BUCCANEERS AND CHIEFL Y HISTORIANS Simione Durlltalo
MATANITU: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER IN EARLY FIJI. 247 pp., Institute of Pacific Studies, University of the South Pacific, 1985, David Routledge. This book is essentially a revised version of the author's Ph.D. thesis, first written in 1965. The theme we are told is to do with "the struggle for political dominance between the great chiefdoms of Fiji until the first half of the nine teenth century, and then between Fijians, Tongans and Europeans in the years 1855 to 1874" (p. 5). Given the paucity of work on Fijian history generally, the book fills in some empirical gaps in Fijian history in the early part of the last century. But the book cannot be evaluated on empiricist grounds alone for the author is the leading advocate of new type of Pacific history and he uses this present work to utilise this new approach. "The study seeks to be not merely island-centred but Islander-oriented. It re-establishes the status of Fijians as the main protagonists in their own history, something which has been lost sight of in much past history-writing" (p. 6). Routledge has claimed in a recent article (Routledge 1985:91), "that he leans towards the tenets of what is sometimes called social history" along the lines of the French Annales school, founded by Marc Bloch and Lucien Febure, which is interested "with the persistent patterns of the long term, with the quantative and the structural, with what is recurrent, or at least comparable, in the process of history" - in contrast to the 'history of mere events' used for the traditional orient ation towards the surface history of the actions of great personalities. Furthermore, Routledge emphasises that practi tioners of the 'new Pacific history' must study: whole societies, and study, moreover, according to the worldview of the people themselves. One must study process and not merely sequence of events and one must emphasise social categories rather than individuals.
JOURNAL OF PACIFIC STUDIES SSED, university of the South Pacific, Suva Volume 11, 1985, pp. 117-156 117 How does the present work measure up to the aims that the author has set us the guiding principles of the 'new Pacific history'? What this reviewer finds astonishing is that despite all these pronouncements of a new orientation in Pacific history, the present work fails miserably to fulfill any of the historio graphical tasks that he champions and sets for others. If the work under review is an example of the new Pacific history "as seen from the Pacific Islands", which the author claims it is and of which he is the self-appointed high priest, then the new approach of 'island-oriented' history has some serious short comings and might be even considered as just another version of the 'Pacifi~ Way' in different guise. These shortcomings can be discerned at three levels, firstly at the level of theory. Most historians, particularly those subscribing to the A.N.U. orthodoxy, refuse to acknowledge that the practice of history is a theoretical practice. The implicit assumption is that historical evidence (i. e. the truth) can be presented independently of theory. This is particularly surprising for in the post-Thompsonian world in which we live the art of writing history can no longer be regarded as a matter of theory - neutral technique. Even a conservative historian like E.H. Carr has partly conceded the point that presentation of historical evidence cannot be theoretically neutral when he remarked: It .used to be said that facts speak for themselves. This is of course, untrue. The facts speak only when the historian calls on them: it is he who decides to which facts to give the floor, and in what order or context (Carr, 1964:11). For Carr the facts need an interpretation. But this inter pretation works only to select the facts of history, to determine them as having historical significance, rather than say personal significance or no significance at all. In themselves, facts are given, they are independent of theory. The Battle of Kaba occurred on 7 April 1855. Whether this is an historical fact is up to the historian, but the historian does not doubt the fact itself. Carr likens facts to fish swimming in an ocean; "What the historian catches will depend partly on chance, but mainly on what part of the ocean he chooses to fish in and what tackle he chooses to use" (Carr 1964:23). But even facts such as the data of the Battle of Kaba or the annexation of Fiji depend on theory - very low level theory it is true, and for that reason
118 -they are often uncontroversial. For Carr, facts are externally related to their interpretations. Thompson among other has convincingly demonstrated in The History of the English Working Class that 'interpretation' does not merely select the facts but provides the theoretical framework within which the facts are composed. One of the greatest shortcoming of Matani tu is the fact that the place of Fiji in relation to the wider global, particularly economic forces is played down. Routledge, like AND historians Scarr ( 1979) and MacNaught (1982), believes that there was no comprehensive cause or purpose behind Britain's colonisation of Fiji; it was a fortuitous freak. The strength of Australian oplnl0n was sufficient at least twice to force the Colonial Secretary to bring the question of Fiji before his colleagues. Institutional inertia, however, frustrated any positive line of action until the issue had virtually gone by default. Britain found itself being forced from expedient to expedient until no retreat from annexation was possible (p. 187) [emphasis added]. The author is here putting forward the great theory which tries to portray the picture that Britain was a 'reluctant colonist' in the case of Fiji. This theme of 'reluctance' permeates Routledge's present work where he also adds that Fijian leaders were reluctant to accept independence in 1970 (p. 220). His explanation for the reasons behind this reluctance is, as will be shown later, rather superficial, employing approvingly the conventional apologia for British imperialism; "that the empire was acquired in a fit of absentmindedness" (p. 186). The most outstanding element of Pacific colonial historio graphy, of which Routledge's work is but one example, is the deliberate or unwitting omission of the exploitative and racist relationship between white Europeans and indigenous people, between members of the native ruling class and their subjects, between co10niser and colonised. Thus Routledge condones the hiring out of the defeated Lovoni people as plantation labourers as being true to rules of the Fijian polity. E.L. Layard and J.G. Goodenough ••• b1unt1y condemned the hiring of the Lovoni as an act of slavery, but their understanding of the Fijian polity was not acute and they were also prejudiced. Sir Arthur Gordon, 119 the first governor of the crown colony, not only accused the Cakobau Government of selling the Lovoni people into slavery, but implied that other campaigns had been conducted with the avowed object of aiding the exchequer by obtaining lands to sell and prisoners to dispose of. His inability to quote examples, however weakened the force of his allegations (p.141). Routledge again excuses the exiling of eight hundred Vatusila and Magodro people to the island of Koro and the hiring of three hundred men among these to white planters and suggests that Commodore Gdodenough 's attempt to interfere was ill-conceived (p. 194). Imperialism in this scheme is seen merely as the extension of peaceful foreign British rule into Fiji (i.e. colonialism) . So imperialism and colonialism are equated as one and the same thing. Lenin (1964) had defined imperialism in its economic essence as nothing less than monopoly capitalism, which mainly involved the struggle among the white imperialist powers to redivide an already divided world. Colonialism is just a phase of this which involved the division of the world among the imperial powers of Europe and the United States. Monopoly capitalism grew out of colonial policy. To the 'old' motives of colonial policy, finance capital added the struggle for the sources of raw materials, for the export of capital, for 'spheres of 'influence' (Le. for spheres of profitable deals, concessions, monopolist profits and so on) and finally the economic territory in general. This means that those who assert that Fiji was reluctantly colonised by the British are not only parochial nonglobal and ahistorical, but their outlook constitutes an attempt to eschew a class analysis of local Fijian historical development within an overall context of integration into the global imperialist network. For example, Routledge suggests that the British refusal of the first offer of Cession in 1858 was due more to the person ality of Lieutenant Colonel W.J. Smythe: As a somewhat unimaginative army officer, brought up to obey to the letter, he was quite unsuited to assess the complex and irregular situations existing in Fiji. His own instructions made it clear that irrefutable reasons would be required before annexation would even be considered ..• He travelled extensively,
120 questioning the Fijian chiefs along the lines laid down for him, but making no attempt to understand the general nature of the policy. In particular, he accepted too readily the very subjective opinions of the Wesleyan missionaries. It is no surprise that he abided by the tenor of his instructions and recommended the rejection of the offer. The colonial office accepted the advice without demur (p. 98). Britain's disinterest in these early offers of Cessions needs to be placed into a much broader perspective reflecting a general disinterest in the colonies that was natural in the early 19th century when Britain was the pre-eminent economic and military power. As the 'workshop' of the world British policy supported a global laisse-faire (free trade) policy, called by some historians as the era of Free Trade imp'erialism, in which she had all the advantages. This happy state of affairs as far as Britain was concerned could not last forever as other European countries as well as th~ United States increased their industrial power and began to challenge British dominance in the then evolving world capitalist economy in the 1860s. In this circumstance, disinterest in colonies became increasingly unsustainable as the industrial powers grew suspicious of each others intentions in what was now becoming a highly competitive world with rising tariff barriers. This situation of growing rivalry among imperialist powers is explained with great clarity in Political Economy, issued by the Institute of Economics of the Soviet Academy of Science (1957:279, 296). Premonopoly capitalism, with free competition pre dominating, attained the apex of its development. in the 1860s and 1870s. During the last third of the 19th century there took place the transition from pre-monopoly to monopoly capitalism. Monopoly capitalism finally took shape towards the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century. Monopoly capitalism or imperialism is the highest stage of capitalism ••• rn the last quarter of the 19th century, in the period of transition to the monopoly stage of capitalism, the map of the world underwent radical changes. All the developed capitalist countries followed the oldest colonial power, Britain, on the road to territorial conquest .• Towards the beginning of the 20th century, the
121 division of the world was complete. The colonial policy of the capitalist countries had led to the conquest of all the lands not hitherto occupied by the imperialists. No more 'free' lands remained; a situation had been created in which every fresh conquest presupposed wresting territory from its owner. The completion of the division of the world placed on the order of the day the struggle to re divide it. The struggle to re-divide the already divided world is one of the fundamental distin guishing features of monopoly capitalism. This attempt to redivide an already divided world by late comers to the colonial race like Germany led directly to the First World War. After having examined the global situation, we then can place Fiji's annexation historically. Fiji was not annexed as conventional myth has it in a reluctant manner, in a fit of British humanitarianism to control the Pacific Island labour trade and its abuses. Rather it was an example of a pre-emptive annexation by Britain to forestall other rival powers. The humanitarian lobby in Britain had been pressing for an end to the Pacific labour trade much earlier and even the murder of Bishop Patterson cannot adequately explain why Cession was accepted in the mid-1870s and not earlier. At the earlier period only 'economically' attractive colonies were to be annexed but the overall situation changed drastically in the 1870s. The refusal of the 1870 offer of Cession was due to the fact that the British thought the settler-controlled Cakobau government could still do the job of maintaining law and order on the cheap. It was only when this was conclusively demonstrated not to be the case that Britain stepped in. This was the fundamental motive force behind the 'second imperialism' which led to the 'scramble for Africa' and the Pacific, the carving up of Samoa, the 'Solomons and Papua New Guinea, and the annexation of Fiji. Lenin again is a better guide here than official British papers, when he states that not all territorial acquisations could be directly referred to economic motives. His theory of imperialism makes allowances for strategic motives, for economic motives that were largely speculative. With unoccupied territory running out, the scramble for the remaining areas could take on an irrational fervour: Hence the inevitable striving for finance capital
122 to enlarge its economic territory and even its territory in general ••• finance capital in general strives to seize the largest amount of lands in all kinds in all places, and by every means taking into account potential sources of raw materials and fearing to be left behind in the fierce struggle for the last scraps of undivided territory, or for the repartition of those that have already been di vided. (V. I. Lenin 'Imperialism the highest stage of capitalism', Collected Works (Moscow 1964) XX 11, 200. ) Even liberal historians J. Gallagher and R. Robinson agree with Lenin's analysis. The partition [of Africa] had brought them [European statesman] to a kind of geopolitical claustophobia, a feeling that national expansion was running out of world space and that the great powers of the twentieth century would be those who had filched every' nook and cr-anny of territory left. (J. Gallagher and R. Robinson, 'The Partition of Africa' ., New Cambridge Modern History, XI 626.) The 'pre-emptive annexation' of Fiji fits into such a mould of Britain trying to 'filch every nook and cranny' and stop other powers from filching it". Colonies, however, once acquired had to pay their own way as soon as possible and the colonial policy of 'each colony paying its own way', as under Gordon in Fiji, is just a logical continuation of Britain's attempt to keep 'spheres of influence' on the cheap in the pre-colonial period through the settler-controlled Cakobau government. The striking similarity of consul Pritchard and Gordon's ~olicy (not to mention personality) vis-a-vis the Fijian has been commented upon by Routledge (p. 102). The tragedy for PritcQard was that he was the right man at the wrong time - he succeeded in persuading Cgkobau and other chiefs to cede Fiji in 1858, but Britain was not ready to annex for reasons we have already seen. Later in the 1870s this situation would change. The real significance of Fiji to Britain which led to 'pre emptive annexation' has been admirably summarised by a corres pondent of the Times (London) of Saturday October 17, 1874, outlining why Fiji was a very desirable possession.
123 A map of the Pacific Ocean shows that Fiji has one of the most valuable situations in the world. Looking at the future of human intercourse, we must recognise that in another generation the route between the West Coast of the United States and the Great Australian territory is likely to be frequented by multitudes of vessels. Steam nagivation is rapidly expanding •.• the advocate of annexation point to the fact that England possesses no station in the vast expense of ocean that lie between Australia and the Pacific coast of America. From the settlement of British Columbia to the coast of New South Wales, over 7000 miles of sea, there is no Ifritish depot or coaling station, no place of refuge or refit in time of war or peace. The Americans have made the Sandwich Islands [Hawaii] practically their own; the French are established in New Caledonia; we, who hold the grandest possess ion of the Southern Hemisphere - a new world, with an incalculable future - are content to allow our growing Colonies to communicate with the American Continent, to say nothing of the countless islands of the ocean, through the medium of rude tribes over whom we can exercise no real control. The· correspondent then goes on to provide the rationale for 'pre-emptive annexation' by warning that: There is also the danger that if we neglect to take possession of any valuable spot it may pass suddenly into the hands of some European Power more enter prising than ourselves, and we may thus have to use the highway of the Pacific at the discretion of a ri val - perhaps an enemy. Now, of all the groups in the South Pacific Fiji is marked out by nature as the most desirable maritime station. It is to Australia what the Sandwich Islands [Hawaii] are to California and Oregon. (emphasis added). Thus the acquisation of Fiji was not so much determined by economic as strategic considerations within the context of the European scramble for the Pacific in the post-1870 period. It must also be pointed out that although it is quite true that the volume of trade between Britain and her 'new' empire acquired in the late 19th century was small, that did not necessarily
124 mean it was insignificant. In the context of the post-1870 British economy, a 3 to 5 per cent increase in exports to newly acquired colonies could make that difference between survival and extinction for some industries (Stokes 1969). Gunnar Myrdal has described the preferential treatment accorded metropolitan centres in the colonies as 'enforced bilateralism'. Furthermore, although the colony may have in the initial few years not been profitable to the metropolitan country as a whole, colonial acquisations like Fiji could prove highly profitable to certain 'parasitic' elements of capitalism. Lenin, after all, had spoken of finance capital's struggle for 'spheres of influence' which he defines as spheres of profitable deais, concessions, mono polist profits and so on. The often predatory and unscrupulous activities of British settlers led to the undermining of the Cakobau government and threatened to deteriorate into a race war between Fijians and British settlers. The ,death of the Cakobau government and the attendant breakdown of law and order threatened the prosperity of certain large settler capital like the Hennings and the Ryder brothers. This was the most powerful faction of settler capitalism which pushed for annexation, the alternative being war between settlers and Fijians. The Colonial Secretary, Lord Carnavon was certainly thinking of these group of settlers when he told the House of Lords on 17 July 1874 that: There are English settlers in such numbers, English capital is so largely embarked, and English interests so much involved in the peace of the islands, that it would not be safe to fold our arms and say we would not have anything to do with the islands. (Morrell, 1960:165). This was certainly true of the Ryder and Hennings brothers who had been some of the most important whites to support the various experiments in governments - that of Ma'afu and that of Cakobau (p. Ill, p. 142). The others include the Sydney merchants Rabone Feez and Company, the Oriental Banking Corporation (p. 142), the Auckland and Fiji Cotton Company as well as the Fiji Banking and Commercial Company set up in July 1873 and later to become the Bank of New Zealand. So consideration for the humantarian lobby concerned with the abuses of the Pacific Island Labour Trade, for which Fiji white settlers were mainly responsible, the protection of
125 European capital - especially British settler capital - and strategic considerations all figured in the annexation of Fiji. Of these, this reviewer is of the opinion that strategic considerations were the most crucial. Much of this review so far has been devoted to rebutting the colonially-created myth of 'reluctant colonisation'. The other great myth of Fijian colonial historiography is that of the 'paramountcy of Fijian interests'. Routledge's book utilises the 'paramountcy of Fijian interests' argument. So it needs to be commented upon. This views holds that the Fijians through their chiefs have never totally lost power over their own affairs and their traditional system and that following a brief interlude when they temporarily lost power they came out at the end of the colonial situation relatively unscathed. The study ends in 1874, except for a brief afterword concerned with the persistence to the present of the Fijian socio-political order which evolved before cession. While there are many political forces today which did not exist in Fiji in 1874, the 1980s may be completely understood only in the light of what happened earlier. There is a continuity between the tradi tional and post-independence poli tical order in the light of which the colonial period appears as an interlude during which power tempo rarily passed out of the hands of the chiefs (p. 5). Except for the 'colonial period', which is to be seen as nothing but a mere 'interlude', chiefly power and Fijian society supposedly has remained intact. Routledge here is merely echoing a dominant paradigm in colonial Fijian historiography shared particularly by the A.N.D. school of Fijian (Pacific) Hi$tory. This school use the 'paramountcy of Fijian interests' in an implicitly ethnicist sense in an attempt to consciously or un consciously avoid the issue of class analysis especially the emergence of and struggle between social classes within Fijian indigenous society itself. It is however important to note that even in the work of scholars like Mamak and Ali (1979) the concept of social class has been understood at most as a concommitant of other historical developments, and has not been theoretically integrated within the text. E.P. Thompson in his path-breaking work The Making of the English Working Class remarks: By class I understand a historical phenomenon,
126 unifying a number of disparate and seemingly un connected events, both in the raw materials of experience and in consciousness. I emphasise that it is a historical phenomenon. I do not see class as a ' structure' not even as a ' category' but as something which in fact happens (and can be shown to have happened) in human relationships. (Thompson, 1969:9) The economic identification of classes is not (as vulgar Marxists would have us believe) the last word, but merely the first, and it is the political, social, cultural and ideological character of classes which renders them real and recognisable social categories. The struggle between classes developed during the impact of imperialism, particularly its colonialist phase in Fiji. Classes in modern Fiji are not determined by the nation. Rather as a result of Fiji's incorporation into the world capitalist economy, such classes as it has developed were but auxilIary to the world class structure. Developing within the framework of the colonial capitalist mode of production, the class structure of Fiji society today is a distorted and truncated version of the class structure of the ruling centre. Instead of being dismissed as a mere interlude, the colonial period should be seen as the most crucial one to study to understand the configuration of social forces in the present phase of the struggle and the likely future direction that Fiji society will evolve. There can be no doubt that the colonial state was a powerful instrument of political domination and structural trans formation. Colonialism is the implantation of a state apparatus in the conquered territory. The colonial state was a geographical extension of the metropolitan state; it was directly subordinate to the latter •.. Simply put, the colonial state represented an absentee ruling class, the metropolitan bourgeoisie, and it performed the functions of both state and ruling class in an independent nation. The colonial state created the structures of the underdeveloped economy at both the levels of production and exchange ••. [it] destroyed and created entire classes.(Mamdani 1976:142:143)
127 Colonialism then is not to be seen as merely a distinct historical state or period in the modern historical development of Fiji. The historians who talk of colonialism in this sense are apologists for colonialism, since they see it as a 'good' thing that contributed to the 'modernisation of Fiji'. Thus: Colonial rule had brought to function the seeds of national unity, political alliance between dominant lineages in war and peace, and the common problems with Tongan imperialism.(MacNaught, 1983:3) This is a false and patronising view of history, which sees the colonial era ·as essentially a period in which harmony and con census prevailed, which is contrasted to the 'projected image' of Fiji (built up by the missionaries and colonial officials and historians) marked by cannibalism, savagery, turmoil and continual tribal war. This view pervades Fiji's colonialist historiography and also constitutes the legitimating ideology of colonial rule. Colonialism is seen as the 'peaceful revolution' whose final realisation cannot be anything other than 'democracy' and liberalism'. In these self-legitimating ideas of colonial rule there is not even a hint, let alone an acknowledgement, of the destructive role of the colonial impact on Fiji. The fact that doctrinal commitments like the 'preservation of Fijian society' did not inhibit the colonial regime from waging colonial wars (the 'Little War of Viti Levu'), or from exploiting Fijian labour through a migratory labour system (Plange 1985), or from undertaking measures of state intervention which were inimical to the development of indigenous enterprises (the suppression of Nawai's Viti Kabani movement) while promoting the colonial enterprise (CSR, Burns Philip, Oil companies, etc.) Bri tish rule in Fiji shattered the economic and poli tical basis of the old society . This process had begun with the pene tration of the traders, missionaries and settlers and culminated in the creation of the colonial state. Colonialism dissolved the old pre-capitalist mode of production but a new capitalist system did not follow; instead a new colonial mode of production came into being. For example, the new land tenure system introduced after 1874 drastically altered the old agrarian relations (France 1969). The new agrarian structures that evolved were to suit the needs of colonialism and, although it based itself on 'traditional principles', the economic forces released by it were nevertheless new (small peasant commodity production - the galala) and were not a simple perpetuation of the old. In fact,
128 throughout the Fijian social structure, new relations and new classes emerged, a new internal class structure evolved which was the product of and fully integrated with colonialism. As Baran (1957:144) has pointed out: The natural outcome of this development was the tangling of the old and the new, the feudal and the capitalist, the traditional and the modern, and the native and the western reducing the members of all communities to a semi-feudal and semi capitalist people who found themselves in the twilight of feudalism and capitalism enduring the worst features of both worlds and the entire impact of imperialist subjugation to boot. It is the articulation between a 'feudalised' lineage mode and a colonial capitalist mode of production which gave rise to the well-known but misdirected debate between individualism and communalism represented by Governor Sir Evarard im Thurn and Sir A~thur Gordon (Lord Stanmore) and their respective admirers among colonial historians. In addition to these effects, colonialism also changed the whole demographic structure of the colony wherein an emigrant ethnic category now constitute the majority population. Much of ethnic Fijian unity and solidarity must be seen as an ethnic response to the alleged "threat of the Indo-Fijian pressure and aspirations" (Nayacal 129 and colonial policies did not constitute the essence of colonialism but a mere part. Colonialism was the complete but complex integration and enmeshing of Fiji's economy and society within the world capitalist economy carried out in phases over a period now lasting well over a century. Constantly plagued for r~sources (revenues) and possessing limited coercive forces, the colonial state appears as a facade of power sustained by a. delicate game of bluff and wit, combining exhortation and threat with the co-option and accommodation of indigenous social forces. Rather than being the agent of change, the colonial state feared the consequences of change emanating from social forces over which it had little effective control. Colonial order was ultimately a 'close run thing', constantly threatened by crisis and struggle: I t was managed with extreme caution. The political administrators of the colonial state were instinct ively aware, if not full conscious of the frai1ity of their position and knew they could never maintain their power in the face of organised opposition among the mass of the [Fijian] people ..• The attempt, wherever possible to avoid such opposition by exercising deliberate restraint runs like a thread through official actions and statements; Colonial administrators were practised exponents of the maxim that those who wish to rule must first learn to govern themselves.(Kay 1982:9) Here in a nutshell lies the explanation why Gordon set up his so-called Native Administration, - which has been mytho10gised in the 'myth of indirect role', and the continued 'paramountcy of Fijian interests'. How did this myth come to attain its status as conventional wisdom not only in relation to Fijian colonial history but also among the Fijian ruling class itself? Those who subscribe to Fijian colonial historiography, including the ANU school and Routledge, hold the 'balance sheet approach' which is the view that when examining colonialism in Fiji it is necessary to dra~ up a balance sheet. On this balance sheet they place both the 'credits' and the 'debits' and invariably they come up with the conclusion that the good outweigh the bad. The thesis is never stated explicitly. But its summary is best expressed in MacNaught's (1982) work. This thesis states that colonialism in Fiji was the result of a partnership between the British rulers and Fijian chiefs. Despite some shortcomings 130 the 'partnership' between the Fijian chiefs and their British colonial masters was in the final analysis for the benefit of Fijians. It pre-empted 'detribalisation' by protecting Fijian land, thus saving them from the fate of being 'landless' proletariat like the Hawaiians, Tahitians and Maoris and also ensured their dominance in the national political scene of post independent Fiji. For this happy state of affairs one needs to thank Thurston and Gordon (for having shouldered the heaviest load of the white men's burden in Fiji) and the great colonial collaborator chief Sukuna for having faithfully followed their policy. This represents the orthodox official view of Fijian history. For example Routledge notes the re-emergence of the eastern Fijian chiefly class in the neo-colonial (post-independent) phase of Fiji's integration into the world-capitalist economy: Successors of the ruling chiefs of early Fiji thus found themselves in power once again g1v1ng the appearance of continuity between the pre-1874 and post"':1970 political order. The Prime Minister, Ratu Sir Kamisese Tuimacilai Mara bears names that were famous in traditional times. Head of the Vaunirewa, he holds the titles of Sau, Tui Nayau and Tui Lau and is thus heir to the Fijian paramount line in the Lau islands and the Tongan line established by Ma' afu. His wife, Adi Lady Lala, is the Roko Tui Dreketi and vasulevu through her mother to the chiefdom of Nadroga. Both, in addition are direct descendants of the first Cakobau as are Ratu Sir George Cakobau, present Vani valu of Bau and former Governor General, and Ratu Sir Penaia Ganilau, kinsman of the Tui Cakau and present Governor General. These are merely the most obvious relationships at the highest levels, for intermarriage and the vasu ties thus created between the chiefdoms are still very much part of the politics of power in Fiji. (p. 220). Here, Routledge as the eastern high chiefs' historian is in full cry. This is a rather unabashed celebration and congratulation (rather than analysis) of the resilience of the eastern Fijian chiefly class and its re-emergence in the neo-colonial phase. Routledge comes close to Len Usher's view who said that: "Fiji has been fortunate for more than a century - beginning with the first Cakobau - in the quality of leaders that have come from 131 Fijian chiefly families" (Usher 1983: 12). Just as earlier in his book Routledge talked of reluctant colonisation so in the end he speaks of reluctant decolonisation, particularly among the eastern chiefly class. Routledge attributes this reluctance to ethnic fears of Indo-Fijians by the eastern chiefs - The Fijian leaders somewhat reluctantly accepted independence in 1970 •.. They were concerned that their privileged political status as defined by the colonial constitution would be whittled away in the face of Indian demands for democracy based on common political roll (p. 220). This however is a somewhat superficial treatment of the background to the attempt of the eastern Fijian chiefly class to maintain their colonial pre-eminence and privileges in the neo-colonial (post independence) era. In restraining the dreams of 'rampant Anglo-Saxons' and conserving aspects of the traditional Fijian mode of production, custom and law, the colonial state in Fiji served the distinctive function of countering the formation of classes that could challenge colonial rule and metropolitan domination generally, as exemplified by the role of the eastern Fijian collaborator chiefs in the 1959 Oil Workers strike. This function of the chief as instruments of class containment within the context of 'communal politics' was set down in laws such as the Native Regulation and Ordinance aimed at conserving the traditional system (with the chiefly class) since this conservation maintained ethnic divisions between two self-contained ethnic groups (the native i"ijians and the indentured Indian labourers) which, in turn, countered class consolidation. The task therefore of any committed historian is to explain the relationship between capitalist exploitation and these racial/ethnic divisions? The resiliency of the eastern F~jian chiefly class is closely linked to the failure of the indigenous Fijian and Indo-Fijian masses to gain political and economic control. This review suggests that the answer lies in the fact that capitalist exploitation and class domination in Fiji has depended upon the selective reproduction of communal (racial/ethnic) di visions in the political, cultural and economic spheres. Colonialism is in the final analysis a relation between human beings. One of the most important aspects of the class structure of a colony is that the ruling class is alien and the domestic propertied classes are not a part of the ruling class. They 132 are not even its subordinated allies or junior partners; they are completely ruled by it. Thus there is no question of competition over state policies between the colonial ruling class and the indigenous upper classes, as certain historians would have it. The indigenous classes influence the colonial state policies from outside the colonial state structure through 'loyalism' (collaboration) or through anti-imperialist parties and movements; they exhort concessions. There is a continuous process of bargaining and accommodation going on, which is related to the whole attempt of the colonial state to tread the tightrope between allowing some autonomy and maintaining control over the various class and ethnic groups in a colonial society such as Fiji. This point is particularly important in relation to the development of Fijian cadres of colonial functionaries and whose process of collaboration is generally obscured by a myth of indirect role which tends to stress the fundamental difference between the British and French administrative methods in the colonial countryside - the village 'bantustans'. The French, it is contended, employed direct administration (administration directe) through a cadre of administrative chiefs directly appointed and controlled by the French governor while British administrators as in Fiji acted largely as advisors ruling 'indirectly' through largely preserved Fijian 'native authorities' . The principles of indirect rule explicated by Lord Lugard on the basis of his experience governing Nigeria have been acknowledged as informing the policies of Sir Arthur Gordon, first substantive governor of the colony of Fiji. If this is justified, then equally it is justified of the Cakobau government - with the difference that the later was free of the paternalism that developed among later nineteenth century administrators. (p. 218). A full discussion of this mythology is beyond the scope of this review but we can note briefly that it is very doubtful whether indirect rule actually worked this way in Fiji. As France (1969:109) has stated: The high chiefs rarely met in council until the imported institutions of government required them to do so. The Council of Chiefs was directly subject 133 to Gordon's authority, the regulation which provided for its establishment stating: the Governor is the originator of the Council and he alone can open its proceedings. Gordon demonstrated, on one occasion the despotic nature of his relationship with the Council by threatening to dissolve it and never call another, on hearing that some of its members were drunk. As to the authenticity of Fijian customs and traditions which were supposeclly being 'preserved' by Gordon's colonial policy, France (1969:110) has again provided us with an inclslve summary: The Fijian administration very soon established itself as the new mode of social control which supplemented and, in some respects, incorporated, that of the languages, title and observances of an indigenous institution. . But to Fijians it was an imported system of authority whose demands and whose sanctions reflected the way of life of the whiteman rather than their own. (France 1969) France (1969) has also convincingly demonstrated the inauthencity of Gordon's 'native' land tenure. Gordon himself revealed the real intentions of his so-called native rule when he wrote: It is of the utmost importance to seize if possible tne spirit in which native institutions have been framed, and endeavour to work them as to develop to the utmost possible extent management of their own affairs without exciting their SUsplclon or destroying their self-respect. (Gordon 1897: 178) British colonial administrators like Layard Goodenough and Gordon made the point as strongly as they could that all chiefs, even Cakobau, were henceforth agents of the government and that the authority of the local residents was above theirs. Legally this was vassalage and not a Deed of Cession relationship which stressed 'paramountcy of Fijian interests'. Chiefs of Fiji were free to act only in ways the British approved, were ordered to carry out policies whether they liked them or not, and were deposed and replaced when they were found incompetent, corrupt or insubordinate. Thus chiefs who 'pocketed' the taxes they collected, or who demanded 1a1a services from their subjects without British approval were sacked or suspended from services, including Cakobau' s second son Ratu Timoci Tavanavanua who was 134 sacked from the post of Roko Tui Lomai vi ti for utilising his 1a1a rights in Lomaiviti without British colonial approval. Even Ratu Sukuna' s power (generally considered to be the most powerful of Fijian colonial collaborator chiefs) was subject to the goodwill of the man at the top of the colonial power structure (the Governor). Sukuna' s power and the leeway that he enjoyed was his so long as it did not harm,in any substantial way,in the interests of the British masters. It surely is more than sheer coincidence that the power of colonial collaborator chiefs and the tenets of 'indirect rule' gi ving them apparent autonomy was the greatest and most closely observed in times when the power of the colonial regime was under challenge. The co-operation of the mass of Fijians and Fijian chiefs in particular was particularly critical in crucial conjunctures of the evolving colonial state during the Gordon/ Thurston/Desvoux years (1875-1900) when the process of consolid ating the colonial regime in Fiji was going on. In this regard we should note the crucial roles of the eastern/coastal chiefs who fought Gordon's 'Little War of Viti Levu' as well as the denial of 'indirect rule' to the Colo people who were ruled directly by White Comissioners because of their impertinence in not submitting tamely and with proper servility to British colonial rule. The other times of stress when Fijian chiefly co-operation was important include the Macuata/Seqaqa highland rebellions in the 1890s (where the contribution of collaborator chiefs to putting down the rebellion was again crucial), the 1921, 1943, and 1968 cane field strikes, the Vatukoula gold mine strikes, the 1959 Oil strike and the Second World War itself when the Japanese invaders were on our doorsteps. In this latter event, Ratu Sukuna was able to exhort concessions from the British, namely the revival and reorganisation of the Native Administration as well as the passing of the Native Land Trust Board Act crucial to the continued survival of the Fijian colonial collaborator chiefly class and the centralisation of power in their hands in preparation for formal political independence in the neo-colonial phase of imperialism. The Fijian mass were used as tools through the colonial collaborator chiefs not only to keep their own people in line (such as Navosavakadua of the Tuka and Apolosi Nawai of the Viti Kabani movement) but also as a counterweight to the Indo-Fijians who were increasingly challenging the colonial predominance and racial privileges accorded to the white settlers and administrator class as well as the excessive exploitation of sugar monopoly capital - the 135 Colonial Sugar Refinery or CSR. The 'paramountcy of Fijian interest' is in fact a created myth propagated by colonial historians, but which on closer scrutiny is merely an attempt to try and preserve a formal and artificial appearance of para mountcy when in actual fact the interest of the Fijian mass is subordinated to that of a minority, a colonial collaborator chiefly class, who are in turn subordinate to the local white bourgeoisie and big metropolitan capital like CSR, Emperor Gold Mines, Burns Philip, and Morris Hedstrom. Within this context of deliberately-created antagonistic colonialism is the process of collaboration essential to the extension or stabilisation of colonial control. Where willing collaborators could not be found within indigenous pre-colonial structures (such as in western and central Viti Levu and in Macuata) they were created and the actual practice in the field was formulated by administrative officers on the spot in response to local exigencies. Routledge therefore oversimplifies and distorts Fijian colonial history when he asserts that: The colonial administration was founded on the structure created by the Cakobau government ••. There was thus continuity in government, particularly with respect to Fijians themselves, which is somewhat at variance with the idea of the colonial regimes' inaugurating a new period . • • : The Cakobau Government began the system of bul is or Fijian officials with magistraterial powers at village level, which the colonial government was pleased to inherit. The provincial governors, with an authority derived from and coinciding to a large degree in extent with the traditional chiefdoms, were in function, and in many cases in identity, the predecessors of the rokotuis. Colonial magistrates combined the functions of the former secretaries and wardens. (p. 217). In his overeagerness to show continuity of administrative structure, Routledge forgets the substantial difference between a settler-controlled puppet government like that of Cakobau's and the new colonial state. The most striking characteristics of the colonial state was the ambiguous, indeed contradictory character of its structures and process. This reflected the contradictory social forces 136 of colonial society, social forces which both determined the development of the colonial state and were in turn shaped and modified by it. In as far as the process of collaboration is concerned, the presence or absence of centralised pre-colonial state forms, or whether these were adapted or destroyed by the colonial administration, do not seem to be the factors which determined the development of a group of strong and effective collaborators. Rather the key variable appears to be the degree to which the process of class formation, notably the emergence of an indigenous class of accumulators of wealth within the narrow opportunities provided by the colonial political economy, over lapped with the indigenous levels of political control apparatus. This class was far broader than the chiefs or turaga-ni-koro (headman). It comprised not only wealthy Fijian peasants (8a1a1a) who gained an increasingly large proportion of the revenues from cash crops, but also school teachers, soldiers, policemen, native catchecists (ta1ata1a) and clerks who found employment in both private firms and the expanding Native Administration bureaucratic apparatus at salaries often sub stantially higher than the miserable wages paid to Fijian unskilled labourers. All of these elements benefitted in some degree from the colonial political and economic presence and comprised a potential base of support for it. As I have tried to show in my thesis (Durutalo 1985) the different elements of this emerging class were generally encouraged by local administrators. It contained the 'progressive' Fijians who willingly pursued the development of commodity production and wage labour without administrative pressure. Administrators often deliberately sought to ~bring the ' progressi ve' elements into more direct collaboration by recruiting them to subordinate state positionsi especially those requiring a degree of Western education, or into largely co opted institutions like the Council of Chiefs, Provincial and District Councils. The examples that come to mind include 'new type chiefs' like Ratu Jone Madraiwiwi, Ratu Deve Toganivalu, Ratu Marika Toroca and of course the greatest of them all, Ratu Sir Lala Sukuna, and later Ratu Mara, Ratu Penaia Ganilau and Ratu Edward and George Cakobau. The British colonial admin inistrators also encouraged chiefs, b111is (district officials) and headman in particular to take the lead in opportunities for accummulation through production and trade, both as an 137 example to others and to provide the legitimate material rewards to supplement their generally meagre official salaries and inhibit their abuse of authority through direct exactions (1818) from the peasantry. This brought the British colonial administrators into the process of class formation. Their discretion and the resources at their disposal gave them sources of patronage to encourage and reward the members of the Fijian proto-bourgeois. Access to western education, especially the post-primary education that was the key to higher salaried jobs was one of the most important and, in British Fiji as elsewhere, this was deliberately directed towards the sons of chiefs and other notables, as shown in the setting up of Queen Victoria School. Institutions such as the Copra Fund Board and co-ops could be employed to provide loans and advances to wealthy 'progressive' farmers who were often local chiefs and other notables as well. All of this meant that the administration mediated access to many of the sources of accummulation, and the state increasingly became the necessary focus of the emerging proto-capitalist Fijian class. The patronage and other local resources controlled by local administrators could also to some extent be spread more widely among the Fijian peasantry. At one level, the wealth accummulated by the chiefs and other local notables enabled them to construct wide networks of patron-client relations. More directly, the discretion of local administrative officers enabled them selectively to administer or modify the policies and apparatus of the state in ways that both softened it's most coercive apparatus and distributed some small material rewards. This included disciplining the exploitation of native Fijians by external or settler capital in such a way that the admin inistrators' role as benevolent protector was affirmed. Third and finally, the discretion of field administrators focussed Fijian political and economic aspirations and grievances on the District Commissioners as the sole source of authority, prinCiple decision-maker and broker of access to benefits and new forms of wealth. Greater centralisation would have forced local administrators to clear their actions with higher authority or subjected them to more detailed dix:.ectives from the centre. Fijian demands and opposition, in turn would have quickly been communicated to the very centre of the state. Instead, from the local administrators' discretion and the general decentralis ation of the administrative apparatus emerged the colonial 138 version of 'divide and rule'. Fijian political and social forces were fragmented, isolated and contained within the framework of local administrative units. This protected institutions of the colonial state from constant involvement in diverse issues and conflicts, and inhibited the coalescence of Fijian opposition and resistance such as the 'Little War' and the 'Tuka' and 'Viti Kabani' movement into a colony-wide challenge to the colonial order. The British rulers worked to prevent the growth of horizontal linkages that could generate Fijian opposition across the main axis of structural cleavage in the colony. The reliance on chiefs was tied to the principle of 'tribe' as the basis for administrative sub-divisions and to encourage pre-colonial ethnic groupings as the basis of local identity (the vanuas into districts and the provinces into yasanas; in some cases like Cakodrove, Kubuna (Tailevu), Rewa, Bua and Lau it closely paralleled the ' tradi tional' rna tani t us (or poli tical confederations). Thus a principle objective of 'indirect rule' in fact was to prevent the mobilisation of the peasantry within the context of a trans-ethnic anti-colonial struggle. So as is typical of bourgeois historians whose historical scholarship is imbued with the idealism of the mistakes and Vl.Sl.ons of great personalities, Routledge is widely off the mark and misses the strategic significance of 'indirect rule' for the colonial state when he states: The effect [Le. of inalienability of land and of indirect rule], as opposed to the intention, was to place Fijians at a disadvantage in the face of changes that were inevitable as capitalism with its emphasis on individuality rather than communalis~ penetrated the social order more completely. When the policy was instituted, little thought was given to the process of integration into the developing economic order, or when this should be accomplished. Governor Sir Everard im Thurn ... worried more a bout this than any other colonial administrator. In an attempt to begin the process of integration, he relaxed the rules governing the absolute inalien ability of l "and. The idea was to give Fijians the possibility of greater economic flexibility and accumulation of capital. After a generation of restraint on their actions, the policy was in sufficient in itself, although it might have been 139 developed with others to allow entry into the economic order. It was rejected out of hand, however, and im Thurn removed, by the persisted opposition of Lord Stanmore, the erstwhile Sir Arthur Gordon, most opinionated of Fiji's colonial governors and architect of the separate Fijian administration. (p. 219) This passage carries a strong conviction of the role of indivi duals in society, and the explanation for the failure of indirect rule to allow Fijians to enter the capitalist economic order of modern Fiji is attributed to the individual action of Gordon and im Thurn's failed individual attempt to bring them into the capitalist economic mainstream. This is an idealist or psycholo gistic conception of Fijian social development. The conscious or at least public intention of the two respective colonial governors are taken as the explanation for the failure or success of the 'indirect rule' policy. Such an explanation shares the illusion of that epoch, that is it simply adopts the terms in which the principal actors themselves conceived of their actions and motives. Fijian society is characteristically seen as an inert mass, incapable of change or structural motive forces of its own, save through the activity of powerful individuals like Gordon and im Thurn. This view pervades the whole length of Matanitu and other examples will be cited later. Naidu (1985:169) has stated that: The incorporation of the chiefly order within the colonial state meant [that] although the chiefly structure remained ideologically traditional, in reality it had been transformed into a foreign controlled instrument of domination over the ordinary (commoner) Fijians. , This process had already begun in the Cakobau government, and it shows the limitation pf the voluntarist and psychologist explanatory framework used by Routledge that blinds him to these structural changes in the Fijian polity. The chiefs of eastern Viti Levu who had consolidated their position with beachcomber, trader, missionary, and settler help and had gone a long way to become 'absolute rulers' were in the colonial period beyond the control of ordinary Fijians. They continued to be the symbol of their communi ties and the centre of ceremonial life but were not subject to local control. Also, as Nayacakalou (1975:14) has shown, hereditary principles 140 increasingly overtook those based on service to their people. But the chiefs were subordinate to the white colonial masters, as seen in the operation not only of a 'dual' system of administration but also of law. Colonial law was imposed by force of conquest over the terri tories which the British ruled - this was particularly true of central western Viti Levu where Bauan and colonial hegemony was extended by force and the imposition of martial law suspending the rules of the Supreme Court after the 1876 'Little War of Viti Levu'. In the colony as a whole a dual legal system existed; 'traditional law' was permitted to operate in those sectors which did not interest or affect 'British sovereignty' or 'rule', while British law operated elsewhere. There was absolutely no guarantee of fundamental human rights in the colonial period. For example, preventative detention and exile as well as execution were used by the British whenever it was felt necessary, such as after the 1876 inland wars, the exiling of the whole village of Draunii vi in the 1880s by Governor Thurston, and the exiling of Navosavakadua and Apolosi Nawai to Rotuma respectively. Sedition laws were routinely used in order to control colonial protest such as in the 1959 Oil Strike, and were much more restrictive in the colonies than in Britain itself. In principle this dual system of 'traditional' authorities and courts was left to operate without British inter ference, through the policy of allegedly indirect rule. But in fact there was a great deal of interference in 'native courts' . This was justified by the repugnancy clause, which stated that traditional law repugnant to natural justice, morality or good conscience would be abrogated by the British. But there was no consistent philosophy explaining the content of natural justice, rather it was decided by British civil servants, such as District Officers on an ad hoc basis. For example, William Carew (one of Governor Gordon's most trusted settler lieutenants) acted as chief martial law administrator, military commander, prosecutor, judge and jury in the trial and eventual executions and exile of the 'rebellious' western Viti Levu highland chiefs who opposed the British annexation of Fiji. For his assessors in his military court, Carew chose the colonial collaborator chiefs who had helped him put down the 'rebellion' and included the Roko Tui Nadroga, the Roko Tui Namosi, the Turaga Buli Serua (the infamous Gaga bokola) , the Buli Vatukarasa and other chiefs (Gordon 1879:421). Carew conducted this trial without seemingly any inner soul-searching 141 regarding how their practice violated the 'hallowed' British principle of the rule of law. Also at the local levels, District Officers such as that of Rotuma, often young and inexperienced Englishmen, acted as both administrators and judges. The British assured everybody that the mere fact that the exec uti ve and the judiciary were not separate at the lower levels would not prevent anyone getting a fair trial. At the central government level, the Governor incorporated within himself the judicial, legislative and executive functions. In short, he was a dictator. He could revoke any decisions made by the Legislative Council, which was in any case composed primarily of executive and appointed members loyal to him. In its turn the Colonial Office could overturn any decision made by the Governor and legislate directly for the colonies, with little, if any scrutiny by the British Parliament. In addition there was also a principle that native law could not breach English substantive law or conflict with any written colonial law already in force. By the end of the colonial period, traditional law was far from traditional. Even when the British tried their best to ascertain what native law was, the effort was made difficult by their unfamiliarity with local customs, laws, languages, and land tenure system. Socio administrative structures peculiar to one ethnic or 'tribal' group such as the Bauans were taken as applicable to other ethnic or 'tribal' groups. Thus a Bauan-based land tenure system and socio-administrative structure, including its associated social practices such as ceremonies as well as the Bauan language, were applied or required to be used through colonial dictate by many non-Bauan Fijian people. Moreover, the British also interfered in the native court systems by legislating as absolute, powers which traditionally chiefs held only with the consent of the people, as expressed through their elders (qase) of the sauturaga (senior line), bete (priest) or ba ti (warrior) clans. By removing traditional checks on the abuse of power by patrimonial authorities (or chiefs), while at "the same time strengthening their power by permitting them to impose prison sentences and fines (in their positions as Rokos , Bulis or native magistrates), the British made the chiefly judges' positions extremely powerful and valuable. This combined with the British habit of executing, 142 exiling or declaring as political prisoners, chiefs who did not submit to their authority or recognise their pre-eminence. All these in turn resulted in the emergence of a new cadre of 'traditional' chiefs highly dependent on the British for their existence (Duruta10 1985:Chapter 4). The author of Matanitu, as already stated, cannot discern this transformation in chiefly power because he is caught at the level of surface appearance, since these chiefs were not usually imposed on local 'tribes' from outside (except for the Bauan chiefs who ruled western Viti Levu provinces and Lomaiviti) but were chosen from inside. They managed to adopt the cloak of patrimonial (i.e traditional) authority and come to some accomodation with traditional representatives of the common people. Thus, reflecting the contradictory character of the colonial state's structures and processes, patrimonial authority was both subverted and buttressed by the imposed rational legality of British colonial ism. These observations are extremely valuable in any study of Fiji society today as a class-ruled society with a veneer of parliamentary liberal democracy but where the disparities between the rich and poor are wide and continue to widen. It also should help to illuminate how the constitution, the law and political office are used especially by the Fijian ru1ing .c1ass to ensure both wealth and continued power for themselves. The events leading up to the Carroll Report and the Royal Commission of Enquiry into the 1982 General Election when the political tool of 'anti-communism' was used to devastating effect, the draconian measures contained in the Fiji Trades Dispute Act, the attempt to whittle down the constitutionally guaranteed independence of the Office of the Director of Prosecutions, the introduction of a proposed Housing Authority Bill to pre empt the right of appeal of Board Members against the dictates of a Minister. of the Crown are just a few examples that demonstrate the continued survival of important legal institutions of the colonial into the neo-co10nia1 period. Ruling classes, and the Fijian ruling class is no exception, exaggerate the perceived lack of popular legitimacy of opposition or oppressed classes' spokespersons who call for the democrat isation of the socio-po1itica1 system, for the lowering of the voting age; and an end to corruption. They justify the reintro duction of the colonial Native Fijian administration, with its underlying 'divide and rule' dynamics, by using the supposed 143 disjuncture between foreign practices (e.g. individualism, criminal activities) ·and their conscious model' (Clammer 1975: 200) of Fijian culture and tradition (permeated with colonial prejudice) as an excuse to introduce such regressive legislation in their own interests and for the continuation of their class rule. When we are looking at or considering the clash between indigenous patrimonial systems of authority and colonial rational-legal systems, we are also considering how this clash is manipulated by the Fijian ruling classes or cliques to satisfy their own desires not to be checked by constitutions or the judiciary, as the proposed Housing Authority Bill of 1985 clearly demonstrates. The Fijian ruling class are ranked in hierarchies of importance, which of course have been changing over time. This ranking began under the colonial state and is graphically illustrated by their salaries. The Bauan, Cakobau, was given an annual pension of 1500 pounds, his rival Ma' afu as Roko Tui Lau received 600 pounds, the Roko Tui Tailevu (Ratu Epeli Nailatikau, Cakobau's first son) received 340 pounds, and the Rokos of the western side of the main island (for instance Roko Tui Nadroga) received 100 pounds each (Samy 1977:42; Naidu 1985: 171; Fiji Blue Book, 1877). The failure of Fijians to enter the modern capitalist enclave economy is an important by-product of the creation and mainte nance of a stable mode of production in the countryside with its 'village bantustans' which balanced the imperatives of accumulation and control, metropolitan and indigenous interests, exploitation and materials rewards, coercion and collaboration. The mass of Fijians have never been outside of the colonial capitalist economy, they h,..iVe actively participated in it,. but through the prism of their colonially created 'communal' mode of production. In this 'communal' mode of production the administrators operated on a 'principle' of optimal fragmentation of various local levels since cross-districts or cross-ethnic communication might ignite combinations of people, groups and resources which like the Tuka, Viti Kabani and Bula Tale movements as well as the collaboration of the indigenous Fijian and Indo-Fijian workers in the 1959 Oil strike could become alternatives to official indirect rule politics. The communal contradictions of Fiji which are stressed by conventional scholars are real but they are not the principal contradiction. What is usually overlooked by these scholars is that the 144 historical development of the two major communities did not take place in isolation from one another but was conditioned by the same historical forces and contradictions that have also conditioned the development of Fiji society as a whole. This historical fact ~s of utmost importance because it clearly shows that not only are the fundamental interests of the broad masses of the different communities not in conflict, but they also have many things in common in their search for equality and unity. Given this factor, the colonial period is anything but a 'mere interlude' as Routledge claims. This review has claimed that Matani tu is riddled throughout with an idealist conception of history. Idealism is the view that consciousness or theory ultimately determines the nature of social practice. Thus Routledge in explaining the signifi cance of the Battle of Kaba concludes that: Looking back over the long term, it can be seen that the battle brought to an end the traditional systeIll for the aggregation of chiefly power - or perhaps more accurately the systems which had developed in the eighteenth century and had been brought to a climax under Naulivou, who had un doubtedly been its greatest opponent. In less than thirt y years, he had used war, marriage alliances, the creation of a network of vasu relationships and a ruthless policy of assisting the weaker against the stronger in order to defeat both to raise Bau to a position that would have been impossible to predict at the beginning of the century (p. 87). Here Bau's rise to prominence under its chief Naulivou is~being attributed to the building of vasu relationships which had to be "deployed outwards to build up support and to command material resources without conceding the same advant~ge inwards" (p. 214). Bau we are told "was distinctly more successful in this respect, than other chiefdoms". This is again a superficial explanation for the rise of Bau to power, for every chiefdom was utilising the vasu relationship for political ends. Why did Bau succeed and others fail? What is missing is a real materialist history of Bau's rise to prominance that will show us why the politics of vasu relationships were successful for Bau but not for others. A materialist explanation is one which examines the practices by which people produce their material means of life. Economic practices determine the limits within 145 which all other social practices, and through them forms of consciousness, can vary. Materialism also recognises that both consciousness and other practices also have effects upon economic practice. The powerful chiefdom of Verata (and there were others) had risen into a dominant position, conquered other ethnic politics, utilised its vasu relationships but was on the verge of decline of the eve of European penetration in Fiji. This was likely also to have been the fate of Bau but for capitalist penetration. The strategic island position of Bau in relation to the Viti Levu landmass has certain similarity with Britain's position in relation to Europe although one must be careful not to over draw the comparison. Erskine noted (1853:180) that: Bau owes its importance to its insular position rendering it easily defensible except against firearms ••• and also to its ties of close kinship connection with the Butoni people, who were sailors and fishermen and although undp.r the services of other chiefs (e.g. Tui Vuna in Taveuni and in Lomaiviti as well as the Levuka people of Lakeba, Lau) were "under obligation of returning to the capital at intervals of several years to pay tribute to their own sovereign" (Erskine, ibid). Apart from its natural advantage in terms of defence and the support in terms of wealth and the military-naval prowess of Butoni, Levuka and other kinsmen scattered throughout eastern and northern Fiji, Bau was itself a strong maritime power, dominating eastern Fiji as far as the coasts of Lekeba, the coasts of Vanua Levu and Taveuni as well as Lomaiviti. Because European explorers, traders and missionaries usually entered Fiji from the east, Bau through its martime power or through the Butoni and Levuka kinship connection was able to control access to and secure supplies of sandalwood, beche-de-mer and even supplies of provision for whaling and warships. An episode in which Cakobau was paid US$25 by Captain Erskine for a supply of pigs that came from Makogai is a case in point (Erskine 1853:120). Furthermore, these benefits enabled the Bauan chiefs like Nau1ivou and Cakobau to have a near monopoly on tabua (whales ,teeth) and thus control the indigenous money supply which enabled 14(; them to raise large armies and keep the widest network of political military alliance of any chiefdom in Fiji. The monopoly over tabua and the judicious manipulation of political marriage and vasu relationships allowed the Bauans to play their brand of politics (vere vakabau) with very great success. Sandalwood and beche-de-mer fetched traders huge profits on the China market, but the impact of this trade on Fiji was unevenly distributed. Through customary exchange networks foreign goods like clothes, tools, and weapons accrued to chiefs and local dignitaries, especially the Bauan chiefs. Between 1828 and 1850 well over a 10,000 muskets and rifles were introduced into Fiji . Steel tools reduced the labour time required for subsistence production including the time available for other activities such as warfare. These: tools and weapons were unevenly distributed through the islands, and as trade moved from one area to another the local balance of power was upset ..•• In the wider scene, the forces of Mbau greatly increased their firepa.wer during the beche-der-mer period as Mbau had close relations with many coastal groups in the main production area. This was to be an important factor enabling Thakobau to establish Mbau as the dominant political unit in the 1850s. What pork did for Tahiti, beche-der-mer did for Fiji (Ward 1972:111). The other important problem with Matanitu is the attempt to downplay the role of Charles Savage and the missionaries. Savage's knowledge of firearms was crucial in giving Bau the initial advantage over rivals like Verata and Navuso, an edge which it never lost. Chieftain women of Bau wer.e given to him in return for his services. He was also adopted into the chiefly family. Locally, within Bau, the support of Savage must have been crucial in Naulivou's successful power' struggle against the Roko Tui Bau in which the military/secular chieftain, the Vunilau, prevailed over the sacred Roko Tui Bau line. The fact that Bau began to show greater aggressive tendencies during Nauli vou and Charles Savage's time - we are left to conclude is merely coincidential. The fact that Naulivou was careful to ensure Savage's influence did not survive his death in 1813 is not the same as saying that his association and military service to Bau 1808-1813 did not decisively affect the dynamics of the traditional politics of South Eastern Viti Levu. 147 The Matani tu also does not do justice to the tremendous in fluence of Methodist missionaries, who actively helped Cakobau in the Battle of Kaba by persuading Taufa'ahau of Tonga to come to Cakobau' s assistance against his enemies - his half-brother Mara Kapaiwai and Qaraniqio, the Roko Tui Dreketi of Rewa. The missionaries used their influence strategically by rein forcing the power of selective chiefs like Cakobau and acting as intermediaries between them and their subjects as well as with foreigners. In Fiji the bete or traditional priests were ousted through the influence of white Methodist missionaries and as a result an important check on chiefly power was removed. The traders and missionaries also helped selected chiefs to promote island-wide and even broader entities for the purpose of consolidating their own positions in the social, economic and political set-up of the islands. Thus they supported the Tui Nayau and Ma'afu's war for Wesleyan Methodism in Vanuabalavu and the Yasayasa Moala in 1849 in which the three islands of Moala, Matuku and Totoya were forcibly converted to Christianity. Ma' afu, when he became Tui Nayau, also claimed to be Tui Lau. So did Tui Cakau, who began to take on the self-proclaimed title Tui Vanua Levu. Cakobau, who carried the i valu ni lotu (war of Wesleyan Methodism) to central and western Viti Levu, began to call himself Tui Viti as well as Vunivalu. The missionaries en~ouraged this because they knew that in order to attain their goals large stable communities had to be set up. Cakobau has been portrayed in colonial historiography as the chief whose wise decision to offer Fiji at the Deed of Cession enabled Fijians to retain a semblance of power in their hands in the colonial and post colonial period. We have already demolished this myth. In fact white settlers and missionaries were fond of dealing with Cakobau (rather than Ma' afu) because the former was more pliable to European control. Thus: With the assistance of quantities of champagne Cakobau was induced to put his hand to a charter granting land in various parts of the group, with freedom from all export and import duties and other taxes in return for a small annual annuity. The company acquired a banking monopoly and the right to make such laws as it should consider just, equita ble and right. Pri vileges had been given had been given without consideration of the effect they would have upon Cakobau's position in Fiji, and the grants 148 of land included territory which had never been subject to Bauan control, most of which was occupied by independent tribes in arms to prevent the invasion of their country. (Routledge, p. 119). Cakobau had again tried to alienate 200,000 acres of planting land in Fiji (most of which belonged to tribes who did not owe him allegiance) to the Polynesian Company. Cakobau constantly demonstrates that he was willing to sell the sovereignity of Fiji down the drain as long as his position and welfare were looked after. This was also the case in the 1874 Cession. France (1969:72) has noted that the Cakobau government was set up by the settlers for their benefit,in particular to protect their security in lan~. It was, therefore, clear that power really was with the settlers and Cakobau was just a puppet: We do not require their (Fijians') talent, the white man will bring that; but we require their sanctions because in mere brute force •.• we are not more than a fiftieth of what they are and we also require for purposes of government their money contributions. In all either respeGts, the Europeans will rule .•. and if the prominent figure be a native whether in the form of a king or president, it is only a puppet, the strings of which are pulled by the white men. (Narsey 1979:73). White settler opihions of the chiefs, including Cakobau, were of utter contempt. As an influential elected member of the Cakobau governments' Assembly openly expressed: What are they but niggers and hillmen? Is it not an insult to this house and to every white man in this country to have an old nigger like the King set up, as he is being set up? King indeed. He would be more in his place digging or weeding a whiteman"s garden. (Scarr 1973:193). Notes Narsey (1979:74), "One of the most powerful chiefs in Fiji was seen as only fit to be the white man's gardener". The so-called Cakobau government was so only in name: in actual fact it was the settlers such as Thurston, Carew, Wilkinson and Swanston who were the real powers behind it. These veteran white settlers were later to play a prominent part in Gordon's colonial regime. The real shortcomings of 149 Routledge in treating the 1860-14 period is his inability to recognise the interactive effects of expansive, intrusive capitalism on the subsistence economy and its role in the migration (forceful or peaceful) of clansmen to settler plantations or the creation of a class of peasant small commodity/subsistence producers. In summary Routledge's historical method with its: emphasis on voluntarist explanation ••• is not illuminating .•• Ideas examined in isolation from their economic or social mainsprings are ahistorical. Thus the reification of an idea, its expression as a fact or a cause, effectively divorces the individual whose behaviour it ostensibly explains from their own history rather than fulfiling the admirable aim of rescuing natives from the old history, the revisionists have by their own histori cal method reduced the [Fijian] to a caricature, a Pacific Sambo, mindlessly hosting for the bright lights of civilisation. (Graves 1984:114). Routledge also makes one or two errors of facts. Thus Nubutautau is mentioned as the stronghold of the Magodro. It is in fact the stronghold of the Vatusila people (p. 176). The Magodro people,who also were attacked by the settler (Cakobau) government invasion~ had defended their territory from the stronghold of Nawaicavu and Nacule forts. The fiercely independent Cawanisa people who fought against Cakobau' s 1873 campaign as well as defended against Gordon's 'Little War of Viti Levu' and were almost wiped out are not mentioned. In his footnoting, one footnote (p. 163) is numbered 40 while the number of footnotes in that chapter (Chapter Seven: Balance of Achievement) only goes up to number 39. The use of Fijian words like the title itself, Matani tu, as well as terms like Wailevu (Rewa River), Gusunituba (Ba River) etc., is an attempt by the author to give an 'indigenous Fijian' aura to his work. This brings me to the third level, which relates to political practice. The great Filipino historian and patriot Renato Constantino has urged that politics and history must be closely integrated in the service of demystification and cultural de colonisation. Colonialism turned people into ob jec ts in order to facilitate their manipulation. Colonialism sought to 150 eliminate that inner tension of men possessed of a critical intelligence by denying their ability and their 'right' to question. All repressive systems used ideology and psychological coercion in addition to physical violence to buttress their rule. One of the most underplayed aspects of colonial history is the cultural impact of colonialism in those countries of the South Pacific dominated by imperialism. Imperialism has three basic aspects. The first and primary aspect is economics. Imperialism during the colonial and neo colonial periods wants primarily to control the productive forces of the people, that is the natural resources and products of labour. But to control the people economically imperialism finds it necessary to have political control; that is it imposes judicial systems and institutions, political systems, military systems and institutions designed to control people directly (particularly during the colonial stage). But in history economic and political control have never been complete without cultural control. Culture is the carrier of a peoples' values. And the values a people hold as the basis of their self-identity as a people is the basis of how they look at themselves collectively and individually in relation to the universe. So the aim of cultural control is in fact to control how people look at themselves, to control the basis of their self-identity as a people. Imperialism did this through the educational institutions, through language, literature, religion, drama, dances, ideas, e~c. And they did this to make the colonised look at themselves through cultural eyeglasses made in Europe, United States, Australia, and New Zealand. This has meant the colonised look at themselves through the eyes of the dominating nations and the dominating classes in the islands. If you look at yourself through the eyes of the person dominating you, then it means you really are not in a position to resist him. That is why cultural control is so important. A slave is not a slave until he accepts that he is a slave. Unfortunately the colonial phase of imperialism, which is dismissed as nothing but an interlude in Matani tu, did produce an indigenous Fijian elite with a mentality that was in harmony with the needs of the ruling classes in the imperialist country. It was this Fijian elite, nurtured in the womb of imperialism with the cultural eyeglasses from Europe via Australia, United 151 States or New Zealand, that came to power during the neo-colonial phase of imper,ialism. It means that this class, because of the cultural-mental outlook it took from the impe.r~alist ruling classes, does not see any contradiction between itself and the needs of the imperialist ruling nations. Cultural control, as a means of economic and political control, is the most dominant factor in the neo-colonial phase of imperialism. We who really want to contribute to the liberation of the Fijian people, to the liberation of their productive forces and genius, must put our intellectual resources at the service of the people, to make sure that whatever we articulate in writing, in lectures, in essays, everywhere is in harmony with the needs of the struggling classes in Fiji - that is, their struggle for the liberation of their productive forces, so that he/she who produces is he/she who controls what he/she produces. This is why this reviewer is afraid that the call for an 'island-oriented' history which does not squarely address the issue of imperialism and cultural decolonisation must , be regarded as the Pacific Way - the islands' ruling class ideology dressed up under another guise. Thus Matanitu reflects the limitations of colonial and chiefly oriented studies, being too empirical -and idealistic, providing the reader with a prodigous number of facts, and placing much emphasis' on discreet isolated events and the particularist perspective of great personalities without any serious attempt to present a totalising or even a comparative view. Matanitu is informative about discreet events, but its 'balanced' account is permeated with colonial apologia. The well-known Kenyan author and patriot Ngugi wa Thiongo has defined two types of intellectuals in a situation where one nation aominate's another or one race or one class dominates another. The first type is one who rationalises a world view or an outlook which is in harmony with the needs and positions of the dominating nation, race or class. In other words this kind of intellectual, whether he is conscious of it or not, is expressing a \vorld view that does not contradict, or is not a threat to, the dominant position of that class, nation or race. 152 On the other hand, the second is the intellectual who expresses a world view which is in harmony with the needs and positions of the dominated class, race or nation: in other words who rationalises a world view which reflects the need for change. -The final aim of all true history is the illumination of the present. For this reason we must look to Fiji's past, not as chronicles of antiquity but for understanding present processes of control. Fiji has become a model neo-colony. Fiji is a country whose people have a heroic history of struggle: the Little War of Viti Levu, the Macuata/Seaqaqa Rebellion, the Lovoni resistance, the Tuka and Nawai Viti Kabani movements, the Indo-Fijian struggles and the 1959 strike. But at the same t.ime the British colonial regime in Fiji managed to recruit an elite that absorbed the outlook of the British ruling class. And this elite was given the dominant positions in administration in all key 'sectors of the new independent regime. This means . that Fiji on acceeding to independence, never actually broke with the colonial economic structures nor even the political and ideological structures. If you do not break your links with imperialism, then the same political and cultural problems which were present during the colonial era will continue during the neo-colonial era. If Fiji does not break with the economic structure of colonialism, which means the exploitation of the vast majority of the people, then politically the regime in power will become more and more alienated from the people and it will become more and more repressive in order to maintain its dominance. There are unmistakable signs that such a situation is developing in Papua New Guinea and Fiji. 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