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The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law CUA Law Scholarship Repository

Scholarly Articles and Other Contributions Faculty Scholarship

1986

Gorbachev and His Reforms

Rett R. Ludwikowski The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law

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Recommended Citation Rett R. Ludwikowski, Gorbachev and His Reforms, 30 MOD. AGE 120 (1986).

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Estimating the chances of economic recovery of the

Gorbachev and His Reforms Rett R. Ludwikowski

IN THE LAST year the Western press has major policy address also freely ac- given a great deal of to the new knowledged that the previous period had attempts at economic reform in the Soviet not solved the Soviet bloc’s most urgent Union. “Gorbachev Sets Shift in Econo- problems and declared his determination my,” “Gorbachev’s Vigor Holds Attention to fight against inefficiency in agriculture, of Soviets,’’ “Gorbachev Orders Wide ‘Re- drunkenness, corruption, the black mar- structuring’ of Soviet Economy”-these ket, the general disintegration of the com- are the titles of only a few articles which munist economy, and so forth. Some examine Gorbachev’s “breath-taking de- others mentioned that Andropov’s pre- termination to make changes in the decessors had made the same declara- Soviet economy.’’’ tions when first addressing the Central The general optimism as to the chances Committee. As Martin Ebon, author of a of Gorbachev’sreforms that accompanied biography of Andropov, was able to show, these comments was based on Gor- Andropov’s sharp of the Com- bachev’s vigor, on the fact that he was the munist bloc’s managerial deficiencies was youngest Soviet leader to attain the posi- almost identical to remarks by G.M. tion of Secretary General of the Com- Malenkov thirty years before: munist party of the Soviet Union since In 1982 the optimistic Western assess- Malenkov and recently was the youngest ment of the “new era of Soviet reforms” of his competitors in the Soviet Politburo? stemmed from tales about Andropov’s Gorbachev is also the first leader since preddections for jazz, whisky, and Western Lenin to have completed regular higher novels. Now it is based on the fact that education, and his dedication to the re- Gorbachev is “a man of a new generation,” form of the Soviet economy was proved in on his expertise in agriculture, and on the summer of 1981, when his lobby tried reports of his visit to Great Britain, where to defend a radical reform of Soviet agri- he was portrayed as “a civilized diplomat” which was practically to exclude with a sense of humor, “bright and tech- some sectors of agriculture from the sys- nically able to absorb new concepts of tem of central planning? The reform was government and scien~e.”~The American never implemented because of the op- public can inquire with good reason: Why, position of the conservative group in the despite these repeated optimistic prog- Politburo (supported by Brezhnev and noses, has nothing changed substantially Prime Minister Tikhonov), but Gorbachev in the Soviet economy since Krushchev? made his mark as a reformer. True, the system did not collapse, but also, The more cautious commentators try until recently, it did not show any symp- to remind us that Yuri Andropov in his fist toms of a quick economic recovery. The

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succession to the younger generation may The concept, which in a way typified the result in attempts to introduce a new Old Bolsheviks, fell victim to corrosion in epoch of modest reformist transfor- the decades of Stalin’s rule. The fact that mations. It is even very likely that eco- millions of people were encouraged and nomic stagnation will compel Corbachev even forced to survive at the cost of to at least resume attempts at modifica- others’ lives could not but drastically af- tion of the Soviet economy. Yet the suc- fect public morality. The role of a collec- cess of the reforms is a function of a vari- tive in the formation of a socialist per- able that is the sum total of many ele- sonality was decidedly crippled. In fact, ments-social, ideological, economic, po- party notwithstanding, the litical. The personal characteristics of the in any true sense posed a threat Soviet leaders and their awareness of the to totalitarian control. The real aim of the deficiencies of the system are only one of collective as it developed under Stalin was the elements. As far as a substantive not to bring people together, but to serve reconstruction, not a marginal modifica- as an instrument for the annihilation of the tion, is concerned, the economically coun- approach to life and to promote terproductive elements of the system are the complete atomization of society. Artifi- more significant. They have worked and cial communities created by the state most probably will continue to work were to destroy all genuine intermediate against any attempt at reform. They are social structures. The destruction of all worth careful examination. trust in mutual relations between people, What Happened to the Communist the disintegration of family loyalty, and the Tollectiue Mentality”? denunciation of parents by their children were intended to weaken the distinction THE CONSTITUTION OF the Soviet Union Says between truth and falsehood and to de- that state property-the principal form of prive of the capacity to form socialist property-is subject to common their own opinions. Religious beliefs were ownership by the Soviet people (Article proclaimed to be in clear contradiction to 11). Soviet citizens are obliged to preserve the materialistic of com- and protect socialist property (Article 61). munism. The moral impact of the Church According to Marxism-Leninism, respect was blocked, but was never replaced by for collective values was supposed to any kind of Communist morality. Socialist follow the growing unity of individual and , which had been expected to society. Socialist doctrine promoted the replace the Church’s authority, never ideas of ultimate equality, freedom, and gained broad public respect. justice, and offered a that these The Bolshevization of society resulted goals could be accomplished only by a in its cultural and moral impoverishment, total reconciliation between individual in the leveling of all groups to the lowest and social interest. Awareness of the su- common denominator. “Social justice,” periority of shared interest to that of in- comprehended in this way, led in practice dividual interest was supposed to create a to the total subordination of private in- so-called collective mentality-a precon- terests to some projection of “public dition for the further evolution of society good,” which was usually offered by a toward communism. On behalf of the relatively small group of social leaders, collective interest, not only all means of who only pretended to speak on behalf of production and distribution, but also so- society as a whole. The total unity be- cial, moral, and even religious convictions tween individual and society appeared to were to be subject to public control. The be nothing but a total destruction of hu- individual’s rights and duties were to be man individuality. When we discuss the determined by society. difficulties of the Soviet economy and the The attempt to create a “collective prospects of economic reform, all of these mentality” turned out to be a total failure. factors must be taken into consideration.

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Ideological and Moral Background moral repercussions of ideological decay. of the Economic Crisis This leaves an impression that the col- lapse of Communist is a relatively THEDECAY OF Communist ideology is un- recent occurrence. In fact, the role played doubtedly a leitmotif in all debates over by Marxism-Leninism has undergone vis- the crisis in the Soviet political system. ible transformations throughout the dura- Numerous commentators on Soviet do- tion of Communist rule in Russia, and the mestic problems like to emphasize the ideological crisis has had much more ex- total decomposition of Marxism-Leninism tensive consequences than is usually in the Soviet bloc. They argue that in recognized. today’s Soviet bloc nobody takes ideologi- The Old Bolsheviks were masters of cal clichCs seriously. Party leaders are revolutionary techniques, but they had no cynical and the public hates communism. experience in running a state. They knew As Vladimir Bukovsky has written, “From how to subvert, destroy, and change; but top to bottom, no one in Marxist they had little knowledge of how to build, anymore, even though they con- create, or introduce more advanced in- tinue to measure their actions by it, refer stitutions, better economic techniques, or to it, and use it as a stick to beat one improved agricultural methods. For them another with: it is both a proof of their Marxism served as a sort of sacred guide loyalty and a meal ticket.”6 to be followed almost blindly. But ex- Some distinguished writers like Alek- perience usually is a better teacher than sandr Solzhenitsyn hold that Marxism- theories are. The tenets of “genuine Marx- Leninism is a dead ideology in the sense ism” often proved inapplicable in post- that “even during its best decades it was revolutionary Russia. Soon it appeared totally mistaken in its predictions and was that the Bolshevik party, despite its ad- never a science.” This completely false herence to Marxism, did not practice its and harmful ideology is followed blindly basic assumptions. On the one hand, the by Soviet leaders, however. Their ad- Bolsheviks had to pervert Marx’s theory herence to the precepts of Marxism- for their own purposes; on the other, they Leninism is a principal source of the nu- were not able to create a new theory. The merous failures and blunders of the Soviet solution hit upon was to appear to adhere regime. “The spiritual renaissance of our to the basic of Marxism, while im- country,”argues Solzhenitsyn, “ in our posing strictly controlled thought. The liberation from this deadening, killing bigger their pragmatic deviations, the ide~logy.”~ stronger they pretended to be the most Other writers, among whom Leszek orthodox followers of “scientific social- Kolakowski is a prominent example, ism.” Marxism, or rather Marxism-Lenin- believe ideology is used in the Soviet bloc ism (which means Lenin’s Marxism), has primarily as an instrument for legitimizing never become a dead ideology. It played the power system. Kolakowski writes, and still plays a significant role. “The socialist class of exploiters is not The theory of Marxism-Leninism is suf- eager to retain and extend its power be- ficiently flexible to provide general prin- cause it professes a false doctrine (after ciples which can be adopted by the regime all, throughout history despots did quite and exploited as its stable theoretical well without Marxism); rather, they ad- background. At the same time, no doc- here to this doctrine as a tool to retain and trinal tenets are sacrosanct under Soviet extend their power.”s policy except insofar as they are useful to It is worth noting that discussion of the the ruling elite. As Daniel Bell has correct- significance of Communist ideology usu- ly pointed out, in the Soviet system “no ally concentrates on the most recent single element of doctrine is a keystone symptoms of ideological crisis, while sel- whose removal would cause the collapse dom if ever considering the economic and of Soviet ide~logy.”~The regime armed

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with totalitarian machinery does not need tion, an important means of shaping a a precise guide to its actions. What it does political culture of the society. Indoctrina- require is general confirmation that the tion was an effective form of political leaders are moving in the right direction; it which involved individuals in needs a theoretical justification, and the political system. Marxism-Leninism is able to provide this Ideological manipulation, once its ef- disguise. ficacy was discovered, was continually ex- Does this mean that ideology no longer ploited to totally invade the peoples’ causes Soviet leaders to act? In a literal minds. The state-controlled press and sense, the answer is yes. This does not broadcasting system were transformed mean, however, that the role played by into one big “machinery of the .” Politi- ideology is meaningless. Marxism-Lenin- cal education reached all groups in soci- ism long ago ceased to serve as the main ety. Special political schools, universities guide to action, but it did not disappear. of Marxism-Leninism, study circles in the Though pragmatic Soviet leaders do not army, and special committees of political follow Marx’s recommendations literally, enlightenment in factories and in “houses Communist rulers are forced to decorate of culture” were bound to create a “new their decisions and speeches with Marxian communist individual” totally subservient rhetoric. And this everyday contact with to the party.” Marxist cliches and has an inevit- Despite all these precautions, it did not able impact on their mentality. After all, prove true that “lies continuously re- adherence to Marxism-Leninism can be a peated sound like truth.” The common source of difficulty, but it can also be very sense of the public has never been totally convenient. When at a loss for a solution destroyed by party indoctrination. True, to a policy question, party leaders can some people began to accept ideology open the “sacred books” and find some without question. The permanent repeat- “phrase” which, in the future, can justify ing of the same ideological lessons “totally even the most stupid decision. Obviously, stripped them of critical tho~ght.”’~ in such a situation, mechanical application Others, however, ceased to react at all to of Marxism can only exacerbate the con- ideological stimuli. The effectiveness of sequences of a former inept policy, but the ideological manipulation has weakened ideological facade is a useful weapon until considerably in the last forty years. The a stronger contestant is able to pin a repeated Soviet “counterrevolutions” and “revisionist” label on such an interpreta- “periods of deviations”-the successive tion. Viewed from the perspective of a disclosures of the fallacies in the regime- Soviet leader, then, ideology can serve as had gradually destroyed the “magic” of a means of legitimization and delegitimiza- Marxism-Leninism. tion of political, economic, and social This growing ideological crisis has been decisions-an excellent weapon in politi- most strongly felt in the middle ranks of cal and internal struggles, a justification of society in the Soviet bloc. This “center” of any international strategy. And, after all, it the social structure of a Communist so- provides a stable theoretical background ciety consists of three important groups. for the system. The fist-consisting of those who live in Ideology has also played an important so-called internal emigration-includes social role. Its unifymg function-its role those who are almost totally indifferent to as a sort of “social cement”-has often political issues, neither believing in ideo- been pointed out by Western political logical cliches nor willing to fight against thinkers.I0 Ideology helped the ruling elite them. They do not accept the regime, but to maximize its control over the thinking their main concern is merely “to be left and actions of individuals. It was a price- alone.” The second group, the passive ob- less method to mobilize public energy, an servers, brings together skeptics and op- excellent instrument of political manipula- portunists, who do not refuse participa-

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tion in the regime but try to minimize it. that, in fact, is useful not to pro- Though not believing in the Communist tect ideological values but to protect their ideology, they are ready to follow cyni- own privileges-privileges which are ob- cally those who offer the biggest benefits tainable by simple loyalty to the party elite and to pay lip service to those ideological and which, in any other circumstances, clichCs which are most profitable at the would not be tolerated by society. The moment. The third group-and the one lack of ideological illusions helped create which is most important for Communist what Lenin called “conventional hypoc- leaders-consists of the “active par- risy.” The devaluation of ideology has had ticipants,” who really believe in the re- an equally demoralizing effect on the rest gime’s ideological goals and are whole- of society. Workers began to realize that a heartedly engaged in the creation of “a double standard of morality means one Soviet World Republic.” This group pro- morality for the party elite and another for vides the party with members who are nonparty people and even for ordinary ready not only to make party careers, but party members. They realized that cor- also to fight for the future of communism. ruption had become institutionalized by The continuous dwindling of this group, the system-so much so that it had be- which in certain Communist-ruled coun- come the unofficial method of distributing tries has almost ceased to exist, is the goods which were scarcely available on most spectacular effect of the crisis of the open market. Communist ideology. This realization has become a major The window-dressing character of detriment to the system of public proper- Marxism-Leninism has had important so- ty: the central characteristic of com- cial, moral, and economic repercussions, munism. The ordinary citizen argues that however, which were scarcely noticed at if state doctrine is only a facade, then the time either by Communist rulers or public property-sanctified by the ideol- Western commentators. The fact that ogy-actually belongs to no one. Hence ideological criteria were losing credibility the “seizure” of public property has noth- as the standard of social behavior in- ing to do with theft. It is prohibited by law evitably led to the creation of a double but not stamped by public morality. Or standard of public morality. Under pres- rather, to be more precise, there are two sure from the regime, the public had to public moralities, official and private. If an observe ideological tenets although they act of “seizure” of public property is of- could not be forced to respect them. ficially revealed, an individual will be pub- Books without substance, even if they are licly condemned otherwise,even if the act useful decorations, are not taken seri- is broadly known, he will not meet public ously. but, in many instances, un- Ideology served for a while to hamper derstanding and assistance. In the double the process of moral corrosion in socialist standard of public morality, the rule of societies. Communism itself is a sort of “live and let live” has become sacrosanct. . The blind belief in Marxist- For decades party leaders believed that Leninist dogmas deprived society of the the state derived many benefits from this capability to think independently; but rule, which was commonly known and ac- ideology did serve, on the other hand, to cepted by the authorities.According to an provide a sort of “quasi-moral” dogma unofficial party interpretation, it made which reduced the pure cynicism of in- sense to tolerate a moderate level of cor- dividual attitudes. As ideological values ruption. Among its advantages from the began to lose their authority, however, state’s point of view was the fact that the this resulted in a further drastic decline in public seemed more intimidated, more de- public morality. The awareness of ideo- pendent on the authorities, more control- logical decay corrupted a generation of lable. Under such a system, those who party members. They came to understand steal can be condemned at any time. If

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public opinion accepts that everyone repertoire. Thanks to the lack of demo- steals if he wants to live, it will accept the cratic control, such techniques are in- fact that everyone can be punished if the herent in the Bolshevik system of power, state so desires. The individual must live which protects all its fossilized com- with the impression that the state’s toler- ponents. The Soviet “vicious circle” is also ance can cease at any time. closed around the sphere of public This does not mean that the Communist morality. party consciously created the system of “double morality.’’ The party simply ac- The ‘Dictatorship of Ignoramuses” cepted it and tried to derive from it as A QUEsTlON WHICH is Often put to new- many benefits as possible. Every coin has comers from the Eastern bloc concerns two sides, however. With time the advan- the competence of the nomenklatura peo- tages of such a strategy seemed less and ple, who occupy hundreds of thousands of less clear-cut. The collapse of public important posts in science, education, morality contributed explicitly to all of the agriculture, and ind~stry.’~Is it really true distresses of the Soviet economy men- that their ineptitude results in incalculable tioned above: low labor discipline, neglect losses for the Communist economy? Are of equipment, absenteeism, , un- they really so incompetent and their de- productive work, total lack of interest in cisions so foolish? Before we delve deeper quality output, and so forth. Society into this problem, some explanation of the created new unofficial techniques of social transformation the system of party bu- compensation for the unfairness of com- reaucracy has undergone in the post- munism, methods of competition for Stalinist period will be required. benefits available only in backstage strug- The death of Stalin began a new era for gles, means of circumventing the pretend- the regime. It was obvious that the system ed social equality. The system created not created by Stalin had been consolidated only a black market and other corruption, and that the absence of its creator did not but also unofficial channels through which jeopardize its basic tenets. The crucial decisions of all kinds are made. A “double principle of one-party rule, which in fact morality,” in fact, is linked with the “dou- meant the power of a small elite headed ble life” of the whole society. by a single leader, was left untouched. Yet As Arnold Beichman and Mikhail S. the system required some modification. In Bernstein have pointed out, “The ‘second Stalin’s time, even the top-ranking mem- economy,’or the ‘gray-black’economy, is bers of the party elite felt extremely in- what makes the Soviet state function. The secure. This inevitably reduced the appeal ‘second economy’ is what makes life bear- of a party career. The younger generation able for everybody. The consumer can ob- of party leaders was much more prag- tain various kinds of food, goods, and ser- matic, much less dedicated to revolution- vices otherwise unobtainable in official ary ideas. They wanted to enjoy their shops. The people who provide these “share in power” without the risks that foods, goods, and services profit and can had accompanied their predecessors’ in turn better their life through the ‘second endeavors. economy.’ The ‘second economy’ system At the same time, the system of “sup- is what provides the incentives for people plementation” of the acting party elite re- to produce. To weaken these incentives by quired some improvement. Krushchev’s a drive against ‘corruption’ will decrease generation understood perfectly Vilfredo what productivity exists n0w.”13 Lower- Pareto’s theory of the “circulation of level party leaders watch carefully for elites.” The rule of the party elite, “the every possibility of grasping privileges guiding force of the proletariat,” was taken which they still do not possess. Backstage for granted as well as the truth that elites mechanisms, corruptive techniques, un- ruled in all societies. Yet their success official strategies-all are part of their depended upon their degree of flexibility.

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Only “open” elites, which were ready to ness for the job. Anyone who demon- co-opt the most flexible social elements, strated extreme stupidity or incom- were able to survive. Based on this prem- petence was simply transferred to another ise, the Communist party concluded that it post, thereby developing the impression had to involve more groups in its politics that, in exchange for his loyalty, he would by giving them the impression that they gain security and the protection of the might be able to participate in the de- system. cision-making process. The only qualifica- The party elite consisted of persons tion for co-optation into higher ranks was who, though they competed among them- to be acceptance of the politics of those selves, were capable of mutually support- currently running the party and skill in ing one another against threats from out- presenting ideological cliches. side the party system which could In looking for recruits, party leaders ob- jeopardize their careers. Thanks to these viously sought people from whom both arrangements, the system was relatively loyalty and expertise could be expected. fluid and able to survive the long period of Unfortunately, the combination of both totalitarian rule. The multitudinous no- characteristics in the same people was menklatura allowed the Communist party hard to find. In fact, a system based on ar- to involve a sizable group of adaptable bitrary decisions frequently changed by people in its affairs. To be on the nomen- the party leaders could not really wel- klatura list meant having a better-paying come experts. On the contrary, pro- job, a better apartment and a car, better fessional skills and values were incompat- and quicker prospects for promotion to a ible with the principle of partiinost, which higher bureaucratic office, an impression declared that the party was always right. of protection and immunity, and participa- The system led to the method of “negative tion in the decision-making process. In selection,” which promoted only com- return, one had only to follow the party pliant, conformable yes men. Individuals line. To oppose this line meant being de- who combined this trait with a particular prived of everything; it meant having one’s ruthlessness had the best prospects for career ended instantly. party careers. In fact, nomenklatura did The successful climb to the top of the not require traditional education, but party pyramid instills in the mind of an ap- rather these “talents” of a special type. paratchik, or party technocrat, the con- Party officers and managers were not viction that ruling others is his own per- selected on the basis of professional or sonal right. He begins to treat a Commu- even bureaucratic ability. Professionals nist enterprise, factory, educational cen- who could think independently and crit- ter, or hospital as his own possession. A icize openly were disqualified as can- member of the nomenklatura experiences didates for nomenklatura positions. To the an emperor-like power in his territory. He party elite, reliability was far more im- begins to reward friends and relatives, portant. punish enemies, and modify decisions in To perform routine activities through- return for bribes. The process of climbing out the country, the regime had to replace to the top seems itself to legitimize his Stalinist terror with a more effective sys- conduct. tem of rewards and motivations. As a In a closed society that does not toler- result, unaccountabdity, tolerance for ir- ate any open criticism, professionals will responsibility, incompetence, and corrup- always pose a threat to the secure posi- tion became the price paid in exchange for tion of the leaders. Incompetent party loyalty of the nomenklatura to the party leaders personally not only interfere in elite. As long as a person on the list did not detailed economic problems, but also ap- act against the party elite, he usually could parently even feel an obligation to do so. expect to remain in one nornenkliltura Every step in their political careers position or another, regardless of his fit- teaches them that the party is infallible

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and that they share infallibility of a sort minants contribute to the final decision. with the entire organization. The party and Because of the predominance of non- its vanguard cannot err. This system does rational factors, important choices are not need and cannot endure experts who made without proper calculation,and wild could reveal the mistakes of the ruling predictions take the place of rational cost- elite. Mistakes are not possible because “a benefit analysis. In the socialist system, defeat” is something alien to communism. which not only lacks proper information That reasoning closes this “vicious circle”; but is actually based on misinformation, if the party and its leaders cannot be the odds of increasing the role of rational wrong, then every economic failure of the factors in planning and decision-making acting leadership must be presented as a are quite small. Without proper informa- victory. Except during periods of succes- tion, socialist decision-making processes sion crisis, when predecessors can be will never fit the rational model. criticized,the leadership shows a total in- Why is adequate information unavail- ability to break out of this economic and able in Soviet economic management? It political deadlock. The “dictatorship of ig- has often been emphasized by Western noramuses” (as it was called by Stefan analysts that misinformation is a signifi- Kisielewski) is a permanent component of cant strategy in Soviet foreign policy and the Soviet system. that propaganda and help to manipulate political attitudes in the Soviet What Handicaps the bloc.15 To exist, the system has to be pro- Decision-Making Process? tected from real information. Only selec- EVERY STUDENT OF bureaucratic structures ted information without alternatives can knows well that no decision-makingproc- be approved. Information shapes the ess can prove effective without at least political culture of society, and Com- several basic elements: competence, in- munist leaders cannot afford to relinquish formation, coordination, responsibility of the dissemination of information which policy-makers, control over the imple- serves as a convenient instrument of mentation of decisions, and capability to power. While misinformation was seen as learn from mistakes. In the preceding ex- the means of subjugating society and amination, the first item on this brief list manipulating public attitudes, it was pre- was found sadly lacking. It must be said, sumed that the party elite, which had at its besides, that the Soviet system is equally disposal a widespread system of police deficient in the rest of the necessary control, was itself perfectly informed elements. about the true state of things. The numer- A study of how policy choices are made ous party cadres subordinated to top in the Soviet bloc finds that central plan- party leaders were supposed to help ning, the policy-making process, and the maintain military control over the coun- implementation of crucial decisions are try, monopoly control of all means of profoundly affected by the permanent communication and education, and com- lack of proper information. All bureau- plete state control over the economy; cratic organizations are built to act on they were also responsible for providing rational premises. It is true that decision- perfect information to their superiors.This making always involves some nonrational is a complete misunderstanding of the real components when decisions take place situation in socialist countries. The system under uncertainty and when the conse- which successfully keeps individuals to- quences of the choices are unknown. But tally obedient and almost completely de- the problem that handicaps the socialist prived of all forms of privacy is entirely economy is not simply the presence of lacking any effective means of economic nonrational factors in the decision-making information or control. process, but rather the overwhelming de- In fact, the large number of overlapping gree to which such nonrational deter- intermediary organizations badly hampers

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the decision-making process. Function- nomic sections for more effective results aries of all ranks are equally interested in cannot properly be established, if for no “success” and ready to misinform the cen- other reason than the shortages of mate- tral authorities. The hierarchical pyramid rial of which production has been ex- of control simply does not work. If the aggerated in statistics. This causes supply party cannot be wrong, then “success” dislocation and competition for resources must accompany all Communist econom- between enterprises which, theoretically, ic endeavours. This accounts for the fact should not exist in socialist industry. that the party is totally incapable of learn- Further contribution to the lack of ac- ing from its mistakes. The constant push curate statistics and empirical data comes for economic success leads to the “over- from the partiinost mentality of the Cen- fulfillment” of all plans and the inclination tral Offices for Control of Press, Publica- to “maximize” output without regard for tion, and Performances. Their official quality. It leads managers who are reward- Books of Directives and Recommen- ed only for “successes” to conceal the real dations forth detailed instructions for inefficiency of their enterprises. In a sys- the elimination of any negative comments tem in which production of predetermined on party decisions or any reference to offi- quantities is the essential indicator of suc- cial blunders or bungling. This obviously cess, there are weak incentives to strive makes any serious discussion of economic for more efficient production or reduction fallacies impossible. Under such broad of expenditures. censorship, basic economic, social, and Misinformation is implicit in the organi- political information goes unpublished. zational inadequacies of the Communist Costly scandals and blunders in urban system. Some managers fake the ac- planning, housing, and agriculture; irra- counts; others artificially exaggerate the tional decisions and investments; location quantity of production. In Polish coal and production facts are withheld from mines, Solidarity revealed the existence of the public. All scientific disciplines which special machines that were imported to are based on statistics are hampered by mix rock and soil with coal to double the such politics.I6 Reliance on similar misin- apparent output. And, what is more para- formation, economic naivete unsupported doxical, the central authorities prefer not by genuine economic research, and the to be well-informed. A friend of mine arbitrariness of decisions made by central working on statistics at the police criminal authorities go a long way toward explain- officeonce explained to me how reports ing the economic weakness of all Com- on criminal activity were put together. His munist countries. task was to “improve” the data received Reformation proposals usually focus on from each police station to show a lower a program of decentralization of the man- level of crime. “The Ministry of Internal Af- agerial system and emphasize the need for fairs,” he explained, “would then review creating a system basing incentives on the composite report and most probably profit, increasing efficiency and discipline, send it back for ‘proofreading’-a eu- giving greater responsibility to local mana- phemism for a downward revision of the gers, et cetera. Each new party “team” has figures. It is the routine procedure, re- repeated that the decentralization of peated in each reporting period, regard- decision-making could begin the real re- less of the originally quoted figures.” It is covery of the Communist system. Each obvious that in this situation, providing the has soon realized, however, that decen- correct information would certainly tralization is incompatible with the politi- amount to self-denunciation. cal aspirations of the Communist leader- Inadequate information and deliberate- ship. On one hand, it is obvious that, given ly distorted statistics handicap all eco- the lack of proper information at the top, nomic planning and cripple all coordina- local managers are better equipped to tion. Harmonious functioning of the eco- deal with economic . On the other

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hand, short of returning to a system of (3) The ideological crisis has under- market stimulants, the system of central mined the rudiments of Communist mor- control could be replaced only by the su- ality and corroded all Marxist-Leninist pervision of local workers’ committees. values, including the key dogma of com- But this solution could endanger party mon ownership. dominance. Economic power, once shifted (4) The moral and ideological crisis has to the working class, would lead to the killed all healthy incentives among work- growth of political power for the masses. ers and managers. Communist theory assumes that political (5) Without the rudiments of democ- and economic resources of power are in- racy people can be forced to work, but not separable. The totalitarian system cannot to work efficiently. They will operate pur- be transformed into one that is merely au- suant to the principle: “Those at the top thoritarian without posing a real threat to pretend to share power with us; we pre- the ruling elite. Rank-and-file bureaucrats tend to work.” On the other hand, demo- at the center are afraid of losing power, cratic transformations are too dangerous and their influence and even their jobs for the ruling elite, They are simply incom- might be threatened. For this reason, at- patible with the totalitarian framework of tempts at decentralization have been uni- the system. formly superficial. In their final effect, such (6) The double standard of morality, “reforms” have brought about only the together with massive- economic dis- further extension of bureaucracy and the locations, has created a black market and creation of new intermediate bureaucratic other corruption, which have been toler- structures which serve merely to convey ated for so long that they are now ir- the real decision made by functionaries at revocably integrated in the way of life in the center. Nor is this surprising, since Communist countries. both central and regional administrators (7) The need for creating a relatively want power, not responsibility. The center open party elite forced the party to build a does not want to lose the appearance of system of “negative selection” that pro- economic control; the local agencies want motes compliant, conformable yes men, to share power while bearing no respon- who care far more about their careers sibility for economic results. Barring fun- than about the system of Communist damental changes in the system, there- values. fore, it would be naive to expect that (8) Lack of competence, widespread administrators will voluntarily accept corruption, and unaccountability of de- more responsibility than absolutely nec- cision-makers are incompatible with the essary. People are not angels. It is difficult basic principles of economic efficiency. enough (and Communists disregard this (9) Lack of information, coordination, totally) for them to be beings. and proper control over the implementa- tion of productive decisions, coupled with TO RECAPITULATE My analysis, I do not ex- a form of decentralization that is more ap- pect a recovery of the socialist economy parent than real, cripple the socialist sys- for the following reasons: tem of central planning and decision- (1) The system has forever destroyed making. the so-called collective mentality, which (10) Without the party bureaucracy was supposed to be a basic component of and nomenklatura people, the party can- Communist political culture. not function; but with them, no reform is (2) The crisis of Communist ideology is possible. Both are key ingredients of a sys- irreversible. The belief of the masses in tem which can be crushed but not re- Marxism-Leninism cannot be reconstruct- formed. They are an inseparable part of ed, yet socialist leaders will not give up ob- the system. solete dogmas because they do not know In 1982 some Western scholars referred how to function without them. to Andropov’s plan of reform as “the task

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of Hercules in cleaning the Augean decessors. If I am asked whether this “vi- stables.”17To the extent the “task” refers cious circle’’ will compel the Soviet lead- to real reform and not a tiny “cleaning,” ers to return to the negotiation table (after the attempts of Corbachev will more Reykjavik talks) my answer is affirmative. nearly resemble the Sisyphean Labors. If the question refers to the chances for The system itself has suppressed eco- economic recovery of the Soviet system, nomic vitality and spontaneity, protected the answer follows the old Roman for- its own incurability, and locked its leaders mula: Quod natura negat, reddere nemo in the “vicious circle” created by their pre- potest.

)The Washington Post, March 12, June 4, 12, 16, 17, system of nomenklatura was established during 1946 and 21, 1985.2Lenin when he reached this position and 1947, and it consisted originally of about 40,000 was 47, Stalin 50, Malenkov 51, Krushchev 59, Brezh- newly promoted officials and newly approved old ap- nev 58, Andropov 68, Chernenko 71. 3See Arnold paratchiks. In the 1950s this network was substan- Beichman and Mikhail S. Bernstam, Andropov: New tially extended. See Beichman and Bernstam, An- Challenge to the West (New York, 1983), pp. 198-208. dropov, p. 103. %ee Richard H. Schultz and Roy 4Martin bn,The Andropov File (New York, 1983), Godson, , Active Measures in Soviet p. 132. SThe Washington Post? March 12, 1985. Strategy (Washington, 1984). official book of GQuoted in Donald D. Barry and Carol Barner-Barry, censorship reads like a historical novel. Here are a Contemporary Souiet Politics: An Introduction (En- few examples from one of them: “Figures illustrating glewood Cliffs, NJ., 1982), p. 37. 7Aleksandr Solzhe- the state and growth of alcoholism on a national nitsyn, Warning to the West (New York, 1976), p. 114. scale are not to appear in the mass media.” “All infor- SLeszek Kolakowski, “Ideologyin Eastern Europe,” in mation about the direct threat of industry and the East Central Europe: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow, use of chemicals in agriculture to human life and ed. Milorad Drachkovitch (Stanford, Calif., 1982), p. health must be expunged.” “Information concerning 45.gDaniel Bell, “The End of Ideology in the Soviet Poland‘s purchase of licenses from capitalist coun- Union,” in Marxist Ideology in the Contemporary tries is to be eliminated from the mass media.” “All World-Its Appeals and Paradoxes, ed. Milorad publications presenting general statistics with regard Drachkovitch (Stanford, Calif., 1966), p. 107. IKorn- to conditions of safety and hygiene at work or to oc- pare the views of Joseph M. Bochensld and Daniel cupational diseases must be withheld.” “Absolutely Bell, Marxist Ideologry in the Contemporary World, no information is to be published concerning the pp. 60-120. IISee Robert Conquest,Politics ofldeasin Katowice mine disaster in which four miners lost the USSR (London, 1967), pp. 97-117. IzCompare the their lives.” Official Censorship in the Polish People’s examination of k Zinoviewv‘s points on thii matter in Republic (Ann Arbor, 1978), p. 4. l7Ebon, The An- Kolakowsld, “Ideology in Eastern Europe,” p. 44. dropov File, pp. 128-29. Weichman and Bernstam, Andropou, p. 202. 14The

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