riction at the Helm Four Decades of Amity, Conflict, and Reconciliation F between Hashemi Rafsanjani and Ali Khamenei Introduction Alliance, Competition, and Rivalry: 1979–2009 The Present Day: The Elections of 2005 and Beyond Conclusion: The Rafsanjani-Khamenei Relationship: What Lies Ahead?

Rajab - Shaban, 1437 24 April - May, 2016 © KFCRIS, 2016

ISSN: 1658-6972 Issue No. 24 - 24/05/2016 L.D. No: 1437/2868

Rajab - Shaban, 1437 - April - May, 2016 or the past thirty years, Iran's political Fscene has been impacted by the ongoing competition and ideological clash between the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and former president . This issue of Masarat focuses on the history of the on-off rivalry between the two prominent figures, and, in turn, how the ensuing tension has impacted many key moments throughout the Republic's history. It also explores how such could possibly affect Iran's elite.»

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Introduction

One of the endemic features of the Islamic Republic of Iran has been the resilience and longevity of its senior state figures. As the state system founded by Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979 approaches its fortieth anniversary, the political scene has yet to undergo a thorough generational transformation that would usher in a new generation of figures who did not cut their political teeth in the period preceding the Revolution of 1979. Some of the holders of the highest state offices, such as Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, chairman of the Expediency Discernment Council Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, and President , hail from a generation that experienced repression and incarceration during the Shah’s time, surrounded Khomeini as the new state system weathered the turbulent period following its creation, and assumed control over the state after 1989. Their personal trajectory in many ways matches that of the Islamic Republic as a whole and has shaped it decisively in key moments. For most of the past three decades, the Iranian political scene has been in the throes of an on-off rivalry between Khamenei and Rafsanjani. Without exhibiting outward signs of marked confrontation, distrust, or distance, the two have clashed with increasing frequency in recent years, as Khamenei’s conservatism has collided with Rafsanjani’s more flexible politicking and occasional pragmatism. The rivalry has shown signs of accentuation in recent weeks, as the parliamentary and Assembly of Experts elections have delivered substantial success for Rafsanjani-backed figures at the expense of Khamenei- supported ones. This article discusses the roots of this rivalry and its possible implications for the future evolution of the Islamic Republic’s elite, particularly in the short to medium term, when an at least partial generational change is to be expected. In order to understand the current state of play between Khamenei and Rafsanjani, it is necessary to cast a glance at the previous three decades, particularly at the first decade of the Islamic Republic, when several key junctures were decisive for the psychological and political formation of the two leading politicians of .

Alliance, Competition, and Rivalry: 1979–2009

The rise to political prominence of both Rafsanjani They also hailed from the segment of Khomeini’s and Khamenei dates back to the early stages followers who were not active in exile: they had following the collapse of the Shah’s regime in formed the backbone of his Iran-based supporters February 1979, when they both featured prominently and experienced long terms of incarceration and in the first postrevolutionary state administration. internal exile as a consequence. At the time, Khamenei and Rafsanjani were mid- Khomeini’s 15-year exile meant that he lacked ranking clerics under the age of 40 and possessed information on and detailed knowledge of his solid but not exceptional revolutionary credentials. younger cohorts, many of whom he had not seen

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or interacted with meaningfully for more than a victory of Abulhassan Bani-Sadr, for whom they had decade. It also meant that many young upstarts, such little affinity because of his long spells as a politician as Rafsanjani and Khamenei, had opportunities to in exile in Western Europe, his aloof intellectualism, emerge as figures high up in the political pecking and his antagonism toward Beheshti. order. The duo’s first tastes of office came as early Bani-Sadr’s victory also compelled Rafsanjani to press as the spring of 1979, when they became deputy for, and obtain, a provision that limited incumbency defense minister and deputy interior minister in the first post-revolutionary parliament to those respectively in the Provisional Revolutionary candidates who succeeded in obtaining 50% or more Government led by Mehdi Bazargan. As several of votes cast, effectively preventing the entry of the sources acknowledge, both acquired considerable myriad non-clerical groups into Parliament and experience during this stint, particularly Khamenei, assisting the IRP, which was better organized and who gained a sense of how to harness the military could rely on an extensive national mosque network. into the political arena. The future president and The IRP’s eventual strong showing paved the way for Supreme Leader argued against the requests of Rafsanjani to become the Majlis speaker, a post he leftists and radical groups to disband the army, would hold from 1980 until the start of his presidency despite perceptions that pockets of support for the in 1989. This nine-year tenure would decisively shape ancient régime remained in its ranks. Khamenei Rafsanjani’s attitude to statecraft and turn him into a would be immersed in military-related matters figure who understood the importance of arbitration until 1981, when he was pushed toward running and negotiation between political factions. for the presidency by Rafsanjani, among others. Rafsanjani and Khamenei started to work to unseat The two were also instrumental in the creation of the Bani-Sadr by the end of 1980, as it became clear that Islamic Republic Party (IRP), the organisation that the constitutional provisions governing the selection was set up by Khomeini’s clerical and lay religious of the new prime minister were unworkable in the supporters as a counterbalance to the Mojahedin-e context of Bani-Sadr’s rising antagonism. They Khalq, the Tudeh Party, and other political parties succeeded in their quest in the summer of 1981, then active on the scene. when Khomeini finally relinquished his support There is evidence that relations between the two for the president and his unwillingness to see him were warm in those first heady months. On the day deposed after Bani-Sadr made several speeches in on which the US embassy in Tehran was occupied which he appeared willing to entertain the notion of by student supporters of Khomeini, both Rafsanjani a coup against the rest of the state system. and Khamenei were in the middle of the Hajj Rafsanjani and Khamenei pressed Khomeini once pilgrimage and hurriedly returned home to find again for his approval of a clerical candidate in the that Bazargan had resigned. Rafsanjani remained aftermath of Bani-Sadr’s impeachment in June 1981. in control of his remit, however, as he became the The revolutionary founding father finally relented caretaker interior minister and effective organizer of at the end of the summer, after a series of bombings the first presidential and parliamentary elections of that assassinated Beheshti and many other promi- early 1980. Having been rebuffed in their attempts nent IRP leaders. The first clerical president of the to persuade Khomeini to accept a clerical candidacy, Islamic Republic would be Khamenei himself, who that of IRP stalwart Ayatollah Muhammad Beheshti, had rapidly risen through the ranks of the IRP, be- Rafsanjani and Khamenei were forced to assist the coming its secretary-general prior to the presiden-

Rajab - Shaban, 1437 - April - May, 2016 6 tial elections of late 1981. Rafsanjani increasingly oscillated between the left Khamenei’s rise to the presidency, coupled with and the right, occasionally moving in the opposite Rafsanjani’s strong control over Parliament, gave rise direction to Khamenei. Upon his reelection in to hopes that the IRP would stabilize the state system 1985, Khamenei attempted to make use of the and end political acrimony and confrontation. This constitution’s vagueness about the fate of the prime expectation proved short-lived: as non-Khomeinist minister and the cabinet after presidential elections organizations, from the left to the radical Mojahedin-e to force Mousavi’s replacement with Velayati. Despite Khalq to moderate nationalists, were ousted from Khomeini’s opposition to the move, apparently the political scene, the emerging fissures within the motivated by concerns over the effect it would have clerical camp came to light. Khamenei would suffer the on the morale of soldiers on the front of the war first of a series of decisive setbacks in October 1981, against Iraq, 99 MPs famously opposed Mousavi in when Parliament denied approval to his pick of prime the chamber. They were joined by Khamenei, who minister, the right-wing Ali Akbar Velayati. A cross- allegedly proclaimed himself the hundredth signatory section of MPs who came from outside the ranks of the of the initiative. Rafsanjani continued, however, to conservative, mercantile Motalefeh associations and who maintain an understanding with Khamenei, and would later on form the “left-wing” flank of the inner- according to the contents of a secret resignation letter regime elite instead supported Mir-Hossein Mousavi, produced by Mousavi in 1988, the two were plotting another prominent IRP figure who had been the interim behind the prime minister’s back. But Khamenei foreign minister and editor of the party newspaper. appears to have stayed on the sidelines at critical Throughout his first tenure in office, Khamenei felt moments, such as the arms negotiations that led to increasingly constrained by the constitutional limitations the Iran-Contra scandal in 1986 and the process that on his post and would air his displeasure openly, as he did brought an end to the Iran-Iraq war two years later, during his 1985 reelection campaign. Anxious to avoid both of which featured Rafsanjani prominently as a a presidency with too much power, the Constitutional policymaker and broker. Assembly of 1979 had watered down the authority of The then-president also made a series of the role, initially modeled on that of the Gaullist French unsuccessful interventions in state affairs in early Fifth Republic, by ceding powers to the prime minister. 1989. He first tried to stymie the Mousavi cabinet’s The emerging factional divide resulted in the frequent ability to engage in autonomous dealings with the sidelining of Khamenei in important matters of state, private sector but was firmly rebuked by Khomeini; such as the yearly budget or foreign policy. later that year, he undertook an ill-fated initiative to By 1983, it was becoming clear that the two clerical contain the fallout from Khomeini’s fatwa against figures of Khamenei and Rafsanjani were the most Salman Rushdie in the form of a daring attempt important characters behind the throne. A recently at mediation during a Friday prayer speech, in declassified CIA report from that time reported which he called upon protestors to avoid attacking that Khomeini had acted to ensure that neither foreign embassies and floated the possibility of a accrued too much power, but it noted a streak of retraction of the fatwa if Rushdie expressed regret pragmatism in Rafsanjani.1 and sought forgiveness for the publication of The Satanic Verses. Rafsanjani did not stand in the way 1- For the full report, see http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/ of angry reactions by members of Parliament and by files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0000833160.pdf. Mousavi, who sought to capitalize on his rival’s faux

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pas by reminding the public of the obligatory nature (IRGC), and played a dominant role in foreign and of Khomeini’s pronouncements on government. economic policy. By far the most crucial and decisive interaction Khamenei’s elevation to the leadership was likely due between the two occurred in June 1989, when the to Rafsanjani’s own machinations. Faced with a still Islamic Republic’s political elite had to react swiftly hostile and active left-wing opposition and running to the passing of Khomeini. Ayatollah Montazeri’s short of clerical allies he could trust, the Majlis fall into disgrace meant that no anointed successor speaker was probably of the view that Khamenei’s was ready to replace the founding father, and both placement would result in a cooperative leadership Rafsanjani and Khamenei went into the extraordinary that would not stand in the way of his own emergence session of the Assembly of Experts—the body tasked as the dominant figure of post-Khomeini Iran. with selecting the new Supreme Leader—with great This calculation proved to be correct until 1992, uncertainty over the outcome of its deliberations. when Khamenei, who had by then accrued enough According to statements made by Rafsanjani himself political power to rely upon his own, autonomous and by other Assembly members, initial attempts to power base, began to progressively shed support for appoint a senior, elderly Ayatollah from Qom or to his erstwhile companion’s presidential performance. create collegial leadership gave way to Rafsanjani’s Khamenei was particularly effective in shielding recollection—of an oral exchange unsupported Rafsanjani from the growing criticism of leftist by documentary evidence—that Khomeini had factions and prominent personalities such as Ahmad once spoken approvingly about the elevation of Khomeini, the late founder’s son and chief of staff. Khamenei to the leadership. The absence of Ahmad The Leader provided key backing to Rafsanjani on Khomeini, son and chief of staff of the Ayatollah, occasions such as the decision to assume neutrality and the likely surprised reaction of the Assembly in the conflict between Iraq and Kuwait in 1991, at members to such an assertion enabled Rafsanjani to a time when some of the most radical left-wingers engineer Khamenei’s rapid elevation to leadership. voiced support for intervening on Baghdad’s side This occurred despite the fact that, until as little as in an anti-Western stance, or the decision to avoid 72 hours prior to the meeting, Khamenei had been recognizing the coup which had briefly put Soviet referred to by state media as a Hojjat al-Islam, a leader Mikhail Gorbachev out of power in 1990. mid-ranking title that stood in stark contrast to the The most substantial support of Khamenei in the requirement, still enshrined in the constitution, that early Rafsanjani presidency came, however, in the the leader possess the rank of Marja. form of backing for the first Development Plan of The newly-minted Ayatollah Khamenei did not the Islamic Republic era, of 1989. The Plan, which oppose Rafsanjani’s assumption of the augmented was to last for five years and which was conceived presidency, the sole body of the executive branch by Rafsanjani’s technocratic aides, contained a bold following the abolition of the prime ministership departure from orthodox economic reasoning during the constitutional revision process of 1989, within the Islamic Republic’s elite. It proposed effectively making the two the paramount leaders of that the expensive subsidy provision system, set post-Khomeini Iran. By the end of 1989, Khamenei up by Mousavi during the war hardship years, be and Rafsanjani held most of the effective executive progressively scrapped and that foreign financing, power, controlled the upper rungs of both the to the tune of some 25 billion dollars, be acquired army and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps via the IMF. Khamenei’s outright support for the

Rajab - Shaban, 1437 - April - May, 2016 8 plan forced the left-wing parliamentary majority to key factor in the endemically high inflation; and his reluctantly acquiesce to these principles, to which it wooing of fugitive elements of the Shah’s economic was ideologically opposed. elite. The government’s inability to contain the Despite their rapid and successful ascent to the inflationary consequences of several liberalization pinnacle of power, the two men had to face the directives and the emergence of bread riots in the concerted opposition of the left-wing factions, which mid-1990s severely dampened Rafsanjani’s reputation still controlled Parliament and which were mounting and provided Khamenei with the opportunity to a strong challenge to the new leadership. By 1992, the consolidate his own power at Rafsanjani’s expense. duo succeeded in ousting the left through institutional During Rafsanjani’s presidency, Khamenei exhibited engineering. They favored the imposition, proposed by many of the traits he would display in future: he the Guardian Council, of a written test as a prerequisite claimed a share in the achievements made by the for admission to the list of candidates for the Assembly head of the government, but swiftly joined critics of Experts election of 1991 and, more controversially, of the the president and did not prevent the routine the approbatory supervision of candidates for embarrassment of Rafsanjani by the Majlis and even parliamentary elections from 1992 onward. by cabinet members imposed on him by Parliament, It was during this period that fissures between the such as the culture minister. As Rafsanjani was two leaders began quietly to emerge. Khamenei had rapidly losing influence, his closest allies founded, spent much of the first phase of his tenure at the in the weeks preceding the parliamentary elections helm of the Iranian state buttressing up his personal of 1996, an electoral list devoted to the president support. Anxious to avoid the smarting defeats and called Karguzaran-i Sazandigi, or “Servants of setbacks of the 1980s, he set up a personal network Reconstruction,” which was met with a tepid and of loyalists at the head of the armed forces and in unenthusiastic response by Khamenei. sensitive ministries, such as foreign policy, culture, However, the surprise victory of Khatami in 1997 saw and defense, effectively stifling Rafsanjani’s meek Khamenei and Rafsanjani thrust on the same side in attempts to achieve détente with the West, relaxation the political confrontation that engulfed the Islamic of rigid Islamic mores, and reduced military Republic’s political elite. Within six months of the spending. His political modus operandi settled on a electoral triumph of Mohammad Khatami, the new tried-and-tested formula: assuming a posture, such president’s political allies began pushing the envelope as his positions on the United States or , and on human rights, foreign relations, and the balance of very rarely changing it. Rafsanjani, on the other power among state institutions. Since both Supreme hand, became an active proponent of the necessity Leader Khamenei and the former president Rafsanjani, to keep open the doors of ijtihad (independent now head of the Expediency Council, felt pressured legal reasoning) and to apply it also to the political by the media-driven and very popular reformists, they dimension. However, the fourth legislature, teamed up once again to oppose their old rivals, now inaugurated in 1992, featured a considerable refashioned. Rafsanjani’s stance hardened after he was number of traditionalist conservative opponents of forced to relinquish his Majlis seat, having finished in the president, who were alarmed by his attempts the thirtieth and final available place in the Tehran to enlarge the private sector; his encouragement of constituency during the 2000 elections. department stores to stifle bazaari control over the The period from 2000 to 2004 arguably saw the distribution of consumer goods, which he saw as a most collaboration between the two stalwarts. Freed

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from government duties, Rafsanjani was relieved of by the reformist Parliament but blocked by the arch- the burden of the making policy decisions which still conservative Guardian Council. The 1989 constitution preoccupied Khamenei. He instead played the very dictated that the Majlis could then refer the bill to the useful role of repeatedly obstructing legislation passed Expediency Council, where it usually languished. The Present Day: The Elections of 2005 and Beyond

By the end of 2005, it was clear that public opinion depicted as a financial thief and the instigator of had lost faith in the reformist agenda because of political murder and violence in several reformist its inability to make headway in economic, social, newspapers and in bestselling books by daring and political matters. Rafsanjani then engaged investigative journalists such as Akbar Ganji. in an eager but ill-managed attempt to return By the end of 2005, the balance of power between to the fray by announcing his candidacy for the Rafsanjani and Khamenei had firmly tipped on the 2005 presidential elections. While he obtained the side of Khamenei, who had prevented Rafsanjani’s customary permission from Khamenei, Rafsanjani return to prominence and had presided over the appeared from the outset not to be the Leader’s end of the last vestiges of institutional power held preferred candidate. There was a well-populated by the reformist factions. Khamenei’s initiative was roster of right-wing conservatives who had a track not followed, however, by a stable and trouble- record of appreciation and support from Khamenei, free rule by the new brand of conservatism that such as Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, who had by then now controlled government and Parliament. stepped down from the position of national police Ahmadinejad’s abrasive style, which resulted in the chief; Ali Larijani, a hawkish official whom the right firing and rapid replacement of dozens of high-level wing had imposed on Rafsanjani as culture minister state officials, including Central Bank governors, in the wake of Khatami’s resignation in 1993; and regional governors, ambassadors, and ministers, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the quixotic and unknown together with Iran’s rapidly deteriorating relationship official who had become mayor of Tehran in 2003 with the West and Western allies, brought unity after two decades of service in various conservative between reformists and Rafsanjani. The first overt organizations. Rafsanjani’s hopes of a return to the signs of a mend in the relations between them came presidency were ultimately felled by the insurgence in the 2006 Assembly of Experts and local elections, of Ahmadinejad. Despite accusations of vote rigging when Rafsanjani made a point of showing up to and irregularities advanced by Rafsanjani and vote—in the customary location of the Jamaran another moderate candidate, (the complex, which hosts the Khomeini Foundation— latter of whom accused one of Khamenei’s sons, together with Khatami. Mojtaba, of collusion), Ahmedinejad ultimately The growing popular disquiet with Ahmadinejad’s succeeded in reaping the benefits of popular erratic policies drove Rafsanjani and Khamenei revulsion at Rafsanjani, who had been variously further apart. In the spring of 2009, the former

Rajab - Shaban, 1437 - April - May, 2016 10 refrained from entering the presidential race but Khamenei’s elevation to Supreme Leader in 1989. showed increasing signs of backing Mir-Hossein Khamenei’s restraint enabled Rafsanjani to weather Mousavi, the former prime minister who had broken the severe storm of 2009–2010 and remain a sidelined two decades of political silence to enter the fray but active member of the Tehran political elite. on a national salvation platform. Mousavi’s long Despite solidifying his hold on most levers of the history of friction and disputes with Khamenei left state and the military after 2009, Khamenei had to no illusions regarding the latter’s unwillingness to contend with a worsening economic situation and accept a Mousavi presidency, a factor that compelled the unprecedented international isolation of the the Leader to discreetly back the reelection of country following the imposition of harsher EU Ahmadinejad. During the televised direct debates sanctions in 2011. The Leader was also forced to between Mousavi and Ahmadinejad, the outgoing support the troubled second term of Ahmadinejad, president made remarkable claims about the financial which descended into almost daily confrontations probity of the Rafsanjani clan, which led Rafsanjani with conservative opponents. Instead of forming a to write a detailed letter to Khamenei, asking him to uniform and peaceable right wing, Khamenei now rein in the irascible president. Rafsanjani’s last-minute presided over a fissiparous, squabble-prone array warnings of possible electoral fraud, made on the eve of factions and personalities. Despite increasingly of the June 12, 2009 vote, were left unanswered, as manifest signs of the hardline conservative groups the country rapidly descended into crisis and turmoil and personalities’ inability to continue their hold following the poll. Khamenei once again appeared on government, Khamenei remained reluctant to to be cutting himself off from his erstwhile ally and shed his support for them, continuing his pattern of kingmaker by preventing Rafsanjani, a customary rarely if ever backtracking on decisions. Friday prayer leader since the early 1980s, from Rafsanjani, in the meantime, remained on the fringes giving sermons after July 2009. He refrained from of the political system after the diminishment of preventing the indictment of two of Rafsanjani’s many of the moderate factions after 2009. However, children, Mehdi and Faezeh, the removal of another in contrast to the more pronounced reformists, he one, Mohsen, from the chairmanship of the Tehran retained a foothold within the inner regime and metro system, and the public humiliation of a close presided, until 2011, over the Assembly of Experts, Rafsanjani aide, Mohammad Atrianfar, who was albeit by chairing meetings that usually ended with paraded on television in a mass trial and forced to fawning appreciations of Khamenei’s performance. confess on camera. Nevertheless, Khamenei did not He also increasingly bemoaned Iran’s isolation and move directly against his old partner. This was most became more outspoken on the need for selective likely due to a few factors: the residual clout enjoyed dialogue with foes, including the United States, by the former president within the state system, a stance that diverged sharply from that of the Rafsanjani’s unassailable pedigree as a trusted and rigidly anti-American Supreme Leader. The two close assistant of Khomeini, apprehension over also differed in their attitudes to Saudi Arabia, a potential revelations that the Rafsanjani clan could key foreign policy issue. While Khamenei carried make regarding the financial probity of leading on with Khomeini’s intransigent rejection of Saudi conservative figures linked to Khamenei, such Arabia, Rafsanjani has often been the sole high- as former head of the judiciary Ayatollah Yazdi, level Iranian political figure not not shy away from and regard for the role Rafsanjani had played in meeting with Saudi emissaries and the only one

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to advocate détente with Riyadh. In short, while is not required to provide formal justification for Khamenei remained anchored, in post-Khomeini its decisions, but its spokesman indirectly alluded Iran, to his 1980s worldview and to an orthodox to Rafsanjani’s age—he was 79 at the time of the and unflinching conservatism, Rafsanjani has deliberations—as the factor that prompted its continually evolved since 1989, eventually achieving decision. It is quite clear that the decision could not a pragmatic, realist stance, all the while without have been reached without Khamenei’s approval. overtly estranging himself from Khamenei. Instead of engaging in a sustained but likely These circumstances prompted Rafsanjani to spring unsuccessful confrontation with the Council over back onto center stage in the 2013 presidential its decision, Rafsanjani decided instead to back the elections. As public opinion showed increasing candidacy of Hassan Rouhani, who had quietly made signs of weariness and despair with the regression it past the Council’s scrutiny. A mid-ranking cleric of the country under Ahmadinejad and appeared who had a long track record of close collaboration unwilling to provide large-scale backing for the with Rafsanjani, having served as his deputy for conservative camp, Rafsanjani pondered his move military affairs in the 1990s and as the head of the before deciding on a remarkably direct entry into the Center for Strategic Research (a body that had been race. According to one of his close advisors, Gholam under the aegis of Rafsanjani’s Expediency Council Ali Rajaee, he finally ended his indecision on the since 1997), Rouhani was the best option for the last day of registrations, when he hurriedly made former president, but he suffered from a popularity his way to the interior ministry with barely an hour deficit: according to the prominent political to spare, after unsuccessfully attempting to secure commentator Sadegh Zibakalam, he had at best two direct approval from Khamenei; on his last phone million votes of his own. Rouhani, who espoused call to the Leader’s office, he was told that his former an agenda very similar to Rafsanjani’s, could also companion was resting and that he should make count on a acceptable working relationship with the decision on his own. Faced with considerable Khamenei, having been one of the few moderate pressure from the moderate and reformist ranks, figures who had not significantly locked horns or the latter having set aside its previous strident fallen out with the Leader after 1989 and who had criticisms, Rafsanjani drove to the interior ministry been discharged with honor from the arduous task of building with his motorcade mobbed by crowds negotiating the early stages of a nuclear deal with the who hailed him as a national savior. West between 2003 and 2005. Rouhani was therefore Khamenei’s attitude to Rafsanjani’s candidacy was a mutually acceptable figure, and Rafsanjani and indicative of the relationship between the two men. the reformist machinery turned him into a winning Rather than openly block or approve Rafsanjani’s candidate, mostly through a series of well-honed decision, Khamenei opted for an ambiguous stance, endorsement messages and by persuading the other, which he could reshape and refine at a later stage. more outwardly reformist candidate, Mohammad As it became clear that Rafsanjani had experienced Reza Aref, to pull out of the race with two days to go. a dramatic increase in popular support and was Rouhani’s victory in the first round brought respite quite likely to win the contest outright in the first to Khamenei’s tense relations with civil society and round of voting, the conservative Guardian Council made possible a road map for the resolution of the decided against providing the necessary salahiyat, or nuclear issue and the reestablishment of ties with “competency” approval, to Rafsanjani. The Council the West. At the same time, it resulted in a situation

Rajab - Shaban, 1437 - April - May, 2016 12 with which Khamenei was evidently displeased: the Rafsanjani effectively turned the Assembly poll return to the executive branch of the moderate- in Tehran, where he ran at the top of a list of reformist wing he had opposed in various degrees moderate and conservative supporters of the and with various measures since the early 1990s. current government, into a referendum on himself, The Leader, however, had few options. He was faced exploiting the first opportunity in a decade for him to with a conservative wing that was more congenial gauge his popularity. Khamenei, on the other hand, to his own worldview and ideology but that had relied on the performance of stalwart conservative plunged the nation into unsustainable economic hardliners, who were subjected to an active social and political isolation and was competitive only media campaign calling for their exclusion from the in elections that featured active gerrymandering next Assembly. The Assembly poll in Tehran ended by the Guardian Council. Rouhani was the best with a clear victory for the moderate side, which compromise candidate; he should be understood, swept all but one of the 16 seats on offer. Rafsanjani therefore, as a figure who has somewhat bridged the won his self-imposed “referendum” handily, with gap between Rafsanjani and Khamenei. more than 2.3 million ballots in his favor, a sharp Since 2013, Rafsanjani has turned into an outspoken rise from the 1.5 million he had obtained a decade supporter of the government’s negotiation tactics earlier. This was a clear indication of his popularity over the nuclear issue, going far beyond Khamenei’s and an indirect rebuke of sorts to his critics. meek admission that the sanctions imposed by the After the poll, Khamenei publicly voiced his UN and the EU had affected the Iranian economy irritation on several occasions, implying that the and had to be removed. While Khamenei insisted active moderate efforts—unimpeded and discreetly that the “Resistance Economy” paradigm, an essen- supported by Rafsanjani—were inopportune and tially autarkic vision, had to be upheld, Rafsanjani politically naïve. By doing so, he attempted to depict spoke outright, often using colorful idioms, of the the votes cast in favor of the moderates as products of economy’s having broken society’s back and of the mudslinging and character assassination rather than necessity of supporting the government’s strategy reflections of the genuine quality and competence of and the eventual concessions that paved the way the moderate faction. for the Vienna agreement. He also bemoaned other Forced to contend with Rafsanjani’s latest rise foreign policy conundrums, becoming a rare senior to prominence, Khamenei engaged in a series of politician to criticize Bashar al-Assad by calling his speeches and declarations that laid bare the extent shooting of civilians at the beginning of the cur- of the gap between the two on key policy issues. rent uprising an error and even admitting—before His continued reiteration of distrust and suspicion the customary denial—that Assad had made use regarding the intentions of the United States in the of chemical weaponry, all while Khamenei and the midst of ongoing direct diplomatic communication senior IRGC leadership remained steadfast in their between Tehran and Washington, coupled with support of the Syrian president. his insistence on the continuation of missile tests Despite the outward manifestations of cordiality by the IRGC, is a result of this strategy. It was in and détente between Khamenei and Rafsanjani, the aftermath of one such statement by Khamenei the recent parliamentary and Assembly of Experts that one of the more direct verbal confrontations elections have had the consequence, as often in between the two in recent years occurred. In late the past, of rekindling animosity between them. March, soon after Khamenei’s expression of steadfast

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support for the recent battery of missile tests by the out his consent or previous approval, the incident was IRGC, a Twitter account presumed to be run by widely seen as the manifestation of opposition by an Rafsanjani’s public relations team issued a message emboldened Rafsanjani, who for the first time chose that appeared to pose a direct and unprecedented to make the public aware of the extent to which he challenge to the Leader’s declaration: “Tomorrow’s is ready to challenge Khamenei’s views openly. The world is one of dialogue, not missiles.” Leader, on the other hand, has effectively givencarte blanche to Rafsanjani’s many conservative critics by offering two terms on which attacks against him may be based: he called anyone sharing the former presi- dent’s ideas on rolling back missile testing khaen, or “traitor,” and na-agah, or “ignorant.” Conclusion: The Rafsan- jani-Khamenei Relation- ship: What Lies Ahead? The past several decades of the Rafsanjani-Khamenei relationship encapsulate the ongoing, long-term Below: Rafsanjani’s original offending tweet, “Tomorrow’s world is dynamic between two major factional strands of one of dialogue, not missiles.” Above: The retraction, “Correction: The previous tweet was misquoted. The complete text is: Tomorrow’s world the Islamic Republic. Since the early 1980s, the is one of discourses such as the one of the Islamic Revolution, not one two figures have jostled for power—occasionally of intercontinental missiles and atomic bombs.” assisting each other, as Rafsanjani did on the occasion of Khamenei’s elevation to Supreme Leader The furore that followed the tweet played into in 1989; frequently acting together to eliminate Khamenei’s hands: he stated that those opposed common adversaries from the political equation, to missile launches were either “misinformed or as with the elections of 1989 and 1992; but often treacherous.” The Rafsanjani team’s retraction finding themselves at loggerheads with each other of the tweet, which it labeled incomplete, and as a consequence of clear and widening differences Rafsanjani’s rapid declaration that the vali-ye faqih in their ideological and political outlooks. But the had to be obeyed at all times also carried significant two are acting more like estranged partners living implications: they constituted a rare admission that under the same roof and sharing a concern for the the Twitter account, which had never been formally welfare of their family—the rest of the political elite acknowledged as “official,” was indeed controlled and the combination of institutions, informal and by the former president’s office. The incident formal, that make up the Islamic Republic—rather transformed social media into a recognized, rather than choosing to be fully divorced and separated. than simply de facto, arena of political activity This situation is unlikely to change as long as within the upper echelons of the Islamic Republic. both are active, powerful members of the Islamic Despite claims that content placed on Rafsanjani’s Republic’s political elite. The state of their personal website (www.hashemirafsanjani.ir) and on related and political relations is thus one of persistent, social media accounts was at times published with- dynamic stalemate.

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Despite Khamenei’s institutional advantages, over state power, and he is also the sole elite figure he is unable to oust Rafsanjani, with his deep who dares to venture into the troubled waters of governmental roots, from the political scene, nor public, even if haphazard, expressions of resistance. is he able to lessen or eliminate the considerable The ultimate direction of this struggle will be influence Rafsanjani wields. As Khomeini’s state governed by the extent to which each of these system approaches its 40th anniversary, the quest figures is able to organize a newer generation of to bring about generational change and transition, acolytes. Rafsanjani’s more advanced age appears which was left hanging after a first, abrupt attempt to be a factor in his current outspokenness and his during the Ahmadinejad presidency, will gain added desire to lay down the early cornerstones of a post- urgency. Khamenei has two key advantages in this Khamenei era, most notably in the economic and regard: he is six years younger, 76 to Rafsanjani’s 82, a foreign policy realms. significant difference at their stage of life, and he has As ever, the confrontation between Rafsanjani considerable institutional machinery and financial and Khamenei will continue to take place in other clout at his disposal. Rafsanjani, on the other hand, institutional arenas. There are indications of conflict has become less cautious in his public remarks in already in the presidential elections of 2017, when recent times, possibly because of a feeling that his it is expected that Khamenei will not stand in the more advanced age and pedigree effectively insulate way of a strong conservative candidate, possibly him from possible reprisals. His shrewd use of former president Ahmadinejad, running on an internet media to channel his muted but significant anti-government platform. The projected platform opposition to Khamenei’s intransigence has been will fault the Rouhani administration for its lack of widely noted by observers and by those who have adherence to the Iqtisad-i Muqavimati, or Resistance similar views but are unable to air them, but there Economy, and its excessive rapprochement with the is still considerable reticence within the elite about United States and the West. As they have so often following the former president down the path of done in the past four decades, the two old partners resistance. Rafsanjani is therefore the sole and daring will lock horns in yet another of the battles which flagbearer of those who believe that Khamenei have indelibly marked the history of the Islamic should not have unchecked and unmitigated control Republic almost since its inception.

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Rajab - Shaban, 1437 - April - May, 2016 King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies (KFCRIS)

Founded in 1983 in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, the mission of the King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies is to be a beacon for humanity as envisioned by the late King Faisal bin Abdulaziz. The Center aims to accomplish this through conducting research and studies that stimulate cultural and scientific activities for the service of mankind, enrich cultural and intellectual life in Saudi Arabia, and facilitate collaboration with the East and the West. The Center’s activities include lectures, seminars, conferences and roundtable discussions. It houses the King Faisal Library, collections of rare manuscripts, an Islamic art museum, and the King Faisal Museum. It also administers a robust Visiting Fellow Program. Since the Center’s focus is scholarly research, the Research Department was restructured in 2013 to carry out in-depth analysis in contemporary political thought, Saudi studies, regional studies, Arabic language studies, and modernity studies. The Center has also been collaborating with various research centers around the world within its scope of research. The Chairman of the KFCRIS Board is HRH Prince Turki Al-Faisal bin Abdulaziz, and the Secretary General is Prof. Yahya bin Junaid.

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