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Canada THE DISSOLUTION OF THE STATE OF 1860-1975

Michael M. Deeb Department of History

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

Facule of Graduate Studies The University of Western Ontario London, Ontario February 2000

@IichaelM. Deeb -2000 ABSTRACT

An extensive amount of literature has been written on the topic of

Lebanon exarnining the reasons for the collapse of the state. Research has focused on religous tension, class conflict, colonialism and the role of foreign powers including the Palestinians. Much of the information has dealt with the specific role each one of tliese factors played in the demise of the state. Since the inception of an autonomous Moiint Lebanon in 1860 by the Ottoman

Empire. iintil the collapse of the state in 1975, the relationship behveen the various sects has always been very tenuous. Of course. the issues cited above Iiad something to do with this volatility but the ovemding factor which divided the Lebanese and brouglit the state to its dissolution in 1975 was the confessional political system it was based tipon.

The purpose of this thesis is to examine how confessionalisrn created a narrow framework which prevented the state from handling serious challenges to social and economic refom. the Palestinian presence and the desire for underdeveloped areas and communities to obtain more power.

With the establishment of confessionalism~ three trends emerged which dictated the social, economic and political entironment of the country from

1860 to 1975. The way in which the inhabitants identified themselves. dernogaphy and local power smiggles were the three bi-products of the

III confessional system. Every other issue that was evident in the Lebanese conflict was a direct or indirect result of confessiona~ism. Direct representation was unable to t.Ae mot in Lebanon as the political elites maneiivered themselves into positions of power ensuring their permanency.

It is extremely dificult to classi- the Lebanese conflict as the issues involved toucli so many different areas of economic. social and political ti~story. However? the one element whicli remained the constant historical tradition of the Lebanese state was the confessional system. Every sect der-ived its power frorn confessionalism, al1 of the decisions were based around sectarianism. and the decay of the state took place because of its confessional nature. Even afier the 1975- 1997 Lebanon war subsided. the political dites returned to the systein tliey new best to form a new begnning- confessionalism. 1 would like to thank the following people for making this study on the

Dissolution of the State of Lebanon possible. Dr. Clovis Maksoud of the

Arnencan University in Washington, DC for introducing me to the fascinating co~iiplesitiesof Lebanese liistory. The staff at the D.B.Weldon Library for their patience and professional service. The staff at the Robarts Library for their kind lielp. Celeste George and Danielle Desjardins for their editing. My adwsor. Dr. Maya Shatzrniller. for her direction? guidance and supervision withoiit whom this study woiild not have been made possible. And finally rny

Motlier. who proçlded me with the inspiration to cornplete this project despite the many obstacles it faced.

LIST OF APPENDICIES

APPENDIX I Villages, Towns, Cities and Areas Related to the Nineteenth Century Conflict ...... 1 10

APPENDIX II Regulation for the Administration of Lebanon

7he .\l~rrusarrifivva.... -- ...... 1 1 1

APPENDIX III Treaty of Peace Behveen the Christians and Dnize 1860 ...... 115

APPENDIX IV Contemporary Distribution of Lebanon's Main Religious Groups - comparing 1932 to 1983...... 1 1 7

APPENDIX V Epe Witness Account Detailing PL0 Abuses in Lebanon...... 1 18

APPENDiX VI Disiri bution of Governrnent Positions by Sect. under t lie .\ lir tusar*r*flvw.- - ...... 119 INTRODUCTION

The political system of Lebanon devrloped within the frarnework of confessionalisrn and created a narrow system of representation which operated in an atmosphere of fragility. mistrust, hostility and conflict. No matter what reforms or adjustrnents were made to it, the Lebanese system. because it was based on sectarianism. imposed restrictions and limitations on the propess of the state. However. as eacli community Wed for its own share of power. in the long run the system couid no longer evolve nor accomplish its pals because it was iinable to handle crucial issues such as the distribution of wealth, democratic reform. elections or new factors such as the

Palestinians and their military apparatlis.

The purpose of this stiidy is to describe and analyze the historical evolution of the Lebanese state kom its inauguration in 1860 to its dissolution in 1975. Tliree basic trends have forrned the pattern which Lebanon has taken toward the path of dissolution. Since the inception of the Ottoman imposed political settlement in 1860. the region was divided along the lines of religious affiliations. Over time, semi-autonomous areas inside Lebanon developed under this sectarian framework and were controlled by the religious political aoups who regulated taxation, se~cesand economic C excliange in lieu of a centralized state.' Cornpetition for local power characterized the relationsliip behveen the various commiinities, and culininated into a smiggle for domination benveen status quo forces

(Cliristians) and those who wanted more power in the affairs of the state iMuslims).

In addition to religion. demograpliy was an equally important factor in tlic political and social situation because it determined the basis for daims in

tiir shifis of power between the participants in the Lebanese body politic. The

demograpliic factor was manifested in different fortns: in the traditional

Maronite majority under the Ottoman nrim.saiwj&yu. in French tampenng

witli the population figures by addinp territory to the newly established state

of Greater Lebanon. in the influence of the Sunni Muslim commimity in

political affairs and in the rise of the Shiite Muslim comm~inityas a political

and military force. The dyamics of population change became a contentioiis

issue tliroughout Lebanese history given the fact that the ninbers of the

Sectrinanism 1\35 the only source of powr that detcrmincd nhat hpe of change took pIacc in Lcbanon from 1860 untiI the collapsc of the state in 1975. Various militias bclonging to diffcrcnt sects tore off pans of Lcbanon and converted the rims into separate fiefdoms providiq senices to the mcmbers of their obi n cornmunitics much the samc wriy ;1 national govcrnmcnt would. Sami Adeeb Ofeisli. Srctarrcrnrs~rt mi ( 'ircmge In i.&nnon lIW-IY75. (California:Ljnkersity or Southcrn California. 19961. 2. various groups were contin~ioiislyfluctuating and argued upon after the one and only officia1 census had been taken in 1932.' Since then no reliable numbers tiom either side could be accepted. Confessionalism and deiriography together were the core of Lebanon's socio-political landscape. and tlie reason for its dissolution.

The sources used for this study represent both traditional scholarship and new ic-riting on the topic. The traditional research taken tiom various autliors found in Cliapter One provides an oveniew of the material which. over time. lias been updated. For instance. authors such as Nejla Abu

Iuedin. lïw Ilnce, A.J. Abraham. Ixhmon ut Md ( 'rnttry, Charles

concentrated tlieir works on introducing the Dnize and the Maronite

Cliristians as participants to an overall problem in Moimt Lebanon. These autliors sought to introduce their studies during 1960- 1985 when little was knoivn or being wntten on tlie topic. In particular? Nejla Abu Iuedin. 7he

. -

- Dtrnogr:ipli?. in Lcbanon hclped dctcrminc lion shifts in political rind social pmcr occurred. Thc sire of ihc \mous cornmunitics added lcgitimaq- to thcir stmggle for dominance as the numbcrs of ach scct adcd ri prin~culargroup in richieving local powr. Disputes over the numbers of ach group bmme more contcsted in tlic mid to latter t\\.entieth ccntuq ris the data concerning ach scct was unoficirill~recorded crcatins rin atrnosphcrc of suspicion rind pamnoia. Amon Soffer. "Lebanon: Where Demograph! is the D~ïrzr and Iliya Harik, Politics and Change in a Traditional Society:

Idehanon Ill-1845, concentrate their works on describing the social structure of the Dme and the and the ot-igns of their communities.

However. tlieir research weakens as newer shidies examining the Drue enable a more broad and informative discussion on the topic.

Autliors sucli as Leila Fawaz. .-ln OcrasronJor Wou, have been able to increase tlie insipht into the dynamic Dnize culture and society. Slie has been able to acqiiire more information thro~igh interviews. documents. memoirs and Dnize spintual leaders about the contents of the secretive religion. In contrast. to Abu luedin, Fawaz discusses the demographics of the Dwe and tlieir role as landlords in Mount Lebanon along with their desire to resist foreip penetration of their community. With this information. she is able to link the existence of the Dnize in Moiint Lebanon to tlie problems in the region with a more thorough historical foundation than her predecessors.

Engin Akarli's 7he Long Proce, analyzes the Ottoman role in Mount

Lebanon with overt bias as opposed to the traditional writings on the topic by

Charles Climc hiII. The Dr-icr ard .Ilar.onric.s ( iitirr. 7ilrkish Rlrk 18M-1860.

Akarli analyzed the interplay between the varioiis participants in the conflict

------Corc of Politics and Lifë'. in.. .\licltlle Emrrrn Stncfies, (London:Frank Criss & Co.. Ltd.. 19861. i.01.. 22. 1 94) and supported the notion that the Ottoman presence was necessary to maintain the political settlement of 1860 in order for peace to prevail.

Alttiough his view is narrow, it is consistent as he aims to portray the

Ottomans as benevolent occupiers of the inhabitants of the region. Churchill is more descriptive as he attempts to outline the positive and negative aspects of Ottoman rule not definitively criticizing or supporting Turkish actions in the region.

The sources for chapters Two and Three are also divided along the saine lines of older and newer scholarship. Authors such John Entelis,

I'llrr*uir.w~m~tl Paro. ïi*an.s\Orrnlatror al I.ehui~orl. Walid Khalidi, Corlfllct irml l iokcmv rn I.ehunon. Itmar Rabinovich. Ille Chv jbr Lehanon, Kamal

Salibi. The .ltotleun Histori- of-. Lrhmon. .-l Hoirse oj',llany .Ilan.sronsl and

John Spagnolo. France mi Orronron I.ehmo,~, represent a large body of work tliat was completed in the 1960s and 1970s dealing with Lebanon's iiistorical heritage after independence in 1913. Their w-ritings concentrated on the multiple problems that eroded tlie Lebanese state. Issues such as confessionlism, class conflict. religion and socio-economic imbalances represent the major themes of tlieir works. These well-known authors becaine tlie standard in the late 1980s and early 1990s by which worthwhile scliolarsliip on the topic of Lebanon was rneasured. The weakness in some of these sources lay in their exclusion of historical background which would help piece together the time frame they chose to focus on. For example, Jolm Entelis, Plirralism and Pa-1

ïi*irii.sfOn~z~tio)~111 Lrba~m. and Walid Khalidi, C'onflicr and hlence in

I.ehotiotl. present challenging new questions to the coexistence of the various m-OUPS in Lebanon but remained narrowly focused on the post-1943 time L hame without an'; historical connections to the overall problem in Lebanon.

Witliout looking at the broad pattern of confessionalism throughout al1 of

Lebanon's liistory the analysis is reduced. providing the readers witli only part of tlie Iiistorical context.

The newer body of works completed on Lebanon. found in Chapter

Four fociised attention on more specific trends and patterns to accoitnt for the demise of tlie Lebanese confessional state. Books and articles written by people such as Latif Abul-Husn. The I.ehmtesr ('or~liclicrLooking Irtwartl.

Tlieodore Hanf ('oerisrrnce in K~rtinzrI.rhmon. Kamal Hamdan. "About tiie Confessional State in Lebanon", Judith Harik and Hilal Khashan.

"Lebanon's Divisive Democracy"? William Hams. Eàces qf' Lrhmon: Swrs

IIilr-s mti (ilobal E~w~nrons.Michael Hudson, --The Problem of

Authoritative Power in Lebanese Polirics: Consociationalism Failed"?

Elizabeth Picard, Lebanon a Sharteretl C'olmtp: I~1vrh.sat~d Reafirics qf' rlie LC'urs irl Lehanon, and Rosemary Sayigh, Too Many Enemies: The

I'destinian Erperience in Lebunon, al1 concentrate on specific issues ranging fioin the role demography had in the collapse of the state to the effects of the

Palestinian presence in the dissolution of Lebanon. These works deal with the effects of confessionalism and link the development of Lebanon and al1 of its problems as bi-products of the confessional system.

The evolution of the liistoriography concenng this topic on Lebanon lias iindoubtedly become more analytical in terrns of the questions and tlieories postiilated about the break up of the Lebanese state. It is eqiially important to note tliat the newer research has adopted the pattern of the older literatiire by incltidinp the historical background of Lebanon and linking it to the trends wliich helped cause tlie break iip of the state. This represents a positive phase in the researcli: as more information becomes available historia11s will be more equipped to s-tt iesize, analyze and criticize the materiai to make final determinations on an area that is conhsing, yet imperative to understand in order to address the dissolution of Lebanon.

In the following chapters the different phases of confessionalism rvill be esamined in order to demonstrate the destructive environment that existed beneath Lebanon's beautihl landscape, sunny resorts, casinos. liberal press and tlie pliiralistic nature of its major cities (Brirut. . Pipoii). This research attempts to focus on confessionlism as the main reason behind the break up of the Lebanese state. The difference between this literature and pre\ious works is the focus on what is considered by this author to be the core root of the Lebanese debacle-confessionalism. It was this system that dtimately dictated the destruction of the Lebanese state. Completed research on Lebanon iisually chose to focus on the bi-products of the central question and not the essence of the problem which caused the dissolution of Lebanon.

Tlie discussion will be camed out chronolo~cally. The first chapter will deal with the inaiguration of the confessional system implemented by the

Ottoman Empire, 1860-1 9 14. the second chapter will discuss the modification of the system under the French Mandate. 19214943, the third chapter will esainine the solidification of the system under the independent Lebanese state since 19-13 and the fourth chapter will deal with the dissolution of Lebanon in

1975 and the resurrection of confessionalism after the war in i 992. CHAPTER ONE

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CONFESSIONALISM IN

MOUNT LEBANON

1840-1914

Bockgroitrrd: The Drute, Maronites aird the SociaCPolitical Origins of tlie .Ifoirrzt Lebanon Governing Systern

Histoncally, both the Dnize and the Maronite Christians of Mount

Lebanon believed that their cornmunity was deprived of social and political power in the region. The Maronites were remnants of a once flourishing

Cliristian popiilation in tlie Eastern Mediterranean area while the Dntze were a lieterodo't offshoot from the dominant political and cultural body of ~slam.'

Creating a harmonious existence for the two groups was a major challenge as

Ili!ri Hririk rinril!.-r.cd the rclationship bctwen thc Druzc and hlaronites wliich includcd thcir rcligious iiistoncs and social inicnction nith one anorlier as possible orisins to thc conilta in ninetcgntli centun Mount Lebrinon. The fact that these tu.o Sroups thought ach nris destined to ruic the arcs buseof tlicir fiistoricril cspcnenccs ultimatel!. rcsulted in conflict. Iliyri Harik, Poliries md C'hmpe ln a 7N1d11ionol.?i)cr~~<\*: I.~hnnon 1 -1 1-l,S.IZ. IUnited States: Princeton Universi- Prcss. 1968) 12: Nejla Abu Iucdin- The Drrces: . 1 .\'ewStrrcf\+ qt-rhrir flisro? Forrh and Svcren.. (Nethcrlands: E.J. Brill. 1OX4). 2-3: Pl~ilipHitti. The Origins q/'tiie I-ruze People nndrherr Religton. (New York: .MMS Prcss. 1006 ). 44. they strugpled to overcome differences in their religious beliefs' historical legacies and positions in the feudal system of the area.4

The Maronites had been living in Mount Lebanon for several centuries as a Christian people witli strong links to the Papacy in Rome. Deriving their name from the sect's Patron Saint. the Monk , who lived in the latter part of tlie foiirth century. the Maronite langpage was Ararnaic until the Arab conqiiest of in the seventh centiiry, afier which they began to speak

~rabic.' The churcli had a profound influence amongst the Maronites as they spread into various parts of Mount Lebanon including ./ahai u/-D~îcc.

(Molintain of the Drue). Patriarchs and Bishops were sent into various

Maronite communities to set iip missions and resolve disputes. The chiirch was highly or~anizedin its missionary activity, a fact that allowed tlie

institution to secure for itself a power base within the Maronite social

structure. Monasteries, sees and even a tixed wage system for the clergy

were established by the churcli enabling it to acquire control over the means

of i t s own administration this depriMng the niiiqali lis (tau-farrners) of their traditional power.6 As the nineteenth century wore on, the church grew in power and played an important part in Maronite life. The clergy assurned leadership in political affairs as well as the ability to articulate and advance the new communal values of the Maronite people.'

The town of Rsharreh. located north east of Reinit (see Appendix l), was tlie major centre of tlie Maronites. Their nluqqatianr (sub govemor). resided in Hshavvelt and was iinder the jiirisdiction of the Ottoman Govemor in p.Pnor to the eigiiteentli centiiry the Maronites were like the rest of the Cliristian people living in a traditional Islamic society who held the statiis of tllt~ntniuhpeople (protected people)." ssyçtem was set up in wtiich the

Maronites woiild be panted the riglits of religious practice and security. in retiim. tliep would pay state and poll taues. As a tlhinmnh people. the

Maronites were forbidden to ca- atms? ride horses, Wear Muslim garb or ring bells in tlieir churches."

Under the leadership of the Sl~illahi fmily, which niled Mount

Lcbanon behveen 1697- 1840, the condition of the Maronites improved. An indication of this improvement carne fiitli the Ottoman policy concerning

" Ili? a Hank. F-'~liticsml C .hnnge. Il6; Brisscm KhaliFih. The R~srand Fa11 ofC~hr~stimLebanon. (Toronto:York Press Ltd.. 199?). 25: ?.Iikh;r!d Mishaqa. .\ !tm/rr. ,\kg-hm. Pillage and Pltrnder. 127. Ibid. .Charlcs Cliurcliili. The Drzrzti crntl.\lnronrtes I Mer Trrrkrsh Rule Front IWO-llY6t9. (New York: Arno Press. 197-3 1. 92: Phiiip Hitti- khcrnon rn I/isron.. (New York: St. Manin's Press. 1967). 436. property. Under this system Maronites had certain property nghts which included exemption fiom inheritance tax or fines on succession."' Some

Maronite feudal lords in the north such as the Kkin and Habayht. farnilies controlled property where Maronites constituted a majority.

Social stratification in the niral Maronite cornrnunity during the early nineteeth century was formed along the lines of property holders and tenants, dividing tlie cornmunity in to shqvkln and peasants. The .vl~aykhswere heads of tlie villages and usually came frorn tlie peasant class. They possessed a feu extra material goods in cornparison to the other villagers such as horses, foods and in some cases tlieir homes. The wealthy and powerfül shu-vkhs lived in klrsrmarz which was an area nonh-east of Bernlt and the peasants tliere were either small land owners or tenants who ciiltivated the land with the shgkhs and shed the produce with tliem in equal portions."

Tlieir neighbors, the Dnize. were a small community and a relipous sect wlio were able to preserve their identity in the midst of recuminz changes

' Ili!ri Harik, Polirrcs ont/ ('hnngr. IO; Carter Findlcy. Hrrrrallcrnlrc Rqhrni sri rlw Orroman Eniprrr: The .~'t~blrmcPorrr 1 39-192,'. (New Jersey: Princeton Uni\.crsit' Prcss. 1980). 20. Cmcr Findlq. Omninn (Ir11Olficlddunr: -1 Sc~inlfhyon.. (Ncw Jersey Princeton Uni\.ersi? Prcss. 1089). 3 1: Caner Findlcy. Bureaucrntlc Rqthrnr. 46: Youseff hl. Choueiri. "Ottoman Rcform and Lcbancsc Patriotism". in cds.. Nadim Slichadi & Dana Mills. I.rhnncm .1 H~sronrfCon?7ict and ( 'onsensus. (London: I.B. Tauris & Co.. Ltd.. 1988). 67: Linda T. Darling. "The Finance Scribes and Ot tornan Po1itics'-. in cd.. Cacsar Fanh, Duclsron .\ laking cmd ( 'itnnge rn rhr Ortuman Enrprrr. (United States of Arncrica: Thomas Jefferson Univcrsih Prcss. 1993). 95. Ili: a Hririk. ~~011~smd C-hanp. 20: Basscm Khrilifah. The Rrsr and Fafi. 57. and upheavals, since the time of the sect's birth one thousand years ago.12

Various factors contributed to the strong social cohesion that existed within the Dnize cornmunity. Relipon was one of the most important elements that bonded the together - stressing courage and uni& as values for al1 of its worshipers. The duty of every commimity member was to care for his/her co- religionists. show deference to the high among them and be accessible and lielphil to those of an inferior position in life." Courage and loyalty in Drue society Iiad emerged From tlieir historical past which displayed a spirit of resistance to an? attempt from a foreip power that threatened their way of life in Mount Lebanon. Tl~eseevents created traditions of personal valor and lieroisrn whicli were transmitted from generation to generation, giving the

rnernbers of the community a sense of history and iini~.'~Kinship played an

eqiially important role in strengthening social cohesion as the Druze practiced

endoga~n'. - niarrying only within their community. The geography of the

liigh mountain range enabled the Dnize to live in isolation free from outside

interference for a considerable pet-iod of time. Attacliment to the land was an important part of life for the Druze since they had always owned their land fiee from intervention, and were

own As Crovemed by their laws. customs and beliefs. a mountainous community, land was essential and agriculture was the predominant occupation." Here too, the social stratification followed that of tenants and propei-ty oviners. The land was controlled by the owners, and the tenants rented tlie property along with other peasants who were journeyen, continuously roaming the coimtryside. Both the tenants and the poorer peasants had a vested interest in seeing the land produce an income as the! sliared in its revenues witli tlieir feudal lord. The Dwe lords mled over a

Maronite tenant population who had to obey Druze laws and regulations.

The Dnize were intent on rnaintaining this landlord - tenant relationship while the Maronites desired more fieedom in Mount Lebanon. This relationship was ultirnately bound to create difficulties as these two comrnunities faced eacli otlier with different agendas for the future of the area.

By tlic beginning of the nineteenth century the Maronites nurnbered about 1 50.000 while the Dnize population was 60,000.'~eligionwas a fiindamental differentiating factor for the two goups to express their status in

-

' Il! ri Hank. r7olrtrc.v and ( 'limgr. 2 I: Nejla Abu -1ucdin. The Drrrze .-f .\erim Sru&. 222. + Ibid.. 22; Mount Lebanon, but there was also an ideological component emergng: the

Maronites, who had direct links with the Papacy in Rome and the French, proclaimed the view that Mount Lebanon should be an independent region with links to the West and demanded the elimination of the Drue feudal system and an end to Ottoman nile. The Druze-Maronite antagonism had now taken the form of '-change versus statu quo" with a sectarian element forming the basis of the alignments. As the competing interests of both

Cmoi~ps intensified and clashed. religion was iised to articulate the conflict in

Mount Lebanon.

Phase I:

The Civil Wur of 184 1 and the Rise of the Mked Disttkt System

The first vestige of Lrbanese autonomy emerged out of the bloody clashes that ensried between the Drue and Maronites in mid-nineteenth centup Mount Lebanon. Initial hostilities between these two religious groups broke out in 1811 and it is here that the roots of confessionalism as a political system can be found. Historically. the Middle East's primaiy divisions have been based on religon and tibe. The Ottoman millet system allowed religiotis groups to live peacehlly, unhampered by threats of persecution or espiilsion. but it also created a polarization amongst the various c~mrnunities.'~When the Maronites set out to challenge their Dnize feudal lords. religious affiliation fomed the basis of their movement. By 184 1, the

Maronites were the only political group in Mount Lebanon with enough

stnngth. organization, foreign support fiom France and rnilitary proficiency

capable of challenging the Porte's allies, the ~ruze.'"

The first set of isolated skirmishes between the Dnize and Maronites

broke out in early spring 1841. Towms whicli had once been peaceful, now

became the site of confessional conflict of the bloodiest kind.;" The conflict

escalated into a series of massacres as the Dnue went on the offensive in the

to~msof .leziw?.4huylt? Sl~ic~ai~r. - - ai-Hutiarh and Buahda ( see Appendk 1)

endinp with Ottoman intervention which stopped the hostilities but left both

sides vengefiil. Umar Paslia. the new Ottoman Govemor of Mount Lebanon.

18-12? appointed Maronites to important positions within the local

administration. By doing so. he may have been attempting to bnng the

Maronites into the main political Stream as though they were equal

loiin Entclis. Pluralisnl mdParri. 'Trnn.yti)rrrrntionIn I.ehanon. ( Ncthcrlands: E.J. Brill. 1974 ). 13: Crincr Findlcy. IJtrrenucrafrc Rqti~rnr.2 1. '* .A.J. .Abnham. I-rhnnon al .\lidC'etrttr?. .\ fnronirr-Dncr Rrlnrions in Lebnnon IWO- 1,YrjO: .l Prei'wfu IO. lrclh .\nr~ondi.sni. (Lnitcd Sttitcs: Uni\.crsi~Press of Arncrica, 1981 1. 69: John Spagnoio. f+~ncrand !htonmn Lehanon. l.i'fil-1 Y 14. (London:Ithaca Prcss. 1977). 20. ' >tiklirt!d hlisfiriqri documentcd the tyeof i-iolencc and hritrcd that esisted betwcen the Dwc and Jlrironitcs. 1840-lS60. ris a backdrop to the historicril Icgacy thcir confiict wouid lea~cin the arcri. The bittcnicss. wngancc and rumor n hich ensucd laid the foundzirion for future confiict but more importantly for Ottoman intcnmtion and the imposition of 3 poIitic;11 settlcmcnt based on sectarian lines. MikhayiI hlishriqri.. .\ fwder. .\ lq\.hem. Pilkqr. 227; Kamal Salibi. The .\kotfuni Histofi. qf Lrbnnon. (Net\. York: Prxgcr Fublishcn. 1965). 49: Basscrn Khalifah. The R1.w miFkil. 42. participants in Mount Lebanon's polity and society but instead his actions

iipset the Dwe cornmunity. As the Maronites becarne Umar Pasha's most

favoured social group, the Drue realized their traditional role as the power

elite in Mount Lebanon was weakening.'" The ensuing fiction between the

Dnize and Ottomans ultirnately fanned into an open revolt against the Turks

and gave the Maronites an opportunity to strike a blow at the Dwe.

After the clashes of 184 1-1841. tlie Ottomans attempted to impose a

political system that would provide some stabilit'; to Mount Lebanon giving

botli tlie Dwe and Maronites social eqiiity. The result was the creation of a

inised district system or double district (I)ci~mycmair),as it was called. that

divided Moiint Lebanon into wo sections. the north and soiith." The Reinil-

1)trnra.wir.r road was the dividing point between these two districts and each

Iiad a sub-governor (qqv nroqani): in the north it was a Maronite and in the

soutli it was a Dnize. The system intended to allow both the Dmze and

Maronites to live side by side and share local political power." The qay

- Compccition bctwcn the Dnuc and Maronites Tar lowl powr led to a protnctcd stm~gleto achie\.e dominancc in thc arca. On thc surfacc. the compcting intcrcst of thc IWO groups uerc different. but undcmcÿih. ilic! a crc similar as the Drwe attcmptcd io rciain their fcudal positions of prïvilege trhile the \frironitcs attcmptcd to richicw that same puer. Rcli~ionuas an underking motivation for the coflict in Mount Lcbanon not necessani'- the sole onyn of the problcm. -4.J. Abraham, Lehanon ar Jlici- f -eriru~..37; Abu-Izzcdin. The Dnm .f .\>M..Srut&.. 56.

-' L& Tami Faivaz. .ln rkcmion!iir Ililr: ( '/\.il<<)qUcr rn Lrbnnon and Doniascr~sin 1360. (Berliele-- Cnii.crsit> of California Prcss. 1994). f 7; Engin .Uiarli. The Long Pence: Orroman Lrbnnon. ],Y61- lylO, ( Bcrkclc' : L'nii.enip of California Prcss. 1993). 28: Abdo BaAIini. Lr_qi.slarrr-rand Puliricnl Iki.~ir~pnitwti-. Lehanon. f 34,'- 1Y 71. c Nonh Carolina: Duhc Unt\mi& Press. 1976). 33 -- Basxm Iihalifah. The Ri.w mlEirlf. 42. maclam would monitor and regulate these districts but was not given any specific authority as each sub-governor was accountable to the Ottoman

Governor of Mount Lebanon.

The self-governing districts created more problems than they solved because they did not correspond to the social realities of nineteenth century

Moiint ~ebanon." The plan could have worked only if the population in each district was homogeneous, which was not the case, and the system did not take into accoiint other religioiis sects in the districts such as the Protestants.

Catiiolics or Greek 0rtliodo.u. The population in the southem dimicts under the Dnize quv tnayarn were more Iieterogeneous as opposed to the north wtiere the Christians made up 2/3 of the inhabitants.'" Additional problems arose as the power of the qat' tmclnnîs was restricted to their own areas thus

ciittinirC the Maronite sub-governor in the nortii from his CO-religonistsin the soiitli. Moreover. the Maronites no longer accepted the idea of living under tlie aiitliority of Ottoman nile and tlieir leaders began to plan for a second

- - -' Class conflict and ihc social composition of the Dwcand Maronites in ninetccnth centun Lébanon are Lciln Fri~vri~'smain arguments for the problcms nhich plagucd the arc3 for so man- 'cars. Thc Landlord ( D~K)and Tenant (Maronites) rdationship included social. political and econornic interests of thc diffcrcnt Croups which cach \vas attcmpting to maintain. Religion n-as ri na! that the Icriders of the diffcrcnt cornmunitics could nlly thcir membcrs to fight for ri Caux the! claimcd was worthy. Lcila Fauw . ln Occa.sron_hr If$, 28: Ensin .Lkrirli. The Long Pence. 52. '' 1bid.- 29. campaign to liberate the mixed districts in an attempt to bring them under coiitrol of the ~atriarch."

Phase II:

The Reglement and the Creation of tlte Majiis 1845

The next stage of the conflict-and in the formation of confessionalism as a political power system came-in Apnl 1845. when the Maronites initiated the next civil war by attacking several Dnize villages with the aim of cliallenging Ottoman authority and liberating their CO-religionistsin the mixed districts. Initiallp, the Maronites were able to inflict Iieavy damage on the

Dnize and threaten the most notable of Dnize families-the .Jzcmblat.s at al-

.\luklrrurn. the Dnize seat of power. However. by the end of May, Ottoman forces had intervened to shift the balance of power in favour of tlie Dwe. forcing the Maronites into a defensive position enabling the Dwe to engage in offensive activities.'"~ a result of tlie Ottoman actions. the second civil war beht-een the Maronites and Druze ended in a stalemate. The Ottomans wisely maintained a balance of power in Mount Lebanon between 184 1 - 1845 by ensuring that neither the Dnize nor the Maronites achieved their military or political goals. The Maronite attempt to form an independent Mount Lebanon had failed mainly because the Turks acted as the Drue military reserves in eveq engagement of the civil war." It is evident from the refortns iinplemented by the various governors. especially the appointment of

Maronites to Iiigher positions in the local political structure, that the Turks attempted to distibute power more evenly arnongst the Dmze and Maronites while keeping each sect in a state of eq~iilibriurn.

The Ottoman Foreign Millister. Shakib Efendi. imposed a cease-fire arnongst the hvo sides and the second civil war of 1845 ended. Sectarianism now Iiad a higher profile than in the previoiis conflict of 184 1 as reiigion was used to bond the two communities more solidly within their respective

SOIIPS. C Convents were used to store weapons for the Maronites while the

Patriarch became an effective voice for Maronite unity and propaganda. In

1845. the Patriarch believed that if the Maronites could achieve the liberation of the mised districts it would be the first step towards Moimt Lebanon's unie and independence.'"owever, the Dnlze-Ottoman alliance in 1 845 proved to be too great a force for the Maronites to overcome and achieve tlieir objectives.

-. - -'.Charles H.Churchill. The Druzr mi .\lmmres. 92. -' .A..!. .4brriharn. I.chnnon nr .\ lid-Cvi.nnrn.,94. Shakib Efendi tightened Ottoman control of the area by first attempting to collect weapons fiom the warring factions. When this proved to be iinattainable, he imposed an organic law called the Regiement which provided new replatims for the mixed district system. The new policy continued the systern of the yuy nlaqam but also added a ntaj1i.s (council), which represented al1 the various sects: Siinni, Shiite. Dwe. Maronite. Greek

Ortliodox. Catholic and Protestant. The fiinction of the nrajiis would be to work in conjunction with tlie (pqv/wqam to regulate the mixed districts.

This. a ininiature representative body foitnded upon confessional lines was put into place to ensure the stability of the region and security for the different sects.

The idea of the qq nmpm was a step in the ri@ direction to stabilize tensions between tlie Druze and Maronites: however, the plan was unable to satis- the needs and aims of each commttnity in the area. The separation of

Mount Lebanon into hvo districts ultimately proved to be an ineffectual remedy for its problems. Althou& the system stayed in effect until 1860, renewed conflict would eventually overpower the sub-govemors and the nujlis reducing them to public officials wlth no real power.2' Phase III:

The Civil Wur of 1860 and the iM(ttt~rrifiyy~

The 1850s marked a period of relative calm in Mount Lebanon between the Due and Maronites-however. in 1851 the Ottomans made an error wlien they attempted to conscript the Drue into their military. The result was an open Drue revoit against the Turks in which the Ottomans souglit help From the Maronites. By 1853 the Dwe and Ottomans were back on good terms as the Turks rescinded their policy and 3?000 Duefought for tlie in the Crimean War as volunteers.")

In contrast, cohesion within the Maronite community deteriorated in the 1850s. The Maronite North. particiilarly Ki.vrmuw, became a center of a peasant revolt and an insurrection against Maronite feudal lords as a result of a dispute behveen the Khum family. wlio was challenging the auth0t-i~of tlie yu!. m~ipn~.Abu Lam. for control over the peasant population. Tanyis

Shahin. an eniployee at the Lazarist Convent in Ki~rawan.organized and led the peasants in a full scale revolt against their feudal lords which broke out in

189 Articulate and outspoken. Sliahin led the peasants to remove the

Khc7zrns From their homes. confiscate their property and parce1 the land arnongst thernselves. The revolt cornpletely alienated the clergy and peasants from their Khazin feudal lords as this social revolution threatened to dismernber the system of local Maronite feudalism." As the revolt wore on, tlie peasants, under the direction of Shahin, became a powerfùl force in the region. The Khuzrns appealed to the Ottomans and the British for help but tlie clergy prevented their attempts until the? realized their own power base.

(the peasants) were tiiming against them, as Shahin's movement gained immense influence and authority in the Christian North. The peasants then elected Shahin as a '-dictator to whom they pledged a blind obedience.""

Tlie chtircli knew if it did not respond and intervene as mediators in the conflict. their historical control over the peasants would be lost. Only afier the Ottomans made promises and pledges to Shahin did the fighting subside.

In the final analysis, the peasant revolt of 1859 provided the Dwe with an ideal opport~inityto smke at the Maronites while the seat of Christian power was in a state of flux.''

In the early spring of 1 860. the Druze prepared for an offensive against the Maronites. Upon hearing of the Dnize preparations, the Maronites began

" A.J. Abmliarn. I.eihmon al .t Id-( 'unrtty-.IOZ.

" Pliilip K. Hitti. Lehnnon ln flisrtrr?.. 436. Tlic aim of the .Liaronitcs in Lebanon \\.as not only to achicve lad poner but to shed the vokc of Ottoinm nitc from the maThe Maronites nanted to establish their church as the Ieading elcmcnt in socict~.rilong with an indcpendcnt arcri 11 hich hrid links to the West. particularly France. This additional factor g\.c the Maronitcs the will the! nceded in an ara dominated bu the Dnizc and propped up by the Ottornans.- - Bassern Khalifah, The R~Jmd Firll. 3. '- hIikhrt~ilVtishaqri, .Mtrder. .\ whent. Pillage and Plrrnder. 227. to take the appropriate measures for their ovm self-defense. Informal clashes took place and in the mixed districts Druze oppression intensified as harsher tenancy conditions were imposed intimidating their renters. The Christian peasants. who were motivated bÿ the revolt in krcs~~cm.began to de@ their

Dnize lords." Fighting spread to areas such as Hasharya. . Zuhle and Dc7vv al-Qamr. Killing and bumin lasted for three days and then espanded into Rernii and Scyda (Sitlorl) where Maronites were killed indiscriminatelu." The brutalit?, in wliich the Duecarried out their attacks was iinparalleled to an?; violence Moimt Lebanon had witnessed before. nie

Maronites attempted to combat the Dnize but their attempts were Futile and the laree-scale massacres and looting of the Christians in Lebanon forced the

Ottomans to create a more '-permanentg-solution in order to stop the killing prevent immanent European intervention and stabilize the regon.

It was obwous to the Ottomans that a system of representation was needed to satis- not only the Druze and Maronites but also the international community. The mutasarrrfiwu.. - (see Appendix II) was a system which est ablislied an administrative council representing the twelve religious communities-each guaranteed representation based on confessional affiliation.'We council oversaw taxes, local security, mbunals and the appointment of judgs (qadrs) and included a governor (mzitasarrg) who was not fiom Mount Lebanon but who was Ottoman, in charge of the area working in conjunction with the administrative council. The Central

Administrative Council (CAC) became the region's main political body and tlie source of power in solving disputes and creating laws.'? The ntutasarrrf' also became the eyes and ears of the Turks in Istanbul. What helped to stren~qhentlie system was the fact that the inhabitants of Mount Lebanon did not have an- larger national or extra national loyalties that cornpeted with parocliial attachments. Confessional representation was therefore the only rlement ivhich ensured the integrity of Mount Lebanon's emerging pluralist

Hence. the nzutasarrifivy-. emerged in 1 86 1 as the first representative body for the commimities of Mo~uit Lebanon that was elected througi1 sectarianism. How effective was tliis system of representation? What were the short and long tem effects of the nnirasai-rIfirva?- - How did this new

.r+ .-John Entclis. Plurnlisrt~and Pcrr~Trnn.sti,rrnntron. 22. .Abdo 1. Baaklini. I_rpi.slati\.e and fidrrrcal L4wfopniunr. 51. '' John Entclis csamined the philosophical foundations of conlessionalism and how mong communal ties ncrc it hich discouragcd an' tye of support for ri national idcntit> whcrc the inhabitants would bc patnotic toit ards the pater good of ri countn instead of a sect. The lack of this larger identih set an unstablc prcccdcnt 3s pIuralism in Lebrinon flourished but 1\35 on[!- temprap as coexistence ktwecn the \,ririous Croups could ncvcr be sustaincd for 3 long period of timc. John Entelis.-Plrrrafisni and Parp irr'zi7.~;;i;rrtr~~r~o~z.2-7. political environment influence the coexistence of the various communities?

In order to answer these questions, it is necessary to address the conditions tliat enabled the tmrrasarr.!fi~ to emerge. In the afiermath of the Dwe-

Maronite conflict there was devastating poverb? lawlessness, distrust and insecurity amongst the inhabitants of Mount Lebanon. Economic hardships, acts of revenge to settle scores, and looting, ail generated new tensions which

Iiad the potential of spawning renewed conflict."' More fnghtening, the absence of responsible leadership pushed the communities of Mount Lebanon more in ille direction of chaos and violence than peace. Many refugees needed relief but the Ottomans were unable to solve a11 of these problems tliemselves. They now needed European and local cooperation to deal with issues sucli as displaced perçons. compensation. rebuilding and securing a lastinp infrastructure.'"' These circiimstances prevented my possibility of findins a solution amongst the weakened victims, dislocated mountaineers or the devastated notables and their families.

Wlien the Druze-Maronite peace treaty was signed sliortly afier July

12. 1860. it was signed by the two qq't~taqanu. rntivs. rnnqata/is. majlis members. some notables and otlier deputies (see Appendix III). The political. legal and religious elites converged to ensure that their interests were secured by the new peace agreement. The new system institutionalized confessionalism, preserved power for the elites, and ultimately had both negative and positive affects for the welfare of the inhabitants.

The events of 1860 and the violence that surrounded them alarmed the

Ottomans for varioiis reasons. foremostl among them, the fear of European intervention. France had been the traditional protector and supporter of the

Maronites in Lebanon and it was deinanding the Ottoman Empire do more to ensure Maronite safety in the regi~n.~'Napoleon III of France supported minority rights and nationalistic aspirations. particularly those of the

Maronites in Mount Lebanon. At the same tirne, Napoleon III did not want to see the collapse of the Ottoman Empire for fear it would affect the European balance of power."2 Russia also began to propose joint action wtth the

French to protect the Christians of Mount Lebanon with the goal of weakening the Turks. The British were luke warm to the idea of any milita. intervention or any proposa1 tliat would give France and Russia an

'' Wiihout the Ottomans the course of evenrs in Mount Lebanon ivouid have spun hrthcr out of control as thc Turks maintaincd ordcr bctwen ihc wamng parties. Thcir minaim \vas to keep their empire intact. frcc from Europcan pcnetntion. To this end, the Ottomans rcscmbled peacc keepers nthcr than riuthomies oncc the conflict rcriched its pcak. The impact of thcir poiiq stopped the violence and cmtcd ri political scrtlcmcnt which mcntually lcd to rtn autonomous status for Xlount Lebanon nithin thc Ottonian Empire. Engin Akarli. The Lonp Pmce. 25: Lcila Fauaz. ..ln Occas~nnjbrIlar. 10 1. '- Lcila Frivaz-. ln Occnsron~fiwIlirr. 103. opportwiity to send expeditionary forces to the region that could result in the expansion of their influence and power.43

The only cause which each of the powers could agree on was an immediate cessation of Iiostilities and the search for a political solution which would permanently stabilize the region. By creating the nlrrtasarrifiyva, the

Ottomans moved quickly to prevent further European rneddlinp and were able to get the parties of the 1860 contlict to sign a peace treaty. In consultation with the various European powers, the Ottomans were also able to impose the

1mitc7.r~7rnfic~w. -- system whicli gave birth to political sectarian representation for the region? The result was a special statu~for Mount Lebanon in the

Empire and a political system-confessionalisin.

Con clrr sio rr :

The .Witasarrzji'yya as a Political System

As an institution: the nmrosarrrfiyw provided political stability and allowed both continuity and change in Mount Lebanon's political fabric. The council became a forum where the various sects could voice their concerns. pass laws and wimess the effects of their power without usinp violence. The

:; Ibid.. 1 1 1 : Iskander ibn Yaqub Abkanus. The Lehanon ln Turnroil: .Srrra and the Powers rn IlY60. tmns. J.F. Schcltcrna. (New Haven: Yale University Press. 1920). 33. ,., Engin .-Uüirli. irhc Ltiq E+acc. 3 1: Lcile. Fanu. .ln (kcinron$)r if'ar. 105. institution gave the different comrnunities a political identity and a sense of self-worth as they embarked upon creating their own cultural, political, social and economic systern within the Ottoman Empire. It was a mechanism that operated under the watchful eye of the Turks but soon became a forum for demands of greater autonorny From the Ottoman ~rn~ire.'"Cornpetition for political power emerged without weapons as the members representing the religious coinmiinities debated. passed motions and voted upon issues rather tlian settling their differences on the battlefield. In a way, the miriasarrfi- not only brouglit peace and stability but also political maturity to the inhabitants of Mount Lebanon. With this, the administrative council eventuallp became the embodiment of national aspirations for independence and self nile.'"'

The system created an autonomous region in the Ottoman Empire wliere leaders were locally elected. Albeit. the basis of these elections were not cornpletely free, nor direct in the sense that each sect was paranteed a cenain number of seats on the counci1.'- [t is evident that the system fiinctioned without S~~OUSproblems becaiise it ensured representation for each community. The village .shu~khsand leading notables were chosen by the peasants and used patronage appointments to consolidate their positions ensuring the- became heredita~y.''~On his part, the miuusarrij' attempted to prevent the notables from abusing their positions for personal gain so in the end. the orgaiiizational hierarchy of the system headed by him and the council. prevailed over the traditional hierarchy of the notable families.'"

Nevertlieless, tlie system allowed the notables and their power blocs to exist intact even though not at tlie forefront of Mount Lebanon's political system.

Once the Ottomans lost control of the area in 1914. the patronage system of the notables was able to exert enougli power to dominate Moimt Lebanon's body politic.

The inhabitants of Mount Lebanon were better off under the

111 nrclstw~ï-fi -- ii-a than they were under the precious feudal system. Each group

\vas now represented and coiild participate in detennining at least part of tlieir existence and a trained political core of administrators and forma1 institutions

\vas in place. Along with the enfianchisement of the Chnstians, the

Maronites were now brought into the political arena, which made them see tliemselves as something more than just a community of believers."'

Traditional feudal power was now weakened since land, althougli still important. was not the primary source of power. Mount Lebanon was given a distinct identity, different fiom the rest of the Arab World and the Ottoman

Empire. The autonomous sanjak, as it was known, dnven by the desire of its inhabitants to achieve full independence. embarked the country on a historical patli in whicli confessionalism remained its only foundation of representation. CHAPTER TWO

THE MODIFICATION OF CONFESSIONALISM

UNDER THE FRENCH MANDATE

1920- 1933

The Establislrnrent of Greater Lebanon 1920

Although the latter half of the nineteenth century witnessed a detenoration in the relations behveen the Christians and the Dnize of Mount

Lebanon? the Ottoman social and administrative system (mrrlasarrrfiyyc7)still provided a solid basis of coexistence for the time being" The limited autonomy that was achieved under the ~miuscrr.r.~fip+ameant different things to both the Muslim and Christian communities of the region. For the

Cliristians. any type of independence or independent state was a dream corne tnie? and if it included French protection it was an added bonus. Autonomy was welcomed by the Muslims but as the French took over the area their presence was viewed as a larger scheme to dominate the lives of the Muslims and isolate their comrnunity in order tu prevent them fiom uniting with Syria

" Xlcir Zamir. The Furnmion qf.\hlern Lehnnon. (London:Crwm Helm. 1985). 1: -4nn Williams. Hritnln and 1-rnncr rn the .\lidi/le &.sr ont/ .\idr .vica. 1914 /96;-. (London:St. Martin's Press. 1968). :(1. into a larger state. nius- when the Ottomans were defeated by the end of

World War 1 the break up of their Empire resulted in uncertainty for the

Druze and the Muslims of the area but was seen as a welcomed change to the

Post-war confusion exacerbated tensions and suspicions as new forms of Arab-Nationalism, Christian Nationalism and Zionism emerged @vin@the region a new set of variables which affected the political climate." The break up of the Ottoman Empire set the stage for the difficulties that the Frencli

Mandate would encounter in Moiint Lebanon as rising forrns of nationalism and appeals for independence began to surface.

French policy in Lebanon initially set oiit to safeguard the Maronite cornimini ty with the proclamation of cirnncl Liban (Greater Lebanon) in

1910." The aim was also to prevent the Maronite community from becoming part of a Syrian Muslim state which would have disrupted French plans to set iip a Western protectorate in region. Keeping the Maronites detached from

Syria provided a loyal base for the French to implement their policy since the

Maronites made up the single largest religious comrnimi~,even though they

.- .-. Da\.id McDou.cll. 1.ehnnon: .l I;)yilicr of.\lrncwrrrt..s-(London: Minority Rights Group. 1986). 10. hlcir Zrimir. The f-br~rtntroni$.\lotlrrn Lehonon. 1; N. Kliot. The Terrirorral Di.sutreprariun q\'n ';rare: Tilc ( 'aw cliL.t.thnnon. ( Britain: Occrisional Pripet Series. +iO. 1984). 4. i.l \Villin~nClc\.elrind. .-l fiisron (ifthe .\loclrrn .\ litklfr Em-r. (United States: Wcmiew Press. 1994). 209: Lcila MT.Mm. Luhanon: Inrprohablr .\krron: . l Sruc!~.in Polirrcnl Dei-elopnrunr. (Bloomington: Indiana were not a rnajority in the population.'j During the early 1920s the French expanded tlieir Mandate and included several Muslim areas into old Mount

Lebanon to create a new state. The Sunni Muslim cornrnunity initially made iip the rnajority of al1 Muslims living in Greater Lebanon and were tlie most inoderate arnongst the Islamic groups. Diiring the latter part of the twentieth centiiry tlie Shiite Miislims emerged as the dominant Islamic force in

~ebanon."' The intentions of the French then surfaced as they directly affected the demographics of the region enabling them to maintain a volatile political inix in whicli cornpetition for power would be based on sectarian affiliations. They slowly adjusted the demography of Greater Lebanon in an attempt to have their policies implemented with little or no difficulty. The aini was to limit the Maronites by 30°/0 in order to ensure their dependence on

French backing." This ieft no one religioiis group with enough power to clialleiige the French single handedly. Knowing full well the historical

Prcss. 1965 ). 37: David C. Gordon. The Rcpirblrc r!t'Leihanonr .\brron in Juoparciv. (Colorado: Westvicw Prcss. IW?). 2 1. < < Y. iiliot. T/JCTm-rrorral Drsrnrrgr~rronqt'n Srme. 9: LVilliarn Clc~elrind.. I Fi~sron-cfrhe .\lotie *n .\ l~ddlc.f

Lebanon. the formation of an alliance between the two communities was unli kely .

The French Mandate set precedents for instability with its dernographic modifications, as the foundation of Greater Lebanon was characterized by profound cleavages over its legitimacy.'"e new sectarian alignments brouglit on by demographic change resiilted in the Muslims identi-ing tliemselves as being pro-Syrian, desiring to join a Syim Federation while the

Cliristians wanted complete independence. French policy had a beîter chance succeeding in Greater Lebanon as compared to Sp*abecause of the religious affiliation with the Christians and tlieir desire to be a separate entity from the

Arab ~orld.'"

French policy in Lebanon fluctuated in the early 1920s due in part to budgetas and fiscal constraints."" The French changed their policy as the reality on the ground in Greater Lebanon forced them to shift from a strategy

" Conirovcrq plaped the creation of Grcater Lcbanon as the French scparated bits and pieces of the rcgion to crcm ri stable Western protcctorac. This angcrcd man! Mwlims as the! wanted union n-ith S' n3 as opposcd to thc Chnstians tt ho nantsd complete indepcndcncc. Thc question ovcr Lebanon's idcnttty nas rootcd in the French establishment of Greatcr Lcbanon and the debate remaineci ri constant sourcc of instabilih- as the diffcrent sec& rittcmpted to transfonn Lebanon into nhat the felt its proper roIc sliould bc in the Middle East. Thcodore Had. ( ;le+rrsrencrrn Ifurtrnte Lebnnon. 59: David C. Gordon. Thr Rrpuhljc rtf Lebonon. 20: Lcila MT. Mco. Lebanon: Inrprr)hnbk .\ktron. 4s. <., William Stionwii. Erunch Imperdi.srtt rn the .\lidlle Easi: The Farlurr qf Polk! in Strrti md Lehanon, ( hiridison: üni\.crsity of Wisconsin Press. 1976 1. 102; .Une iVilliams. Bmmn and Fkancr. 3.

-8 \ ii'ii liam S horrock, French Imperialr.sni In the .\ lrdtllr Ensr. 104. of domination to simply one of rnanaging the ares!' The French had to steer a delicate course between the Chnstians and the Sunni Muslims as the

Maronites aggressively lobbied for separation From the Syian Federation along with other refoms.

The High Commissioner .

The High Commissioner. Henn Gouraud, and his delegate in Lebanon,

Governor Robert De Cairu. filled a role similar to that of the Ottoman

Govemor during the time of the niutasavqfi~y.Gouraud played the role tliat

Daud Pasha played in shaping the political organization of modem Lebanon and his actions cliaracterized the methods he would employ in order to fuifil1 the an date."' He set oiit to paciS the inliabitants' political appetites by

formally announcing the creation of a state whereby. through confessionalism,

eacli community was given to tliink they were an active participant. The

arrangement adopted a tradition that became an accepted part of political life

in the area as sectarian tensions were reduced through the idea that for each

rbld.

*'- Tlic High Commissioncrs crcatcd the political and social cniironrncnt ~vhichcharacterizcd Lebanon's tiiston durin_ethe ti~odecades of tlic French Mandate, 1922- 1943. Since the formation of Gmtcr Lcbanon. thc first Frcnch High Commissioncr. . set the pace of progrcss for the countq and his policies ultimatel! culminatcd into a deteriontion betwcen the Frcnch and thc nathe inhabitants. The Frcnch rctaincd clcmcnts of the confcssional ?stem in order to placate the various sects and stabilizc t hc rcgion for t hcir own purposcs. Mcir Zarnir. The fi)rinczlion ctt'.\ lodern Lebanon. 140. 37 parliamentary seat cornpetition would be intra- and not interconfe~sional.~'

An extemal power was needed to create a stable environment arnongst the varioiis sects in Greater Lebanon and tlie French set out to also create a sound administrative system and an independent political entity for the country as cornerstones of their policy. However, they faced enonnous difficulties in tlieir attempts to achieve tliis goal as the Mandate evolved into a set of inisgiiided principles that the French believed they needed in order to rnaintain sufficient authorit?; to control and supervise Greater Lebanon's de~elo~ment.'"De Cais retained existing institutions, laws and customs iinder the nt zrta.sarrrfivvu. -. while gradually introducing modifications to suit modem needs. The High Commissioner Gouraud had already dissolved the old Administrative Council and formed a new one called the Representative

Council whicli had seventeen rnembers including representatives kom the annexed areas. Again, the system's foiindation rested upon confessional representation which derived its weakness From tlie very fact that the deputies were sening tlie interests of their specific communities and not necessarily

Greater Lebanon. While the French seemed honorable in their intentions to

" .4 manifcstrition of Frcnch poIip tfirough confcssionalisrn was thc fact that the different groups non cornpctcd \t ith onc anothcr internaIl!- for positions and parlirimcntap scats. This ficlped to Funher ~i-cAcnan! rittempt on the part of the inhabitants of thc region to form a solid opposition force against Frcnch ruk or bc inclined to attack othcr sccts. David C. Gordon. The Rrprrbiic qfLehmm. 10. .. I Meir Zarnir. The. Forninrion qf.\ ioderri Lehanon. L 40. develop the country, their real motives soon began to surface as a Council so defined along religious lines and hunbgry for power lefi no opportunity for a iinified opposition or coalition to challenge the French.

The French policy of tarnpering with elections led them to hand pick politicians in order to have their policies supported with littie or no opposition. Deliberations of the Council on budget-, and social legislation were roiitinely disrupted by French intervention so that the Hi&

Coinmissioner. Gouraud, would be able to control the Pace of progress in the country."' Dep~itieswho were once French allies soon began to abandon tlieir previous positions and openly opposed and accused the High

Commissioner of meddling. The Coiincil adopted a more independent stand as it deliberated over the budget and the relations of Greater Lebanon with

Syia. The spirit of opposition to the French Mandate that existed in the

Reprzsentative Council was part of a historical trend that previously witnessed the Administrative Council under tlie ntiirasarrrfi~ya defend local interests a-ainst the Ottoman Governor.""

Relations further soiired between tlie Representative Council and the

- -* .*. - .. . * Hi@ Commissioner. as a new Council. which was tomed again in the late 1920s: faced two decrees: 1304 and 1307, irnposed by the High

Cornrnissioner to replate the election of the Council. The first decree, which passedl reorganized the Council to be comprised of thirty deputies elected for a term of four years based on confessional representation according to population size. The accepted view by both the French and native political elites was that in the prevailing circumstance only a system based on sectanan representation coiild lead to coexistence between the various sects."- The Hidi Conimissioner and notables From the various sects concluded that tliis sy stem had been successfiil under the muiosurrifiwo., .- and it won imanimoiis support for the new state.""

Decree 1304. whicli granted lirnited authority to the Council and extensive autliority to the Govemor. aroused loud protests amongst the legislators and common people. The Governor could now initiate legislation. decide on the budget and adjourn or dissolve the Coimcil. This outraged the

Cliristians and Mtislims and made them feel as though their future was bound to be regulated bp a foreign power.t" These actions were in direct violation of the Mandate powers and many began to daim that there had been more autonom!. under the nnirasar-r($i~cr.- - Althoiigh the decrees were passed they were a major source of discontent as both Muslims and Chnstians rallied against the legislation and transformed the Council into a forum for aievances and opposition to French policies. The Council became a training b

c.momd for the development of political life in hamony with Western deinocratic ideas. 7 1 The 19% constit~ition.which outlined basic rights and freedoins. solidified Lebanon's emergence fiom an agarian society based on feudal ties to a modem state. in its infancy. struggling for greater independence fiom an imperial power. The document also formalized the role of the President as it was to be filled by a Maronite Christian and the

Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim. '1

Gouraud's tenure as High Commissioner brought some westemization to Greater Lebanon but the overall impact of his policies caused social stagnation and discontent with the political elites. The anger generated by his policies towards French domination filtered down to the cornmon peasants as tlieir political bosses proclairned the- had been victims of European colonialism. Gouraud's move to bnng a new council, constitution and more

.As part of Lebrinon's historia1 hentrige the Rcprcsentattvc Council carne to symbolize the clearest crsmplc of ïonfcssronal interplay khmn the \xious grmps. The Council esisted to presene sonfcssiondism and the pater of the dites n hich hindered an! chance of direct reprcsentation or cqurtiiblc change for the masses. The Council soon aoh-ed into ri forum where dernands for more indcpcndcnce from French authontics verc made b! the Lebancse political dite. Theodore Hanf- ('c~~~srstencern Ilàrtime Lebanon. 74. Basscm Abdul iiridcr Nrimant, C-0~2s.vronnlisniin Lehanon 1'120- 19 76: The Interpkq. o!'Dontestic. fii~i~~i~f'inil lnmnarlonal Poliric~.(Xcn I'ork. Columbia Universio. 1985)- 1 19. state machinery to Lebanon was admirable but useless as he intended to weaken the Coiincil and give more power to his Govemor.

High Commissîorier Marime Weygand 1923- 1924

Maxime Weygand succeeded Gouraud as the new High Commissioner and altliougli liis reign was short lived, his policy was the most daring of al1 the French officiais to rule Lebanon. He realized that the region nceded a penod of stability free fiom power struggles and petty confessional differences. As he was able to gain respect and confidence fiom both

Muslirns and Christians, Weygand made security, economic development, eqiiality and justice the ttmist of his policies. -7- He suppressed small amed skimislies. disarmed the pop~ilaceand placed French officers in key regions of the coiintry. As a resiilt, strong resentment emerged fiom man- of the inhabitants as they felt the French were not only paralyzing them politically

T. but pacibing them pliysically. ' Economic prosperity was the philosophy behind many of Weygand's methods maintaining that if prosperity touched eacli community and individual then Frencli rule would be accepted and the different communities would be able to live in hmony."

-. - - &kirZamir. Thr t.i)rnintlon qf--\lodernLehanon. 147 ' 1bid.- 149.

' ' Ibid. Weygand's idealistic goals and impractical methods should not be discredited because they were never implemented. The French did not have available money to allocate sufficient resources for hs prograrns and thêrefore. his vision of economic prosperity and the acceptance of French nile did not materialize. However. the idea of bnnging relatively even economic prosperity to a11 of the communities had ment in that it would have created other opportiinities such as a higlier standard of living, integration of the rural areas into the economy and at the same time alternative forrns of power other tlian the confessional ridden Representative Council. Weygand attempted to play down the power stmgples in Greater Lebanon by offenng social stability through economic means by being more inclusive. However, France was not in a position to expend the financial resources that woiild facilitate his ideas and the program died with his departure as High Comrnissioner.

High Cornmissimer Maririce Sarrail 1 925

Maurice Sarrail, the tliird Hi& Comrnissioner, was impatient and aiithoritative which set him apart from his predecessors. His period of office resuited in creating a sense of uncertainty and fear amongst the Chnstians in particular." The High Cornmissioner announced the election of a native

Lebanese Governor and a Christian candidate, Emiie Edde, forwarded his candidacy. As soon as Sarrail realized the church was supporting Edde's campaign? the French opposed his candidacy because Sarrail's policies were seciilarist in nature and the Christian Church had a hard tirne from the outset of Iiis teniire adapting to the changes. Support for Edde grew and as the

Frencli opposed him, the Representative Council felt its power was being

-1 - subverted by tlie High Cornmissioner.~" Eventually Sarrail dissolved the

Council and the Maronite Cliurcli becarne enraged over the Frencli actions.

Sarrail. to worsen the sit~iation. camed out liberai policies towards the

Miislims in an atternpt to seek a base of support against the growing discontent of the Cliristians. In his desire to transform Lebanon into a united. modeni. sectarian state, he introduced radical reforms based on secular pnnciples some of which were especially designed to weaken the influence of the Maronite clerg77 The very essence of his reforrn policy was to make tlie inhabitants see themselves as citizens of a country raiher than members of a particiilar church or creed. To implement Iiis refoms, Sarrail unified the tzx system. thus cutting the church out of revenues it was traditionally collecting. He went further to reform education. the administration and electoral law, ail of wliich resulted in a reduction of Maronite power that ùireatened their dominant position and alienated them fùrther fiom the ~rench.'"

As a result of these reforms- the Siinni Muslims were able to benefit

From increased opportunitieç in education while Maronite schools had iheir fiinding slaslied. Increased tension behveen the Muslims and Christians resulted because of the new reforms as power in the social and political

Franiework of the country was shifting horizontally back and forth between tlie Muslim and Christian commiinities. The French also reformed tlie administration forcing the integration of the new regions of Lebanon under one iimbrella. The effect the new temtorial inclusions was a more impotent

Council. Each sect was receiving new confessional brethren into their cornmiinities that would expand their interna1 power bases but not the representative body as a whole. In fact. the new system weakened the power base of each comrnunity within tlie Council due to the recruitment of new pro-French deputies who were loyal to the High Commissioner because of their new positions. -9 The Lebanese protested that the changes taking place were made without going througli the proper channels-the elected body. Other officials who stood to !ose their positions complained for the sake of their persona1 power and not necessarily the greater good of their country.

Sarrail was deterrnined to brinp reforms he felt would be the most suitable for the country but he did not consider the backlash his programs and the

Mandate created. The fiercest opposition was now coming from the Maronite

C hurch.

Sarrail was not finished in his attempt to modemize Lebanon according to tiis secularist principles, and he moved quickly to make his most ambitious proposal -et wliich would have abolished confessionlism and introduced a modem political sy stem .'" Sarrail argiied that confessional representation reinforced sectarian divisions thus giving religion too much of an emphasis witliin the social and political structure of the country. Both the Muslims and the Christians were resenred about the proposal because a11 supported confessional representation as a way to giarantee their voices would be heard." French officials forced Sarrail to abandon the policy but the important question concerning this development was the rejection by the political notables to free elections. Certainly. one of the positive aspects of

Sarrail's proposal for free elections would have added legitirnacy to the Representative Council enabling the deputies to resist any attempt on the part of the French to intervene in their affairs given the fact that the Council would have been popularly elected.

Another explanation would be to siiggest that the integration of the new temtories into the system along with a constitution created fear in facing the outcome that free elections would have on the political landscape of the country. In other words. the cornmiinities that had their power bases establislied not only relied on numbers but also on the fact that each group vas piaranteed a seat on the Coiincil. Moving to free elections would have disrupted the status quo and dismantled the political tradition fiom which the

Ieading political notables derived their power-confessionalism. The long tem negative impact of this rejection on the part of the political elites made tliem unable to see beyond sectarian ideologies and embrace the larger concept of direct and popular representation.

Sarrail proposed too man- radical reforms that neither the inhabitants nor Iiis own goverment back in France were willing to support. Challenging the in an attempt to weaken its influence in socies was a huge rniscalculation which entangled Sarrail in a constant conflict with the

Maronites. Esisting confessional differences intensified because of the horizontal shifis in power between the communities. The Cliristians resented rhe fact tliat the Muslims were benefiting from some of the reforrns while they were suffenng because of the policy changes. Sarrail's biggest blunder was tlie announcernent of popular elections, thus weakening the confessional system. What he failed to realize was that the system of sectarian representation was not just an institution but a way of life built into the political and social fabnc of Greater Lebanon which developed as a historical tradition too powerfiil for an? High Commissioner to eradicate.

The Impact of Fretdi Policies on Confessio~ïalism

The Ottoman niurasat-r1fic.w- - witnessed the creation of forma1 political and social institutions whicli ganted autonomy and initiated a process that was to be continued by the French iinder the Mandate. Enough historical evidence esists to dernonstrate tlie positive outcorne of French rule in Greater

Lebanon. The Mandate provided a first step towards a Lebanese state but the basis upon which it was constnicted was representation along sectanan lines.

This fiinlier contributed to the polarization of the different communities.

Most important, was the creation of state-nin administration, judicial and educational systems which operated under French direction." French missions initiated the process with the creation of numerous schoolso hospitals. orphanages and, under the Mandate. a constitution and a new

Representative Council were created based on religious representation.

While these formal institutions helped to bring Lebanon into the modem era, the French, for various reasons, began to back away from many of their programs creating mistnist, confusion. and rejection amongst the various comm~tnitiesin Lebanon.

As mentioned, tarnpering with the demographics of Lebanon was a large part of French policy in the Mandate years and it had long term effects on tlie repion'ç social and political landscape. In the former Ottoman Sanj~k tlie Christians fonned 80% of tlie population. shortly afier the inception of

Greater Lebanon. their numbers decreased to 5 10.6." In an effort to promote

the Clinstian population in the early 1970s, the French attempted to restrict

the issue of exit permits and encourage a Christian settlement policy along

witli Amienian immigration to the ares? The French realized that by

controlling interaction and social disproportionality they would be able to

stabilize tlie region. The Turks had never thought in these terms: they did not

- --

'-Tlicodorc Hmf. ( .oexrsrence rn Il'nrrmr I-ehtrnon. 67 '' Tlic Frcncli usc of altering thc demognpliics of Mount Lebanon \vas \.en destructive pariicularly in the n3' it affectcd the social and political cnvironmcnt of the countc. At first. the Frcnch wnted to ensurc thnt thc Clinstians in Lebanon tvould remain dcpendcnt on thcm for protection thus the intcgratcd man! Muslim mas into Grcarer Lebanon. .Uter tliis. tlic French n-antcd to cnhance thc Christian population in ordcr to sspand thcir base of support and did so bu an immigration poliq based on incentives ,and rcstnctions. The French succceded in stifl ing an' strong opposition to thcir policies and at the same time alter the demographic smicture of the area as a means to control the inhabitants of Mount Lebanon. Thus, the French were introducing new methods into the region to ensiire the balance of power would remain in their favoiir. The loyal base (Cliristians) that the French were attempting to create along with the establishment of a Greater Lebanon became the culmination of a continuous historical process during wliich Lebanon becarne identified as the national home for the Cliristians in the Levant despite their reduction in

Tlie dificuit task for the French and Greater Lebanon was the issue of organizing coexistence between areas with hvo religious groiips of approsimately eqiial niunbers and several religious communities of which no single one Iiad anything resembling a majority to forrn an expanded power base."' westernization of Lebanon's political system in tems of a constitution. formal administration. and judiciac had not been an experience of the inhabitants under the Turkisli nimscwrlfiyyu. In spite of this, the representative system wliich fimctioned along sectanan lines still remained the constant source of power in the Lebanese social and political fabnc.

crcatcd rcscntmcn! rirnongst thc ia-ious sccts because of the changes. Meir Zamir. ?lie Formarron O/* .\ locferri Lrhantm. '1 8. " rbid.. LOI. '' Yousscf Clioueiri. *-GrcaterLebanon: The Formation of a Caste Sp~ern--.in ed.. Youssef Chourein. Sfmr mtl Socie& IR .):\.riatmcl Lehanon. (New York: St. Martin's Press. 1093)- 64. hlci r Zarrii r. Ikr i;i)r~~inrrunqf.1 fotiern Ltrh~non,102. Damascus had been the traditional ci& where decisions were made conceming Mount Lebanon. When Greater Lebanon was declared, the focus of decision making shifted to Hrinîr. This should not be considered merely symbolic as the city evolved into a political and administrative center where ideas einerged out of the pluralistic. secular and cosmopolitan nature of its society." The merchants, financiers, entrepreneurs and intellectuals were the elements who pided the political development of Greater Lebanon from

1920 onwards within the confines of the French Mandate-in contrast to the

Ottoman regime, where this type of progress and openness was non-existent.

Land. as the most important econornic base in rural nineteenth century

Lebanon. was now replaced with trade from the ports of Beinlt, Tripoli,

Sidon and .lotîriie ~a~."The different religious communities found tliemselves rningling and interacting on a larger scale than under the previous system. The evolution of Greater Lebanon was now progressing at a rate wliere even the Muslims. wlio had been traditionally rural, were benefiting fi-om this new iirbanization.

' Hanf portravs as a citv composcd of manu diffcrcnt rcligious, ethnic and foreign groups dong u i th a 1-ibrmt cconorny and an intellcctual cuIturc uhich cocsistcd pcaccfully . Howe~.cr.Hanf dso dcpicts thc rcalit?. of Beirut as it cvcntua!l~bccamc the qmbol of the norst sectarian narfare which plagucd thc countn as it lias dividcd along religious lines - Muslim West and Christian East. The riut hor ai~ncdat drziwing attention to the fact that the cit! had 3 plunlistic swiety for man! yxrs prior to the coilapsc of the siaie. Theodorc Han1 ~'ormsrrncrin Iïarrrnrr Lrbanon. 69. The indecisiveness characterizing French policy at the outset of the

Mandate created weaknesses for the overall objectives of establishing a modernized protectorate. Once Greater Lebanon was created sepatately tiom tlie Sy.rian Federation, the French began to concentrate on administrative issues. Up to this point ( l9X-lW2). the proposals dealt mainly with redistricting and redrawing the borders."'At the core of this redistricting was a power struggle that ensued between the various communities, and the

French found themselves cauglit behveen the Christians, attempting to safeguard their power. and the Muslims, rejecting an independent entity. The

Maronites attempted to thwart close relations between the French and other coinmunities which was sornething that could not have been done under the

~ttornans."' The French rnaintained a more open society. where citizens had the nglit to petition and cnticize the Iiigher authorities of the Mandate. In contrast, criticism of Ottoman policies would, at times, result in a crackdown of tliose various communities. whicli does not in any way imply that the

French went easy on those elements tvlio opposed their nile. Open challenges to the Sultan were not as common as challenges made by the

'"ousscf Choucin. .-Laissez-Faire. Outwnrd Orientation and Regional Economic Disintegmtion: .A Case Stud? of tlic Dissolution of thc Syro-Lebancse Customs Union". ln Slate and Sucien. in .S~.rraand /.thnon. cd.. Youssef Choueiri. (New York: St. Martin's Press. 199 3 1.79. ''-' Wi lliani S horrock. Ei.rnclz Inrperialrsr~rin tht. .\fidcllr Emt. 1 i(1. 4 8 'lieir Zamir. The Fhnnairon of.\forlen~Ldmilorr, 122. varioiis communities and the Representative Council to the French High

Although the Maronite Christians wete the loyal base for the French in

Greater Lebanon, various members of the Maronite commercial sector regarded the French administration as a hindrance to econornic acti\;ity."'

Tlie French monitored the ports. inspected sliipping activity and, at times. proceeded to take their share of the commercial transactions. By the mid

1920s the Christians were continuously smiggling to achieve full independence From the Frencli to ensure tlieir positions in determining the country's economic and political course. The Maronites made up a large part of the administration but in an effort to retain control of the system. the

Frencli limited the Christian role in ninning the newly established state."

Tlie French also had to deal with opposition fiom the Muslims as the- were opposed to a Lebanese entity but at the same time saw the benefits of the

Frencli system. Regardless, the offcial Muslim community position by the mid-1920s held the view that the Mandate was a form of foreign rule imposed by force and that the French presence was a parantee of Cluistian s~ipremac~.'~owever,in the confusing politics of shifting alliances in

-

" Ibid. 123 '' Tlicodorc Hanf. ( .or.rrsrencr rn ICi~rrrnruLehonon. 7 1 '' Ibid. Lebanon, the Muslirns, at times, banded together with the Chnstians for greater independence fiom the French. In spite of their motivational differences. the regressive policies of the Military Comrnissioners forced the opposing groups to see the negative impact of the French presence in thei: country and forge a political alliance to achieve greater freedorn from the

Imperia1 power.

In terns of dealing with anti-French elements, the Mandate was harsh on subversives who stood in the way of the Comrnissioners bnnging Greater

Lebanon iinder tlieir control. For instance, the Drue resented French control over Greater Lebanon but an arrangement was concluded between the two in retum for a large degree of autonomy."-' The French had leamed from past e'cpenences tliat the Dnize cornmunity was strategically placed. large in nurnbers and cornmitted to the idea of self-nile. The isolation of the Dwe enabled the French to deal with the newly acquired areas of Ti-ipolr, Hcrnrr. the Hckka Valley and Soiithem Lebanon. These territorial acquisitions atternpted to transform Greater Lebanon fiom a small regon of confessional conflict into a viable state following its territorial enlargement." The Mandate dealt witli issues of an expanded territory and formal institutions by iising the elements of the Ottoman rnum.sarrifi,t:t'c~ to keep political and social power stniggles f?om disrupting the implementation of their policies. It was the expenence of this political system that provided a precedent for effectively

Iiandling the political problems of a multi-confessional society that the French adopted as a cornerstone of their policy in Greater ~ebanon.~'

The French retained a Representative Council based on confessional lines. One of the reasons for maintaining tliis policy was simply that they embraced an age old aphorism, tlie application of which was most relevant ta tliis liistorical process - "If it's not broke - don3 fix it". The French realized tliat after the implementation of the mzucrsarr(fiyya, stability reigned in the region because of the system itself. Thus. the Mandate continued the idea of a representative body in order to serve as a mode1 institution embodying the principle of sectarian representation and bringng the secular leaders and the varioiis communities together. Parliamentary dernocracy was an ideal the

Frencli embodied and it allowed for openness in Lebanese society. The

French did not stop with this: they intended to bnng economic prosperity to

Greater Lebanon in order to facilitate the consolidation of the Mandate. In doing 50, the French would ensure the protection of Greater Lebanon's political independence and in addition they helped to integrate the inhabitants of the annexed areas and give some financial aid and development progarns to the new country."

Despite the political cooperation to achieve independence, the presence of the French in Greater Lebanon certainly exacerbated tensions behveen the

Miislims and Chnstians as the Milita- Hi& Commissioners constantly sliifted tlieir support back and forth from the various communities. Their predecessors. the Turks, backed their traditional allies, the Dwe feudal lords. dunng most of the conflicts in nineteenth century Mount Lebanon. The stniggle for power dong sectarian lines in Greater Lebanon took on a new face as the modernized institutions gave way to various forrns of protest in the newly formed state. Despite the tensions. the Mandate was probably the most important factor in the transformation of Greater Lebanon from an artificial entity into a relatively stable state with a political system under wliich the varioils corniinities could coexist.'~owwould the French go about creating this environment in the face of Sunni Muslim opposition (the larges1 Muslim group at the forefront of the political scene) and the domineenne attitude of the Chnstians? Only the French had the vision and power strong enough to impose political. administrative and legslative

- -- \Villinrn Clcvcland. .-I Hisron. cf the .\hirrn .\lrddlti East. 2 1 1. " Ibid. solutions for the inhabitants of the area. However, this only dealt with the question of institutional mechanisms in the political system, not the method of how tlie French would bring a viable Greater Lebanon into the twentieth century as a peaceful coexisting pluralistic state.

Between 1923 and 1926, the French changed home governrnents four tiines and their High Cornrnissioner in Lebanon three times.'" Obviously, with so many changes in the home government over such a short penod of tiine. tliere was bound to be weakness and inconsistencies in French policy as it concerned Greater Lebanon. The uncertainty that cliaracterized Greater

Lebanon's development was in part a direct result of the political and economic situation in France. Shifting pnorities for the French and budget cut backs affected their Greater Lebanon poiicy. The fact that the inhabitants were granted additional powers in the Representative Council. and that some of the new programs being developed were positive, inevitably damaged the credibility of tlie French once they had to cancel the programs. When the years of instability in France took place. budget cut backs and a tighter fist policp were imposed on Greater Lebanon.

Dunnp the two decades of the French Mandate the imperiai power brougllt witli it a progarn of transition for the inhabitants of the area but retained the single most important element that kept the various communities stable and that was the Representative Council based on confessionalism.

The French could be accused of many things in Greater Lebanon but the real failure of their policy was not necessarily their intentions but their methodolo~gin implementing their strategy. Modemizing the political and social structures of Greater Lebanon allowed the country to progress at a rate that did not take place under Tiirkisli nile. The Europeanization of Greater

Lebanon planted the seeds for fiirther destruction as the various sects rallied togetlier to resist French domination during tlie Mandate years. The changes tliat took place were not based on open deinocracy but on colonial control of the institutions and the inhabitants of the region. The system was sure to fail as the French allowed small doses of democratization and power to the

Representative Council and then took them away.

Wliat exactly were the intentions of the French in continuinp the tradition of the nititasarrrfiiw?- - The answer has to do with the political climate along with the French aim of retaining the area as a protectorate. To placate the Chnstians, the French loyal power base, reforms were made that cave tlie native officials more power than they previously had under the C

Ottoman regime. In order to retain control of Greater Lebanon and prevent the political notables from becoming too independent, the French retreated from rnany of their pledges and parantees. The process of westemizing the area cotnbined with French interference in elections and the Representative

Council created an environment of hostility towards the Mandate as leading representatives of various commimities Med for power. While the French bzcame less clear about the strategy of their policies, a deterioration within the system took place creating widespread resenmient to their presence in

Greater Lebanon.

From the outset, the French iised demography and election tarnpering as a means to retain control. In the pliiralistic society developing in Berna the intelligentsia and notables were iinwilling to accept the conditions itnposed by the French. Tlius. the Mandate became harder to implement and it was only a matter of time until full independence from the French would be achieved. Until this could happen. tlie Ottoman tradition of the

/?~uirr.*furemained the system in wliich social and political life in

Greater Lebanon continued to develop as the basis for power and mobility.

The notables were unwilling to accept direct and free elections once the opportunie arose as their traditional power. which was denved fiom confessionlism. would have been threatened by a more democratically elected system. Thus, to place the question in tlie appropriate historical context it must be understood that the stniggle against the French and the reaction to tlieir policies came from a desire to win more independence for Greater

Lebanon - free elections and representation for al1 citizens were not included in the equation.

It would be fair to say that no one comrnunity came out as the beneficiq of an- policy imposed by the Mandate. However, there were improvcrnents in the areas of social and political opportunities for those who tliiis far had been deprived of them. The Muslirns, traditionally rural, benefited from the state nin education and social progams. not available to them before the French amved. In addition, Sunni Muslirn notables, once the territorial expansion provided additional electoral seats. were able to forward tlieir candidacies and represent their constituents. The Cliristians benefited frorn the Mandate as they wimessed their goal of full independence move a step closer to reality once the Ottomans were out of the picture. Once the new political institutions were formed, the French felt Greater Lebanon was now consolidated into a viable protectorate. However- after the disintegration in relations between the native Lebanese and the French in the 1930s and the

French withdrawal in 1943, the various groups were lefi to contend with each otlier and attempt to find sorne way to coexist. The Mandate system ultimately decayed and then disintegrated because it was never founded upon real principles of direct representation or individual rights and freedoms. The system was taken hostage by the petty confessional power stmggles that plagued the various comrnunities which resulted in armed conflict arnong the members during the second half of the twentietli century. The French constantly created and implemented a policy then witlidrew from it, either because of pressure from their government, budgetary concerns or mere ignorance. These actions caused a downward spiral and a deterioration of relations behveen the French and the inhabitants of Greater Lebanon as both the Muslim and Christian communities by the late

1 930's wanted cornpiete independence.

The failure of the French to deliver control of the institutions to the native inhabitants created an explosive situation which ended up in complete

îàilure of the Mandate. The evolution of the state dictated the need for alternative fonns of democratic representation and independence along with economic and social justice. The political leaders, the notables themselves, backed away from abandoning the confessional system and opted to keep the statiis quo. which was an un fortunate circiunstance as the Representatives displayed their mie character in demonstrating they were no better than their colonial coiinterparts in impeding the Pace of progress in Greater Lebanon. CHAPTER THREE

FROM THE NATIONAL PACT TO THE

DISSOLUTION OF THE STATE

1943- 1975

Vat-ious intemal and extemal events changed the political, social and economic environment in Lebanon during the 1930s which hastened the

French withdrawal in 1943. The global depression profoundly effected the

Mandate and French policy in Lebanon as social and economic problems emerged inside France which became a primary concem of the govemment and forced a reassessment of its Lebanon policy. The u~avelingeconomic and political scene of Europe began to consume the attention of French authorities and weaken the effectiveness of their Mandate in Greater

Lebanon. As a result of the events in Europe' the French formulated a more realiçtic approach to Lebanon which called for a long-range treaty with the native inhabitants in order to secure a long-term presence in the area. ""'

' ' Raghid al-Solh. "Rcligiow Identih and Citizenship: An O\cniew of Perspmh-es-. in Deirdn: Collings. ed.. Pence For Lrhnnon: Eronr lCkr ro Rrconsrnrcrron. (Boulder: Lynnc Rienner Publishers. 1994 1. 3-3. Inside Lebanon. the Sunni Muslims were making dramatic maneuvers to ensure a permanent hold on the political scene by using their numbers to vie for more power. The reaction by the French and the Chnstians was the signing of a Treaty of Friendship in 1936.'0' The agreement provided the

French with a long rem military and political presence inside Lebanon.

Naturally, tlie Sunnis regarded the treaty as a blow to their aspirations of increased political power and union with ~yia.'"' The political climate becaine more fiagile as the competing agendas of both Sunni Muslims and

Maronite Christians drove the two comrnunities closer to a confrontation.

However, just as it seemed as though there woiild be an escalation, an important political event occurred when Riad Al-Solh, the Sunni Muslim spokesrnan. altered the strategy of his community in the smiggle for power.

Instead of confrontation with the Christians he made the expiilsion of the

French tiis priori- in the hope of reaching out to the Maronites to form a coalition apainst the Mandate.

To make the situation worse, the French atternpted to retain control of

Lebanon tlirough a series of repressive actions which only helped to

:'" rbid.. 34. . . - Onc of thc main thernes of ths argument dals with the idcri of religious identification and how various dcmcnts of Lsbancsc socich viewd the identit! of thcir countc in regional and global terms. Lebancse pcoplc. politicilins. schoIars. and forcigncrs have postuiatsd the idea that Lcbanon is unique to the Anb h'orld. nit h links to the West, and at the samc tirne part of thc Amb Worid affili3ted nith Islam. It \vas ihis dcbritc thrit bccrirnc an undcrcurrcnt for the bniak up thc stritc. ibid.. 35. consolidate the Musliin-Christian alliance. The French suspended the constitution and dissolved parliament in an attempt to rule Lebanon single

Iiandedly. The arrest of Lebanese Ministers by French authorities served to increare discontent with the French presence. With a broad based coalition against the French on one hand. and the war in Europe pulling France apart on the other, the Mandate collapsed.

The timing of Sohl's offer to the Cliristian commiinity could not have been better as Nazi Gennany cnished and occiipied France in 1940. The

Cliristians qiiickiy realized tliat tiieir stable connection to France had now been sliaken since the Vichy Government disnipted traditional relations with the Lebanese sect. 1°' The Christian Phalangist Party of Pierre Gemeyal called for a compromise with the Muslims and the campaign for liberation from

French nile was now poised to acliieve its objecti~e."~DeGaulle, being in a tough position, promised independence to Lebanon and the French began tlieir withdrawai from the region.

. . " Ibid.. 86. ' . " .As part of thcir political and social program the Maronites fclt it n3s not only their mission but thcir destin!- to cnsurc 3 dominant rolc for tlic Christims in Lcbrinon. More specificaiIy. the Kataeb Part? ticadcd b! thc Gemc'al famil>-intcndcd to cstablish and prcsenc a Maronite Icd qstem as the foundations for ~hcLebancsc state. Other sects wouid bc allowcd to csist ris Iong as the twc not a threat to thc hlrironitc qstcrn. Frank Stoakes. '-The Supcr Vi_riIantcs:Tlic Lcbancsc Katacb Pa* as Buildcr. Surrogatc and Dcfendcr of the Statc". in.. .\lddk E~strrn-J~utlirs. ( London: Frank Cass & Co.. Ltd.. 1075 1. Vol. i 1- 23 1. By 1943 the Mandate was officially dead but its traditions. and its predecessor, the mi~tasarrrfiyvastill operated in the political system of the country. Lefi to govern themselves, the Lebanese had to corne up with a power sharing agreement in order for the political and social systern to fimction. In the spirit of compromise that emerged in the late 1930s the

Cliristians and Muslims entered into an entente. An oral agreement was arranged between Bishara al- Kliouri (first President after independence) and

Riad al-Sohl. The essence of this arraneement was referred to as al-nzrlhaq

~~~-M*LIIWIILI.The National Pact, which distributed power among the vanous

religioiis communities according to their presumed numerical strength. '()'

The importance of the National Pact is not only in the way that it fiinctioned. but in its overall effect on the political and social development of

Lebanon. The essence of the Pact relied on confessionalism for its distribution of power arnongst the different cornrnunities. The agreement ensiired several key elements whicli helped cause the collapse of the state.

The politicians who negotiated the Pact were the local z~ian~u(notables) who solidified tlieir power to ensure it would be permanent. In addition? these politicians liad no concem for a larger identity under the newly established system.'"' The distribution of power based along sectarian lines became the accepted tradition in Lebanese politics and society. The enormous compromise reached behveen the communities did not lead to a Lebanese polit'; biiiit around the idea of a Lebanese nation but to a confederation of protonational commimities. '"'

The importance of the Pact should not be viewed as completely negat ive because it preserved and institiitionalized confessionalism. 1t can be viewed from the perspective that it was part of a larger trend towards state building. The arrangement clearly kept the Maronites from tuming completely Westward and the Muslims fiom making Lebanon a stnctly

Islamic state tied to ~yia.'""oo~eration between the vanous sects to forge a new relationship only extended the confessional system to be nin and operated b'; the native Lebanese themselves. The reality in Lebanon, just after 1943. was that the political elites of the country were neither state nor nation building because the basic orientations of most Chnstians and Muslims contradicted each othedO' Under the smoke screen of concessions and entente the Pact was nothing more than the preservation of the statiis quo and

' " Saniir Klirild. Lehonon S Predicnniertr. ( Ncu York: Columbia Prcss. i!)87). 102. , - Thc National Pact \\.ris nothing more than a formal agrccmcnt bctween the Muslims and Chnstians to sccurc cricfi sidc's tiereditary power base. It \iris a compromise to sharc poner but it negatcd an! chance of rcfonn or dcmocnq ris it sencd as ri politid mcchanism for the dite to dispense poixer dong scctriririn lincs. Itmar Rabinovich, Thr llirr For Lehanon, 24.

:' " S. idiot. Thr Terrrrurrd Disintegraiion o .Smrr.j. a temporary penod without confrontation between the two major communities at that time (Sunnis and Maronties). With this narrow system now being operated by the Lebanese themselves. the iikelihood of failure was far greater without an extemal force to control the different groups. As precarious as tliis Frarnework was, the political system was temporarily able to maintain a balance of power among its lieterogeneous confessional, ethnic, kinship and communal groups. ' l0

The National Pact of 1943 remained in eKect up until the of 1975- 1992. However, the Pact. as a uniQing force for peaceful coexistence amongst tlie Lebanese did not last. The elements of confessional representation in the document were ~isedas a means for the Christian elites dong witli the Sunni Muslim notables to preserve their power blocs in

Parliament. The advent of the Palestinian conflict after 1967 presented new dimensions to the social and political scene which thrust Lebanon into civil war. At tlie core. the disintegration of the system was pnmanly due to a lack of real representative democracy, secular political parties and an iinwillingness arnongst the leading political fipires to have broad-based, free

"" Ibid.

' ' Samir Shalaf' Lcbanon's Prcdicarncnt. 102. and open elections. The disparate social and economic conditions between

Christian and Muslim, urban and rural, also brought the country to civil war.

The idea of consociationalism in Lebanon was doomed to fail fiom the outset of independence in 1943 as the vanous communities were comrnitted to the traditions of confessional representation. Lebanon. from the Ottoman

.\ lurcistu*rifiv~~a. -- 1860- 1 9 11. to the French Mandate 1921- 1943 and the

National Pact 1943-1975 was a divided society with a fragmented political culture consisting of numeroiis sub-communities. ' ' ' The initial aim of the

Pact was to hold these communities together under the umbrella of confessionalisrn. However. there were deeper problems weakening the

Lebanesé system which related to the success or failure of confessionalism.

The primordial affiliations which c~istedhad strong vertical cleavages which were reinforced by ethnie? sectarian and kinship bonds."' Problems and crises were not just confined to Christian versus Muslim but also infighting amongst the sectarian groups pitting moderate elements against more extreme

' ' Tlic tcrrn consociationaIism is dcfincd as 3 powcr shanne amneement \\hich. in this case. dcalt spccificsl1~-~ith how man'- positions the iCIulirns and Chnstians u,ould hold in the ncn-l! formcd statc riftcr lWt. The distribution of officcs supcrccdcd al1 othcr conccrns of the neid! established state. Econoniic rcform. underdcveloped areas and csternal issues wcrc not considcntions of the Pact. blichacl Hudson. -'The Problem of .4uthoritati\.c Poucr in Lébancsc Politics: Consociationdism FaiIcd. in Shchridi & hlills. cds.. I.rhmon -1 litsroc-ot'c 'orylicr and ( 'onsensrr.s- (London: I.B. Tauris & Co.. Ltd.. 1988 1. 224; Hrilim Barakat. "The Social Contest-'. in. khanun In C'r~.s~.s:Par~rcrpmrs ancl Issues. eds.. P. Edu 3rd Hrilcy und Lm-is W. Snidcr. (Syracuse: S!racuse Uni\.cnih Press. 1979). 5; David Gilmour. I.t>hanr)n:The Frnpenrrd .\irrron- (Californ~a:The Hoover Institution Prcss- 1980)- 3 7. ones. The absence of real political parties with grassroots followers comrnitted to social agendas gave way to the rise of political bosses, factions, armed groups and militias. Ideology centered around religion, tribal affiliation, confessionalism and the desire to maintain or grab power. These rnovements had no concrete social or political substance directed towards the

~eneral progress of the country After 1956, Arab Nationalism. the

Palestinians. and çhifiing alliances in Lebanon prevented the emergence of strons political parties with national agendas committed to achiecing their mals tlirougli free and fair elections. b

The reality of Lebanon in the years preceding the outbreak of violence in 1975 saw two different coiintries. One tiad a rapidly modemizing

économy. a piuralistic society coexisting peacefully and coastal resorts attracting people fiom al1 over the world. The other Lebanon witnessed an iinbalance in the social and economic system. the maldistribution of wealth. a colonial legacy and a divided political CU turc."' Slums, Palestinian refugees. the eflects of the Arab-israeli 1967 Sis Da? War and underdeveloped wal

..- - Rrigliid cl-Solli. "Rcligious Identic and Citizcnship: An O\.cn-icw of Perspectives'-. in Dcirdrc Col l i ngs. cd.. Penw For Lehmon: Ekm Il i7r ro Recon-srrricrron. ( Boulder: Lynnc Ricnner Publishen. 1004 i. i ; ... 23 Jiic hacl Hudson. - The Problcm of Authoritrttiw Pouw-. 124. ' Lcbanon 1\35 s countp of c.\-trerncs as there 11-erearcas dubbcd a play gound for foreign tourists and arcas thai ncrc xi\wAy underdeveloped which hmeri \bar ground for various sccts. These undcrdc\clopcd aras bccamc the flash points for conflict as the sheer negiect of the goventment only culminatcd into violent outbursts and thcn nide scale conflict. Hassan Charif, "Regional Dcvelopment regions existed beneath the surface of the Lebanese mosaic. The National

Pact was vague enough for a broad consensus thus enabling the leading figures to manipulate the system in order to entrench their power within the

Lebanese body politic. The way in which the Lebanese identified thernselves bot11 politically and religiously contributed to the dissolution of the state.

The most efficient way to examine the deterioration of Lebanon is to analyze the Iiistorical Iieritage of the Repiiblic by isolating the Presidencies after independence ( 1943) in order to examine their social and political impact on a society that was open and liberal. yet dependent on confessionalism for its existence.

The Bidrara Khoury Presidettcy 1943-52

Under Bishara Khoury. rivalries and confessionalism existed at the liighest levels of govemment. The President was a Christian, the Prime

Minister a Sunni Muslim and the Speaker of the House a Shiite. Each cornmunit'; lied for patronage and the maintenance of their power in order to ensure their interests woiild be secured as the country moved fonvard.

Unfortunately. the Khoury Presidency did not do enough to seize the opportunity of independence and develop a system which would move away

and Inicgrrition" in. Deirdrc Collings. cd.. Peace For f.uhnnon: Ficm Ifkr ru Reconsrrucrion. (Boulder: fiom confessionalism. The question as to whether or not it was possible to move From a system based on sectarian affliations to a more open structure with real secular political parties is a matter of debate considering the fact that the infancy of the Lebanese state did not provide for such a dramatic move. Considering the momentous occasion of Lebanese independence,

1943. it is fair to say that President Khouq missed the oppominity to change the course of Lebanese history. If he would have attempted to initiate a more

fieely elected system tliat did not rely on religious affiliations for political and

social power lie wotild have broiight Lebanon into the worid of nations as a

possible modem dernocrac?. The reality however. was that the historical

Iieritqe of confessionalisrn was so deeply rooted amongst the political elites

and notables that Khoury's main priority was to ensure the continuation of a

Maronite dominated political sy-stem.' "

It may have been too dificdt so early in Lebanese statehood to move

fiom a confessional to an open democratic system. Lebanon, in its infancy.

coiild not have sustained tliis type of transformation because the political

notables and their system of patronage were rapidly filling the power vacuum

------

L!nnc Ricnncr PubIishers. 1994). 15 1: >licliacI Hudson. " The ProbIcm of Authoritati\.c Poncr-. 234. '! ' \!'alid Kbalidi. Cùnllicr nnd I iolrncr in Lehonon: <*oqr~'li.>nromnrn the .\fi

Maronites the power they possessed. He embarked on aggressive capitalist policies and began the foundations of the Merchant Republic. Prosperity and election tampering characterized Khoury's time in office and by the 1950s two trends emerged which incliided a bustling economy and the stagnation of the niral areas."" The stagnation of the niral areas created a permanent iinderclass. the majority being Muslim, which successive regimes chose not to reinedy .

The Camille Clmmoun Preside~tcy 19S2-j8

Wien became in 1952 he had the respect of most Muslims as he inherited an environment of mounting tension over the socio-economic order not to mention a population that had doubled since 1932."- The cnicial six years of his reign marked the first serious breakdown of the National Pact as he did not command a personai power base like other notable farnilies such as the Gemayels. Two factors

.. .

' ' ' \Valid Klialidi. ( .onjlicr und I Ïoknct*. 3 9.

" Willaim Harris. Foces cfLc.h

Publislicrs...- 1997). 137. C;trolinc Camille Attie. Lehnnon rn rher /~.?OS:Presitknr ('lronroun and fi2stern Poli~!in Lebanon. i Ausiiri: Lnil-ersit>of Tcsas. 1996). 43. LViliriirn Harris. Faes c~j-Lrbanon 1 JO. caused his Presidency to fail and the principles of the Pact to be disregarded.

First, he conducted a policy of gerrymandering and was subsequently accused of attempting to subordinate the hme Minister and Parliament to an autocratic ~residenc~."" This process of redistricting abrogated the

Maronite-Sunni balance of the National Pact and the Smi Muslims iinmediately demanded more sectanan appointments. Any observer could plainly see that reform of the electoral system not based on confessionalism was oversliadowed by the power stniggles ensuing behveen the different sects. Cliamoun's attempts could have been aimed at safeparding his

Presidency by building up a loyal base througli patronage. Regardless of his motives. the National Pact was slowly losing its legitimacy as a re- polarization of the V~I-~OLISsects began to emerge.

President Cliamoun was informed by advisors and through a Ieading

Muslirn p~iblication(Ahdent Lehonon ïbdqv, 1 9.73), which represented the mood of the non-Christian majority, that if a census in Lebanon were condiicted during his Presidency it would reveal a decrease in population figures of the traditional Christian majority."' However, under his policies,

' :Y " h'illairn Harris. Eclcrs c*Lebnnan, 14 1. : ' Tlic \cirious roups dependcd. rclicd and derked thcir poaer from the members of the tanous zccts. Ttic idca that the conflict in Lebanon nas one based soicly on the idca of -rnajorih vs. minorih- is a m>-th. Each sidc. no mattcr what thcir currcnt nurnbcrs nere. had political and socid potrcr and =ch sidc nwdcd tlic othcr to go\.eni propcriy - according to the codcssional %stem. Amon Soffer. --Lebanon: the Cluistians still had power concentrated in their hands. In fact, the my, civil senice, police, customs and the judiciary were al1 controlled by the

~hristians."" Muslim anger began to moiint as the demographics in Lebanon slowly indicated that tlieir community was the new majority.

Confessionalism was beginning to have a tough time supporting a system wliere the demographics were changing so rapidly as each community attempted to leverage their niimbers in a bid for more power. The very fact tliat the Muslim segment of the population was growing faster made matters more unstable as they sought to improve their community which had been traditionallp locked out of various social and economic reforms.'" More pressure was now being eserted on the National Pact. and the rampant political corniption iinder Chamoun combined witli the shifi in demographics. began a decay that fiirther dissolved in 1956.

E~gpt'sPresident Gemal Abdul Nasser nationalized the Suez canal in

1956 and his brand of Arab Nationalism Iiad profound effects on the

Lebanese Republic. Virtually every Arab and most developing world leaders supported Nasser's initiatives in the Suez Wai except ~harnoun."~Chamoun attempted to maintain his pro-Western stance by not declaring support for

Nasser but his attitude polarized the Muslims and Chnstians in Lebanon. "' - Relations deteriorated fhrther between Chamoun, tgypt and Nasser supporters when he declared that Nasser's "aim was to extend its [Egypt's] control over Lebanon's politics.-lfJ This enraged the Sunnis. Drue and

Nasserites. and Chamoun received harsh cr-iticism for his statement. Tensions were fiirther escalated by his policy of '-electoral refom-' aimed at cutting the

Nasserite supporters out of parliament. "' Relations soured between Efypt and Lebanon, leading pro-Nasser elements to revoit against the govemment in

1958. However, the occurrence did not escalate into open confessional confrontation as Sulieman Franjieli (a notable Christian power broker) sided witli the Sunnis and the ~nize.''" The Lebanese amy remained neutral and

Cliainoiin requested the U.S. govemment to send its mannes to help stabilize the situation.

Afier the civil unrest subsided. leaving 2,000 dead, Lebanon reverted back to the status quo. The Muslims were content with their positions and the system of patronage. As a new election approaclied. each comunity

. .- .-' Caroline Camillc Attic. Lebunon rn rhe 1 r)_ifls- 1 12. . -. -'"Stntcmcnt by President Chamoun at a press confcrcncc June 27 .1958*-. in b1.S. Apvani. cd.. The !.dlianc.se ( -rrsrs. IYZX .1 Doctrnrenrq. .JItrcfi.- (New Del hi: hian Pubiishing House. 1965). , . '-* Kamal S. Salibi. c'ross Roock ru (.ii.rl Ilir Lrhanon 1933-1976. (London: Ihtaca Press. 1976). 2; \Valid Klialidi. (hjllcranci 1 toltrnce. 38. '- -.. Theodore Hanf. ( 'oexr-srence rn liirrrrnre Lebunon- 117. organized itself to maintain its power bases. Chamoun attempted to manipulate the clections once again but failed to do so. His Presidency strengthened tlie Muslim sense that an omnipotent Maronite President held tliern in check politically and ec~nornicail~.'~'For the Chnstians, he was an object of tiero worship and a defender of Lebanese independence in the face of Nasser's tlireat. His main flaw was the fact that he tried to govem

Lebanon as though it was a homogeneoiis society. He obeyed the constitution. a separate source of power? rather than the spirit of the National

Pact which defined the confessional structiire of the Lebanese state. ""

The Fuad Ch ehab Presidency 1958-64

If tliere was ever the possibility that Lebanon ma- have been able to shed the political heritage of the nmasorr~fi-vaand move to a system of freer electoral representation it was iinder Fuad Chehab. He was a former head of tlie Lebanese army and emerged as the hero who kept tlie armed forces neutral during the 1958 civil unrest. He became endeared to the Muslirns as lie embarked on policies that attempted to improve their socio-economic status'" while engaging in a policy of détente with Nasser. His attempt

- -- , -- ' - Ibid. Ib,d. ' -.,; Waiid Khaiidi. ('oc/lrcr und I ~olei~cr,?i) seems to have been aimed at wi~ingthe Muslims over to the concept of being "Lebanese'?, as opposed to just Muslim or haMng an external affiliation with the Syian Socialist Nationalist Party (SSNP) or ~asser."" Chehab wanted to stay tme to the National Pact but an iinstable power base and the nse of Pierre Gemeyal's Knttreh thwarted his efforts. His unlikely support in the early years of his Presidency came fiom the entire Islamic leadership whicli was willing to work with him.';' His opponents were Chamoun supporters. former hesiderit Emile Edde's supporters. and the Christian militia Kuiclc.hl headed by the Gemeyal farnily who were al1 intent on presening a Maronite dominated system and the status quo.

Immediately following Chehab's election, the Sunni Muslim Prime

Minister. Rashid Kararni. dernanded that no supporters of Chamoun be allowed into the new cabinet. It was ai this point that Pierre Gemeyal and the

Kmeh became a power broker in Lebanese politics as they vied for positions in the govemment resulting From Karami's concems."' A month of inconclusive fighting lefi both sides realizing that the other half of the country coiild not govem alone.'" The result was not an overhaul of the poiitical

. . , +c. Hrmld Vockc. The Lehanese Il'clr: 1r.s Orrgins and Po/irrcal Dinrunsrons. (London:C. Hunt Bi

Company.. - 1978). 2 1: Walid Khalidi. (7)njlmand I iolence. 35). " William Harris. F&xs cfLebnnon. 148. . -7 '- Frmk Stoakes. "Thc Supen-igilantcs".215. . , .-.. Tlicodore Hanf. (.Oemsrrncr rn Il irrrrnre Lehanon. 1 18. system. but a compromise between Kararni and Gemeyal on a 'cabinet de salut ptihlic' in which each of them would fil1 half the posts with the

Christians retaining a sliglit majority of a 63 ratio. Lnstead of sweeping reform. the country tumed to what it knew best, which was the essence of the

National Pact-confessionalism. One positive aspect of the compromise was tliat it allowed Chehab to cary out his program to rectiS, the economic iinbalances between the cornmunities. To this end. he attempted to build a iieutral ci1 service (whicli had been traditionally dominated by the

Christians) to produce confessional parie within the system.I3.' He was soon criticized by both Muslims and Cliristians-for not doing enough or doing too

Cheliab made a fatal error in Iiis dealing with the criticisms and he

began offering political favors and subsidies to the groups, Street gangs,

villapes and suburban associations of the political notables. "' Patronage

became rampant and reinforced confessional power bases. If opponents

proved too stiibborn, Chehab built up their political rivals. On the balance.

Iiowever? his presidency was impressive. He restored peace after a civil war

and Lebanon enjoyed six years without civil unrest. He transferred power to the next President peacefidly and under his regime the Prime Minister became more visible, had more responsibility and many of the hctions of confessionalism devolved to the cabinet, such as the selection of various officiais within the different ministries."" The uniqueness of the Chehab

Presidency was his vision for peacefid coexistence arnongst the various communities. Other Presidents iip to this point were more concemed with presening rectarian affiliations to enhance their own power base. Chehab kvas the first President to accept the notion that the division of political power as agreed upon in the National Pact could oniy su~veif complemented by a social and econornic Pact whicli would distribute state resources equitably

- 7 across confessional lines. " ' Chehab's dowmfall was brought on by a combination of factors including political rivalry kom the Kutaeh. and his own plan to irnprove socio-econornic imbalances which alienated traditional political allies and paralyzed his Presidency in its latter stages."'

Charles Helou 's Presidency 1964- 70

Heloii's was a short lived Presidency and was characterized by administrative corruption and political immobilization but most of al1 by the

"' tbid.. 12 1. . .- . -' ibid. '" ibid.. 172. manifestation of the Palestinian element in Lebanon. He was a former professor of philosophy at the Amencan University of Beirut and did not have a political or persona1 siipport base. Under his regme, the Pace of reforrn virtually came to a standstill."' The greatest impact on Helou's weak

Presidency did not corne from any specific social or economic policy but fiom extemal events that would have profound effects on Lebanon. The Six Day

War in 1967 witnessed an infiltration of Palestinian commandos in the

Southem part of Lebanon setting iip bases to conduct attacks against Israel.""'

Of course. a steady stream of refiipees poured across the border into Lebanon creating a nation within a state. This resulted in a steady polarkation of

Maronite and Musiim opinions about the Palestinian presence and their commando activities."" As Israel retaliated against the Palestinians on

Lebanese soil. President Heloii and Karami found themselves in opposition over the issue. Kamal Jumblat. the Dntze leader. led the campaign with other lefiists for support of the Palestinians. The result was the Cairo Agreement of

1969 which legtimized and controlled the Palestinian commando presence and operations against Israel. '"'

''; Wdid Khalidi. (;)n/licr and I iulencr. 40.

$' Ibid.

; 1: Ibid. , .- '- ?vIichacl Hudson. "The Problcm of Autliorittilivc PowF'. 246. The backlash was immediate and it came fiom the Maronites as they viewed this agreement as a continuation of Chehabist détente policies towards Nasser and the Muslims. The real impact of the Cairo Agreement

was the move on the part of the Maronites to strengthen the trend towards

militias.14' The Gemeyals already had their militia (Kataeb), and now

Camille Chamoun and Sulieman Franj ieh created their own persona1 amies.

Once the Maronite militia fever took place. the Muslims. Palestine Liberation

Organization (PLO), and other radicals responded by militarizing their

coininiinities. The confessionai system already had a hard time dealing with

issues such as the mal-distribution of wealth and demographic change. and

now the new ernerging challenge to the Lebanese state was the fear and

paranoia eacli sect had of being dominated by one another militarily.

The Frattjieit Presidency 1970 fo the Begittni~tgof the Civil War

The Presidency of Suleiman Franjieh did not achieve too much in ternis

of social or political reforms. One important initiative during his term was to

dismantle the "Deuxiernme Bureau." the intelligence Bureau established by

Clieliab that kept tabs on the various communities. Franjieh sought to smash

its power as it controlled the flow of information between many of the different sects and operated with broad immunity. lu Unfominately, Franjieh did not see tlie negative effects in dismantling the apparatus. The impact was that it opened up the flood gates to the unprecedented militarization of

Lebanese political groups which continued ri& up until the civil war.14' The

Cliristians realized that tlie Lebanese army was incapable of controlling the couiitry and therefore they chose to safegiiard their own interests by creating militias.

Tlie Palestinians, as tliey continued to use Lebanon as a land base for tlieir attacks. increased their pressure on Franjieh as the Phalangists were lobbying the governent to clamp down on the guerilla activities. To make inatters worse. attempted to nin for President and Musa Sadr foounded the Shiite group .- (Hope). Sadr sought to change the severely

~inderdeveloped condition of tlie Shiite community, who were primarily located in the South, by arming Iiis people in the early 1970s. The Sunnis were the only sect that stayed aloof fiom militarization but still continued to play an important role politically.' Jh Tensions increased in 1974 between

Muslims and Chi-ktians when Franjieh dismantled the social policies and state rnacliinery of Chehab. Tlie country was on the brink of civil war as the

' :: .LIichricl Hudson- "The Problem of Authoritativc Powr'-. 247 . :i Thcodorc Hanf. ( >e-r~srrnceln Il'nrrwrr Lubanon. 127. ' "' lbid.. 129. cnicial issues facing the Lebanese could not be solved by the confessional structure wliich only divided the inhabitants fi~rther.

Virtiially every Lebanese President had to perform his duties within the contest of the confessional system, which after 1943 only heightened the suspicions of the various religious goups. The system negated any chance of tnist or equity as the various sects maneuvered themselves through the political system with their new found power to ensure it was permanent. The power stmggles between the various cornmimities were intensified by the confessional state. Ordina~policy making concerning social and economic refonn. dong with development, were consumed and overshadowed by the obsession the various leaders had in wanting to maintain their sect as the strongest witliin the confessional framework. CHAPTER 4

THE DISSOLUTION OF LEBANON

AND THE RESURRECTION OF CONFESSIONALISM

1975-1992

By the mid 1960s the Lebanese economy was bustling with development which enabled the country to ernerge as the banking centre of the Arab ~or1d.I~"Aside from the oil rich Arab nations, many Arab coiintries did not experience this type of econornic growtli as tiieir co\.ernments played a more active role in their economies.14' The Lebanese L infiastnicture was highly developed and in the 1960s four major uniwrsities were already established. hosting students and academics from al1 over the world. The liberalism and free press in Lebanon were unrivaled in the Arab

World and the country witnessed the emergence a new concept cailed

"Lebanesism". This idea lent itself to an identity separate from the rest of the

Arabs larpely due to the Christian presence in the countq. Lebanon was a neutral intermedi-: behveen the Arabs and tlie West-it becarne a showcase

' 9- Da~dAlcDoncll, Lt.hanon: .I !'oql~r. 12. '%mal Snlibi. . l Ibmse ($-\lani- .\!an.vrt~ns: The Fiisron- o/'i.t.hnnon Rrcons,clml. (London: [.B. Tmns K: Co.. Ltd.. 1988). 190. to the wliole world. as it was a mosaic for different communities and sects to

coexist imder the National Pact. 14"

So what Iiappened? Why did this small but irnpressive country break

apart and dissolve'? Once the Lebanese were left to pvem themselves after

19-43 their bigpest failure was the fact they did not build a nation-state where

loyalty to Lebanon came before loyalty to tlieir clan or religious community.

Tliiis. tlie National Pact of 1943 cemented the confessional system in

Lebanon and included no meclianism to deal with senous challenges posed by

an ideolog or estemal factor. as in the case of the 1958 C~S~Sand the

Palestinian armed presence.'5" There was no development of a common

identity in Lebanon and therefore aliprnents. allegiances and polycommiinal

valiies cliaractenzed the political situation after independence in 1943.

Two specific causes in the deterioration of Lebanon which contributed

to tlie cliaotic atmosphere just prior to the 1975 civil war can be analyzed by

the rise of the Shiite cornmunity and tlie Palestinian presence in the countv.

It is iinportant to examine the rise of the Lebanese Sliiite community because

it is Iiere tliat one cm find patterns of demography_ poiitics, socio-economic status and rnilitarism as examples of the kind of issues the fiagile Lebanese state could not handle. Lebanon was undergoing

a phenornenal economic boom and an international cosmopolitanism which ensued in Beinit and the nearby mountain districts. mostly Maronite, while the other regions, notably the Biqa' and the South, stagnated. This regionai-communal unequal development, mirroring a similar state of discrepant political access and participation? contributed to the social and economic disparities tliat cliaracterized pre- 1975 Lebanon and conspired to perpetuate the socioeconomic marginality of the Shiite community and the hinterland which it occiipied. According to al1 indicators - education, occupation. income - the socioeconomic differentials were ciear: (1) South Lebanon and the Biqa' were by far the poorest and least developed regions in the coiintry:(?) In Lebanon. the Miislims were worse off tlian the Chnstians: and (3) the Shiites stood at the very bottom of the socioeconornic scale."'

According to the Ministq of the Interior. by the late 1960s. the Shiites had outnumbered the Sunnis- thanks to a clearly higher birthrate, rapid iirbanization and better registration."? The growth of the Shiite community is a signiticant historical trend as they replaced the traditional majority Sunni establisliment in Lebanon diiring the early 1970s. After the Shiites began to mobilize their new found strengtli in aumbers. under the leadership of Musa

.: Tlic nsc of tbc Shiitc communih reprcscnicd a ncn cliaIlcngc to the Lcbrincsc starc as thcy ncrc 1iighi'- motivated. Ixge in nutnbcrs and morc active in thcir rcligious convictions than thcir Sunni counterparts. Thq nantcd political poncr. social dcvclopmcnt and the cconomic bencfits the' felt the! Iiad been dcpmcd. Tlic National Pact couId not handle ihc risc of the Shiites and their ascension crmted morc frrtgilit!- in an airead! narrow estem. Majcd Hrilaiti .l I.rhnnon Dqfietl: .\fu..scl CI/-Snclrand the .Shr 'a ( .orrrmunr il..( Bouldcr: Wcs~iewPress- 1 WZ), 6 1 . ..- - Giiliss~neSaîrirnc. Lehanon S injiiwd Itirnrrrie..~:Ifho Rrprewn~sIl'hont rn n C7ii.i/ Ilirr". (Osford: Ccntrc for Lcbiincsc Studics. 1956). 15. al-Sadr, the religious community began to lobby for the creation of a Higher

Shiite Council dealing with judicial matters. [t was a clearly different legal body than the Sunni judicial system and it gave the Shiites a recognized religious status separate fiom the Sunni Muslims. As the community developed an institutional framework. they soon developed political objectives wliich gradually led to greater distance from the Sunni est ablisliment ."-' Their objectives included development of the Shiite areas in

Lrbanon. the State's responsibility for social and economic refom. and iiicreased participation for the Shiite sect in the affairs of the confessional state. The evolution of their community naturally led to the establishment of a

inilitia bu the late 1 960s called dnd(Hope).

In Tate 1978 and early 1979 tliree events accelerated Sliiite mobilization

and contributed to their ascension on the Lebanese social, political and

milita? scene. The first was the 1978 Israeli invasion of Lebanon (Operation

Litani): the second was the disappearance of Imam Musa alSadr in Libya:

and the third was the Islarnic Revolution of Iran which inspired and enabled

.-lr~ralto play an ~mprecedentedrole in Lebanese politics.'54

. -. hd.-l6. '-: ugustus Ricitard Nonon. .lnrd und ihe .Shi 'o.-.Jirtrgg/2 ti~rihr .%cd qilrhnnon. ( Austin: Uni\zrsie of Tcsris Prcss. i 987 ).49. The nse of the Shiites on the Lebanese political scene was supported by a membership who were far more active than their Smicounterparts and hunLgry for social and economic power. As the protector of their CO- relig+ionists,the Shiites mobilized militarily and with their large numbers were able to seciire the Western section of Beinit in 1984 as their land base, thus eiving tliem political leverage in Lebanese affairs. A new dimension and C "' participant in the stniggle had emerged on the Lebanese political and social scene and because of their strength in numbers by the mid 1980s. as

Appendis IV illustrates. the Sliiites becarne a major power player in Lebanon.

Amonp the external factors that contributed to the break down of the

Lebanese system. none was as far reaching as the Palestinians. Their militaq and political presence in Lebanon. particularly in the early 1 970s. increasingly marginalized the Lebanese state and the response was the pararnilitary growth in the Ch~istianand Islamic sectors."" There was a steady growing chaos as tlie Palestinian movement continued to gain strength first by the 1973 Arab-

Israeli war. which radicalized more Palestinian factions with the help of their

Lebanese allies the Dnize. and tlien in 1971 when further political and

i.( The 1OYOs provcd to k ven successful !cars for the Shiitcs ris their milit- n-ing. .-lnral. n-as able to rnobilitc into Bcirut and occupy the Wcstcrn section of the cih . This dismptcd the iraditional powr base of the Sunnis and now a ncw Muslim force had to bc factorcd in to the power struggles of the Lebanese var. ibid.- 139. . . " Willirim Harns. F'nces qt'lrhrrnon. 1%. international recognition was given to Yasser Arafat and the PL0 as the

United Nations recognized the organization as the representative of the

Palestinian people.'5' The PL0 military atm conducted raids from Southem

Lebanon into northem Israel, provoking retaliation From the lsraeli air force.

The Israeli air raids resulted in a mass esodus of many Shiite Muslims fiom tlie South into Beinit and tlie capital becarne a center of dissatisfaction. particularly ainongst the Muslims in the Western section of tlie city. The new

belt of mise- and discontent in Beinit increased the Maronites' fears of a

collapse in the political order wliich tliey were controllinp.""

Tlie Dnize in particular fomed alliances with the V~~OUSPalestinian

factions eserting more pressure on tlie Lebanese system. In his book, I Speak

leor l.c~htrno~~.Drue leader Kama1 Joiirnblatt openly admits that he heiped

--fonniilate tlie common political program of tlie Lebanese Left and the PL0

in an effort to 'catch' tlie Lebanese [govemment] and shake them up ... so

tliat the war might at least have some positive resi~lts."'~"To this end, the

Dnize solidly backed the Palestinian presence in Lebanon. However.

Palestinian involvement in the coiintry ai times had negative impacts as

' <- rbid. '' Da\.id Cilmour. Lrbnnon: The I;rocrured tiiunrn.. (Great Britain: Sphere Books Limited 1987). 1 1: \L'illirini Hams. I-kcrs oj'Lehanon. 133. . - '"Kamal Joumblatt. 1 Speak For Lehanon. irans.. MichaeI Pallis. B Philippe Lapouncrlc (London:Zcd Prcss. I9XZ 1. 94. abuses on the part of some of their officiais bred a discontent for their activities and existence on Lebanese soil.'") The document in Appendix V illustrates the contempt held for the Palestinians by some local Lebanese as the actions of PL0 oficials and military personnel disrupted the lives of villagers in various areas with the occupation of certain homes, the collection of taxes, and the PL0 control of traffic in and out of the villages. At the same time. there was a large segment of the Lebanese population particularly

Sunnis and Drue. who were anpy with the govemment's attempts to refiise fGtki :iwn (guemlla resistance) operations against Israel from Soiithem

Confessionalism could not Iiandle the problems of social and economic reform. patronage or the Palestinians. which had become an especiaily destabilizing element. The Palestinians were armed and this pressured the

Maronites to rnilitarize and ultimately form an alliance with ~srael.'" The

-4 , Aliliougli support for Palestinian rtttacks on Isncl from Lebrinon wcre popular. tlicrc wsri grovin- conccrn amongst man) Lcbrincsc. espccinll~thosc in thc South and the Bekaa Vallq. that thc Palestinians wrc attcmptin_eto crcate their onn homcIand in Lebrinon. Thc PL0 armed prcscncc uas a frîghtcning torcc for sorric ~dlagcrsand the abuscs that took placc rcsultcd in a disdain for tlic rcfugecs who ncrc tocatcd t hroughout Lcbanon. Hussein Sirri)~eh."The Prilcstinian Armcd Prcscncc in Lcbanon Sincc 1967". in.. cd..Roger Ouen. E.ssn~~-son I.erhnnon. ( London: Ithaa Press. 1976). 77. . ,. . ' Roscrnan. Sayigli. Tot) .\ion!. Enenrres: The Pafr~;rinrnnFkperirnccr rn Lehmon. (London: Zcd Books Ltd.. 1994).-30. 'r- - .As thc Palcstinian miiitan grcw in numbers. thcir prcscncc awdemcmc di\-isionsn-ithin the Lcbrinesc: body politic as the Chrïstians feit thcir traditional poiler in Lebanon \vas iulnenble ro this Arab 'iationalist movcmcnt. The Maronites sought OUI Isncl in ordcr to dcfcnd themseltes more adequatcly frorn the PLO. Once this took pIacc. tlic Muslims and othcr nationalist groups in Lsbanon dong wiih ille Dru1.c twc convinccd thc Chnstians intcnded to maintain Lcbanon as a colonial tvestern state tvith ties to intricacies and alliances were bound to have negative effects on an already

framleC sÿstem. The emerging complexities, made it impossible for the system to operate and cope with the new political, military and economic pressures wliich began to overpower the National pact.lh3

In some respects, the conflict in Lebanon does not seem to conform to the lo~lcof çomr other conflicts and in some ways it completely defies

classification."^ An acciimiilation of historical factors brought Lebanon to the point of collapse in 1 975 as class conflict. regional conflict, socio-economic dispanty. the effects of dernographic chanse and the Palestinian armed presence al1 contributed to the dissolution of the state. However, in the case of Lebanon. the most potent ingredient tliat ensured its destruction was the fact tliat these issues al1 revolved around the sectarian system.

Confessionalism prevented any type of viable state-idea to emerpe and this sealed the country's fate for tlie final collapse in 1975.'"

The historical heritage of the political system did not allow for the long term continuation of a system based on confessional alignments. Rooted in

------

Europe and Isrricl. Jonathan, C. Randal, (hng.l ll the II i!\.: ( 'hrrsrrm Cl'arlords. lsrarli .I h.enrrrrrr.s and the If .or rn i.dhanon. (Nci\ York: Viking Press- 1983). 6. . . '.' hd.- 156 '. 0 " it 1s cstrcrncl'. diffrcult to definc the Lcbancsc conflict sincc it lias so mny dimensions that inctude we~.possiblc cornpies issue a nation faces. To characten~ethc problem as on[! reiigious or class codict n.ouId not do justice to the topic. Hence. it is a problem that defics singular historicril classification bccriusc of thc multiple issucs and mors tnt.olved. B.J. Odeh Lcbanon: ~nanirc.~of C'onflict. (London: Zcd Books. LW).S. the National Pact but even more so since the time of the Ottoman

~~iirtusurrrfivc.~- - through to the French Mandate, the fear of progress and development robbing the leading politica! figures of their power directed them to do nothing about seriously correcting their inherited sYstem.lb6 Both tlie

Muslims and Chnstians set out to enhance their positions by exploiting the disproportionate social and econornic development of the country.

Successive regirnes left initiatives to i~nbridled capitalism and when

2(Tovemment planning was involved, private interests made plans to sabotage tlie e~ons.'~)~Sadly, in rural areas. the traditional leaders had no interest in seeing tlieir constitiients develop for fear tliis would weaken their mainstay of power.'""~lien fighting broke oiit behveen the PL0 and the Maronites in

1975. tlie deterioration of the country moved into full swing as the actual figliting demonstrated the central govemment's inability to not only cope with the cliallenges it faced, but the lack of control over its own social and political institiitions.

The civil war in Jordan 1970-7 1 eliminated the Palestinian milita. presence in the Hashemite Kingdom. From that point onwards attacks by the

Palestinians came solely from Southem Lebanon causing [srael to respond with massive retaliatory raids. As a result, alignments in Lebanon were formed on the basis of those who supported tlie Palestinian presence (Druze and Sunni Muslims) and those who did not (Maronites). This hastened the deterioration of the Lebanese system and resulted in direct clashes between tlie Lebanese my,the Palestinians and their Dwe supporters.'"' As the isolated clashes grew, widespread violence pitted tlie Miislims and

Palestinians against the Maronites. Confessional alignments, along with the

Palestinian presence, transformed the dynamics of preseMng power into a struggle for survival amongst the varioiis groiips wliich led to the dissolution of the state.

The Taif.4ccord and the Resurrection of Confessionalsirn 1989-1 992:

The civil war that ensued fiom 1975-1 997, devastated and evhausted the county in a similar fashion to that of the 1860 civil war. There were intemal and extemal factors that brougiit the warrîng parties to a cessation of liostilities in earlp 1992. The most significant outcome of the war was tlie adoption of a peace agreement between the Muslim and Chnstians in the form of a treaty called the "Document of National Reconciliation" passed in

Taif. Saodi Arabia. 1989.

Ibld. The arrangement called for a balancing of communal interests and a redistribution of power and aiithority in Lebanon between the two main confessional blocs (Muslim and Chn~tian).~'"It was also, in principle, to eliminate the element of confessionalism from the political and social system, particularly fiom the lower ranking government offices. However. the

èlections durinp the summer of 1991. as a resiilt of Taif, took on the nature of a popdar referendum to determine the legitimacy of Lebanon's oldest and ne~cest political bosses.'-' The Accord altered the ratio of offices traditionally controlled by Christians 65, to an even division of 6%. Al1 militias were to be abolished and most interestingly the agreement clearly stated that in terms of an identity. Lebanon wouid now be descnbed as an

Arab country by identity and affiliation.'-'

The Accord created several sliifis in power whicli modified the political and social landscape of the coiinrn. Historically. it was the Christians who

Iiad a slight majority in Parliament. now it was to be evenly distributed.

Lebanon's classification as an Arab country or a unique part of the Arab

World was previously a matter oldebate and amed conflict: now it had been

'' ' ( J . - Wi111d Lhalidi. 'r~r!fl~tmtd ?dence. 43. Latif Abd-Husn. The Lehanese ( 'oqlicr: Looking Inw;trd, (Boulder: Lynnc Ricnncr EkbIishers. Canbern S tudics on Pcace. Rcsarch and Conflict -4nalysis. I9Y8). 109. Judith P Hank & Hihl Khashan. -'Lebanon's Di\-rsi1.c Dcrnocraq: The Parliamcntar Elcctions of 1902". in.. . lrnh S~~icliesQunrrer&.. (LISA: üni\wsit> Graduates and the Institute of Anb Studies. 1993). 101.. 15. 49 resolved. Militias and para-military organizations affiliated with the diferent parties, dong sectarian lines, previously operated with broad irnmunity, creating --semi-autonomous" regions inside the country; now they were disbanded. How could the coiintry turn so many of its deeply rooted problems into solutions'? How was it that the Christians were so willing to accept this new power sharing formula'?

The answers to these q~iestionslay in both regional and interna1 events wliich accotint for the emergence of this new system. First, the leftist aligiments in Lebanon particularly the SSNP? Naserites and Comrnunists bepan to wither away as the Soviet Union collapsed and the PL0 formalized peace negotiations with Israel in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Economic and milita? support from the Eastern Bloc filrther dissolved with the transformation of the Soviet Empire. Secondly, there was a detemined effort aniongst the Arab Leagie in the 1990s to find a solution to stop the protracted violence plagiing Lebanon for aimost two decades. Finally, and most importantly? S-yria, the main power broker in Lebanon, formulated a new prograin suited to the chanpng regional and global climate to ensiire its grasp oker the country wouid remain permanent. Internally, the late 1980s saw political and rnilitary setbacks for the

Christians in Lebanon as the various militia leaders squared off against one another over different policy directions. The Lebanese Government of Amine

Gemeyal was unable to provide a solution for resolving the civil war. On

September 23? 1988 just as his term was ready to expire, President Gemeyal appointed a bi-sec tarian six member interim rnilitary govemment composed of both Christian and Muslim generals to pvern the country."' General Michel

Aoun Iieaded the new milita- govemment as acting Pnme Minister. This caiised outrage amongst those politicians belonging to the reformist camp and the Sunni Muslim cornrnunity who traditionally had their candidate fil1 the post of Prime Minister. Salim Hoss. the elcisting Prime Minister protested. claiming tliat the move was illesal and would not be recognized by the

Lebanese Muslim cornmunity .

The country once again witnessed renewed fighting as Aoun and the status quo forces squared off against Hoss and the refomist forces. AAer massive shelling of both rnilitary camps General Aoun was finally dislodged frotn the Presidential Palace at &abth by the Muslim forces with the help of the Syrian amy. The result of Arab Leape diplomacy, and an eshausted

Lebanese public, combined with the political and military maneuvering of Sy-ia, brought the Deputies of Parliament, last elected in 1972, to Taif, Saudi

Arabia in 1989 to work out a power sharing arrangement and an end to the war in Lebanon.

The most important effect of the Taif Accord was the dangrous pattern it renewed instead of solving Lebanon's most S~~OUSpolitical and social problems. The traditionai role of the Cht-istians and Muslims in the

Lebanese polity liad now changed as the Maronite position, due to the Syrian occupation of East Beinit. after 1990. weakened their political and military

statu in Lebanon as the traditional power elite. The idea that the Muslirn

camp represented the reformist movement must be clarified in order to

understand the tnie sense of the word within this context. An evaluation of

the political refotms sought after by the Muslims and those tliat emerged out

of the Taif Accord represent nothing more than a new communal

accommodation within the ~incliangedfi.amework of the Lebanese political

sytern. '-'

Afier 1992, the poles of influence were revened as the Muslims seized

the opportunity of Syian backing to fil1 the role similar to that which the

Cliristians had under the French Mandate and National Pact. The Muslims of

. - : Tiic Taif Accord oni! re\.ened the powr equation in Lcbanon. gi\ing the Muslims more mtsin Parliament and the Shiitts somc cconomic benefits. Confcssionlisrn vas not &lishcd nor was the Lebanon now had their parantor, Syria, aiding them and stabilizing the region for their owgeo-political purposes. The Shiite cornmunity, who was traditionally rejectionist, and looking to separate themselves from the rest of tlie Muslims. were equally anxious to go along linder Synan guidance as they now Iiad a vested interest in rnaintaininp the stability of the Lebanese state since the) had acquired new stakes in it."' The fact that there were new econoniic benefits for their cornmunity. not to mention a high concentration of

Palestinians in their areas. made tlie idea of an agreement and a cessation of

Iiostilities more appealing to the Shiites of Lebanon.

Tlie Taif Accord still provided a confessional political system wliich did not include a mechanism for fiitiire amendments to accommodate deinogapliic or sociopolitical sliifts among tlie varioia cornmunities.'" Tlie political and social situation in Lebanon tlierefore remained unchanged even tliough the fighting had stopped. The new formula agreed upon at Taif has provided a potentially dangerous environment for repeated episodes of violent conflict. The Chnstians did not benefit. the Sumis and Drue stayed

patronrigc ?stem of thc clitcs. Joscph Mailri. The Boctrnirnt ry'l ir~fer.smttling:.-[ c'ontnienrnn. (Osford: Ccnrre .-. for Lcbanese Studics. 1992). 5. Roseman Sqigli. '-The PaiC~tniansin Lebanon: Harsh. Prcscnt. Uncenain Future-. in.. Jotrmal qf Palesrrnr. - .\'itrtlrc.s. \rd.. .\CYV. No. 1. 1995. 45. ' '' The ncn agreement workcd out in Teif. Saudi Anbia ignonid the issues and problems of the fragile qstcni in Lebanon uhicii lcd up to its collapse in 1975. -4s3 resulr. the agreement did not provide an! rncclianisms to dcal n-ith the \.arious issues leaving Lcbrinon a potcntial flash point for codict in the futurc. Lririf Abul-Husn. The Lehanese c 'ontlrcr. 1 13. relatively the same and the Shiite situation was partially rernedied as state resources shifted in their fav~ur.'~ CONCLUSION

Confessionalism becarne the lifeblood of Mount Lebanon's social and political fabric as a system dominated by elites which helped contribute to the demise of the state in the latter twentieth century.""e implementation of the mirrosmr~fii~a- - in 1860 was successhl in the short term: however, it had

long term negative affects. The shortsightedness of the niutasarrrfipu cannot

be criticized to the extent tliat it should be labeled as a backward system as

the conditions that emerged out of the Druze-Maronite conflict dictated its

fonn. Peace reigned in Mount Lebanon because there was an opportunity for

eacli sect to develop its own role within the political framework. The desire

to implement peace in Mount Lebanon and provide representation to al1 the

parties iindermined the actiial long-term effects of the system's logistics.

However. the Administrative Council provided the forum upon which the-

could agitate for more autonomy and transform the power, historically drawn

liom the feudal system, into power derked from a modem political

institution.

, - ' ibid.. 37 The distribution of offices by sect was not considered to be a problem at the time-instead it was considered an aviom of the population's civility."'

It was an accepted fom of political life in Mount Lebanon that encouraged patronage which in tum hindered good citizenship and damaged the efficiency of public service. Political comiption and the very essence upon which the government were decay. C was structiued indications of how it would

Regardless of other flawç or shortcomings in the system, or positive aspects of the ~~iirrcisan.ifivi.a,- -- the confessional basis from which the system was built would not be able to sustain the challenges it would face.

An important negative aspect of the system was the oversight of the native leadership and tlieir failure to address the social and economic

ineqiialities of the V~~OLISregions.'"' The imbalances conceming the distribution of ~vealthand tax reform continued unabated until the time of

World War 1. The church, Maronite north, rich business people and large

landowers paid the lowest taxes. Social and economic disproportion would

prove to have disastrous affects as tliey becarne the undercurrents f~rthe

break up of the Lebanese state in 1975. Related to these imbalances, were

the iinequal divisions of civil and milit-; positions between the Maronites

' Ensin .*arli. The Long Prncu. 185. ' .* Ibid.. 1st). and other sects. Appendix VI illustrates the relative share of positions and pay in the region which were dominated by the Maronite sect. According to the Reglemant of June 9, 1861' al1 feudal privileges of the leading notable families were to be abolished in order to allow a degree of access to those wlio had been preciously deprived of those positions.'s' This measure failed as tlie Ottoman Govemor, Daud Pasha, moved to appoint traditionai notables to these positions. The system that was to bring more representation to the people of Mount Lebanon witnessed the reinstatement of top notables to civil and rnilitary positions.''=

It could be ar~edthat at the time of the nrurasarrrfi~y's implementation. direct, fiee and open democracy would have been impossible considering the conditions of Mount Lebanon irninediately following the civil war. The Ottomans intended to retain control of the area and prevent tlie

Europeans from establishing a foothold.'""e devastation and mistnist resulting from the Due-Maronite conflict required a laree body to oversee life and regulation in Mount Lebanon. The idea of having the inhabitants govern themselves would have probably led to renewed conflict? violence and an opportiinity for foreign powers to gain access in the Ottoman Empire if the old power structure had remained. Although the inhabitants of Mount

Lebanon achieved an autonornous sanjak with special statu in the Ottoman

Empire. the power structure was still dominated by the mutasaurif. and monitored from Istanbul.

The representative system was dominated by elites who rnaneuvered tliemselves into their positions to secure their personal power. At the time of its implernentation. there was no consideration of establishing a long range plan or rnechanism to alter the rigidity of the confessional system. Thus. confessionlism, as a tradition whose roots were planted in the nineteenth centlis. spread its branches well into the twentieth century and continued to develop. becoming less flexible. As a result. when the new challenges etnerged after the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, decisions would be

by Ceiiided this fragile system of representation. The mutasarvlfi-y changed the social and political landscape of Mount Lebanon by institutionalking a status quo system where achievement and power were based on confessional affiliati~n.'~"Open dernocracy and complete autonomy were out of the question as the? would have not only resulted in the independence of Mount

Lebanon but woiild have worked against the plans of both the British and Ottomans who wanted to preserve the Turkish Empire for geo-political reasons.

The civil wars of 1841. 1845 and 1860 drained the communities of

Mount Lebanon, damaged the notables and exposed the Ottomans to the hghtening possibility of European intervention. Thus, developing a system where no one community would be dominant biit would remain dependant on a council for their power served the Ottoman purposes of stabilizing the region iip iintil World War 1. Once Mount Lebanon became an autonornous surytrk. it was only a matter of time until the inhabitants. given the riglu conditions. would be able to achieve fiill independence. It would have been difficult to impose another system or create a different scenario given the nature of the conflict in Mount Lebanon-a struggle between hstrated peasants. the weakening power of traditional elites and the changing role of the ctergy'"

The end of World War I ushered in changes throughout much of the

Middle East as the old goveming system collapsed and new structures ernerged after the breakup of the Ottoman Empire.'" Mount Lebanon was one of the areas where a new occupyinp power. the French, imposed its

'>iIbid.. 276. ' Y-, Eliubcth Picard. I,rhcmon a Sharrerd ( 'otrne-:.\(\.dis mci Rralities qirhe Ifars in Lrbanon. (New k'ork: Hot mes & hlcirer. 1996). 3 1. system of nile, the Mandate, 19724943. Unlike the Ottomans, the French attempted to Westemize Lebanon and create a state with a diverse mixture of ethnic and religious communities which could permanently coexist under a

French protectorate. The French reinforced confessionalism in Lebanon by maintaining the elements of the old Ottoman political structure but were naïve and careless at times in their anempts to introduce changes by not hlly realizing the dynamics of the relations between the Christian and Muslim cominunities and their unwillingness to siibmit to foreign rule. Despite the traditional alliance between the French and Christians. bitter resistance to

French policies came primarily From the Maronite comrnunity as the French

High Commissioners in charge of implementing poiicy sought to impose their

~+isionsin the region. Ultimately. the policy lacked a clear direction and helped consolidate the sectarian divisions tliat plagued the country up until the

French witlidrawal in 1943 and beyond. With the intent to pit one cornmunity against the other, the Mandate system ended, polarized the various communities and created resentment towards the French.

The constant themes throughout this historical analysis have focured on the divisions in Lebanese society based along the lines of religious identification. demography and the cornpetition for local power between the various sects. In order to effectively analyze these historical patterns, an examination of their interaction within the Lebanese confessional political system along with the multiplicity of actors must be considered in order to understand the conflict. The system itself left no room for these trends to fimction as the Lebanese social and political structures developed an intolerance for change along any lines that was not based on sectarianism.

The struggle for politicai power in Lebanon was c&ed by sectanan moups which prevented the govemment from eficiently handling the basic L. cleavages in Lebanese society. This fragile political system eroded any chance of good government. democracy or fair representation as the political dites of the V~~OUScomrnunities used the system in order to enhance their o~mpower base. Conciliation and cooperation between the various groups was curtailed as the stniggle for power evolved into a struggle for domination amongst the di fferent sects witli the political bosses reaping the benefits of the fragile state.

Both the Muslims and the Cluistians can be labeled as hypocritical as eacli side became more concerned with preseMng its own power base and not solving the imbalances of the country's economy or society. As the

Cliristians wanted to presewe their powerfiil establishment. the Muslims were determined to weaken it. Tl~erefore~no real progress could take form because the only hvo priorities whicli existed included the maintenance of power and the domination of other groups. nie Muslhs should have seized tlie opportunity after the population estimates in the 1960s and demanded freer and more open elections-not more sectarian appointments. The

Cliristians. who were promoting this Lebanese concept, should have made sacrifices for tlie advancement of their country and opted for an open dernocratic systern. Both sides are culpabie in the problems that eroded the

Lebanese state.

in order for the Lebanese systern to be successful it needed a society coinrnitted to the pnnciples of direct representation and in Lebanon that

çociety was lacking. The Christians felt confessionalism was appropriate for society and did not want to tamper witli tlie Pact. The document preserved tlieir siipreinacy and therefore reasons for defending it were ultenor to sa? the least. '" In order for any real progress in Lebanon to take forrn? confessionalism had to be abolislied. If Lebanon's political and social system are to have an); chance of stirvival the counny must move toward non- sectarian politics and a lessening of class bar~iers.~'~Howevet, by the 1950s and 1960s confessionalism was not just part of the legal fabric? it was rooted in Lebanese society and becoming too dificult to abolish. Kamal Joumblatt and the secular forces emerged and proposed that al1 parts of Lebanon be secularized.l"~owever,an examination of their policies will conclude that the cal1 for secular political parties was nothing more than a political ploy to eser; additional pressure on the Maronites. Meanwhile, the Sunnis wanted to inaintain their personai status according to Islamic law in the areas of succession. divorce and marriage. By tlie 1970s confessionalism as a balance between Muslims and Christians was eroding but no other viable political or social alternative emerged to settle the liistorical differences between the varioiis g~oups.Secularism gained no momentum and no other force to uni@ the Lebanese was established.

As long as confessionalisrn reigned as the supreme forrn of govemment direct representation had no chance of taking mot. The mobilization of the various Muslim and Christian forces in Lebanon to solidifi their power blocs consuined tlie leading political figures and superseded any hopes of social or rconomic refom. Given the adversarial nature of Lebanon's social and political climate, true democratic ideals were unable to usiirp the power of the traditional elites. thlis allowing confessionalism to operate unchallenged as the modis operandi in Lebanon. The lack of mie dernocracy and a sincere 109 vision in wanting to correct the condition of the disinherited in the country gave way to the cnimbling of the state and civil war that ensued because the essence of the system became a political garne rather than an honest relationship between the various cornrnunities.

Based on J.C. Hurewitz, ed., The illidtilc I:àst and North Africa in Wodd Politics, 1 97 5.

113. REGULATION FOR THE ADblISlSTRATION OF LEB.&iON 9 June 1861

Fnnslatcd from the French tcxt in Great Britain, Parliamenrary Paperr. ISdl, 65: 683-861

A commission of the Big Five created to investigate the causes of the massacres of 1360 and to recommend changes in the administration of Lebanon arrived in Bayrut on 26 Septernber and complzted its report on 4 May 1 S6 1. On the bajis of the com- mission's recommendations, the diplornxic representatives of the powers at Istanbul and of the Sublime Porte drew up the regulation that is reproduced beiow. providing for a non-Lebançse, Ottoman Christian governor nominated by the Porte after consultation with the Europem governments. The regulation was rnodified on 6 September 1861 (French iext in Holland. Et~ropeanConcerr in rire Eastern Question, pp. 212-18). The special regime transhrmed Lebanon into the best administered Ottoman province and cndured until Ocrober 19 13. when it was unilaterally ter- minated by the Sublime Porte. The govcmor's tenure, rit first Iimited to threc years. was extended in 1S6J to five and in 1565 to ten. The confessionai basis of mid-twen- ticth-century politics in Lebanon may be found in precedents established in the period of the sprcial Ottoman regime. Spag-nolo. "Constitutionai Change in Mount Leba- non." and "Mount Lebanon. France and Daud Pasha"; Salibi. Modern Hisroryof Lebunon, chap. 6; Hurewitz. "Lebanese Dernocracy in Its International Setring"; Houranî. $ria und Lebanon, pp- 3330; Jouplain, La question du Liban, bk. 3; Mange, Near Eastern Policv of the Emperor Napoleon Ili. chap. 4; Young, Corps de droit otioman, 1 : 139-59 (reguiations).

, 1. Protocol Adopted by the Sublime Porte him but oncc, at the time thrit he himseif 3nd the Europn Powers shall be invested wich authority, and not in conncction with cach appointment. Article 1 gave rise to the following deda- Regarding Article IO, which deds with ration, issued by His Highness 'Ali Pa5a suits between the subjects or protégés of and accepted by the five Rcprcsentativcs: a foreign power, on the one hand, anri the "The Christian Governor entrustcd with inhabitants of the Mountain on the other. the administration of Lebanon shali be it has been ageed that a Mixed Cornmis- choscn by the Porte, to which he shafl be sion sitting at Bayrut will be charged with directly responsible. He shdl have the title venfying and reviewing tiiles of protection. of hlü3ür [commander], and he shall reside In order to maintain the security and nomally at Dayr al-Qamar, which will fresdom of the highway from Bayrut to rigain fa11 under his direct authority. In- Damascus at ail times. the Sublime Pone vated for a three-ytar term, he will never- will ertablish a, blockhouse at the point of theIess lx removable at pleasure, but his the said highway which may be deemed dismissal shall not take place without a most sui table. trial. Three rnonths prior to the expiration The Governor of Lebanon may procttd of his term, the Porte, before taking action, with the disarmament of the Mountain at shail seek a new agreement with the Re- such time as he shall consider the circum- prcsentatives of the Great Powers." stances favorable. It has also knundentood that the 2. Regulation for the Administration of power granted by the Pone to this official . Lebanon to appoint on his own ksponsibiiity Ad- ministrative Agents shaII bc confemd upon by a Christian Governor appointed by and sentino; the various clements of the popula- directly responsible to the Sublime Porte. tion and landed intercsts in the District. This official, holding ofice at pleasure, The lo&l Counci1, presided over and shcill be invested with al1 the attributes of convoktd annually by the chief of the Dis- exeutive power, shall maintain order and trict, shs1I in the first instance resolve al1 public securiry throughout the Mountain. matters of administrative Iitigation, shall shaIl collect taxes, and shall appoint on his bar the daims of the inhabitmts, shalt oun responsibility Administrative Agents provide the necessac statistical informa- with authority that he shall receive from tion for tax assessrnent in the District, and His Imperia1 Xftljesty the Sulmn; he shall shsll give its advisory opinion on ail ques- appoint judges, shdl surnmon and presidt tions of local interest. over the Central hdrninijtrritive CounciI ART, 5. The .Administrative Districts (hlcclis). 2nd shall assure the execution of shaIl bç dividtd inio Sutdistricts, the ter- di sentences legally rendcrcd by the courts, ritov of uhich shall br based rou~hlyon except 2s timitcd by the provisions of that oi the former iklims (zones), and shall Article 9. tic insoiar as possible of homogencous Exh oi the constituent ril~rnentsof the popuiation; the Subdistricts shstll be di- population of the Xiountriin shali be rcpre- vidrd into communities, çach with at least sented bsiore the Governor by an Ascnc five nundred inhabitants. At the hcad of (Vckil) appointed by the chicfs and nota- each Subdistrict rhere shall be an Agent bles of exh community. ap~ointedby the Govcrnor upon the re- .ART. 2. Thcre shall bc for the cntire cornmendation of the Chief of the District; hlountain one Central Administrative and 3t the head of cach community there Council comprision twelve mcmbers: ttvo shalt !x a shaykh seiccted by the inhabitants Xlrtronitcs, two , two Grcek Ortho- and appointed by the Governor. dox, two Grezk Cathotics, two hfatawilôh, In rnixcd communities, cach constituent ' ' and two Xiuslirns; it shall bc charged with clement of the population shall have its assessing taxes, adrninscering revenues and own shaykh, who will exercise authority expenditures, and rendering its advisory ovcr oniy his corrcligionists. opinion on al1 questions submitted to it by ART. 6. pcre shdl bel cquality of al1 the Govcrnor. before the law; al1 feudal privileges, espc- ART. 3. The Mountain shall bc dividcd ciakly those appertaining to the 3lukatrt'aci into six Administrative Districts: (Icaxholdcr or Iandowner, &ho was also (1) Al-Kura, including the Iower sec- frqucntly the local tax farmer), are abol- tions, as ucll as other such sections of tcr- ished. ritory in uhich the population adheres to MT.7. There shall be in each Subdis- the Greek Orthodox scct, but ecxluding the tria one justice of the pertcc for each rc- city of al-Qalrirnun, situated on the cost ligous group; there shall be in each Dis- and inhabited-. almost exclusively by Mus- trict a Lower Judicial Council [Meslis), l irns. comprising hm three to six rnembcrs (2) The northern part of Lebcinon, cx- [and] representing the diverse elernents of cepr for 11-Kura, to the Nahr al-Kalb. the population: and at the scat of the gov- (3) Zahlah and its tenitory. ernrnent 3 Higher Judicial Council, com- (4) Al-M3tn. includinp Christian Sahal prising twelve rntmbers, two from erich of and the territories of Kata and Saha. the six communities enurneratcd in Article (5) The rerritory to the south of the 2. :o whicn will be added a representative Damascus-Bayrut road to Jazzin. of the Protestant or the Jewish religion (6) Juinand Taffah. uticnever the interests of a member of The Governor shall appoint to each of these communities may be involved in a these Districts an Administrative Asent, Iau-suit. selected from thrit refigious group which The presidency of the Judicial Council predominates either in size or in the im- uiI1 rotatc every three rnonths among ail portancc of its properties. of thcir memben. ART. 4. There shall be in each District ART. 8. Justices of the pace shall pass a Local Administrative Councii comprking judgment without appeai in ases invotving from three to six memben [and] repre- no more than five hundred piasters. Cases involving more than five hundred piasters a clerk appointed ad hoc. In addition, the shall faIl under the jurisdiction of the Lower cierk shall maincain a register of a11 con- Judicial CounciIs. tracts of sale of real estate; the contracts Xlixed cases, that is, cases involving per- shall not become valid until they have ben sons not ol the same sa, ~hatcvcrthe fomially registered. value ar stake in the sui:, shall be brought ART. 14. Inhabitants of Lebanon who directly before the Lower Judicial Council, have cornmitted a crime or delict in an- unless the parties agee to rtcognizc the other Sancak (provincial district) shdl be competenct of the defendant's justice of tried by that Ssncak, just as the inhabi- the peace. tants of othsr Districts who have com- In principle al1 cases shall be tried by rnitted a crime or delict within the lirnits the entier rnembership of rhe Council of Lebanon shall be tried by the t;ibunals Ho*sever. whcn al1 the parties of the par- of the Mountain. tlcular suit shalL klong to the same scct, Accordingly, indigenous or nonindige- they shall have the ri-ht to chdlenge a nous individusls who have commi tted a judze bclonging to 3 different set; but crime or delict in Lebanon and who have even in such a case the chsllenged judges tscaped to another Sancslk shdl be ar- shall participate in the trial. rested, upon the request of the authorities ART. 9. In criminal mattefi, rhere shall of the Mountain. by those of the Sancak br three degrees of jurisdiction. Contraven- whcre they may be found, and they shall tions sh311 be tried before justices of the tw handed over ro the administration of peace; deIicts before Lower Judicial Coun- Lrbanon. cils; and crimes More the Higher Judicial Similarly, persons indigenous to the Council, whose sentences shalI be executed Mountain or inhabitants of other Districts only in conformity with forma1 usage in the who have commirted 3 crime or deIict in , , resi of the Empire. a Sancak other thm Lcbanon and who may ART. 10. A11 suits of a cornmercia1 na- have taken refuge therc shall te arrested ture shall he brought before the commercial without delay by the authorities of the tribunal of Bayrut, and every suit, even in Mountain, upon the request of the inter- civil matten, between a subjcrt of or per- csted Sancak, and shaII be hmded over CO son protected by a forcign power and an the mthorities of the latter. inhabitant of the Mountain shall be sub- Agents of the authorities who are guitty mitted [O the jurisdiction of the same tri- of ntgiigence or of nonjustifiable delays in bunal. the execution of orden relating to the rc- ART. 1 1. Ali the memben of Judicial turn of guilty persons to the competent and Administrritive Councils, without ex- tribunals shall bt punished according to the ception, and the justices of the pace will Iriw, like those who would seek to shelter be chosen and desimatcd by the heads of guilty persons from the police. their respective communities aftcr consub Finally, the relations of the Adrninistra- tation with the notables and wilt be ap- tion oi Lcbanon with the respective Ad- pointed by the Govemor. ministrations of the other Sancaks shall be Half of the personnel of the Administra- precisely the same as the relations which tive Councils will k changcd every yerir; eliist and which shall be rnaintained among outgoing mernbers will kx eligibie for reap- al1 the other Sancsks of the Empire. pointment. ART. 15. In ordinriry times the main- ART. 12. Al1 judoes shall be paid. If, tenance of ordcr and the enforcement of aiter investigation. it is proved that one faw shall be the exclusive responsibility of oi them habeen partial, or has cornmitted the Governor, assisted by a mixed police any act of any nature unworthy of his of- force recruited on a voluntary bais and fice, he shall De disrnissed and in addition comprising about seven men for every shall k subjcct to a penalty proportionate thousand inhabitants. to the rnisdeed committed by him. me pnctice ofl arrest by troops shalt ART. 13. nie sessioos of a11 JudiciaI be abolished and replaced by other rneth- Councils shall be public, and a verbatim ods of constraint, such as attachmcnt and report of their proadings shall be kept by irnprisonrnent; exaction by policemen of payrnents in money or in kind from the and discipline. The troops shall withdraw' inhabitants shall bc: prohibited and most from the Mountain as soon as the Gwcrnor scverely punished. Policemen shall Wear a wiIl have officially notified their comrnand- uniiorm or other extemal sign of thtir of- ing officer of the fulfillment of the mission fice, and in the exçcution of any order for which ihey were callcd to the Moun- whatsoever the authorities shall use as far tain. 3s possible agents beionging to the nation ART. 16. The Ottoman Porte rtscrves or the sec[ of the individu31 against whom for itself the right to collect, through the the ordsr is directed. United the time that medium of the Governor of Lebanon. the the Gobtrnor rnay Celare the local police 3,500 purses (about S75.00u) which con- force capable of fulfiiling a!I the duties for stitute at present the tax burden of the krhich it is responsible in normal tirnes, Mountain and which may be augmentcd to the roads from Bayrut to Damascus and 7,000 purses (about 5150,000) when cir- from Sidon to Tripoli shd1 be occupicd by cumstances allow it ; it is understood. how- imperta1 troops. The troops shall be sub- ever, char the proceeds of the tax wilI fint jccr co the command of the Govemor of be appfied to the administrative cxpenscs the XIountriin. of the Mountain and to its outlriys for pub- , Whenevcr the necd may arise in cxtraor- lic service, only the surplus, if ihere is any, dinxy circumstances. the Governor, after becoming revcnue of the state. consultation with the Central Adrninistra- If the general cxpcnses absolutcly cssen- tive Council, rnay request from the military tial for the regutar conduct of the admin- authorities of Syria the assistance of rtgu- istration should cxcecd the revenue from 13r troops. ta.uts, the Porte will providc the neccssary fhc oficcr cornrnrinding the troops shall balance. rcrich agreement with the Govemor of the However, it is understood that the Sub- Xtountztin on the measures to be taken, and lime Porte will be responsible for public for the duration of his sray in Lebanon works or other extraordinary expcnditurcs hc shdl be subordinatcrd to the Governor of only if ripproved in advancc by the Porte. the Mountain, acting undcr the latter's rt- ART. 17. As soon as possible a census sponsibility; he shall, howcver, rctain his of the population by cornmunities and by rights of initiative and cva1uation in al1 sect shall be taken, and a land rtgistcr purdy military questions, such as strzttegy drawn up for al1 cultivatcd lands, .4PPENDI,Y III

Based on Leila Fawaz, An Occasion For War, 1994,229-230.

"Further Papers," Encl.4 in Xloore-Russell, 370. 28, 19 july 1860, pp. 61-3

Trraty of Peace between the Christians and Druses. [Translarion of the ireaty signrd on 12July 1860.1

11-c, the Un~ersigmd,Kaimakam of the Chrisrians, Depries of ;he people, Emirs, and hlokattadjis, members of the Medjlis and Xotables, have ap- peared, in obçdicnce ro the orders of his Excellency ouLord the blushir of the Eyalet, before his Exceliency's Kicihia and Liçuttnnnr, his Excellency \Visfi Effendi, and afcer drliberstion and discussion benveen us and the Kaimakarn of ihe Druses and Deputier of the nid nation, Emirs, hlokat- 13djis. mernbers of the 4fedjlis and Xotables, as to the duty of securing the mesns of repressing the dissensions that have arisen, of gurrding the country, cl rescoring the tranquiliry and well-bcing of the people, in pur- suance of the Mushirid orders, and of our love of country, have agreed Ls follo\vs: Seeing that irom the commencement of this movement, whcther on the part of the Government or on that of wise and orderly persons and lovers of pence, who know the value of order and tranquiliry, most active measures were taken to prevent its occurrence, and to prrserve tranquiliry, 2nd aftenvards to quel1 ir speedily, but owing CO the cfTorts of designing and corrupt persons, especially thosc who have not the quaiiry of com- passion for children and infants, and ro the folly of the turbulent, the agitarion estrnded, no means remained of immediatcly quelling it and ravinç the shedding of blood, and rescoring order, escepc by effecting a general pacificxion bettveen the belligerencs simihr to the one concluded after the war of 18ij, and thnt is upon the bases of "oblivion of the pasr." Consequcntlv, it hns agrecd and decided, aftcr invoking the Divine assistance, to conclude pexe upon the condition aforemenrioned; and chat dl that has passed from the beginning or the tvar ta the present date is not liable to any daim or prctension on eithcr side, neither ac present nor in the future; thar, afrer signing the Instruments of Peace, whoever should do anyrhing caIculated to occasion the recurrence of disorder ta be punished by the authoritics, and whoever cakes part with hirn will be 3n accomplice in his crime and will be punished like hirn; that ail func- rionaries should unitc against whoevcr commences any such pr~vocstion, 2nd give literal effect to the ordcrs of the Government, in accordance with :he cstablished regulations: thx the Kaimdiams. Mokattadjis, and oficers, shouId conform in their poceedings to the regulations and syem of qovernment of che Mountain, ivithout any dzviatioo rherefrom, 2nd readily esrcuce the ordcrs of the Government agrerabfe thereto, and should hristen ro suhrnit ta the Governor tuhatever it is rçquisite thcy should ~ubrnitto it, and esert themselves to bring about and ro promoce conciliacicn, good- !>*ilIl and union betwcen rhc trvo nations, and the wclhre and tranquility of all, and espccially the speedy recurn of everyonc to their homes in ~ccurity,and put hirn in possession of his lnndcd and imrnovcAc propcrty as forrnerly, withour any trcspass or injustice to anyone, and ro give every possibie assistance to all, in every respect, in pursuance with the Imperia1 \bill, under the auspices of his Excellency the hlushir, in case of need, and according to regulation, and thac al1 should strenuously esert themselves ;O substitute harmony for strife, and restorr general tranquility, hc. Prace having been concludcd upon thesc cerms, with the agreement 3rd conszni of us all, this lnscrurnenr has bcen drawn up, and four copies lvritcen, two by each nation, in ordcr that each nation should give one copy :O the other; and two copies subrnitted by both nations to the Slushirial threshold, rhat the' ma? be kept in the archives of the Govcrn- ment, to be adhered to and executed at present and for the future. Based on the Map Section Central Intelligence Agency ref.37 15042 (B00483), 1988.

APPENDIX V

An Eye-witness Account Detailing PL0 Abuses in Lebanon Based on Raphael Israeli, ed., PL0 ifi Lebanon: SeIecrrd Boc~rments,1983.

[Document 811: Tanfil; Shamtef from the villnge of 'Abra Th2 itt tcn*ie\r' Iraus broaticast orr hael Tcle~isionor1 23 July Z9SZ (rr-nnslared from A rabic).

The moment thcy moved into 'Abra, they took over thé stratsgic spots. They brokc do1i.n our olive trecs and otlier nice places and trces. Every house tvhich li3okd strategic to thcrn, they took ovcr, turned it into a posirion and corducted observations and othcr military activitits from thers. \i's rried to . t31k ttiçni out of ir politcly. but thcy woiild not listrn. They saw a new house which had just been cornpleted. and its otvner just occupird ir, and they confiscatsd it. Thry urgcd us to keep oiir mouths shiit and to remnin indoors. So. wc took Our childrcn and sheitcred them in n protected room; wc were tiardly in thnr room, when thcy srarred shelling us with cannon. T\vo girls frorri the Safi household iverc killed. and rny father \vas woundtid and died.

Then the! started shelling the strrets and the rest of the houses and WC tnd no one CO nsk for help. Mre had no choice but to take our wounded ro a nearby hospital under fire. This is what Iiappened to us. We located the wounded according to their cries for help; I and oiher young people who werc in the village tvcni to collect the wounded and the dsad. We met the village rnukhtar ~vho,hirnsclf, tiad rernoved a dead girl. Her hands were cut offand part of her hcad was inissing. The houses were set on fire. people were caugtit in the fire, burning and iinablt: to escape, al1 crying and wecping. We pickcd up some crying women but they shot at us and the walls around us wre fiill of bullet holes. Wc wanted to load them into cars and rush to hospitals but we could not go far; they blocked the roads \vith their jeeps and forbade us from going anv further. Ncverthelcss, Ive succeeded in bringing Io the hospital a few of the wounded. &4PPENDIXVI

Based on Engin Akarli, The Long Peace, 1993, 150.

3is;ribution of Governrnent Positions by Sect, 1902-1907

------Civ&an Positionsa Miktary Positions Non- Totd At commissioned number Total the ln the oFcers and of salary sec:^ center provinces Oficersb troops positions Percentage paid' Percentage ht~ironrre Dmze Greek Orthodox Greek Ca tholic Sunnite Shiite Others Total BIBLIOGRAPHY

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Namani. Bassam Abdel Kader. *Y hnj~ssionlisnl in Lehanon 1ZO-i9'6: Ïhe I~tterph-vr! f - Ilont est rc. Regional and Itaernnrronal Politrc~"?(Dissertation: Columbia University, 1985).

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