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Aristotle's Rhetoric As Political Philosophy

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Aristotle's Rhetoric As Political Philosophy Founding Speech: Aristotle’s Rhetoric as Political Philosophy by Tina Rupcic A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Department of Political Science University of Toronto © Copyright by Tina Rupcic 2017 Founding Speech: Aristotle’s Rhetoric as Political Philosophy Tina Rupcic Doctor of Philosophy Department of Political Science University of Toronto 2017 Abstract There is notoriously little agreement in the literature on Aristotle’s Rhetoric. While disputes about most every aspect of Aristotle’s argument abound, most scholars tend to agree on one general point. That is, most read the work as an attempt at discovering and describing the nature of rhetorical persuasion. The present study takes a different view: it maintains that the Rhetoric is better understood as an attempt at replacing the existing teaching and practice of rhetoric with one that is better suited for use within the deliberative institutions of political society. The Rhetoric, on this reading, is a work with a political project. This dissertation contributes to the literature in three distinct ways. First, it attempts to show that there is a significant rhetorical component to some of Aristotle’s most prominent arguments. It argues, among other things, that the first chapter of the work and the taxonomy of rhetoric presented in chapters two and three should not be taken at face value. Second, this study illustrates the extent to which concerns about legislation figure into Aristotle’s attempts at articulating an art of speech. Most readings conceptualize the problem of rhetoric as consisting in the relationship between rhetoric and collective judgment, taking the view that Aristotle’s solution lies in liberating judgment from a rhetorical practice that enmeshes it in some incongruous or inappropriate way. This study ii suggests that preserving the rule of law, protecting a state’s legislative institutions, and cultivating civic virtue, are among Aristotle’s chief concerns. Third, the present work also locates, what it considers to be, Aristotle’s non-rhetorical teaching about the nature of rhetorical persuasion. iii Acknowledgements I wish to thank the members of my committee, Clifford Orwin, Ryan Balot, Ronald Beiner, Edward Andrew, and Waller Newell. To my sisters, since I count you among my most important teachers, there is no better place for me to acknowledge my debt to you than on this page. Thank you for all that you have taught me over the years, and thank you for your unwavering support and encouragement. I dedicate this work to you. iv Table of Contents Chapter 1: Recovering the Politics of Aristotle’s Rhetoric 1 Reading the Rhetoric 9 The Problem of Aristotle’s Rhetoric 12 Rehabilitating the Rhetoric 16 Contemporary Readings: The Rhetoric as Philosophy 20 Contemporary Readings: Politics as Primary 25 The Rhetoric as Political Philosophy 28 Chapter 2: The Political Problem of Rhetoric 38 Stage One: Breaking With Plato 47 Stage Two: Discrediting the Teachers of Speech 53 Behind the Rhetoric 65 Rhetoric and Legislation 78 Rhetoric in the Courts 82 Rhetoric in the Assembly 88 Looking Forward: Putting Rhetoric in its Place 93 Chapter 3: Reconceiving Rhetoric 98 Defining Rhetoric 99 Aristotle’s Three Species of Rhetoric 109 A Moderated View 117 Chapter 4: Putting Rhetoric in the Service of Politics 120 Deliberative Rhetoric (Rhetoric, Chapters 1.4-8) 123 Epideictic Rhetoric (Rhetoric, Chapter 1.9) 143 Judicial Rhetoric (Rhetoric, Chapters 10-15) 160 v Towards a Political Rhetoric 182 Chapter 5: The Path to Persuasion: Aristotle on Human Motivation 187 The Art of Speech and the Causes of Persuasion 189 Movement in Aristotle’s Argument 199 Aristotle on Human Motivation 207 Advantage, Pleasure, and Aristotle's Art of Speech 215 Chapter 6: Conclusion 223 Works Cited 227 vi Chapter 1 Recovering the Politics of Aristotle’s Rhetoric Aristotle’s Rhetoric is a book about speech written at a time when the power of speech could not be underestimated. Citizens of ancient democracies understood that a handful of words properly arranged and aptly delivered could alter the fortunes of private men and determine the fate of entire human societies. Daily experience readily confirmed the former. It was evident to all that individuals skilled in speech could better defend their interests in courts of law and that they could better advance their personal agendas within a political assembly. As for the latter, here history, even if events of the moment did not, afforded ample evidence of the overwhelming influence that a single individual gifted in speech could exert over an entire political community. There is the example of Themistocles who prevailed against common opinion and succeeded in persuading Athenians to abandon their city and put their faith and their fate in their ships, thereby securing the preservation of their people.1 There is Pericles, who in his famous funeral oration inspired Athenians to hold their aggressive course in the war, even though a more moderate approach might have served them better.2 Then there is Peisistratus, a favorite example of Aristotle’s, who established himself as tyrant by successfully convincing Athenians to act against their own best interests.3 These are but three examples of individuals who bent cities to their will with their words. They illustrate that speech is a 1 Herodotus, The Histories, ed. Robert B. Strassler (New York: Anchor Books, 2007), 7.141. 2 Thucydides, The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War, ed. Robert B. Strassler (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1998), 1.4.13. 3 Aristotle, The Politics, trans. Carnes Lord (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 1035a20-25. 1 viable source of power and influence, and that it is not a skill to be spurned by anyone seeking influence within political society. The Greeks understood this. Hence, there would have been little need to persuade most Greeks in Aristotle’s day of the utility of developing a facility in public speech. For the older Greeks facility in speech was understood to be something that could not be taught. In the time of Hesiod and Homer eloquence was considered to be a divine gift, a talent bestowed by the gods upon a select few.4 Among these few were counted some of their greatest heroes. If Achilles could throw a spear faster, further, and with perfect accuracy, Odysseus was the man who could persuade the arrogant, the ignorant, and the otherwise intractable, to alter course when they could only see reasons to stay firm. The Greeks recognized the strength of the warrior as well as the strength of intelligence, which often manifested itself as an ability to move men with words. Beginning in the time of Socrates, and certainly by the time of Aristotle, the older view of speech had been entirely displaced by rhetoric, the teaching of which was said to have been invented in Syracuse in the fifth century after the tyrant Thrasybulus had been ejected and democracy was established in his stead.5 Before then, no one, as far as is known, taught speech. Of course, that does not preclude the possibility that some may have practiced rhetoric before that time. Even so, the so-called invention of rhetoric marks the moment when everything changed, because it was at that time that the first teachers of speech emerged. It was then that the gift of eloquence was wrested from the gods by a crop of orators who offered their fire to any man who could pay for it. The 4 Friedrich Solmsen, "The Gift of Speech in Homer and Hesiod," Transactions of the American Philological Association 85(1954); Richard Leo Enos, Greek Rhetoric before Aristotle (Anderson, South Carolina: Parlor Press, 2012). 5 Greek Rhetoric before Aristotle, 100. 2 teachers of rhetoric were in no way coy about precisely what it was they offered their students. They unabashedly offered their students a means of defending their interests and establishing their influence over others: they were celebrated, sought after, and paid well. Before Aristotle began writing the Rhetoric, Plato had already articulated some of the potential hazards of this new teaching.6 In the Gorgias, he makes these concerns clear. On the one hand, he argues that rhetoric is potentially dangerous for those who wield it because it weaves corruption into their souls. On the other hand, and perhaps still more worrisome for Plato, is its effect on its audience in which it implants a passion for injustice. Whether or not Aristotle was similarly concerned about the development of rhetoric is a thornier question. The debate over the value of rhetoric is said to have continued as a particular point of disagreement between Aristotle and Isocrates, a student of Gorgias and the most influential rhetorician of his day. If the reports of ancient chroniclers are to be believed, Aristotle had nothing but contempt for his teachings.7 So much so that he is said to have offered evening courses in rhetoric to the general public to serve as a counterpoint to Isocrates’s teachings. 8 Although these reports are not to be relied upon, one finds evidence of this dispute, and evidence of an anti-rhetorical position more generally, in some of Aristotle’s other writings. His interest in the subject was serious. In addition to 6 Edward Schiappa argues that Plato coined the term rētorikē while writing the Gorgias. He offers two arguments in support of this claim: “the first is that the surviving instances of the word (rētorikē) demonstrate that its use in Plato’s Gorgias is novel. The second is that Plato’s penchant for coining terms ending in (-ikē) makes it highly probable that (rētorikē), like most other terms denoting specific verbal arts, was originally coined by Plato.” Edward Schiappa, "Did Plato Coin Rhetorike," The American Journal of Philology 111, no.
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