Ubuntu and Moral Value

UBUNTU AND MORAL VALUE Jason van Niekerk A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Humanities, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. 15 February 2013, Johannesburg I declare that this thesis is my own, unaided work. It is submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before for any degree or examination at any other University. _______________________________________ Submitted on this______________day of____________________2013 in_______________ ii Abstract This thesis argues for a perfectionist account of the African communitarian philosophy ubuntu as the best account of ubuntu qua theory of moral value. Surveying extant work on ubuntu , it finds that most such work reproduces the ambiguities and difficulties of the fraught public discourse on ubuntu , or falls to fallacies characteristic of many African philosophical projects. It argues that the approach which most successfully avoids these difficulties, thus reflecting the concerns and critical methodologies developed over the recent history of African philosophy more broadly, is the Analytic approach exemplified by Thaddeus Metz’ work. Metz makes explicit the constellation of value claims generally glossed as ubuntu , and proposes an attractive positive account, but does not account for the aretaic (or virtue-ethical) features integral to and attractive in most accounts of ubuntu . Seeking an account capable of incorporating the advantages of Metz’ account and these aretaic features, the thesis proposes two possible bases for such an aretaic account: an autocentric account, reducing moral value to the agents’ prudential value; and a perfectionist account, entailing moral normativity from the fullest development of some essential feature of human nature. The third chapter proposes the best formulation of an autocentric ubuntu in response to Metz’ objections to such accounts. In light of further objections, even this proves insufficient to support an intuitively attractive account of ubuntu . The fourth chapter develops and defends a perfectionist account of ubuntu , according to Thomas Hurka’s methodology, on which the relevant essential feature of human nature is our disposition toward relationships of communion with one another. This feature takes what is relevantly essential to be an emergent property of features already plausibly essential to human nature – rationality and language-use – and is congruent with the account of human nature proposed by advocates of ubuntu and African communitarianism. Since this perfectionist account is coherent and intuitively attractive, and offers novel, plausible responses to challenges facing aretaic accounts of ubuntu and ubuntu generally, this dissertation concludes that it is the most attractive account of ubuntu qua theory of moral value. iii Acknowledgements Umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu . No work is achieved without the assistance of others, which becomes all the more apparent in the process of work as isolating as writing a PhD thesis. I would like to acknowledge my deep indebtedness and thanks to the following others in particular. I have benefited, at different stages of the project, from the contributions of two supervisors. Thaddeus Metz has been both an essential interlocutor, and a supportive promoter of my engagements with African philosophy. Lucy Allais has contributed her patience and keen critical attention, and is crucially responsible for the actions which led to the completion of this thesis. In addition, this work could not have been completed without the financial support offered by a Wits Postgraduate Merit Award in its initial phase, and a Wits Staff Bursary in its latter phase, for which I am grateful to the University of the Witwatersrand and the Faculty of Humanities. I have also benefited from opportunities to develop work which has contributed to this thesis offered by the South African Journal of Philosophy, which compiled a special edition responding to Metz’ work at an opportune moment for my project in 2007; and by the Rhodes University Philosophy Department, who invited me to teach their 2 nd year African Philosophy course in 2010. I am especially grateful to Pedro Tabensky, both for the latter opportunity and for his insights before, during, and since. I have, in fact, been incredibly fortunate to have undertaken this work within a supportive philosophical community including the entire Wits Philosophy Department, and David Martens in particular; the broader South African and diasporic African philosophical community, among whom Ward Jones, Michael Eze, Paul Taylor, Richard Bell, Bernard Matolino, Michael Cloete, and Bruce Janz have been particularly influential in shaping my thinking on this project; and my examiners, Kwame Gyekye, Samuel Oluoch Imbo, and D. A. Masolo, whose helpful comments improved the final version of this thesis. Finally, I am most thankful for the support of Barbara Harmel, sine qua non for the completion of this thesis, and Frances Ringwood, through whom, and for whom, I am. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction vi Chapter 1: Introducing ubuntu and the context of investigation 1 Introduction 1 Ubuntu in Public Discourse 2 African Philosophy 16 Extant Philosophical Work on Ubuntu 48 The Ethnophilosophical Approach 48 The Supernaturalist Approach 51 The Constructivist Approach 54 The Analytic Approach 56 Conclusion 57 Chapter 2: Ubuntu as an Aretaic Theory of Moral Value 59 Introduction 59 Metz’ Account of Ubuntu 59 Ubuntu’s constellation of claims 60 The constellation in light of criticism 69 Metz’ anatomy of ubuntu accounts 73 Ubuntu as aretaic 84 Aretaic theories in outline 84 Aretaic Language 87 Plato’s Requirement on the Virtues and ubuntu 89 v Dispositions of character as partially constitutive of harmonious relationships 99 Conclusion 103 Chapter 3: Ubuntu as Autocentric 105 Introduction 105 Metz’ objections to an autocentric account of ubuntu 105 Responses to Metz’ objections 107 Metz’ replies 113 Whither autocentric ubuntu ? 118 The problem of parochial exemplars 119 Conclusion 120 Chapter 4: Ubuntu as Perfectionist 122 Introduction 122 Perfectionism and its appeal 123 Hurka’s perfectionist methodology 128 Developing perfectionist ubuntu 139 Challenges to a Perfectionist Ubuntu 162 Conclusion 166 Conclusion and Further Implications of Perfectionist Ubuntu 167 Conclusion 167 Scope for contestation and development of my perfectionist ubuntu 167 Perfectionist ubuntu’s novel responses to ubuntu’s challenges 169 Works Cited 174 vi Introduction In this thesis, I seek to outline the best account of the African communitarian philosophy glossed as “ ubuntu ”, as a theory of moral value. The term ubuntu is generally invoked to capture a constellation of traditional African value claims with a purportedly deep oral tradition, though theoretical discussion of the term as such, and a fortiori of the term as a coherent moral theory, has been uneven. As such this thesis proceeds from a critical examination of accounts of ubuntu extant in the philosophical literature, defending what I take to be the best extant account, produced by Thaddeus Metz. Metz’ account, however, achieves robust coherence and theoretical focus while sacrificing the aretaic (or virtue- ethical) aspects which are among ubuntu’s most attractive features. As the thesis progresses, therefore, I argue for an account of ubuntu capable of incorporating the advantages of Metz’ account into a plausible aretaic framework. I conclude by arguing for the advantages such an account has over alternatives, providing a promising basis from which to resolve challenges to ubuntu qua moral theory in the most intuitively appealing manner and producing a novel focus of moral concern consistent with African tradition. In the first chapter, I introduce the concept of ubuntu as currently articulated, and contextualise it in three ways: noting how and why the term is politicised, contentious, and under-determined in South African public discourse; outlining methodological precedents in developing African philosophical concepts from the broader history of recent African philosophy; and categorising the four methodologies which characterise extant work on ubuntu . Concluding these lines of enquiry, I argue respectively: that ubuntu ’s congruence with cognate terms in African philosophy is best explained by a coherent concept in need of greater development; that methodologies developed to avoid fallacies particular to African philosophy should be applied to developing ubuntu ; and that these concerns applied to extant methodologies for developing ubuntu suggest that the Analytic approach is best suited to the task. In the second chapter I rehearse what is currently the only Analytic account of ubuntu qua moral theory – Thaddeus Metz’ account – and argue that it does not account for the aretaic features which are among the most theoretically compelling aspects of ubuntu . In the first part of the chapter, I rehearse Metz’ position to distinguish two projects in his seminal work vii Toward an African Moral Theory : isolating a constellation of characteristically African moral claims which, taken together, pick out what is meant by ubuntu ; and arguing for one specific account as the best explanation for this constellation. I argue that the constellation ought to serve as a touchstone for any account of ubuntu , and concede the explanatory efficacy of Metz’ preferred account against all

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