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“You Can Die Any Time” Death Squad Killings in Mindanao

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“You Can Die Any Time” Death Squad Killings in Mindanao THE PHILIPPINES “You Can Die Any Time” Death Squad Killings in Mindanao “You Can Die Any Time” Death Squad Killings in Mindanao Copyright © 2009 Human Rights Watch All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America ISBN: 1-56432-448-6 Cover design by Rafael Jimenez Human Rights Watch 350 Fifth Avenue, 34th floor New York, NY 10118-3299 USA Tel: +1 212 290 4700, Fax: +1 212 736 1300 [email protected] Poststraße 4-5 10178 Berlin, Germany Tel: +49 30 2593 06-10, Fax: +49 30 2593 0629 [email protected] Avenue des Gaulois, 7 1040 Brussels, Belgium Tel: + 32 (2) 732 2009, Fax: + 32 (2) 732 0471 [email protected] 64-66 Rue de Lausanne 1202 Geneva, Switzerland Tel: +41 22 738 0481, Fax: +41 22 738 1791 [email protected] 2-12 Pentonville Road, 2nd Floor London N1 9HF, UK Tel: +44 20 7713 1995, Fax: +44 20 7713 1800 [email protected] 27 Rue de Lisbonne 75008 Paris, France Tel: +33 (1)43 59 55 35, Fax: +33 (1) 43 59 55 22 [email protected] 1630 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 500 Washington, DC 20009 USA Tel: +1 202 612 4321, Fax: +1 202 612 4333 [email protected] Web Site Address: http://www.hrw.org April 2009 1-56432-448-6 “You Can Die Any Time” Death Squad Killings in Mindanao I. Summary ......................................................................................................................... 1 Key Recommendations .................................................................................................... 5 II. Note on Methodology ..................................................................................................... 7 III. Map of Mindanao .......................................................................................................... 9 IV. Background ..................................................................................................................10 Legacy of Violence ......................................................................................................... 10 Problem of Illicit Drugs .................................................................................................. 12 Davao City ..................................................................................................................... 12 Davao’s Mayor Rodrigo Duterte...................................................................................... 14 Targeted Killings in Mindanao and Beyond .................................................................... 16 V. Pattern of Killings ........................................................................................................ 18 Warnings and Intimidation ........................................................................................... 20 Locations ...................................................................................................................... 21 Perpetrators ................................................................................................................. 22 VI. Map of Davao City ....................................................................................................... 25 VII. Victims ....................................................................................................................... 26 Targeted Victims ........................................................................................................... 26 Unintended Victims ....................................................................................................... 27 Death Squad Members ................................................................................................. 28 Other Victims ................................................................................................................ 28 VIII. Targeted Killings ....................................................................................................... 29 Davao City .................................................................................................................... 29 General Santos City ...................................................................................................... 42 Digos City ..................................................................................................................... 46 IX: The Perpetrators: Inside the Davao Death Squad ......................................................... 48 Membership, Structure, and Equipment ....................................................................... 48 Recruitment and Training ............................................................................................... 53 Identifying the Targets ................................................................................................... 54 Operations .................................................................................................................... 57 Financing ...................................................................................................................... 58 Killings of Death Squad Members ................................................................................. 59 X. Failure to Investigate and Prosecute the Perpetrators ................................................... 61 Duties of Law Enforcement Officials ............................................................................... 61 Guarantees of Impunity ................................................................................................ 62 Lack of Witness Testimony ............................................................................................ 65 Role of Prosecutors ....................................................................................................... 67 Role of the Commission on Human Rights in Davao City ............................................... 68 Role of Ombudsman ..................................................................................................... 68 XI. The Role of Government ............................................................................................... 70 Local Government ......................................................................................................... 70 National Government ..................................................................................................... 75 XII. Recommendations .......................................................................................................77 To the President of the Philippines: ............................................................................... 77 To the Philippine Congress: ........................................................................................... 77 To the Philippine National Police: .................................................................................. 77 To the Department of Justice: ........................................................................................ 78 To the Commission on Human Rights: .......................................................................... 78 To the Ombudsman’s Office: ........................................................................................ 79 To the National Bureau of Investigation: ....................................................................... 79 To the Mayors of Davao City, General Santos City, Digos City, and Tagum City: ............. 79 To Major Donors and External Partners, Including the United States, European Union, Japan, the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank: ............................................ 80 To the United States Government: ................................................................................ 80 XIII. Appendix................................................................................................................... 82 Acknowledgements ......................................................................................................... 103 I. Summary If you are doing an illegal activity in my city, if you are a criminal or part of a syndicate that preys on the innocent people of the city, for as long as I am the mayor, you are a legitimate target of assassination. —Davao City Mayor Rodrigo Duterte, February 2009. At around 6 p.m. on July 17, 2008, 20-year-old Jaypee Larosa left his home in Lanang, a quiet residential neighborhood in Davao City, to go to a nearby Internet cafe. An hour later his family heard six successive gunshots. A neighbor rushed into their house to say one of their sons had been shot in front of the café. Jaypee was taken to a hospital, but was declared dead on arrival. Eyewitnesses said that Larosa had been shot by three men in dark jackets who had arrived on a motorcycle. After they shot him, one of them removed the baseball cap Larosa was wearing and said, “Son of a bitch. This is not the one,” and they immediately left the scene. It appears that the assailants were seeking to kill another man, a suspected robber. No one has been arrested for Larosa’s murder. His family is unaware of the police having taken any meaningful action in the case. Chicks placed atop the coffin of Jaypee Larosa, who was killed by unidentified gunmen in Davao City on July 17, 2008, to symbolically peck on the conscience of the killers. © 2008 Human Rights Watch 1 Human Rights Watch | April 2009 Jaypee Larosa is just one of hundreds of victims of unresolved targeted killings committed over the past decade in Davao City and elsewhere in the Philippines. Dozens of family members have described to Human Rights Watch the murder of their loved ones, all killed in similar fashion. Most victims
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