Gorbachev and His Reforms

The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law CUA Law Scholarship Repository Scholarly Articles and Other Contributions Faculty Scholarship 1986 Gorbachev and His Reforms Rett R. Ludwikowski The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/scholar Part of the Political Science Commons, and the Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies Commons Recommended Citation Rett R. Ludwikowski, Gorbachev and His Reforms, 30 MOD. AGE 120 (1986). This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Scholarly Articles and Other Contributions by an authorized administrator of CUA Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact edinger@law.edu. Estimating the chances of economic recovery of the Soviet Union Gorbachev and His Reforms Rett R. Ludwikowski IN THE LAST year the Western press has major policy address also freely ac- given a great deal of publicity to the new knowledged that the previous period had attempts at economic reform in the Soviet not solved the Soviet bloc’s most urgent Union. “Gorbachev Sets Shift in Econo- problems and declared his determination my,” “Gorbachev’s Vigor Holds Attention to fight against inefficiency in agriculture, of Soviets,’’ “Gorbachev Orders Wide ‘Re- drunkenness, corruption, the black mar- structuring’ of Soviet Economy”-these ket, the general disintegration of the com- are the titles of only a few articles which munist economy, and so forth. Some examine Gorbachev’s “breath-taking de- others mentioned that Andropov’s pre- termination to make changes in the decessors had made the same declara- Soviet economy.’’’ tions when first addressing the Central The general optimism as to the chances Committee. As Martin Ebon, author of a of Gorbachev’sreforms that accompanied biography of Andropov, was able to show, these comments was based on Gor- Andropov’s sharp criticism of the Com- bachev’s vigor, on the fact that he was the munist bloc’s managerial deficiencies was youngest Soviet leader to attain the posi- almost identical to remarks by G.M. tion of Secretary General of the Com- Malenkov thirty years before: munist party of the Soviet Union since In 1982 the optimistic Western assess- Malenkov and recently was the youngest ment of the “new era of Soviet reforms” of his competitors in the Soviet Politburo? stemmed from tales about Andropov’s Gorbachev is also the first leader since preddections for jazz, whisky, and Western Lenin to have completed regular higher novels. Now it is based on the fact that education, and his dedication to the re- Gorbachev is “a man of a new generation,” form of the Soviet economy was proved in on his expertise in agriculture, and on the summer of 1981, when his lobby tried reports of his visit to Great Britain, where to defend a radical reform of Soviet agri- he was portrayed as “a civilized diplomat” culture which was practically to exclude with a sense of humor, “bright and tech- some sectors of agriculture from the sys- nically able to absorb new concepts of tem of central planning? The reform was government and scien~e.”~The American never implemented because of the op- public can inquire with good reason: Why, position of the conservative group in the despite these repeated optimistic prog- Politburo (supported by Brezhnev and noses, has nothing changed substantially Prime Minister Tikhonov), but Gorbachev in the Soviet economy since Krushchev? made his mark as a reformer. True, the system did not collapse, but also, The more cautious commentators try until recently, it did not show any symp- to remind us that Yuri Andropov in his fist toms of a quick economic recovery. The 120 Spring 1986 LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED succession to the younger generation may The concept, which in a way typified the result in attempts to introduce a new Old Bolsheviks, fell victim to corrosion in epoch of modest reformist transfor- the decades of Stalin’s rule. The fact that mations. It is even very likely that eco- millions of people were encouraged and nomic stagnation will compel Corbachev even forced to survive at the cost of to at least resume attempts at modifica- others’ lives could not but drastically af- tion of the Soviet economy. Yet the suc- fect public morality. The role of a collec- cess of the reforms is a function of a vari- tive in the formation of a socialist per- able that is the sum total of many ele- sonality was decidedly crippled. In fact, ments-social, ideological, economic, po- party propaganda notwithstanding, the litical. The personal characteristics of the collective in any true sense posed a threat Soviet leaders and their awareness of the to totalitarian control. The real aim of the deficiencies of the system are only one of collective as it developed under Stalin was the elements. As far as a substantive not to bring people together, but to serve reconstruction, not a marginal modifica- as an instrument for the annihilation of the tion, is concerned, the economically coun- individual approach to life and to promote terproductive elements of the system are the complete atomization of society. Artifi- more significant. They have worked and cial communities created by the state most probably will continue to work were to destroy all genuine intermediate against any attempt at reform. They are social structures. The destruction of all worth careful examination. trust in mutual relations between people, What Happened to the Communist the disintegration of family loyalty, and the Tollectiue Mentality”? denunciation of parents by their children were intended to weaken the distinction THE CONSTITUTION OF the Soviet Union Says between truth and falsehood and to de- that state property-the principal form of prive individuals of the capacity to form socialist property-is subject to common their own opinions. Religious beliefs were ownership by the Soviet people (Article proclaimed to be in clear contradiction to 11). Soviet citizens are obliged to preserve the materialistic philosophy of com- and protect socialist property (Article 61). munism. The moral impact of the Church According to Marxism-Leninism, respect was blocked, but was never replaced by for collective values was supposed to any kind of Communist morality. Socialist follow the growing unity of individual and collectives, which had been expected to society. Socialist doctrine promoted the replace the Church’s authority, never ideas of ultimate equality, freedom, and gained broad public respect. justice, and offered a belief that these The Bolshevization of society resulted goals could be accomplished only by a in its cultural and moral impoverishment, total reconciliation between individual in the leveling of all groups to the lowest and social interest. Awareness of the su- common denominator. “Social justice,” periority of shared interest to that of in- comprehended in this way, led in practice dividual interest was supposed to create a to the total subordination of private in- so-called collective mentality-a precon- terests to some projection of “public dition for the further evolution of society good,” which was usually offered by a toward communism. On behalf of the relatively small group of social leaders, collective interest, not only all means of who only pretended to speak on behalf of production and distribution, but also so- society as a whole. The total unity be- cial, moral, and even religious convictions tween individual and society appeared to were to be subject to public control. The be nothing but a total destruction of hu- individual’s rights and duties were to be man individuality. When we discuss the determined by society. difficulties of the Soviet economy and the The attempt to create a “collective prospects of economic reform, all of these mentality” turned out to be a total failure. factors must be taken into consideration. Modern Age 121 LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED Ideological and Moral Background moral repercussions of ideological decay. of the Economic Crisis This leaves an impression that the collapse of Communist ideology is a relatively THEDECAY OF Communist ideology is un- recent occurrence. In fact, the role played doubtedly a leitmotif in all debates over by Marxism-Leninism has undergone vis- the crisis in the Soviet political system. ible transformations throughout the dura- Numerous commentators on Soviet do- tion of Communist rule in Russia, and the mestic problems like to emphasize the ideological crisis has had much more ex- total decomposition of Marxism-Leninism tensive consequences than is usually in the Soviet bloc. They argue that in recognized. today’s Soviet bloc nobody takes ideologi- The Old Bolsheviks were masters of cal clichCs seriously. Party leaders are revolutionary techniques, but they had no cynical and the public hates communism. experience in running a state. They knew As Vladimir Bukovsky has written, “From how to subvert, destroy, and change; but top to bottom, no one believes in Marxist they had little knowledge of how to build, dogma anymore, even though they con- create, or introduce more advanced in- tinue to measure their actions by it, refer stitutions, better economic techniques, or to it, and use it as a stick to beat one improved agricultural methods. For them another with: it is both a proof of their Marxism served as a sort of sacred guide loyalty and a meal ticket.”6 to be followed almost blindly. But ex- Some distinguished writers like Alek- perience usually is a better teacher than sandr Solzhenitsyn hold that Marxism- theories are. The tenets of “genuine Marx- Leninism is a dead ideology in the sense ism” often proved inapplicable in post- that “even during its best decades it was revolutionary Russia.

Load more