U. S. F-15 Jet Fighter Sale to Saudi Arabia--Analysis
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In all cases we have filmed the best available copy. Uni International 300 N. ZEEB RD., ANN ARBOR. Ml 48 06 1 3 1 7 3 6 6 HAZZAN, CHARLES A. Ü. S- F-15 JET FIGHTER SALE TO SAUDI ARABIA— ANALYSIS. THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY, M.A., 1981 University Microfilm s International 300 N. ZEEB RD., ANN ARBOR. Ml 48106 U.S. F-15 JET FIGHTER SALE TO SAUDI ARABIA— ANALYSIS by Charles A. Hazzan submitted to the Faculty of the College of Public and International Affairs of The American University in Partial Fulfillment of The Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in School of International Service Signatures ofII. VUilUHJLCommittee U Chairman (t&iLmeimejL Dean of the College .1^-1 Date^ 1981 The American University Washington D.C. 20016 0 ‘i l ^ THB UIÊHXCAJI UNIVERSITY filBRARY U.S. F-15 JET FIGHTER SALE TO SAUDI ARABIA— ANALYSIS BY Charles A. Hazzan ABSTRACT For the first time in its history, the United States faced the crucial decision of whether or not to sell its most sophisticated weaponry to an Arab nation that could conceivably use it against another American-supplied ally (Israel). After an intense lobbying effort at all levels of the American political structure, Saudi Arabia, in concert with the Carter administration, persuaded a reluctant U.S. Congress in the spring of 1978 to approve the sale of 62 "state-of-the-art" F-15 jet fighters to be used for the defense of the militarily vulnerable oil superstate. The main Saudi argument, was that the sale would be in the American interest as well as that of Saudi Arabia. This study utilizes press accounts, scholarly analysis and personal interviews along with U.S. government studies to evaluate the sale of American F-15 jet fighters to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in ii the context of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. The results of the research indicate that Saudi Arabia, based upon the evaluations of experts in the U.S. and abroad, needed the F-15S in order to adequately defend its oil fields. This study also shows why the sale of the jets to Saudi Arabia will not necessarily pose a threat to the security of the state of Israel. Ill ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I am greatly indebted to Mr. Hassan Y. Yassin for his generosity, for without his assistance this study could not have been possible. To M. Mark Mansour, I would like to extend special thanks for the long and many diligent hours he spent in contributing to this paper; his assistance from day one and throughout the duration of the study was not only appreciated but needed. Mark, thanks again. I would also like to thank Priscilla L. (Bitsie) Lance and S. Bradford Smith for their meticulous typing and editing. Thanks also to my roommates; Peter, John and Jim for their patience and support. I would like to extend my warm appreciation to the staff members of the Saudi Arabian Information Office, Washington D.C., for their kindness and cooperation. Last but by no means least, to my mother and father, Aziz and Laila Hazzan; no words can truly express how dearly I love them both. IV TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT .......................................................... Ü ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ................................................. iv Chapter I. INTRODUCTION ................................................ 1 History of the Proposed Sale of F-15s to Saudi Arabia 4 Carter Administration Objectives ...................... 7 Choosing the F-15 ........................................ 9 Saudi National Defense Needs .......................... 11 The "special selationship"............................. 11 The Battle Lines ........................................ 13 The Pro-Israel Lobby ................................... 14 Implications of the Debate .... ...................... 18 II. THREATS TO SAUDI ARABIAN SECURITY ...................... 20 Threats From the Soviet Union ......................... 22 Increasing Radicalization of the Arab World ........ 23 Foreign Labor, Reformism, and Conservatism .......... 25 Threats From Within the Saudi AirFo r c e .............. 28 Israeli Preemptive Strike ............................. 30 III. U.S. VIEWS ON SAUDI ARABIA'S DEFENSE NEEDS; PROS AND CONS OF THE SALE FROM THE AMERICAN STANDPOINT .. 33 Major U.S. Political Considerations Relative to the Sale .......................................... 36 Arguments Against the Sale ............................ 43 IV. SAUDI ARABIA'S LOBBYING STRATEGY ....................... 48 V, POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS .............................. 61 Refusal of the Sale .................................... 63 Support from the Department of State ................ 64 U.S.-Israeli Relations ................................. 65 U.S. Commitment ......................................... 66 Oil Linkage .............................................. 68 Senate Opposition ....................................... 69 Battles on the Hill .................................... 71 Chapter VI. ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS ................................. 73 Oil ...................................................... 73 U.S.-Saudi Trade ....................................... 75 Currency ................................................ 77 U.S. Military Expenditures in Saudi Arabia ......... 78 VII. STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS ................................ 80 Technical data ......................................... 81 Implications of the Data............................... 85 Alternatives to the F-15 .............................. 87 Support for Manpower and Materiel ..................... 91 Stationing the F-15s ................................... 93 Possibility of Transfer ............................... 93 Compromising U.S. Technolog ........................... 98 Controlling Munitions ................................. 98 The Issue of Additional Equipment .................... 99 VIII. REGIONAL REACTION .................................. 102 IX............. CONCLUSION........................................ 114 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY............................................ 128 VI CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION Saudi Arabia and the United States may share many common goals and interests, but none as important as the protection of Saudi Arabia's vast oil fields. This common interest stretches all the way back to 1938 when oil was first discovered in Saudi Arabia. Soon afterward, Saudi leaders would look toward the United States to develop and protect their valuable resources. Saudi Arabia played an important role in World War II by cooperating with the allied forces, and for thirty years thereafter, Saudi Arabia and the United States shared many common foreign policy objectives. That long-term commonality of interest has created the basis of an understanding from which all other aspects of the U.S.-Saudi "special relationship" have evolved. The United States first agreed to provide military training and assistance to Saudi Arabia in 1944. At the turn of the decade, Saudi Arabia enhanced the already growing relationship between the two countries by allowing the U.S. to establish a military base in Dhahran (completed in 1954). On June 27, 1953, the U.S. launched the U.S. Military Training Mission to Saudi Arabia, which was part of the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement. As a result of Saudi Arabia's support of the Eisenhower Doctrine (April 1957) , Saudi Arabia and the United States signed an agreement under which the kingdom agreed to renew the base rights agreement for Dhahran airfield until 1962; in return the U.S. agreed to provide training and equipment for the Saudi forces and to improve the civilian air facilities at Dhahran. Several years later, a diplomatic agreement between the U.S. and the kingdom for construction