General Assembly Distr

General Assembly Distr. GENERAL

A/44/960 1 July 1990 ENGLISH ORIGINAL: 'ARABIC/ENGLISH/ FRENCH/RUSSIAN/ SPANISH /

Forty-fourth sessic Agenda item 28

POLICIES OF APARTHEID OF THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA

Prouress -made in the imnlementation. of the Declaration- on Auartheid and its Destructive Conseuuences in Southern Africa

mart of the Secretarv-General

Parauraohs Paue : ;, I. INTRODUCTION ..*....**...... **.*...... -.a*..*.....*..... 1 -9 1

II. OBSERVATIONS ...... *...... m...... *...m...... *.....*... 10 - 1B 4

Annexes / I. Report of the Mission dispatched to South Africa by the Secretary-General ..0...*.*..*...... *.~,....~...... ~.*..*....~~ 6

II. Information provided by Governments relating to the progress made in the implementation of the Declaration on Auartheid and its Destructive Consequences in Southern Africa l ..*...... **.~C...**...... k‘.~*. 60

III. Letter dated 7 December 1989 from the,Minister for Foreign Affairs of South Africa to the Secretary-General ...... **...... *.C.*.....~**..... 83

IV. Excerpts from the address by President F. W. de Klerk at the opening'of the second session of the ninth Parliament of the Republic of South Africa on 2 February 1990 . ..*.*..*...... *....*...... *.....***.** 88

v. Letter dated 7 June 1990 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of South Africa addressed to the Secretary-General ,..,,I.*..,.,.C..C..~...... * 95

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CONTENTS (continued)

VI. Statement by Nelson Mandela, Deputy President of the African National Congress, to the 641st meeting of the Special Committee against Apartheid on 22 June 1990 .*...... ~,*...*.*.....*...... ,.*...... ** 103

VII. Declaration on AParthe'id and its Destructive Consequences in Southern Africa ...... C...... a.*...... 108

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. At its sixteenth special session, on 14 December 1989, the General Assembly . and its Destructive Consequences in Southern adopted the Declaration on Aaarthei4 * Africa (resolution S-16/1) (annex VII). The Declaration, ,inter al&$ encouraged the people of South Afsica to join together to negotiate an end to the system and agree on all the measures that are‘necessary to transform their country into a non-racial democracy, The'Declaration dealt with fundamental principles for a new constitutional order (para. 3), with the creation of a climate for negotiations (paras. S-7), with guidelines to the process of negotiations (para. 8) and with a programme of action in pursuance of-the objectives of the Declaration (para. 9). ,'

2. In paragraph 10 of the Declaration, the General Assdmbly requested the Secretary-General to transmit copies of the Declaration to the South African Government and the representatives of the people of,South Africa, -and to prepare a report on the progress made in the implementation of.the ,Declaration and submit it to the Assembly by 1 July 1990.

3. Prior to the adoption of the Declaration,. on 7 December 1989, the Minister ,for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of South,Africa addressed a letter to the .. Secretary-General in which he outlined the posf?.ion of ,the Government oftSouth , Africa relating to the draft declaration then under consjderation (annex III).

4, Pursuant to paragraph 10 of the-Declaration, on l&January .1990, the : Secretary-General personally transmitted to.the.,Permanent Representative of South Africa to the United Nations a copy of the Declaration.. He.also.transmitted copies of the Declaration to the Permanent Observers of the African National Congress aad the Pan Africanist Congress of Asania on 7 February 1990. In addition, the text of the Declaration was transmitted to the Permanent Representatives of,nember States by a note verbale dated 7 March 1990# requesting them to bring,the.Declaratic~n to the attention of their Governmerrts and to provide the Secretary-General,with information on the actiorl which their Governments had taken in respect to provisions of the Declaration that concerned them. The replies received to date from Member States are reproduced in annex II. In addition, the Secretary-General of the Organixation of African Unity provided a copy of the i'eport of the Monitoring Group of the OAU Ad Hoc Committee.on Southern Africa, which is being issued separately as a document of the General Assembly.

5. Since it was important that the report be as factual as possible, the Secretary-General, while in Windhoek on 20 March 1990, sought the ayreement of the State President of South Africa for a teem of senior United Nations,officials to visit the Republic at an appropriate date. While agreeing to this suggestion, the State President made it clear that this was without prejudice to the position of his Government on the question of non-interference in the internal affairs of South Africa.

6. On the basis of this understanding, the Secretary-General arranged for a United Nations team to visit South Africa from 9 to 19 Yune. The Team was led by

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Mr. Abdulrahim A. Farah, Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Questions, Regional Co-operation, Deaoloniaation and Tru8teeehip. He was accompanied by Mr. Sotirios Mousouri~, Assistant Secretary-Qenerel for the Centre Against m, and four other senior officials. The Team was instructed to obtain fir&hand information on the latest developments in the country and to meet with members of the Qovernment and with representatives of political parties and movements and ooncerned organisations in order to gather factual information on reoent meaeuree taken and proposals made for brinr l&g about an end to the e system. The report of the Team is contained in ar ex I.

7. On the eve of the Team’s arrival in South Africa, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of South Africa addressed to the Secretary-General a letter concerning the Team’s visit in which he reiterated his Qovernmexat’s position in regard to the Declaration a8 well as on the question of non-interference (annew V).

8. During the period following the adoption of the Declaration, and in addition to his meeting with President de Klerk, the Secretary-General had the opportunity, on a number of oaaaaLon8, of disausaing with the Permanent Representative of South Africa to the United Nation8 developments relating to the situation in South Africa. The Secretary-Qeneral also met, on two occaaion8, with Mr. Nelson Mandela, Deputy President of the African National Congress. The first meeting took place in Windhoek last WarOh, and the seoond one was held in New York on the oacasion of Mr. Mandela’s visit to United Nations Headquarters on 22 June 1990 (for a tent of , Mr. Mandela’8 Statement, see annex VI). In his meetings with President de Klerk, the Secretary-General was informed of the new policy that the South African Qovernment had begun to implement for the dismantlement of the w system (see annex IV). Mr. Mandela aleo provided the Searetary-Qeneral with an aesessment of the situation and the position of hie movement on some of the salient features covered by the Declaration.

9. The information assembled in the report of the United Nations team that visited South Africa, taken together with that provided by Member States, as contained in annexes I and II respectively, presents a compreheneive picture of developments againet which the General Assembly will be able to measure progress achieved 80 far in the implementation of the Declaration.

II. OESERVATIONS

10. The Secretary-General has been greatly encouraged by the positive developmentn that have taken place within South Africa wince the beginning of this year. Tha bold and courageous policy to which Praeident de Rlerk has committed his Government opens up distinct possibilities for the dismantling of the &?&r&hu system. Equally encouraging and statesmanlike has been the vision and forebearawe displayed by the black leadership which, despite long years of injustice and oppreseion, hat renewed ito commitment to I# peaceful procese for ending wx.thai.a’ crnd building a non-racie.1 and democratic society.

11. The fact that the Team was able to meet with whom it wished, travel where it. desired, and receive freely the views of all on political iasrrsa eriaing Cram the

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I demonstrates, by itself, a significant change in the political

12. Of the measures required by the Decla&atian cm and its Destructive Consequences in Southern Africa to create a climate for free political activity, the measwe relating to the lifting of the ban on political parties and mcsvemceets has been implemented in full. Other measures have been implemented in part. While it is evident that an important process has been set in motion, many believe that the Government should implement all measures in their totality to create the appropriate atmosphere.

13. Parallel with the need to establish an appropriate climate for the negotiations is the urgent requirement‘to end the violence. The issue of violence, not least in Natal, urgently needs to be addressed at the highest level since, if it is allowed to continue unrestrained, the consequences could well present serious difficulties for the political process. The Secretary-General t++refore appeals to all parties to do whatever is necessary to-end the'violence and to work tog&her to build a peaceful South Africa. :' 14. Xt is quite clear from the report of the Team that a substantial &Qdy of public opinion is anxious to see that the process'for the dismantlement of the 3partheid system be accelerated.

15. Some of the data in the report illustrate vividly the grave socdal injusticas l . that have been inflicted by marthead on the black popufatfon: The Secretary-General would strongly endorse y measures aimed at redressing the social and economic imbalances, particularly in the area of housing, education, employment and health. Such measures would go a long way towards addressing effectively glaring inequities and instii'ling public confidence in the dtiocretic process and in national institutions.

3.6. The Secretary-General was requested by.tlie General Assembly to submit a repor; on the progress made in the implementation of the Declaration on -4 within six months of its adoption. As the report of the United Natidns: Tea& shows, the political process towards the dismantlement of the i+steh is still at aa early stage. Political parties and movements are in the first phases of developing their responses to the negotiating process. For this reason the report does not comment in detail on some of the major issues covered by the Declaration, such as those envisaged in paragraph 0 of that document concerning the mechanisms for drafting a constitution, as well as the principles of the constitution itself. ANNEXE

CONTENTS

I. PREFACE ...... l-7 L . A. Terms of reference ...... 1

B. Composition of the Team ...... 2

C. Itinerary and list of interlocutors ...... 3 -4

D. Programme of work ...... 5 -7

rr. BACKGROUND ...... 8 - 38

A. Developments in 1989 ...... 9 - 20 9 . B. Basic wartherd laws in force at the end of 1989 ...... 21 - 27 12 :

c. Some measures announced by the Government in 1990 ...... 28 - 38 14

III. PROGRESS MADE'TCMARDS CREATING A CLIMATE CONDUCWE TO NEGOTIATIONS ...... 39 - 86 16 I

A. Release of all political prisoners and detainees ...... 40 - 48 16 8. Lifting of all bans and restrictions on all proscribed and restricted organizations and persons l .*..*.....**.. 49 - 56 18

c. Removal of all troops from the townships ...... *.. 57 - 61 20 D. The lifting of the state of emergency and the repeal of all legislation, such as the Internal Security Act, designed to circumscribe political activity ...... 62 - 79 21 E. Cessation of all political trials and political executions l ...... **.*..*..*.*...... - ...... 80 - 86 25

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CONTENTS (continued)

IV. ER ELEMENTS CONDUCIVE TO FREE POLITICAL DISCUSSION AND TO THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATIONS r**..**.....*...... **...***~~... 87,- 14Q 27

A. Creation of an atmosphere free of violence ...... **..... 88 - 121 27

B, Freedom of assembly ...... *...... *...... *..** 122 - 12% 34

C. Freedom of the press .*,...**...C...... *...... *...... 130 - 14Q 35

V. VIEWS RELATING TO THE QUESTION OF NEGOTIATIONS FOR A NEW CONSTITUTlON ...... 141 - 181 38

VI. MATTERS ENBANCfNG OR OBSTRUCTING TBE PROCESS'OF ENDING :. APARTHEID ...... ig2 -,250 44 . A. Pillars of mart&& e.....; ...... 185 +b6:‘ 45

8. Labour ~*...~..~...... ~....**.~..~...... ~...... ~. ?Q? * 214 48.

c. Education ...~...... *....*..*....**~...... *.**..~.. 215 - 22% 50 .' D. Housing and land issues ...... a...**....*...*. 230 = *at 53

E. Health care ...... *...... *.....~..*....~....**.*.*.*..* 243 - 250 55

VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS ..~..~.~..~.~...~...... ~...~~.~.. 251 - 256 56

Appendix: Itinerary. and list of irkerlocutors e..**...... **.....*.e....9.... 58 I. PREFACE

A. Ter@ of referencg

1. On 4 June 1990, the Secretary-General annoumced his decision to send a team of senior United Nations officials to South Africa to meet with members of the South African Government, with representatives of political part'ies and movements and with other concerned organizations on the latest developments relating to the question of a-e The Team was instructed to obtain factual information on the various m!oasures taken and proposals made for bringing about a speedy end to the system and to do so within the framework of the Declaration on Anarthezd. and its Destructive Consequences in Southern Africa (resolution S-1611).

B. Comoosition of the Team

2. Under-Secretary-General Abdulrahim A. Farah, led the Team. He was accompanied by Assistant Secretary-Gsnerai Sotirios Mous~uris, aad the following senior United Nations officials: Mr. James Simpson, Legal Consultant; Dr. Berschelle Challenor, Co-ordinator, World Decade for Cultural Development, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation; Mr. Leonard T. Kapungu, Chief, Africa and Asia Data Unit, Office of the Secretary-General for Research and the Collection of Information; and Mr. Thomas McCarthy, Chief, Research, Studies and Prevention of , Discrimination Section, Centre for Human Rights. Support services were provided by: Ms. Araccelly Santan8, Senior Political Affairs Officer; Mr. Michael Moller, Special Assistant: Ms. Anastasiya Delenda, Administrative Secretary; and Ms. Adelia Ocempo, Secretary.

C. Itinerarvad last, of znterlocutors.

3. The Team arrived in Cap% Town on 9 June on the first stage of its mission. Xn addition to Cape Town, it also visited Durban, Pietermaritsburg, Johannesburg and Pretoria. Tba Team held 55 meetings in the course of its l&-day stay and left South Africa the evening of 19 June (see appendix I).

4. The Team met with members of the Government as well as with a large number of organizations representing a wide cross-section of South African opinion. Apart from the Government, 39 oryanizations and professional groups responded positively to the Team's invitation. Only one party declined to meet with the Taem, namely, the Conservative Party, stating that the Team's presence i?l South Africa was a "blatant interference" in the internal aEfairs of the country. The Labour Party did not reply to the Team's invitation. To enable the Team to have a better appreciation of the positfu.: of the Conservative Party on relevant national issues, tFe Goveraqent provided it with extracts from statement s made in the South African Parliamon;, by party members.

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5. The Team was conscious of the factthat its visit was taking place at a relatively early stage of the political process. For tY*is reason, it decided to concentrate its attention on four specific areas, namely, the progress made towards helping to create a climate conducive to negotiations (sect. ITI), the creation of an atmosphere free of violence (sect. IV), the process for negotiating a new constitutional order (sect. V), and matters enhancing or obs",tucting the process of ending aDartheid (sect. VI). .To facilitate the measurement of progres&towards the dismantlexsnt of =2rtheid, the Team.considered,it essential Lo use. as a starting point the situation as it existed in South Africa at the time of the adoption of the Declaration (sect. 11). .s : T :

6. In all areasI the Team obtained the oral views'of, the Government, as well as of political parties and movement-6 and.other comernet% organ,i%at&ons. %n many cases oral views,were supplemented by wrf-tten &.&missions and background ,/ documentation. '. .- : , ;- .'; .' 7. Given the nature of its mandate ahd the limp&d time available, th&'Team '. confined its approach‘to the collection and the deporting of infotiation as presented to it and did not-attempt to mhke iralue: judgmentit 04 t%&iy?u&s raised, It was not its purpose to,undertake.independent researoh of the data'nor.to II ., econcile any conflicting fnformation'presented to the Teem;, l

: .’

: .- .II. BACKGRolMD I : 8. This section reviews briefly major political developments in South Afrhar during 1989 as well as the situation that obtained at the time, that the Detilararion . on ADartheXd and its Destructive Consequences in Southern Africa was adopted. Such information provides a context in which to assess the progress tbat.has been made since December 1989 in the implementation of the provisions‘of the,Declaration. "

9. A series of developments, both within and.outside South Africa, in X989, set for the beginning of a process which held promise for the~eliminatian of through negotiations. Improvements in the international climetie : facilitating the peaceful ri?solution sf conflicts were manifested in the southern Africa region by agreemo led to the independence of Namibia. Within South Africa, actions by anti- forces rangtsd from new forms of sesistaxw3’to zenewed demands fox a negotiated evld to -t&?&J and a new constitutional Srder. Concurrent with those developments, there was a change of thinking within the r;rling party in South Africa towards a new policy which acknowledged the failure of apartheid and the need for constitutional change.

20s Among the notable challenges to the snar$heia system during earfy 1989, was khe ~~~~~~~~id~ hunger strike by more than TUU detainees. This strike had the j-.z f f e t-z ';- of bringing to national and international attaution the situation of lrrrge

I .** A/44/966 Eaglish Page 10 numbers of detainees who were being held without trial. The hunger strike marked a resurgence of organiraed 0ppositJ;n to apertheid, much of which was restricted under the four-year-old otate of emergency and of the security laws. A eubsequent campaign of ma86 defiance of e lawa led by the Moeo Dsmocratic Movement (WDbi).attempted to render them ineffectuel, The soJio-economia inequalities created by m and the political disonfranchisemont of tire black population were the foaus of the Campaign.

11. Civil disobedience iavolved hundrealn of black people seeking treatment at hospitals or moving onto beaches and other facilities resocved exalusively for the white population. In industry, black mineworkers challenged the privilege6 accorlied to white miners. The non-racial trade unions engaged in joint actions to have reversed the regressive provieions of the Labour Relations Amendment Act of 1900. Restricti*n orders on individuals and organieations beuame the object of defiance. In the same vein, urban squatters and rural dweller’s defied Government attempts to remove ther.1 to the :aomelands. In cities such as Johannesburg protests were organieed to highlig‘it the housing crisis. The Defiance Campaign also reached the achoole, where the boycott of claseee aimed to ehow the consoqueaces of the unequal fad hferior education provided for the black population.

:2. At the government level, a new coastituti.on& dispensation for all South Africans became the subject of renewed diacuesion following the publication of the South African Law Commiesion Repcrt ia March. The Law Couaniesion had been instructed by the ldiniater of Justice, to inveotigate and make recummendations on the definition and I: .,&tion of grou); rights in the context of South African constitutional issues. In its report, the Law Colnnission called for the adoption of a Sill of Rights in a new constitution and urged the Government “to purge the statute books” of all diocriminatory laws. It recommended that a new constitution include universal franchise.

13. Ln June 1909 the National Party unveiled its five-year Plan of Action outlining the key principles for a new South Africa. .According to the Plan, which became the National Party’s electic batform, South Africa should be a democracy in which no group dominatea or is dam-natedr the independence of the judiciary ie upheld1 civilised norms apply) free enturpriae ie the basis of the economy and there is eafety and harmony emong all groups. The Plan laid emphasis on the need for negotiations with representative leader6 in order to devise a new constitutional diepensation. A Bill of Rights was considered a poesibility in a future constitution.

Pd. Elections to the racially segregated ..ri-camera] Parliament took place on 6 September in an atmosphere of violence ana i>roteets against the continued disenfranchisement of the black population. In the elections to the House of Parliament the governing National Party obtained a majority again, though enmewhnt. reduced. Out of the 165 seats, the National Party obtained 93 seats, the Conservative Party 39 and the newly-Lormed Democratic Party (constituted by the merger of the Progressive Federal Party, the New Democratic Movement and the Independent Party) won 33 seats. The Government interpreted the election ne a “clear mandate for the IMAonal Party’s policy of orderly reform”. The search for a resolution of the Political impasse in the country was enhanced by the election of Frederik W.‘llem ;e Klerk as SLate President iu September.

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15. Following his election, President de Klerk outlined his programme for change, speaking of "bridging the gap of distrust, suspicion and fear among South Africans, launching a great $ndabg or negotiating forum and developing a new const5tution allowing individuals to participate without domination" of any group ever another. Among his first measxes, as State President, was the release of eight long-term political prisoners. In addition, permission was granted for several mas6 gatherings. The length of the national service war reduced from two years to one year * The military-controlled National Management System, a nationwide security network, was replaced by a co-ordinating system under civilian control,

16. Earlier in 1989, the ANC began a process of wide consultations with the anti-a>:theid oppositicn within and outside South Africa concerning the politico-economic fcture of the country. As a basis for discussions, the AM! used its 1987 Constitutional Guidelines, which'outlined its views of South Africa as a non-racial, united-and democratic society. By mid-1989 the ANC noted that a "conjuncture of circumstances" existed that was favourable to ending through peaceful negotiations. The Grganization of African Unity {OAU) endorsed the principle of negotiations between the Government and the South African libnration movements when its Ad-Hoc Committee on Southern Africa adopted the Declaration on the Question of South Africa inxarare on 21 August‘1989. This Declaration was later endorsed by the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. . 17. The Conference for a Democratic Future , which took place in South Africk ($I; , 9 December 1989 with the participation of representatives from more than. 2,000 organizations, resolved to adopt the Harare Declaration and to call for a Constituent Assembly established on a non-racial basis representing all the people of South Africa in order to draw up a new constitution. The Ciadfernnce adopted a number of resolutions varying from the issue of negotiations to education, -he<h. labour and environment.

18. At the United Nations, a special session of the General Assembly on and its destructive consequences in southern Africa, wP: held from Z2 to 14 December 1989. At that'session, the Assembly adopted by consensus a 'Declaration in which it encouraged the people of South Africa '*to join together to negotiate an end to the apartheid system and agree on all the measures that are necessary to transform their country into a non-racial democracy": expresseti the view that a raew constitutional order, deteratned by the people of South Africa, should be based on the Charter of the Wnited Nations and on the Universal Declaration of Hum.n Rights: suggested guidelines for the process of negotiations and for the drawing up of a new constitution, outlining a number of steps that the South African Governmeat should take in order to create the necessary climate for negotiations; established a Programme of Action regarding the responsibilities of the international oemmunity and called for the return of South Africa to the fold of the Unite3 Nations upon adoption of a new constitution,

19. Prior to the special session of the General Assembly, the South African Government stated that it considered action by the Assembly as an undue Lnterference in the domestic affairs of a Member State (see annex fIX). .wJate~ ?MJe ..12

?O.. Tongrds the sad of the yeerr President de Klerk held preliminary auneultations qp the oouatry’s politic81 futuxce with Mr. Nelson Wsndela, rtilS in prison, and other anti-pRBpslhBIp leaders, The President also announced that the Government WAS oonsidwJnq c eeriea of meaeurea whose applioation would tend to improve the climate for aoastitutloaal neqotiatiQne.

a. -- ‘. ~ . 21. By the end of 1999 racial lnwe designed to regulate the life of the blaok population and t? keep-rsoee apart, known a8 pillars of:- I were in forae and the sdmixi&&rative structures to implement them remeined, The provirionc of the atate of emerq4noyI of the Internal Seourity Aat and. of other rertrictive [email protected] ale0 still in foroe. Below ie a brief derariptioa of the basic leqielative struature of m, namely the pillars of npn&h9Ur

22. Thd Population Registration Aat, No. 30 of 1950 ie the law basic to, the ey'etem of e. It esteblishee II eyotem of raoe claosifioation aaaording to wh4ch the population ie identified and olaesified from birth into four raaisl groups nudely Whitec,-Coloureda (pereoae of mixed origin), Aeiano (meetly Iadianrr) and Africans, although the laet three consider. themselvso Blaoka. Racial alaesification determines eaah individual’s destiny in terme of franohise, mobility, residential rights and sooial beneiits and services provided by the Btstq.

23. The Wative Land Aat of 1913 and the Development Trust and Land Aat OX 1936 and their eubsequent amendmente eetablieh that 13.6 per cent of the country’6i tar.ritory be reeerved for the black population, which represents 75 per oeot of the population, The 13 per cent is divided into 10 separate and non-contiguous qeoqraphiaal areas oslled bantustans, homelands or national otatea. Asian0 and Coloured8 must live in segregated areas in the territory reeerved far Whites. The blsab population ie denied ownerrhip of land outside these territorier, In recent yeare these etatutee have beaome untenable due to the refueal of millions of blaakc to be removed to the homelands and to their determination to settle in urban area.6. Limited freehold housing right6 are now allowed in urban areas. These law& nevertheless, empower the Qovernment to remove the bl&ak population from either rural or urban areao if ouah area8 are designated for Whites. Since 1990 en estimated 4 million Blacke have been removed from white arem to area.8 set aside for the black population. Over 3 million more are still threatened with removals and evictione. In addition, millione of black squcttere live in “informal settlementa” around major cities. According to published aourceo in 1997, in Durban alone there are more than 1,790,009 squatters and in the Pretoria-Witwaterorand area there are between 1,600,OOO and 2,400,OOO squatters.

24. The Qroup Areas Act of 1966 (first promulgated in 1950) and its eubeequent amendments eetsblieh control throughout South Africa over inter-racial property trsneaatlone and inter-racial changes of occupation. In eseen~er the Act empowers’ the Qovernment to declare area6 for ueer whether for housing, education, or industrial development, strictly according to race. Heavy penalties 8re provided for violstione. Legislation introduced in 1989, namely the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act, gives authorities new powers to enforce reeidentisl eogreqstion

/ . . . A/44/860 E‘ngl iSkr Page 13 without interference from the courts, The provisioao; of the Group Areas Act affect the black.population also in terms s-5 the effects of the abolition of other racial laws r notably the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act, No. 55 of 1949. Ev@a though the Mixed Marriages Act has been abolished, its positive effects have been undermined because "mixed couples'* cannot live legally in any group area without reclassification of a partner or a permit to live in the group area of one of the partners. A similar difficulty arises concerning the education of a cAild born to a "mixed couple". In recent'years, the urban housing crisis and the growing poverty in rural areas, in add5tion to defiance of the law, bave made the provisions of the Group Areas Act unworkable. The enforcemene of tke law has also been less strict.

25. The Reservation of Separate Amenities Act, No. 49 of 1,953 provideu that: any person who was in charge of or had control of anyypublic premises or public vehicle might, whenever it was deemed expedient,- reserve such.ptemises or vehicle .er any portion thereof for the exclusive use of persons belonging to.9 particular IcacI'Or~ class. The term "public premises" included any laud enclostlre, building, : structure, hall, room, office or convenience to which the; public had,accoss, 'j whether on the payment of any admission fee or'not. ""WilZul, contravention, of the ~. Act was an offence, punishable with a fine.or imprisonment Or both+ Subsequent amendments to the Act provided for exemptions, i.e. facilities which.'were deemed for "international" use or for foreign officials and their ftiilies,. -As in the case of the Group Areas Act, this Act became untenable in practice. sn the past . two years, Johannesburg and Cape Town passed ordinances providing-for the racial integration of certain facilities, although resistance to such fntegratioa efforts has developed ia different areas of the country. . . .- -.

26;. An important aspect of m. legislation concerns the provision of education for the black population. According to this legislation, all public education is segregated according to the races and the curriculum is devised along racial lines. Education is free agd compulsory for white children. Publie sources indicate that the Government spends an average of 3iO82.00 rand‘on'the.education of every white child and 764.73 'and on that .of evary.black third.' .There are at present 17 education departments.

27. While the above laws constitute the statutory basis upoa which was erected, the Republic of South Africa Constitution Act, No. 110 of 1983, which established a racially segregated tri-camera1 Parliament for Whites, Coloureds and Asians, specifically excludes the black population from the vote for central government. This exclusion is reinforced by the provisions of the Homeland Citizenship Act, which was introduced in 1970. The Act creates independent homelands although their status as such is recognised only by'South Africa. To date, the homelands of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei have been declared independent. As a consequence, millions of blacks have heen declared citizens of these homelands and have been deprived of their South African citizenship. It is recognised that the absence of the fr'anchise xdr South Africa's 27 million blacks is the most fundamental'issue to be dddressed in a process of I?[ gotiations *

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aa. Thle sactlon outlines some of the meaIWea annou’ rB by the Qovernment since the begibnLng of 1990 until the arrival of the United rations Team in South AI rios. It is based on information drawn from government and other souraet3.

29. A more detailed diecussion of these measurea, as well as the views of political movements, parties and organisations concerning the adequacy and implementation of these meaeuree, is presented in the following relevant chapters of thie report.

30. During an address given at the opening of the Parliament session on 2 February 1990, President de Rlerk announced several measures toward&! reform, declaring that his final aim waa a totally new and just constitutional dispensation in which every inhabitant would enjoy equal rights, treatment and opportunity in every sphere of endeavour - constit*:Lional, social and economic. These measures included the following: the promieed release of Nelson Mandela, the releaee of certain political prieonerar the suepaneion of the death penaltyt the lifting of the banning order on the ANC, PAC and the South African Communist Party (SACP), as well a8 of the reetriations on 33 organisationer the repeal of certain aspecta of the emergency regulations) the lifting of all restriction orders on individuelsr and the limitations eetabliehed on the period of detantion under the etate of emergency.

31, Since President de Klerk’e addreee, the Qovernment has undertaken other initiativee. The budget for the new fiscal year dieplays a shift of priorities, a6 expenditure on eocisl welfare (comprising education, health and housing) will increase while defencs spending will decrease in real terms. A 3 billion rand fund hae been created to reducr a variety of backloge in housing, education, training, literacy and baeio health.

32. In April, the Criminal Law Amendment Sill was tabled in Parliament providing the Supreme Court with discretionary powers to impose death eentence in appropriate cases or to grant automatic right of appeal to any person 00 sentenced.

33. In May the Minieter of National Health and Population Development, announced the end of racial segregation in hospitals. The Qovernment is reportedly developing a system for the implementation of this measure which at present applies to public hoepitala cnly. Aluo, the Indemnity Act, No. 35 of 1990 was adopted granting temporary immunity or permanent indemnity against arrest or prosecution. Indemnity was initially granted for three montlre, until 19 August 1990.

34. In May, the Minirpter of Constitutional Development, in hie capacity as Acting President, introduced in Parliament a lz-point plan on the conotitutional future of the country. In this bluoprint it ie etated that minoritien, because of their particular values and aspirations, should have a epecial voice in the now constitutional dispensation. The plan incluties State support for racially separate echools, the holding of regular electdonrr, a bill of individual human rights, the prerervation of the free market system and the existence of an independent judiciary.

/ . . . A’//b4/960 Eqglish Page 15

35. On 7 June, the State President announced that the country-wide state of emergency.would not be reimposed , although it would remain in force in the province of Natal, inaluding the homeland of KwaZulu. In June also the Parliement removed one of the pillars of a&usU~M law when it ado-ted the Di,scrimin&ory Legislatiod Regarding Public Amenities Repeal Act, which ab,lished the Reservation of Geparatci Amenities Act, No. 49 of 1953. The measure will come into ekfect in October WI?., , ,.a 3; : 36. The Qovernrnent also appointed several independent commiseione of inquiry’to’ ” investigate allegations of misconduct by the security forces. The Harm8 Commlss~op is investigating ar.cusationa that the South African Defence Force operates hit squads against wthei8 opponents within and outside South Africa. In this ” connection, the activities of the Civil Co-operation Bureau, a military unit I” allegedly involved in asaaesinations, are tho subject of this inquiry. The Hiemetro Commiseion of Lnquiry is investigating allegations that the Johanneeburg City Council operated a spy network directed at the e opposition. Also, a judicial inveetigation la being conducted into the event6 of 26 March 1999 in the township of Sebokeng in the southern Transvaal province where police fired at demonstrators, killing at least 12 personc and wou:nding nearly 500.. I 37. From 2 to 4 May the Government and the ANC held their first talk6 at Qroote Schuur in Cape Town. The talks seek to remove obstacles to a process of negotiations. A minute was adopted (see A/45/266) which establiehed a working , group to address the issue of the release of political prieonere and the gr+$ng’i, of immunity in respect of political offences to those inside and outrride South, Africa (a measure which wae considered on an urgent basis for membora of.the &NC’s Natlonal Executive Committee). .‘. 36. The Qovernment undortook to review existing b;ecurity legislation. Both parties pledged to seek an end to “the existing olimato of violence aa& intimidation from whatever quarter” and reiterated their “commitment tq stab’ili& and to a peaceful process of negotiations”. AR scheduled, the wxking group presented a confidential report to the parties concornefj by 21 May.

I... A/44/960 English Page 16

1x1. PROGRESS MADE TOWARDS CREATING A CLIMATE CONDUCIVE TO NEQOTIATIONS

39. In it8 Declaration on s and its Destructive Consequences in Southern Africa pf 14 Deaember 1969, the Qeneral Aaeembly referred to an essential need to create a climate for negotiation, and, in that regard, stated that “the present South African regime should, at the least” take the measures described in paragraph 6 of the Declaration. The present section containe information provided by the Qoverment concerning measures it has taken or intends to take relevant to the oreation of a climate aonducive to negotiations. It also present8 the positions and views on these matters of the varioue political parties and movements and other concerned organiaatione.

A. -ai-

40. Paragraph 6 (a) of the Declaration calls on the South African Qovernment to “release all political prisoners and detainees unconditionally and refrain from impoeing any restrictions on them”.

41. The Teem was informed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs that, in an anaouncement made by the State President on 2 February i990, all persons oerving ’ sentencee by virtue merely of their memberehip in previously banned organisations, or for having committed an act which was an offence merely because of the prohibition of the organirations concerned , would be identified and released forthwith. Moreover, the conditions which had been imposed in terms of the security emergency regulations on 374 persons upon their rolease, were being rescinded with immediate effect, and the regulations which provided for ouch conditions were likewise being abolished.

42. The Minister for Foreign Affairs alao made the following pointer

(a) The Qovernment and the AK! had agreed, a8 reflected in the Qrooto Schuur Minute of 4 May 1990 (see A/45/266), to establish a joint working group to make recommendations on the definition of political offences in the South Africau aituationr to diecuae, in this regard, time scales8 and to advise on norms and mechanisms for dealing with the release of political prieoners and the granting of immunity in respect of political offences to thoee inside and outside South Africa.

(b) The Working Group, including representatives of both the Government end the AK!, submitted its report to the Qovernmont and the AWC on 21 Way 1990. ThCl State President announced in his speech before Parliament on 7 June 1990 that the Qovernment was ready to implement it. The AWC had indicated that it would provide an answer on 10 July 1990. By agreement the contents of the joint report. roulcl remain confidential till both sides had agreed.

(c) The State President also announced on 7 June that, as a gesture, he ~nr; releasing 48 prisoners in term0 of powers vested in him by the conetitutlon and the Prison6 Act. A total of 104 prisoners have been released since 1 Februaay l(J90.

:’ . . . A/44/960 ZEnglish Page. 17

(d) No rastrictions have been impooed on any of the released prisoners - with three exceptions where minor aonditione were imposed, (One, a foreigner, was , departed ‘end requires approval to returns two are required to notify the polioe if they should leave their dietrict of residerrae permanentl:*.)

(e) Further development@ in the releaoe of priaouero will have to await ANC agreement on the Working Qroup’e report. 1

(I) The last 12 prisoners held under the term0 of Smorgeaoy Rogulationr WOEB unconditionally released on 8 June 1990 when tha otate of emorgeaay wae lifted. In Natal, where the state of emergenoy ie still An focoe, 2. I persons are etill being held. s,

(ii) In terms of the Internal Security Act:

8. Section 29 (1): 45 persona are detained for queetioningl. s *I

b. Section 31: 2 persona are in preventive detrntioa (for their own safety or to prevent witnesses ebeoonding).

43. The ANC etated that, at the Groote Schuur meeting, ito dolegation and that.08 the Government had agreed on the establishment of a working 9roup to make recommendations on the definition of political offence@ La the South Afriaan ‘. situetion. All pereono who aould be affected would be aonsidered. .,Tha working ,., group would beer in mind experiences gained in Uemibia and elsewhere. Moreover,. the following offence6 would reaeive attention immediatolyr (a) loaviag the, country without a valid travel d+amenent~ and (b) any offence6 rmlatod msroly to, II organisations that were previously prohibited,. ,

44. The ANC coneidered that relatively few political prisonerr bad boon raleaoed. Approximately 3,000 politioal prisoners remained in prison and thio irsue had brrn a matter of intense discuseione at the Groote Sohuur meating. The Oovernment seemed concerned only with people who had been arrested for membrrrhip of banned organisation8 or for actions furthering the aim8 of those organieations. The ANC and the VDP insisted that there were many others outside thoce oatogoriar whom they regarded a8 political prisonere. The definition of political prieonere, which had been applied in Nemibia, would be the correot one to apply to South Afriaa. It wae hoped that egreement would eoon be reached with the Government in that r8gatd.

45. The PAC stated that hundreds of political prioonerc were rtill incaroeratod, including more than 250 on Robben Ielend alone. The Government had mada thr definition of “political prisoners a,nd detaineee” a matter for negotiations and it appeared that the releaee of all priuoners hsd been made rubjoot to a compromiao on that definition. The PAC conoidered that ouch an approach had no mrrit at all. In its view the measures presaribed in paragraph 0 of the Dwzlacation oa m and it6 Destructive Conseguencee in Southern Afriaa were non-negotiablo aondltions that had to bs fully met by the Government before negotiations regarding a new constitution could commence.

Position of other organ&a-

46. Representatives of other organizations and groups, including the Human Rights Commission of South Africa, while concerned by the relatively small numbers involved, were pleased with the releases of prisoners to date; however, there still remain between 2,500 to 3,000 in jails. Several considered the continued incarceration of political prisoners a serious obstacle to negotiations. It was observed that many of those released had already served a large part of their sentence, and most had served more than two thirds of their sentences, which would have automatically qualified them for parole under criminal law. Concerning detention without trial, the Human Rights Commission indicated that between 400 and 500 persons, including children under the age of 18, remained in detention.

47. The Inkatha Movement welcomed the release of political prisoners, including Mr, Nelson Mandela, Mr. Walter Sisulu and other political prisoners, to which, according to Inkatha, it had contributed. Likewise, Inkatha was satisfied that exiles could now return and that organizations were unbanned.

48. The delegates of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) mentioned that there were three types of prisoners, namely: persons sentenced after trial , for security-related offences (the,Internal Security Act of 1982, the Treason Act and the Public Safety Act); persons sentenced after a trial on common law charges (public violence, arson, assault, murder, attempted murder, malicious damage to property, illegal gatherings) which were related to unrest situations; and persons detained without trial under the security laws or awaiting trial for common law crimes related to unrest. While ICRC does not have complete records of prisoners and detainees in South Africa, it does possess records of 336 security prisoners and 560 unrest-related prisoners (including 72 people sentenced to death). TCRC, quoting other sources, estimated that there are approximately 400 convicted security prisoners, 1,100 convicted unrest-related prisoners, I,100 detainees currently on trial (for security and/or unrest-related offences) and 40 detainees held under the Internal Security Act.

. B. Lifting of all bans and restrictions on all oroscribed and restricted oraanisatiozs and oersons

49. Paragraph 6 (b) of the Declaration calls on the Government to "lift all bans and restrictions on all proscribed and restricted organizations and persons". wition of the Goverrunent

50. According to the Minister for Foreign Affairs nc .organisations were at Present banned, proscribed or restricted. He further stated that nu restrictions or conditions were being imposed on any persons released from prison or detention with the exception of minor restrictions on three persons (see para. 42 (d) above). .

A/44/909 ’ English‘ Page 19

The Minister drew to the statement 2 Februsry 1990 by the State 51. attention of / President, in which he announced that8 :c.

(a) The prohibition of the AN!, the PAC , the South African Communiet Party ’ and a number of oubeidiary orgenisstions was being rescinded)

(b) The media emergenay regulations and the education eme&gency regulations were being abolished in their onhirety! ’

(c) The restriction8 in terma of the emergency regulationr on 33 organisation8 were being rescinded (those organlsatione inaluded the National Education Criois Committee, the South Afriaan National Student8 Congreoc, the United Demoorstie Front (UDF), the Congrees of South African Trade Unione, and Die Rlanke Bevrpdingubeweging van Suid-Afrika);

(d) The emergenay regulations on the basis of whiah reetrictiono could be imposed on individuals would be abolished with immediate rffeat.

52. Repreeentativee of the Qovernment, referring to the Foreign Funding Aot, caid that the purpose oi the Act was to regulate the disclosure of the reaeipt of money from outside the Republia by or for aertein organlaatione and per60ner and to provide for matter6 pertaining thereto. The underlying objeative wae to eneure thst all receipte from a foreign eourco be utilised for the purpose for hich they, were intended and waa not intended to enaroech upon the activities of any orgsaiaation or person. The influrr of money to a reporting organisation or peroon from abroad cannot under the term8 of the Act be aontrolled in any way whateoever by either the Regietrar or the Qovernment, and the Aot docrs not reetrlct the activitirrs of ouch orybniaation or person sn any way whateoever.

53. Regarding the licting of pereone, repreeentatives of the Uovernment etated that, einco 3 February 1990, the names of all peroons who were listed have been removed eraept thoae convicted of violence or violenae-related oftoncee. IL lo correct that the listing of peraone uontinuee, but :;his haa nothing to do with their membership in or the aativitles of any orqeniaation. The only persona who are listed at predent are those convicted of certain offenoee euoh a8 terrorlem and cobotago. This involves the addition of the name6 of approximately 19 percone since 3 February 1990, The lietiny of persona convicted of offencei! euch a8 terroriem or oabotage is impeaativa untkw the existing provieions of the Internal Security Act. In this regard, the Qovernment undertook at the Uroote Schuur diecuooione on 2 to 4 May 1990 to roview erieting sacurlty legislation. The litlting of people convicted in terme of the Internal Security Act ie one of the provisions under review.

. , 54. All organisations and groups with whom the Teem met agreed that the lifting oP the bans end restrictions wee the only pre-aondition that had been fully met.

55. Concern ww ezpreoeed by aomo organisations that, despite the removal of the bans, they were @till not able to organjae freely. The ANC and the URF demanded

I . . . A/44/960 Englirh Page 20 that they be allowed to enjoy the same freedom to organise es the National Petty, stating that without freedom of aeeociation the unbanning of ~~rganiaatione would be meaningleos. Mention was made by the ANC of the restriation~ still pieced on aertain organi~atiune, such a81 prohibition8 on the receipt of funds from abroad) reotrictiono plaoed on returning member0 of organioationc (under the Indemnity Act, indemnity for a number of cadres we8 initially granted for three month8 until 19 Auguot 1990)~ the listing of 601118 300 pereons in the oonsolidated list under the Internal Seaurity Aat with the effect that they could not legally be quoted in the medial the reguirement to obtain prior authorisation to hold meetingor end the poceibility of members of organisationa to be detained at any time undor the Internal Seaurity Aat. It was pointed out that even though the organisations had been unbanned all theee retmiotiorre were enforoeable.

56. On 17 April, the leader of the Coneervative Party otated in Parliament that the unconditional unbanning of the ANC, the PAC, the South African Communist Party and Umkhonto we Siawe was in conflict with the aategorioal a88uranaes given by the former State Preeident and those of the preeenc State President. He was of the view that the legalisation of such organirationc wae abeolutely outrageous. These organisations had no intention of establishing democracy in South Africa, nor to share power, but only to seise it. They had not given up the armed struggle, and thus violenae would aontinue in South Africa. Further, theee organisations had no coneideratioa at all for the self-determination of other people.

c. Remlrval of 1 57. Paregraph 8 (a) of the Declaration calls on the Qovernment to “remove all troops from the townshipa”.

56. With regard to the removal of troops from the townehipe, the Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that, with few exceptions , all troops had been withdrawn exoept in the Provinoe of Natal and some @elf-governing territoriee, In Natal, a state of emergenoy still exist8 sad troops have been dep?oyed to aesist the police in that province. Troopo have been deployed in certain other areas at the request of the police authoritieo. Ae the ratio of police to population in South Africa was emonget the lowerrt in the world, currently juet under 2 per 1,000, troops were needed to help rectore order. The Cdinieter for Foreign Affairs added that the ANC and other organisations who had previously opposed the deployment of troop6 in townships now.publicly sccepted the need for the presence of troops in certain areas, under specific aonditione. (The Qovernment position on the situation is precented in greater detail in paragraph 64.)

59. The ANC indiosted thet although troops hed been technically removed from the townehips, except in Natal, they still entered the townships for operational purposee and mounted road-blocks to impede AWC end UDP political action and hares8 their eupportero. Although it we8 felt that the overall situation had improved,

/ . . . I A/44?#80 English \‘- Page 21 concern was expressed by the ANC at the continuing presenae of troops in Natal, in particular that of the 32nd Bettslion , which had served in Angels. They alleged , numerous cases of misconduct by those troops.

60. The PAC stated that some troops had been removed from Borne townehipe end demanded thet they be withdrawn from all townships. ‘.

61. Some organisatione felt there wee e continuing need for the presence of troops in Natal. It we8 claimed that they served es a buffer between the warring groups. Several organisetions said that even though troops ere not currently stationed inside the townships, they sre often called in by the local authorities, and therefore their remove1 did not have the deeired effect. Since violence was increasing in Netel, the Inkathe Movement welcomed the continuation of the state,oC emergency end the redeployment of troops in the area, both of which would’aooiqt in reducing tensions. The troops, in their view, would helg the police in the maintenance of lew end order. Indeed, Inksthe believed that a l$rger continge.nt .qf police was needed in Natal. t

62. Paragraph 6 (d) of the Decleretion celled upon the Government to “end the stete of emergency end repeal all legislation , such as the Interns1 SecurJty Act? designed to circumscribe political activity*‘.

63. The Minister for Foreign Affairs referred the Team to the State Prbci~ent's ' announcement of 7 June 1990 in which he stated that the general country-wide atate of emergency would not be reimposed in South Afrim whon it lapoed at midnight on 0 Juno 1990. However, e state of emergency we6 proclaimed in the province of Natal in view of the escalating violence among the black population in that province involving the destruction of human life and property, which had assumed shocking Proportions, and the exceptionelly high level of intimidation rife there. The Government was of the opinion that public safety end public order could not be guaronteed by the application of the ordinary laws of the land.

64. The Minister of Law and Order, at another meeting, told the Team that it hkd’ been necessary to retain the state of emergency in Natal for the oame reeaon6i that it had been necessary to apply it throughout South Africa in 1989, cinoe the Interrwl Security Act was not adequate in dealing with large numbers of people, particularly where quick and effective measures are required. Similarly, the Regional Commissioner of South African Police in Natal stated that ordinary law did

I . . . not provide the powers necessary to deal with the Natal situation, such as the powers provided by regulations under the state of emergency to search homes for weapons in areas of riots, to declare a curfew, and to prohibit marches, meetings and large public funerals which had become politicized. The hope was expressed that with more police and fewer incidents, the lifting of the state __ emergency in atal could be recommended. Previous media restrictions on reporting were no langer in effect and the press could go where it wishad, it was claimed.

65. As regards the detention of persirns under the state of emergency, the Stat@ President announced on 2 February 1990 that the period of detentson under the security emergency regulations would be limited to six months, and that detainees wcruld have the right to legal representatisns and visits by medical practitioners of their own choosing. '

Position of the national liberation movemw

66. ANC asserted that+. while the state of emergency had been lifted elsewhere, it was still in force in Natal and-inhibited political activities. ANC alleged that because of the open support given to the Inkatha Movement by the police, the situation was difficult to re,solve for a number of reasons: the security forces relied largely on "ordinary" police powers to search, seize and arrest in Natal; emergency powers were invoked specifically to exclude lawyers and journalists from "unrest" situations or funerals: the emerge&y regulations exist to maintain the , morale of the Sotith African Police and the right-wing "law and order" lobby.

67. PAC objected to the state of emergency being retained in Natal and considered the Government's reasons for retaining it there totally unacceptable.

Positicn of other orqanizations

68. A number of organizations welcomed the lifting of the state of emergency in the three provinces. The lifting had a tremendous psychological effect and the rule of law was now better respectbd. Under the state of emergency any police constable could arrest a person without laying a charge and that person had no recourse. Further, it provided immunity to the police for their actions. For some organizations the 1if"in.g was considered to be symbolic, since the State possessed virtually the same powers under the Internal Security Act and other statutes still in force as it had under the state of emergency.

69. In the case of Natal, many organizations felt that the state of emergency should be lifted as the ordinary criminal law could deal with all violent offences while, under the Internal Security Act, the State possessed wide powers which were not subject to judicial review. They charged that the maintenance of the state OF emergency hindered political activities in that province.

76. Some organizations took the view that the Government could not be criticized dor maintaining the state of emergency in Natal. They noted, however, that, while the state of emergency might reduce violence, it did not help create a climate rrrjnflucive for negotiations. Some were skeptical that the retention of the state of ~erqency could reduce violence in Natal in view of the fact that it bad not ~anaqed to do so durinq the last four years of its application therz"

I . . . A/141/960 EngJish’ Page 23

2. d:_sisned to circumscribe uolitical acw

Position of 'the Government

73. When asked by the Team for comments with regard to the repeal of legislation designed to circumscribe political activity, the Minister for lEoreign Affairs referred to the State President's speech in Parliament on 7 June 1990. In that speech, the President had said that the Government was already looking at aspects of security legislation which could possibly inhibit the free conduct of peaceful politics. The Internal Security Act was non-discriminatory in that it applied to all whose actions threatened the security of the State, whatever their political affiliations.

72. The Minister of ConstituLional Development told the Team that the Internal Security Act would be amended; some suggestions had been received from the ANC and it was expected that? the Act would be amended during the next session of Parliament with the process beginning during the coming parliamentary recess.

73. Regarding.deaths in detention, the South African Government is aware of two Y cases of the deaths of prisoners in detention in terms of security legislation during 1990. One of these was investigated by a judicial commission of inquiry under the chairmanship of Mr. Justice Goldstone, and the finding was that the deceased took his own life. The second case is currently being investigated by a l judicial inquest.

Position of the national liberation movemenu

74. The ANC stated that at the Groote Schuur meetings its delegation had argued for the repeal of the Internal Security Act and, although the Minute of that meeting implicitly speaks of amending the Act, the A&K wanted it repealed. The AN. in addition, requested the repeal of all other laws which inhibited political activity; they are mentioned below in paragraph 79.

75. The PAC stated that, except for the-state of emergency regulations, no other legislation designed to circumscribe political activity had been repealed. Together with other organizations and groups.. the PAC and AZAPO called for the repeal of the Internal Security Act on the grounds that its wide provisions constituted a hindrance to free political act:.vities.

Position of other Darties and orcganizatj.0~

76. The Democratic Party argued for the amendment rather than the repeal of the Intcrr?al Security Act. Others stated that, although every state needed a law on internal security, the South African Act went too far as it curtailed normal pcll?itical expression.

77 s The Euman Rights Commission of South Africa levied criticism against the wide ';:tf;: all-encompassing definition of political ideas which have been outlawed by the Ziitrernal Security Act. Possession or dissemination of politic81 publications

d . . . A/44/QBO Englieh Page 24

containing banned ideas is still an offence under the Internal 8eaurlty Act, ao is promoting, inciting or funding any protest or aamgaign against any law of the Republic. The Act also had a direct impsct on freedom of aesociaticn and expression in that, under section 48, all gathering0 or any particular gathering could be banned by the Minister cl? Law and Order or by the local magistrate. Pursuant to that powerr the Minister on 30 Marah 1000 and for the fifteenth consecutive year renewed the ban of all outdoor political meetings, making them subjeat to spec!.fic prior authcriaation, while all indoor gatherings were banned if educational boycotts or viork staysways were to be advocated. In addition, cho Act could be ueed against freedom of exgreesicn since under it any person whose name ia on the list of persons aesociated with banned or illegal organisations could not be quoted in the media. 0

78. A number of crganiaations spoke of the wide powers of detention under the Internal Seourity Act, whiah hindered free pclitiaal activity. These included1

(a) Under seation 28 of the Internal Seaurlty Act, a person may be held in preventive Betenticn indefinitely by order of the Minister of Law and Order and no judicial review ie poesible. The person can be held in prison inacmmunicadc in accordance with regulations made by the Minister of Justice under subsection (2). Under eubeection 28 (71, no court of law has jurisdiction to pronounce upon the validity of any regulation made under subsection (2).

(b) Under seation 29, a police officer of the rank of lieutenant-colonel or above can without a warrant detain a person for questioning for 30 day8 (renewable by the Minister of Law and Order). The person can be held ir..ccmmunicadc on8 no information need be given about the arrested peraon although he or she is to be visited fortnightly by a magistrate and o district surgeon. There ie no judicial review of the detentlou.

(d) Under section 31, the Attorney-Qeneral may detain a potential witrens Per up to PI% months. In this connection, the person can be held incommunicado and shall be visited fortnightly by a nlagietrate and a district surgeon. The AC t specifically provides that the Courts have no jurisdiction to review the validity of this type of detention.

(e) Finally, two Bections, 50 and 50 A, provide police officers with the power to arreet persons in connection with public dioturbances for up to 14 dwys (section 50) or for 48 houre (socticn JO A).

Concern wae also expressed by these organieations over th treatment received by detainees under the above provisions, elrpecially when held incommunicado of 111 solitary confinement. They alleged that five deathG in police custody havn beun reported in 1990.

79. several organieatione were of the view that a number of other laws which circumecribe political activity should be repealed. Among them are the foll~)wiuqr A/A-a_/960 ! Eng2."ieh ?wqe 25

ta) The Public Safety Act, No. 3 of 1953, as amended in 1986, which permits the proclamation of a state of emergency, and the declaration of "unrest areas", which would amount to a mini-state of emergency;

(b) The Disclosure of Foreign Funding Act, No. 26 of 1989:

(d) The Riotous Assemblies Act;

(e) The Gatherings and Demonstrations Act, No. 52 of 1973.

Other acts, some of the provisions of which were said to limit freedom of expression and information and therefore political activity, are the Police Act, the Prisons Act, the Publications Act, the Nuclear Energy Act a,nd the Defence% Act.

80. Paragraph 6 (e) of the Declaratianon &B&&&&d and-its Destruotive Consequences in Southern Africa calls for the South African rigime te "cease aP3L political trials and political executions". I *-_:-: : . . n of the Gover&enf;

81. At the request of the Team, the Minister for Foreign, Affairs provided information regarding the present status of political trials .amJi executions Hn ,i: South Africa. He stated that the Joint Gover~ent-~I'Wo~~~~~~ Group's recommendationk were relevant. The Government,was ready to implement the recommendations in the report. The approval of ABC is awaited. The cases of all persons convicted of political offences as then defined would b; reviewed in accordance with the terms of the agreement arrived at between the Government and the ABC. Furthermore, as the State President announced on 2 February 1990, the i death penalty will be limited as an option to extreme cases onPy. In this respect, the Criminal Law Amendment Bill is before Parliament. Its main objective is to do away with the compulsory imposition of the death- sentence (which applied in cases of murder without extenuating circumstances) and to vest the Supreme Court with a discretion in this regard. All persons sentenced to death will have an automatic right of appeal, and the defence counsel will be empowered to appeal for clemency if the accused decides not to do so. The Bill also provides for the appointment of a panel of legal experts and Appeal Court judges to review, in accordance with the new legislation, the cases of all persons previously sentenced C.o death. Meanwhi la aPk executions have been suspended, pending adoption of the legislation and completion of the review procedure.

8.2. The term "political trial" is considered a misnomer. Trials as such were not political. Offences featuring in trials may, however, be described by some as "'political". "Political offences" were a product of the times. fn Soutn Africa k;imp~c"s have changed dramatically and what may have been viewed as a "political h/44/980 BngWh Page 26 trial” in the paot may not be viewed in the same light in the future. In any event, offenaes which aro judged to bo political oould be eligible for parBon or iademai ty .

83. Aaaording to ANC and UDFI

(a) A number of political trials wore still in progresst and

(b) Although ereoutions for offenaes had been suspended, the further stop of amending the law to Prevent exocutione for Political offences needed to bo taken without delay. 84. QAC oummed up its views on this matter as follows: “A large number of political trials are presently irk progress and political exeautions have beon stayed, pending the review of each case by a panel of judges who have been enjoined to apply new legislation whiah permits greater disarotion in the imposition of the death sentence. Implicitly, some political exeeutione may be carried out.”

85. Aaaordiug to tho Human Rights Commission of South Africa:

(a) Political trials and imprisonment continue unabated under the Internal Braurity Act as well as under a plethora of other repressive legislation and common’ law. About 400 political trials were recorded in 1989 and the rate during 1990 is won higher .

(b) Political executions have been suspended since 2 February and legislation governing the death sentence is to be amended to some extent (Criminal Law Alnendment aill). Nevertheless, over 300 persons are on death row (70 as a result of political ciraumeLancee) with their fate uncertain.

86. Several other organisations, including AZAPO, IDASA and the Detainees’ Support Qroup, said that political trials wore still taking place. Some political trials were alleged to have commenced under the guise of criminal trials, involving a shift from detaining persona without trlrrl under security legislation to detaining them on charges uhder the normal criminlrl law.

/... A/44/960 English Page 27

. xv. OTHER ELRMENTS CONDUCIVE TO FREE POLITICAL UISCUSSION AND TO TRE PROCESS OF NEQOTIATIONS

07. In ad’lition to obtaining information related to measures pesoribs in ” paragraph 6 of the Declaration on AoarCheid and its Destruative Consoquenaos in Southern Africa, the Team focused its efforts towards collecting information ft0m' its interlocutora on other elements which are directly related to the issu0 of frae politiual disauseion and activity. Those elements are Creodom from ViOlonQor frcredom of assembly and C roodom of potis l . .

A. N an m of vialence

08. The Declaration recognises tho linkage between an atmoeghere free of &olpwo and progress towards negotiations. Paragraph 8 of the Declaration etatea, “we prp of tho view thst the parties concerned should, in the content of the noaeesary climat0, negotiate the future of their country and its peoples in good faith sob Aa an atmosphere whiah, by mutual agreement between the liberation movement6 and the South African regime, would be free of violence”.

09. Several types of violence wore identified by the variouo groups which mot with the United Nations Teem. They included violenae related to aativltirs by the ‘. police and security forces, attacks by hit sguads against anti-m aotiviat6,. violence by vigilante groups and by the far right, violence between pOlitiaa1 organisations and violence related to the armed etrugglo. The violence in Natal was considered to be a combination of several of these types. eonitiae

90. The Qovernment of South Africa made it clear that it has COnSistOntly sttea& the importance of msfntaining law and order and that there wae no place for violence and armed struggle in the aountry. In his statement to the Parliament on 2 April on the search for peace and stability, the State President cuggeoted that the current acta of violence differed from that in the middle 1999s. At that stage, he stated, the security forces were blmned and often accused of violence and its continuea existence. The present was however different. There was a’ protest against the security forcesr in fact, ths assistance of the seaurity forms had been requested from unexpected quarters. There was an acceptance of the aecqeaary protective role of the security forces. He announced that the South African Police, assisted by the South African Defence Force, had received instructions to Immediately act firmly and purposely in curbing all area8 of unrest and violenoe. Thess new measures incluaed an increased visual presence of thO security force@,, , road blocks and the patrolling of roade and areas with vchiclee and aircraft and increased enforcement of lnw against crime, intimidation and unrest. Everyone, he stated, should understand that the instructions may 1eatS to an increase in tha number of people detained. Continuing this theme in a etatoment to the Parliament on 17 April, the State President said chaos and anarchy would not be tolerated.

91. At the meeting at. Groote Schuur, the GovernmInt and the ANC agreed on **a common commitment towsrds the resolution of the existing climate of violence and

/ . . . ~~t~rnidati~n from whatever quarter as well as a commitment to stability and to a peaceful process of negotiations" (see A/45/268). The Team was informed that, in conformity with the provision of the Groote Schuur Minute to establish effective channels between the Government and the ANC to curb violence and intimidation, regular consultations between the two parties take place through a joint steering committee.

92. The Minister of Law and Order stated that although he believed that the unrest in South Africa required a political solution and could not be solved by security measures, it was necessary to maintain law and order. The number of people arrested for violent actjivities had increased since the measures announced by the State President de Klerk on 2 February 1990. For instance, arrests increased from 1,371 in February to 2,136 in March. He indicated that many more people would have been arrested had the full powers of the Minister been exercised. To address criticisms of police activities, police partiality for instance, the Minister said that he had appointed a senior police officer to investigate any complaint made against any member of the South African Police force. Moreover, he was considering seeking an amendment to the Police Act prohibiting members of the police force from joining any political parties.

93. After stating that the Government was reluctant to repeal the Internal Security Act because of the existing high level of extreme violence from, inter alia, the extreme right wing, the Minister explained that the police were , unable to take more law enforcement action because there was not enough police available. This shortage of police was also the reason why whites carrying weapons had started patrolling the streets. The Government recognized this problem and decided to increase the police force by 10,000 men within 12 months. He further indicated that since the extreme right could be even more dangerous than the left, it seemed advisable to talk to them and convince them of the futility of any further violc:nce. He stressed, however, the fact that the Government would not hesitate to act against the far right wing if necessary and that several right-wingers are in detention at the moment.

94. It was further mentioned by Government representatives that CCB was currently subject to investigation by a Judicial Commission of Inquiry.

Position of the n&ional liberation movements

95. AN expressed great concern about the extent of violence, claiming that the . Buartheld system was its source. It claimed that anti--theid. activists lived in fear of their lives, and of attack on their buildings and property, consequently a climate for free political activity did not exist. ANC charged that there was an unwillingness on the part of the Government to take firm action against police indiscipline and to establish strict guidelines for police action.

95. The AN leadership expressed disappointment that the Government had not dismantled CCB, despite all the evidence of the "horrific deeds" it had committed. akey further complained about the narrow terms of reference of the Harms ~~rnm~s~io~, established to investigate the illegal activities of the security Iorces. Special concern was registered about the failure of the Government to take s

A/44/960 Rnglirh Page a0

action against white paramilitary f;rrcee thst publicly proalalm their violent intentions. The caao ot Welkom was oitetl a8 an eaample, where armed white oxtromo right-wing Broups patrolled the etreetc. Black miner@ had bren rttaokrd and the Ii prevtses of the miners’ union firebombed.

97. PAC asserted that institutionalised violence in the form of OUpprea8iOn of community uprisings or publio marshes was still provalont. The killiag of blaake in bebokeng and in Welkom were cited aa examples. Particular dodown WII volcsd about the alarming trend of the far right to arm themselves and ragage in~milltary~’ training ae well a8 the apparent unwillingness of the Government to addrsce thii iesue squarely. Ae a result of the rising threat poeed by the far right wing a@ the continued police repression, PAC said it felt oompellod to oontlnue the &red” etruggle. t * t. , PoeltianoL

98. The majority of organisations believed that the continued eecalatlng vlolenar remained an obstacle to the creation of a olimato for free politioal dicauucioabad progrese toward8 negotiatione. In their view, violanoe was pervauivo In 8outh Af rioa. Attention wae drawn particularly to a large number of fir@arm#i liccrnaoe which h&Y been iseued in reoent months to the white population, and to the growing threat of the extreme right wing.

99. It wae also etated that a relationship enisted botween violener end the ’ Government’e failure to monitor adequately the inplementrtion of Ltr ooourity laws. Although the state of emergency had been lifted in three provInaee, it wau claimed that many lawc otill remained on the bookc vhlah enabled the authotitloe to arrest, detain, haraes and dieperee anti-m supporters and demo~retrators. In this conneotion, it was stated that most of the ourrent police a&ion agalnot demonstratore take8 place under section 46 of the Internal Seourity Aat.

100. Documents submitted by the Human Right@ Commission and the Indogondmt Board of Inquiry into Informal Beprescion provide what they ooneidered to be 8 ’ conservative eetimate of 176 persons killed and 1,963 injured ae m rorult od po~lae action during some 70 demonstrations between 2 February and 2 June of this year) In the Sebokeng incident alone, 12 people were killed and nearly 500 were injured when police fired into the crowd. Several anti-m grwpr alro oomplained that Operation Watchdog, a reoent programme of search and 8eMure oweepr instituted by the police, ostensibly to find illegal weapons, had been used primarily againat opponent3 of aparthei8. 1 101. Several organisations statsd that black and white vigilante violenae had increased since the beginning of the year. They observed that meet of the blnck vigilante activity occurred in the context of the conflict in Natal, while white vigilante activity wae carried out by covert death cquadr related to CCB undercover operations and to Overt acts of the far r.tglrt wing. They also attributed the growth of far right-wing intimidation and violence to tacit support and encouragement by the local police and Recurity forceo.

102. In B document preeented by the Black Sash it was ateted that **we have been greatly dismayed by the widespread violence which is shaking the country, It eeeme

I... as though there is a hiatus, created by the uncertainity of e transition period, which is being inexorably filled by conflict at many levels: a contest for power and control; attacks based on racist hostility, intimidation, punishment and revefng and outright warfare between competing forces'". The Black Sash felt that "all must share the responsibility. Causes and culprits must be identified, and the government must acknowledge its task as the ultimate provider of protection for all, This means that it is of the utmost importance that the police and the army are impartial servants of the public and are seen to be so. The constitution-making process must be as speedy as possible, and as consultative and open as possible. Those who see no future for themselves unless they fight for it, must be persuaded that there is a vehicle through which their aspirations can be met. The help of those who have power to affect the outcome of events must be enlist&. It is inevitable that the actions of the powerful business community, the outside world, the unionised labour forces, the religious communities and other groupings within and outside the country have an impact on events."

1. The violence in Natal

103. Virtually every organization considered the protracted violence in Natal a national crisis. Many considered it a major obstacle to the creation of an appropriate climate for negotiations. They maintained that the situation had taken on special importance not only because Natal was the one province where the state , of emergency had not beeli lifted, but also because a government-backed self-governing homeland - KwaZulu - was a major party to the conflict. The conflict was being seen by some as a power struggle for mass support, influence in the negotiations and pre-eminent status in the post-aoartheid South Africa between two divergent political movements.

Position of the Government

104. The State President has called the destruction of life and property in Natal shocking. Speaking to the Parliament on 2 April 1990, he said that '*investigations indicate the causes of the unrest can be traced to many areas .-. in addition to the above factors, there is a strong presence of a power struggle between political and ethnic groups, which is complicated by long family and tribe vendettas".

105. In an effort to address this situation, Mr. de Klerk announced that the Government intended to implement a more extensive action plan. This plan included, inter alia, a co-ordinated security plan that involved the deployment to the areas of considerable additional manpower provided by the Defence force, the provision of appropriate equipment, the intensification of normal policing and the arrangement for extra courts, as well as a special effort "on the socio-economic areas" that would be co-ordinated with the Minister of Planning and Provincial Affairs in close co-operation with all relevant functionaries.

106. Later, on 7 June, when announcing the lifting of the state of emergency except in Natal, State President de Klerk said that "the increasing phenomenon in Natal of violence among Blacks, which has led to destruction of human life and property and has assumed shocking proportions, as well as the exceptionally high level of A/44/960 English Page 31 intimidation that eniste there, muet et111 be oountered by the atrongeet mean0 available” (Al4W307, appendix II).

107. The Miniotor of Lnw and Order oaplsined that it was nooeeeary to maintain the Mate of 8mergenoy in Natal beoav-s the Internal Security bat wae not useful ” againot large numbers of people. We said that the major aautw of violerae there wao the power etruggle betweon the ANC and Ink&ha. The hletory of 8uJu fattily ” ’ foude wae aleo a oontributing faator. Troape wore neoeeeary in that ‘Provino6 ’ ” beoauee the avallable polioe foroe wae insuffiaieat to deal with the violmar: No’ eaid that at firet additional troogs end poliae had been brought in fromotIibr*, ,I parts of the oountry but that they aould not be meintainod there indofiniti&ly, I They wore replaaod by troops ePeaking Zulu , end oubesquently by troope Cram Cap ” provlnoe, but for various raaeone the Minieter’ had been aoked to withdraw thea, : The 32nd army battalion was now stationed theret it had been in Angola and its ’ eoldlere, now all South Afriaan aitleene, woco aonuidorod impartial ae thry’did not come from the region and they diC not epeak Zulu. .’

108. Conaerning a peaoeLu1 resolution of the conflict, the Minister for Foreign ‘! Affeire said that the government hed tried unouaaeeefully to arrangd for a meeting between the louder of Inkatha and the Reputy President of the ANC. While the I I Oovernment was prepared to help, the problem should be rseolved by the two organlaations.

109. Provinaial authorities in Natal eleo viewed the oonfliot betwoea lnkatha and ’ the ANC/UDF/COSATU alliance to be Political in aharactef, aimed at 6eeing who would represent the people in the coming negotiations. They pointed out that violracr had moved from the urban to the rural areas. It wae ctsted that the South African’ Poliao had joint patrols with the army, and when in KwaZulu territory,‘wlth the KwaZulu polioe offioers whonever Possible. Local authoritiee denied that the South Afritian Poliao, or members of the 32nd battalion of the defence fordee, were biased. In order to maintain political neutrality, there wee an agreement between the South Africsn Police and the KwaZulu Qovernment to report any wrongdolnq by member8 of oithor ~ollae force to the Attorney-Qeneral. The RwsZulu polioe aoted under the inotructione of the XwaZulu Oovernmont and the South A’friaan ~overnnlsnt ” had no authority over their actions.

110. Tho Regional Commiseioner of South African Poliae in Natal etated that, under normal clrcumetancee, the number of police in the Province would be eufficient. However , since March this year, the situation of violence had hocome very serious and could not be controlled by the police. In that month, 573 incident6 of unrest (burninge, etoninga, QetrObOmbingO, serious eesau1t, and riotous acte) had been toaorded. In April, with the ‘arrival -f the troop, that number had diopyed tu ’ 376; tte figure for May WRA 1538 and Cor the first 10 deye of June only 45 minor incid&ntc had been recorded. The police had tho mein reeponeibility for maintaining lew end order and were eeeisted by the military on joint patrols. There wan elwaye a South African police officer and, if Poecible. a KwaZulu police officer with tho truops when thy WQ~O in KwaZulu territory. 111. A recent address by the Deputy President of the ANC before the I,6~ternational Labour Conference in June 1990 was brcught to the Team's atte;atioa. Speaking of the continuing police violence, the Deputy President said "We must, i:R this context, also mention the continuing senseless carnage that is taking place in the province of Natal. We have made it very clear to the Government that they must discharge their responsibility and end this violence. We, for our part, will continue to do everything in our power to solve this problem by peaceful means, whatever the obstacles in our way. We would like to take this opportunity to urge you to support the international campaign initiated by our democratic mc:vem@nt, to draw attention to this situation and to generate the necessary pressure Lo oblige the South African Government to end the killing of our people. You should know that there are present in this hall representatives of our major trade union federation, COSATU, who have come out in part to take up this issue of Natal violence."

112. ANC, supported by UDF and COSATU, asserted,that the South African and the RwaZulu Police forces were a major obstacle to the creation of a peaceful settlement in Natal because of their lack of impartiality. In its view, these forces were the main contributing factors to the continuing violence in the region. The state of emergency had neither stopped the violence nor police misconduct, instesd, it had tended to protect the police from prosecutions and , public scrutiny. Numerous cases of criminal activity by the police were cited, including theft, rape and assaults, and it was contended that the troops, together with the South African and KwaZula police forces, had demonstrated partisan support for Inkatha. The fact that only 12 prosecutions had been obtained despite hundreds of charges and that more than 3,000 persons had been killed in four years, clearly indicated that the criminal justice system in Natal had broken down. That situation strengthened the prevailing attitude among the KwaZulu police that they were above the law, and left witnesses unprotected and open to retaliatory violence. Even when prosecutions were obtained, defendants were easily acquitted.

113. According to ANC, since 1987 all peace efforts had failed due to Irskatha's position. ANC, supported by UDF and COSATU, stressed that the magnitude of the violence in Natal made it an issue of national concern. Therefore, it had recently demanded that: the State President intervene directly in the resolution cf this crisis: the state of emergency be lifted ir. Natal; the troops be withdrawn from the area or that their peace-keeping functions be defined clearly; the police powers be withdrawn from the Chief Minister of KwaZulu; the KwaZulu police be disbanded; the KwaZulu warlords be arrested and prosecuted; the homelands system ke dismantled: and a commission of inquiry be established to investigate the conduct of the police. Waving failed to reach an agreement with Inkatha, COSATU, in co-opsrs%ion with ANC, UDF and the South African Youth Congress (SAYCO), planned to convene a national peace conference in Natal in July/August 1990. They were also planning a series of national actions, beginning with a national stayaway on 2 July 1990. 114, Two meetings were held with representatives of the ~nk~tb~ movement, one with local representatives in Pietermaritzburg and the other with a ministerial delegation in Durban. The two Inkatha delegations contended that the conflict between their organisation, on the one hand, and ANC, UDP and COSATU, on the ether, had begun in 1985 when UDF launched a recruitment drive in Natal. They claimed that Inkatha had suffered most from the ensuing violence and that attacks against its supporters had increased in recent months. The local Inkatba delegation maintained that the Chief Minister of KwaZulu had taken the initiative to discuss the Natal situation with &NC leaders, first with ANC President, Oliver T&~bo# and subsequentiy, last April, with the Deputy President, Mr=. Nelson Mandela. 00th efforts bad failed.

115. The Inkatha ministerial delegation reminded the Team that, for the past decade, when AW was in exile and other groups were banned, Lnkatha had been the leading .spokesman for blacks in support of a democratic alternative to l By rafusing to accept independence for KwaZulur. its Chief Minister Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelesi and Inkatha bad frustrated the Government's homeland policy. They recalled that Chief Minister Buthelezi had refused to discuss constitutional development proposals with the South African Government until Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners had been released. The fnkatha delegation mentioned that its Central Committee.had taken the initiative in attempting to establish a peace process in the KwaZulu/Natal region. Originally, l the idea was to have Inkatha nominate five representativesc and UDP and C0SATU another five representatives for the purpose of pursuing peace initiatives as a Joint Peace Committee. Unfortunately, the Joint Committtte encountered difficulties, particularly because of a vilification campaiga against the leader of Inkatha. Inkatha alsc mentioned that following the lifting of the ban on ANC, the President of Inkatha had called for a broadening of the membership of the Joint committee so that each individual organisation would be represented by a five-man delegation. Inkatha felt that, because of the critical situation, ~b full-blown attempt should be made to call all sides together. The Inkatha delega",?ons were uf the view that a joint appeal by the ChieL Minister and the Vice-President of ANC for peace in Natal could have salutary effects.

116, The delegation stated that Inkatha was in the process of transforming itself into a full-fledged political party: and appealed for United Nations recognition as a liberation movement aas in the case of ANC and PAC.

1%'~. A number of church groups asserted that the violence in Natal had reached crisis proportions. They felt that the situation was serious eaougb to warr&nt *+q services of a United Nations peace-keeping force. The police, who had been conditioned to counter revolutionaries, were overeealous in their efforts to mairatain law and order. In addition, it was suggested that the multiplt, sesponsibilities of Mr. Buthelezi as Chief Minister of XwaZulu, Chief of Police and Zeader of the Inkatha Movement created some confusion and perhaps even a sanflict i; r_ interest.

/ . . . A/44/980 English Page 34

118. Some church leaders claimed that the Qovernment did not appear to be willing to stop the violence in Natal and commented that had such extensive violence occurred in a white area, it would have been stopped in 48 hours. They emphasised the strategic importance pf Natal, which shared a border with independent African States and contained the mout important port in South Africa. For these reasons, Natal would be expected to play a significant role in any constitutional talks. It was suggested that continued violence in Natal would affect the climate for political activity and negotiations, and oould spill over into other regions of the country.

119. Church leaders had celled upon the Government in February 1990 to establish n Judiciary Commission of Inquiry to make R full investigation of the situation, dncluding an assessment of the role of the various security forces. This request was renewed during a meeting with the State President in April, As of mid-June, no response to this request had been received. Business and academic groups and msdia representatives also expressed support for a judicial inquiry.

120. Some organisations viewed the situation in Natal as intense rivalry between traditionalism and mcdern urban sectors and. a result of economic conditions in the province.

121. COSA’rU and UDF menlioned that repeated demands had been made for the appointment of a Commission of Inquiry to investigate police action in the conflict, but this was rejected by the Government. They alleged that, since 1987, several initiatives to establish a peace process in Natal had failed as a result of Inkatha intransigence. A code of conduct for the organisations in Natal had also been proposed, envisaging the monitoring of police action and the adjudication of complaints. In 1989, COSATU and UDF established a Joint Working Committee to meet with Inkatha in order to resolve the conflicts. These initial contacts had yet to produce any concrete results.

B. Freedom

122. The Government affirmed that no organisations are presantly banned, proscribed or restricted. There were few or no restrictions on political activities in the country. Individuals and political parties can organiee as they wish and can participate in peaceful demonstrations.

123. Regarding the impact of the Internal Security Act on freedom of assembly, Qovernment representatives indicated that section 29 of the Internal Security Act applied indiscriminately to all persons in South Africa without distinction. It applied only to the investigation of activities involving violence. Since the announcement of the State President on 2 February 1990, there was now ample evidence that the rights of freedom of assembly and political expression were fully enjoyed and regularly exercised in South Africa. A/44/960 1 English’ Page 38

124. The Minister of Conatitutional Development stated that the Internal Security Act would be emended at the next session of Parliament so as to remove those’ aspects of the law that could impinge on political activity. In response to a question by the Team, the Minister stated that a6 a way of promoting aonfidence it might be useful to promulgate an interim “mini Bill of Rights” with enforaement powers so that people might feel protected as they undertook political aativitiee. Hot-ever, the Government would not allow freedom of assembly to be abused, as peaceful protest should not become the springboard for lawlessness, violenae sad intimidation.

of the natianalliberationm

125. Both ANC and PAC charged that although organisation5 had been unbanned they were still not able to organire freely. There were a host of laws, especially .tho Internal Security Act, which limited the e-rercise of freedom of assembly. The process of obtaining permits for meetings was cumbersome and often involved arbitrary decisions by the local authoritieo. Resort to the courts, in the limited, instances where judicial review of ministerial or police powers were permitted, involved lengthy proceduree which often Poraed organisers to postpone meetings. ,

128. These movements, as well as some other organi5atione, claimed that political organisers continued to be harassed from time to time by the poliae~.some had b~err beaten, and even murdered by vigilantes and hit squads; others had been detained , under section 29 of the Internal Security Act, thus making mass mobiliratioa impossible.

127. The Human Rights Commission of South Africa considered that the Internal Security Act had a direct impact on freedom of association. Under seation 48, all outdoor political gatherings Gould be banned and made subject to opeaifia permission.

128. The Black Sash and IDASA said that the best way of assuring freedom of association and assembly as well as freedom of expreseion i# the interim period, before the adoption of a new constitution, would be to have a “mini Bill of Rights”, with enforcement powers, enacted forthwith.

129. Political organi5ations also complained that the continued impriooament of some of their cadres, and the delay in dealaring a general amnesty whiah would allow exiles to return home, were undermining their ability to organire and commun’cate among themselves in order to develop policies essential to their political activities.

130. The Government and most of the organisations acknowledged the special role that the media 7ould play in communicating to the people the political changes that werd taking place in South Africa and in promoting a free exchange of viewo.

/I.. Englioh Page 38

1.31. The Minister of Constitutional Development indiaated th&t tha Qovernment had lifted the’media emergenay regulat!ons and that it envisaged that freedom of press would be protected under the Charter of Human Rights whiah would be introduaed in South Af rila. The Minieter stated that even if thd South Afriaan Broadaasting Corporation (SAW) wore to be privatised, the Government would ensure that radio would be uoed to promote eduaation throughout the country.

132. Government representatives made alear that it is open to any organisation to h.ake a aase for greater aaaeea to television and radio direatly to 8ABC. With regard to complaints that the Poliae, Prisons and Defence Acts imposed restrictions on the preser the Qovernment representatives observed that a eaanning of the South Afriaan media would make alear that the alleged restriction6 had a minimal effect on the freedom of the press.

133. Representative8 of ANC alleged that there was no statutory heels for appeals against unequal radio and television coverage by politiaal parties seeking to make their views knownr in the absence of such legislatian, it was vital that an independent and impartial overview body be set up to monitor and guide SAN. It was also noted that the visual media still suffered from greater restriatione than, the print media, for exmple, under the Internal Seaurity Act the visual media was not allowed to show any events related ta unrest. AWC observed that in Natal, where the state of emergency wae et111 in force, freedom of the press was non-exiotent.

134. Media representatives disalosed that the Minister of Home Affairs had requested the Mndia Council to examine all the laws under which the media operated and report to him, thus implying that there were laws restriating the media.

135. Media repreeentatives both from the established and the alternative press (press not affiliated with the Media Council) agreed that there had been aonsiderable improvement in the freedom granted to the media since 2 February 1990. However, the press was not yet fully free. It was still restricted by many laws such as the Internal Security Aat, the Prisons Act, the Police Aat, the Defence Act, the Intelligence Act and othersl all imposed heavy penalties for reporting activities conce%ing these services.

136. One member of the alternative media Pointed out that the established press wae owned by a few conglomerates with cSose association6 with the Government and financially supported by white advertisers. In such circumstanaes, the established press served only the interest of those groups and did not provide adequate coverage of news and events affecting the black population.

/ . . * ~A/44/940 ‘; ’ mgqirti’ ‘: Page 37 ”

137. Aaaording to another member of the media, the press ottnn sweroieed eelf-aensorohip beoauee of the heavy panaltiee under the Priscao; ?olics aMl Dsfenoe Aate for reporting what the QoveWnent considered to be Zslor inCormstion about Lhe eervioes oovered by thooe Aats. The aost ol litigation was (10 ’ “’ eahorbitant that the prese preferred nQt to report eome eventu, erpeaialky on astters concerning relaf. 4 ’ : between the poliae and the publia.~ Other membsru of the media etated that i. ;e ol! the eortc the presc bad aontinued ‘to go td aourt ” to aontest restrictions placed on them by authoritiec, ahilo at the same time .(’"" trying to report whatever they aould, testing the limits of law.

130. Defending the role of the preoe , oeveral media repreoontatives raid that throughout the past 40 yeare it had been the pees that had taken the’ lead in ‘, ’ ” aalling for changer it had been the press that had rovesled the aato OS offioial aorruption and polioe brutalitiee that were ourreatly being inveotigatsd by the Harms Commiesionr and it wae becauce of press efiorte that the minde of the. ” majority of the white people were able to accept the change0 being introduaed bj ’ ,’ the State Rresident. ” 139. Representatives of BABC, which is owned by the Qovernment, declared thdt both ’ ,, it and some of the independent radio etations have been promoting debatrn oq radio and television Between Qovernment ministers, reprereatativer of political organisations and other leading figurca of anti-&QUUsl& movemente. The media representative8 felt that much more could be done in this respeat. , .* 140. There wee agreement among the media representatives that the preos must work on promoting a future democratia South Africa, that it must have thi, aou&age to debate new ideae ouch ae the bill of rightc, and that it wae aeamscary that the C3overnment utilise the media, espeaially the electronic: media, to eduoate the people about the changes. ‘. v. VIEWS RELATING TO THE QUESTION OF NEGOTIATIONS FOR A NEW CONSTITUTION'

141. Sections III a?d IV of the present report presented the views and positions of the Government and those of other interested parties on the measures taken so far and still required to create the necessary climate for negotiations as well as other elements conducive to free'political discussions and for advancing the negotiating process. This chapter contains positions and views expressed to the Team with regard to the mechanisms for the drawing up of a new constitution and an assessment of tke progress made thus, far and prospects for the future.'

142. The Minister for Constitutional Development informed the Teem that the State President, in his inaugural address‘ last September, had made it clear that,he wanted the situation in SouthIAfrica‘ to be, normalized so that negotiations for a new constitutional dispensation could begin. For this purpose, the State President had entrusted him with the task of starting the process of negotiation, and developinq models for a constitution that could be presented at the negotiating table. The Governrnent~had concluded that as: long as political organizations were banned and their leaders were. in prison or in exile, the negotiation process could not be initiated. There w&s consequently a need to allow such organixations to function freely. Therefore, on 2 February 1990, the State President had announced, the unbanninq of the organisations and the release of Mr. Mandela, which became effective a few days later.

143. As a number of pre-conditions had besn.s+:: hy the ANC and others before negotiations could begin, the Government hadchad to embark in a long process of consultations to remove the so-called obstacle; to negotiations. The Government's view was that although some of the items on the *'shopping list" of the pre-conditions were probably relevant a year ago, they were no longer so, e.g. the removal of troops from the townships. Nevertheless, the Government had tried to meet many of the pre-conditions and had had many bilateral discussions to that effect with those parties in South Africa with an interest in the negotiating process.

144. The Minister of Constitutional Development spoke of preliminary talks with ANC. He said that three issues were of major concern to the Government)ANC working group which was formed at the Groote Schuur meeting, namely: release of prisoners and immunity for exiles; return of South African citizens from abroad, many of whom did not have identity papers to prove that they were South African citizens (the ANC and the Department of Interior had set up a mechanism to work on the necessary arrangements for repatriation); and assistance te returnees (a Government-ANC group was working on this issue as well). The Government was disappointed in the delay shown by the AK in responding to the recommendations of the working group. As soon as these preliminary consustations were complete, the Gcvernment would wish to see comprehensive rsgotiations begin that included all f&%rties f

.: t: .,*:; ~'he Ekinistlsr felt that under the present circumstances it appeared that the ;> '.?:-%ilriInar.y* 9 arrangements could be finalised by the end of the year, and that

/ ..s negotiefione would not atart before the beginning of 1891. HQ expfeeaecl hie intention to qomplete the prooees within the nex$ two to three ymrx. The Ministir “’ mentioned that he wae aware thst some orgsniaetiods preferred tbo‘coaetitutlon’to ‘,, be drafted by 8 ConsUtueat ABodmbly. Although the W!iernment was o~gosed to’kh\qI’; proposal, it did not object to its being discussed at the negotiatiqn.,I t*la’!i!?,3.) any other proposal aoming from any party. ,1 !. ,,: tL 8 : .(.. 146. The Minister of Conetitutional Development oboerved that, .durlng the, :, :’ 1, September 1989 rleatione, the sltate Preside& had’~iamleed ta put the”aew aonstitutiional dispensation reeultdng from the propocsd aegotiati0iM to a ‘.‘I “’ ’ referendum of the white olsotorate. RespbndinQ to a gueetioa fiobii the TeamI' the ” 1’1 Minister stated that the reeult of the negotiation8 could aleo be’submittsd t0 a’- national referendum.

147. Acaording to the Mfnieter of Constitutional Dev&pment; the violeirae’in’iSaibl ” would not be a serious obetaole to the commenc4mont of”negotibtio~,e. HOWiwer, te?’ “’ Natal situation had to be resolved. The Qovernment had suggested khkt‘the Ststg 1 President, Mr. Mandela and Chief Buthelez+i meet and settleI the problfm. Suah’ir.”I. meeting had not yet taken plaoe. ,;z . . 140. The Qovernment felt that it had gone very far in urea&g the alimate for negotiationa. The National Party wae in aloee touch with its membera in order to ” ’ help them aacept the result6 of the forthcoming negotiations. Syah gras,Q,;roote , support was necessary for the aucceee of the politioal proimee. ‘. :-. *‘: 149. The Minister for Foreign Affairs pointed 032 that the Oovernymt prefdtred that 1111 parties with a “proven, acknowledged aone!iltuenay** had the right to ' ", 'I' partiaipate in the negotiations on the new oonetitution, and that thp, Oovernmcmtct. , ’ would welcome broad psrtlcigation. ,a ,I. 150. He reiterated the Qovernment’s strong view that it wae for the pople of South ,,, Africa to negotiate a new constitution and that the Qovernment dLd.not appieciate being told by outsidere how the atinstitution ohould be drafted and what it’ehotild’ “‘:I contain.

151. The Uovernndt intended to eeek the repeal or amendrhent ot the ‘Land Aato aad the Qroup Area8 Aat at the 1991 sesaion of Parliament. It was indbatcd that the ” I’ Population Registration Act was inextricably linked with the preeent constitution and therefore it8 repeal could take place only in the context ot the.adoptidn ot a”“ new constitution.

152. ANC fully recognised the boldness and the signiticance of the IBaouteo take@’ thus far by the State President towards the oreetion of a Olimate conduoive’ta negotiations. However, it felt that sufficient ahangex had not yet ocoutred In South Africa to make the procese of dismantling e irreversible. “PrdtounA and irreversible changes” could only be declared to have taken place on00 trre and fair elections to a Conctituent Assembly had been conducted on a non-r&o&al qdglc. ANC warned that in the event that the results ot a “whites only” reterendum or an election rejected the dismantling of w, the political clock would be turned back.

/ 0 . A/44/980 English Page 40

153. AWC stated that it would continue to press for the release of all political prisoners, for the end of political trials, for the return of exiles, tor the repeal of repressive legislation, and for the lifting of the state of emergency throughout the country. Ongoing consultetione between AYC and the Uoverment were aimed at the creation of the necessary climate for negotiations. The Groote Schuur meeting in May had been held at its initiative for the purpose of removing obstacles to negotiations.

144. ANC had long pressed for the repeal of the Internal Roaurity Aat and, at Qroote Schuur, had reiterated the demand that it be repealed, not just reviewed. The ANC noted that the Parliament was about to adjourn and would not meet again until next year; oonseguently that Act would not be repealed in 1990.

155. AK explained that not everybody in South Africa had as yet accepted that a negotiated resolution of the p: oblem was the best way forward. Thrl’e were many among the white population who were determined to resist change by force. ANC was worried about the influence that the far right elements were having on the army and the police. An alliance seemed to be dWelOQing. Weapons were beginning to disappear from the state armouries and were ending up in the hands of far right elements and in Inkatha hands. Sucp a situation, coupled with the increased number ot gun licence6 being issued to whites, did uot augur well for the process of negotiations and the future of the country.

156. ANC added that when the obotacles to negotiation had been removed it would be’ possible to bring all the representatives of political forces in the country together and agree an the necessary measures which would lead to the elaboration and adoption of a demooratio constitution. ANC said it was determined to ensure the broadest possible unity of all those who were in favour of a genuine democratic transtormation and of the creation of a new non-racial society based on the principle of one person, one vote on a common, non-racial voters’ roll.

157. ARC stated that it was inoumbent on the United Nations to aontinue to maintain the international community’s consensus on the dismantlement of m. ANC considered that the United Nations could continue to play a valuable role as an impartial monitor of developments in South Africa, and could make such developments known to the international community. It believed that the Constitutional Quidelines of ANC should be supported by all since they were in full accord with the epirit of the United Rations Charter and the Universal Declaratitn of Human Rights, and indeed, the Declaration on Al?- and its Destructive Consequences in Southern Africa adopted by the General Assembly in December 1989.

150. FAC believed that the south African Government had no intention of negotiating genuinoly and seriouslv for the creation of a new social order. In its view the Government rejected “majority rule”, non-racial democracy as well a6 the rodistri*)utiorr of tet3ource8, in particular of land.

150. It was the view of PAL’ that the conditions which the Declaration had set as essential to create the necessary climate for negotiations were not negotiable. The South African Government had not complied with most of these conditions. The Government had shown no “demonstrable readinees” to deal with at least two of the moat fundamental principles in the Declaration, notably the right to universal

/ . . . ’ Englirh’ Page 41 equal suffrage under a non-racial votere’ roll and the creation of an economic order that would promote and advanae the well-being of all South ACriaano.

160. PAC oonsidered that all of the coadltioue for areatlng the cllmpto for negotiations etated in the Declaration were inteadad to be unilaterally mqt by the Qovernmemt , None of these conditlone were intended to be rubjrot to aegotlatioa. Only one condition had been fully met by the South African Qovernment, nemoly t&o unbanaing of organlaatione. Since there had been no oubotantial aom~llanoo with the mea@urea necessary for the oreation of a climate for negotiatlono, .thore wae no bar& for contact or talks, exploratory or otherwlro, betwooa the South African’ ’ Qovernment and the liberation movements, at this stage.

161. PAC advooated the establishment of a Constituteat Aceembly whloh would l amm that the process of new constitution-making wae democratlor lend legltimaay to tho conetitution-making proceeo: enaure the partioipation only ot there orgaai8atlonl with legitimate support among the peopler and free the aonstitutioa-making prooorl from manipulation and channelling through governmental etructuter. Isa. Pdrther, PAC iaformed the Teem that there had been no aoneuXtcrtionr betweoa liberation movemente over the iceuee contemplated in the Declaration.

163. According to PAC, onae the Qoverment had oonaeded the neaoouity to ratablich a Constituent Aesembly, agreement would have to be reaohed between the liberation ; ’ movements and the Qovernment over transitional arrangement0 sad modalitlos related to the process of constitution making through a Conrtituent .boembly. Thor0 arrangement6 would include the holding of eleotionc to a Constituent Aoremblp and the traneition to a democratic order. liaoe It did not expeot the Qovermnent to agree to these demands in the near future, it was the view of PAC that aegotlationr with the Qoverament at this stage would not aahieve any of its ctated objeativor, ,”

164. According to the Democratic Party, the State Prerident, in hir rpooah of ” 2 February, had initiated a procecs of seeking a political l olutlon to the problqa facing the country, and that proctmc could not be roveroed. tt war highly improbable that there would be another all-white general election. The grococr pointed towards the ending of e and it wao moot unlik8ly that it oould bo stopped. If it was stopped, there would be chaoc. The white backlash and porrlbk far right-wing violence should not be underestimated, since many whiter felt insecure and uncertain about the future. The Democratic Party hoped that the proceea of negotiation would be accnlorated.

165. In the view of the Democratic Party, the climate for negotlationo did not ~ depend only on the Qovernment, but also on ANC. Sinoe 2 February 1000, muoh had happened, namely the reLaa,se of Nelson Mandela, the llftlng of the otate of emergency, and the agreement at Qroote Schuur. The Qovernment had gono a long way in creating a climate for negotiations. The other aide had to contribute alro to that climate. The question of violence wae crucial and oould not bo roprratod from the “armed struggle”. Both hurt the climate for negotiationo, partloularly oiaco they encouraged right-wing untremiete to arm themeelves, thue creetlng Lurthor obstacles to the process of negotiation.

/ . . . 566. The Democratic Party suggested two ways to further the process of ~@~o~i~tio~. First, to reduce those factors which contribute to the climate of v-9 olence I In this respect, political violence would only end when all the parties concerned such as ANC, Inkatha and PAC, met to consider ways to stabilize the situation. Second, to expand, as soon as possible, the process of consultation by including other parties, such as PAC, AZAPO, the Democratic Party, and even the Conservative Party. It was explained that the latter, if not brought into the negotiation process, might attempt to veto the results. There was a frustration developing, a feeling of exclusion, ,which could endanger the future. It appeared that the Government and the ANC believed that, between them, they could control the process and this was troubling other political organizations. The Democratic Party maintained that it had not yet been invited to participate in the consultations that were under way.

167. In the opinion of the Democratic Party, the Government had, at present, three roles: it governed the country, it represented a political party in the Parliament and it was supervising the process cf negotiation. Some way had to be found to separate those roles. It would be desirable to appoint a facilitator who would be in contact with all parties to the negotiating process. The Democratic Party thought that the Chief Justice, for instance, could fulfil that role.

168. The Democratic Party said that there was some irritation with the notion that an outside body like the United Nations could set down guidelines for a negotiating process. While the Democratic Party had no disagreement with the guidelines on their merits, however, negotiations should not be limited to national liberation movements. The Democratic Party made clear it was anti-apartheid but not a liberation movement.

169. The leader of the Conservative Party, during the debate in Parliament on 2 February, declared in reference to the State President's speech on that day, that it was the most revolutionary statement he had ever listened to in Parliament over the past 19 years, and merely served to make him more excited about the battle which was about to begin. He added that the National Party neither had a mandate to negotiate away the future of the whites, nor to give a place to those who continued to be committed to the armed struggle. The Conservative Party leader continued that if the State President intended to force the whites of South Africa to accept a constitutional dispensation, depriving them of their political say, he was going to have to bear the responsibility for the violent reaction which it would evoke.

270. The Solidarity Party expressed the .riew that the Government had established a climate for negotiations by its recent actions. The Party believed that a bill of rights protecting the political rights of minorities would have to be a part of any new constitution. The five million whites must be made to feel secure because if ey were not they could destroy the country.

'971. Concerning negotiations between the Government and ANC, the Solidarity Party tholrght they should start as soon as possible because irreparable harm coulcl result Zrom c2elay. The Party expected all parties, regardless of race, to be represented <:t the negvtiations for a new comtitution. The Solidarity Party was not in favour 3 P i? Constituent Assembly to negotiate the constitution. In its view, any new ,. A,44/960 Englirh Page 43 negotisted draft constitution would have to be roferrrd to the whit. l leatorate for approval, aa ao Promised by the State President, and then be submitted for adoption to the Present Psrliement aa it ie aurrently conotitutsd.

172, The Inkatha movement ropreeeotstivec said that they wanted changer to QO fseter but it wao necessary to be pragmatia and all political’ foroor should be taken into account. Inkatha supported the ialtlativeo towards negotiatioar undertaken by Stste President F. W, de Clerk and coaeiderod that the procoro Iat in motion by him is irreversible. In that conteut, they atreoeod that a0 an I organisation which had alwaye supported negotiation8 a8 a path to a rorolutioa of the conflict in the country, Inkatha should be a party to the nogotiatioar.

173. The Inkatha Movement believed in the creation of a united South Africa with one eoveroign parliament. It also believed In a demoaratic, non-raaial and multi-party political system, in the protection of individual and miaority rightr, in freedom of association for individuals regardlees of raw, and in the fro0 enterprise aystem.

174. ASAP0 stated that the consultative process should be broadened and that a Constituent Aeoeinbly ehould be established to prepare a new aonotitutioa, l iaao only elected representatives should partialpate in aonstitutional argotlstionr. Regardless of the sincerity of the State Preeident, MAP0 added that tha prrreat system could not be trusted. The land ioeue should be part of ooafideaoo buil~iag,,

175. The Team also received viewe conaeraing negotiations and the aow constitutional order from a wide spectrum of organieatione. Nearly all organisations were of the view that time had some to widen the oonrultstioor between the Qovernment and the ARC before actual negotiationa rtartad. The divide in South Africa was no longer between Parliamentary and extra-Parliamaatary foraae, but between the “insiders” and the “outsidera”, the Qovermont and ARC beiag the key “insiders”.

176. According to IDASA, it wae neaessary for the negotiation0 to bo a8 iaclurivo aa Possible in order to eneure a wider acaegtanae of the reoult. 2he irreversibility of the changes taking place in South Africa would be raaohed whoa negotiations on the constitution itself began. Howwar, it was l mpheeirod by nearly all organisations that there was “no luxury of time” and hence tha aeod to begin negotiations a8 soon as Pocsible.

177. Several organlxatlone coneldered that the demand to establioh aa elrated Constituent Assembly a.8 the instrument fc)r drafting a new constitution was a realistic one aa it would entail a mandate from the people. A variety of viewr were exyreaced regarding the exact powers of a Constituent Acoembly in relation to the enieting Parliament and ways to avoid a power vacuum. Suggectiono lnaluded the idea of investing the Conetituont Aseembly with powers limited to the draftlag of the new constitution. Some organisations suggested, that in order for the Goverlmrent not to be alone in the “driver ‘a @eat” during the negotl8tiow, a Qovernment of national unity should be formed. However, several orqani8stlone, including church, buslnese and academic grougs, felt that the negotiating prooece would face its greatest challenge from the deep-rooted fears among ths white population and suspicions among the black. It was mggested that both white snd

/ . . . 8~6 intensify their efforts to co~~~~~ata to the and objectives of the political process.

e Aon-racial trade unions, in particular COSXXU, as well as some cbur~b balieved that the message being sent by the Government on the questioa of ions was confusing and contradictory. COSATU pointed out, as an example, that after an agreement had been reached between t&e black trade uAioAs aAd several players on proposed amendments to the 1988 Labour RelatioAs Amendment Act, the ve~~eAt bad delayed sending the legislatioia to Parliament because of objeetions ised by white trade unions and some white emplnyers. Such colnfused signals da~~Red the process ation and made the black workers feel that the process towards ending was not serious.

199. Some sectors of the business commtsnity considered #at constitutional chazoge would be facilitated if there was better understanding of the economic issues at stake among the white and black leadership and the business community at large. Thus, business organiaations such as CBM, had initiated contacts in which various pArties exchanged .;riews on future basic economic policies that might be reflected in a new constitution.

180. Sections of the business community held the view that if there was AU reel progress in the negotiating process the National Party might be forced by its own constituency to manage the situatir?A rather than solve it. While business leaders, felt the need for the process of negotiation to move quickly, they recognised that all parties needed some time to adapt their responses to the negotiating process and to consolidate their power in their constituencies. This delay should not necessarily be seeA as jeopardising the preparatory process but rather as a necessary elemernt sf the long-term solution.

181. As for the process of negotiation, some business leaders thought that the parties should be aware that symbolic victories for both the whit% and black community could be important and therefore their leaders must give each other a margin for manoeuverability. It was mentioned that such evideace could, for example, involve black leaders advocating the lifting of some sanctions, such as the sports and cultural boycotts which have emotive impact DA the white community. Likelise, white leaders, together with the business community, could seriously undertake visible and concrete programmes aimed at the economic uplifting of the black communities in order also to strengthen the message that the sys tern is being eradicated. Such acts, according to the business leaders, would be erueial for the success of the negotiating process.

VI. MATTERS ENHANCING OR OBSTRUCTING THE PROCESS OF ENDING

2. All political movements, organisations and groups with whom the Team met f the State President to embark on a po?.icy for 3 system, and to this end, to engage Pn s TQC@SS to &?V~lOp E% QCW C0UStitUtiOA. Most believed that until the were removed racial. discrimination would continue to divide ause of kuman rights and social justice would not ba served. 183. They sll urged the removal of the pillars of mutbaid, namely the PopuXstlod. Registration Act, the Land Acts, the Group Areas Aot and the Recervatioa Of. ’ ’ Separate Amenities Act, as well a8 all other law6 and the praatices that entreaahe4 racial discrimination. At the 8~18 time, it wati feared that if nb concomitant " progrmmee were immediately eotablirhed to addreec the glaring eocial and l conOmiC inegualitiee that were the legacy of npAWUi& the process towards ~tirestiing the new South Africa could be obstructed. On the other hand, a number oL’hltidtlvW taken by various sectors of soaiety with the objoat of enhancing the’proaeee Ot ’ change were brought to the Team’s attention. These included8 the ,r,approohemont between the South African Council of Churches and the Dutch Reformed Chirrch, the initiatives taken by business groups such ae the Coneultative Buelaooe Movelllbibt i0 debate the future economy of South Afciaa with politiaal pattiee and movWWttri”hho aotivitles of such other groups a8 IDASA to provide for forums for dieouroione’on national issuest the efforts of civic organisatione to negotiate with authorities on local iesuee; and the negotiations between COSATU and NACTU on ono’hrrad, and SACOLA on the other, that have led to proposals for 8fMtdmanta to the ‘labour J legislation. These efforts, which are parallel to the procees of coamiltatioa&“’ being undertaken at the national level, deaume great importance in eathbllibln9 ” confidence on the futute of the democratlrc process. lR4. The State President’s ad&rose of 2 February 1990 hse already ret lo motion a’ flurry of legislative aotivity which is teoordel below. At the memo tlmo, ,!t has eparked debate within the nation a8 to the adequacy and earneatnbue olc the ‘, Qovernment’e progrenme. The various pointe raised by polltiosl partlea and ‘, ‘, movements, and by other conoerned organisations, are rlmllarly refloatrd in’thia section. They cover not only the pillare of m but matter6 related ‘to labour, education, housing and health.

185. The Oovernmsnt’s commitment to end dieariminatfon wao outlined ln the Natlbn8,l Party Plan of Action of September 1989. The State Precident provided more doteiLed information about the Government’s strategy to end e leglclation in hir statement to Parliament of 17 April. At that time, he raid that the Qroup Arose Act would have to be replaced in an orderly manner a& that, ar outlined in tha Plan of Action, until such time a8 effective and genertr!ly acceptable meaaur@# wr() substituted, the residential arena would be protected by the Oroup Arose Act. The” new meacwrea would have to have the support of the three Houees of Parliament. To be generally acceptable, such meaeuree ca,uld not “inetitute any new torn OL discrimination on the grounds of race or colour” , would have to “9Lve aommunitiro peace of mind with regard to their wiehes and ideals on (I fair and just basil)“, would have to “accomodate the need and deeire of some communitlee to be protected egainot financial enpltiitation”, and would “not jeopardise civilioed norms and 8 tandards” . Until propoealc were submitted nest year on thic matter, the Stat. President eaiCl that the application of the Free Settlement6 Areae Act chould continue.

/ . . . A ‘44/960 Englioh Pa*9 46

186. On 17 April, the State President aleo declared that a.8 a result of the obvious similrrities between the Group Area8 Act end the Land Acts, the same factorA would be taken into account. Signalling the important constitutional implications involved in the Land Acts, particularly at the looal government level, Mr. de Klerk stated that “any reform with regard to the usage of the land will have to take into account the principles of free entorprieo, security of tenure and vested property rights”. He promised that any reforms would “include consultation with all affected groupe, such a8 agricultural unions, municipalities, etc.” li 7. The State President made it clear on 17 April that the Population Regietration Act, which differentiates on the basic of population group, is an inseparable part of the Conetitution and the Electoral Actr therefore it must be “emended in conjunction with the existing conetitrtion”.

106. Referring to tho “pillars of e”, the Minister for Foreign Affair0 explained that the Retiervation of Separate Amenities Act wae being repealed in this seesion of Parliament and that t’re Group Areas Act and the Land Act8 would be repealed during the 19904991 session of Parliament.

169. The Minister of Planning and Provincial Affairs also stated that the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act would be abolished at this session of Parliament and it wae expected that the Group Areas Act would be abolished next year. Whils the Land Act and the Qroup Areas Act were to be repealed, their , repeal had to be approached with adre. Property rights were involved and protective legislation had to be negotiated. For exemple, black farmland could not now be purchased by whitee, but ehould the Act simply be repealed, whites could purchase that land, to the detriment of the black population. Time wae aleo needed to allow people to adapt to these new circumstances.

190, The Minister of Constitutional Development obeerved that the Land Acts and the Group Areas Act would be repealed early in January 1991, but that the Population Registration Act could only be repealed when the new constitution wae negotiated because the two were inertricubly linked. He believed that it might be necessary to keep come sections of the :stiod A.*to to protect traditional land. But thie would aloo be a reeult of negotiatiow.

:91. The major responee of the Qovernment to social inoqualitiee has been to provide a 3 billion rand fund for social upliftment. One million rand will be diebursed by thrJ Parliament, end 2 billion will be managed as a trust fund under the leadership of the honorary Chairman of the Urban Foundation. The Team was informed tk-t these fund6 would be spent mainly for housing, land ant? education.

of bhe m.nro\ralw

192. AWC emphasxseA that only when free and f4r elections to a Constitvdnt Aeeembly had taken place could it be said that “profound and ir.eversible changes” in the dismantlement of m hatl occurred.

193. PAC cplled for the repeal of what ?t cozsldered to be the pillars of m namely, the Population Repjetration Act. the 1913 and 1936 Land Acts, on which wae A/44/9&0 English Page 47 based the Group Areas Act, tbe Tri-camera1 Parliament System, the Bantu Education ~y~~@m and the Bantustan System. Their repeal would establish the good faith of &he Guve~~~~@nt. gpition of otheraizatious

194. The Solidariky Party did not feel that the Population Registration Act and Land Acts could not be repealed until a new constitution had been adopted, as the present Parliament was founded on those two Acts. The repeal of the Group Areas Aet and the Internal Security Act, however, would be considered next year.

195. The Democratic Party wished to see the removal of the pillars of but did not consider their removal as critical to negotiations.

196. Inkatha noted that the Separate Amenities Act had been repealed and that the Group Areas Act and the Land Acts would be repealed next year. It considered that the repeal of the Population Registration Act should wait until a new constitution was negotiated. It also believed that the Constitution Act, No. 1-10 of 1983, should be removed.

197. COSATU beiieved that the process of eradicating m. had to proceed in conjunction with a specific programme designed to redress socio-economic imbalances, otherwise serious socio-political dislocation could octzur. NACTU , deplored the fact that the pillars of aDarth6id were still in place and mentioned, in particular, the Bantu Education Act.

198. The South African Council of Churches said that while it was satisfied with the process of consultation, it believed that the State Presi.;ent had not yet . introduced substantive changes that affected marthead itself. Therefore, it felt that the Government needed to make a firm commitment to repeal the pillars of apartheid.

199. IDASA believed that the Group Ari?as Act should be repealed immediately, A group of academics with whom the Team met in Cape Town felt that the corner-stonns of apartheid needed to be repealed, Tkey believed that the black population needed a strong signal from the Government in the form of the immediate repeal of some of those Acts. However, there was a djlference of opinion among the academics as to whether the Acts should be repealed before the negotiations commenced or following the adoption of a new constitution.

200, Civic organizations considered that while the Government was proceeding with scme changes, the real test was the manner in which it addressed the problems created by wartheid, specifically the repeal of the pillars of -mh&gl. These s:houfd be abolished, together with the Internal Security Act. Until that had happened it could not be said that the process of change was irreversible.

-a, c 4riL m ,VXFC0(7 said that there would be no real progress until the pillars of .~~~F~J~,&J+~ had been repealed anA affirmative action taken. It felt that the ‘:i.;inai?I,lemcrit of aar&jf.Lfi wa5 not a matter for negotiation. A/44/940 Englieh Page 48

202. The Federation of South African Women considered tl.at tho impact of the repeal of the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act would be diminished a8 long as the Qro - Areas Act remained. It felt that the homeland system ehould be scrapped immediately rather than wait until II NW constitution ~88 adopted.

203. The Urban Foundatiorl considered that the repeal of tho Qroup Areas Act would contribute to the full development of blecks and that the recent repeal of the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act would make a differonce in the life of the. black population.

204. NADEL considered that the Population Registration Act should be repealed before negotiation8 begin.. A8 long a8 the Act remained on the books, whites would continue to decide on the future and dominate the negotiation8 for a new constitution.

205. The Black Sash, referring to the State President’s 2 February speech, said that in a short space of time organisations had to move from the “politics of resistance to the politic8 of nation-building”. The m legacy would not di8Appear soon because it had distorted all aspects of life, i.e. education, health, land BLstrihution, etc. These would have to be taken into account in the future.

206. The Human Rights Commission called for the removal of the pillar8 of m, stating that the recent repeal of the Reservation of Separate Amenities ’ Act did not indicate a change of heart but was rather a recognition of reality. It stressed that m should not be examined simply in terms of its statutory provieions, since ?t had infected the very heart of the country through a comple: web Of inStitUtiOn8 and 8trUCtUr88. It would take a major effort by the people of South Africa, supported by the international community, to revor the situatiurl.

207. It was represented to th8 Team that while in recent years some progress had been made in the pursuit of black workers’ demands, the existence of racial discrimination on the job continued to be an issue of importMC0 to black workers. Xt was considered that a8 long a8 regressive labour legielation was in place, entrenching racial discrimination and curtailing freedom of association and the right to withhold labour, no possibility OXiSted to develop a healthy industrial labour relation8 Bystem, important to the revitalisation of the economy and within which affective negotiations could toko place. In that regard, it wad feared that continuing industrial conflict could be t1 serious obstacle to the process towards negotiation8 in the country.

208. The Government informed the United Nations Team that the Labour Relations Amendment Act of 1988, which regulates industrial relations, was being rovisecl and that consultations on the issue were in progrese with the two major trade union federations, namely COSATU and NACTU, as ~011 a8 with the South African Employers’ Consultative Committee On Labour Affaira (SACCOLA). The 1988 Act providei: that

/ *.. A/44/960 Engl ieh &age 49 discrimination base% on race can be regarded as an unfair labour practice by the Industrial court. The anti-discrimination cl&us@ in the Act is enforceable k,htough the courts. COSATU, NACTU, and SACCOLA (CNS) had reached an accord concerning amendments to the labour law and had proposed that they be translated into legislation during the current session of Parliament. Since many submissions had been received with respect to the amendments, all of which needed time to he studied, it would net be possible for Parliament to adopt this legislation during the Turrent session. A Gover,nment proposal that sections of the law on which full consu:tation had taken place be passed at the present session and that the final revised bill be submitted to the next session of Parliament (February 1991) ha% received a negative response from the trade union federations. The Government emphasized that its policy was that provision should not be made for "'racial unionism” in statutory enactments. It believed that in view of the National Manpower Commission's present major investigation into labour legislation, a visit by a Fact-finding and Conciliation Commission of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) to South Africa, as required by the COSATU complaint to ILO, at this stage, was premature. The Government had requested a meeting with the Director-General of IL0 in Geneva to discuss this subject. It was interested in developing a labour code that would equal international labour-standards as defined by ILO.

209. The Government informed the Team that it had requested that the National

Manpower Ccmrrission study outstanding issues such as the provision in labour l relations legislation for the protection of farmworkers. A bill providing for minimlun conditions of employment for farmworkers will be published during 1990. Another issue, a trade union demand for a minimum wage, required careful consideration as it could worsen unemployment. Other issues such as job training and education as well as ~IM-~-'----ur.rpyruyment were of concern to the Government and initiatives were being undertaken to address them. For example, the Manpower Training Amendment Act, which had just been adopted, provides for improvement in training. Employers, as part of their social responsibility, were to contribute to the training of workers and the Government would provide incentives to companies in this regard. Concerning privatization, the Government stated that the issue had been "politicised". In cases of the privatization of industries, the Government was undertaking efforts to prevent the dismissal of workers and to reduce employment through d process of attrition.

Position of the labour movement

210. 'The two non-racial unions, COSATU and NACTU, pointed out that the provisions of the Labour Relations Amendment Act curtail freedom of association, entrench racial unionism and limit further the freedom to withhold labour, all of which costravene international iabour standard:% recognieed by ILO. They amphasieed that after a long process of negotiations COSATU, NACTU and SACCOLA (CNS) had reached ip historic accord in April 1990 recognizing that all workers were entitled to basic *ights,& including the freedom of association and the right to withhold labour. In order to address the difficulties introduced by the Act, the CNS accord include% proposals to amend the labour law and the Government ha% undertaken to do so. IfA, 'z3e> said, had played a supportive role in the process of discussing &he proposed c>;eypps i Tile two trade unions expresse% tbeit strong disagreement with the

/ . * . A/44/950 English Page 50

Qovernment’s deaision not to legislate the necessary amendments to the labour law during the current session of Parlisment.

211. Roth federations considered that by not having the amendments legislated, the Uovernmeat had disregarded both the CNS accord and the reaommendation to accept the majority of the proposals made by its own advisory board on labour affairs. In view of the Qovernment’n deaision, the federations would eeek now a comprehensive review of the law. COSATU also informed the Team that it had lodged a complaint with -IL0 on the allegation that the LRA “fundementally infringed international standards on freedom of association”, COSATU therefore requested that the Uoiteu Nations and IL0 call upon the Qovernment to8 (a) submit to the jurisdiction of a fact-finding and conciliation commission; (b) give statutory effect to the accord by passing the proposed amendments to the labour lawr and (c) recognise and give effeat to the accord in so far as its own employees are concerned. COSATU stressed that the Qovernmeat’s uadertakiaq to make the necessary amendments to the law we6 an “al18 test” of the extent to which the Qovernment could be rolled on to fulfil aonrnitments made by it during negotiations. COSATU and NACTU warned, therefore, about the inevitability of protest action and of heightened industrial conflict, all of which could hinder the overall process of negotiations.

212. Subsequently, a joint statement by COSATU and NACTU indicated that the State President and other Qovernment officials had held a meeting with the federations’ leaders to discuss the crisis that had arisen in connection with the labour legislation. According to the federations, the State President had endorsed the ’ process of negotiations between the trade unions and the employers aimed at obtaining a national consensus on an acceptable labour law. All parties present at the meeting had agreed that a prompt resolution of the current crisis was needed and modalities to that effec’. were proposed for consideration.

213. Concern about the socio-economic inequalities created by m has prompted COSATU to develop initiatives concerning job skill training and housing, among other issues. The federation considered that the Qovernment’s propoaals in this regard are inadequate to the magnitude of the present problems and to their impact on a future society. COSATU informed the Team that it was undertaking a study of the economy and its prospect6 under a non-racial and democratic government.

214. It was stressed by both federations that the present labour legislatioc as well as the security legislation in place curtail freedom of association and the ability of trade unions to function. This circumstance affected negatively the otherwise positive developments in the country.

215. The Team was struck by the coneensus among all parties, organisations and professional groups it met on the imperative need to address the crisis in education.

216. It recalled that the Universal Declaration on Human Right8 stresees the importance of education for the full development of the human personality and the

/ . l . . A/44/960 I English’ Page 51

sense of dignity, and for enabling all persons to participate effectively in a free society to promote understanding, tolerance and friendship. Such principlas were consistent with the provisions of the United Nations Declaration, which affirmed that all men and women have the right and duty to participate in their own government a6 equal members of the society.

217. #any of the groups that expressed concern with the eduaatioaal crisie pointed out that the spirit and repercussions of the Bantu Education Adt still permeated’ the present education system, resulting in vast diseropanaies in litereay, sohool availability, teaching faailities, ensmination score8 and education funding between black and white students.

21&. The Minister of Education and Training, who is responsible for education of the black population outside of the 10 homelends, stated that the educational system for them was inferior to that for the white population and this u-as an unacceptable situation. The question was not whether it ehould change, but how.,

219. State-provided education for the black population was introduced for the first time in 1953. The approach of the Qoverment then was to provide **full” education for blacks in the homelands and minimum education for blacks in South Africa. The turning point came in 1978, when the Qovernment first aacept!,d the fact that blaoka were permanent residents in South Africa. A new Education Act was introduoed at that time, which provided that blacks in South Africa were entitled to full education modelled on that available to whites.

220. Over the past decade, resources for black education have increaeed tenfold, or six times in real terme. Believing that immediate equality would cause 80 muah disruption that it woulir outweigh the benefits, the Qovernment has advocated a phased approach. Progress was also reported in improving the quality of blaok teaching staff . The percentage of underqualified or unqualified teachers has been reduced to 30 per sent from the 70 per cent of five years ago. The dramatic 6 per cent per annum increase in the black school population was cited by the Qovermnent as a major constraint in narrowing the gsp between white end bleak ” education.

22X. The Minister of Education and Training stated that tho fJtriCt m3parbCLOn of schools was being phased out. The Minister of Education and Culture, who lo ” ’ ,I responsible for white education, is introducing a policy whereby it will be 1Cft to” > white pa.rants to decide to open their schools to all race8. Part of the voluntary “I programme that will be implemented next year will permit local oonununities to li3’ decide whether to “privetfee” their echnols. Uncler current arrangements subsidies ’ to private schools are reduced once the black enrolment erceeds 40 per cent, Catholic echools have been particularly disadvantaged by this policy. Howewr, schools privatised under the new scheme would continue to receive virtually a ! 100 per cent goverment subsidy, whatever the ratio between black and white pupil6 )’ might be. No financial incentives are envisaged at this time to encourage ’ : ” localities to desegregate t.heir schools. The Minister of Education and TraininiJ stated that no discrimination exists at the tertiary level of education. ’ A/44/960 Enqlioh Page S2

222. The Team aloo wee informed that the Qovernment is concerned about people using schools as a political tool and creating so many problems on a daily basis that they are sourinq relatioaa.

223. ANC expressed the hope ;hat the international community would help resolve the eduoationel crisis faced by the black population in South Africa. It warned that South Africa was sitting on a powder keg which could explode at any moment if inmediate a&ion wae not taken. The PAC called for the immediate repeal of the laws governing and controlling black education.

224. The National Education Criiis Committee (NECC) and other groupe also expressed serious concern about the atate of black education. It wee reported that education was still not compulsory for black child%% There were 17 dietinct departments OP education in spite of continuing demands for a unitary system.

225. According to information provided by the NECC, approaimately SO per cent of the black school age population did not attend school because of leak of funds or facilitiee. There was a shortage of over 165,000 claserooms in black primary and secondary schools, while an excess capacity of 177 schools and 305,000 seats exists for whites. Only 3 of every 1,000 blacks have a university degree, while the comparable figure for white6 is 35 per 1,000. The acute shortage of qualified , teachers wee the direct result of deliberate ap&%hU policies.

226. As evidence of the deterioration in the quality of education, it was pointed out that only 41 per cent of the blacks who took tho matriaulation examination at the end of high school passed in 1989, as compared to a pass rate in 1957 of 51 per cent. Only 9 per cent in 1959 passed at a high enough rate to be eligible to enter the university. Even lower matriculation examination pass rates are anticipated this year.

227. NECC stated that at the height of the etate of emergancy tens of thousands oe black students had been expelled, or had dropped out of schools. Following back-to-rohool campaigns lauached by community groups nt the end of last year, 10,000 students had returned to school in Soweto alone. However, as the Department of Education and Training had only projected a student enrolment in Soweto of 4,500, adequate funds were not available for salaries, textbooks and other supplies. During the month of June, there were seven different marchee, sit-ins, demonotratione and etnyaways in Soweto, Durban, Cape Town and Johannesburg to protest such educational concerns as ineufficient textbooks, teachers’ working conditions, unequal calaries between male and female teachers, the Department’6 system of inepection and broken school f~~cilities.

228. The South African Chamber of Suaineoa stressed the imbalance between the output of an inadequate educational system arad the needs of the economy as heinq a cruaial problem that cut across the colour barriers. The big challenge was to ensure that people were employable. The challenge was even qrea+.er when seen in conjunction with the imbalance between the growth of population and the availability of jobs. It was stated that, in the 1980s. there had been an annual

I... A/re/oe~ ’ Eaglieh Page S3 average increase of 230,000 new job seekers on the market while only 80,000 new jobs had been created per year.

229. The Black Sash described the situation in the following words: @*we have produced a generation of illiterate, untrained, politicised and unemployed black youth”. In its written submission it noted that in %he procoos the young have sacrificled their youth, their education, their innocre.aae. They cannot regain the lost yeari. This is the tragedy of the young black generation, but it is aleo true of the white youths who have been indoctrinated and trained to believe that it ir worth fighting to the death to prerrerve an ethnic identity.

230. The repeal of the Pass Lawa and the end of influr control in 1986 accelerated the large-scale migration of blacks to urban areas in search of employment and a better way of life. This hae areated problems of overcrowding, a eignificant expansion of sguatter settlements and xwere pressures on urban serviaee. The magnitude of the problem, according to the Urban Foundation, can be gauged by the fact that 7 million, or one out of five of the black population, lack permsnenc: shelter.

231. As discussed at the beginning of thio chapter, the State Prerident has announced thet the Qroup Areaa Act and the Land Acts will be reviowed by the Parliement early next year.

232. Severar change@ in land policy have oaaurred 6ince January 1990. Xn rergonre to popular uprisings, the Government snL.?unced in May that independence for the non-independent homelands was no longer a viable option. Foreover, the incorporation of land into the self-governing homeland6 will not take place without the approval of the lawful inhabitants. The Oovernmant aleo announoed that the 2 million hectares reeerved for blac).s and owned ty the South African Development ' Trust would be lessed or sold to black farmers. At present, blacks live on thiu land a8 rent-paying tenants.

233. The Minister of Planning and Provincial Affairs said that the Government #aa making an effort to address the problems aaueed by the rapid urbanisation of black@ einue 1986. This year, 300 million raud has been allocated to purohaoe lend on which people can build houses.

234. The Government doee make a diotinctJ.on in its troatment of aqUattOr0 who erect structures 011 land they can legally occupy under the Group Areac Aat and l&l they occupy illegally, either becauee it .(e not reserved for blacks or becauoo It lo owned by someone else. According to the Minioter of Planning and Ptovlnclal Affairs, the Qovernment evicted people only when “euitable and aoceptable” houeing could be found elsewhere.

I... A/44/900 English Page 84

235. Representatives of civic associations and community service groups welcomed the proposed changes in land policy, but expressad concern about privatisation efforts that could lead to land speculation and dispossession in areas formerly reserved for blacks or colourede. In explaining the problem with rural land tenure, one group said that although the Q>vernment has stated that incorporation of land into oelf-governing homelands would not continue without the approval of the lawful tenanto, such incorporations still take place. In addition, some of the homelands wer’e trying to privatire their land, while other homeland communities maintained that there should be a moratorium on such sales.

236. According to information provided by the National Land Committee, most blacks live on land held communally, or as rent-paying tenants on land administered by the South African Development Trust. According to the Committee, the announcement by the OoverAment that 2 million hectares of Development Trust land would be available for salt or lease to black farmers, contrary to the previous controversial policy of incorporating it into homelands, raised concerns about the possibility of land speculation, and its euitabilitl* for farming. It was also stated that black farmers generally have neither adeguate infrastructure nor access to such financial assistance. The development basks in tho homelands tend to allocate their resources mainly for large infrastructur? projects, rather than for agricultural credit for farmers.

237. The Urban Foundation said projactions indicate that South Africa’s population will expand from 30 million in 1980 to 60 million in 2010. The black percentage of the population will increase from 71 per cent to 82 per cent duriAg this period. Commenting on the high rate of urbanisation, it was expected that the number of persons living An urban area6 will increase Prom 9 million in 1980 to 27 million by the year 2010,

238. ACCOrdiAg to bile Urban Foundation, the housing situation was appalling. The backlog in housing in the urban areas alone was 850,000 units. Although 130,DOu housing un:‘ts needed to be produced annually to meet the demand, only 40,000 units were built last year.

239. Members of civic associations complained of serious OvercrowdiAg and spiralling rent inareases in +ownships and newly-opened urban areas. Private groupsr such a6 the Urban Fourrdation, have eseisted black people to obtain housing and leasehold aAd freehold tenure rights. Howove r , they contended that the two major constraints to b;eck home ownership were aPfordebility and the pace of delivery. IA 1919, the Urban Foundation oaid it wao responsible for the creatlou of 5,000 houses and serviced lots, making their progrsanme the largest housing scheme for black6 in the country. The P’~~undotion also meAtiOAed that it had Bet up an agelrcy that assisted black buoines ,I~II iA competing fca building contracts la the hcuaing industry.

240. Tko Team was 1nPormod by nome association8 that the GoverAment’s black town councils in the township6 were not viable. Black townships receive lower subsidies than the white townships and they have no tax levying powers. As a result there hue beon a serious deterioration in services.

/ . . . A/14/960 , IECnqliah, Page 65

241. The Black Sash explained that the rapid movement of blacks into urban aentresr particularly after 1986, had been followed by pressures to vaoate land near white residential areas. Local authoritier and landowner8 sought legal action to remove blacks thrauqh the use of the Trespass and the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Acts. According to the group, the Government was recognising that 1 could not provent black urbanisation, so it now sought to oontrol it and make it orderly.

242. The Urban Foundation felt that a careful study of land poliay and rights was required to protect black interests prior to the repeal oL the Laed Acts. By establishing multiple authorities, the Land Acts created a complex system. For instance, six different bodies exercised authority over land in Natal. One can travel three kilometres and go through five jurisdictions.

E. Health

243. Inadequate health services and proventable dicease arising from poverty and. poor sccial conditions were matters high on the agenda of a number of anti-e groups. Both tk7 Gov,ernment and movements and organioationo ayraed that urgent action was required to address the health needs of the black ggpulatios.

244. Following its decision to eliminato diearimination in health and reaOqnixhg ’ that there was no statutory requirement that such faciliti6s be Separate, thm South African Government announced on 16 May that provinoial hosgltale would ba opa3 to all groups. The Minister of Health stated that the new policy is intended to introduce greater equality in the health care syrltem where there is an taxaass capacity of 11,700 beds in white hospitals ar.d a 7,000 bed ehortaqe in black hospitals. Instructions on the new policy, wUch providar that no p6 .oon apey be rejected or turned away on the grounds of race or oolour , have been omat to all hospital superintendants.

245. The Minister also stated that the abolition of influx control and the resulting acceleration of urbanisation by blacks Fad created a gtrat noed to expand primary health care centers. To address this need, the Government plane to allocate additional Punds and resources to commission the establichmant o& 21 primary health clinics that will concentrate on health education, iurnunisation, maternal and child care and sanitation. A network of clinics will be drveloprd. Tbo new policy represea.ts an important slrift in health aarb policy, whioh in. the past has allocated 43 per cent of the health budoet to 13 academiu tsaahinq hospitals and to specialised high-technology procedures. Such a shift in poliay will affect the training of health cere profeesionale.

246. Since 79 per cent of the people in South AErica depend upon the State for ,., , health care, and 20 per cent of those cannot afford to pay for expensive procedures, the Government faces formidable costs in trying to provide health aare for all.

/ . . . A/44/960 English Page 56

247. As needs vary by province, the Minister indicated that she had asked for a etudy of each region in order to elaborate an appropriate strategy and the development of new facilities by region as part of a five year plan. 248. Among the other health problems cited by the Minister were the care of the elderly, ensuring the treatment of widespread diseases such a8 tuberculosis and diarrhoea-related illnesses and tanching traditional medical practitioners how to, detect such impostant diseases as t berculosis and AIDS. The Winister announced that the Government would intro&;ce legislation in the current session of Parliament that reflected the move towards a unitary health system.

249, The Government’s decision to eden the hospitals to all race8 was welcomed by the two black health qroupsr namely the National Medical and Dental Association (NAMDA) and the South African Health Workers’ Congress (SAHWCO). They were aPtaid, however, that this decision could be circumvented by entrenched attitudes at the local level. They also contended that the Group Areas Act would tend to neutralise the impact of the new policy. According to SAHWCO, the Government spends 451 rand on health care for white patients and only 115 rand on black yatients. Even greater disparities exist in infant mortality rates. Whereas 12 white babies per 1,000 die at birth, the ssme rate for blacks ranges from 94 to 124 per 1,000.

250. Among the obstaclea to the improvement of health care for blacks, NAMDA and BAMKO identified the fragmentation of the health management structures into 13 or 14 different departments and the unequal level of resources and health insurance available to blacks. In addition, malnutrition, female illiteracy, income inequalities, particularly in rural areas, poor occupational health and safety conditions and the prerogatives given to local authorities, remained issues of aonaern. The two qroupo advocated a non-racial health system based upon equality, accessibility and affordability.

VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS

251. The United Nations Team had the opportunity during. its visit to meet with eight Cabinet Ministers and with representatives of 39 political parties, movements and orqanisetiooe. Having listened carefully to their views on the current eituation in South Afrioa, it was not possible for the Team to leave the country without having formed some definite impresslone of the concerns uppermost in the minds of the South African people.

252. South . frica has reached the throshold of a new era. The political process un which it has embarked holds encouraging prospects of leeding to the dismantlement of e.

253. A national debate has begun on the adequacy of the measures that have been initiated to establish a climate conducive to negotiations, and on additional measures that need to be taken to satisfy the aspirationo of the South African people I

/ . . . 264. There ie a general proegtloa that the path taken by the Qoveramrat offore real promise for construative political dirauscioa and reproseate a cignifioant change fronj the position of it6 ptedeasroore. Yet, there is al80 a widespread belief that a number of additional steps ema required to l atablish an atmosphere favourable to free politiaal aativity. AgmJibU laws, rapterrive l eaurlty regulatione, and persistent violenae, inoluding that prevailing in Natal, aont9nbm~ j to adversely affect domestic tranquility, ae well aa the emso of reourity end well-being of the people. 80 long as raoisl attitudea poroirt and m ’ ‘+a~ I, struaturee at the local level remain, the prooeae for ohange will encounter difficulties.

255. These issues need to be addfesued aa CL matter of urgenay. They woulld ” “P beg undoubtedly faoilitate the proaerc of broad aonrultstionm among all politioal forcer on the mechaniems appropriate for framing a now aoartitution and Cor rhaplng the politiaal, soaial and economio future of the oountry. Moreovar, a rorkr of confidence-building measures designed to reduoe politiaally-related violonao and addrese saute soaial and eoonomia problems affeoting the bleak populstIo& would I,’ strengthen this proceee.

2S6. Fundamental ohange in any eoaiety often orestoo unaertainty, ansiety and oven fear. These emotions should not be underretimste+d, psrtioularly ia a aountry of vast inequities, euoh as South Afriaa. Oeepite them real aonaarneI t40 ahallrnge of nation-building and the growing desire to build a future different from the paI& has already begun to stir the people of South Afrioa in way8 that hold the promiro of profound and benefiaial ohange. .. A/44/980 English Page 88

APPENDIX

Saturday, 9 June 1990 Arrival in m

Sunday, 10 June Meeting8 with! the Black Sash; representativez of the ANC Constitutional Committeer repreeentativoe of PAC (Western Cape Region) tlonday, 11 June Meetings with: ABWVDF (Western Cape Eieqion)i the ‘Institute for a Democratic Alternative for South Africa (IDASA)J University Rectorzr the Solidarity Partyr the Asanien People’s Organisation (AZAPO)

Tuesday, 12 June Meetings with8 the Minister of Education and Development Aids Civic Leaders from the townehipe of Khayelitsha and Crossroadsr Editors of local newsgagere# the Minieter of Health and Population Development8 the Democratic Party8 the Minister of Law and Order! the Minister of Financer the Minister of Constitutional Development

Wednesday, 13 June Meetings with: the Minister of Planning and Provincial Affairs8 the Minister of Manpowerr the Reverend Allen Boeeek (Pxesident, World Alliance of Reformed Churcheslr the Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairsr Academicst the Archbishop Deemond Tutu (Anglican Archbishop of Cape Town)

Departure for F

Thursday, 14 June Meetings with: the regional leadership of ANC/VDF/COSATVJ civic ANWVDF leaders from Pietermaritzburgl civic Inketha leader6 from Pietermaritzburgt the Administrator of Natalr an inter-denominational group of church leaders

Friday, 15 June Meetings with8 the Nationel Association of Democratic Lawyers: Inkatha

Departure for B

Meetings with8 the South African Council of Churchest the Consultative Bueiness Movement (CBM)r the National African Federated Chembers of Commerce (NAFCOC) A/44/960 English Page 99

Saturday, 16 June Meetings withr the League of Red Cross SoaietiesJ Editors of local newopapere and the South African Broadaacting CorporstioW the International Committee of the ‘Red Crosej the Reverend Frank Chikane (Saaretary-Qeneral of the South African Council of Churches 1

Sundayr 17 June Meeting la EBW&B with: Mrs. Albertina Sirulu (Fe&ration of South Afriaaa Women) Meetings with: Editor6 of the alternative medial the Detainees’ Support Cossnitteer the Human Rights Cosm~iseion; the National Land Connriseion

Monday, 18 Juae Meetings with: the Urban Foundation? the Inrtitute of Raae RelatiOnSit the National Eduaation Crisis Cosvnittee, the National Council of Trade.Vnionrr the South Afriaaa Chamber of Busiaeee# the leadership of PA0 the leadership of ANC and VDF) the Boerstaat Party ./ Tuesday, 19 June Meetings with: the Congreeo of South Afrioan Trade Unions, the National Wedical and Dental Arewiation j’ (NAMDA)J’ the South African Health Workorr' Congreoc , (SAEWCO); the Independent Board of Inquiry into ! Informal Regreecionr the South African Youth Congresot the national umbrella organisation of aivia organioations

Weeting in Ptetatie with, the Minicter for Foreign Affsirs and his senior offiaials

Departure for Na#

I... A/44/990 English Page 90

AUSTRALIA , 1 , [0riginal~ English]

[References to AustrJiao aseistanaehave been written on the aesumption that this material will be published after 1 July.1

1. The Australian government remains oelsed of .tba icoue of a politiaal resolution of the South Afriaa question. Austral$a hau consistently called for a negotiated settlement to South Africa’s politiaal crisis involving the full and free partiaipation of legitfmate representatives of the South African people. Australia has warmly weloomed the steps taken by the Bout4 African Oovernmeot to normalise the politiaal situation inside South Africa and initiate genuine negotiations with representative black leaera. Australia.has taken every opportunity to encourage all parties in South.Africa to keep up the momentum in removing the obetaales remaining to such negotiationa on a new constitutional , dispensation.

2. The Australian Qoverxment has.stepped up ita, long-ctanding support for the opponents of m. Both the African Natiooal Congress (AK) and the Pan Africanist Congress of Aaania (RAC) continue to maintain offices in Australia. Australia’s Minister for Fore&gP: Affairs.and Trade travelled to Lusaka to meet with ABC Deputy President Mandela and other senior AtX leaders in March 1990. He also met the ANC delegation, including Deputy President Mandela, at the meeting of Commonwealth Foreign Minioters on Southern Africa held at Abuja from 16 to 17 May 1990.

3. Australia has taken a lead in campaigning internatioaally for an increase in support for the opponents of m. Auatralia joined other mambare of the Connnonwealth Connnittee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa in welcoming initiatives to provide support for the process of dialogue and negotiations and aalling on all governments to make more aource8 available for aid to the victims snd opponents of w, with particular reference to the costs involved in the rapatriation and resettlement of South African exiles.

4. On 17 May 1990, the Auotralian Government announced that it would provide #A 15 milPion over the next three years to desist in the reintegration and development of South African victims of m. The majority of the new funds will be earmarked for assistance to AEC Por humaaitarian and educational activitiee. Up to $A 2 million will be available immediately to assist with the repatriation and resettlement of exiles, estimated to number in excess of 20,000 people.

/ . . . ’ I : A/44/qai);, ~: Ea@&sh ,’ Page 61

5. Australia continues to use concerted and effective measures, including the full observance of the mandatory arms embargo, aimed at applying pressure to eneuro a epeeedy-end to m. Auetralia hae implemented the full range of eanctione measures adopted by Commonwealth Heads of Govbrnment at their meeting@ in Nassau (1955) and London (1966). The Australian Qovernment remain6 committed to. ~,,“, the Commonwealth’s Qleqeaglee Declaration on sporting contact&with South Afriqa. .,

6. Australia ueee no immediate reaaoa to contevplate relaxation of eahsting “’ ” : eaactlons and pressures until the commitment of the South Af!rican Qoymunent is, ,;.. ,,., visibly demonstrated by at least some degree uf performance in dismantling the pillars of w. The Australian Qovernment hao taken an international,le,pb in efforts to ensure that the international aommunity does not re.lar qxisting mqqpur?,g :,,:. aimed at placing pressure on the South African regime to implement meaningful ., ! change as envieaged,in the Special Session Declaration. Australia’s MiaCeter for Foreign Affair6 anO,Trade, together with other member6 of the Commonwealth For&u Ministers Committee on Southern Africa, wrote to EC and Q7.f3overnments urging the j, continued application of sanctions until substantive change has occurred, cleaqy “.,(,: and irreversibly. The letter wa6 delivered by the Australian Mninister for Foreign ’ Affairs and Trade to the Preeidency of the Eurogean Community (EC) (E~re),pnd..~ijl/ ,. I. be followed up in hie dieaueeions at the May EC Minieterial,talks. ; .I.,,’ ,.I 7. Australia continues to render assistance to the front-line and neighbou~L{g ‘,‘.‘:“I States through it8 Southern Africa Aid Programme of 8A 119 million over the., : ,,, .( triennium 1990191 to 1992193. Australia has continued to support the.people of ,: Namibia, through an allocation of up to $A 6 million Ln the current triennium oi the Southern Africa Aid Programme. Up to June 1990, Auetralia spent approximat+y $A 13.9 million on South Africans disadvsptaged by e through the $J)@W, ~ ,,, ,j programme since its establiebment in 1986/87. The SAPSAN programme 18 deoigped t? !, I ,,,), eupport efforts to prepare for a poet-m Soukh Africa, partiaularly : through ll!. the sponsorship of education and training activities. Oignlficant humanltarian:~ t assistance has also been provided to meet the needs of rtfugeec being..reloaatsd in ,...i 1 the front-line States and, more recently, $A 200,000 wa8 allocat;ed to ase@& tt)e “,.;. victims of violence In Natal province. a’ ,2 :. . . i. 0. The Australian Qovernment ha8 extended assictance to the Q&rroasato,.of Angola and Moaamblque and hae eugported their efiforte to find peaaqful aolutioas. to @he ,I internal conflicte in Lheir respective countriee. Australia has a eubstsatlal ,. progrenune of assistance to Mozambique, amounting to OA 19 milLion for cleve~o~ent~,~ :,] activitiee over the next triennium. This aeeiotance. will be channelled primarily :. ,I through the Special Comnmonwealth Fund for Mosambigue. Auctralia has been the. , largest contributor to the Special Commonwealth Fund with pledges totalling $A 5.45 million. Australia has aleo allocated to Angola $A 1 million over the next thre years under its Southern Africa Aid Programme. In addition, Australia provides emergency aseietsnce on a needs baeis. I A/44?9'60 En@ ish Page 62

BULQARIA

[Original: English]

The People’s Republic of Bulgaria hae repeatedly confirmed ite condemnation of the policy of a@uk&U pursued by the South African Qovernment. Bulgaria is of tbe view that it would be impossible to build lasting peace and co-operation in southern Africa without establishing a new constitutional order in that country baeed on the principles of.the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights.

The People’s Republic o#Z Bulgaria has always actively supported the struggle of all democratic an% anti-racist forces in South Africa aimed at the complete elimination of the eystem of racial segregation. These efforts, supported actively by the international community, have already led to positive changes in the country. The Bulgarian Government issued a special declaration welcoming tho release of Nelson Mandela, the outstanding fighter for human rights and social juetice.

Bulgaria continues to adhere to the respective resolutions of the United Nationa, particularly to the Declaration on Ags$&i& and its Destructive Consequences in Southern Africa, adopted at the sixteenth special session of the United Nations General Assembly, calling for international isolation of the Pretoria r6gime. The Bulgarian Qovernment does not maintain political, economic, ’ trade and cultural relations with the South African authorities.

The People’s Republic of Bulgaria has extended it8 consistent support and assietance to the democratic forces and movements fighting against m in South Africa.

Special attention is being paid to promoting co-operation with the front-line States. A concrete expression of this is Bulgaria’s participation in the Africa Fund with the sum of $US 1.5 milion earmarked for scientific and technical assistance and for training of personnel.

The Qovernment of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria and the Bulgarian public are convinced that the proceeses of democratic changes in South Africa will lead to the triumph of the ideal8 of the struggle against m and to the establishment of a united, non-racial and democratic Stete.

CANADA

[Original I English]

1. The Government of Canada is using c.)ncerted and effective meaauree, including full observance of the mandatory arms embargo, to apply pressure to ent3ure a speedy end to BRB~$&&. In this regar%, the Prime Minister of Cana%a made the following etatemeut in the House of Commons:

/ . . . A/44/960 English ’ Page 63

The time will no doubt come, sooner rather than later, we hope, when clear and irreversible change has occurred and it will be appropriate to ease come of the prebrlure that has helped bring it about.’ But, at this arucial juncture, ’ we believe the way to advance the proceea of~clemocracy in .South Africa is to maintain exist+g esnctiofia.

2. Canada has also continued to provide aaaistenae to the front-line States in the form of financial, material and technical resources.

DENMARK

[Original : Enyt/,ahl ‘ ’ ’ 1. Denmark has consistently condemned the system of BPsrthaid and time.. and ‘again urged the international conununity to put pressure on the South African Qovernment. ’ to ecbure the immediate end tqtal’abolition of nga&&i$)’ * 2 . .? The Danish Qovernment attaches the greatest importance to the Declaration on ikBr.md and its Destructive Consequences in Southern Africa, adopted by consehsus at the sixteenth special session of the Qeneral Assembly On 14 December 1969. . . :. . 3. It is our firm belief that the unanimity demonstrated by the world community , on that occasion layed a significant role in persuading the South Afrialur I I' Government of the need to take steps towards creating the neaesaary climate for negotiations on the future of,South Africa. ‘.~ I 4. The Danish Qoverzunent welcomed the measuree announced by Prebsent de Klerk on 2 February 1990, .the subsequent releaoe of Nelcon Mandela, and, not leant, the first formal meeting between the South African Government and MC in Cape Town from 2 to 4 May 1990. We urge all concerned to continue on this poaitlve and constructive path.

5. However, the basic otructurec of sasrthald are rtill in place. The Danirb ’ Government will therefore continue to exert preseure on the South African Government to take the neceoeary etepe to enable dialogue and peaceful change to take place in South Afric&. Until there is clear evidence that profound and irreversible change has taken place, Denmark will maintain its trotriative meaauraa, including ita far-reaching economic and other eanations, in aacordance with the Programme of Action contained in the Declaration on m. Concerning details of the mea6urea taken by the’DBniah Qavernment. ref4rence~lc made ta previous reports on the implementation of the annual General Assembly reaolutione on concerte% international action for the elimiuation of mtbaiP.

6. Furthermore, Denmark will continue Lta consider-Cle humeaitarian, legal, educational and other aesiatance to the victim@ of m. The support to the victims of apartheid has increased continuously over the years, and in 1990 the amount will total 80 million Denieh kroner.

/... A/44/060 English Page 64

7. Finally, Denmark intends to continue its strong support for the endeavours of the front-line States and other neighbouring States through bilateral development assistance, assistance through the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC), and through other multilateral channels.

FEDEIAL REPUBLIC OF OERbUWY

[Original: English]

1. The Federal Republic of Germany reaffirms its suupport for the goals and measures set out in the Declaration on &fa&&U and its Destructive Consequences in Southern Africa, dated 14 December 1969. Together with its European partners it partiaipated actively in bringing about the international consensus impressively reflected by the adoption of the Declaration. The Declaration, backed by the entire international community, is a milestone along the road to the final and peaceful elimination of m. It did not fail to make its political impact, as the recent encouraging developments in South Africa show.

2. The Federal Republic of Germany confirms its conviction, which it hae expressed on numerous occasions within and outside the United Nations! the degrading system of ~g~r!&.Rid cemot be reformed, it must be abolished and replaced by a liberal, democratic and equitable social system. To attain this goal, the Federal Republic of Germany has for a long timo been eaerting strong influence on * the Government of South Africa both bilaterally and in unison with its European partners. It appeals to the leaders in South Africa to proceed further along the route recently embarked upon and at last to enter into a national dialogue so that the foundations can jointly be laid for creating in South Africa a system truly characterised by freedom, and in which both the present population and coming generations can live and work together in conditions of justice, peace and solidarity.

3. The Federal Republic of Germany is aware of its responsibility for the people in Africa and acts accordingly. The common goal of peacefully overcoming e ie served above all by the positive and restrictive measures yie-h-v&~ South Africa which the Federal Republic of Germany adopted with its European partners in 1965 and 1966 and has been systematically implementing. In addition, it makee use of its bilateral opportunities and contacts to press for swift and definitive changes in South Africa.

To carry out the programme of action described in the Declaration on iLkth.&# the Federal Republic of Germany has in particuler taken or continued the following measures:

(li In its committed struggle against m, the Federal Republic of Germany fully meet its obligatfons arising from the mandatory arms embargo imposed by the United Nations Security Council in 1977. Lonq hofore that, from 1963 onwards. the Federal Government had no longer approved any supplie6 of weapons and other military equipment to South 4friea. After the Security Council decision of 5 November 1977 it

/ . . . A/44/960 ’ English , Page 65

supplemented and tightened the relevant regulations, thus fully incorporating into domestic law the mandatory arms embargo and the recommendatory provisions of the pertinent resolutions on rpoprtbaip, especially Security Council resolution 591. This consistent poiicy aimed at the elimination of m is also manifest in the wording of the ministerial decision on European political co-operation of September 1965, pursuant to which supplies of sensitive goods intended for the police and armed forces of South Africa are no longer authorised ‘in the countries of the European Community. Any violations are prosecuted in the Federal Republic of Germany.

(2) The restrictive measures taken by the Federal Republic of Qermany’for the abolition of e are based on the decisions made by the foreign, ministers of the European Community countries in Luxembourg on 10 September 1965 and in Brussels on 16 September 19S6. The Federal Government will maintain these measures until there ie clear evidence of profound and irreversible changes in South Africa in Yeeping with the Strasbourg Declaration of the European Council of 9 December 1969. 14, monitors fully the application cad implementation of these measures.,

(3) To counter the consequences of eaartheia and mitigate them for the people concerned, the Federal Republic of Germany has .also taken a number of supportive measures. It has for some time been sponsoring projects in , South Africa which are, in it8 view, likely to help overcome m and its consequences. They include above al’ tivgaolarship and training progremmes for black South Africans as well as activitiee concerning ,. health care, rural development and promotion of the arts. These project0 have an annual financial volume of roughly DM 6.1 million. In aQdit$on, the Federal Republic of Germany’contributes to the EC Comniooion’e progremme of poeitive measures, which involves a total of approximately DM 50 million. The Federal Republic of Qmnany’s long-standing assistance for the opponents and victims of e was also ooatinuqd and expanded in 1990. In the 1990 fiscal year a substantial voluntary contribution is again being made to the Unite& Nations Eduaational @ad Training Progrsmme for Southern Africa. A corresponding aoatribution ie earmarked for the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa, which serves to finance legal assistance to persons politically persecuted under the Bpartheia laws as well as their dependents. A sum of DM 135,000 was again pledged for the United Nations Fund for Namibia in 1990. As Namibia has meanwhile become independent, the use of this amount will be decided on together with the new Nemibian Government.

(4) The Federal Republic of Germany backs rrational and international efforts aimed at achieving a cease-fire and lasting peace in Angola and Moesmbique. In the context of European political co-operation, the ’ ‘, Twelve #embers of the European Community adopted on zi April 1990 at the suggestion of the Federal RepWlic of Germany a declaration on the situation in Angola, in which the conflicting parties are called upon to agree on a cease-fire and to enter into direct talks. In the declaration, the delve also announced eubstantial assistance for the

/ . . . Al44/i+60 Rnglish Page 66

reconstruction of the country, once a peace process has been effectively initiated. The Federal Republic of Germany has earmarked DM 36 million for development co-rperation with Angola in 1990 in the hope that such co-operation can be started before the end of the current year. The Federal Republic of Germany regards humanitarian aid for Angola and Mosambique as an important contribution towards fostering peaae and securit_v in the region. Xn 1989 it therefore ma& available DR 5.4 mallion ta assist refugees there. So far this year DM 2.5 million has been dioburbed as humanitarian aid. For years now the Federal Republic o Germany has also been supporting projects in the context of ’ “Operation Hunger” for the benefit of disadvantaged sections of the South African population.

(5j The Federal Republic of Qermany has at all times backed the front-line and neighbouring countries in their struggle against BJUMA~U and in repeiling South Africa’s policy of destabilieation. For the 1986/09 biennium alone it made available bilaterai assistance amounting to ahout DR 675 millicn for tlros.. countries, which are all members of the SADCC. In addition it bilaterally supported SADCC co-operation in the mne period with an amount of DM 70 million. In 1969, agreements were concluded with tte front-line countries of Mosambigue and 2amb;i.w ~11 the cancellation of debt from bilateral financial co-operation totalling DR 750 million (Mozambique: Dt4 160 millionr Zambia: DM 570 million). For, development. co-operation with the now independent State of Namibia, a 8um of DM 100 trillion is envisaged for 1990 for the first time. The food aid additions”; granted by tbo Federal Republic of Qermany to countries in southern Africa in 1909 amounted to DM 25.6 million. The Federei Republic of Germany will continue its co-operation with the SADCC countrio: and undertake every effort in future, too, to help them make economic progress. The Federal Republic of Germany hopes that the initial talku between the ANC leaders and the South African Government will soon be followed by negotiations leading to the abolition of RR~&&&¶ end the joint drafting of a new aonstitution whiah ensures juetiae for all South A’ ‘:ans. South Africa now has the opportunity to become a democratic cou,, y free of racism, All of us should seek to ensure that this happens quickly. The Federal Republic of Germany is willing to do so.

FINLAND

(Original: English]

1. The main elements of Finnish policy towards southern Africa continue to he assistance, on one hand, and sanctions on the other. The r;bjectives of our assistance are to alleviate the effects of South Africa’s policy of aoerthefi and to contribute to development and demourar:y throughout southern Afriae. Our economic sanctions against South Africa include a trade embargo as well a6 a ban on loans, on involvement in lending consortia and on the sale of new patents to and new investmente in South Africa.

/ . . . ‘A/44/960 English Page 67

2. Finland welcome8 the resent positive developments in South Afriaa. In the present situation. it is of utmoet importance that the promising dialogue between the Government and the African National CongrecB in partiaulsr aontiauro and develops. The Qroote Sahuur Minute of 4 May 1990 embodying their aommon oommitment towards the reeolution of the existing alimate of violenae and intimidation from whatever quarter aa well aa commitment to stability and to a.pesorful procera of negotiation8 can provide a basis for further progress. It is an enaouraging ctsg towards the realiaation of the objectives set out by the international aonununity. last December in the Dealaration on &U&&U and its Dentructive Coarequenoea ip Southern Africa.

3. At their meeting in Finland last Ebarah, the Nordia Foreign tdiairtere agreed that the positive developmente in South Africa made .:t neceooarp to review the’ joint No:dic Programme of Aation against m Coaseguently, the Nordio countries have modified their joint guidelines uon;erning the iseuanoe of visas to South Africm citirens with a view to broadening poseibilities for oontaatn whiob contribute to further dialogue in South Africa.

4.However, aa the pillare of the m eye&em remain in plaoe, Finland does not regard it opportune as yet to lift its economia eanctions againet South Africa. If reform6 in South Africa continue, ae we hope, we will review our policies accordingly.

5. In keeping with the Nordia Progrme of Action, Finland Pas eignifioantly * widened its co-operation with South Africa’s neighbours.. the members of the Southern African Develogment Co-operation COW.--*? 1 (AADCC). .One third of Finland’s direct devoloPment asaietance goes to SADCC co*:?,:ties, with the purpose of assisting them in their economic development., thec~by reducing their dependenoe on South Af riaa.

6. Finland givee humanitarian assilLmae to the viotime of m through multilateral channels as well a8 bilabrrally. Finland supports the aativitirr of ’ the United Natione Educational and Training Progrtumne for Southern Afriaa a8 well. as those of the United Nations Trust i’cmd for South Africa. We have aloo oupported the humanitarian anti-e activities of the ANC a8 well ar thr aativitiee pf other non-governmental orga&aatione providing a variety of setvia to the viatims of m both inside South Afriaa and abroad.

I... A/44/960 Englieh Page 68

FRANCE [Originall French1

1. France has for many years been working for the total eradication of ~ in scrrthern Africa. For this purpose, it pureues an active policy on two fro&e: by applying a eerie6 of restrictive measures end by implementing a programme of aeeietanae for victims of racial diecrimination. France has frequently made public the full list of restrict$ve measure8 which it has adopted either at the national level or togethor with its European partners. Besides military matters, these measures address other items suah a8 economic, nuclear, eaientific, cultural and eports co-operation. In this respect, it should be noted that France’s intention is not to impcse punishment!.s or penalties but to exert preesure in order to hnaten a process which we believe to be just and inevitable. a. For Frame, a progressive relaxation of the restrictive meawrefs can be aontemplated only in ths light of the results of the negatiatione under way in South Africa. The French Qovernment believes, in thie connection, that the South African f3overnment must lift the state of emergency and release all political prisoners.

3. France urges a continuation of the dialogue between the parties a8 the only way of moving forward. In this context, the constructive atmosphere which has prevailed in encounter6 between the South African Government and the black I nationalist movement augurs well for progrees in the near future towares the dismantling of e.

The French Qovermnent ha6 always done its utmost to help the victims of li.uaid through a programme which hinges on training, health and legal aseietance. The total value of euah programmes will amount to 8 million franc8 in 1990.

5. Finally, Franae has, with ite European partners, engaged in intensive diplomatic activity with a view to persuading the South African Qovernment of the need to embark on fundamental reforms. These diplomatic meatsure represent a significant contribution to action by the international community to eliminate e in South Africa.

IRELAND 81

(Original: English]

The European Council welcomes the important change6 that have taken piece in southern Africa eince it met in Strasbourg.

01 On bshalf of the Twelve member States of the European Community

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The European Council warmly.welcomes the successful conclusion of the process b~i~q~~q Namibia to independence with a constitution based on multi-party democracy and human rights. The European Community and its member States will continue to give aid and support to the people of Namibia as they build their new country, in particular in the frametiork of the new Lom& Convention. They welcome the talks which have taken place between the Angolan Government and UNITA under Portuguese auspices. They look forward to the resolution of the conflict in Angola and also of that in Mozambique through dialogue.

The European Council greatly welcomes the significant changes that have taken place in South Africa in recent months: the release of Nelson Mandela and of tither political prisoners; the unbanning of political organizations; the substantial lifting of the state of emergency; the commitment by the Gover&ent to abolish the' a?artJeid system and to create a democratic and non-racial South Africa, and its willingness to enter into negotiations on the future of South Africa with the representatives of the majority.

They pay tribute to the parts played in bringing about these changes by President F. W. de Klerk and Mr. Nelson Mandela. The efforts of President F. W. de Klerk to bring about a new era in South Africa are testimony to his foresight and courage. Mr. Nelson Mandela, a prisoner for 27 years, has . inspired millions of South Africans opposed to anarthead and thereby amply demonstrated his qualities of statesmanship, qualities that will be required in the, challenging period ahead in South Africa.

The objective of the European Commurnity and its member States is the complete dismantlement of the apartheid system, by peaceful means and without delay, and its replacement by a united, non-racial and democratic state in which all people shall enjoy common and equal citieenship and where respect for universally recognised human rights is guaranteed. They welcome the joint commitment between the South African Government and the ANC in the Groote Schuur Minute to &-ability and a peaceful process of negotiations. They call on all parties in South Africa to endorse this objective. It is the intention of the European Community and its member States to encourage, by every means available to them, the early opening of negotiations leading to the creation of a united, non-racial and democratic South Africa.

Negotiations on a new South Africa should get under way without delay. The substantial progress made towards removal of the obstacles represented by the state of emergency and the detention of political prisoners is welcome. The European Council looks forward to early agreement between the South African Government and the ANC on the conditions in which exiles can return and on the fiefinitiorx of political prisoners leading to their release. The European Council calls on all parties to remove the remaining obstacles to peaceful negotiations and to refrain from violence or advocacy of violence. . The L'uropean Council fully recognizas that a new post-m South Africa should be able to avail itself of all ths economic resourcesr including access to external finawe, required to ensure its future prosperity and the full development rsf i-33.4 its people. South Africa faces acute socio-economic problems, especially in

/ - . . A/44/88; English Page 70 the area8 of employment, eduastion and housing, againet a background of a high rate of population growth. TheCe problem8 have been greatly,ewscerbated by aoar.theid. Positive action i8 needed to reotify imbalanCe8. ‘,‘I . .

Through the programme of poeitive ~ea8Ureer tt Community ha8r for a number of years, been providing asoiotanae to the victim8 of m. In the light of the recent deVelOQmenL8 in South Afriaa and a8 a 8trOng signal Of QOlitifJal 8UQpOrt t0 tholre disadvantaged by m and of the will to aontribute to a new .’ sooio-economio balance, the Community intend8 to inarease the fund8 being made available under it8 .programe and to adapt the programme to the need8 of the new eituation, includirq thoee conneoted with the return end reeettlomeat of exiles. It welcomss the positive attitude being di8played by all parties,, inalud4ng the new South Afrioen Qovernment, to euah programmes. <’

At it8 meeting in Stra8bOurg in December Last, thi .European Counail dkoided that the Community and it8 member States would maintain the pressure that they errert on the South African authorities in order to promote the profound and irrevereible change8 which they have repeatedly stood for. The ,European Council affirm8 its willingnese to aonsider a gradual relaxation of this pressure when there is further clear evidence that the process of change already initiated continue6 in the direotion called for et Stresbourg. ..

. LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA

[Original: Arabic]

1. Believing that men were created equal , a8 affirmed by all the revealed religione, including Xelmn, the Oreat Sooialiet People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya has taken a firm stand againet the policy of apartheid and raoisl diearimination emong the peoples of the world and considers this policy to be an abominable orime against humanity that is not subject to reform but muat be extirpated and al;minated.

2. Proceeding from thi8 position, the Qreat Jeunahiriya gives comprehensfve and aontinuous support to the African people in South Africa and the Palestinian Arab people in occupied Palestine in their strugqle to escape from the policy of ~ and racial discrimination imQosed on them by rsoist regimes and to attain their right to live under a democratic regime that would enable these two militant peoples to ererciee freedom of choice with regard to their political and euonomlc: eyeterns.

3. Libyan legislation prohibit.8 any form of -4 or r8cial discriminetion and, on 12 June 1988, iesuecl the Great Green Document on Human Rights iu the Age of the Masses, which rejects discrimination among men on the basis of colour, nex, religion or culture.

4. The Great Jsmahiriya discharges in full the obligations laid down by the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the resolutions of international organisations providing for a boycott of racist

/ . . . A/44/9b0 English Page 71’ rdgimes. Consequently, it does not maintain any politiaal, cultural, sports or , other contacts with these racict regimes and constantly calls upon the international community to impoee a aomprehensive boycott againet them and to aeat drsling with them.

5. The Jemahiriya maintains good re1atior.r with the Afriaaq States that are neighbouro of South Africa, gives material and politiaal support to theoe State8 and stands with them in resietanae to the repeated attacks by this racist dgim0, which are aimed at undermining the independence of theee Statee.

6, The Oreat Jamahiriya give8 moral and material support to the liberation” mcvamenta in South Africa (the African National Congroas of South Africa and the Pen Africanist Congreee of Aaania) in the struggle to put an end to the repUgr(Ant’ poliay applied by the racist Qovernment of South Africa againet the Afriaan people in South Africa.

7. As a tribute to the struggle of this people and its leaders, a great ’ internstional celebration was held on 12 June 1989, in the aouree of which the first Qaddafi International Price for Human Rights was awarded to the militant Nelson Mandela. The prilae was accepted by hi6 daughter on hi8 behalf, as the militent Nelson Mandela was at that time imprisoned in the gsols of the rWi8t Pretoria regime.

8. The Qreat Jamahiriya has always supported all the resolution8 adoptod by the ’ United Nations, the Organisation of African Unity and other international and regional organisations calling for a boycott of raaiot r6gime8, at the political, economic and culture1 levels, until these racist regime8 comply with the pacts and reeolutions of the United Nations and other international organisatioac and renounce the repugnant raciet policy that they apply to the indigenoue inhabitants’ of the area8 under their domination.

9. The Qreat Jamahiriya proclaims the need to implement all the reoolutik adopted by the General Assembly, the Security Council, and other international, and regional organisations, without any remissae68, feebleneos or dilatorineoc in their implementation, and to take a stand in the face of raaiet dgimes in their endoavoure to dieavow, circumvent or deley the implementation of these rssolutione, dismiss the charges brought, nullify their implementation or countermand them.

MAURITANIA

(Original t French,]

1. The Minister for Foreign Affsirs and Co-operstion of the Ieleunic Republic ok Mauritania presents his compliment8 to the Secretary-Qeneral of the United Nations and, with reference to the above-mentioned notes verbalee, ha8 the honour to tranemit herewith the reply of the Msuritanian Qovernment.

2. The Ielamic Republic of Meuritsnia ha8 always taken 8 clesr and consistent ’ position on South Africa, its policy end ite precticee of e.

/ . . . A/04/ 960 English Page 72

3. Meuritanie has never had relatione of any tyQe with South Afriae and wae quick to make the movement to impose OOIIbQrehe#WiVe and mandatory sanctiona against the w regime a mejor oonclrrn in its relations. foreign # . 4. For ite Qart, Mauritania has never maintained any eaonomio, aommeraial, financial, cultural, scientific, eports or ties of any other tyQe with South Africa.

In addition, Mauritania has always stood by the front-line b&her Stateu, ’ tust as it has always aetdted the liberation movements recognised by OAU.’ ’

6. Acaordingly, Mauritania has ratified the Qrinaipal international instrumente which deal with racial discrimination and apartheid and, ae part of the campaign to sensitise African Qublic opinion to the crime of m, Nouakchott served in 1988 as the venue for the second preparatory meeting for the hearings on w. 7. The Qovernment of tho Islamic Republic of Mauritania is convinced of the need for the international community to maintain and step up its Qreseure on the AQ&L&LW regime until that system is eliminated and a democratic and egalitarian regime is eatablished in South Africa.

MEXICO

[Original: Sgsnish]

1. The Government of Mexico, pursuant to its traditional foreign-policy Qrinciples and with a view to ensuring the swift elimination of the m regime in South Africa, has maintained a firm and unequivooal policy against the eegregationiet and discriminatory regime in South Africa.

2. Mexico believes that the ~QG&&U regime rune contrary to the most fundamental human rights of the majority of the South Afriaan people and to the dignity and integrity of the human race. It has therefore not relented for one moment in its offarts to bring about that r8gime’s dieagpearanoe.

3. In accordance with its Qrinciples and the Qertinent reeolutions of the United Nations, Mexico has condemned racial discrimination in South Africa and taken all the measures within its power to exert the preesure required for the eradication of Thus, Mexico maintains no form of contact with the Government of South z%Y’. The Government of Mexico has neither diplomatic nor consular relations with that country and has WSQOnded all economic, financial, commercial, eporte, cultural and other relations with South Africa. It has also forbidden any form of trade with that country, including the exchange of goods originating in, routed from or bcund for South Africn via third countries.

4. Neither does the Government of Mexico Qermit tourist exchanges with South Africa1 it grants vieao to South African nationals only in humanitarian cases. Wsxico has also strictly observed the provisions relating to the mandatory arma embargo laid down by the Security Council.

/ . . . A/44/950 EngIirh Page 73

5. Mexico has apared no effort to promote the prompt elimination of the w rdgime in South Africa and belieVOb that n united efXort by all mamborr of the internatiohal community to adopt o!milnr meacuror~.ir urgently required. Thio effort is vital in order to eaeure the moat elementary respect for ths human rightr and fundemental fresdome of the South Afriann people. Furthermorev the very exietenoo of the m rigimo. has xvcerctly proved #to be a. eourae of $ international tenoion and a cauee of aonfliato in ooufihsra Afriaa. It ir thareforo also vitsl for peace and ssourity in the wgion thet m rhould be diemantled immediately, , , ., : ,I i b. .I !

6. Mexico rriteratee. onan again it8 aomitmant to uphold the right8 of the ,' majority population of South. Afriaa.. Mexiaa offorr the mnmborr of that population its unaonditionbl support in the. negotiatione upon vhich they have ‘anbarked .vith, the South African authorities for the gurgooo of aohit vdng the total l radiontioa of the segregationiet rbgime. ‘. . I 6, : I UORWAY

~Origiasl I Englirh)

1. For many yearae the NorbAa countrior hnva play.6 a loading role an ragardr meaauren daelgned to .incroaoo prorrure, on South Afrias to nbolirh the m nyetem, In 1978 the.Nordio foreign minirterr.adogtrd the firrt ~#ordio~Progreums~. or’ Action against m, The Progremne of Action va8 ravired and furthor l mpendad in 1985 and 1988. . . * .,‘_. I ,,, , 2. At the national level, the rale or nqotietion of tha ralo of Norvagian petroleum to South Africa vae prohibited by law on 20 June 19U6. ‘A uomprihearive Act relating to an~economic boyaott of South Africa end Namibia to ccmbat m took effect on 20 July 1987. Tbo boyoott of Namibia wae formally abolbrhad on ,” 30 March 1990. 1 1 I I’ t ‘I >i,,’ .,,. ” i. ).I. : 3. The purpoce of the Act ir to aontrfibuto to the AntOraatiOnal grarruro on South Africa to abolish m. Acaordkag.bo the Aot, it ir prohibited nalisr I. (a) to engage in connnodity trader

(b) to transport crude oil by e Norwgian-owned rhig or a chip that 18 regietered in Norway or ie under Norwegian management;

(e) to great loan6, crcddto or guaLaateos, or to enter into iarurma~ aontracter *. ,, .,I.

( f 1 to makf inveotmenter

/ . . . A/44/980 English Page 74

(g) to transfer patent or production righter

(h) to organiae or offer tours.

4. One of the primary purgooec of the erteneive mebuuree instituted by the Norwegian Government has been to take part in a broader international boycott of South Africa to combat m. The Norwegian Government lo making an aotive effort, nationally, at th(, Nordic level0 end internationally - not leaot through the United Nations - to help to abolish the nga~&&U eystem by peaceful mean8.

5. ‘Norway also provides humanitaPien aeelstance to liberation movements, refugees and other victims of m. Norvegian aeeictanoe to victims of m hae increaeed coneidernbly during the hot years, and in 1989 reached approximately &IS 28 million.

6. The Norwegian Government aonsidere that there is et111 a need to uphold inter,national preesure against the South African suthorities C,?r order to contribute to tlie aomplete dismantling of the system of m. For thio reaeon Norway does not regard it opportune to lift Norwegian economic eanctione against louth Al rica.

7. Important and promieing developments have taken place in South Africa over the past monthe. On 4 May X990 the South African Qovernment and the AUC agreed on a , aomnon comitment toward8 the reoolution of the climate of violence am well a8 a commitment to atability and a pesaeful proceoo of negotiationr. The Norwegian Qovernment velcomee this and other developmente that have occurred eince the election of F. W. de Klerk to the presidency.

8. The latest development8 in Eouth Africa have varraated a review of the Nordic Programme of A&ion against Bop*M which will be carried out by the Nordic Working Group on meawree again& South Africa. At their meeting in Turku, Finland, on 4 and 7 March 1990, the Nordic Foreign Minioterr adopted certain modifiaationo in the joint guidelines conaerning the adminictration of obligatory vieae for South Afriaan citiasnrr with the objective of widening poooibilitier for contactc that could contribute to further dialogue and democratisation in South Africa.

[Originalr English)

1. The objective of Sweden’s Soutk Africa policy is to contribute to the elimination of apartheid by Qeaceful means and its reQlacement by a democratic, non-racial society with univereal suffrage for a11 South African@. Together with the other Nordic countries, Sweden has outlined the sctlonr it ie taking in this regard in the Nordic Progranune of Action againet w (A/43/284-8/19737), which wae firct adopted in 1978 and subsequently rsvised and extended in 1985 end 1988. In accordance with a decision by the Nordic Ministers for Foreign Affairs at

/ . . . * A/44/940 I EngZish esge 75 1 , their meeting in Turku, Finland, on 6 and 7 March 1990, that Programme is currently being tevlewed in the light of recent developments.

2. Sweden~malntains a general trade boyaott of louth Africa sinae 1 July 1987. Sweden also appliec a number of other eaonomio meacures, auah so the prohibition of new inveetments in South Africa. ‘./ 3. m 11 at111 entrenahed.in South Africa. However, 4 politiaal proaeco ‘I’ hae baen cet in motion in whiah the oo-aalled Qroote Sohuur Minute of 4 May 1990 ) regreeente a reoent important atap forward. It.10 the hope of the Swedish * Qoverament that,all obstacle6 to eubetantivs negotiatione will be ranovsd 118 soon aa possible. Sweden doe6 not intend to l aoo thr prrorure on South Africa until profound and irrevereiblo change hat taken place-in that aountry.

4. In view of resent developments in Bouth Africa, 8weden and the other Noidia t aountries deaided in Yarah 1990 to modify the joint Nordic guideline0 for the administration of obligatory vloas for citiaena of louth Africs, the objective being to widen poooibilitier for ouah aontaato aa will be of a pooitA\re vrluo to the dialogue and the dsmocratieatlon proaess in louth Africa.

5. 8weden rolcomeo the iadependeaae of Namibia and has lifted the oanotloao it previouely applied to that country. A Swedich Ambaorador hao been scaredited in Windhoek, and Bweden io looking forward to alooe ao-ogrration with Namibia. ‘8wedeq hope6 that Namibia’s independenae will aontribute to a demoaratio >nd peaarful ” development in South Afrioa. .

6. More than half of Bweden’o bilateral development AoelataIIae, or the eguivalrat, of 8IJS 500 million, is destined to aountries in couthern Afriaa. Coneiderable support ia ettentied to BADCC. Victims and opponenta of m receive ri~eciblr humanitarian aesfetance. The 8wedloh Qovornment intoado to maintain and oxtmnd’ these aid programmeo. In partfaular, 8weden plans to inarease its aeoietanae to -I the democratisation proceso in South Afrloa. a 7. Sweden attaahoc partiaular importance to aoriotsnor to Mozambique and Angola ’ in view of the imenoe suffering asured by many year8 %f South Afriaan ” destsbilisation and other outcide interferrnoe in thooe oouatrlsc. : 1 6. To IWII up, Bwoden welcomes the important etepo taken in resent monthe towarde a negotiated eettlement in louth Afrioa. However, the pilZare of -h!y*, ,, not yet been removed. In 8weden’u view, international preoruro on the south African Qovernment ohould be kept up until profound and Irreverrible ahange hati taken plaae. lweden wishee to aontribute by appropriate meaeuree, together with ” the other Nordic oountrlee, to a peaceful proaeco in South Africa which will lead to the abolition of aoarthafd and the establishment of a non-reals1 and democratic society.

/ .I. A/44/960 English , Page 76

UNION OF SOVIET BOCIALIBT REPUBLIC8

[Original: Russian1

1. The Soviet Union condemns the policy of m as the most odious form of’ raalal oppression, incompatible with general ethics, with the purposes and prinaiplss of the United Nations Charter and with the Universal Declaration of Human Bights. The task of eliminating m requirea the united effcrts of all countries of the international community. To that end, it is ot Oouree necessary to take into aocount the wealth of positive oxperienoe gained in resolving complex aonfliot situations and the aspiration of peoples to put an end to manifestations of rscial hatred and of the,foraible suppression o&.the righta and freedoms of people’whose skin is a different oolour. Ia this csseI as for the eettlement of other aonfliats, the loviet Union advocates a wide variety of approaches and multi~stsral and bilateral aontaats which might make a real contribution to th< elimination of the aoattheid system.

2. We believe that the.potential of the United Nations offers special possibilities in this area. The resolutions on the question of m adopted over the yeare by the G,eneral Assembly and the security Council are a major tool for influencing the m rigime and an important expression of moral and politiaal support for the national libera Jon movements of southern Afriaa. The loviet Union supported the resolutions adopted at the forty-fourth session of the General Assembly, as it doss all other United Nations reeolutione on this question; and applies their provisions strictly. It has no diplomatia relations with the Qovernment of South Africa and adheres to existing sanctions against South Africa imposed by the United Nations,

3. The adoption of the Declaration on m and its Destructive Consequences in Bouthern Afrioa, by consensus at the sixteenth spsoial xession of the general Aseembly, represeats the preparation of a aomnon platform and the adoption of a common approach by the international conunwity to the problem of dismantling npn&&id and adds a new dimension to the United Nations role in the settlement of regional conflicts. The Declaration on m is forward-looking and offers a solid progrsmme of aation, the implementation of which will permit the complete eradication of m from South Africa. It is important that all. Gtates base their practical policies towards Bouth Africa on this document.

The procecsee currently under way in louth Africa strengthen hopes that :.srcheld can be eradicated through dialogue, with each side respecting the other’s right8 and the rights of every citizen of south Africa. The 8oviet Union advocates the complete dismantling of the ~ system, also peaceful change and the creation of a democratia, non-racial Btate in South Africa. It therefore views the Cape Town meeting between delegations of the African National Congress and the louth African Government as a significant event and as the real beginning of a dialogue on the elimination of m.

5. The 8oviet Union considers it important at this stage that the United Nations and the entire international community continue and intensify efforts to ensure that the poeltive processes making hgadwsy fn louth Africa prove irreversible and

/ . . . A/44/96Q , , English Page 77 lead ultimately to the full and fins1 eradioation of e. The 8oviet unioar for its pert, is ready to do everything is ite power to help achieve thst goal.

UNXTED RINgDCM OF QREAT BRITAIN MD NORTHERN IRELMD

[Original: Engllshl :./, 1. The United Kingdom is pleased to have been able to partiaipate in the ., , , consensus that adopted the Declaration on &~&b~id and its l?estruative. ‘ 3 Coneer,usncee in Bouthem Afrioa at the sixteenth special session of the generai‘ Assembly. It constitutes a strong and unanimous signal from the iateraational , comnunity of the need for 8gukhaU to be abolishsd. Rightly, At do.8 not Sey dowa presariptions for the south African peoplec it is their prerogative to work out.a,. solution to South Africa’s problems whiah best suits their needs and aspirstloos~ .,. ., iI 2. since the adoption of the Declaration last Dsaembsr the United Kingdom ha8 continued to use its influence in louth Africa to help bring about the.oad of ,: ,.’ e. The United Uingdom has long believed that it is only through negotiations that this can be achksved peacefully and the transition to a non-racial democratic south Africa 8uCCeSSfully assured. ta the United Kingdorn*r view the “possible negotiating concept” developed by the Cornnonwealth Eminent Pereoae Qroup, which called for mstching end reaiprocal c~itmentc by both sides , in the context of a suspexreion of violence , represented la one form the most feasible beeis on which to get such negotiations under way. The United Kingdom is pleased to note that the Declaration edopted at the sixteenth special session is consistent with this concept.

3. T’be United Kingdom welcomes the significsnt progress made towards the start of these negotiation6 since last December. The situation la 8outh Afrlaa has barn radically transformed. The coursgsous stsps whiah PrssiUent Us IUerk baa takau, including the release of Mr. Nelson Mandela curd other polltiaal prisoners, the. lifting of the baas on political organisationor asd the ending of ths stat. of emergency (except in Natal) have fulfilled many of the conditions bdlieved necessary to open the way to dialogue. The United Kingdom warmly welcomes the tslks which have taken place between the South African Qovernment and the MC and notes, in particular, their importent joint connitment to stability and a peeoeful process of negotiations.

4. The United Kingdom has urged all parties to abandon violeeca and the rhetoria of violence. Tbe United Kingdom hopes that agreement may soon be reached on those remaining issues which need to be resolved and that substantive negotlstions on a new constitution for south Africa will begin without delay.

5. The United Kingdom believes that the process now launched in Bouth Africa is irreversible in itself and will lead to the “profound and irreversible changrs~~ called for in the declaration. In recognition of the progress made, the United Kingdom lifted its ban on new investment in South Africa and on the promotion of tourism to South Africa on 23 Fabrusry. Both measures were voluntary In application and it remains for individuals and companies to decide whether to

I . . . A144l960 English Rage 78 invest in, or visit 803th Afriaa. IA aonmon with other membw Btates of the European‘Connunity, the United Ringdom will no longer discourage aultural, scientifio or aaadsmic contaats, whiah may themselves lead to dialogue and the ’ sbolitIoa of agnrlhaip.

6. !fhe United Kingdom has~dontinued to’use its’high level cbnteats with the louth Afriaan Qovernment (the lecretary of Itate for Foreign end Comonwealth Aftairs visit& louth lfrioa ir #azoh, and President de Klark visited London la May) to enauurage negotiation about eonetitutional change in louth Africa. The United Kingdom is expanding its prograxxns of aid to the black comun!tire in South Afriaa both as a signal of support and to givs’thein practiaal help to prepato them to take their rightful role in a post-Ppap$W South Africa. The progra&nr is now running at over pounds sterling 7 million per a&awn. In addition, we oontribute scms pounds sterling 4 million to the EC Positive Measures ProgYamc. . .‘.. _, ., I .! ; ,( 7. The United Kingdom believes.that the task of the internhtional aommunity is now to enaoursge the moves towards negotiatSons in South Africa aad to consider what can be done to omooth the tranoition to a prospefous, bdmouratio and non-racial South Africa.

/ . . . A/4~~96~ English Page 79

UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA

[Original: English1

1. Tanzania effectively cut off all links with racist South Africa on the day she gained her independence in 1961. (Please refer to the Prohibited Exports (Tanganyika) Order, 1963; CAP 27 East African Customs and Transfer Tax Management Act; and Act No. 19 of 1977, attached.)

2. She has continued to abide by all United Nations resolutions calling for --,. sanctions, mandatory and voluntary; on South Africa.

3. Tanzania has rendered unflinching support to all opponents of and has campaigned unremittingly through various international forums not only for the maintenance of all existing sanctions, bat also .for. 'the imposition of comprehensive mandatory sanctions under Chapter.7 of the United Nations Charter in order to ensure a speedy end to aP_arWleid. .- . . -. 4. Resolution 44/27/E: No. Taneani& bank has any connection 'whatsoever with the banking system of racist South Africa. The question therefore of Tanzania passing credits to the private or public sector of that country does not arise.

5. Resolution 44/27/K: Tanzania has continued to apply mandatory sanctions , against the Pretoria rigime, and has put into place other measures aimed at bringing -heid to an end. Tanzania has no investmentsln South Africa, no trade of any kind with that regime, including the sale of kruggerand, and & military co-operation whatsoever with the racist r/gime, and- does not export goods or services to that country.

6. Resolution 44/27/D: Tanzania is a member of the Intergovernmental Group to Monitor the Supply of Oil and Petroleum Products to South Africa. In'that capacity, she has continued to play her part in the effort of ensuring that those who violate the ban on oil and oil products to South Africa are exposed. English Page 50

ATTACHMNNT

A. LEQAL NOTICE NO. 51

THE EAST AFRICAN CDSTQdS MANAQEMENT ACT, 1952 (No. 12 of 1952)

IN RRRRCISE of tho pouorr aoaforrod upon him by wb&tioa (2) of , seation 16 of the Eart Afriaaa Cuetomo Wanag8mmsnt Aat, 1962, tho Preridont of the Republia of Tanganyika hereby makes the fcllawing Order: TRS PRORIBITED IMPORTS (TANQANTIKA) ORDER, 1963

1. This Order may bo aitod a6 the Prohibited Imports (Taaganyika) Order, 1963, and ehall aome into opnration on the let day of Oatober, 1968. ‘# a. The direct or iadiroat importation into Tanganyika of any goode from the Republic of South Afriaa ie abrolutoly prohibitod.

By Con&d of the Proeidont,

c. a. KAHAMAI Winioter for Comnerao and Induotr:~ Dar os Salaam, 25th September, 1903.

B. LEGAL NOTICE NO. 52

TRE EAST AFRICAN CUSTCMS MANAQKMENT ACT, 1952 (No. 12 of 1952)

IN EXERCISE of the power8 aonforred upon him by rubroation (2) of section 62 of the East Aftiaan Cuotomo Yaaagemont Aat, 19S2, the Preoidont of the Republia of Tsnganyika hereby makoo the following Order8

THE PROHIBITED EXPORTS (TANQANXIKA) ORDER, 1963

1. This Order may be aited as the Prohibitod Exports (Tanganyika) Order, 1963, and shall come into operation on the 1st day of October, 1963.

a. The exportation from Tanganyiks of any goods to, or any goods ultimately destined for, the Republic of South Africa is abeolutely prohibited,

By Command of the President.

C. 0. AAHMA, Minister for Commorae and Induetry

Dar es Salaam 25Lh September, 1963.

/ . . . , ‘. ., A/44!9ty Engalrh jj page - 81

CAP 27 EAST AFRICAN CUSTOMS AND TRANSFB!( TAX MANAQEMENT ACT

8.140 (.a) Any person who inrporte or aarriee aoastwise -

(iI Any prohlbited good6 whether or not such gqods are u~loadedr Or \ n ,> 3 .: 1 (ii) Any reatrioted good0 aoatrary to any aoadition krgulatiq the ” importation or aarriagp aoaotwire p# ouah good0 whe&hqrc or not cuah goodc are. ualoaded,, , ; , ,., ,? 8hall be guilty of aa offanae and liable to imprisonment for a teem mot ~ ’ ’ sraeedhg 3 yearo or to a fine not exaeeding ten thousand rhilliagr or to b&h such imprieonment and rush Line. i. , ACT NO. 19 OF 1977

In this Aat Vh@ Management Aat" meana the Eaot ,Afrlaa Cuetoma aad I’r&eICer Tax Management Act. I

8.4 - Until suah time a8 the Parliemeat makes provicion irngooing or reltitlag to the aolleation of austome and enaim dutieo the CustoRla Wmagomont Aat and Ercire Management Aat ahall aontirpue to apply and Jpvo q#fw$ , , within the United Repubiia of Taasania.

/ . . . Al44/960 Englioh Page 82

UNITED STATES Ol’ AMERICA

[Originals English1

The United State6 Qovernmeat agplaude the aourageous deaision by the louth Afrioan Qovetnmeat and the ANC to enter into face-to-face talk0 aimed at alearing the way for negotiatione. We also applaud the reaent reform meaeuree undertaken by Precident de Clerk.

Unitsd State8 polioy ia to eupport a broadly-inalusive negotiating proaess in South Afriaa, and to enaourage all leadere prepared to pursue a peaceful transition to non-raaial demooraay. ye ougport the oahievement of a non-racial, democratic ooairty baosd upon univercal sufferage in a united South Afriaa.

The United Statre doee not give direat a66i6tanae to any politiaal party or group in South Africa. United States aeeiotanae of over $30 million a year sssiets dieadvantaged South Afriabna to prei)are themeelves for leaderahig in a post-m non-real81 demoaracy with a free-market based economy. As outlined in the COmgr6h6nOiV6 Anti-m Aat, our program foauees on eduaation, aonnnunity development and self-help, human rights, labor union training, and black private entergriee.

The United States Qovernment, a.8 of 30 June 1990, has not relaxed enieting mesoures aimed at enaouraging the South Afriaan Qovernment to enter negotiations. ’

/ . 0 . A/44/960 English Rage 83

ANNEX III

As you know, the United Nations General Assembly is about to hold a special session on "aDartheid" in New York (12 to 14 December) and is to consider a "Declaration on anartheid and its destruetive consequences in southern Africa". A draft of the proposed declaration has been circulating at the United Nations and support for its adoption is currently being canvassed among regional groups and others.

Negotiating constitutional, economic and social changes in any sovereign State is the inalienable right of the citizens of that State. Attempts by other governments, however well-meaning, or international organieations to usurp this responsibility should be rejected. The Charter of the United Nations specifically prohibits the General Assembly from,adopting a document such as the draft declaration on apartheid, which is unarguably a blatant intervention in the domestic affairs of a Member State.

The United Nations General Assembly can RO longer ignore the dramatic steps taken by the South African Government recently to improve the climate for negotiations on a new constitution for South Africa. It is generally acknowledged' virtually throughout the world that the South African Government has introduced and announced constructive steps in removing obstacles to negotiation.

In three brief months the Government has taken a number of substantive steps which underline the sincerity of its purpose, releasing long-term security prisoners, permitting peaceful mass demonstrations, committing itself to the opening of public amenities and central business districts eo all races etc. The State President has personally practised an open-door policy and has met opposition personalities across a wide spectrum.

South Africa's positive contribution towards the independence process in Namibia is generally acknowledged. So is South Africa's positive role in supporting African efforts to bring internal conflicts in Angola and Mozambique to an end. The South African Government fully realises the urgency of getting credible negotiations off the ground and Wusts that it will soon be in a position to make further announcements in order to clear the way for negotiations by recognised leaders.

The South African Government is irrevocably committed to the creation of a new South Africa based on a free and equitable constitutional, social and economic sys tern I

In the political field the aim is the creation of a free and democratic po2itical system in which, inter alaa :

ople shall be free in their country of birth and shall he e have equal rights regardless of colour, race, sex and creed; m No individual or group of individuals will have any right to govern other8 without their aonsentt

Adequate proteatioa chall be glven~to the rights of individual8 and einoritier, regardlese of aolour, caaeI eex or areedr

All people ohall be equal before the lawr

a Freedom of apeeah, with& the generally reaognired bow& of responsibility, @hall be the right of all people.

Xn the cocial field the aim is the creation of a free and e&table social ryotan in South Africa in which, inter:

Freedom of religion will be guaranteed for allr

Each individual shall be regarded ab a unique creature of Ood entitled to equal proteation of hio human digaityt

All discrimination between group9 of people or between individuals shall be eliminated. (In other word6 m ie no longer the South African Government’s policy)~

Proedom of movement, of aeeociation and of dieaooooiation shall be guaranteed to alli

All people shall have the right to work , and all discrimination in the work plaae shall be eliminated)

Housing for all shall be a high priority.

Ia the eaoaomia field the aim is to ensure equal aaaeem to opportunities within the framework of a free entergriee economia oyetem in whioh, inter:

All people shall be free to utilise their skills to their beet advantage;

Private ownership is fostered and property rights guaranteed for alit

Ae is already the easer the resource8 of the State will continue to be utilised to create an environment within which all individual0 aan develop their skills to the beet of their abilities and within whiah the eaonomy aan prosper and the benefits of growth aan be pasoed on to all individuals a6 effectively as possible;

Special attention is given to the development of disadvantaged individuals and communities.

The adoption at the epecial eeosion of the proposed declaration will make the purouit of these policies within South Africa much more difficult. The people of South Africa fail to underetand the international aonmnunity’o responre to what

/ . . . A/44/960 Englirnh I Page 88 this ~overnmeat her already achieved. South Afriaa will have no option but to rejeot the dealsration if adoptod.

The adoption of thie dealaration would have m e8tremoly negative effoat on the initiatioa of negotiations between the relevant part108 in South Afriaa. It would, further, aompliaate the future aoaduot of runh aegotlatioaa.

The dealaratioa is an attempt to iaaorgorate ar much aI) porriblo of the H8rarO Declaration of 21,Augurt 1989, whiah l ndor8ed thr porition of oaly one of the parties likely to ~artiaigatr in future wgotiatiorrr, the Afriaan National Congress, thuo putting it in a prefor8ntial pooition. The MC OM qualify itoolf for partiaigatidn by aonunittiag itrrlf to the Qeaaeful rerolution of differoaaer. Suah a commitment will matah the South Afriaan Govormeat’8 comitment to a new political aon8titutioaal dirgeasation which will moat the politiaal arp~rationr of all south Afriasrns, to be arrived (It by QOacOful AIoanI~

The negotiating pooitionc of the various parties will need to be saaorded equal consideration. For the United Natioar to take aognisanae of but one ir a recipe for failure.

The QropOeed dealaration oeeko to eotablich a rigid framework whiahrould undermine the flexibility required for genuine aegotiationo, The declaration reeka to entrenah in advance principle8 whiah are the eeaoaae of what the future . negotiation8 will be about, pro-empting the prerogative of the aegoticrtoro.

By oug#esting a aontinuing role for the United Nation@ and aloo for the international a-unity and promoting the aonaept of an interim government, the propoeed declaration overlook8 the fact that South Afriaa ir a l hvereiga State ad it is South African8 them8elve8 who will have to rolve current problem8 and ahart their future.

If the international a-unity wirhec to onaourago the people of South Africa to proceed on their declared course of creating a new South Afriaa through negotiations, the way to go about it la hardly to promote the continuation aad extension of eanatione, 86 the draft declaration doom. Sanationr harm the economies of all the aountriee of southern Africa. The prime motivator of the new South African Qoverament’o approach to the routhera Afriaan region ir l aonomic progreeo and stability. The Qoverrunent bellover --hat peaaoful coerirtoace and maximum co-operation in all field6 in eaoential for the benefit of all the countries of southern Africa. There is no logic or advantage in aonfrontation.

While, on the one hand, the South African Government 18 laying the ground-work for a new order at home, on the other it la coaaerned about the eaonomla progrers and stability of the southern African region and the welfare of the rest of the continent. The aountriee of southern Africa indeed have opportunitier for eaonomic progreoo unique in Afrisa. Through trade, tranrport, invertmeat, labour, migration, touriem and technology tranrferr they interact alorely and beneficially with the strongest and moat divereified eaonomy routh of the Sahara. Conuneraial exchanges between aountriee etimulate development more effectively than handoutr, Western nations interested in the development of the region sbould support mutually profitable links between the countries of southern Africa, rather than actively discouraging them such as by debating the adoption of t declaration on anartheid.

What is urgently needed for the very survival of the sub-continent is a Frog= e to improve political and economic conditions through regional co-operation, The world community should:

Acknowledge that South Africa has an essential contribution to make if efforts to uplift countries in the region economica1l.v are to have a chance of succeeding;

Pursue policies supportive of - rather 'than impeding - South African efforts to evolve a domestic social and political order broadly acceptable to all South Africans;

Grant and/or mobilize funds and expertise for extending and moderniaing the physical infrastructures of the region;

Provide assistance for measures aimed at raising human productivity through education and training as- well as public health and family planning programmes and housing; . Urge and assist southern African Governments to create economic and legal conditions conducive to attracting local and foreign private investments in processing, manufacturing and other productive ventures.

South Africa is already contributing towards the development of southern Africa, notably in the fields of agriculture, mining, building and construction, including roads and dams, human health, educa%ion and training, diverse technical fields such as transport, telecommunications. the use of fissionable materials, environmental protection and trade and investment. Significant co-operation projects are the Highlands Water Scheme in Lesotho, the Soda Ash Project in Botswana and the Cahora Bassa hydroelectric project in Mozambique.

Given the broad spectrum of Africa-related technological know-how available in South Africa, common sense suggests that outside governments and development agencies seeking to promote the material welfare of the peoples of southern Africa should make maximum use of this locally available expertise. It would be wasteful and counterproductive to ignore the availability of such expertise. The South African Government places its resources and know-how at the disposal of the continent.

South Africans are still divided as to the best ways in which our aspirations and ideals are to be realized, but are united in their love for their country and in their resolve to come peacefully to an agreement on a new constitution. The South African Government is determined to apply all its energy to overcome the differences and to find a peaceful way in which a better future can be created for Somt31 Africa, all its peoples, and the generations to come.

/ . . . A/44/QOO Engliab j Rag70 87

We sgmaial srosion offaro the United Nation8 the opportunity to aaknowlrdga and promok tbo unmrgiag now rmalhn tbst 10 dovolopiag In ooutbera Africa aa aroimd tbo world. Siaar tba aoa8on of wbitm domination hloutb Afrlos is ovarr ir it too muab to hops Chat tbu emmaon for l mpty doalarations and hollow reeolutionr In tbo Qawrsl A88anbfy bat a100 oome to an end7

/ . . . ANNEX IV

Republic of South Africa on 2 February 199Q

The general election of 6 September 1989 placed our country irrevocably on the road of drastic change. Underlying this is the growing realization by an increasing number of South Africans that only a negotiated understanding among the repressntative.leadera of the entire population is able to ensure lasting peace.

The: alternative is growing violence, tension and conflict. That is unacceptable and in nobody's interest. The well-being of all in this country is linked inextricably to the ability of the leaders to come to terms with one another on a new dispensation. No one can escape this simple truth.

On its part, the Government will accord the process of negotiation the highest priority. The aim is a totally new and just constitutional dispensation in which every inhabitant will enjoy equal rights, treatment and opportunity in every sphere of endeavour - constitutional, social and economic.

I hope that this new Parliament will play a constructive part in both the , prelude to negotiations and the negotiating process itself. I wish to ask all of you who identify yourselves with the broad aim of a new South Africa, and that is the overwhelming majority:

Let us put petty politics aside when we discuss the future during this session;

Help us build a broad consensus about the fundamentals of a new, realistic and democratic dispensation;

Let us work together on a plan that will rid our country of suspicion and steer it away from domination and radicalism of any kind.

During the term of this new Parliament, we shall have to deal, complementary to one another, with the normal processes of legislation and day-to-day government, as well as with the process of negotiation and renewal.

The Government accepts the principle of recognition and protection of the c:;rdmental individual rights which form the constitutional basis of most Western +--gT; i) :'.". r- 2% c i p*. $ . We acknowledge, too, that the most practical way of protecting those A/44/QdQ Bngliah Pege 89 rights is vested in a declaration of rights justifiable by an independent judiaiary. However, it is clear that a oyetem for the proteotioa of the rights of individuals, minorities and national entities hae to form (I well-rounded and balanaed whole. South Africa has its own national composition and our constitutional diogeneation has to take this into aaaount. The formal reaognition of individual rights does not mean that the problems of a heterogeneous population will simply disappear, Any new constitution which dieregardu this reality will be inappropriate amd even harmful. ‘S i I Naturally, the protration of aolleotive, minority and national right8 may not bring ahout an imbalanoe in respect of individual rights. It ie neither the Qovernmeat’s policy not its intention that any group - ia whiahaver way it may be 3, defined - shall be favoured above or in relation to any of the others. ,. The government is requesting the [So&h African) Law Commireion to undertake a further task and report on it. This task lo &irectN at the balanoed protootioa in 8 future constitution of the buman rights of all our citisena, aa well a# of collective units, associations, minorities and nations. This invaotiqatJson will also serve the purpose of supporting negotiations towards a new aonctitution.

The terms of rsferenoe also include:

The identification of the main types and models of democretia constitutions which deeerva consideration ia the sforemontionod aontenta '

- ha analysis of the ways in which the relevant right8 are protected in every modelr and

Poseible methods by means of wbiah euob constitution may be mede to succeed and be safeguarded in a legitimate mannor.

The death penalty has bean the eubjeot of intenrive diraurrion in roaent months. Hovevet, the Qovsrnmeat has been giving ito attention to tbio l stremoly sensitive issue for 8ome time, On 87 April 1989, the honourable [email protected] of Justice indicated that there was merit in suggestions for reform In tJ I are& Since 1988 in fact, my predecessor and I have been taking decisiona on repriovor which have led, in proportion, to a drsetic dScline in eseautionr.

We have now reached the ptloitioa in whiah wo are able to make concrete propoeele for reform. After the Chief Justice wes consulted, and he In turn had consulted the Bench, and after the Qovermnent had noted the opinion8 of eaadamiae and other interested parties, the Qovernment decided on the following breed principles from a variety of available options:

That reform in this area is’indicatedr

/... Tkat the death penalty should be limited as an option of sentence to extreme cases, and specifically through broadening judicial discretion in the imposition of sentence; and

That an automatic right of appeal be granted to those under sentence of death.

Shculd these proposals be adopted, they should have a significant influence olb the imposition 02 death sentences on the one hand and, on the other, should ensure that every case in which a person has been sentenced to death, will cfme to the attention of the Appellate'Division.

These proposals require that everybody currently awaiting execution be accorded the benefit of the proposed new approach. Therefore, all executions have been suspended and no executions will take place until Parliament has taken a final decison on the new proposals. In the event of the proposals being adopted, the case of every person involved will be dealt with in accordance with the new guidelines. In the meantime, no executions have taken place since 14 November 1989.

New and uncompleted cases will still be adjudicated in terms of the existing law. Only when the death sentence is imposed, will the new proposals be applied, as in the case of those currently awaiting execution.

The legislation concerned also entails other related principles which will be announced and elucidated in due course by the Minister of Justice. It will now be formulated in consultation with experts and submitted to Parliament as soon as possible.

I wish to urge everybody to join us in dealing with this highly sensitive issue in a responsible manner.

Neootiation

I wisk to focus the spotlight on the process of negotiation and related issues. At this stage I am refraining deliberately from discussing the merits of numerous politic:1 questions which undoubtedly will be debated during the next few weeks. The focus, now, has to fall on negotiation.

Practically every leader agrees that negotiation is the key to reconciliation, peace and a n+*li and just dispensation. However, numerous excuses for refusing to take part, a?:. advanced. Some of the reasons being advanced ace valid. Others are merely part ug a poXitica1 chess game. And while the game of chess proceeds, valuable time is Keing lost.

Against this background, P cxiImitted the Government during my inauguration to giving acti ..zFf atttSntion to the most important obstacles in the way of negotiation. *%day T am able to announce far-reaching decisions in this connection. A/44/9~0 English Page 81

I believe that these dec+sions will shape a new phase in which there will be a movement away from measures which have been seized upon as a justification for confrontation and violence. The emphasis has to move, and will move now, to a debate and discussion of political and'economic points of view as part of Le process of negotiation.

P wish to urge every political and cor,munity leader, in and outside Parliament, to P?proach the new opportunities which are being created, constructively. There is no time left for advancing all manner of new conditions that will delay the negotiating process.

The steps that have been decided are the following:

The prohibition of the African National,Congress of South Africa (ANC), the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC), the South African Communist Party and a number of subsidiary organizations is being rescinded;

People serving prison sentences merely because they were members of one of these organizations or because they committed another offence which was merely an offence because the prohibition on one of the organizations was in force, will be identified and released. Prssoners who have been sentenced for other offences such as 'murder, terrorism or arson are not affected by this; I

The media emergency regulations as well as the education emergency regulations are being abolished in their entirety:

The security emergency regulations will be amended to make.provisions for effective control over visual material pertaining to scenes of unrest:

The restrictions in terms of the emergency regulations on 33 organisations are being rescinded. The organisations include the following:

National Education Crisis Committee (NEW)

South African National Students Congress

Wnited Democratic Front (UDF)

Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU)

Die Blank@ Bevrydingsbeweging van Suid-Afrikar

The 'conditions imposed in terms of the security emergency regulations on 374 people on their release, are being rescinded and-the regulations which provide for such conditions are being abolished;

The period of detention in terms of the security emergency regulations will be limited henceforth to six months. Detainees also acquire the right to legal representation and a medical practitioner of their own ChOOSiX-KJ. Thee? decisions by the Cabinet are in aaaof~paas~wi~h ghe QoyQrnment’e dealared i,@tq&+n t 3. fioimali,ae t’he, .poli$ioal ,proaeoc ,io, +ut,F Af,r,ipa without ’ jeogardiqinb glib, ~a+i+en?pae pi &he good, orper. T$ay wer) prec?dpd by t!orough an! ” unanimoun ad+~~,py, t? &o,up gf,,,off4+a+a .yl++ iaalude~ meplP,ero ,?f kpe eedirity aomunity. f,

ImplementatiQn $11 be innnediate and, whtge n~aposary,,not+aeg w!l; appear, in the QoverqpntII &g@q,:, #j@ ‘~o~or~on,~’ ,‘I , ,, ‘, ., ’ / .I ,.: 1’ , ..1 1, .i * I.,, , ..a ,,.‘.‘. i, ,,..I ,I .. : At the same time I wish to ?,mphagioq thqt, the maintenance of law, and order dare not be jeogardised. The Qovsinment will not for’sake iti duty in this aonnect~on, Violrnae from whichever oourc~e will be fought wit+ all available might. Peacefil protest rnsJj no! braoqe the’epr+agbdard.for ;lawleccoeec~,violence ,, arrd Antiniidhti,pa. No. ~demoarsi$o, ociuatry e&n. tolerate that.

‘?? , ,. .I. , I. ‘,’ .‘I ?~Wh:atate“of &er$erroy, I havb been advioed tihat an emergenay siiuation, which $&iii@ thecoi dgeaial mea6urea whiah have beeri retdined, still exiets. There is .etill aohfliat irhioh is manifesttag i$sel,f vainly ilp Natal, gut a8 a aonsequenae’of’the country-wide political Rower-struggle. In igdition, there are , indioations that radical0 are otill trying to diorupt the poooibilitieo of negotiation by.1) means of maea $olenae. It ie my intention.to.terminate the state'of emkrgenoy aompletely aa soon as aircumetsnces justify it and I request the ao-operation of everybody towards this end. Thobe reoponsible for, unrest and aonfligt have to beqr the blame for the aontinuing f&ate of emergenay. ' Iii the tieantimr, the state of emergenay io inhibiting only those who uee ahaos and dioorder ae politiaal instruments. Otherwise, the rulee of the game under tihe btatp of emergwaay ark the MIW &or everybouy . ’

Against this background, the Qovernment 10 convinaed that the de&ions I have announced are justified from the security point of view. However, theoe dqqieiono are justified from a politioal point of view ae well.

Our oountry and all ite people have been embroiled in aonfliat, teneion and violent struggle for decades. It is time for UB. to break out of the cycle of violenae and break through to perce and reconciliation.’ The silent majority is yearning for this. The youth deeerve it. ,

With the cteps the Qovernrnent hae taken, it hao proved its good faith and the tablr ic laid for eensible leaders to begin talking about a new disgensation, to reach an underetending by way.?f dialogue and disguesion.

The agenda io open and the overall aims to whiah we are acgiring ehould be aaaoptable to all reasonablti Sguth Africans.

/ . . . Junonq other thinqe, thooe alma iaalude a new* demoaratia~anaetitutionJ ’ ! univereal franChiWJ no dOIIIinatiOnJ equality bafora 10 ia&mdent ‘jtididdk$; ttie” ‘W protection of minari~ies ao well 88 of indivSdua1 righta, frocdom of religioar ,d ” ’ ” ’ sound economy baaed on proven aaonomia priaaiplas and private l aterptioe# and * dynamia progrmmes directed at better eduaatioa, health uerviaea, houring and oooi~l conditions for all.

In thic connet , Mr, Neloon Mandela could play an important part. Tha ’ “I ’ Qovernment has noted that he ha8 dealared hlmeolf zo be wilZinq to make a aonetruative contribution to the peaaeful politiaal ptoaoss lrr South Africa.’ ’

i wish to put ‘it plainly tihat the Qo+ornmrnt hao gakra @“firm d~alrioa to release Mr. Mandela unoonditionally. X am seriour about bi‘ingiaig thii m&er tb finality without delay. The Qovernment will take a deairion ‘soon on the”drte of ’ his release. Unfortunetely, a further short paeoage’of th is unavoidable; ‘, .,. ..,I ,’ ,;, Normally, there ie a certain paesage of time between the doairion to trlaarr and the aatuaS release beaauoe of loqietiaal and odminlotrative requlromanta. In the aaae of Mr. Mandela, there are faat?rs in tho way of hir tiedirrd, tileaea,’ of whiah hi6 personal tiirdumstanaee and Bafetp aPi$‘ndt”l!hc, leaat’. ‘Me h&a .n&‘bran ‘ha ordinary prisoner for quite some time. Because of that, @ia aaeo requiroe partiaular circumspection. .’ Today’s annouaaement, in perticular, goer to tho heart of what bladk lradetr i aluo Mr. Mandela - have been advancing ovor the yearn at! their raasoa for having reso ted to violence, The allegation has been that tho Qovatamoat did not wirh to talk to them and they were deprived of their right to normal p~litiaal aativity by the prohibition of their organiaatione.

Without conceding that violenae has ever been juotified, I wirh to ray today to those who argued in this munaer:

The Qovernment wishes to talk to all leaderc who reek pesoor I ,*

The unconditional lifting of tho prohibition on the oaid organisetionr places everybody in a poeition to kureue politico freely; The juetification for violence which was alwaye advanaed, no longer axiets,

These facts place everybody in South Afrioa before a Wm. 00, the basici of mmeroua previous statemeuts, there ie no longer any reaoonable eaaume for the continuation of violence. The time for talking has arrived and whoever wi!l ,,. make eKcuee8 does not really wish to telk. , II,, , ,.’ Therefore, I repeat my invitation with greater aonviation than evirr ‘waik through the open door, take your place at the negotiating table together wlth the Government RIIQ other leaders who have important power bases 1nBide and ‘outoldq ot Perlicunont . Henceforth, rverybody~r politioal pointa of view will be tooted againot their aeali#m, their wor~mili$y apd their fai,rn?ol., The time for negoFibtion,I,, ‘ha8 ’ arrived. ‘; ! ,, , . : . . .

" 1 . . . WI,. ;, Ia my indugurq! addrrro.1 ,saia‘the followiaq:

VQl reasoaab~~, PFoplr ia tbir aountry - by far the majority - anriously await;ta moooa9a of hope.. It ie our re8ponoibilit~ as lradorstia sll’sph~~c to provide that mesoage ‘rsaliatiaslly with oourage and aonviation. If we fail in that, the iaouing ahaoe, the demise of t&ability and progrew, will for ever be held agaiaet us.

0W8tory haa t,hrust upon the leadership of thio aouatry the tremendoue reoponaibility to,tura our oountr,p, away from it6 present direction of confliot ond ootifrontetioa. Only we,, the loaders of our pso~lse, aan ,do it.

“The eyes of recponribie Oovernmantc actrorie the world are.foeused on us: T!tie hopes of millione of South Afriaane ore oeatred around ~8. The future of, southern Afr$aa depend0 on uo. We dare not falter or fail,”

/ . . . ~/44/96~ English Page 95

On the eve of Mr. Ahdulrahim Farah’s visi,t to Sa&h Africa, I wish to reaffirm my Government's position on the General Asxembly's Declaration on of 14 December 1989 so that there is no m,isunds,rstanding as to my Government's unequivocal rejection in principle of interferqnco in South Africa's internal affairs. I enc1ose.a copy of.a.media statemontzissued by me on 4 June 1990, on the forthcoming visit of Mr. Farah td S&h Africa (appeadix.I,)..'

As set out in my letter tc you of..? December I999 mad repeated to you at our meeting at Windhoek on 20 March 1990, ,it is the ix&alienable and sole right of the citizens of South Africa to negotiate, a~new.co.~stitution .for. Soslth Africa. The South African Government will under no circumstances agree tb'any, attempt on the part of outside agencjes .to usurp this respqnsibili,ty...,7.,In the light of the latest developments in South, Africa, *the Goneral Assembly,would be bette.r'advised to terminate its irregular interference in-Sou~h,.,Africaa.,affairs.~ .Xt is generally acknowledged world-wide that the process of refoq +itiaied.:bx .< President F. W. de'klerk cannot b,e reversed- This is'thg new reality in,Sauth Africa. It requires a fundamental re-evaluation:bir..]Afrjcan and-other Governments of their position towards this new reality,, TpIer:e iis"na need,to manif& aq irreversible process. What is required issnoouragement .- ?qg,-interfqrence.

Further evidence oi the irreversibility-of this pr,o,cess.was today supplied by President de Klerk in his address to Parliament. I enclese .exeerpts 'from his statement (appendix II). Further interference by the General Askmbly in the events in South Africa can only be counterproductive. It would be most unhelpful given our strenuous efforts to get negotiations under way. South Africa is a sovereign State and it is for South Africans to decide their awn future.

There are pressing problems on the African continent urgently in need of attention. Africa is sliding into an economic abyss. Unless this process is stopped the peoples of the African continent will soon be faced with the frightening reality of permanent and irreversible poverty and degradation. My African colleagues may not agree with me, but in all serious.*ess I predict today that the point of no return in the process of economic retrogression for most African States will soon be reached unless bald and incisive initiative6 are taken by their Governments. The time to do so is now. President de Klerk has done it in South Africa. I sinc?rely invite my African colleagues to persuade their leaders to follow his example. I advise them as a fellow African, take heed of the events in Central and Eastern Europe. Take heed of the new movnment in Western Europe to create both economic and political unity. Then let us ask ourselves, we Africans, whele are all those events going to leave us? Do we have a plan? How do we see 3ur furture? These are the matters with which we ought to concern ourselves. Continually sniping at South Africa will not save us. &J is going in any ~i'.r~Yie. We are preparing for a future without I am askin African ^ .* ~Jri.i..ieacJEnes : are you preparing yourselves for ? A/44/980 English Page 06

APPENDIX I

Puriug the meeting at Windhoek on 20 Waroh 1990 between the State Preeideat and the Searetary-General of the United Nations, the Secretary-Qeaersl erprossed an interest in the politioal developments in South AFrioa. It was agreed that a representative of the Secretary-Qaneral oould visit South Africa to acquaint himself first-hand with the latest developments in the 8eme way and on the same becie as previous misaions’from other international organisations that had visited South Africa during recent years. *

It was also made clear that suoh a visit is construed by the South Afriaan Government as a genuine debire on the part of the Secretary-General to obtain correat information on the internal situation of South Africa and not as an indication that the South Afrioan Qovernment acquiesces in the uncalled-for interference by the Qeneral Assembly in the internal affairs of South Africa.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs in a letter dated 7 December 1989 set out the South ACtloan Government’s attitude to the draft resolution before the Vnitell Nations Qeneral Assembly. The South African Qovernment made it clear that it rejected the General Assembly’s action. This remains the attitude of the South * Afriaen Qovernment. However, the South Afriaan Qovernment has no objeotion to correct information on South Africa being made available to the Secretary-Qeneral on condition that the Secretary-Qeneral clearly understands that this is not to be construed as co-operation in the implementation of a Qeneral Assembly resolution that the South African Qovernment rejects as ultra the Charter at the United Nations.

/ l . . A/44/960 English Page 97

APPENDIX XI

Among the main objectives of the Government in recpeot of which we obtained a mandate have been the normalisation of the politioal procero inside South Africa and the normalisation of international relations.

A6 far as our international relations are oonomrnmd, there aan be little doubt after my recent vieit to Europe that we have made substantial progrera.

The prospect of once again playing a full and unreotrioted role in the international community holds out the promise of immense eoonomia and cultural benefits for our country and all ite people.

We cannot live .in isolation from the rest of the world. Wo need formiga tradm and investment. We need technologioal, cultural and sporting interaotioa with other countries. We have a right to make our voice heard in the oounoile of the nations.

We cannot stop the world and get off as eomo people ia South Africa would Ukq us to do nor can we turn the olock back and take refuge in the part. Whmthmr we like it or not, we must wreetle slso with the international realitiel of thm present and secure for our country its rightful plaoe in the conxnunity of nations.

This the Qovernment will continue to bring about.

Even more important, obviously, is the need to bring pmaac and stability to our country. This can only be done through a peaaoful politiaaZ procece of negotiation, preceded by normalisation of the politioal processl

Here, also, we have made dramatic progress in the past nine monthr.

The fact is that there are today few or no reetriotionc on political activities in our country. Individuals and political parties oan Bay what they like and write what they like. They aan organirv as they wish e:ad they can participate in peaceful do*onstrations.

For many of our people this has been a difficult process. Many South Africans preferred the situation when unpleasant politPoa1 realities could be swept under the oarpet. It was much less troubling to Pretend that theso realities did not exist and to continue to live in comfort and complacency.

However, the normali~otion of the political prooese has on balance had a beneficial effect.

Many organinetions, including the AWC, have now been stripped of the mythological status which they previously enjoyed. They now have to defend

/ a.. A/44/960 Gnglieh Page 98

their policies in the open market-plaae of ideac. They have to endure the glaring light of accountability for their statements and their aotione. Media which previously regarded them as oaorocaact are incrrasingly questioning their polities and their prograsmnes. Pormign audiences which listened sympathetically whaa they were peroeived to be SUQQreSSad, queetion them with inoreasing eoepticism about their progrtunmee and policies, now that they have become partialpants in the open politioal arena.

The procero of normaiisation her been trawnatic for all of ~8. Dut without it wo oannot achieve either a negotiated and laeting solution or the normalisation of our relatione with the rest of the world. Nevertheless, it has been a bewildering, eometimes frightening erperlence for many. It has been aooompanied by dangerously rising expeatations and by an increase in violence, particularly in Natal.

During ouch time6 it lo of cruoial importance that the Government should firmly maintain law and order. And this has, since 20 September, also been one of our main objectives .

In my inaugural speech I eaid that we would continue to deal with unrest, violence and terrorism with a firm hand. On 2 February I said that I wished to emphasiee that the maintenance of law and order dare not be jeogardieedr

“The Govo~mnent will not forcake its duty in this connection. Violence , from whichever eourae, will be fought with all available might. Peaceful proteet may not beaome the springboard for lawlessnees, violence and intimidation.W

In my speech of 2 April I dealt with the whole queetion of security in even greater detail. I announaed a number of practical steps which the Qoverameat would take to strengthen the maintenanoe of law and order, particularly in Natal. Those etepe are, generally speaking, indicating poeitive results.

Another conotant theme has been the Government’e attitude towards the state of emergency.

My predecessor frequently stated that it wae his objective to lift the otate of emergency as soon as ciroumstanceo made this possible.

In my inaugural address I said that we would “try to create a climate which will make it possible to lift the state of emergency or, at leaet, to gradually move away from it”.

On 2 February I again said that it wae my intention to terminate the state of emergency completely as soon as circumstances justified it and I requosted the co-operation of everyone to this end.

Again, on 2 April I repeated this view but added that we were still in a situation which necessitated maintaining the declared state of emergency.

The state of emergency is due to lapse at midnight on 8 June and the time has once again arrived for the Government to give this question its consideration.

/ . . . i/44/9a0 f&IglAsh Page 99

After thorough aoasideratioa of al& t&e relevant factore,. I have deoided to ” aanounoe that there will no longer he a general country-wide etate of 8mergeqoy but that henoeforth it wAl1 exist in Natal only.

The Qovernmeat has pureumd with all itr might and reeourcee the ideal that, a8 far as eeourity wae oonoerned, there should be a return to normality in whioh the remaining vmetiger of violmnoe could be countered with the ordinary law6 oC the S land. That point has now been reached. ! ,’ ” I : r. This decioion hae been baeed on the following aentrs~.ooneide~~tioar, “. .Ik,

A6 far as Natal ie concerned, there is et111 a faotual l taC;r of eia~rgenoy whioh seriously throatone the eafety of thm pub110 I’d maiatenurc~ of~publiq order and which oannot be oountered with the ordinary lawa of thq land. Thm inoreaeing phenomenon in Natal of violence among Elaokc, which h8e led to deetruotion of human life and property and hae aerumed rhooking ptoportionr, ao well as the enoeptionally high love1 of imtimidation that l 8Aete thQte, must et111 be oountered by the etrongeet means available. , For that rmaaon I., have, in aonsultation with the Goverameat~e smourity advieoro end the Cehinot, decided to annouonoe the exietenoe of a state of emergengy in the provinoe of Natal, including the self-governing territory of ICwaEulu.

A proclamation to this effqot will appear in the Govmmmon~ ibmUa. . tomorrow, 8 June 1990. 5

To maintain order and stability in Natal and to provide for eny poeeiblo’ vaouum which may result from the termination of the #tat6 of atnergosoye the Qovermnent has decided to expand the oeourity forome eubatantially.

I also want to use this opportunity to refer to the prooeoe of the removal of the eo-called stumbling block6 in. the way of negotiation.

The announcement which I have made today addreoeee 0110 nf the moet important issues constantly raieed ineide and oyteide South Africa.

I ehould like to empbasiee that the GoverDll)ont*@ decirion bar nothing to do with pressure from any quarter or with any wish to gain political aapitsl. Wm do not, and have never, regarded the state of emargeacy a8 a politioal pawn* I ‘a

None the le66, the net result of the lifting of the rtato of.mergeaoy 16 that one of the main otumbling bloake hao been removed. ” As regards the other matters referred to in the Qroote Schuur Minute f would like to state the following:

Further to the Qroote Sohuur Minute, a working group hold diooueeiono durAng the week of 14 May on various faoete, including erriles and sentenced offendore. The participants then had to report beck to their respective principsle, The Qovernment conoidered the report and ie ready to impl6ment it. The ANC has, however, requested that they be allowed time until 10 July 1990 to inform us of their reaction. The ANC, therefore, has to account for any delay in thie regard.

/ . . . A/44/960 ' EInglirh Page 100

In the mean time X am, however, willing to releace 48 people aa a geetufe, whiah I am empowered to do ilr term@ of pPerrat potierr embodied in the Coaetitutioa ‘and the Prioorbo Aat. Any Lurthor dev#lo~ents in this area will depend OR implementation of the working group’8 report, which the Qoverruhrnt is ready to do.

The Minioter of Jurtiae will deal with further., detailo in thio regard. ‘With regard to reaurity ligiolation the Qoveimedt ‘ii already looking at aepeate of seaurity legirlation whisk aould porribly inhibit the free aonduat of peaaeful politias and whioh, beaauee of the reduation in the violent onslaught on the existing order, might no longer be neaesoaryl

’ With regard to the so-called exiles. the Qovermnent has aleo started to aat, notwithetanding the fact that we are waiting the reaation of the &WC to the ‘report of the working group.

Temporary reprieve wae granted a number of leaders of the AUC to come here to establieh their peaceful politiaal structures and activities. Co8mnunication lineo between the louth African Police and ANC leadeee have in the mean time also been established 80 that violence and intimidation‘could be monitor’ed had countered right down to local level.

In the sphere of the removal of dlsarimination the government has also acted , in terms of ite policy to remove discrimination. The repeal of the Separate Amenities Act is now invninent a8 it has been t&led in Parliament. Early next year the group Areas Act and Land Acts will receive attention.

This I can confidently state that the govermnent is adhering to the aommitments which I have made cinoe I became State President. We are not only talking. We are satually implementing in rspid succession tha eteps we have envisaged. The proaeoe of building a new South Afrias has become irreversible. We are on the threehold of the real negotiation proceoo and the time has comb for other important role-playere to do their bit.

In particular the MC must now atop vacillating.

The time hse now arrived for the AWC to state unequivocally where it stands on key iesuee. By it.8 actionr Ma its statements it murt now give proof of its adherence to the principles of the groote Schuur Minute.

It is true that, since the Uroote Schuur Meeting, there hae been evidence of the ANC (or at least moot of its leadere) striving for the goals set out in it.

In term6 of that minute the Government and the ANC agreed on a “common oonmitment towards the reoolution of the existing climate of violence and intimidation from whatever Quarter, a8 well aa to stability and to a peaceful procese of negotiation”. On 2 June Mr. Mandela said that the leadership of the MC was united in itr rejection of all form of violence among the people. eneral thair meetings aud marches are also we11 c~~t~o~~~d and ft is clear at they.are making an effort, Th8 ABYC, however, HOW can adds@ pos!tive aspects be reconciled with continui support for the so-called d struggle"? How can they be reconciled with Mr. andsla's stat%m%~t on ~~~@ that:

The only sort of violence which we accept fs %~gau~s%d vio~e~c% in the form of armed activity which is properly contsollsd md where the targst is carefully selected".

Exactly what targets has the ANC in mind?

The same police farce which protsctsd him and hfs colleegurak during their recent visit to Cape Town?

The departments of the Minjsters with whom he and his collaagues were discussing in a good spirit the need for peaceful solutfoas?.

Political opponents in tho'to&hips '&d ia the h&War~ds? :

fn the same way, the ANC should explain the contradictory positions which ft has adopted with regard to the economy.

On 5 June Mr. Mandela told a meeting in Blptswana that the AWC wished to * bring about a non-racial democracy with a **powerful %conomy" in South Africa, How does the At?C raconcile this view with its contiairad calls for sanctions against South Africa? Surely it must realit% &hat sawMona are hkfng the economic prospects of all South Africans? How does the AEtC re~oaciZo its continuing calls for the natkmaliratfon of knportaut ssetors of the economy with its professed wish to build % powsrful %conwrr;y? .Xs it not aware of the potentially disastrous implications of such irresponsible statements for future foreign investment in the Republic?

The time has come for the ANC to give a prop%r account of ittePf %rkd of its true intentions. Its commitment to the Groote Gchuur Minuts must be reflected in all its future actions and statemeats.

The leaders of South Africa must now rise to ths oeciwion,

In South Africa, southern Africa and in the world, obsol%t% policies and systems are being discarded. Irreconcilable diff%r%nc%s at% being cwerctmc b>p negotiation. There is no longer any need or justifW!Mon for viokmce to achieve political objectives.

History will demand from us to account for our willingness to rfss above our own selfi&h particular interests and prejudices in ordsr to build a new fUtW8. rirrioap trrglirh Page 192

Confliat muet end. Secret agendas muet be sarapped. .Let bygocco be bygoneo t Let UP forget real or imeglaed injuetlaee of the,psat and areate a new future ,fnr our ahilJrea, free from mistrust, prejudiac, aqb hat, ed and domiaatioi. A future in whiah all of UB will feal.tpaure. A-future free of discrimination or a struggle for domination. A future whiah will make 611 of ‘~8 proud to be South Afriaans. But above all, a future to be determined by U6 - not diatated by outside intereets.

/ . . . AiWWO EuglfUh Rag0 ,103

hv m of thm Airiasn ' 1 1' of the wqn ,, ,I r, Your Bxoellenay Ambassador Ibrahim Qembari, PWmirIMlat ElOgrOOentatiV~ Op th0 Federsl Republic of Nigeria and Chairman of the Bgdaial Coimittrr agaialt " ,' ml Your Excelleroy Mr. Joseph Qarba, Ptoridorrt of the Qonoral Aaounblyl ” Your Eraellency Mr. Javier Peres de Cuellar, Iearcrtarp-Qeneral of tHi, United “” Nationsi Your Enaellencies Fsrmanent Uepreorntativeot Heads of Observer HioeiOnOJ lsdiee and gentlemen, friends and aomtadesr / 11.. . ,, .I ; We feel eepecially honoured and privileged to have the poooibility today to ” stand at this partiaular plaae, ‘to apOak to all of you,“who rcgraooat the propio$ ! of the world. We are most grateful to you, Mr. Chairman, the Speoii~l Comnitteo ’ Member State0 of againet m, the Secretary-General and all , the OrgeaisatiOn making it pOeI3ible for U&I to be bore. for , ,.. The tragedy is that what hae oreated the aood for this gathering urd’mada ‘it. ’ eetem tiatural that we muet gather in thie hiotoria mretiag plaae’Ya tho,fact of the continuing commission of a arimd againat humanity. How much batter it would h@V!,, bean if we were meeting to aelebrate a viatory in hand, ‘S deeash fulfilled, ‘6ho triumph of jwtiae over a tyranniaal part, the realimatioa OR the vioioa l rhrinad in the United Nations Charter and the Uaivoroal Doalaration of HuWtilj nighti. I,, ,,, It will for ever remain an indoliblo blight on humrn hiotoicy that the :‘:’ e crime ever oacurred. Future qeneratioas will rurely e&t' what l rtbr #A# made that this syyetem eetabliohed itcolf in l Qw wake of the adoption ofI a Un@?oiW$I.:‘.., <’ Declaration of Human Rights?

It will for ever remain an oaauration’ ead a chrllongo to all rned and woMn of, conscience that it took ao long aa it hao before all of uo rtood Up t6 ray,r?qu h is enough. Future generation6 will surely inpuiret what error was ‘lm~o Ftt+ ) J,to’ eyetem eetablishc itself in the aftermath of th@ trial0 it Nuremberg? ‘. .J:’ .)I These questions *ill atloo boaauoo w&on thio augurt body, the Uoitad ~atiaae, firot discussed the South Atriaan quortion, in 1946; it was Uioauro~ag th?,;!illU? 01 racism. They ~111 be poeed beaaurc the opur to tti~‘e~tebliohmmt bf khir Organisation wae the determination of all ‘humanity never again to pamit ta&& . theory and practice to dragoon the world into the deathly alutahor ‘og ‘(iar mad “5 .“’ genocide. ’ <: (, I

And yet, for all that, a raairt tgraany eot8bli~hrd,,itrrlt 'ia,oW WI&~. A@ they knew would hegpen, who rhmed to treat thir ‘mattW ‘ar a quaint ‘hiotoiid+a”““’ aberration, this tyranny har claimed 3to ova aoaalbvo of viatho. it’hrr establiehed it6 own brutal worth by the aumbrr of ahildren it hIo killrd and 4$?q //i orphans, the widows and widowerr it aaa &aim aa ito unique WOatiOn* Englioh Page 104

And et111 it livea on, provoking strange and monstrous debates about the means that it.6 victim8 are obliged ta use to rid themselves of this intolerable ecourge, eliciting argument6 from those who ahoose not to act, that to do nothing must be accepted a8 the very eesenae of civilised opposition to tyraCy*

We hold it a8 an inviolable principle that raclbm must be oppo,oed by all the meane that humanity has ,at its disposal. Wherever it occure it has the yotentisl to rsault in a cystematia and aompreheaeive denial of human rights to thoee who are dis > iminated against. This is because all racism is inherently a challenge to human rights, becauoe it denies the view that every human being is a pereon of equal worth with any other, because it treats entire peoples a8 sub-human.

Thle is why it was correct to charaateriae the np.WJdd syetem a8 a crime against humanity and appropriate that the international community should decide that it should be suppressed and punishment meted out against its perpetrators. We pay tribute to this Organisation saw’ lte Member States for this and other declslons and actions it took to expunge this crime.

We also take this opportunity to salute the Special Committee against &.&&h&l, which has been and la a very important instrument in our struggle against the iniquitous and oppressive polldles or;’ the South African Qovernment. We eslute also the Stetee that make up its membership, which have been unrelenting in their resolve to contribute everything they cou3d to enwre that the world was , mobilised to act againet the aosrthaid system.

In this connection alao, Sir, allow us to express a well-aecervea trl:trrte to your country, Nigeria, which you 80 ably represent, a8 did your predeceoeor in this important office, His Excellency Major-General Joeeph Garba, current Preeldent of the Qeneral Assembly, under whose leadership the United Nations Declaration on South Afrlaa wa.8 adopted by aanseneus at the sixteenth epealal seeelon of tho General Assembly last December.

That Declaration will go down in history as one of the moat important document6 in the struggle of the international community against -4. The fact thnt it wae adopted by conaeneua was itself a telling blow agalnot the m system and a vital Atatemeat underlining the unity of the world community on the South African question and its resolution.

We look forward to the report that the Secretary-General of the Unltccl Wfltions will submit dealing with the question of the implementation of the Declaration in South Africa. This report will also be important to the extent that it ~111 provide a basis for further decisions by the United Nations regarding future action on the queetlon of m.

WQt must, hv svey, be clear 161 that the a-4 eyetem remain0 in place. None of the priuciples laid down in the Declaration has been implemented to provide what the Declaration characterised as an lnternatlonally acceptable eolutlon elf the South African question. Similarly, the profound and lrrevarnible changes which thb Declaratlc~ -?ieuallaed have not yet occurred.

I / . . . A/44/960 Knglish Page 185

The conclusion from these observations would seem clear to us. It 'is that nothing which has happened in South Africa calls kor a revision of the positions that this‘ Brganization has taken in its. struggle against I We therefore strongly urge that there should be no relaxation of exist res. The sanctions that have been imposed by the United Nations and by individual Governments should remain in place. Li '. ,.. ._.. I, :.. We also urge that the United Nations ._ should do e\rerything in'its power to maintain the unity it achieved when it adopted the Declaration on South Africa last December. We therefore hope that all Member States wil.1 continue to act in concert so as not to creatcany situation in which those who are op;)osed to change in our country find encouragement to resist change, because some countries would have destroyed the consensus that has been achieved. In this regard, we .taka' this opportunity once more to call on'the countries of the Europeen~community, which are holding a summit meeting in a few days' time; themselves to remain faithful to the purposes of the Declaration to whose e.laboration they were party and for which‘they voted.

At the initiative 3f ANC, the process 'has begun which could.lewd to a just political settlement in our country. At t3ur well-known meeting in Cape Town, at the beginning of last month, we agree& with the South African Government on the removal of the obstacles to negotiations which are identified in "Lhe Declaration. The process of implementing that agreement ,has- started, but as. this distinguished , gathering knows, a lot still remains to be dorie before tie can say tbat a climate conducive to negotiatiolis has been created.

We therefore still have some distance to travel before we undertake the further steps outlined in the declaration, leadilng.to negotiations for the adoption of a new, democratic constitution. The fact that a good beginning was made in Cape Town should not lead us to conclude that further pr,ogress is-assured or t&t ye will not have to confront major obstacles in future.

In this regard, we would like to reiterate what we have said before; that we believe that President de Klerk and his colleagues in the leadership of the ruling party are people of integrity. We are of the view that they will abide by decisions that are arrived ct in the course of our Gscysions and negotiations. This, in itself, is an important victory of our common struggle because it is that . struggle which has made the cost of maintaining the m system too high and helped to convince the ruling group Hn our country that changes can no longer be resisted.

It is, however, also true that there are many among our white compatriots whs are still committed to the maintenance of the evil system of white minority dsmination. Some are opposed because of their ideological adherence to racism. Qthers are resisting because they fear democratic majority rule. aralad and are to be found within the army and the police,

Outside of these State agencies, other whites are working at a feverish pace " cj. $ 4; \b.&Ii& ~~r~~l~~~~y groups whose stated aim is the physical liquidation of: .i: *A.? r-tip j. $-- s ~~~~~~s~~p and membership, as well as other persons or formations which

I * I I A/44/960 Ebglish Page 106 these right-wing terrorists see as a threat to the continued existence of the system of white minority domination. We cannot afford to underestimate the threat that these defenders of a brutal and continuing reality pose to the whole process of working towards a just political settlement.

The ANC is determined to do everything in its power to‘ensure speedy movement forward towards the peaceful abolition of the aoertheie system. To this end we are engaged in many initiatives within South Africa aimed at bringing into the process of negotiations all the people and the representative political formations of our country. We have to overcome.the mistrust that exists on both sides end reinforce the understanding that the only victory we should all seek is the victory of the people as a whole and noi the victory of one party over another.

It is obvious that none of these processes can be easy; We are, however, inspired by the experience of the people of.Namibia and our comrades-in-arms of the South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO), who also overcame the divisions and the mistrust generated by the e system, carried out a peaceful political process within a relatively short period of time and are today a Qroud nation of independent people. We take this opportunity to salute the representatives of the Namibian people who are present in this Hall and acknovdledge the debt we owe them for the contribution .they have made to,our own liberation.

We also salute the front-line States of southern Africa and the rest of our , continent for their own enormous contribution to the struggle against e, which has brought us to the point today when we can say that the victory of the struggle for a united, democratic and non-racial South Africa is within our grasp.

Tribute is also drd to the non-aligned countries and Movement and the peoples of the rest of the world for their own sterling efforts in pursuit of the common cause. What we must once more urge is that all these forces should maintain their unity around the perspectives contained in the United Nations and Harare Declarations on South Africa. How fast we progress towards liberation will depend on how successful we are in our efforts to sustain that united resolve.

Thie is for UQ a moving moment because we know that as we stand here we are among friends and people of conscience. We know this because we know what you did over the decades to’secure my release and the release of other South African political prisoners from Pretoria’s dungeons. We thsnk you most sincerely for this, especially because you have thus gJven us the tpportunity to join hands with you in the search for a speedy solution to the enormous problems facing our countryI our region and continent and humanity as a whole. We know also that you harbour the hope that we will not relent or falter in the purouit of that common vision which should result in the transformation of South Africa into a country of democracy. justice and peace. Standing before the nations of the world, we make that commitment, strengthened by the knowledge that you will fight on side by side with us until victory is achieved.

We also take this opportunity to extend warm greetings to all others who fight for their liberation and their human righte, including the’peoples of Palestine and

/ . . . Weotern Bahara. no aosmnenb thmir rtrugglor to you, aoavlaoed that wa arm all novod by the faat that freedan la iadivirlb+, oo~viaood that tha denial of m right0 of one diminishes the booborn of othorr.

We thank you for your kind iavitatioa to uo to @l&err thir gathariaq amd Lor the opportunity it hso given urn to 888 hasago to you all: to the Seoretary-General, to the Prooidont of the (knorrl Awrrblp, to tha Bpoaial Committee againot m md to tha Waited Mat&oar AtrelE for tha work that bar been done to cad the w orilm eg8llMt huMo&h

The distanae wo at111 have to travel In rrot loag. Let uo trawl At togothor. Let us, by our joint actions, viadioato tbo purporer Car wbAoh t&14.0 OrganArmtloa~ WAS eetablirheU sad oreate (r ritucrtioa wherein itr Clmrtor and tlrm ,Univorral Declaration of Human Rights will booaM part of the body of ‘1~ oa wbloh will bo baaed the political and sooial order of a saw South Afrior. Our oamoa viatory lr assured.

0 . . . A/44/060 kglieh Page 10s

ANNEX VII . .

Aeeembled at the siiteenth epeaial session of tje Qeneral Assembly, a special sseaion on e and its destructive consequences in southern Africa, guided by the fundamental and universal principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a/ in the content of our efforts to eotablish peaae throughout the world by ending all conflicts through negotiations, and desirous of making serious effort6 to bring an end to the unacaeptable situation prevailing in southern Africa, which is a result of the poliaies and praaticee of e, through aegotiations bawd on the principle of justice and peace for al11

Reaffirming our conviction, wh!ch history conf1rm8, that where colonial and racial domination or m exist, there can be neither peace nor justice,

Reiterating, accordingly, that while the #w.t&&d system in South Africa perelate, the peoples of Africa as a whole cannot achieve the fundamental objectives of justice, human dignity and peace which are both crucial in themselves@ and fundamental to the stability and development of the continent,

Recognising that, with regard to southern Africa, the entire world is vitally interested that the processes in which that region is involved, leading to the genuine national independence of Namibia and peace in Angola and Yoaambique, should succeed in the shortest possible time, and equally .tPcognising that the world is deeply concerned that destabilisation by South Africa of the countries of the region, whether through direct aqgression, sponsorship of surrogatca, economic subversion or other meaau, is unacceptable in all its forms and must not occur,

Also recognising the reality that permanect peace and stability in southern Africa oan only be achieved when Lhe uystem of w in South Africa has been eradicated and South Africa har been transformed into a united, democratic and non-racial country, and therefore reiterating that all the necessary measures should be adopted now to bring a speedy end to the saartheid system in the interest of all the people of southern Africa, the continent and the world at large,

Relieving that, as a result of the legitimate struggle of the South African people for the elimination of e, nnd of internationsl pressure againat that eystem, as well as global efforts to resolve regional conflicts, possibilities erist Cor Purther movement towards the resolution of the problems facing the people of South Africa,

A/ Resolution 217 A (III).

/ . . . A/IIlO(LO Eaglirh Page 109

Reaffirming the right of all DeoDleer including the people of South Aftias, to determine their own destiny and to wor& out for themsolves the’inrtitutionr and the oyctem of govermmnmt under wkioh they will, by goners1 aoneont, l&v0 and work together to build a hatmoaiouo society, and remaining comnittrd to doiag’@vorything possible and necessary to assist the people of South Africa, ia cuah wlrys 88 they may, through their genuine representatives, determine to aohi,ve this objeative,

Making these commitments beoause we believe that all peogle are equal and have equal rights to human dignity and respeot , regardlocs of oolour, raoe, sex or creed, that 811 men and women have the right and duty to partibipate in their Own qovernmeat, as equal member6 of coaiety, and that no individual or group of individuals has any right to govern .others without their demooratla OOMM$; and reiterating that the m syrtem violates all these fundamental and uulversa& principles,

Affirming that m, obaraaterlsed ao a arime againot the oonodence and dignity of mankind, is responsible for tha death of oountleoo numbsre of glople in South Africa, has eought to dehumanise entire peoples and has hapoced a brutal war on the region of eouthern Afrioa, which ha8 resulted In untold 100s of life, destruction of property and maorlve dioglaaemeat of innoaent men- women and children and whiah is a eaourge and affront to humanity that must b,e fought and eradicated in ito totality,

Therefore wo ougport and aontinue to rupport a11 thO#O in South Wrioa who ’ pursue this noble objective. We bolievo this to be our duty, oarried out lo the interest of all humanity,

While eatending this eugport to there who rtrive for a non-raaiai and democratic eoaiety in South Afriab a point on whiah no oaBprod@r ir porriblo, we have repeatedly OzprOssed our objwtive of a solution artlved at by prwOfu1 IIOILOQ) we note that the peogle of South Afrios, and their liooratloa aovmmt~ who felt Compelled to take up arms* have alro upheld tholr preferenae for thte pouitioa for many decades and continue to dcl 80~ ; .1 Welcoming the Declaration of the A&&g, Cwmnltt?r 05 the Otgauiratioa of ,' African Unity om Southern Afriaa on the queotioa of South’AfrioL, a&@@& at Harare, ’ r,n 21 Auguet 1989, p/ and eubeequently enborred by the Ho+ 6f Btato, or ‘bovotinmoh( of Non-Aligned Countries at their Ninth Conferonae, held at Balgrado from 4 to ' 7 September 1989, T/ aa a reaffirmation of reabinors to teeolvs the problem of ., South Africa through negotiationa. The Dealsration is oonoiotent with the ’ poeitions contained in the Luoaka Manifesto a/ of two decade? ago, l!, pprtlo&rr ,:’ . . . ..’ -m :. w A/44/697, enneu.

c/ See A/44/591-.8/20870, annex.

41 me QfuialPecorde~~- * U, agenda item 106, docwnent A/7534.

I... A/44/960 Englieh Page 12.0 regarding the preference of the Afriaan People for peaceful change, and takes into eceount the ahanges that have taken place in southern Africa since then. The Declaration conrtitutes a new challenge to the Pretoria r6gime to join in the noble efforts to end the m system, an objective to which the United Nations has always been committed,

Noting with appreciation that the Cozmnonwealth Heads of Qovernment, at their meeting held at Kuala LumPur from 18 to 24 October 1989, noted with satisfaction the strong preference for the path of negotiated and peaceful settlement inherent in the Declaration adoptsd at liarare on 21 August 1989, and coneidered what further etege they might take to advance the Prospects for negotiations, 81

Also noting with aPPreciation that the Third Francophone Conference of Heads of State and Qovermnent, held at Dakar from 24 to 26 May 1989, likewise called for negotiations between Pretorie and regresentatives of the majority of the people with a view to the eotablinhment of a democratic and egalitarian system in South Africa,

Consequently, we shall continue to do everythkng in our power to increase eupport for the legitimate struggle of the.South African People, including maintaining international preesure against the 6yste.m of ~ until that eyetem ie ended and South Africa is transformed into a united, democratic and non-racial country, with justice and security for all its citisens,

In keOpiIIg with this eolemn resolve, and resPonding directly to the wishes of the majority of the people of South Africa, we publicly pledge ourselves to the positions contained hereunder, convinced that their implementation will lead to a Speedy end Of the m system and heralding the dawn of a new era of peace for all the peogles of Africa, in a continent finally free from racism, white minority rule and crolonial domination,

1. A oonjunature of aircwnotances exists , which, if there is d demonstrable readiness on the part of the South African rdgime :%I engage in negotiations genuinely and seriously, given the rePeatad expression of the majority of the people of South Africa of their long-standing Preference to arrive at a political settlement, could create the pOOBibility to end m through negotiations.

2. We would thcefore encourage the people of South Africa, as part of thelr legitimate struggle, to join together to negotiate an end to the apartheid system and agree on all the measure8 that are necessary to transform their couutry inru a non-rucial democracy. We support the position held by the majority of the peopla of South Africa that three objet!vee, and not the amendment or reform of the r,P&tW,d eyetern, should be the goals of the negotiations.

8.1 See A/44/672-8/20914.

I . . . 3. We are at ore with the people of Sruth Africa that ths o~tc~rn~ of such a recess should be a new cotistitutional order determined by them tad based ml the barter of the United Nations and the UniverswP. Declaration of W ~1 Rights. We therefore hold the following fundamental principlss to be of importance:

(n) South Africa shall become a united, non-racial and ~~rn~~r~t~~ State;

(h) All its people shall enjoy common and equal citiranship arkd aationality, regardless of racez colour, sex or creed;

(c) All its people shall have the right to participate in the government and administration of the country on the basis of universal, equal Piuffrage, under EA non-racial voters' roll, and by secret ballot, in a united and non-fragmeratsd South Africa:

(d;) All shall have the right to form and join any political party of their choice, provided that this is not in furtherance of racism:

(a) All shall enjoy uaixxsally recognised human rights, freedoms and civil liberties, protected under an entrenched bill of rights;

(f) South Africa shall have a legal system that will guerantse aquaPity of all before the law; . (g) South Africa shall have an independent and non-racial judiciary:

(&I) There shall be created an economic order that will promote and advance the well-being of all South Africans:

(8) A democratic South Africa shall respect the rights, sovereignty and territorial integrity of a31 countries and pursue a policy of peacer friendship and mutually beneficial co-operation with all peoples.

4. We believe that acceptance of these fundamental principles could constitute the basis for an internationally acceptable solution that will enable South Africa to take its rightful place as an equal partner among the world comnunity of nations.

5. We believe that it is essential that the necessary climate be creatad for 8legotiations. There is an urgent need to respond pDsitivsXy to this universally acclaimed demand and thus create this climate.

6. Accordingly, the present South African rigime should, at the least:

(3) Release all political prisoners and detainees unconditionally and rbfrnitr dram imposing any restrictions on them; A/44/960 Engliclh Page 112

(p) Lift all banr and rertrictionr on all proscribed and restricted organisationa and per6onet

(n) Remove all troop@ from the towashiper

(4) End the rtato of om*rgency and repeal all legirlatioa, ruch a8 the Internal Seaurity Act, deeigur : to circumraribe political activityi

(~1 Ceare all politioal trials and political executionr.

7. There meawwee would help aroatr the 6&eeoary climate in which free political diooureion can take place - an ersrntial condition to oneuro that the people themrelvee participate ia the proascc of remaking their country.

B. m to tha w of m

9. We are of the view that the parties concerned ohould, in the context of the necessary climate, negotiate the future of their country and its people in good faith and in a6 atmorphere which, by mutual agreement between the liberation movomoate and tha South Afrioan rdgime, would be free of violence. The procea:s could aonmeace along the fOllOWi6g guideliaeoc

(~1 Agreement on the mechaniem for the drawing up of a new constitution, ’ bared onI emong othere, the principle8 enunciated above, and the baris for its adoption!

01) Agreement od the role to be played by the international oonnnuaity in earuring a euccesaful tranritioa to a democratic order;

(E) Agreed traneitional arrangement8 and modalities for the process of the drawing uy and adoption of a now aonstitution, and for the transition to a democratic order, including the holding of slectionr.

9. In purruance of the objectiver rtated in thir Declarstion, wo hereby decide8

(D’ To remain reired of the issue of a political resolution of the Soutlr African queotioni

(&I To step up all-round support for the opponents of m and to cempaign internationally in purruance of this ohjectiver

(9) To uoe concerted and effective meaturea, including the full observance by all countries of the mandatory erms embargo, aimed at npplying pressure to ensulr n apeody end to mt A/44/990 Cnglieh Page 113

(9) To ensure that the international commuaity does not relax l xietiag meaeuree.aimed at encouraging the South African rdgime to eradiaato n~a&b&d until. there ia clear evideace of profound and irraversible ahangea, bearing in mind the Obj6CtiV66 of this Doclarationr

(a) To render all poocible aseiatance to tho front-line and neighbouring State6 to enable them8 to rebuild their economies, which have been adveraaly affected by South Africa’8 aote of aggreesion and d66tabili66tiOW to withstand any further such act81 and to continue to eupeort the pooplee of Namibia and louth Africa:

(i) To extend such aesietanae to the Governmente of Angola and Hosambiqua a0 they may request in order to eecure-peace for their peopled, and to l naoursge and eupport peaoe initiatives undertaken by the Qoveraments of Angola and Mozambique aimed at bringing about peaae and normalisation of life in their oouatriec?

(0) The new Bouth Africa shall, upon adoption of the new oonstitutionr participate fully in relevant organs and specialised agenciee of the United Nationr.

10. We request the Bocretary-Qenersl to tranamlt CCpie8 of the present Declaration to the South African Qovernment and the repreeentativos of the ogpreesed people of South Africa sad alro request the Secretary-Uewral to prepare a report and 8ubnrit it to the Qeneral Aeeembly by 1 July 1990 on the grogross made in the I implementation of the preeent Declaration.