papers edited by Leszek Balcerowicz acceptance of free market policies in both and Stanley Fischer—Living Standards rich and poor countries: from private own- and the Wealth of Nations: Successes and ership, to free trade, to responsible budgets, Failures in Real Convergence (MIT Press, to lower taxes.
    [Show full text]
  • Andrei Shleifer Murphy Kevin M
    Epstein Larry G Hynes J Allan Karni Edi Smith V Kerry Bolton Patrick Anna L. Paulson Lach Saul Robin Brooks Robert M. Townsend Jeremy Bulow Isabel Correia Bresnahan Timothy F Rosemary Avery Joseph G. Altonji Peterson David W Chen Chau-nan Bhagwan Chowdhry Lars Peter Hansen Stern Robert M Bertin Amy L Weingast Barry R Alan Mathios Cabreales Antonio Lang Larry H P Donald Kenkel Barton H. Hamilton Zuber Richard A Hugo Hopenhayn Robert B. Ekelund Jr. Michael Greenstone David Dranove Saks Daniel H Deaton Angus Findlay Ronald Philip DeCicca Cropper Maureen L. Shiller Robert J Assaf Razin Harold G. Moulton Dooley Martin D S. Lawrence Bigelow Francesco Drago Robert D. Tollison Greif Avner Myron W. Watkins C. Arnold Anderson Tai-wei Hu Alon Brav Whalley John Bruno Biais Postlewaite Andrew Tano Santos Sanjeev Goyal Cole Harold L Ehrenberg Ronald G Day Richard H Neumann George R Harrison Glenn W Ricardo J. Caballero Thomas Sargent Christina Paxson J. David Brown Bhattacharya Sudipto McMillan John Jonathan M. Karpoff Rucker Randal R Bronars Stephen G Luigi Guiso Hubbard R Glenn Diebold Francis X Wolfe Barbara L Lior Menzly Leffler Keith B Luigi Pistaferri Paul Gomme Friedman Daniel Lewis Tracy R Stiglitz Joseph E Wellisz Stanislaw Hoffer George E Firms Zeckhauser Richard J Eswaran Mukesh Orazio P. Attanasio Thomas Cooley Hodrick Robert J Kerwin Kofi Charles Vernon Henderson John Knowles Blair Douglas H Schwert G William Deaton Angus S Zellner Arnold Rothkopf Michael H Wolpin Kenneth I Michael Mann French Kenneth R Michael P. Keane Cass DavidMilgrom Paul Hansen Lars Peter Frey Bruno S StarkRosenzweig Oded Mark R Andrew W.
    [Show full text]
  • Anarchism and Austrian Economics
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Munich Personal RePEc Archive MPRA Munich Personal RePEc Archive Anarchism and Austrian economics Peter Boettke George Mason University 2011 Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/33069/ MPRA Paper No. 33069, posted 30. August 2011 16:16 UTC Anarchism and Austrian Economics Peter Boettke I. Introduction It is a great honor for me to give the Cuhel Memorial Lecture at the Prague Conference on Political Economy for 2011. Franz Cuhel rightly holds an honored place in the development of the pure theory of the Austrian school of economics.1 Ludwig von Mises credits Cuhel (1907) with providing the first presentation of a strict ordinal marginal utility analysis. The confusion in choice theory that eventually lead to the purging of the human element in the economic analysis of decision making would have been avoided had Cuhel’s ordinal presentation of marginal utility analysis been more widely accepted. Instead, it was for Mises (1949) and later Rothbard (1962b) to develop that presentation and offer it as an alternative to the neoclassical theory of microeconomics that developed after John Hicks’ (1939) Value and Capital. The implications, I would argue, are far greater than the technical issues of ordinal versus cardinal utility and the subsequent debate among ordinal utility theorists of marginal utility analysis and demonstrated preference versus marginal rates of substitution and indifference curve analysis, etc. The implications of the debate in choice theory go to core of how we view the individual that we study in economics.2 The University Professor of Economics at George Mason University, and BB&T Professor for the Study of Capitalism at the Mercatus Center.
    [Show full text]