The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project Information Series
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The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project Information Series EUGENE KOPP Interviewed by: Tom Tuch Initial interview date: March 7, 1988 Copyright 1998 A ST TABLE OF CONTENTS Coming to USIA Promotion to USIA Assistant Director Administration Sha espeare!s operating policies Policy Differences Strains between USIA and Dept of State Vis a Vis Soviet Union/D'tente Distrust of Foreign Service USIA (eographic Offices Subordinated to Media Offices USIA Deputy Director Corrects policies (eneral Counsel (ordon Strachan a problem Confronting Keogh!s explaining Keogh!s accomplishments Agency difficulties, -atergate VOA director Ken (iddens and Keogh Differences Special Concern .etrospective View Disagreement on Policy between USIA Management and VOA INTERVIEW ": This is Tom Tuch interviewing Eugene Kopp, former Deputy Director of USIA in his office in downtown (ashington, today on March 7, 1988. KOPP/ Tom. 1 ": Nice to see you. KOPP/ Than you very much. Coming to USIA ": Let,s start by tal-ing about your coming into a foreign affairs agency, USIA, from life as a lawyer, during the Ni.on Administration. How did you decide that you wanted to wor- in USIA as a political appointee at that time0 KOPP/ -ell1 let me bac up Tom/ After I got out of law school in 1341 I served a year as law cler for a federal judge1 I then went to the Department of 5ustice in 1342 as a trial attorney. And by 1348 I felt that I probably ought to be thin ing about something else to do because I didn8t thin I wanted to say at 5ustice for a full career. At that time1 a very close friend of mine who had been a close friend and colleague since undergraduate days at Notre Dame1 .ichard Allen was serving as the Director ..of Foreign Policy .esearch for the Nixon campaign. Dic contacted me in the summer of 848 and as ed what I was thin ing about doing. I told him I was thin ing about leaving the Department. He suggested that if they won the election in November there might be something interesting to do as part of the Administration. So I decided to wait and see what happened. you may remember that Dic :.ichard Allen; was Henry Kissinger8s first deputy at the National Security Council. And from that position in 843 he was influential in putting me in touch with Fran Sha espeare. The net of it was that in 5uly of 843 I left the Department of 5ustice to come into USIA as Deputy (eneral Counsel and Congressional Liaison. Charley Ablard was then (eneral Counsel. And that8s how I started with USIA. And I served in that job until 5uly of 872. ": As Deputy0 Promotion to USIA Assistant Director1 Administration KOPP/ As Deputy (eneral Counsel. And then in 5uly of 872 Ben Posner1 who had been the Assistant Director for Administration1 decided to retire. So Fran as ed me to be Assistant Director for Administration replacing Ben Posner. .ight after I agreed to do that1 Charley Ablard left the Agency to go to the Department of 5ustice. So for the period of 5uly 872 to December 8721 I really covered two jobs. I was Assistant Director for Administration and Acting (eneral Counsel and Congressional Liaison. Then in December of 872 the -hite House sent us a new (eneral Counsel1 a young fellow named (ordon Strachan who had been wor ing at the -hite House for Bob Haldeman. I remained as Assistant Director for Administration. Then Fran left1 I thin 1 sometime late in December and 5im Keogh was named Director. 2 Problems Created by Sha espeare8s Operating Policies ": Before Fran- leaves the Agency, tell me about your relationship with Fran-. How did it go0 I mean, Fran- was a very active USIA Director. He was a very opinionated, a very strong personality in running USIA. 3et, he had his ma4or differences, for instance, with the Secretary of State at the time. How did this wor- itself out in your relationship with 2ran-0 KOPP/ -ell1 I was concerned about two aspects of Fran 8s approach to the Office1 which concern I later expressed to 5im Keogh because they represented the two most serious internal problems that Keogh was inheriting. It is true that Fran was a very active and vocal and high profile Director of USIA. One of my concerns was that his activity got over into the policyma ing area1 far beyond the mandate or charter of USIA. But there was nothing that I could do very much to dissuade Fran from what he intended to do. ": Nobody could. Policy Differences, Strains Between USIA and Department of State KOPP/ Yeah1 Fran had certain views about administration policy in the EastA-est relationship. As a very strong and articulate conservative1 he was just bound and determined that he was going to articulate those views. Now that activity and high profile over a period of time started to create a very serious strain in the relationships between USIA and the Department of State and it affected communications and coordination and cooperation. But there was nothing that I or anybody else that I new could do to get Fran off that course. But I would also say that at all times the relationship was very cordial and friendly even though on occasion we disagreed about what he ought to be doing and how he ought to be doing it. You may recall in a similar vein but on a lower level1 Fran created a great stir about how officers were going to be promoted at USIA. He thought that the selection panel system and the ran order system were offensive to management. And he directed that our personnel office prepare an alphabetical listing of officers who had been recommended for promotion so he could pic and choose rather than go in ran order. And that created a hec of a dispute with the American Foreign Service Association and the Department of State. In any event1 Fran was a uniBue and intelligent and articulate individual. But his whole style and approach to the office created a great deal of problems for us. Vis a Vis Soviet Union/Detente ": I agree. This is really a rather interesting phenomenon because you had Fran- Sha-espeare as the head of USIA. And, of course, you had Bill Rogers as the Secretary of State. And the issue was the tone policy of the Ni.on Administration vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. 3 7n the other hand, you also had a terribly strong national security advisor in Henry %issinger during that time. And to me it,s always been a 8uestion why did the (hite /ouse or the National Security Council let Fran- Sha-espeare get away with his really completely divergent policy interests vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. He did not believe in detente. KOPP/ No1 he didn8t. He didn8t trust the Soviets and for very good reasons which I thought were valid then and1 not so incidentally1 I thin are valid now. I agreed with Fran . But USIA wasn8t ma ing the policyAAwe either had to support it or resign and then be critical. I viewed detente as nothing more than a tactical stance the Administration was ta ing to adjust to short term realities1 not a long term policy shift into naiveteAAabout the communists. But Fran often said1 well1 if the President doesn8t li e what I8m doing1 he can call me1 and I8ll be out. And1 of course1 that never happened. But what did happen was that the NSC and the State Department simply got into a practice of ignoring Fran . And1 unfortunately1 in some respects ignoring the Agency. ": Did that wor- to the detriment0 Distrust of Foreign Service KOPP/ Yes1 it did. -hen Keogh came in1 he naturally started tal ing to me about budget matters and other things. And I remember in one of the early conversations1 he as ed me what do you thin are the one or two major problems I8m inheritingC And I told him part of Fran 8s approach had been on the predicate that the career foreign service was not reliable. In the EastA-est dialogue1 Fran felt that career foreign service officers just weren8t tough enough about the Soviets. So1 he had another personnel policy that no officer could expect to rise to the senior ran s without having served a tour in the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe. Fran 8s approach here was that career officers who tended to be a little bit hopeful and optimistic about the Soviets needed to actually live and breathe and smell and seeAAthose would be Fran 8s wordsAAthat society to understand how dangerous tough they were as adversaries. USIA (eographic Offices Subordinated to Media Offices In any event1 Fran 8s lac of regard for the career foreign service was reflected in his decision to put the media in the hands of political appointees and shift substantial amounts of resources from the control of the area offices to the media offices to produce the hard ind of media product that Fran thought was necessary to be tough in the EastA-est situation. I told Keogh the net result was that we had an agency where the media was operating under one set of principles1 the area offices1 mainly directed by the career service1 were operating under another set of attitudes and that we had the potential for a major problem on our hands1 particularly in front of Congress. I said I8m afraid 4 you8re going to find that there are a lot of media products that are being produced that can8t be used in the field because they are not consistent with U.S.