ROGER W. GARRISON Curriculum Vitae (Fall 2011)
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Public Choice and Public Health
Public Choice https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-021-00900-2 Public choice and public health Peter T. Leeson1 · Henry A. Thompson1 Received: 3 March 2021 / Accepted: 12 March 2021 © The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2021 Abstract Public choice scholars have attended only modestly to issues in public health. We expect that to change rapidly given the Covid-19 pandemic. The time therefore is ripe for tak- ing stock of public-choice relevant scholarship that addresses issues in public health. That is what we do. Our stock-taking highlights three themes: (1) Public health regulations often are driven by private interests, not public ones. (2) The allocation of public health resources often refects private interests, not public ones. (3) Public health policies may have perverse efects, undermining instead of promoting health-consumer welfare. Keywords Public choice · Public health · COVID-19 · Interest groups JEL Classifcations D72 · I18 1 Introduction Public health is “The health of the population as a whole, esp. as monitored, regulated, and promoted by the state” (Oxford English Dictionary, 2020). Public choice is “the applica- tion of the principles of maximizing behavior…to institutions and behavior in the political world” (Tollison, 2004, p. 191).1 You might therefore think that public health has attracted major attention from public choice scholars. But then you would be wrong. The Elgar Companion to Public Choice (Reksulak et al. 2014), an “authoritative and encyclopaedic reference work” of more than 600 pages that “provides a thorough account of the public choice approach”, contains just six pages on which the term health (or a vari- ant) appears. -
David Skarbek Brown University Department of Political Science Political Theory Project
David Skarbek Brown University Department of Political Science Political Theory Project 25 George Street, Box 2005 [email protected] Providence, RI. 02906 www.DavidSkarbek.com ACADEMIC APPOINTMENTS Brown University, Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science and the Political Theory Project, since 2017 University of California, Berkeley, Visiting Scholar, Center for the Study of Law & Society, 2019 to 2020 King’s College London, Senior Lecturer in Political Economy, 2015 to 2017 King’s College London, Lecturer in Political Economy, 2012 to 2015 Duke University, Searle Visiting Assistant Professor in Political Science, 2010 to 2012 EDUCATION PhD Economics, George Mason University, 2010 MA Economics, George Mason University, 2008 BS Economics, San José State University, 2006 RESEARCH AREAS Political Economy, Institutions, Methods BOOKS The Puzzle of Prison Order: Why Life Behind Bars Varies around the World. 2020. New York: Oxford University Press. - Winner of the 2021 Outstanding Book Award from the International Section of the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences. 1 - Academic reviews: International Criminal Justice Review, Perspectives on Politics (A Critical Dialogue), Public Choice, Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics, Review of Austrian Economics The Social Order of the Underworld: How Prison Gangs Govern the American Penal System. 2014. New York: Oxford University Press. 2016: Chinese University of Political Science and Law Press. - Winner of the 2016 William H. Riker Award for Best Book in Political Economy in the previous three years, from the Political Economy Section of the American Political Science Association. - Winner of the 2014 Outstanding Publication Award from the International Association for the Study of Organized Crime. - Shortlisted for the 2014 Thinking Allowed Ethnography Award from the British Sociological Association and the BBC. -
Peter J. Boettke
PETER J. BOETTKE BB&T Professor for the Study of Capitalism, Mercatus Center at George Mason University, & University Professor of Economics and Philosophy Department of Economics, MSN 3G4 George Mason University Fairfax, VA 22030 Tel: 703-993-1149 Fax: 703-993-1133 Web: http://www.peter-boettke.com http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=182652 http://www.coordinationproblem.org PERSONAL Date of birth: January 3, 1960 Nationality: United States EDUCATION Ph.D. in Economics, George Mason University, January, 1989 M.A. in Economics, George Mason University, January, 1987 B.A. in Economics, Grove City College, May, 1983 TITLE OF DOCTORAL THESIS: The Political Economy of Soviet Socialism, 1918-1928 PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE Academic Positions 1987 –88 Visiting Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, George Mason University 1988 –90 Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, School of Business Administration, Oakland University, Rochester, MI 48309 1990 –97 Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, New York University, New York, NY 10003 1997 –98 Associate Professor, Department of Economics and Finance, School of Business, Manhattan College, Riverdale, NY 10471 1998 – 2003 Associate Professor, Department of Economics, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA 22030 (tenured Fall 2000) 2003 –07 Professor, Department of Economics, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA 22030 2007 – University Professor, George Mason University 2011 – Affiliate Faculty, Department of Philosophy, George Mason University FIELDS OF INTEREST -
Anarchism and Austrian Economics
View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Munich Personal RePEc Archive MPRA Munich Personal RePEc Archive Anarchism and Austrian economics Peter Boettke George Mason University 2011 Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/33069/ MPRA Paper No. 33069, posted 30. August 2011 16:16 UTC Anarchism and Austrian Economics Peter Boettke I. Introduction It is a great honor for me to give the Cuhel Memorial Lecture at the Prague Conference on Political Economy for 2011. Franz Cuhel rightly holds an honored place in the development of the pure theory of the Austrian school of economics.1 Ludwig von Mises credits Cuhel (1907) with providing the first presentation of a strict ordinal marginal utility analysis. The confusion in choice theory that eventually lead to the purging of the human element in the economic analysis of decision making would have been avoided had Cuhel’s ordinal presentation of marginal utility analysis been more widely accepted. Instead, it was for Mises (1949) and later Rothbard (1962b) to develop that presentation and offer it as an alternative to the neoclassical theory of microeconomics that developed after John Hicks’ (1939) Value and Capital. The implications, I would argue, are far greater than the technical issues of ordinal versus cardinal utility and the subsequent debate among ordinal utility theorists of marginal utility analysis and demonstrated preference versus marginal rates of substitution and indifference curve analysis, etc. The implications of the debate in choice theory go to core of how we view the individual that we study in economics.2 The University Professor of Economics at George Mason University, and BB&T Professor for the Study of Capitalism at the Mercatus Center. -
1 an Austrian Approach to Law and Economics, with Special Reference
1 An Austrian approach to law and economics, with special reference to superstition* Peter T. Leeson Abstract This paper has two purposes. First, it considers what the components of an “Austrian” law and economics might consist of. I argue that Ronald Coase’s conception of law and economics precludes the economic analysis of legal institutions and, in particular, the beliefs that support them. In doing so, Coase’s conception precludes an Austrian law and economics. In contrast, Richard Posner’s conception of law and economics makes such analysis the core of its study. In doing so, Posner’s conception provides a productive foundation for an Austrian law and economics. Second, to illustrate what some aspects of an Austrian law and economics might look like in practice, I consider several examples of the economic analysis of beliefs of import for the law. I focus on objectively false beliefs, or superstitions, and argue that some such beliefs are socially productive. JEL codes: B53, D8, K00, K49, Z12 Keywords: Austrian-Chicago synthesis, law and economics; Coase; Posner; superstition; beliefs; economic analysis of law * Email: [email protected]. Address: Department of Economics, George Mason University, MS 3G4, Fairfax, VA 22030, USA. I thank Pete Boettke and Chris Coyne for helpful comments and discussion. I also thank the Mercatus Center at George Mason University for financial support. 2 1 Introduction A hallmark of the Austrian approach to economic science is its emphasis on individuals’ beliefs.1 This emphasis derives from the importance the Austrian approach attaches to subjectivism. According to that approach, to understand observed patterns of human decision making and its results, you must understand the “meanings” humans attach to their actions and the problem situations they confront. -
Pirates and the Uses of History
© ephemera 2010 reviews ISSN 1473-2866 ephemera www.ephemeraweb.org theory & politics in organization volume 10(2): 194-198 Pirates and the uses of history Martin Parker review of: Gabriel Kuhn (2010) Life under the Jolly Roger: Reflections on golden age piracy. Oakland, CA: PM Press. (PB: pp. 272, $20.00, ISBN: 9781604860528) Peter T. Leeson (2009) The invisible hook: The hidden economics of pirates. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (PB: pp. 288, £11.95, ISBN: 9780691150093) When research, teaching and writing about history is being done, it is usually justified with reference to the problem of induction. Though induction is called a ‘logic’, it is really a guess about probability. If the sun has risen every day for all of my life, then it will probably rise tomorrow. There is no necessary reason implied here, no deduction from principles, simply a guess based on spotting a pattern and then predicting it into the future. So the largely descriptive practice of history becomes articulated as a search for patterns which trail from then to then, from the crow’s nest of now. Not always, because it could be justified as a literary or cultural practice which is being done for its own sake, or for commercial reasons of selling books and TV series, but when a loftier reason is called for it would usually be about ‘learning’ from history. If you don’t know your past, you are doomed to repeat it. How can we know where we are going if we don’t know where we’ve been? In theory then, when it comes to wars, revolutions or financial collapses, we can go back and look at what happened and use it to shape our actions now with the benefit of hindsight. -
Is the Transition to the Market Too Important to Be Left to the Market?
Other articles Blackwell Publishing Ltd IS THE TRANSITION TO THE MARKET TOO IMPORTANT TO BE LEFT TO THE MARKET? Peter J. Boettke and Peter T. Leeson1 Most models of Central and Eastern European transition fail to appreciate the de facto organising principles that governed life in the Soviet-type system. Concentration has instead been focused on the de jure pronouncements of what constituted these systems. It is this misidentification, we contend, that has caused the major problems for economists devising strategies for reform. Proper appreciation of the de facto realities underlying Soviet-type economies sheds light on the crucial role that market forces must be allowed to play in the process of transition. Introduction competing hypotheses on the causes and consequences of the collapse of socialism have been Official economic statistics reveal that Russia’s circulating: inherent contradictions of socialism, economic system has continually contracted since Western military pressure, bad luck (and corruption) 1989. Indeed, by the end of 1996 the Russian economy in the selection of leaders, and poor economic was about half its size in 1989 – a steeper fall than the management which could be repaired head the list. US experienced during the Great Depression of the One hypothesis about the socialist world of Eastern 1930s. The Russian people have endured great and Central Europe and the Soviet Union, however, economic hardship over the past decade with an has not made the list. And it is from the perspective estimated 22% of the population now living below the of this hypothesis that we consider the question official poverty line. -
Trial by Battle
TRIAL BY BATTLE Peter T. Leeson1 ABSTRACT For over a century England’s judicial system decided land disputes by ordering disputants’ legal representatives to bludgeon one another before an arena of spectating citizens. The victor won the property right for his principal. The van- quished lost his cause and, if he were unlucky, his life. People called these combats trials by battle. This paper investigates the law and economics of trial by battle. In a feudal world where high transaction costs confounded the Coase theorem, I argue that trial by battle allocated disputed property rights efficiently. It did this by allocating contested property to the higher bidder in an all-pay auction. Trial by battle’s ‘‘auctions’’ permitted rent seeking. But they encouraged less rent seek- ing than the obvious alternative: a first-price ascending-bid auction. ‘‘When man is emerging from barbarism, the struggle between the rising powers of reason and the waning forces of credulity, prejudice, and cus- tom, is full of instruction.’’ —Henry C. Lea, Superstition and Force (1866, 73). 1. INTRODUCTION Modern legal battles are antagonistic and acrimonious. But they aren’t lit- 1 erally battles. Disputants don’t resolve conflicts with quarterstaffs. Their lawyers don’t fight to the death. This wasn’t always so. For more than a century England’s judicial system decided land disputes by ordering dispu- tants’ legal representatives to bludgeon one another before an arena of spectating citizens. The victor won the property right for his principal. 1 Email: [email protected]. Address: George Mason University, Department of Economics, MS 3G4, Fairfax, VA 22030. -
Peter J. Boettke
PETER J. BOETTKE BB&T Professor for the Study of Capitalism, Mercatus Center at George Mason University, & University Professor of Economics and Philosophy Department of Economics, MSN 3G4 George Mason University Fairfax, VA 22030 Tel: 703‐993‐1149 Fax: 703‐993‐1133 Web: http://econfaculty.gmu.edu/pboettke/ http://www.coordinationproblem.org PERSONAL Date of birth: January 3, 1960 Nationality: United States EDUCATION Ph.D. in Economics, George Mason University, January, 1989 M.A. in Economics, George Mason University, January, 1987 B.A. in Economics, Grove City College, May, 1983 TITLE OF DOCTORAL THESIS: The Political Economy of Soviet Socialism, 1918‐1928 PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE Academic Positions 1987 –88 Visiting Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, George Mason University 1988 –90 Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, School of Business Administration, Oakland University, Rochester, MI 48309 1990 –97 Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, New York University, New York, NY 10003 1997 –98 Associate Professor, Department of Economics and Finance, School of Business, Manhattan College, Riverdale, NY 10471 1998 – 2003 Associate Professor, Department of Economics, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA 22030 (tenured Fall 2000) 2003 –07 Professor, Department of Economics, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA 22030 2007 – University Professor, George Mason University 2011 – Affiliate Faculty, Department of Philosophy, George Mason University FIELDS OF INTEREST Market Process Theory, Comparative Political Economy, History -
New Perspectives on Political Economy a Bilingual Interdisciplinary Journal Vol
NEW PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICAL ECONOMY A bilingual interdisciplinary journal Vol. 7, No. 1, 2011 NEW PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICAL ECONOMY A bilingual interdisciplinary journal / Vol. 7, No. 1, 2011 New Perspectives on Political Economy is a peer-reviewed semi-annual bilingual interdisci- plinary journal, published since 2005 in Prague. The journal aims at contributing to scholar- ship at the intersection of political science, political philosophy, political economy and law. The main objective of the journal is to enhance our understanding of private property-, market- and individual liberty-based perspectives in the respected sciences. We also belive that only via exchange among social scientists from different fields and cross-disciplinary -re search can we critically analyze and fully understand forces that drive policy-making and be able to spell out policy implications and consequences. The journal welcomes submissions of unpublished research papers, book reviews, and educational notes. PUBLISHED BY CEVRO INSTITUTE AcaDEMIC PRESS IN co-OPERATION WITH WoLTERS-KLUWER CZECH REPUBLIC EDITORIAL ADDRESS: New Perspectives on Political Economy CEVRO Institute, Jungmannova 17, 110 00 Praha 1, Czech Republic Manuscripts should be submitted electronically. All manuscripts and correspondence should be addressed to [email protected]. Full text available via DOAJ Directory of Open Access Journals and also via EBSCO Publishing databases. INFORMATION FOR AUTHORS Authors submitting manuscripts should include abstracts of not more than 250 words and JEL classification codes. New Perspectives on Political Economy edits for clarity, brevity, and in accordance with the Chicago Manual of Style. Authors should use footnotes rather than endnotes or in-text references, and must include complete bibliographical information. -
Knowledge, Liberty, and Coordination: the Outlook of Adam
[Note to Undergraduates: For Undergraduates who enroll in the course as Econ 496 007 (CRN 20974), the requirements will be less. For example, the term-paper recommended length will be only 12 pages.] Econ 827 Economic Philosophy (CRN 13422) George Mason University Spring 2010 Friday afternoons (contact me about the exact time) Knowledge, Liberty, and Coordination: The Outlook of Adam Smith Prof. Daniel Klein [email protected] Office: Enterprise Hall 328 Brief Course Description: The course will treat a number of central topics in the nature and character of economics. I will use the course to develop a Smithian outlook. We will focus on the meaning of liberty, the economic claims for liberty, and its place in web of political economy. Another theme is the nature of social well-being and even of individual well being. Three broad rubrics cover much of the course discussion: • Knowledge • Liberty • Coordination To some extent, the course is an exploration of the meaning and interrelation of those three topics. In a broad sense, you might see the course all as a formulation of the invisible hand philosophy. The class format will be lecture and discussion, based on pre-assigned readings. Composition of Course Grade: 1. Attendance: 5% of grade. 2. Reading Discussion Leadership: 8% 3. Other (General) Class Participation: 8% of grade. 4. Weekly Point-Question Written Assignments on the Readings: each assignment should be a minimum of 1, maximum of 2 pages; 20% of grade. 5. Authorship of two comments at Journaltalk: 6% 1 6. McCloskey Assignment: 5% of grade. 7. Term paper: 24 % of grade. -
Pirational Choice: the Economics of Infamous Pirate Practices*
Pirational Choice: The Economics of Infamous Pirate Practices Peter T. Leesony Abstract This paper investigates the economics of infamous pirate practices. Two closely related eco- nomic theories— the theory of signaling and the theory of reputation building— explain these practices. First, I examine the pirate ‡ag, “Jolly Roger,” which pirates used to signal their identity as unconstrained outlaws, enabling them to take prizes without costly con‡ict. Second, I consider how pirates combined heinous torture, public displays of “madness,” and published advertisement of their …endishness to establish a reputation that prevented costly captive be- haviors. Pirates’infamous practices reduced their criminal enterprise’s costs and increased its revenues, enhancing the pro…tability of life “on the account.” I’m especially grateful to seminar participants at the University of Chicago and New York University for their insightful and thorough comments on an earlier draft of this paper. I also thank the editor, two anonymous referees, Pete Boettke, Tyler Cowen, Chris Coyne, Edward Glaeser, Russ Sobel, Bill Trumbull, and Claudia Williamson for helpful remarks and suggestions, and the Becker Center on Chicago Price Theory at the University of Chicago and the Mercatus Center at George Mason University where this research was partly conducted. Doug Rogers provided excellent research assistance. This paper contains and extends material from the author’sbook, The Invisible Hook: The Hidden Economics of Pirates (Princeton University Press, 2009). yEmail: [email protected]. Address: Department of Economics, George Mason University, MSN 3G4, Fairfax, VA 22030. 1 1 Introduction Few characters in history inspire as much fascination or mystery as pirates.