The Rafsanjani-Khamenei Relationship: What Lies Ahead?
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riction at the Helm Four Decades of Amity, Conflict, and Reconciliation F between Hashemi Rafsanjani and Ali Khamenei Introduction Alliance, Competition, and Rivalry: 1979–2009 The Present Day: The Elections of 2005 and Beyond Conclusion: The Rafsanjani-Khamenei Relationship: What Lies Ahead? Rajab - Shaban, 1437 24 April - May, 2016 © KFCRIS, 2016 ISSN: 1658-6972 Issue No. 24 - 24/05/2016 L.D. No: 1437/2868 Rajab - Shaban, 1437 - April - May, 2016 or the past thirty years, Iran's political Fscene has been impacted by the ongoing competition and ideological clash between the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and former president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. This issue of Masarat focuses on the history of the on-off rivalry between the two prominent figures, and, in turn, how the ensuing tension has impacted many key moments throughout the Republic's history. It also explores how such could possibly affect Iran's elite.» Rajab - Shaban, 1437 - April - May, 2016 4 Introduction One of the endemic features of the Islamic Republic of Iran has been the resilience and longevity of its senior state figures. As the state system founded by Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979 approaches its fortieth anniversary, the political scene has yet to undergo a thorough generational transformation that would usher in a new generation of figures who did not cut their political teeth in the period preceding the Revolution of 1979. Some of the holders of the highest state offices, such as Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, chairman of the Expediency Discernment Council Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, and President Hassan Rouhani, hail from a generation that experienced repression and incarceration during the Shah’s time, surrounded Khomeini as the new state system weathered the turbulent period following its creation, and assumed control over the state after 1989. Their personal trajectory in many ways matches that of the Islamic Republic as a whole and has shaped it decisively in key moments. For most of the past three decades, the Iranian political scene has been in the throes of an on-off rivalry between Khamenei and Rafsanjani. Without exhibiting outward signs of marked confrontation, distrust, or distance, the two have clashed with increasing frequency in recent years, as Khamenei’s conservatism has collided with Rafsanjani’s more flexible politicking and occasional pragmatism. The rivalry has shown signs of accentuation in recent weeks, as the parliamentary and Assembly of Experts elections have delivered substantial success for Rafsanjani-backed figures at the expense of Khamenei- supported ones. This article discusses the roots of this rivalry and its possible implications for the future evolution of the Islamic Republic’s elite, particularly in the short to medium term, when an at least partial generational change is to be expected. In order to understand the current state of play between Khamenei and Rafsanjani, it is necessary to cast a glance at the previous three decades, particularly at the first decade of the Islamic Republic, when several key junctures were decisive for the psychological and political formation of the two leading politicians of Tehran. Alliance, Competition, and Rivalry: 1979–2009 The rise to political prominence of both Rafsanjani They also hailed from the segment of Khomeini’s and Khamenei dates back to the early stages followers who were not active in exile: they had following the collapse of the Shah’s regime in formed the backbone of his Iran-based supporters February 1979, when they both featured prominently and experienced long terms of incarceration and in the first postrevolutionary state administration. internal exile as a consequence. At the time, Khamenei and Rafsanjani were mid- Khomeini’s 15-year exile meant that he lacked ranking clerics under the age of 40 and possessed information on and detailed knowledge of his solid but not exceptional revolutionary credentials. younger cohorts, many of whom he had not seen Rajab - Shaban, 1437 - April - May, 2016 5 or interacted with meaningfully for more than a victory of Abulhassan Bani-Sadr, for whom they had decade. It also meant that many young upstarts, such little affinity because of his long spells as a politician as Rafsanjani and Khamenei, had opportunities to in exile in Western Europe, his aloof intellectualism, emerge as figures high up in the political pecking and his antagonism toward Beheshti. order. The duo’s first tastes of office came as early Bani-Sadr’s victory also compelled Rafsanjani to press as the spring of 1979, when they became deputy for, and obtain, a provision that limited incumbency defense minister and deputy interior minister in the first post-revolutionary parliament to those respectively in the Provisional Revolutionary candidates who succeeded in obtaining 50% or more Government led by Mehdi Bazargan. As several of votes cast, effectively preventing the entry of the sources acknowledge, both acquired considerable myriad non-clerical groups into Parliament and experience during this stint, particularly Khamenei, assisting the IRP, which was better organized and who gained a sense of how to harness the military could rely on an extensive national mosque network. into the political arena. The future president and The IRP’s eventual strong showing paved the way for Supreme Leader argued against the requests of Rafsanjani to become the Majlis speaker, a post he leftists and radical groups to disband the army, would hold from 1980 until the start of his presidency despite perceptions that pockets of support for the in 1989. This nine-year tenure would decisively shape ancient régime remained in its ranks. Khamenei Rafsanjani’s attitude to statecraft and turn him into a would be immersed in military-related matters figure who understood the importance of arbitration until 1981, when he was pushed toward running and negotiation between political factions. for the presidency by Rafsanjani, among others. Rafsanjani and Khamenei started to work to unseat The two were also instrumental in the creation of the Bani-Sadr by the end of 1980, as it became clear that Islamic Republic Party (IRP), the organisation that the constitutional provisions governing the selection was set up by Khomeini’s clerical and lay religious of the new prime minister were unworkable in the supporters as a counterbalance to the Mojahedin-e context of Bani-Sadr’s rising antagonism. They Khalq, the Tudeh Party, and other political parties succeeded in their quest in the summer of 1981, then active on the scene. when Khomeini finally relinquished his support There is evidence that relations between the two for the president and his unwillingness to see him were warm in those first heady months. On the day deposed after Bani-Sadr made several speeches in on which the US embassy in Tehran was occupied which he appeared willing to entertain the notion of by student supporters of Khomeini, both Rafsanjani a coup against the rest of the state system. and Khamenei were in the middle of the Hajj Rafsanjani and Khamenei pressed Khomeini once pilgrimage and hurriedly returned home to find again for his approval of a clerical candidate in the that Bazargan had resigned. Rafsanjani remained aftermath of Bani-Sadr’s impeachment in June 1981. in control of his remit, however, as he became the The revolutionary founding father finally relented caretaker interior minister and effective organizer of at the end of the summer, after a series of bombings the first presidential and parliamentary elections of that assassinated Beheshti and many other promi- early 1980. Having been rebuffed in their attempts nent IRP leaders. The first clerical president of the to persuade Khomeini to accept a clerical candidacy, Islamic Republic would be Khamenei himself, who that of IRP stalwart Ayatollah Muhammad Beheshti, had rapidly risen through the ranks of the IRP, be- Rafsanjani and Khamenei were forced to assist the coming its secretary-general prior to the presiden- Rajab - Shaban, 1437 - April - May, 2016 6 tial elections of late 1981. Rafsanjani increasingly oscillated between the left Khamenei’s rise to the presidency, coupled with and the right, occasionally moving in the opposite Rafsanjani’s strong control over Parliament, gave rise direction to Khamenei. Upon his reelection in to hopes that the IRP would stabilize the state system 1985, Khamenei attempted to make use of the and end political acrimony and confrontation. This constitution’s vagueness about the fate of the prime expectation proved short-lived: as non-Khomeinist minister and the cabinet after presidential elections organizations, from the left to the radical Mojahedin-e to force Mousavi’s replacement with Velayati. Despite Khalq to moderate nationalists, were ousted from Khomeini’s opposition to the move, apparently the political scene, the emerging fissures within the motivated by concerns over the effect it would have clerical camp came to light. Khamenei would suffer the on the morale of soldiers on the front of the war first of a series of decisive setbacks in October 1981, against Iraq, 99 MPs famously opposed Mousavi in when Parliament denied approval to his pick of prime the chamber. They were joined by Khamenei, who minister, the right-wing Ali Akbar Velayati. A cross- allegedly proclaimed himself the hundredth signatory section of MPs who came from outside the ranks of the of the initiative. Rafsanjani continued, however, to conservative, mercantile Motalefeh associations and who maintain an understanding with Khamenei, and would