Court File No. 35009 in the SUPREME COURT of CANADA

Court File No. 35009

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA (ON APPEAL FROM THE QUEBEC COURT OF APPEAL)

B E T W E E N:

BANQUE DE MONTRÉAL, CITIBANQUE CANADA, LA BANQUE TORONTO-DOMINION, BANQUE NATIONALE DU CANADA Appellants (Appellants)

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RÉAL MARCOTTE, BERNARD LAPARÉ, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF QUÉBEC, LE PRESIDENT DE L’OFFICE DE LA PROTECTION DU CONSOMMATEUR Respondents (Respondents, Mise-en-Cause)

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ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ONTARIO, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF BRITISH COLUMBIA, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ALBERTA Interveners (Interveners)

FACTUM OF THE INTERVENER, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ONTARIO

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ONTARIO BURKE-ROBERTSON Constitutional Law Branch Barristers & Solicitors 4th Floor, 720 Bay Street 200-441 MacLaren Street Toronto, ON M7A 2S9 Ottawa, ON K2P 2H3

Janet E. Minor (LSUC No. 14898A) Robert E. Houston, Q.C. Tel: (416) 326-4137 Tel.: (613) 236-9665 Fax: (416) 326-4015 Fax: (613) 235-4430 [email protected] E-mail: [email protected]

Robert A. Donato (LSUC No. 44544F) Tel: (416) 326-4473 Fax: (416) 326-4015 [email protected]

Counsel for the Intervener Ottawa Agent for the Intervener Attorney General of Ontario Attorney General of Ontario

TO: THE REGISTRAR Supreme Court of Canada 301 Wellington Street Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0J1

AND TO:

Mahmud Jamal Patricia J. Wilson Sylvain Deslauriers Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt LLP Sylvana Conte 340 Albert Street, Suite 1900 Alberto Martinez Ottawa, Ontario Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt LLP K1R 7Y6 Box 50, 1 First Canadian Place Toronto, Ontario M5X 1B8

Tel: (416) 862-6764 Tel: (613) 787-1009 Fax: (416) 862-6666 Fax: (613) 235-2867 Email : [email protected] Email: [email protected]

Counsel for the Appellants/Respondents, Agent for the Appellants/Respondents, Bank of Montreal, Citibank, Toronto- Bank of Montreal, Citibank, Toronto- Dominion Bank, National Bank of Canada, Dominion Bank, National Bank of Amex Bank of Canada, Royal Bank of Canada, Amex Bank of Canada, Royal Canada, Canadian Imperial Bank of Bank of Canada, Canadian Imperial Commerce, Bank of Nova Scotia, Bank of Commerce, Bank of Nova Scotia, Laurentian Bank Laurentian Bank

Bruce W. Johnston Moira Dillon Phillippe H. Trudel Supreme Law Group André Lespérance 900 – 275 Slater Street Andrew Cleland Ottawa, Ontario Trudel & Johnston K1P 5H9 Bureau 90 750, Côte de la Place d`Armes Montreal, Quebec H2Y 2X8

Tel: (514) 871-8385 Tel: (613) 691-1224 Fax: (514) 871-8800 Fax: (613) 691-1338 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected]

Counsel for the Appellants/Respondents, Agent for the Appellants/Respondents, Réal Marcotte and Bernard Laparé Réal Marcotte and Bernard Laparé

Jean-François Jobin Pierre Landry Francis Demers Noël & Associés Samuel Chayer 111, rue Champlain Bernard, Roy & Associés Gatineau, Quebec 8.00 – 1 rue Notre-Dame Est J8X 3R1 Montréal, Quebec H2Y 1B6

Tel: (514) 393-2336 Ext: 51452 Tel: (819) 771-7393 Fax: (514) 873-7074 Fax: (819) 771-5397 Email: [email protected] Email : [email protected]

Counsel for the Respondent/Intervener, Agent for the Respondent/Intervener, Attorney General of Quebec Attorney General of Quebec

Marc Migneault Pierre Landry Allard, Renaud et Associés Noël & Associés 100, rue Laviolette, Bureau RC 11 111, rue Champlain Trois-Rivières, Quebec Gatineau, Quebec G9A 5S9 J8X 3R1

Tel: (888) 672-2556 Ext. 3426 Tel: (819) 771-7393 Fax: (819) 371-6489 Fax: (819) 771-5397 Email : [email protected]

Counsel for the Respondent/Intervener, Agent for the Respondent/Intervener, Président de l`Office de la Protection du Président de l`Office de la Protection du Consommateur Consommateur

Nancy E. Brown Robert E. Houston, Q.C. Attorney General of British Columbia Burke-Robertson 1001 Douglas Street 441 MacLaren Street P.O. Box 9280 Stn Prov Govt Suite 200 Victoria, British Columbia Ottawa, Ontario V8W 9J7 K2P 2H3

Tel: (250) 356-5597 Tel: (613) 236-9665 Fax: (250) 356-9154 Fax: (613) 235-4430 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected]

Counsel for the Intervener, Attorney Agent for the Intervener, Attorney General of British Columbia General of British Columbia

Robert J. Normey Henry S. Brown, Q.C. Attorney General of Alberta Gowling Lafleur Henderson LLP 4th Floor, Bowker Building 2600 – 160 Elgin St 9833 – 109th Street P.O. Box 466, Stn “D” Edmonton, Alberta Ottawa, Ontario T5K 2E8 K1P 1C3

Tel: (780) 422-9532 Tel: (613) 233-1781 Fax: (780) 425-0307 Fax: (613) 788-3433 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected]

Counsel for the Intervener, Attorney Agent for the Intervener, Attorney General of Alberta General of Alberta

John B. Laskin Patricia J. Wilson Torys LLP Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt LLP 3000 Maritime Life Tower, TD Centre 340 Albert Street 79 Wellington Street West Suite 1900 Toronto, Ontario Ottawa, Ontario M5K 1N2 K1R 7Y6

Tel: (416) 865-7317 Tel: (613) 787-1009 Fax: (416) 865-7380 Fax: (613) 235-2867 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected]

Counsel for the Intervener, Canadian Agent for the Intervener, Canadian Bankers Association Bankers Association

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PART I – OVERVIEW AND STATEMENT OF FACTS ...... 1

PART II – QUESTIONS IN ISSUE ...... 2

PART III – ARGUMENT ...... 2

1. The Interjurisdictional Immunity Doctrine ...... 2

2. The Interjurisdictional Immunity Doctrine is Not Applicable in this Case ...... 6

A. The “Pith and Substance” of the Consumer Protection Act Provisions ...... 6

B. The Provincial Law Does Not Trench on the “Core” of the Federal Banking Power ...... 8

C. The Provincial Law Does Not “Impair” the Core ...... 14

3. The Preamble to the Bank Act Alone Cannot Trigger the Paramountcy Doctrine 19

PART IV – COSTS ...... 20

PART V – ORDER SOUGHT ...... 20

PART VI – TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...... 22

PART VII – LEGISLATION...... 26

i 1

PART I – OVERVIEW AND STATEMENT OF FACTS

Overview

1. This case concerns the interplay between the provincial power over “Property and Civil Rights in the Province” (s. 92(13) of the Constitution Act, 1867) and the federal power over “Banking” (s. 91(15)). The Attorney General of Ontario intervenes to address the first constitutional question in this proceeding: whether specific provisions of the Quebec Consumer Protection Act regulating credit card transactions and agreements are constitutionally inapplicable to banks. Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, ss. 92(13), 91(15), reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. III, No. 5 [Constitution Act, 1867]. Consumer Protection Act, R.S.Q., c. P-40.1.

2. The Attorney General of Ontario respectfully submits that the Quebec Consumer Protection Act provisions are applicable to the appellant banks. It is submitted that neither step of the two-prong interjurisdictional immunity test is satisfied in this case: (1) the provincial law does not trench on the “core” of the federal banking power; and (2) the provincial law does not “impair” the core. The Superior Court of Quebec was correct in holding that neither step of the test was satisfied, and the Quebec Court of Appeal correctly affirmed that holding.

3. Ontario makes no submissions on whether the specifics of Quebec’s Consumer Protection Act conflict with particular provisions of the federal Bank Act, so as to trigger the paramountcy doctrine. Ontario’s position is that if this Court should hold that specific provisions of the legislation do conflict, then any such conflict should be resolved by the doctrine of paramountcy. As this Court has affirmed in its federalism jurisprudence, paramountcy is the preferable, more flexible constitutional doctrine in cases of overlapping federal and provincial legislation. Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 3 [Book of Authorities of the Attorney General of Ontario [BOA] Tab 11] at para. 77 [Canadian Western Bank]. Law Society of British Columbia v. Mangat, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 113 [BOA Tab 17] at paras. 52, 54 [Mangat].

Statement of Facts

4. The Attorney General of Ontario accepts the facts as stated by the respondent mise-en- cause, the Attorney General of Quebec, and as found by the trial judge. Factum of Respondent Attorney General of Quebec at paras. 4-17. Marcotte c. Banque de Montréal, 2009 QCCS 2764 at paras. 215-318 [Superior Court Judgment].

PART II – QUESTIONS IN ISSUE

5. The following constitutional questions were stated by the Chief Justice of Canada on June 24, 2013:

1. Are ss. 12, 66-72, 83, 91, 92, 126, 127, 219, 228, and 271-272 of the Consumer Protection Act, R.S.Q., c. P-40.1, and ss. 55-61 of the Regulation respecting the application of the Consumer Protection Act, R.R.Q., c. P-40.1, r. 3, constitutionally inapplicable in respect of bank-issued credit cards by reason of the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity? 2. Are ss. 12, 66-72, 83, 91, 92, 126, 127, 219, 228, and 271-272 of the Consumer Protection Act, R.S.Q., c. P-40.1, and ss. 55-61 of the Regulation respecting the application of the Consumer Protection Act, R.R.Q., c. P-40.1, r. 3, constitutionally inoperative in respect of bank-issued credit cards by reason of the doctrine of federal paramountcy?

6. The Attorney General of Ontario supports the factual and legal analysis of the respondent Attorney General of Quebec on the first question. With respect to the second question, Ontario takes no position on whether a conflict triggering the paramountcy doctrine is demonstrated on the facts of this case. However, Ontario supports the submissions of the Attorney General of Quebec regarding the preamble to the Bank Act and will make brief submissions on this point.

PART III – ARGUMENT

1. The Interjurisdictional Immunity Doctrine

7. In Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta, this Court engaged in a comprehensive review of the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine and concluded that “interjurisdictional immunity is a doctrine of limited application”. This Court explained that the dominant tide of constitutional

interpretation “does not favour interjurisdictional immunity” and that, accordingly, “the Court does not favour an intensive reliance on the doctrine”. Canadian Western Bank [BOA Tab 11], supra at paras. 33, 35, 47; see also paras. 34, 36-38, 67, 77-78. Marine Services International Ltd. v. Ryan Estate, 2013 SCC 44 [BOA Tab 18] at para. 50 [Ryan Estate].

8. In this case, the appellant banks are asking this Court to revisit the role of the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine in the context of the same heads of provincial and federal power that were at issue in Canadian Western Bank: the provincial “Property and Civil Rights” power and the federal “Banking” power. While the banks argue that they are applying the framework for analysis articulated in Canadian Western Bank, their argument relies on particularly expansive notions both of the “core” of the federal banking power and of the “impairment” required to invoke the doctrine. Therefore, while the banks argue that their position is consistent with Canadian Western Bank, their approach would significantly broaden the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine. It is therefore worth briefly reviewing the reasons that the doctrine should remain restricted in scope and limited in application. Constitution Act, 1867, supra, s. 91(15), s. 92(13). Canadian Western Bank [BOA Tab 11], supra at para. 38. Chatterjee v. Ontario Attorney General, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 624 [BOA Tab 13] at para. 2: Resort to a federalist concept of proliferating jurisdictional enclaves (or “interjurisdictional immunities”) was discouraged by this Court’s decisions in Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta and British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Lafarge Canada Inc.[citations omitted], and should not now be given a new lease on life.

9. First, constitutional doctrines relating to the division of powers should reflect the overarching principle of federalism. Interjurisdictional immunity runs counter to the dominant interpretation of Canadian federalism – a “federalism that puts greater emphasis on the legitimate interplay between federal and provincial powers”. As this Court explained in Canadian Western Bank, the dominant tide of constitutional interpretation “finds its principled underpinning in the concern that a court should favour, where possible, the ordinary operation of statutes enacted by both levels of government.” Canadian Western Bank [BOA Tab 11], supra at paras. 36, 37 [emphasis in original]; see also para. 24. Ryan Estate [BOA Tab 18], supra at para. 50.

Reference re Securities Act, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 837 [BOA Tab 24] at paras. 55, 57 [Securities Reference]. Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS Community Services Society, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 134 [BOA Tab 9] at paras. 62-63, 70 [PHS]. Quebec (Attorney General) v. Canadian Owners and Pilots Association, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 536 [BOA Tab 19] at para. 44 [COPA]. Superior Court Judgment, supra at para. 567. Banque de Montréal c. Marcotte, 2012 QCCA 1396 at para. 86 [Court of Appeal Judgment].

10. Second, broad application of the doctrine does not sit well with other constitutional doctrines in Canada. The essence of the “pith and substance” doctrine, in particular, is to permit a law to have incidental effects on the other level of government, so long as the dominant feature of the legislation falls within the jurisdiction of the enacting body. Similarly, the “double aspect” doctrine holds that some laws have both a federal and a provincial aspect, and are therefore competent to both Parliament and the provincial legislatures. Canadian Western Bank [BOA Tab 11], supra at paras. 29-31, 34, 42. Superior Court Judgment, supra at paras. 569-570, 602-603.

11. Interjurisdictional immunity also runs counter to the flexibility and restraint of the paramountcy doctrine as the preferred method for resolving the interplay between federal and provincial jurisdiction. The paramountcy doctrine is based on the specifics of enacted legislation by each level of government, and restricted to those situations in which federal and provincial laws conflict. In contrast, interjurisdictional immunity operates irrespective of the nature or extent of actual federal regulation. The doctrine can therefore result in far-reaching and severe effects. By rendering provincial law inapplicable even in the absence of conflict with federal law – and, indeed, even in the face of federal legislative silence – interjurisdictional immunity creates legal uncertainty and, in some cases, can give rise to a legislative or regulatory vacuum. COPA [BOA Tab 19], supra at paras. 62-64. Canadian Western Bank [BOA Tab 11], supra at paras. 44, 77-78, 89. British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Lafarge Canada Inc., [2007] 2 S.C.R. 86 [BOA Tab 8] at paras. 4, 43, 72-73, 76-77 [Lafarge]. PHS [BOA Tab 9], supra at paras. 64, 69. Superior Court Judgment, supra at para. 603. See also: Court of Appeal Judgment, supra at para. 86.

12. Third, unlike all other doctrines of constitutional law in Canada, interjurisdictional immunity sits uneasily with the tradition of the incremental development of the common law and interpretation of the constitution. The doctrine requires the judiciary to engage in what this Court has described as an “abstract” attempt at defining a “core” of a constitutional head of power. The exercise is further abstracted because the “core” of the power is necessarily to be distinguished from the full scope of the power, which is generally what has been elaborated incrementally in the jurisprudence. Canadian Western Bank [BOA Tab 11], supra at para. 43; see also para. 31. Superior Court Judgment, supra at para. 603.

13. Fourth, interjurisdictional immunity has produced “asymmetrical” results in Canadian federalism. In theory, the doctrine is reciprocal, and should serve to protect provincial heads of power and provincial undertakings from federal encroachment as well. However, in practice, the jurisprudential application of the doctrine has primarily favoured federal immunity at the expense of provincial legislation protecting workers, consumers and the environment. Canadian Western Bank [BOA Tab 11], supra at para. 45; see also paras. 34-35. Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction Act, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 457 [BOA Tab 22] at para. 183 [Assisted Reproduction Reference] per LeBel and Deschamps JJ.

14. In short, interjurisdictional immunity undermines the overarching Canadian federal principle that a fair amount of jurisdictional and legislative overlap “is to be expected and accommodated”. As such, this Court has been clear that interjurisdictional immunity should be used sparingly. Rather, courts should favour the application of both provincial and federal legislation whenever possible. General Motors of Canada Ltd. v. City National Leasing Ltd., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 641 [BOA Tab 14] at para. 45.

15. In COPA and Ryan Estate, this Court applied a two-step test for the application of the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity. The first step is to determine whether the provincial law trenches on the protected “core” of a head of power. If it does, the second step is to determine whether the encroachment is sufficiently serious to invoke the doctrine – whether it “impairs” the core. COPA [BOA Tab 19], supra at para. 27. Ryan Estate [BOA Tab 18], supra at paras. 54-56.

Canadian Western Bank [BOA Tab 11], supra at paras. 48, 50.

16. The doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity is generally restricted to “situations already covered by precedent”, and there is little, if any, precedent addressing the core of the banking power. The appellant banks rely on Bank of Montreal v. Hall, but that was a case determined on the basis of the doctrine of paramountcy. The jurisprudence has traditionally refrained from finding that the federal banking power has a core that bars the application of provincial legislation. This is likely due to the intertwined nature of the provincial property and civil rights power and the federal banking power, and the dependency of banks on the body of provincial law that regulates the contractual and other private law aspects of loans and lending. Nonetheless, this Court appeared to acknowledge in Canadian Western Bank that the banking power has a core. Ontario agrees that one can postulate a core of banking, but (as explained below) this core would not include credit card regulation. Canadian Western Bank [BOA Tab 11], supra at para. 77; see also para. 78. Factum of the Appellant Banks at paras. 41-45. Bank of Montreal v. Hall, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 121 [BOA Tab 3] at paras. 59-65 [Hall]. COPA [BOA Tab 19], supra at paras. 26, 58. Ryan Estate [BOA Tab 18], supra at para. 49 PHS [BOA Tab 9], supra at paras. 61, 65.

2. The Interjurisdictional Immunity Doctrine is Not Applicable in this Case

A. The “Pith and Substance” of the Consumer Protection Act Provisions

17. The first step in the process of constitutional interpretation is to identify the “pith and substance” of the law. The identification of the “pith and substance” or dominant feature of the law is critical to the entire constitutional analysis. This Court has held that the process should be informed by the federalism principle, which “accommodates overlapping jurisdiction and encourages intergovernmental cooperation.” Securities Reference [BOA Tab 24], supra at para. 57; see also paras. 55, 93-94. Canadian Western Bank [BOA Tab 11], supra at paras. 21-27 Assisted Reproduction Reference [BOA Tab 22], supra at paras. 184, 189-191 per LeBel and Deschamps JJ.

18. In this case, Quebec’s Consumer Protection Act regulates credit card transactions and agreements. The main provisions that form the basis for the constitutional challenge require the disclosure of credit card fees (s. 12) and provide a statutory “grace period” of 21 days to pay a credit card balance, during which interest is not payable (s. 126-127). Consumer Protection Act, supra, s. 12, 126-127.

19. The loan of money is a matter of contract, and the Consumer Protection Act regulates and makes certain modifications to the law of contract in order to better protect consumers. The “pith and substance” or dominant feature of the legislation is the protection of consumers in their contractual relations with businesses; and the “pith and substance” of these specific provisions is the protection of consumers in their contractual relations involving credit cards. Richard v. Time Inc., [2012] 1 S.C.R. 265 [BOA Tab 25] at paras. 39-41, 160-162 [Richard]. Superior Court Judgment, supra at paras. 576-592.

20. The regulation of credit card contracts, in the interest of consumers, falls within the heart of provincial jurisdiction over “Property and Civil Rights in the Province” (s. 92(13) of the Constitution Act, 1867). The phrase “Property and Civil Rights” originally appeared in article VIII of the Quebec Act, 1774, which maintained the French civil law as the body of private law in Quebec. The phrase is “a compendious description of the entire body of private law which governs the relationships between subject and subject, as opposed to the law which governs the relationships between the subject and the institutions of government.” The regulation of credit card contracts therefore lies within the constitutional authority conferred to the provinces to establish, regulate or modify private law, including the law of contract. P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed. Supp. (loose-leaf) (Toronto: Carswell, 2007) vol. 1 [BOA Tab 34], c. 21 at 2. H. Brun, G. Tremblay & E. Brouillet, Droit constitutionnel, 5e ed. (Cowansville: Editions Yvon Blais, 2008) [BOA Tab 31] at 475: Le paragraphe 92(13) inclut globalement, d’abord et avant tout, ce qui est considéré comme du droit civil au Québec et qui est traditionellement dans le Code civil. Dans les autres provinces, les matières correspondantes qui participent du système common law sont aussi de compétence provinciale. […] La compétence de principe des provinces sur le droit privé s’étend aussi à ce qu’on appelle aujourd’hui la protection du consommateur [emphasis added].

21. Where banks engage in credit card transactions, and where the federal government elects to regulate such transactions that involve a bank, the matter possesses a “double aspect” – an aspect of consumer protection of contractual relations through the provincial Consumer Protection Act, and also a banking aspect through the Bank Act. Canadian Western Bank [BOA Tab 11], supra at para. 30. Superior Court Judgment, supra at para. 591.

22. The provincial property and civil rights power and the federal banking power are by their nature intertwined. Even the most rudimentary forms of banking depend on provincial legislation, particularly on the provincial law that regulates contracts and secured transactions. As this Court emphasized in Bank of Montreal v. Hall, “there can be no hermetic division between banking as a generic activity and the domain covered by property and civil rights”: overlap or “spillover” between federal and provincial laws is “inevitable”.

Hall [BOA Tab 3], supra at para. 40. Canadian Western Bank [BOA Tab 11], supra at paras. 85, 89. See also: Husky Oil Operations Ltd. v. Canada (Minister of National Revenue), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 453 [BOA Tab 16] at para. 30 (in the context of the interplay between federal bankruptcy law and provincial property and civil rights law)

B. The Provincial Law Does Not Trench on the “Core” of the Federal Banking Power

23. The first step of the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine is to consider whether the provincial law trenches on the “core” of the federal banking power. The core is the “minimum content necessary to make the power effective for the purpose for which it was conferred”. Canadian Western Bank [BOA Tab 11], supra at para. 50 [emphasis added]; see also paras. 41, 51, 77. Lafarge [BOA Tab 8], supra at paras. 43, 64. COPA [BOA Tab 19], supra at para. 35. Bell Canada v. Quebec (Commission de la santé et de la sécurité du travail), [1988] 1 S.C.R. 749 [BOA Tab 6] at para. 302. Superior Court Judgment, supra at paras. 612-616, 631-632.

24. The activities of banks, traditional or otherwise, do not define the core of the banking power. It is not the activities involved in banking that have a core, but the banking power. The

focus, therefore, should be on federal legislative authority, and on “the purpose for which it was conferred”, rather than on bank activities. Canadian Western Bank [BOA Tab 11], supra at para. 50. Canadian Pioneer Management Ltd. v. Saskatchewan (Labour Relations Board), [1980] 1 S.C.R. 433 [BOA Tab 10] at 453, 467-468 [Canadian Pioneer]. Superior Court Judgment, supra at paras. 621-629, 715-717.

25. This Court has commented on the problems inherent in defining the banking power by way of functions or activities. These criticisms apply whether considering the full scope of the banking power or the “core”. In Canadian Pioneer, Beetz J. indicated that it might not be possible “to define banking in purely functional terms”. In Canadian Western Bank, Binnie and LeBel JJ. again cautioned that “activities”, unlike federal works, undertakings, things or persons, are particularly prone to “practical problems of application”: While the text and logic of our federal structure justifies the application of interjurisdictional immunity to certain federal “activities”; nevertheless, a broad application of the doctrine to “activities” creates practical problems of application much greater than in the case of works or undertakings, things or persons, whose limits are more readily defined. A broad application also appears inconsistent, as stated, with the flexible federalism that the constitutional doctrines of pith and substance, double aspect and federal paramountcy are designed to promote.

Canadian Pioneer [BOA Tab 10], supra at 461; see also 449-450. Canadian Western Bank [BOA Tab 11], supra at para. 42; see also paras. 43, 65, 85, 89.

26. The appellant banks’ argument in this case ignores this Court’s repeated cautions about the problematic nature of a functional definition of banking. The banks’ basic argument is that the activity of “lending” is part of the core of banking. The banks then argue that as credit card transactions involve “lending”, credit card regulation also forms part of the core. Factum of the Appellant Banks at paras. 41-45, 51.

27. The banks’ only modification to a functional definition of the core of banking is to restrict it to specific activities when they are done by banks. The banks therefore make use of the “institutional test” of banking to limit the benefit of interjurisdictional immunity to the banks alone. However, the critical task of defining the core remains based on banking functions or activities. As such, the banks argue that whereas insurance is not an activity that forms part of the core, “lending” is such an activity. Indeed, the banks go so far as to argue that if the activity

of “lending” by banks is not part of the core, “it is time for the Court to state flat out that contrary to Canadian Western Bank there is no such thing as core banking”. Factum of the Appellant Banks at para. 51; see also paras. 49-50.

28. Ontario respectfully submits that a constitutional analysis that focuses on the purpose for which the power was conferred, rather than on banking activities, reveals that there is a “core” of banking, and also that this core does not include the regulation of credit card transactions and agreements. For the purpose of this appeal, it may not be necessary for this Court to embark upon a delineation of the core of banking (as the Court could hold that whatever the core, credit card regulation clearly lies outside of it). Nonetheless, it may be useful to consider, by way of contrast, what might fall within the core. Canadian Western Bank [BOA Tab 11], supra at paras. 42-43, 50, 65, 85, 89.

29. The core of the banking power would presumably comprise the regulation of the vital parts of banks as federally incorporated undertakings. Federal laws regulating the chartering of banks, capital structure, corporate governance, and labour relations would presumably fall within the core. In addition, it might be reasonable to suppose that the allocation of “Banking” to federal jurisdiction in the Constitution Act, 1867 evinces a policy preference for nationwide branch banking, in contrast to the regionalized banking structures that were prevalent in the United States. Many observers have attributed the Canadian system’s relative success to its structure, one that is very different from that of the U.S. system. The Canadian banking sector has always been composed of very large banks with nationwide branches. This has not only allowed Canadian banks to diversify their loan portfolios across regions; it has also allowed them to transfer funds in order to shore up banks in regions affected by adverse economic shocks. Nationwide branch banking has also allowed Canada’s banks to achieve economies of scale while competing among themselves for business in local markets. C.W. Calomiris & S.H. Haber, “Why Banking Systems Succeed – and Fail: The Politics Behind Financial Institutions”(2013), 92 Foreign Aff 97 [BOA Tab 32] at 108.

Canadian Western Bank [BOA Tab 11], supra at para. 83: The purpose of allocating “Banking, Incorporation of Banks, and the Issue of Paper Money” to Parliament under s. 91(15) of the Constitution Act, 1867 was to create an orderly and uniform financial system, subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction and control in contrast to a regionalized banking system which in “[t]he years preceding the Canadian Confederation [was] characterized in the United States by ‘a chaotic era of wild-cat state banking’” (P. N. McDonald, “The B.N.A. Act and the Near Banks: A Case Study in Federalism” (1972), 10 Alta. L. Rev. 155, at p. 156; B. Laskin, Canadian Constitutional Law: Cases, Text and Notes on Distribution of Legislative Power (3rd ed. 1969), at p. 603).

See also: Reference re: An Act respecting the Taxation of Banks, [1939] A.C. 117 (P.C.) [BOA Tab 21] at paras. 24-26; Alberta (Attorney General) v. Canada (Attorney General), [1947] A.C. 503 (P.C.) [BOA Tab 1] at para. 17 (where the invalidated legislation would have substituted a provincial system of social credit for a national banking system)

30. Furthermore, those critical aspects of federal bank regulation aimed at fostering and protecting the solvency and reliability of the banks as national deposit-taking and lending institutions might lie at the core of the banking power. The core might therefore comprise federal regulation of foreign ownership restrictions, minimum capital and liquidity requirements and prudential lending and investment regulations, as well as the corresponding subjection of banks to a federal regime of reporting, inspection and compliance in relation to these regulations. E.S. Binavince and H.S. Fairley, “Banking and the Constitution: Untested Limits of Federal Jurisdiction” (1986) 65 Can. Bar. Rev. 328 [BOA Tab 29] at 336-337. P. McDonald, “The B.N.A. Act and the Near Banks: A Case Study in Federalism” (1972) 10 Alta. L.R. 155 [BOA Tab 35] at 156, 186.

31. Finally, as Beetz J. noted in Canadian Pioneer, s. 91(15) of the Constitution Act, 1867 refers not simply to “Banking”, but to “Banking, the Incorporation of Banks, and The Issue of Paper Money”. As such, if the issuance of banknotes had not become the monopoly of the Bank of Canada, that also would probably be considered part of the core of banking. Constitution Act, 1867, supra, s. 91(15). Canadian Pioneer [BOA Tab 10], supra at 460: [I]t is significant in this regard that in s. 91.15 of the Constitution, legislative jurisdiction over the issue of paper money is linked with jurisdiction over banking and the incorporation of banks. Binavince & Fairley [BOA Tab 29], supra at 336-337. McDonald [BOA Tab 35], supra at 186.

32. In contrast, the regulation of credit cards does not form part of the “minimum content necessary to make the power effective for the purpose for which it was conferred”. The regulation of credit card transactions and agreements – and specifically, the regulation of fee disclosure or a statutory “grace period” for payment of interest – simply do not relate (and certainly do not relate closely or sufficiently) to bank solvency, bank structure, or other aspects of the regulation of banks that might be considered the “minimum content” necessary to make the power effective at the federal level. Another way of putting it is that the regulation of credit cards is not a matter so distinctly of federal interest that it is “that which makes certain works or undertakings, things […] or persons […] specifically of federal jurisdiction” [emphasis added].

Canadian Western Bank [BOA Tab 11], supra at para. 50; see also paras. 41, 51 Superior Court Judgment, supra at paras. 630-665, 679, 698-699.

33. Indeed, as the “pith and substance” analysis shows, the regulation of credit card transactions and agreements can be regarded as a matter that, in general, is much more closely tied to the distinctly provincial competence to establish, regulate and modify a body of private law. As the Superior Court of Quebec explained, making reference to the specific legislative context of Quebec, consumer protection law is “indissociable” from the history of contract law, and a direct outgrowth or culmination (“l’aboutissement direct”) of contract law. This view is echoed in common law Canada as well. In The Law of Contracts, Professor Waddams describes consumer protection measures – and specifically, legislated disclosure obligations – as measures intended to address the problem of mistake or the problem of unfairness in contract law: Consumer protection merits separate consideration. The growth in the use of standard form printed documents, together with the inequality of bargaining power between the business supplier of goods and services and the customer have placed stress on contract law. The problems are two: First, the customer may not know or understand the contents of the document signed – basically a problem of mistake. Secondly, the contents, whether or not known and understood, may be unfair. […] One type of consumer protection legislation aims at eliminating the mistake – examples are disclosure requirements and requirements relating to the appearance and form of printed documents. The other type of legislation attacks the problem of unfairness, either by giving the court or other tribunal a discretion to assess it, or by prohibiting or positively requiring the use of certain specified terms.

Such legislation is entirely consistent with judicial development of contract law. Clear disclosure of particular terms that are liable to be misunderstood is of concern to a court even where the disclosure is not required by legislation, and in such cases nondisclosure may lead to a judicial remedy.

S.M. Waddams, The Law of Contracts, 6th ed. (Toronto: Canada Law Book, 2010) [BOA Tab 36] at 7-8 [emphasis added]. C. Masse, “Fondement historique de l’évolution du droit québécois de la consommation”, in P-C Lafond, ed., Mélanges Claude Masse : En quête de justice et d’équité (Cowansville: Editions Yvon Blais, 2003) 38 [BOA Tab 33] at 52. Superior Court Judgment, supra at paras. 576-590.

34. The banks’ argument that “lending” forms part of a protected core of banking also ignores the serious problem of parsing which parts of the body of provincial private law would apply and which would not. The act of “lending” requires a body of private law to govern the loans made. Consumer protection legislation, personal property security legislation, mortgage/hypothec legislation, and in Quebec, the Civil Code, are all deeply entwined and integrated with the body

of private law that is at the heart of provincial jurisdiction over “Property and Civil Rights”. The banks would presumably wish to rely, for example, on provisions in the Civil Code that declare that fraud vitiates contract formation, or provisions in provincial legislation that provide rights in respect of secured property. Richard [BOA Tab 25], supra at paras. 39-41. Bank of Montreal v. Demakos, [1996] O.J. No. 4667 (Gen. Div.) [BOA Tab 2] at para. 30: It would seem beyond doubt that the central nerve or core of the credit card is the customer’s written agreement with the bank card issuer. The sparse legislation which exists in Canada at the federal and provincial level is largely concerned with creating narrow but specific legislative controls on this contract. Civil Code of Québec, arts. 1401, 1385. Superior Court Judgment, supra at paras. 650-652, 661-664.

35. The banks’ argument, if accepted, inevitably leads to either: (i) a path haunted by the spectre of a “legal vacuum”, in which huge portions of provincial property and civil rights law governing bank activities become inapplicable to banks; or (ii) a quagmire requiring courts to conceptually distinguish provisions that regulate, for example, disclosure of fees in a contract from other provincial rules governing “lending” (such as those relating to how a contract is formed, its express and implied terms, the circumstances in which the contract is vitiated, and so forth). Canadian Western Bank [BOA Tab 11], supra at para. 44. PHS, supra at paras. 64, 69.

36. While “lending”, as a business activity, is unquestionably a significant function of banks, this is simply not the test to determine the core of banking. The regulation of credit card transactions does not fall within the minimum content that makes effective the specifically federal purpose for which the banking power was conferred on the federal government. It is possible that certain limited aspects of “lending” – such as lending restrictions intended to ensure the solvency of the institutions themselves (e.g., requirements for collateral or security in particular circumstances) could form part of an exclusive core. However, the provincial law governing consumer credit card transactions (and certainly the rules involving disclosure and a statutory grace period) is made in the interests of protecting consumers and does not relate to the purpose for which the federal banking power was conferred. Furthermore, it is integrally related to the province’s historic role in establishing, regulating and modifying private law.

Canadian Western Bank [BOA Tab 11], supra at paras. 83-85.

37. The Superior Court of Quebec and Quebec Court of Appeal decisions place significant emphasis on the history of credit cards in concluding that “credit cards are far removed from banking”. Ontario submits that while the banks’ entry into the credit card market relatively late within the history of credit cards is not in itself determinative of whether credit cards form part of the “core” of banking, the history is entirely reflective of the fact that the “minimum content” necessary to effect the purpose for which the banking power was conferred does not include the regulation of credit card transactions. Superior Court Judgment, supra at paras. 692-693. Court of Appeal Judgment, supra at paras. 85-87.

III. The Provincial Law Does Not “Impair” the Core of the Banking Power

38. It is Ontario’s position that the core of banking is not implicated in this case. However, even if this Court were to hold that the regulation of credit card contracts does encroach on the core of the banking power, then the Consumer Protection Act does not “impair” this core. As this Court stated in COPA, “it is not enough that [the impugned provincial legislation] strike at the heart of a federal competency”; the interference must also be sufficiently serious for interjurisdictional immunity to be successfully invoked. COPA [BOA Tab 19], supra at para. 42.

39. A provincial law must “impair” the core of a federal power for interjurisdictional immunity to apply. In Canadian Western Bank, LeBel and Binnie JJ. explained that “[i]t is when the adverse impact of a law adopted by one level of government increases in severity from ‘affecting’ to ‘impairing’ (without necessarily ‘sterilizing’ or ‘paralyzing’) that the ‘core’ competence of the other level of government … is placed in jeopardy, and not before.” As such, a court must consider whether the provincial law “not only affects the core federal power, but does so in a way that seriously or significantly trammels the federal power”. This high threshold ensures that interjurisdictional immunity is restricted to appropriate circumstances and does not exceed its bounds to frustrate co-operative, flexible federalism. Canadian Western Bank [BOA Tab 11], supra at para. 48. COPA [BOA Tab 19], supra at para. 45; see also paras. 42-44.

Ryan Estate [BOA Tab 18], supra at paras. 54, 56, 60, 64.

40. Even if this Court were to accept the argument of the appellant banks that the protected “core” of banking includes bank “lending”, bank “lending” is simply not impaired by the Consumer Protection Act provisions. In particular, the requirement that banks disclose currency conversion and other fees does not impair “lending”. Banks are simply required to disclose certain information. This may affect the way banks market credit cards to consumers, but it does not impair the act of lending. Similarly, the 21 day statutory grace period does not “seriously or significantly trammel” any (hypothetical) core of bank “lending”. This is particularly so given that the grace period falls within the industry standard of 18 to 26 days, provided by banks voluntarily in their credit card agreements. Superior Court Judgment, supra at paras. 757-760, 875.

41. Furthermore, the profitability of bank credit cards is an insufficient basis for a finding of “impairment”. In Bank of Toronto v. Lambe, the Privy Council held that taxation of banks under provincial law is constitutionally permissible – although taxation clearly affects the profits of banks. More recently, this Court recognized in Canadian Western Bank that provincial legislation relating to insurance, which could have economic consequences for banks, was also constitutionally sound: Of course, profits from the promotion of insurance support the bottom line of banks just as advertising dollars support broadcasters, yet the Court has found a provincial law regulating advertising applicable to a company seeking to advertise on a federal broadcast undertaking in Attorney-General of Quebec v. Kellogg’s Co. of Canada, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 211. Canadian Western Bank [BOA Tab 11], supra at para. 58; see also para. 81. Bank of Toronto v. Lambe (1887), 12 App. Cas. 575 (P.C.) [BOA Tab 5] at paras. 15-16. Superior Court Judgment, supra at paras. 776-782, 818-819.

42. In addition, contrary to the submissions of the appellant banks, the considerations referred to by this Court in Ryan Estate also demonstrate that the CPA provisions do not impair the core of banking. In Ryan Estate, LeBel and Karakatsanis JJ. concluded that the provincial law at issue did not impair the federal core competence, by considering: (i) “the breadth of the federal power”; (ii) the “impact on the uniformity of [federal] law”; and (iii) “the historical application” of provincial law in the relevant context. These considerations were not presented as

16 a test or a list of factors. Nonetheless, these considerations further support the conclusion that there is no impairment in the present case. Factum of the Appellant Banks at paras. 63-68. Ryan Estate [BOA Tab 18], supra at para. 64; see also paras. 61-63.

43. First, “the breadth of the federal power” over banking is extensive (as was the navigation and shipping power at issue in Ryan Estate). For over a century, it has been recognized that the full scope of the banking power (as distinguished from the “core”) has a “broad sweep”. Ryan Estate [BOA Tab 18], supra at para. 61. Hall [BOA Tab 3], supra at para. 15. Canadian Western Bank [BOA Tab 11], supra at para. 85.

44. The banking power is much broader than the federal power over aeronautics considered in COPA, the limits of which are more easily identified. Federal powers concerning works, undertakings, things and people are more readily defined than federal powers with a wider scope, such as banking. When a sweeping federal power, such as banking, is at issue, the Court will exercise much more caution in invoking interjurisdictional immunity. PHS [BOA Tab 9], supra at para. 60: The doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity has been applied to circumscribed areas of activity referred to in the cases as undertakings. These include aviation, ports, interprovincial rail and federal communications works. The doctrine has also been applied to federal things like Aboriginal land, and federally regulated persons such as Aboriginal peoples. It has never been applied to a broad and amorphous area of jurisdiction [emphasis added; references omitted]. COPA [BOA Tab 19], supra at paras. 33-34. Canadian Western Bank [BOA Tab 11], supra at paras. 41-42. Superior Court Judgment, supra at para. 603.

45. Second, with respect to the “impact on the uniformity of Canadian [banking] law”, the principle of federalism requires banks and other entities to adapt to variation in provincial regulation where such variation does not seriously or significantly trammel the core of the federal power. Binnie and LeBel JJ. observed in Canadian Western Bank that federalism allows courts to strike a balance between “reconcil[ing] unity with diversity”. The application of interjurisdictional immunity should be informed by the federalism principle, which facilitates the legitimate diversity of provincial law and promotes co-operation between Parliament and the

17 provincial legislatures. Federal government, as described by K.C. Wheare, accommodates the desire of communities to both unite and to remain separate. Ryan Estate [BOA Tab 18], supra at para. 64; see also para. 62. Canadian Western Bank [BOA Tab 11], supra at para. 22; see also paras. 21, 23-24, 36-37, 42. Securities Reference [BOA TAB 24], supra at para. 73. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 [BOA Tab 23] at paras. 57-58. K.C. Wheare, Federal Government, 4th ed. (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1963) [BOA Tab 37] at 36. Superior Court Judgment, supra at paras. 554-557, 812, 821-826.

46. In addition, the evidence in this case is that the appellant banks have adapted to provincial variation in consumer protection legislation. Banks modify their credit card contracts to take into account differences in provincial law with respect to interest rate calculation, grace period, prescription period of remedies, the cost of balance protection insurance and language requirements. This further supports the position that the core of the banking power has not been seriously or significantly trammelled. Superior Court Judgment, supra at paras. 774-775, 798-812.

47. Under these circumstances, promoting uniformity within each province is the most important concern. In Canadian Western Bank, this Court opined that “the concern for uniformity favours the provincial law so that all promoters of insurance within the province are subject to uniform standards of marketing behaviour and fair practices.” This statement applies with equal force in the present context. The argument of the banks would instead lead to a lack of uniformity, and regulatory disharmony for consumers and issuers of credit cards. By invoking interjurisdictional immunity, the banks claim a special regime of uniformity available only to them. The banks would enjoy a privileged exemption from provincial regulation, leaving competing sellers to contend with a different regime, and consumers subjected to a patchwork of protection depending on whether their credit card issuers are banks. Canadian Western Bank [BOA Tab 11], supra at para. 59; see also para. 108. Superior Court Judgment, supra at paras. 823-825.

48. Third, with respect to “the historical application” of provincial law, the jurisprudence shows that consumer protection law has been applied to banks. Consumers and banks alike rely

on provincial consumer protection provisions in a variety of situations where the contractual rights of the consumer are at issue. Ryan Estate [BOA Tab 18], supra at para. 64; see also para. 63. Royal Bank of Canada v. Klassen, [2013] B.C.J. No. 725 [BOA Tab 27] (S.C.) [Klassen]. Royal Bank of Canada v. Lau [2008] O.J. No. 5007 [BOA Tab 28] (S.C.J.) [Lau]. Bank of Nova Scotia v. Siver, [2001] O.J. No. 2021 (S.C.J.) [BOA Tab 4] [Siver]. Boissonneault c. Banque de Montréal, [1988] R.J.Q. 2622 (C.A.) (Q.L.) [BOA Tab 7] [Boissonneault]. See also: Chartrand v. CIBC and Hirst Enterprises Ltd (1982), 17 Man.R. (2d) 57 (Q.B.) [BOA Tab 12]; Gravino c. Banque de Montréal, J.E. 99-724 (Que. S.C.) [BOA Tab 15]. Superior Court Judgment, supra at paras. 761-773.

49. In Boissoneault, LeBel J.A. (as he then was) referred to provisions of the Quebec Consumer Protection Act in a claim against a bank. While constitutional issues were not raised in that case, and while the plaintiff was unable to make out his claim against the bank on the facts of that case, the court appeared to accept that the act would apply to a bank. Similar decisions have been rendered in common law jurisdictions. In Klassen, the British Columbia Supreme Court applied to a bank the section of the British Columbia Business Practices and Consumer Protection Act governing the disclosure of the cost of consumer credit and credit cards. In Lau, a bank succeeded in having the Ontario Superior Court apply Ontario’s Consumer Protection Act to its transaction with a consumer, requiring the consumer to pay debts arising from the use of her credit card. In Siver, a bank again successfully invoked the Ontario Consumer Protection Act, in order to repossess and sell an automobile. Boissoneault [BOA Tab 7], supra at 4-8. Klassen [BOA Tab 27], supra at paras. 10-16, 19. Lau [BOA Tab 28], supra at paras. 11-12. Siver [BOA Tab 4], supra at paras. 1-6. Business Practices and Consumer Protection Act, S.B.C. 2004, c. 2, s. 97(4). Consumer Protection Act, S.O. 2002, c. 30, s. 68.

50. The banks’ assertion that “there are no reported instances of provincial regulators taking enforcement action involving bank-issued credit cards” is beside the point. Consumer protection law is primarily enforced by individual consumers enforcing their rights. The effectiveness of state regulators is limited by budgetary constraints. Indeed, this case is a perfect illustration of the way in which consumers themselves can make use of and enforce consumer protection law.

Factum of the Appellant Banks at para. 68. Superior Court Judgment, supra at paras. 3-14. J. Ziegel, “Class Actions to Remedy Mass Consumer Wrongs: Repugnant Solution or Controllable Genie? The Canadian Experience” (2008-09), 27 Penn. St. Int. L.R. 879 [BOA Tab 38] at 879-880: “Various government agencies – federal, provincial, municipal – may have the power to intervene but, for the most part, their resources, too, are very limited and rarely extend to ensuring mass relief for consumers adversely affected by wrongful conduct.” G. Borrie, The Development of Consumer Law and Policy – Bold Spirits and Timorous Souls, (London: Stevens & Sons, 1984) [BOA Tab 30] at 36: “To some extent the new [consumer protection] laws are self-enforcing – they give the consumer a better basis for asserting his claim for redress.”

3. The Preamble to the Bank Act Alone Cannot Trigger the Paramountcy Doctrine

51. The Attorney General of Ontario asserts that any conflict should be resolved using the “supple” doctrine of paramountcy rather than interjurisdictional immunity. Although Ontario takes no position on whether a conflict is demonstrated on the facts of this case, Ontario supports the submissions of the Attorney General of Quebec regarding the preamble to the Bank Act. Mangat [BOA Tab 17], supra at para. 54; see also para. 52. Canadian Western Bank [BOA Tab 11], supra at para. 77. Factum of Respondent Attorney General of Quebec at paras. 74-79.

52. In this case, the preamble to the Bank Act is worded generally and applies to a complex statute regulating a wide range of banking issues. The preamble does not refer to the regulation of credit card contracts. Its wording does not clearly or precisely evince an intention for Bank Act provisions to supersede provincial law. The wording of the preamble (which refers to the desirability of “clear, comprehensive, exclusive, national standards”) can be contrasted with the wording employed in provisions of the federal Carriage of Air Act and Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act. The latter statutes expressly assert that specific provisions of federal law shall be “in substitution for […] any law in force in Canada” (Carriage of Air Act), or shall apply “despite anything in federal or provincial law” or “notwithstanding anything in federal or provincial law” (Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act). Nor is there any authority for rendering a provincial law inoperative on the basis of the preamble to an enactment, rather than a legislative provision. Carriage by Air Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-26, s. 2(5):

Any liability imposed by Article 17 of Schedule I or Article 17 of Schedule VI on a carrier in respect of the death of a passenger shall be in substitution for any liability of the carrier in respect of the death of that passenger under any law in force in Canada, and the provisions set out in Schedule II shall have effect with respect to the persons by whom and for whose benefit the liability so imposed is enforceable and with respect to the manner in which it may be enforced.

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, ss. 14.06(1.2),(2),(4),(7); s. 65.13(1), 67(2), 81.1(6), 81.2(1). Rothmans, Benson & Hedges Inc. v. Saskatchewan, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 188 [BOA Tab 26] at para. 21. Mangat [BOA Tab 17], supra at para. 55. Superior Court Judgment, supra at paras. 915-921, 926.

53. Finally, even if a federal provision had been formulated so that it expressed a clear intention for Bank Act provisions to supersede provincial law, the provincial law must also, in fact, frustrate the purpose of the federal law. A purpose provision in a federal enactment is relevant to this Court’s assessment of whether the federal legislative purpose is frustrated by a provision of provincial law. However, Ontario respectfully submits that the expression of purpose or intention in a federal enactment is not, in and of itself, determinative. As with the assessment of the “pith and substance” of legislation, the judiciary ultimately determines the purpose of federal legislation. As such, if a provincial law is consistent with or advances the purpose of the federal law, as determined by this Honourable Court, then there can be no frustration of federal purpose. COPA [BOA Tab 19], supra at paras. 62, 66-70. Canadian Western Bank [BOA Tab 11], supra at paras. 4, 73-75, 103. Ryan Estate [BOA Tab 18], supra at paras. 69, 84. R. v. Morgentaler, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 463 [BOA Tab 20] at paras. 47-48. Hogg [BOA Tab 34], supra at 15-14. Factum of the Respondent Attorney General of Quebec at paras. 74-79.

PART IV – COSTS

54. The Attorney General of Ontario makes no submissions as to costs.

PART V – ORDER SOUGHT

55. Ontario requests that the first constitutional question be answered in the negative.

ALL OF WHICH IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED

January 23, 2014

______Janet Minor

______Robert Donato

Counsel for the Attorney General of Ontario

PART VI – TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Paragraph Reference in Factum

Alberta (Attorney General) v. Canada (Attorney General), [1947] A.C. 29 503 (P.C.)

Bank of Montreal v. Demakos, [1996] O.J. No. 4667 (Gen. Div.) 34

Bank of Montreal v. Hall, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 121 16, 22, 43

Bank of Nova Scotia v. Siver, [2001] O.J. No. 2021 (S.C.J.) 48, 49

Bank of Toronto v. Lambe (1887), 12 App. Cas. 575 (P.C.) 41

Bell Canada v. Quebec (Commission de la santé et de la 23 sécurité du travail), [1988] 1 S.C.R. 749

Boissonneault c. Banque de Montréal, [1988] R.J.Q. 2622 (C.A.) 48, 49

British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Lafarge Canada Inc., [2007] 2 11, 23 S.C.R. 86

Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS Community Services Society, 9, 11, 16, 35, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 134 44

Canadian Pioneer Management Ltd. v. Saskatchewan (Labour 24, 25, 31 Relations Board), [1980] 1 S.C.R. 433

Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 3 3, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 28, 29, 32, 35, 36, 39, 41, 43, 44, 45, 47, 51, 53

Chartrand v. CIBC and Hirst Enterprises Limited (1982), 17 48 Man.R. (2d) 57 (Q.B.)

Chatterjee v. Ontario Attorney General, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 624 8

General Motors of Canada Ltd. v. City National Leasing Ltd., 14 [1989] 1 S.C.R. 641

Gravino c. Banque de Montréal, J.E. 99-724 (Que. S.C.) 48

Husky Oil Operations Ltd. v. Canada (Minister of National 22 Revenue), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 453

Law Society of British Columbia v. Mangat, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 113 3, 51, 52

Marine Services International Ltd. v. Ryan Estate, 2013 SCC 44 7, 9, 15, 16, 39, 42, 43, 45, 48, 53

Quebec (Attorney General) v. Canadian Owners and Pilots 9, 11, 15, 16, Association, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 536 23, 38, 39, 44, 53

R. v. Morgentaler, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 463 53

Reference re: An Act respecting the Taxation of Banks, [1939] 29 A.C. 117 (P.C.)

Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction Act, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 13, 17 457

Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 45

Reference re Securities Act, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 837 9, 17, 45

Richard v. Time Inc., [2012] 1 S.C.R. 265 19, 34

Rothmans, Benson & Hedges Inc. v. Saskatchewan, [2005] 1 52 S.C.R. 188.

Royal Bank of Canada v. Klassen, [2013] B.C.J. No. 725 (S.C.) 48, 49

Royal Bank of Canada v. Lau [2008] O.J. No. 5007 (S.C.J.) 48, 49

Articles and Texts

E.S. Binavince and H.S. Fairley, “Banking and the Constitution: 30, 31 Untested Limits of Federal Jurisdiction” (1986) 65 Can. Bar. Rev. 328 at 336-337.

G. Borrie, The Development of Consumer Law and Policy – Bold 50 Spirits and Timorous Souls (London: Stevens & Sons, 1984).

H. Brun, G. Tremblay & E. Brouillet, Droit constitutionnel, 5e 20 ed. (Cowansville: Editions Yvon Blais, 2008)

C.W. Calomiris & S.H. Haber, “Why Banking Systems Succeed 29 – and Fail: The Politics Behind Financial Institutions”(2013), 92 Foreign Aff 97

C. Masse, “Fondement historique de l’évolution du droit 33 québécois de la consommation”, in P-C Lafond, ed., Mélanges Claude Masse : En quête de justice et d’équité (Cowansville: Editions Yvon Blais, 2003).

th P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5 ed. Supp. (loose- 20, 53 leaf) (Toronto: Carswell, 2007)

P. McDonald, “The B.N.A. Act and the Near Banks: A Case 30, 31 Study in Federalism” (1972) 10 Alta. L.R. 155 at 156, 186, 217.

S.M. Waddams, The Law of Contracts, 6th ed. (Toronto: Canada 33 Law Book, 2010).

K.C. Wheare, Federal Government, 4th ed. (Toronto: Oxford 45 University Press, 1963)

J. Ziegel, “Class Actions to Remedy Mass Consumer Wrongs: 50 Repugnant Solution or Controllable Genie? The Canadian Experience” (2008-2009), 27 Penn. St. Int. L.R. 879

PART VII – LEGISLATION

Legislation Paragraph Reference in Factum

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, ss. 52 14.06(1.2),(2),(4),(7); s. 65.13(1), 67(2), 81.1(6), 81.2(1)

Business Practices and Consumer Protection Act, S.B.C. 2004, c. 2, s. 97. 49

Carriage by Air Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-26, s. 2(5). 52

Civil Code of Québec, 1385, 1401. 34

Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, ss. 91(15), 92(13), 1, 8, 31 reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. III, No. 5.

Consumer Protection Act, R.S.Q., c. P-40.1, s. 12, 126-127. 1, 18

Consumer Protection Act, S.O. 2002, c. 30, s. 68. 49

BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY ACT R.S.C., 1985, c. B-3

PART I ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICIALS

[…]

No personal liability in respect of matters before appointment 14.06 (1.2) Despite anything in federal or provincial law, if a trustee, in that position, carries on the business of a debtor or continues the employment of a debtor’s employees, the trustee is not by reason of that fact personally liable in respect of a liability, including one as a successor employer,

(a) that is in respect of the employees or former employees of the debtor or a predecessor of the debtor or in respect of a pension plan for the benefit of those employees; and

(b) that exists before the trustee is appointed or that is calculated by reference to a period before the appointment. […]

Liability in respect of environmental matters (2) Notwithstanding anything in any federal or provincial law, a trustee is not personally liable in that position for any environmental condition that arose or environmental damage that occurred

(a) before the trustee’s appointment; or

(b) after the trustee’s appointment unless it is established that the condition arose or the damage occurred as a result of the trustee’s gross negligence or wilful misconduct or, in the Province of Quebec, the trustee’s gross or intentional fault. […]

Non-liability re certain orders

(4) Notwithstanding anything in any federal or provincial law but subject to subsection (2), where an order is made which has the effect of requiring a trustee to remedy any environmental condition or environmental damage affecting property involved in a bankruptcy, proposal or receivership, the trustee is not personally liable for failure to comply with the order, and is not personally liable for any costs that are or would be incurred by any person in carrying out the terms of the order,

(a) if, within such time as is specified in the order, within ten days after the order is made if no time is so specified, within ten days after the appointment of the trustee, if the order is in effect when the trustee is appointed, or during the period of the stay referred to in paragraph (b), the trustee (i) complies with the order, or (ii) on notice to the person who issued the order, abandons, disposes of or otherwise releases any interest in any real property, or any right in any immovable, affected by the condition or damage; (b) during the period of a stay of the order granted, on application made within the time specified in the order referred to in paragraph (a), within ten days after the order is made or within ten days after the appointment of the trustee, if the order is in effect when the trustee is appointed, by (i) the court or body having jurisdiction under the law pursuant to which the order was made to enable the trustee to contest the order, or (ii) the court having jurisdiction in bankruptcy for the purposes of assessing the economic viability of complying with the order; or (c) if the trustee had, before the order was made, abandoned or renounced or been divested of any interest in any real property, or any right in any immovable, affected by the condition or damage.

[…]

Priority of claims

(7) Any claim by Her Majesty in right of Canada or a province against the debtor in a bankruptcy, proposal or receivership for costs of remedying any environmental condition or environmental damage affecting real property or an immovable of the debtor is secured by security on the real property or immovable affected by the environmental condition or environmental damage and on any other real property or immovable of the debtor that is contiguous with that real property or immovable and that is related to the activity that caused the environmental condition or environmental damage, and the security

(a) is enforceable in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction in which the real property or immovable is located, in the same way as a mortgage, hypothec or other security on real property or immovables; and

(b) ranks above any other claim, right, charge or security against the property, despite any other provision of this Act or anything in any other federal or provincial law.

[…]

PART III PROPOSALS

DIVISION I GENERAL SCHEME FOR PROPOSALS

[...]

Restriction on disposition of assets

65.13 (1) An insolvent person in respect of whom a notice of intention is filed under section 50.4 or a proposal is filed under subsection 62(1) may not sell or otherwise dispose of assets outside the ordinary course of business unless authorized to do so by a court. Despite any requirement for shareholder approval, including one under federal or provincial law, the court may authorize the sale or disposition even if shareholder approval was not obtained.

[…]

PART IV PROPERTY OF THE BANKRUPT

[…]

Deemed trusts

67. (2) Subject to subsection (3), notwithstanding any provision in federal or provincial legislation that has the effect of deeming property to be held in trust for Her Majesty, property of a bankrupt shall not be regarded as held in trust for Her Majesty for the purpose of paragraph (1)(a) unless it would be so regarded in the absence of that statutory provision.

[…]

Ranks above other claims

81.1 (6) Notwithstanding any other federal or provincial Act or law, a supplier’s right to repossess goods pursuant to this section ranks above every other claim or right against the purchaser in respect of those goods, other than the right of a bona fide subsequent purchaser of the goods for value without notice that the supplier had demanded repossession of the goods.

[…]

Special right for farmers, fishermen and aquaculturists 81.2 (1) Where (a) a farmer has sold and delivered products of agriculture, a fisherman has sold and delivered products of the sea, lakes and rivers, or an aquaculturist has sold

and delivered products of aquaculture, to another person (in this section referred to as the “purchaser”) for use in relation to the purchaser’s business,

(b) the products were delivered to the purchaser within the fifteen day period preceding

(i) the day on which the purchaser became bankrupt, or

(ii) the first day on which there was a receiver, within the meaning of subsection 243(2), in relation to the purchaser,

(c) as of the day referred to in subparagraph (b)(i) or (ii), the farmer, fisherman or aquaculturist has not been fully paid for the products, and

(d) the farmer, fisherman or aquaculturist files a proof of claim in the prescribed form in respect of the unpaid amount with the trustee or receiver, as the case may be, within thirty days after the day referred to in subparagraph (b)(i) or (ii),

the claim of the farmer, fisherman or aquaculturist for the unpaid amount in respect of the products is secured by security on all the inventory of or held by the purchaser as of the day referred to in subparagraph (b)(i) or (ii), and the security ranks above every other claim, right, charge or security against that inventory, regardless of when that other claim, right, charge or security arose, except a supplier’s right, under section 81.1, to repossess goods, despite any other federal or provincial Act or law; and if the trustee or receiver, as the case may be, takes possession or in any way disposes of inventory covered by the security, the trustee or receiver is liable for the claim of the farmer, fisherman or aquaculturist to the extent of the net amount realized on the disposition of that inventory, after deducting the cost of realization, and is subrogated in and to all rights of the farmer, fisherman or aquaculturist to the extent of the amounts paid to them by the trustee or receiver.

PARTIE I FONCTIONNAIRES ADMINISTRATIFS SURINTENDANT

[…]

I mmunité 14.06 (1.2) Par dérogation au droit fédéral et provincial, le syndic qui, en cette qualité, continue l’ exploitation de l’ entreprise du débiteur ou l ui succède comme empl oyeur est dégagé de toute responsabilité personnelle découlant de quelque obligation du débiteur, notamment à titre d’ employeur successeur, si celle-ci, à la fois :

a) l’ oblige envers des employés ou anciens employés du débiteur, ou de l ’ un de ses prédécesseurs, ou découle d’ un régime de pension pour le bénéfice de ces employés; b) exi stai t avant sa nomi nati on ou est cal cul ée sur l a base d’ une péri ode l a précédant.

[…]

Responsabilité en matière d’environnement (2) Par dérogation au droit fédéral et provincial, le syndic est, ès qualités, dégagé de toute responsabilité personnelle découlant de tout fait ou dommage lié à l’ environnement survenu avant ou après sa nomination, sauf celui causé par sa négligence grave ou son inconduite dél ibérée ou, dans la province de Québec, par sa faute lourde ou intentionnelle.

[…]

I mmunité — ordonnances (4) Par dérogation au droit fédéral et provincial, mais sous réserve du paragraphe (2), le syndic est, ès qual i tés, dégagé de toute responsabi l i té personnelle découlant du non-respect de toute ordonnance de réparation de tout fait ou dommage lié à l’ environnement et touchant un bien visé par une faillite, une proposition ou une mise sous séquestre administrée par un séquestre, et de toute responsabilité personnel l e rel ati vement aux f rai s engagés par toute personne exécutant l’ ordonnance : a) si, dans les dix jours suivant l’ ordonnance ou dans le délai fixé par celle-ci, dans les dix jours suivant sa nomination si l’ ordonnance est alors en vigueur ou pendant l a durée de l a suspensi on vi sée à l ’ al i néa b) : (i) il s’ y conforme, (ii) il abandonne, après avis à la personne ayant rendu l’ ordonnance, tout droit sur l ’ i mmeubl e en cause ou tout i ntérêt sur l e bi en réel en cause, en di spose ou s’ en dessai si t; b) pendant la durée de la suspension de l’ ordonnance qui est accordée, sur demande présentée dans l es di x j ours sui vant l ’ ordonnance vi sée à l ’ al i néa a) ou dans l e dél ai f i xé par cel l e-ci, ou dans les dix jours suivant sa nomination si l’ ordonnance est alors en vigueur : (i) soit par le tribunal ou l’ autorité qui a compétence relativement à l’ ordonnance, en vue de permettre au syndi c de l a contester, (ii) soi t par l e tri bunal qui a compétence en mati ère de f ai l l i te, en vue d’ éval uer l es conséquences économiques du respect de l’ ordonnance; c) si, avant que l’ ordonnance ne soit rendue, il avait abandonné tout droit sur l’ immeuble en cause ou tout intérêt sur le bien réel en cause ou y avait renoncé, ou s’ en était dessaisi.

[…]

Pr ior ité des r éclamations (7) En cas de faillite, de proposition ou de mise sous séquestre administrée par un séquestre, toute réclamation de Sa Majesté du chef du Canada ou d’ une province contre le débiteur pour les frais de réparation du fait ou dommage lié à l’ environnement et touchant un de ses immeubles ou biens réels est garantie par une sûreté sur le bien en cause et sur ceux qui sont contigus à celui où l e dommage est survenu et qui sont l i és à l ’ acti vi té ayant causé l e f ai t ou l e dommage; l a sûreté peut être exécutée sel on l e droi t du lieu où est situé le bien comme s’ il s’ agissait d’ une hypothèque ou autre garantie sur celui-ci et, par dérogation aux autres dispositions de la présente loi et à toute règle de droit fédéral et provincial, a priorité sur tout autre droit, charge, sûreté ou récl amati on vi sant l e bi en.

[…]

PARTIE III PROPOSITIONS CONCORDATAIRES

SECT I ON I DISPOSITIONS D’APPLICATION GÉNÉRALE

[…]

Restriction à la disposition d’actifs 65.13 (1) I l est i nterdi t à l a personne i nsol vabl e à l ’ égard de l aquel l e a été déposé un avi s d’ intention aux termes de l’ article 50.4 ou une proposition aux termes du paragraphe 62(1) de disposer, notamment par vente, d’ actifs hors du cours ordinaire de ses affaires sans l’ autorisation du tribunal. Le tribunal peut accorder l’ autorisation sans qu’ il soit nécessaire d’ obtenir l ’ acqui escement des acti onnai res, et ce mal gré toute exi gence à cet ef f et, notamment en vertu d’ une règle de droit fédérale ou provinciale.

[…] PARTIE IV BI ENS DU FAILLI […]

Fiducies pr ésumées 67 (2) Sous réserve du paragraphe (3) et par dérogation à toute disposition législative fédérale ou provinciale ayant pour effet d’ assimiler certains biens à des biens détenus en fiducie pour Sa Majesté, aucun des biens du failli ne peut, pour l’ application de l’ alinéa (1)a), être consi déré comme détenu en fiducie pour Sa Majesté si, en l’ absence de la disposition législative en questi on, i l ne l e serai t pas. […]

Rang

81.1 (6) Par dérogation à toute autre loi fédérale, à toute loi provinciale ou à toute règle de droit, le droit de reprise de possession a préséance sur tout autre droit ou réclamation qu’ on pourrait f ai re val oi r contre l ’ acheteur en rapport avec l es marchandi ses en cause, à l ’ excepti on du droi t d’ un acheteur qui a subséquemment acquis les biens de bonne foi et pour valeur, ignorant que le fournisseur avait demandé d’ en reprendre possession. […]

Cas des agriculteurs, des pêcheurs et des aquiculteurs 81.2 (1) Par dérogation à toute autre loi ou règle de droit fédérale ou provinciale, la réclamation de l’ agriculteur, du pêcheur ou de l’ aquiculteur qui a vendu et livré à un acheteur des produits agricoles, aquatiques ou aquicoles destinés à être utilisés dans le cadre des affaires de cel ui -ci est garanti e, à compter de l a date vi sée aux sous-al i néas a)(i) ou (ii), par une sûreté portant sur la totalité du stock appartenant à l’ acheteur ou détenu par lui à la même date; la sûreté a priorité sur tout autre droit, sûreté, charge ou réclamation — peu i mporte sa date de nai ssance — rel ati f au stock de l ’ acheteur, sauf sur l e droi t du fournisseur à la reprise de possession de marchandi ses aux termes de l ’ arti cl e 81.1; l a garanti e reconnue par l e présent arti cl e n’ est val abl e que si , à l a f oi s : a) les produits en question ont été livrés à l’ acheteur dans les quinze jours précédant : (i) soi t l a date à l aquel l e l ’ acheteur est devenu un f ai l l i , (ii) soi t l a date à l aquel l e une personne a commencé à agi r, à l ’ égard de l ’ acheteur, à ti tre de séquestre au sens du paragraphe 243(2); b) les produits en question n’ ont pas, à la date visée aux sous-al i néas a)(i) ou (ii), été payés au complet; c) l’ agriculteur, le pêcheur ou l’ aquiculteur a déposé une preuve de réclamation en la forme prescrite pour le solde impayé auprès du syndic ou du séquestre dans les trente jours suivant l a date vi sée aux sous-al i néas a)(i) ou (ii). Le syndic ou le séquestre qui prend possession ou dispose des stocks grevés par la sûreté est responsable de la réclamation de l’ agriculteur, du pêcheur ou de l’ aquiculteur jusqu’ à concurrence du produit net de la réalisation, déducti on f ai te des f rai s de réal i sati on, et est subrogé dans tous leurs droits jusqu’ à concurrence des sommes ainsi payées.

BUSINESS PRACTICES AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT

S.B.C. 2004, CHAPTER 2

Division 8 — Credit Cards […] Applications for credit cards 97 (1) A credit card issuer who has entered into, or who is negotiating to enter into, a credit agreement for a credit card must ensure that the application form for that credit card discloses the following information or complies with subsection (2): (a) if the interest rate payable under the credit agreement is a fixed rate of interest, that interest rate expressed as an annual interest rate; (b) if the interest rate payable under the credit agreement is a floating rate, the index rate and the manner by which that rate is to be modified to obtain the interest rate payable under the credit agreement; (c) the grace period, if any; (d) the nature and amount of any non-interest finance charges that are payable or may become payable by the cardholder; (e) the date as of which the information referred to in paragraphs (a) to (d) is in effect. (2) Instead of disclosing the information required by subsection (1), the credit card issuer (a) may disclose in the application form a telephone number that the cardholder can use, at no charge, to obtain that information during the credit card issuer's ordinary business hours, and (b) must ensure that the information is available at the number during those hours. (3) Despite subsection (2), if an individual applies for a credit card in person, by telephone or by any electronic means, the credit card issuer must disclose the information referred to in subsection (1) when the individual makes the application. (4) An individual who applies for a credit card without signing an application form is deemed, on using the credit card for the first time, to have entered into a credit agreement in relation to that card in the terms of the disclosure statement referred to in subsection (5). (5) Nothing in this section relieves the credit card issuer from the requirement to give a disclosure statement in accordance with sections 66 [disclosure statements must be given] and 91 [contents of initial disclosure statement for open credit].

Carriage by Air Act

R.S.C. 1985, c. C-26

Liability under Convention for death of passenger 2. (5) Any liability imposed by Article 17 of Schedule I or Article 17 of Schedule VI on a carrier in respect of the death of a passenger shall be in substitution for any liability of the carrier in respect of the death of that passenger under any law in force in Canada, and the provisions set out in Schedule II shall have effect with respect to the persons by whom and for whose benefit the liability so imposed is enforceable and with respect to the manner in which it may be enforced.

Responsabilité en cas de décès d’un passager 2. (5) L'article 17 de l'annexe I et l'article 17 de l'annexe VI, qui fixent la responsabilité d'un transporteur en cas de décès d'un passager, se substituent aux règles de droit pertinentes en vigueur au Canada. Les dispositions énoncées à l'annexe II sont exécutoires en ce qui concerne tant l es personnes par qui et pour l e compte desquel l es réparati on peut être obtenue au ti tre de l a responsabi l i té ai nsi i mposée que l es modal i tés de mi se en oeuvre de cel l e-ci.

CIVIL CODE OF QUÉBEC

DIVISION III FORMATION OF CONTRACTS

§ 1. — Conditions of formation of contracts

I. — General provision

1385. A contract is formed by the sole exchange of consents between persons having capacity to contract, unless, in addition, the law requires a particular form to be respected as a necessary condition of its formation, or unless the parties require the contract to take the form of a solemn agreement.

It is also of the essence of a contract that it have a cause and an object.

[…]

II. — Consent

[…]

3 — QUALITIES AND DEFECTS OF CONSENT

[…]

1401. Error on the part of one party induced by fraud committed by the other party or with his knowledge vitiates consent whenever, but for that error, the party would not have contracted, or would have contracted on different terms.

Fraud may result from silence or concealment.

SECTION III DE LA FORMATION DU CONTRAT

§ 1. — Des conditions de formation du contrat

I. — Disposition générale

1385. L e contrat se f orme par l e seul échange de consentement entre des personnes capabl es de contracter, à moins que la loi n'exige, en outre, le respect d'une forme particulière comme condition nécessaire à sa formation, ou que les parties n'assujettissent la formation du contrat à une forme solennelle.

I l est aussi de son essence qu'i l ai t une cause et un obj et.

[…]

3 — DES QUA L I TÉS ET DES VICES DU CONSENTEMENT

[...]

1401. L 'erreur d'une parti e, provoquée par l e dol de l 'autre parti e ou à l a connai ssance de cel l e-ci, vi ci e l e consentement dans tous l es cas où, sans cel a, l a parti e n'aurai t pas contracté ou aurai t contracté à des conditions différentes.

Le dol peut résulter du silence ou d'une réticence.

CONSTITUTION ACT, 1867 30 & 31 Victoria, c. 3 (U.K.), reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. III, No. 5.

VI. DISTRIBUTION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS

POWERS OF THE PARLIAMENT

Legislative Authority of Parliament of Canada 91. It shall be lawful for the Queen, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate and House of Commons, to make Laws for the Peace, Order, and good Government of Canada, in relation to all Matters not coming within the Classes of Subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the Provinces; and for greater Certainty, but not so as to restrict the Generality of the foregoing Terms of this Section, it is hereby declared that (notwithstanding anything in this Act) the exclusive Legislative Authority of the Parliament of Canada extends to all Matters coming within the Classes of Subjects next hereinafter enumerated; that is to say,

[…]

15. Banking, Incorporation of Banks, and the Issue of Paper Money.

[…]

EXCLUSIVE POWERS OF PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURES

Subjects of exclusive Provincial Legislation 92. In each Province the Legislature may exclusively make Laws in relation to Matters coming within the Classes of Subjects next hereinafter enumerated; that is to say,

[…]

13. Property and Civil Rights in the Province;

CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT

R.S.Q., CHAPTER P-40.1

TITLE I CONTRACTS REGARDING GOODS AND SERVICES

CHAPTER I GENERAL PROVISIONS

[…]

12. No costs may be claimed from a consumer unless the amount thereof is precisely indicated in the contract.

[…]

CHAPTER III PROVISIONS RELATING TO CERTAIN CONTRACTS

[…]

DIVISION III CONTRACTS OF CREDIT

[…]

126. At the end of each period, the merchant must furnish the consumer who owes him a debt with a statement of account, mailed not less than 21 days before the date on which the creditor may impose credit charges, if the consumer does not discharge his obligation in full; in the case of an advance of money, these charges may accrue from the date of that advance until the date of payment.

The statement of account must indicate:

(a) the date of the end of the period;

(b) the balance of the account at the end of the preceding period, specifying the portion of the balance which is represented by moneys advanced;

(c) the date, description and value of each transaction debited to the consumer's account during the period unless the merchant appends a copy of the vouchers to the statement of account;

(d) the date and amount of each payment made or sum credited during the period;

(e) the credit charges required during the period;

(f) the balance of the account at the end of the period;

(g) the minimum payment required for such period; and

(h) the time during which the consumer may discharge his obligation without being required to pay credit charges except on advances of money.

The consumer may require the merchant to send to him without charge a copy of the vouchers for each of the transactions debited to the consumer's account during the period.

127. Until the consumer receives a statement of account at his address, the merchant shall not exact credit charges on the unpaid balance except on advances of money.

Provided that the consumer has so requested expressly in writing, the address of the consumer includes, for the purposes of the first paragraph, the address where the consumer accepts the receipt of technology-based documents within the meaning of section 3 of the Act to establish a legal framework for information technology (chapter C-1.1).

TITRE I CONTRATS RELATIFS AUX BIENS ET AUX SERVICES

CHAPITRE I DISPOSITIONS GÉNÉRALES

12. Aucuns frais ne peuvent être réclamés d'un consommateur, à moins que le contrat n'en mentionne de façon précise le montant.

[…]

CHAPITRE III DISPOSITIONS RELATIVES À CERTAINS CONTRATS

[…]

SECTION III CONTRATS DE CRÉDIT […]

126. À la fin de chaque période, le commerçant, s'il a une créance à l'égard d'un consommateur, doit lui fournir un état de compte, posté au moins vingt et un jours avant la date à laquelle le créancier peut exiger des frais de crédit si le consommateur n'acquitte pas la totalité de son

obligation; dans le cas d'une avance en argent, ces frais peuvent courir à compter de la date de cette avance jusqu'à la date du paiement.

L'état de compte doit mentionner:

(a) la date de la fin de la période;

(b) le solde du compte à la fin de la période précédente en spécifiant la partie de ce solde que représentent les avances en argent consenties;

(c) la date, la description et la valeur de chaque transaction portée au débit du compte au cours de la période, sauf si le commerçant annexe à l'état de compte une copie des pièces justificatives;

(d) la date et le montant de chaque paiement effectué ou de chaque somme créditée au cours de la période;

(e) les frais de crédit exigés pendant la période;

(f) le solde du compte à la fin de la période;

(g) le paiement minimum requis pour cette période; et

(h) le délai pendant lequel le consommateur peut acquitter son obligation sans être tenu de payer des frais de crédit sauf sur les avances en argent.

Le consommateur peut exiger du commerçant qu'il lui fasse parvenir sans frais une copie des pièces justificatives de chacune des transactions portées au débit de son compte au cours de la période.

127. Tant que le consommateur n'a pas reçu à son adresse un état de compte, le commerçant ne peut exiger de frais de crédit sur le solde impayé, sauf sur les avances en argent.

Pourvu que le consommateur en ait expressément fait la demande par écrit, son adresse comprend, aux fins du premier alinéa, celle où il accepte de recevoir des documents technologiques au sens de l'article 3 de la Loi concernant le cadre juridique des technologies de l'information (chapitre C-1.1).

CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT S.O. 2002, CHAPTER 30.

PART VII CREDIT AGREEMENTS

GENERAL […]

Agreement for credit card 68. (1) Despite section 13, a consumer who applies for a credit card without signing an application form or who receives a credit card from a credit card issuer without applying for it shall be deemed to have entered into a credit agreement with the issuer with respect to the card on first using the card. 2002, c. 30, Sched. A, s. 68 (1). Liability (2) A consumer described in subsection (1) is not liable to pay the lender any amount in respect of the credit card received in the circumstances described in that subsection until the consumer uses the card. 2002, c. 30, Sched. A, s. 68 (2).

PARTIE VII CONVENTIONS DE CRÉDIT

DISPOSITIONS GÉNÉRALES […]

Convention relative à une carte de crédit 68. (1) Malgré l’article 13, le consommateur qui demande une carte de crédit sans avoir signé de formulaire de demande ou qui reçoit une carte de crédit d’un émetteur de carte de crédit sans en avoir fait la demande est réputé avoir conclu une convention de crédit avec l’émetteur à l’égard de la carte lorsqu’il l’utilise pour la première fois. Responsabilité (2) Le consommateur visé au paragraphe (1) n’est redevable au prêteur d’aucune somme à l’égard de la carte de crédit reçue dans les circonstances énoncées à ce paragraphe avant de l’avoir utilisée.