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Uni International 300 N. ZEEB RD., ANN ARBOR. Ml 48 06 1 3 1 7 3 6 6 HAZZAN, CHARLES A. Ü. S- F-15 JET FIGHTER SALE TO SAUDI ARABIA— ANALYSIS.

THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY, M.A., 1981

University Microfilm s International 300 N. ZEEB RD., ANN ARBOR. Ml 48106 U.S. F-15 JET FIGHTER SALE TO

SAUDI ARABIA— ANALYSIS

by

Charles A. Hazzan

submitted to the

Faculty of the College of Public and International Affairs

of The American University

in Partial Fulfillment of

The Requirements for the Degree

of

Master of Arts

in

School of International Service

Signatures ofII. VUilUHJLCommittee U Chairman (t&iLmeimejL

Dean of the College

.1^-1 Date^

1981

The American University

Washington D.C. 20016 0 ‘i l ^ THB UIÊHXCAJI UNIVERSITY filBRARY U.S. F-15 JET FIGHTER SALE TO

SAUDI ARABIA— ANALYSIS

BY

Charles A. Hazzan

ABSTRACT

For the first time in its history, the United States faced the crucial decision of whether or not to sell its most sophisticated weaponry to an Arab nation that could conceivably use it against another American-supplied ally

(Israel). After an intense lobbying effort at all levels of the American political structure, Saudi Arabia, in concert with the Carter administration, persuaded a reluctant U.S.

Congress in the spring of 1978 to approve the sale of 62

"state-of-the-art" F-15 jet fighters to be used for the defense of the militarily vulnerable oil superstate. The main

Saudi argument, was that the sale would be in the American interest as well as that of Saudi Arabia. This study utilizes press accounts, scholarly analysis and personal interviews along with U.S. government studies to evaluate the sale of

American F-15 jet fighters to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in

ii the context of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. The results of the research indicate that Saudi Arabia, based upon the evaluations of experts in the U.S. and abroad, needed the

F-15S in order to adequately defend its oil fields. This study also shows why the sale of the jets to Saudi Arabia will not necessarily pose a threat to the security of the state of

Israel.

Ill ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am greatly indebted to Mr. Hassan Y. Yassin for his generosity, for without his assistance this study could not have been possible.

To M. Mark Mansour, I would like to extend special thanks for the long and many diligent hours he spent in contributing to this paper; his assistance from day one and throughout the duration of the study was not only appreciated but needed. Mark, thanks again. I would also like to thank

Priscilla L. (Bitsie) Lance and S. Bradford Smith for their meticulous typing and editing. Thanks also to my roommates;

Peter, John and Jim for their patience and support. I would like to extend my warm appreciation to the staff members of the Saudi Arabian Information Office, Washington D.C., for their kindness and cooperation.

Last but by no means least, to my mother and father,

Aziz and Laila Hazzan; no words can truly express how dearly I love them both.

IV TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ...... Ü

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...... iv

Chapter

I. INTRODUCTION ...... 1

History of the Proposed Sale of F-15s to Saudi Arabia 4 Carter Administration Objectives ...... 7 Choosing the F-15 ...... 9 Saudi National Defense Needs ...... 11 The "special selationship"...... 11 The Battle Lines ...... 13 The Pro-Israel Lobby ...... 14 Implications of the Debate ...... 18

II. THREATS TO SAUDI ARABIAN SECURITY ...... 20

Threats From the Soviet Union ...... 22 Increasing Radicalization of the Arab World ...... 23 Foreign Labor, Reformism, and Conservatism ...... 25 Threats From Within the Saudi AirFo r c e ...... 28 Israeli Preemptive Strike ...... 30

III. U.S. VIEWS ON SAUDI ARABIA'S DEFENSE NEEDS; PROS AND CONS OF THE SALE FROM THE AMERICAN STANDPOINT .. 33

Major U.S. Political Considerations Relative to the Sale ...... 36 Arguments Against the Sale ...... 43

IV. SAUDI ARABIA'S LOBBYING STRATEGY ...... 48

V, POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS ...... 61

Refusal of the Sale ...... 63 Support from the Department of State ...... 64 U.S.-Israeli Relations ...... 65 U.S. Commitment ...... 66 Oil Linkage ...... 68 Senate Opposition ...... 69 Battles on the Hill ...... 71 Chapter

VI. ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS ...... 73

Oil ...... 73 U.S.-Saudi Trade ...... 75 Currency ...... 77 U.S. Military Expenditures in Saudi Arabia ...... 78

VII. STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS ...... 80

Technical data ...... 81 Implications of the Data...... 85 Alternatives to the F-15 ...... 87 Support for Manpower and Materiel ...... 91 Stationing the F-15s ...... 93 Possibility of Transfer ...... 93 Compromising U.S. Technolog ...... 98 Controlling Munitions ...... 98 The Issue of Additional Equipment ...... 99

VIII. REGIONAL REACTION ...... 102

IX...... CONCLUSION...... 114

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 128

VI CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Saudi Arabia and the United States may share many

common goals and interests, but none as important as the

protection of Saudi Arabia's vast oil fields. This common

interest stretches all the way back to 1938 when oil was first

discovered in Saudi Arabia. Soon afterward, Saudi leaders would look toward the United States to develop and protect

their valuable resources. Saudi Arabia played an important

role in World War II by cooperating with the allied forces,

and for thirty years thereafter, Saudi Arabia and the United

States shared many common foreign policy objectives. That

long-term commonality of interest has created the basis of an

understanding from which all other aspects of the U.S.-Saudi

"special relationship" have evolved.

The United States first agreed to provide military

training and assistance to Saudi Arabia in 1944. At the turn

of the decade, Saudi Arabia enhanced the already growing

relationship between the two countries by allowing the U.S. to establish a military base in Dhahran (completed in 1954). On

June 27, 1953, the U.S. launched the U.S. Military Training

Mission to Saudi Arabia, which was part of the Mutual Defense

Assistance Agreement. As a result of Saudi Arabia's support of the Eisenhower Doctrine (April 1957) , Saudi Arabia and the

United States signed an agreement under which the kingdom agreed to renew the base rights agreement for Dhahran airfield until 1962; in return the U.S. agreed to provide training and equipment for the Saudi forces and to improve the civilian air facilities at Dhahran. Several years later, a diplomatic agreement between the U.S. and the kingdom for construction of military projects (known as the Engineers Assistance

Agreement) was signed on May 24, 1965. (1)

From that point on, the United States continued to advise, consult and train the Saudis on how to best defend their borders and oil fields. U.S. missions were sent to

Saudi Arabia by various administrations in order to help the

Saudis define their defense needs. Two basic conclusions resulted from these missions; Saudi Arabia needed to develop a sophisticated air force to defend itself from an external attack and a national guard to protect itself from internal subversion. Although the Saudis continued to accept (and pay for) U.S. assistance, they quickly made it clear that they wanted to defend themselves. Actually, since the closing of the Dhahran airfield in 1960, Saudi Arabia has consistently opposed American military bases in the Arabian Peninsula, The

Saudi leaders feel that they (with the assistance of some foreign party, i.e. the united States) are capable of meeting

(1) U.S. Congress, Perspectives on Military Sales to Saudi Arabia, Report to the Congress by the Comptroller General of the United States; (October 26, 1977) ID-77-19A, p.34. 3 their own defense needs. Thus, through sales of construction expertise, equipment (arms sales), training, and management, the United States would become the primary source of guidance for modernizing the Saudi armed forces. That long-term commonality of interest has created the basis of understanding from which other aspects of the U.S.-Saudi special relationship have evolved.

It was not until after North Yemeni fighter planes--during the Yemen Civil War--attacked Saudi Arabia did the Saudi government feel vulnerable from outside attack and wake up to the fact that Saudi Arabia lacked the ability to defend itself. The Saudis then turned to the British for their defense needs. In 1966, the Saudis purchased an air defense package of British and American equipment that included 46 British Lightning interceptor aircraft, 10 Hawk missile batteries, radar and communications systems. (2)

In 1971 when the British withdrew from the Gulf area,

Saudi Arabia began to modernize its armed forces, especially the air force. The decision to modernize has led to increased

U.S. military sales and military involvement in the desert kingdom. As a result of the British withdrawal, the Nixon administration strongly encouraged Saudi Arabia to assume primary responsibility for the security of the Gulf area, acting alongside Iran as one of the "twin pillars" of stability in the Persian Gulf, Although the oil embargo of

(2) U.S. Department of Defense, Analysis of the Saudi Arabian Request to Purchase F-15 Figher Aircraft, UNCLASSIFED SUMMARY, (March 16, 1978) p.l 1973-74 strained American-Saudi relations, the U.S. maintained its long-term policy toward the kingdom.

Prom fiscal year 1950 through September 30, 1976, U.S. military sales agreemments with Saudi Arabia totaled over $12.1 billion. Sales began increasing in fiscal year 1972 and from then through September 1976 they amounted to about $8.3 billion. (3)

History of the Proposed Sale of F-15s to Saudi Arabia

Major U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) surveys were conducted in Saudi Arabia in 1970 (Leahy Study), 1972 (Time phased naval expansion plan) and in 1974 (Defense Plan).

In 1970, at the request of the Saudis, a DOD review team headed by Major General 0. A. Leahy evaluated Saudi

Arabia's defense plans and programs. According to the

Comptroller General's report to Congress, some of the important recommendations of the Study were that: [1] the

Saudi Ministry of Defense and Aviation should be reorganized and a 5-year defense plan developed and [2] the Saudi navy and air force be placed on an equal level with the army. The study also recommended that the aging F-86 and T-33 aircraft be replaced. This recommendation led to the modernization of the Royal Saudi Air Force under the U.S. managed Peace Hawk

Program. The Peace Hawk Program's main recommendation was that the Royal Saudi Air Force achieve a level of self-

(3) U.S. Congress, Perspectives on Military Sales to Saudi Arabia, Report to the Congress by the Comptroller General of the United States; (October 26, 1977) ID-77-19A, P.. 8 sufficiency in the operation of the F-5 aircraft. (4)

In 1974 a U.S. Department of Defense study team recommended that Saudi Arabia acquire advanced air defense aircraft to replace its aging British-made Lightning interceptors. The survey recommended development of a mixed force of SAMs (1-HAWK batteries) and fighter interceptors.

The reasoning behind the combination of interceptors and SAMs was to provide Saudi Arabia with needed flexibility and to maximize the effectiveness of limited Saudi manpower. The

HAWK batteries alone would prove ineffective because maximum defense capability would require a substantial increase in the number of batteries (as well as anti-aircraft guns). In addition, the HAWK systems are not designed to defend against high altitude targets, and they cannot quickly move over long distances to counter a new threat. Surprisingly, obtaining the extra number of 1-HAWK batteries would take more time in training and construction of sites and support facilities, as well as acquisition and training of approximately 5,500 technicians, more than 5 times the requirement for personnel to operate fighter replacements. (5)

One year later, the Department of Defense invited a study team of Saudi experts to come to the U.S. to evaluate

(4) U.S. Congress, Perspectives on Military Sales to Saudi Arabia, Report to the Congress by the Comptroller General of the United States; (October 26, 1977) ID-77-19A, p.8-9

(5) U.S. Department of Defense, Analysis of the Saudi Arabian Request to Purchase F-15 Figher Aircraft, UNCLASSIFED SUMMARY, (March 16, 1978) p.4 the F-14S, F-15S, F-16s and F-18s. As a result of the trip, the Saudis concluded that the F-15 was the preferred aircraft for its defense needs.

The overall objective of the 1974 survey was to assist Saudi Arabia to evaluate its defense plans and programs and to develop a plan to improve its armed forces' capability to defend the country. The survey group made numerous recommendations for improving the organization of the Ministry of Defense and Aviation and for modernizing and expanding the Saudi armed forces. These included mechanized and airborne brigades, tactical fighter and airlift/refueling aircraft, helicopters and navy ships. (6)

As a result, the Ford administration agreed in principle to provide Saudi Arabia an advanced fighter (F-15) by 1980 to replace its aging inventory of Lightning F-52/53 fighters, which were phased out of service in 1979.

On February 15, 1977, the Saudi Arabian Minister of Defense and Aviation, Prince Sultan, sent a formal request to the U.S. Ambassador to 'convey the Saudi Government's desire to discuss with the U.S.G. the purchase of fighter aircrafts (Model F-15) produced by the McDonnell-Douglas Company.' On May 25, 1977, Saudi Air Force representatives provided details of the Saudi requirement, requesting the sale of 60 F-15 fighter aircraft with deliveries to begin in 1981. This formal Saudi request was the culmination of a four-year evaluation by the U.S.G. and Saudi Arabian Governments of the SAG's air defense needs. (7)

President Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had committed the United States to provide the Saudis with

"the aircraft of their choice," and the late King Faisal had

(6) U.S. Congress, Perspectives on Military Sales to Saudi Arabia, Report to the Congress by the Comptroller General of the United States; (October 26, 1977) ID-77-19A, p.9

(7) U.S. Department of Defense, Analysis of the Saudi Arabian Request to Purchase F-15 Figher Aircraft, UNCLASSIFED SUMMARY, (March 16, 1978) p.l 7 subsequently chosen the F-15. The U.S. commitment to sell

Saudi Arabia F-15s was reaffirmed by President Carter during his March 9, 1978 press conference, during which he said,

"Commitments to provide Saudi Arabia with advanced aircraft were made in the Fall of 1975." During Crown Prince Fahd's trip to the United States (May of 1977), and Carter's trip to

Saudi Arabia (January 1978), where he met personally with King

Khaled, the President promised that he would propose the sale to Congress, and on his return indicated that he felt he

(Carter) could not refuse them the aircraft because by that time they had come to regard its sale as a test of U.S. friendship.

Carter Administration Objectives

In his second year in office President Carter marked a crucial turn in U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East by proposing the sale of sophisticated weapons to an Arab country. The proposed sale would create a great deal of controversy because it was believed that such an aircraft in

Saudi hands would change the balance of power in the Middle

East. To ease political pressure from a strong pro-Israel

Congress, President Carter proposed the aircraft sales as a package deal to Egypt, Israel and Saudi Arabia; Congress would have to pass the whole package together or there would be no sales.

The arms package proposed in February of 1978 by

President Carter included 75 of the new General Dynamics F-16 for Israel out of a total of 250 requested, 50 F-5Es for Egypt 8 out of a total of 200 requested by President Sadat, and 60

F-15s for Saudi Arabia (62 aircraft were actually committed).

In announcing the decision. Secretary Vance stated that "The

Saudi government has a legitimate requirement to modernize its very limited air defense," and "Saudi Arabia is of great importance in promoting a course of moderation in the Middle

East...and more broadly in world affairs, as in petroleum and financial policy." (8) President Carter at his press conference on February 17, 1978 stated that "We have for a long time sold military equipment to Saudi Arabia, one of our closest allies, staunchest friends and economic partners.

This is the first time we've sold F-15s to Saudi Arabia, but they have other advanced equipment. The first planes will be delivered to Saudi Arabia not this year or next year but in

1981 and 1982.” Carter, in a move that would cause serious problems later, also added that Saudi Arabia would not receive any offensive equipment for the F-15s. The president knew that it would be in the U.S. interest to sell each country the arms it had requested. As for Saudi Arabia, President Carter hoped to gain assurances that the oil-rich kingdom would continue to make oil available to the West, and use its predominant influence in OPEC to keep the price of oil from rising any higher. In what turned out to be a long and arduous battle, the Carter administration finally convinced

Congress and Israel's supporters that the sale of F-15s

(8) Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, (Washington D.C.), Statements Regarding The Proposed Sale of F-15s to Saudi Arabia, Press Release, (March 15, 1978) p.2 to Saudi Arabia was not a threat to Israel's security.

Although many congressmen held reservations about the sale, in

May of 1978 the U.S. Senate passed the Carter package proposal, approving the sale of the 62 F-15s that Saudi Arabia had requested. Thus, the paramount U.S. foreign policy objective in the area was preserved; insuring continued access to Saudi Arabia's tremendous oil resources.

Choosing the F-15

Saudi Arabia chose the F-15 because of its

sophisticated patrol capability and superior air defense characteristics (inducing an advanced, all-weather air-to-air

radar system). The F-15 fighter best meets, according to the

Saudis, their air defense requirements. In choosing the P-15,

Saudi Arabia rejected aircraft with powerful ground attack capabilities such as the F-16. (9) However, according to the

New York Times, "The Saudis didn't select the F-15, the U.S. did." In mid-1977 the Pentagon quietly convinced the Carter administration to choose the F-15 for the Saudis. According to the July 20, 1977 New York Times, Saudi Arabia was encouraged by the Pentagon to buy the F-15 and to expand its air capacity beyond original needs foreseen by the U.S. Air

Force. In addition, the Comptroller's Report to Congress

(requested by Rep. Lee H. Hamilton, Chairman of the

Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, Committee on

(9) Harold Brown, White House Press Release; Letter from Secretary Harold Brown to Senator John Sparkman, (May 12, 1978) . 10

International Relations, House of Representatives) concluded that:

In general, the material made available to us by the Departmment of Defense and the Department of State indicates that (1) the Saudi Arabian Government has a valid need to replace aging aircraft, (2) the F-15 is the only readily available U.S. aircraft that will meet the requirements established by the Saudi Arabian Government, and, (3) the sale of F-15s as part of a package that includes new aircraft for Israel and Egypt will not have a significant impact in terms of numbers of aircraft on the balance of power in the Middle East. (ID)

In summary, Saudi Arabia is not merely acquiring an inventory of weapons, but it is also developing an infrastructure. Saudi Arabia has been purchasing arms according to a well thought out plan. Furthermore, Saudi

Arabia has been conservatively following the 1970-74 American studies which recommended what types of systems and associated facilities were necessary in order to provide the kingdom with an adequate military defense. In addition, a report to the

Congress by the Comptroller General of the U.S. (1977), entitled "Perspectives On Military Sales To Saudi Arabia," points out that;

It appears that Saudi Arabia needs to develop a basic defense capability to protect its borders and oil resources. DOD surveys identified Saudi military needs, which appear to be limited to a basic defense capability. In making these surveys, the United States has influenced Saudi Arabia's military expansion and modernization plans, and DOD's influence increases the probability of continued U.S. assistance to implement these plans. The result is continued United States presence and influence in Saudi

(10) U.S. Congress, Military, Economic, And Political Factors Concerning The Sale of F-15s to Saudi Arabia, Report by the Comptroller General of the United States; (May 1, 1978) PSAD-78-97, p.12 11

Arabia, which could be important to the attainment of U.S. security objectives. (11)

Saudi National Defense Needs

Saudi Arabia has a responsibility to protect its borders and strategic oil resources— 25% of the world's proven oil reserves--against increasing extremist danger from a number of different directions, and that is the compelling reason the country has chosen for its defense the 60 U.S. made

F-15 fighter aircraft. As the level of sophistication of weapons available to potential aggressors increases and as the strategic importance of Saudi Arabia's oil fields becomes more apparent, Saudi Arabia must have the most advanced defensive system which it may be called upon to use. The U.S.-made F-15 is such a system. Saudi Arabia's large borders, modest population and the size of its armed forces make it imperative that it have F-15 technology. Realistically, no one can afford to take the risk of Saudi Arabia being inadequately prepared to protect its borders and oil fields, not even

Israel. (12)

The "special relationship"

During the debate on the F-15 sale, the Saudi

(11) U.S. Congress, Perspectives on Military Sales to Saudi Arabia, Report to the Congress by the Comptroller General of the United States; (October 26, 1977) ID-77-19A, p.10.

(12) Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia (Washington D.C.), Press Release, Statements by Ambassador All A. Alireza to all Members of the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives, (March 15, 1981) p. 2. 12

Ambassador to the U.S., All Abdallah Alireza, said in a letter to Congress that "over the course of the last forty years and especially in the mid-1970s, the United States and Saudi

Arabia have come to share a special relationship on a broad range of basic matters." He emphasized the following:

a. Trade, with Saudi purchases from the United States approaching $5 billion in the current year and agreements with American firms for goods, services and projects beyond that already exceeding $25 billion, b. The overall economic development and well bein<^ of both countries— Saudi Arabia, for instance, supplies almost a tenth of the oil now being used by Americans and in turn looks to the United States for much of the know-how, equipment and technology which it needs for its development program, c. The health of the international economy, including most recently maintenance of the strength of the dollar. d. The assurance of moderation and stability in the Middle East. e. Essential support for the non-communist coalition of nations, including not only western Europe, Japan and other developed nations but also developing countries, to which Saudi Arabia devotes 15% of its annual income in the form of aid and interest-free loans." (13)

The U.S. Comptroller's Report to Congress also indicates that most of the Saudi purchases have been cash transactions handled by the Department of Defense (DOD) under the Foreign

Military Sales Act of 1968, now called the Arms Export Control

Act. The fact that oil sales account for about 95 percent of

Saudi Arabia's total revenues and that oil has increased in price from an average $3.28 a barrel in 1973 to $32 in 1980 have given the Saudis unprecedented resources for both military and economic developmment. Thus, Saudi Arabia,

(13) Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia Press Release (Washington D.C.), Statements by Ambassador All A. Alireza to all Members of the U.S. Senate and House of Representative, (March 15, 1981) p.l. 13 unlike most other countries, is able to pay cash for all the arms it purchases. This fact makes Saudi Arabia a good market for arms.

The Battle Lines

An F-15 attack from Saudi Arabia is not a realistic concern to Israel; it is a known fact that the Israelis will continue to enjoy overwhelming military superiority over their neighbors whether or not Saudi Arabia receives the F-15s.

What worries the Israelis is that as a result of the sale, the

Saudis will strengthen their relationship with the United

States. The gist of the matter is that the fight which took place over the F-15 sale was not about military issues, but about political turf. In short, Israel does not want the

U.S.-Saudi "special relationship" to supercede the traditional

U.S.-Israeli relationship. (14) Israel consistently argues that its relationship with the United States has been one of great friendship; the special relationship prevents the U.S. from pressuring Israel to make territorial concessions with her Arab neighbors in exchange for a final peace settlement.

Refusal to sell Saudi Arabia the F-15s would not only force the Saudis to consider alternative purchases (from France or

Germany) of existing sophisticated aircraft, but would also

( 14) ‘•On the Other Hand: The F-15 Sale," The New Republic, (May 20, 1978) p.6. 14 lead to the possible financing by Saudi Arabia of the development of alternative weapons systems, e.g. the French

Mirage. Worst of all, it would also damage the so called

"special relationship" between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. The impairment of this relationship is an untenable prospect for both countries simply because the level of interdependence is so high. Other Arab states, communist, free world, and developing nations are closely watching the outcome of the

F-15 debate to appraise U.S. support of its closest "allies" in the wake of the Vietnam fiasco.

The Pro-Israel Lobby

It is clear that Israel does not want Saudi Arabia or any other Arab state to acquire any weapons from the U.S., let alone the sophisticated F-15. The major arguments against the sale of F-15s to Saudi Arabia was that the aircraft would be a threat to Israel, that Saudi Arabia is unstable, that Saudi

Arabia is incapable of handling such sophisticated aircraft, that it would transfer the aircraft to other "confrontation states" and that Saudi Arabia was threatening the U.S. with the "oil-weapon."

However, the real reason for Israel's opposition to the

Arabs obtaining U.S. sophisticated arms is the fact that

Israel does not want to jeopardize over thirty years of virtual monopoly on the American connection among the nations of the Middle East through the passage of such a momentous sale to Saudi Arabia. 15

The pro-Israel lobby enjoys a free rein in the halls of

Congress, and few have ever seriously questioned Israel's right to U.S. military, economic and diplomatic support.

During these thirty years, no other nation has received so much from America without "strings" attached. This free rein exists because the Israeli lobby has been able to justify

Israel's arms advantage on the basis of its role as self-proclaimed defender of U.S. interests (oil fields) in the region. Israel boasts that it is capable of militarily protecting U.S. interests, and so it is therefore not necessary for the U.S. to have a strategic relationship with any Arab state.

Israeli lobbying tactics began as early as 1948, when

American Jews quickly came to the aid of Israel, applying political pressure on the Truman Administration to recognize the new Jewish State and showering it with healthy contributions. Ever since, Israel has come out comfortably ahead in every negotiation undertaken. This is totally discounting its undeniably impressive successes in military engagements with the Arabs.

The Arabs, on the other hand, have had little success lobbying for American support. Until recently, they were poorly financed, lacking in organization or cohesiveness, and worst of all, a common cause. The Israelis, viewed by a sympathetic American public to be surrounded by "vicious, barbaric" Arabs who were bent on destroying them, had a complete lock on the American connection. If few Americans knew anything about the Arab cause, less knew of the richness 16

of Arab culture and history. As a result, Israel was immune to

challenge from the pro-Arab lobby such as it existed before

1975.

The pro-Israel lobby, for its part, assured the status quo by unceasingly portraying Arabs in general and

Palestinians in particular as "terrorists and murderers";

certainly, the Palestinians did little to help their image in

the U.S. All of this was facilitated immeasurably by the

attitude of the American public, largely ignorant of the delicacy of the problems confronting the region, and its

instinctive sympathy for Israel growing out of the perception of a commonly shared Judeo-Christian ethic. The U.S.

government had a stake in the status quo as well; fearful of possible Soviet influence in the Arab world, it relied on

Israel and the Shah of Iran to provide a strategic counterforce in the area. In addition, the American government, since the days of Nasser and the pan-Arabist movement, was fearful of the Arabs. It viewed with relative apathy the plight of the Palestinians, concluding that they posed no major threat ; indeed, American policy-makers (like

those in Israel, no doubt) must have thought that the

Palestinians would disappear if ignored.

The 1973 war and the Saudi Arabia's leading role in the oil embargo changed the American perception. No longer could

Saudi Arabia, the Palestinians or the Arabs as a whole be

ignored. Just as important, the U.S.government realized that

Israel could no longer have 'carte blanche' in dealing with 17

the United States. Although the process was evolutionary (the situation is still in a state of flux), perceptions of the

Arab-Israeli conflict in the U.S. began to change.

By 1978, the Israelis viewed with alarm the now-hesitant support preferred by the U.S., as well as the newfound power of the Arab lobby. Arab influence grew in proportion to the rising price and decreasing availability of imported petroleum supplies. Distinguished attorneys, lobbyists, consultants and ex-senators made their well-honed public relations talent and expertise available to the

Saudis. In addition, visiting Saudi dignitaries, especially

Prince Bandar and Prince Turki during their visits to Capitol

Hill in the late winter of 1977-78, demonstrated to a surprised Senate their ability to charm Americans and articulate their positions in an intelligent and sophisticated manner.

In light of all this, it is not hard to see why the

Israelis were so determined to defeat the F-15 sale.

Symbolically at least, the survival of modern-day Israel hung in the balance. If Saudi Arabia was capable of winning a major concession (unthinkable five years earlier) on a deal for sophisticated aircraft, could a U.S. decision to recognize the PLO followed by a concession on a Palestinian homeland be far behind?

Although Israel has many powerful friends on Capitol

Hill, it also sends government officials to do some direct lobbying of its own. In mid-February 1978, Israeli Foreign

Minister Moshe Dayan lobbyied Jewish audiences from 18

coast-to-coast to oppose the F-15 sale. At the Fontainebleau

Hotel in Miami Beach, he told a gathering of 1,000 Jewish

Americans, "We are worried— very, very worried" about the sale of warplanes to the Arabs. "We are going to ask your government to hold it." And in a speech to another 2,000

Jewish Americans in Los Angeles, Dayan said, "I hope the day never comes when we are fighting American planes." (15)

Implications of the Debate

This was the position in which the actors found themselves on the eve of the F-15 battle in the spring of

1978. Saudi Arabia was ready for a fight, as the Arab world looked on in pregnant anticipation. Israel, and its advocates in the U.S., were challenged as never before and studiously concerned over the implications of the sale. Potentially a springboard for a major reassessment of U.S.-Israeli and

U.S.-Arab relations, the debate which loomed ahead already held far-reaching consequences, and the players knew it. The

United States, perhaps, had the most to gain or lose by the outcome of the debate, although it was argued by the pro-Israel lobby that their client would have the dubious distinction in the long-run. For the U.S., the proposed sale would come to be realized in the course of discussion, and, often, bitter recrimination, as much more than an issue of

Israel's security or U.S.-Saudi friendship. At stake— and some legislators, though questionably the majority, understood

(15) "Carter's Plane Package," Newsweek, (February 27, 1978) p.26. 19

this— was the future of America's role in the Middle East,

and, by extension, the parameters of Soviet influence.

Although the one debate would not determine events to come or harm America's credibility, the nature of the

deliberations and the understanding of the issue shown by the

legislators would to a great degree set the stage for future

Mideast relations, and influence the superpower balance in the

region. The Arabs knew this, but it was the U.S., not the

Arabs, which was in a position to affect the direction of events. The Arab world privately hoped that the sale might

also open the door to real prospects for peace through a more

equitable treatment of the Palestinian question.

In addressing the history of U.S.-Saudi relations and

the circumstances of the sale, this paper will examine, on the

one hand, the validity of the arguments presented by Saudi

Arabia and Israel, and, on the other hand, the dilemma that-

faced the Carter Administration and Congress in coming to

terms with two ostensibly right positions on opposite sides of

a crucial debate. This paper reaches a definite conclusion:

the F-15 sale was a positive step taken by the U.S., a move

squarely in line with U.S. national interests, that should be

seen, if followed up by a coherent strategy, as contributing

to regional security, acting as a deterrent to Soviet

influence in the

Mideast and Gulf area, improving severely damaged American

credibility in the region, and reinforcing Saudi Arabia's

position and the stability of the House of Saud, while doing

no real or long-term harm to the security of Israel. CHAPTER II

THREATS TO SAUDI ARABIAN SECURITY

External threats to Saudi Arabia's stability flow from

two disparate sources: the Soviet threat and the spillover

effects of the unresolved Arab-lsraeli (Palestinian) problem.

Recent events in and around Saudi Arabia have forced the

Saudis to examine their security--internally and externally.

The Saudis see themselves as very vulnerable. Today hostile

regimes in Ethiopia, South Yemen, Afghanistan and Iran pose a

threat to the kingdom's security. The kingdom has a small

armed force, an increasingly concentrated populace, a profound

sense of responsibility for the peace and protection of the

holy cities of Islam, Mecca and Medina, a conservative regime

the target of communist forces around it, and a proven record

of working closely with the U.S. during the last forty years--

all in juxtaposition to the need to defend the largest oil

reserves in the world, the oil fields of the Eastern Province essential to the West and ultimately to the entire globe. (1)

(1) Fred Dutton, (Special Consultant to the Saudi Arabian government) "Questions on the President's Authorization of U.S. sale of F-15 Planes for the Defense of Saudi Arabia" (1978) p.8.

20 21

In order for Saudi Arabia to properly defend itself it may have to bring in outside forces to aid in the defense.

Recent reports have indicated that Pakistan is one country already assisting Saudi Arabia in manpower. Such a situation could introduce potentially disloyal and radical elements into the Saudi armed forces.

It cannot be emphasized enough that, the Saudis will turn to other countries for military assistance only if the United

States turns them down. By getting involved in Saudi military needs, the U.S. will maintain tight security cooperation with the Saudis, which would tend to limit the emergence of disloyal and radical elements in the Saudi armed forces.

Saudi Arabia has other strategic worries besides Israel and the Soviet Union. Indeed, it would be dangerous and rather naive for U.S. policy-makers to judge Saudi Arabia's overall defense requirements mainly in terms of the

Arab-lsraeli conflict or the Soviet threat.

Paradoxically, while many people perceive and overestimate Arab oil power, the reverse may be true; Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates may not have enough power to maintain their own security or even independence over the long run. Their weakness presents a serious security problem to the West, which depends on Persian Gulf oil, while the Soviet Union is largely self-sufficient... In the south, the Republic of Yemen provides a center for subversion and infiltration, and in the north, Iraq, and to a lesser extent Syria, may do the same. (2)

The Financial Times of London in a special 8-page section on Saudi Arabia on March 20, 1978 concluded that Saudi Arabia's

(2) Fred Singer, "Limits of Arab Oil Power," Foreign Policy (Spring, 1978): 23. 22

new status is proving to be a mixed blessing. Saudi Arabia, given its political, social and bureaucratic makeup, has been— and is— singularly ill-equipped to cope with the importance thrust upon it. Saudi Arabia possesses one quarter of the world's proven oil reserves, and at the same time, because of its size and comparatively small number of its armed forces, it is almost incapable of protecting its valuable assets. (3)

Threats From the Soviet Union

Saudi Arabia has increasingly become the target of pressure from a number of different directions around the

Arabian Peninsula. The Soviet-Cuban build-up in the Horn of

Africa (barely a half-hour's flying time from key Saudi cities in the south) and the Soviet upgrading of the South Yemeni air and ground forces over the past year with the arrival of 500 to 2,000 Cuban advisors could serve to encourage the communist

South Yemeni government to undertake probing flights over

Saudi territory. Examining the map of the Middle East, an

American will see that Ethiopia (with its Soviet and Cuban forces) is similar in proximity to Saudi Arabia as northeastern Mexico is to Florida. The Soviet invasion of

Afghanistan jolted the Saudi consciousness almost as severely as the capture of the Grand Mosque. It was not only the proximity that bothered the Saudis, but that the invasion set a precedent, as it was the first time the Soviet Union used a friendship pact as a pretext for military intervention.

(31 Financial Times of London, (Special section, 8-page report on Saudi Arabia) March 20, 1978. 23

The Soviet, "friendship pact" with Afghanistan is the same type of pact the Russians enjoy with Iraq and South Yemen. Prince

Turki al-Faisal, Saudi Arabia's intelligence chief, warns that the same thing that happened in Afghanistan could happen in

Iraq and Yemen.(4)

Increasing Radicalization of the Arab world

The growing extremist pressure on Saudi Arabia is the consequence not only of chronic communist expansionism and new

Saudi wealth but, more specifically, Saudi Arabia's demonstrated opposition to the spread of communism, support for the free world economy and the U.S. dollar, restraint on oil pricing, moderation in the Arab world and close overall ties with the United States. All of this places the desert kingdom in a very precarious situation, especially in the eyes of radical Arab states.

Close contact with the West— especially the United

States— is very hard for the Saudis to defend to their Arab brothers, since it is the U.S. who strongly supports Israel and its continued occupation of Arab lands. Close contact with the U.S. is one thing; however, under no circumstances can the royal family afford to expand the relationship far beyond that stage. For example, U.S. bases on Saudi soil would be out of the question. Such a development would be tantamount to political suicide. Accepting U.S. military bases on Saudi territory would ignite radical Arab states to denounce Saudi Arabia as an American puppet.

(4) David B. Tinnin, "The Saudis Awaken To Their Vulnerability," Fortune (March 10, 1980) p.55. 24

This is precisely why the Saudis need the F-15s; they cannot

allow the U.S. to defend them so they chose the best

alternative— to defend themselves with sophisticated American weaponry. Due to growing Arab criticism that the Saudi

association with the United States has not brought expected political benefits, the Saudi leadership has been placed on

the defensive. The late King Faisal once bitterly complained

to an American ambassador:

You Americans do not make things easier for your friends. You disregard their concerns and thereby weaken their (political) influence in the area." (5)

The Saudi Government also seems to perceive the two

Yemens to the south as an imminent threat to its security. At

first, only Soviet-backed South Yemen presented any

challenge. However, last year's quarrel with the Saudis

forced the northern regime to turn to the Russians for more

arms and to begin unification talks with the South. Insofar

as the Russians will try to exploit, this development, the

Saudis must continue to view both Yemens as threats.

The Royal Saudi Air Force is small, even in Third World

terms and especially when considered in relation to GNP.

Virtually all of the region's air forces are equipped with modern fighter aircraft, such as late model MIG-21s, MIG-23s

and now even the latest Soviet MIG-25. Israel, of course,

possesses the U.S.-made F-15 in its huge arsenal of weapons.

(5) Herman F . Eilts "Security Considerations in the Persian Gulf," International Security 5 (Fall 1980) p.96. 25

All these fighters are capable of conducting air strikes in key areas of the kingdom at any time. According to the 1977

Comptroller's Report to Congress, because of the inadequate

Saudi air defense system and obsolete radar coverage, these aircraft can go undetected by flying low and successfully make hits on strategic oil targets.

Foreign Labor, Reformism and Conservatism

The tight-rope balancing act of mixing traditionalism with modernization is a precarious one. One of the many paradoxes faced by Saudi Arabia is the political need to reduce the number of foreign workers in the kingdom while massive modernization plans call for outside experts to run the huge infrastructure needed for full industrialization.

The question that arises is how Saudi Arabia is going to maintain its industrial revolution without drastically

depending on what could turn out to be a subversive underclass of foreign workers. In Saudi Arabia today there is one

foreign worker for every Saudi citizen in the labor force.

(6) Michael Collins points out that although the Mecca

incident had its source in internal religious disputes, the feared foreigners were involved. Collins adds that of the 63 men who were beheaded for their participation in the attack.

(6) David B. Tinnin, "The Saudis Awaken To Their Vulnerability," Fortune (March 10, 1980) p.51. 26

11 were Egyptian, 6 were South Yemeni, three were Kuwaitis, and one each were from Sudan, Iraq and North Yemen. (7)

While attempting to develop rapidly, Saudi Arabia has been warned of the ferocity with which traditionalists in the society resist change. Demonstrations by Shi'a Muslims near the oil fields and the seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca has shown the Saudis that they are indeed vulnerable from within. The incident at the Grand Mosque clearly demonstrates the rigid, fanatically conservative frame of mind with which the modernizers in the royal family must deal:

Mecca showed us we could be caught off guard,’ states Prince Turki ibn-Faisal, the son of the late King who heads the foreign intelligence service. 'As a result, we expect others to try something. (8)

According to the same Fortune article, the capture of the Grand Mosque was not orchestrated by the Soviets or radical Arabs, but was a completely internal affair--and, as such, was all the more ominous. The men who seized the mosque were Islamic zealots who objected to what they regarded as the desecration of the faith in Saudi Arabia. They blamed the royal family for laxity in adherence to Islamic laws. (9)

According to Herman F. Eilts, the threat caused by the

Mecca incident was overdramatized by the media. Eilts points

(7) Michael Collins, "Riyadh: The Saud Balance," The Washington Quarterly Vol. 4, Winter 1981 p.205.

(8) David B. Tinnin, "The Saudis Awaken To Their Vulnerability," Fortune March 10, 1980 p.48.

(9) Ibid, p. 52. 27

out that the political legitimacy of the House of Saud has for the past two centuries been rooted in its strong adherence to and espousal of (Wahhabi) Islam. Eilts adds that despite the massive modernization pace, the royal family prides itself on the Wahhabi association and the Qu'ran still remains the constitution of the land. Consequently, he says, the security gap that existed prior to the Mecca incident has been or is being corrected by Saudi intelligence. Eilts also observes that there is widespread talk that a measure of broader political liberalization in Saudi Arabia will occur as a result of the incident. Thus, the Mecca affair, regrettable though it was, will place the Saudis in a better position to handle an attack of this sort. More significantly, they may even be able to avoid a future attack altogether. (10)

The Saudi government's day-to-day actions are greatly influenced by the conflict between the Arabs and Israel over the Palestinian problem. The Saudis fear subversive attacks from their radical neighbors, including the thousands of

Palestinians now working within their own borders. Although the Saudis are seen by the West as moderates in the

Arab-lsraeli conflict, they felt compelled to denounce the

Camp David peace process. Saudi Arabia's Foreign Minister

Prince Saud al-Faisal describes the kingdom's position on Camp

David as follows;

(10) Herman P. Eilts, "Security Considerations in the Persian Gulf," International Security 5 Fall 1980 p.97. 28

The tragedy of Camp David is that it has fanned the hopes for peace while actually planting the seeds of war. If the present trends are allowed to continue, the Palestinians once again will become desperate and the Arab world will move toward more extreme positions. The problem now is yours. Basically, we can do no more as a stabilizing influence in the area than we already have accomplished. (11)

The main reason the Saudis publicly denounced the peace process was because it failed to provide for a Palestinian homeland, instead sacrificing a comprehensive peace in the region for a separate Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. (The

House of Saud came under domestic attack for not going far enough in its denunciation of the accords.

Threat From Within the Saudi Air Force

Another potential source of internal insurrection could originate within the Royal Saudi Air Force. Although such an occurence is less likely than a disturbance created by foreign workers, it must be remembered that the air force has been a traditional source of opposition to many Arab regimes. PBS'

1980 broadcast of the film "Death of a Princess" contended that King Faisal was faced with a near revolt of his air force led by high-ranking officers in the mid-1960s, and that it was quietly suppressed with a minimum of damage.

Undoubtedly the Saudi regime remembers the coup led by

Hafez al-Assad in Syria in 1970. Dissatisfied with the Atassi regime's decision to fight the Jordanians during the

Jordanian-Palestinian civil war in 1970, Assad led a group of

(11) David B . Tinnin, "The Saudis Awaken To Their Vulnerability," Fortune March 10, 1980 p.55. 29

high-ranking air force officers in an easily executed

bloodless coup. According to former Egyptian General Saad

Shazli's recent book "The Crossing of the Suez," the air force

has in the past placed heavy pressure on the Sadat and Nasser

regimes in Egypt. The reason for this is simple; of all the

branches of the armed forces in the Arab world, the air force

has traditionally contained the most nationalist officers.

This could help explain the enthusiasm of the Saudi regime to promptly request any planes and support equipment recommended

by the air force. Although a large number of the pilots are members of the royal family, there is an element of danger emanating from possible dissatisfaction on the part of those

officers with a Saudi-U.S. relationship that fails to produce

a stronger air corps.

Indeed, frequent meetings in the winter of 1977-78

between Prince Bandar and Prince Fahd bin Abdullah of the

Royal Saudi Air Force and Pentagon officials, as reported in a

number of newspapers at the time, suggest that the Saudi government wanted to prove to doubters in the air force that

the American connection was worthwhile. Under these

circumstances, it is easy to see why the Saudis are determined

to keep their armed forces, especially the air force, happy.

The risk of alienating the most powerful wing of the defense

forces is simply too great to ignore, even if no visible

threat exists at present; recent examples in Arab history prove this fact clearly.

The rivalry between the National Guard and the Air Force

has seen a good deal of questionable speculation in the 30

Western press, yet is a very real issue in Saudi affairs:

By splitting military power and encouraging rivalry between the Ministry of Defense and the National Guard, the royal family has presumably insured that neither can seize control in a military coup. (12)

The fact that Saudi Arabia is not under imminent threat of attack does not encourage a relaxation of preparation.

Recent events in the Middle East demonstrate clearly that potential aggressors can quickly become immediate threats.

But to predict that the House of Saud is doomed is to fail to grasp both the political make-up of Saudi Arabia and the

Saudis* ability to manipulate it. An understanding of the nature of both the Saudi political system and the role of the armed forces within it goes a long way towards reassessing the threats to the House of Saud and how they might be confronted.(13)

Israeli Preemptive Strike

The final area to be considered in assessing the threats posed to Saudi stability and the effect of the F-15 sale is the potential for a preemptive attack from Israel.

Some Israelis argue that even if Saudi Arabia remains neutral in a future Arab-lsraeli war, the mere presence of the F-15s in Saudi Arabia threatens Israeli security. The chance of a preemptive strike by Israel has now become a very real

(12) Michael Collins, "Riyadh: The Saud Balance," The Washington Quarterly Winter 1981: 204.

(13) Ibid. p. 208. 31

possibility. In other words, the sale of additional equipment to Saudi Arabia would transform Saudi Arabia into a confrontation state and thus a military target for the Israeli air force. The Israelis add that this, in turn, would make it more difficult for the Saudis to resist full-scale involvement

in future Arab-lsraeli conflicts. This argument is a tenuous one. The presence of F-15s in Saudi Arabia would not make certain any direct Saudi involvement in a future Arab Israel conflict. In the event of such a conflict, Israel could

justify such attacks on the grounds that Saudi Arabia's F-5s possess a combat range technically capable of reaching Eilat from Tabuk.

There has been public reference to the F-15s in

relation to Saudi Arabia's Tabuk military base, which has existed since before World War II. An air defense capability

was established there several years ago in order to protect the military base. As noted by former Secretary of State Vance

in Congressional testimony on March 9, 1978, the F-15s are of

sufficient importance militarily that they would not be placed at an advance base like Tabuk where they would constitute an

inviting target.

In summary, the real threat to Saudi Arabian security

comes from two sources; the unrest emanating from the

unresolved Palestinian problem, and the attempts by the Soviet

Union to gain influence in the Arab world. The latter is

facilitated by the former. The threat from revolutionary Iran

should not be underestimated, but to a large degree it, also. 32 has been and continues to be influenced by the general instability of the region. Likewise, the internal threats faced by the House of Saud have if not their origins then their motivation in the two above-mentioned sources of turmoil. It should be noted that the social agitation accompanying modernization in Saudi Arabia has its feet planted firmly in the troubles of the region as a whole. CHAPTER III

U.S. VIEWS ON SAUDI ARABIA'S DEFENSE NEEDS; PROS AND CONS

OF THE SALE FROM THE AMERICAN STANDPOINT

Saudi Arabia's large military purchases have received

increased attention in the Congress. Arguments have

been advanced that the military threats confronting

Saudi Arabia do not justify the large increase in sales

in recent years. Further concern has been expressed

that, through such sales, Saudi Arabia could become an

arsenal for the Arab States against Israel. The State

and Defense Departments, however, aver that Saudi arms

purchases are consistent with U.S. evaluations of Saudi

Arabia's defense needs. (1)

As has been clearly demonstrated, Saudi Arabia's major argument for the sales was its need for sophisticated military hardware for the purpose of protecting its vital interests.

(T) uVs. Congress, Perspectives on Military Sales to Saudi Arabia, Report to the Congress by the Comptroller General of the United States; (October 26, 1977) ID-77-19A p.l

33 34

To the extent that Saudi and American vital interests

coincided, the U.S agreed with the Saudi argument. After all,

any threat to the oil fields of the Gulf would spell potential

economic disaster for the West. But in 1978, the possibility

of such a threat seemed remote to many responsible American officials, namely those in the U.S. Senate. The Shah was

still in power, the attack on Mecca's Grand Mosque had yet to occur and the Soviet Union would not invade Afghanistan for another year and a half. Accordingly, the Saudi argument seemed less convincing to the U.S. than it did to the Saudis themselves.

Yet as early as 1977, the government of the United

States saw benefit in bolstering the oil kingdom's defenses:

According to the Defense Department, it is in the U.S. interest to encourage Saudi Arabia to continue to look to the United States as the primary source of guidance for modernizing the Saudi armed force. (2)

The reason for this was rather simple. A commitment by

Saudi Arabia to American military assistance would entail by necessity a close cooperation between the two nations for the foreseeable future. Training, development of infrastructure for U.S. support personnel and the presence of American advisers in the kingdom would guarantee the U.S. a foothold there for some time to come, while reducing the possibility of a negative Saudi reaction that could conceivably lead to

(2) U.S. Congress, Perspectives on Military Sales to Saudi Arabia, Report to the Congress by the Comptroller General of the United States; (October 26, 1977) ID-77-19A, p.l. 35 cutbacks in oil production as a retaliatory measure.

On the other hand, if Saudi Arabia were to be denied the aircraft and turn instead to another supplier, such as

France, the U.S. would lose all leverage and inherent advantages to be gained through military cooperation with the

Saudis. In addition, there would be the distinct danger of a reversion on Saudi Arabia's part to a hard-line on the

Arab-lsraeli dispute, thus jeopardizing America's role as honest broker in the Middle East dispute.

In any event, the Carter administration was convinced by the Saudi argument that there was a tangible threat to the kingdom's safety. The president's visit to Saudi Arabia in

1977 and the trip by Crown Prince Fahd to the U.S. seemed to have an impact on Carter's thinking, because the president by early 1978 was determined to pass the sale of F-15s to Saudi

Arabia, F-16s to Israel and F-5s to Egypt as a package deal.

In fact, the Saudi leaders made a special effort to elicit a promise from Gerald Ford, and then Carter, to sell them the aircraft. The importance of the deal to America's leading source of imported oil was not lost on the administration, and the whole process developed a momentum of its own.

But the Saudi argument was not the only factor in

Carter's thinking. The Defense Department had concluded that the requests were consistent with Saudi Arabia's defense needs based on earlier studies. The Leahy study in 1971 concluded that F-5s sold to the Saudis were essential to their national defense. 36

In fact. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown recommended

the sales on August 30, 1977 for a number of reasons, all of

them delineated in studies prepared by the Pentagon. The

Saudi air force consisted mainly of British Lightning

fighters, which were deemed incapable of meeting the kingdom's defense needs. For military as well as psychological reasons,

the Saudis required protection against the Shah's growing military buildup and the increasing strength of

Soviet-sponsored Iraq. In addition, Saudi Arabia needed the

aircraft to defend its vital oil terminals and the sea routes

to the West through the Strait of Hormuz, as well as those on

the Red Sea and the actual oil fields.

Above and beyond all these factors, the Saudis were defended as a moderate force within OPEC, and the sales would

ensure continued pricing restraint and a relatively high level

of production. Finally, the U.S. balance of payments, low at

the time, would benefit greatly from a cash sale which would

serve to recycle Saudi oil funds in an orderly manner.

Major U.S. Political Considerations Relative to the Sale

Henry Kissinger best summed up the issue of arms sales

as political leverage over strategically or politically

important countries:

Every nation has the paramount concern and sovereign responsibility to maintain its own security and to define its needs. The United States cannot expect to retain influence with those nations whose perceived defense needs we disregard. (3)

(3) U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on International Relations, Hearings, 94th Cong., Second Sess., Report of Secretary of State Kissinger on his trip to Latin America, p.20 37

The United States, according to Bryan Soderholm-Difatte of the Congressional Research Service, has three major objectives in the Middle East. First, it must ensure access to the oil supplies of the Persian Gulf at the lowest price available. Until an alternative energy source is found, the

U.S. and the rest of the industrialized world will be dependent on Middle East oil. The U.S. currently imports 8 to

10% of its oil requirements from Saudi Arabia. Given the importance of oil to the American economy, a second policy objective of the U.S. is the encouragement of political stabililty and the containment of Soviet or other radical influences in the region, since such influences posed a direct threat to the West's oil supply lines. Similarly, a radical regime in Saudi Arabia might threaten Western access to

Arabia's oil.

A third U.S. policy objective is the solution of the

Arab-lsraeli dispute. As long as the Palestinian question remains unresolved. Western interests in the Middle East will be in jeopardy. The U.S. is obliged to find a balance between its responsibility to Israel's security and the need for a settlement to the issue of the displaced Palestinians.

All of these issues came into play during the debate on the F-15. The Saudis made it clear that the aircraft were crucial to their defense needs, and that refusal of their request would carry the most profound implications for

U.S.-Saudi relations. From the American point of view, therefore, the arguments for the sale in the context of Gulf politics and oil resources can be summed up as follows: 38

— Saudi Arabia claimed a legitimate defense need for the F-15 to replace the aged British Lightning fighters which had served as the backbone of its air force. In fact, the Saudis had long been having problems with the Lightnings; the aircraft required a high degree of maintenance and were seldom more than 50% operational at any given time in 1978. (4) The

90 F-5s ordered by Saudi Arabia from the U.S. in 1974 were never intended by the Saudis to replace the Lightnings. The

Saudis would need a follow-up interceptor to replace the

Lightnings, and, in 1974, the U.S. supposedly agreed in principle to provide an advanced fighter by 1980. The F-15 would provide an air superiority that no nation in the region, other than Israel, could match. (5)

— Saudi Arabia had a legitimate defense need for the F-15 as a military and psychological counter to Iran's military buildup and as a counter to Iraq, which was supplied by the U.S.S.R.

The Saudi argument was that a threat from either of these nations would be a direct threat to the West, since the West has such a high stake in Saudi Arabia's security.

— The Saudis needed the P-15s to secure the defense of the vital sea lanes to Saudi oil terminals in the Eastern province on the Gulf and on the Red Sea, as well as the oil fields proper. Without such a defense capability, the Saudis argued, they would be unable to protect themselves in a situation

(4) David Long, Saudi Arabia, Washington Papers #39; Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies (Washington, 1979) p.45, 58.

(5) "Letter by Assistant Secretary of Defense McGinnert to Congressman Dodd," reprinted in the Washington Star, 7 July 1977, p.A4. 39 where their very wealth would be an invitation to attack from ambitious rivals. They contended that it was the U.S.' responsibility, as its major Western ally, to provide Saudi

Arabia with the means to protect itself.

--As stated previously, the meeting of those defense needs would go a long way toward safeguarding U.S. interests and

Western access to Gulf oil supplies at a time when the Western world is more dependent than ever on oil.

--The sale of the F-15s to Saudi Arabia would strengthen regional stability in the Gulf. Political stability in the

Gulf is vital to U.S. strategic interests and the sale of the aircraft would help to serve those interests by making Saudi

Arabia a pillar of the American regional defense system.

— Saudi Arabia had consistently been a moderating influence in

OPEC pricing councils and the proposed sale of the F-15s would assist in the promotion of continuing Saudi Arabian restraint with regard to oil pricing. The argument concerning continued

Saudi cooperation on oil pricing was a trump card for the administration; each argument against the sale was countered by a warning from the Carter administration that the Saudis might react negatively to a U.S. refusal by reducing oil output.

--The sale of the F-15s would assist the U.S. balance of payments and would recycle surplus oil revenues in an orderly and non-disruptive manner. The economic argument was a powerful one; many senators represented areas where factories that produced F-15 parts were located. Loss of such a major 40 contract for McDonnell-Douglas would have a strong economic impact in Texas and California, among other places. On a larger scale, the Saudis' willingness to pay hard cash for their aircraft (as well as the Egyptians') would bolster the

U.S. balance of payments at just the right time.

From the standpoint of the Arab-lsraeli conflict, there existed another set of arguments for the sale:

--Saudi Arabia had a legitimate defense need for the F-15 to protect against Israeli overflights of its territory and to defend against possible Israeli air attacks in the event of another Arab-lsraeli war.

— The sales would promote continued Saudi political and economic support of moderate Arab positions with regard to

Israel and would facilitate a negotiated settlement of the

Arab-lsraeli conflict by demonstrating, not only to Saudi

Arabia, but also to Egypt and Syria, U.S. sensitivity to Arab security concerns.

--The sales, by demonstrating such a sensitivity to Saudi defense needs, might avert an oil embargo or production cutback against the Western powers in the event of increasing

Arab-lsraeli tension.

--Since Saudi Arabia had no military involvement in the last three Arab-lsraeli wars, there is little likelihood that Saudi

Arabia will use or allow the use of its F-15s against Israel in any future armed conflict. (6)

(3) Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Proposed F-15 Sale to Saudi Arabia, December 1977, p.5-6. 41

Perhaps the most telling argument, however, was a military one. Although it seemed to have been played down in the 1978 debates, the Report of the Comptroller General to the

Congress of October 26, 1977 offered several powerful defenses of the sale:

Saudi Arabia is vital to the United States for political, economic, and geographical reasons. Therefore, there are no immediate prospects for limiting U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia. To the contrary, present U.S. policy is to support the Saudi Arabian Government effort to obtain a modern defense capability. This support is expected to continue for the foreseeable future. (7)

The conclusions made by the Comptroller General were taken in no small measure from the results of studies made by the Defense Department in 1970, 1972 and 1974. The Leahy

Study of 1970, conducted at the request of the Saudi government, recommended that the Saudi ministry of aviation should be reorganized and a five-year defense plan be developed, as well as that the Saudi navy and air force be placed on an equal level with the army. The study also recommended that the aging F-86 and T-33 aircraft be replaced. This recommendation led to the modernization of the

Royal Saudi Air Force under the U.S.-managed Peace Hawk program.

(7) U.S. Congress, Perspectives on Military Sales to Saudi Arabia, Report to the Congress by the Comptroller General of the United States; (October 26, 1977) ID-77-19A, p. 6. 42

The Leahy study served as the basis for a memorandum of understanding signed in 1972 whereby the U.S. agreed to provide Saudi Arabia with the technical wherewithal to modernize and expand its navy. (8)

This was followed by a Department of Defense study in

1974. In December 1973, the Saudi government asked the U.S. to conduct a survey of the Royal Saudi Air Force and produce a master plan for its development over a 5-to-lO year period.

In March of 1974, the United States agreed to make the survey but suggested that it be carried out in context with a survey of total Saudi armed forces under the Saudi Ministry of

Defense and Aviation.

The overall objective of the 1974 survey was to assist

Saudi Arabia to evaluate its defense plans and programs and to develop a plan to improve its armed forces' capability to defend the country. The survey made numerous recommendations for improving the organization of the Ministry of Defense and

Aviation and for modernizing and expanding the Saudi armed forces. These included mechanized and airborne brigades, tactical fighter and airlift/refueling aircraft, helicopters and naval ships. (9)

The Comptroller General's study summed up the conclusions of these surveys:

(8) U.S. Congress, Perspectives on Military Sales to Saudi Arabia, Report to the Congress by the Comptroller General of the United States; (October 26, 1977) ID-77-19A, p.8-9.

(9) Ibid. p.9. 43

It appears that Saudi Arabia needs to develop a basic defense capability to protect its borders and oil resources. Department of Defense surveys identified Saudi military needs, which appear to be limited to a basic defense capability. In making these surveys, the U.S. has influenced Saudi Arabia's military expansion and modernization plans, and DOD's influence increases the probability of continued U.S. assistance to implement these plans. The result is continued U.S. presence and influence in Saudi Arabia, which could be important to the attainment of U.S. security objectives. (10)

It would appear that the administration was convinced on the basis of thorough studies by the Department of Defense that Saudi Arabia needed the F-15s for its defense, but even more important, that sale of the aircraft would give the U.S. a strategic role for years to come in the effort to achieve

Gulf security.

Arguments Against the Sale

Despite all the arguments in the favor of the sale, congressional opponents, armed with contradictory information, contended that the sale would be little short of a disaster.

They had a more than a little help from the pro-Israel lobby in the U.S., led by the American Israel Public Affairs

Committee (AIPAC). In fact, the Saudis, not to mention the

Carter administration, expected all the arguments that were to be used to justify refusal of the sales. From the standpoint of Gulf oil politics, the major arguments against the sales were numerous:

(10) Report to the Congress, by the Comptroller General of the United States, p.10. 44

— Saudi Arabia's need to defend its strategic interests could be met with a fighter less sophisticated than the F-15.

--Instead of promoting stability, the sales threaten to further fuel a Gulf arms race that has been raging at least since 1972.

— Saudi Arabia has yet to technologically master the relatively unsophisticated F-5s which it ordered from the

United States. The F-15 is perhaps the world's most sophisticated aircraft and is well beyond the Saudis' technological and flight competence. The Saudis would for many years be dependent upon American technological assistance to maintain and operate the F-15s on a day-by-day basis.

— There are serious contradictions in Saudi society that could serve to undermine the present government's political stability and threaten to compromise the sophisticated technology behind the F-15 and, consequently, current

U.S.-Saudi relations. The security of the Saudi regime does not inspire confidence in the safety of F-15 technology.

— The sale of F-15s is irrelevant to the Saudi position on oil pricing; Saudi Arabia's position on oil prices would be based on Saudi Arabia's prevailing political and economic interests in any case.

--Saudi Arabia could better spend the $1.5 billion to be paid out for the F-15s on internal development projects. (11)

(TT) U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Proposed F-15 Sale to Saudi Arabia, December 1977, pp.4-5. 45

In each instance, the administration and the Saudis had ready answers for the opponents of the sale. First of all, rapidly changing circumstances in the Gulf and growing Saudi vulnerability dictated a far more sophisticated fighter than the F-5. Second, the danger of a possible Soviet threat justified the introduction of more weaponry into the area.

Third, the Department of Defense, according to its studies, anticipated that Saudi pilots, after intensive training programs, would be capable of flying the F-15s successfully.

Fourth, none of the studies undertaken by the U.S. government indicated a threat to the stability of the Saudi regime. In any case, according to the administration, the U.S. would monitor the situation closely to insure the integrity of sensitive U.S. technology. Another important argument was the administration's desire, contrary to that of the critics, to establish a drawn out involvement in Saudi military planning.

This would assure the U.S. a prominent role in countering any potential Soviet strategic moves in the Gulf.

However, the most serious and difficult arguments against the sales were those presented in the context of the

Arab-Israeli conflict:

--The sales would upset the Arab-Israeli military balance because there is no guarantee that in some future war between the Arabs and Israel the Saudis would not themselves use their

P-15s against Israel or would not transfer them to another

Arab state for use against Israel. 46

— The sale of the F-15s to Saudi Arabia might provoke an

Israeli pre-emptive strike against Saudi Arabia's F-15 air bases in the event of another conflict because of the threat posed by the fighters to the Arab-Israeli military balance.

— The sale of the F-15s to the Saudis threatens to add greater impetus to the Arab-Israeli arms race as Israel seeks additional advanced and highly sophisticated fighter aircraft from the U.S. as a counter to the Saudi purchases.

— There is no Israeli military threat to Saudi Arabia which requires an aircraft as sophisticated as the F-15. (12)

— Finally, although Secretary of Defense Brown assured

Congress there would be no additional equipment, offensive or otherwise, for the aircrafts requested by or sold to the

Saudis, the possibility exists that a change of heart by the

Carter administration or a subsequent administration would lead to just, such a result.

Again, the administration had ready rebuttals. The most recent DOD and Congressional Research studies indicated that the Arab nations could not possibly learn to fly the F-15 so as to pose a threat to Israel any time in the foreseeable future, even in case of war. Second, the administration acknowledged that the threat to Saudi Arabia from Israel was not the issue; the worry of the Saudis and the administration was that Saudi Arabia had not the means to defend

(12) Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Proposed F-15 Sale to Saudi Arabia, December 1977, pp. 6-7. 47 itself against a threat from Soviet-backed elements in the region.

In the final analysis, the aircraft were sold over congressional objections because the U.S. agreed there was a tangible threat to Saudi stability, because the U.S. could not afford to offend the Saudis and risk a cutback in oil production, and because the U.S. saw a golden opportunity to establish itself as the primary force in a regional security umbrella, with the sale of the aircraft inspiring the sort of confidence that might lead to military bases in the future, whether on Saudi soil or somewhere else in the Gulf region. The planes, in effect, would be a gesture of goodwill to an invaluable ally. In the long run, these powerful arguments completely overwhelmed the objections of the skeptics in the

Senate, the pro-Israel lobby and in Israel itself. CHAPTER IV

SAUDI ARABIA'S LOBBYING STRATEGY

To a considerable extent, Saudi Arabia benefited from

the most sophisticated and effective lobbying effort ever put

forth on behalf of an Arab state in the U.S. From the very

beginning, the Saudis enlisted professional help in convincing

the Congress and the public that the F-15s were necessary to

Saudi Arabia's, and therefore to America's, security.

The Saudi government threw some of its most personable

and articulate dignitaries, guided by seasoned veterans of the

American political scene, into the fray. Prince Bandar bin

Sultan, son of the Defense Minister and a military pilot.

Prince Turki al-Faisal, son of the late king and head of Saudi

intelligence, Ghazi al-Gosaibi, the Minister of Industry and

Electricity, Ambassador Ali Alireza and Minister of Commerce

Sulaiman Solaym all participated in a well-coordinated effort

to "educate" the U.S. about Saudi Arabia and its needs. They

were quite successful, given the ultimate decision.

As western-educated, sophisticated and low-key as these

men were, however, they could not have been as successful

without top-flight guidance. This came in the person of such

48 49

figures as Washington attorneys Clark Clifford, Pred Dutton,

former Senator J. William Pulbright, and South Carolina political consultant Crawford Cook. After it became apparent

that the battle would take place on the Senate floor, the

Saudis launched their plan to turn the tide of American public and congressional opinion. The advice provided by their consultants led to the steady stream of visits by Saudi dignitaries to the U.S.

Initially, the effort consisted of get-acquainted meetings between Bandar and Turki and known sympathizers in the Senate and House. The erudite Bandar was quite successful in gaining access to influential members of the Senate:

Prince Bandar is being assisted by a group of highly paid American legal, financial and public relations advisers. The Prince has already met privately with 40 senators and over 50 members of the Congress, His message is that his country wants the F-15 jet for defensive use only and if the sale does not go through then the Saudis will turn elsewhere. (1)

Indeed, this was the simple message conveyed by all the

Saudi emissaries. To a great extent, they were handicapped by the vigorous lobbying campaign mounted against the sale by the

American Israel Public Affairs Committee, as well as deep-rooted misperceptions about Saudi Arabia in Congress and in the nation in general. According to Stephen Conner, adviser to the Saudi foreign ministry:

(1) NBC Evening News, Douglas Kiker Reporting, (Transcript), 13 May 1978. 50

There are an awful lot of misperceptions about the Saudis. Americans are told that they are a strange people who don't understand the West. So when a Western-educated Saudi speaking perfect English discusses a highly sensitive issue— and with restraint--it makes an impression on people... One of the points we're trying to get across is that Saudi Arabia is fundamentally conservative, anti-Communist, and tied to the U.S. Many people don't realize that the Saudis have been receiving military aid from the United States since 1944. (2)

Another example of the sort of obstacle that confronted

the Saudis is provided by statements made by Jimmy Carter's

former Jewish Affairs adviser Mark Siegel. Siegel in May of

1978 claimed that King Khaled threatened Carter with "economic

blackmail" if he didn't get immediate action on the F-15s.

White House Press Secretary Jody Powell called Siegel's

allegations "total fabrications." He added that Siegel was

not even present at the January 1978 meeting between Carter

and Khaled, the notes of which showed that while the proposed

F-15 sale was discussed, oil prices and the dollar were not.

(3) In fact, Siegel later was discovered to have been cooperating with AIPAC and other pro-Israel lobbying

organizations in their effort to kill the sale. Said Conner

of the Siegel allegation:

Anybody who knows anything about the Saudis knows that they do not threaten like that, (4)

(2) Daniel Southerland, "Saudis' Quiet Persistent F-15 Lobbying Effort," Christian Science Monitor, (May 15, 1978.) P- 2

(3) Ibid.

(4) Ibid. 51

In fact, the Saudis resorted to rational arguments designed to appeal to America's perception of its own security interests. The major points raised by the Saudis were the defensive nature of the aircraft, the pledge to Secretary of

State Vance from Prince Saud that they would not be used against Israel or stationed at the Tabuk air force base in the northwestern corner of the Arabian peninsula within easy reach of Israel and that the F-15s would not be transfered to another Arab state in the event of war. They also stressed the fact that Saudi Arabia's ability to defend itself against threats to its oil fields was as much in the U.S.' interest as it was in Saudi Arabia's. Then there was the real danger, articulated by Bandar and others, that the Saudis would go elsewhere if turned down by the United States, However, on the economic side was the ever-present, though never spoken, threat of retaliation in the form of reduced oil output and higher prices in the event the sale was refused.

Perhaps the most telling argument in the Saudi arsenal was the low key, genteel appeal to the Senate in the name of the U.S.“Saudi "special relationship." Wave after wave of

Saudi visitors stressed the importance of that relationship to the future of both countries. But the Saudis were not alone.

The efforts of the Carter administration to impress upon the

Senate the importance of maintaining the relationship were herculean, to say the least. One lobbyist for the other side accused Carter of unleashing his whole cabinet to lobby for 52 the F-15 sales. "Everytime we call a senator or congressman, we find they've just finished talking with someone from the administration." (5)

In great measure, the determination of the administration was reponsible for ultimately getting the sales through the Senate. But the Saudis helped themselves in other ways. By early spring, the Saudis, who have been traditionally reluctant to appear on U.S. television, were appearing in interviews on the major networks. Formal statements were issued in the New York Times and other major

American newspapers explaining the Saudi position. Full-page ads were taken out in major papers. Expensive four-page full color advertising supplements toasting four decades of cooperation and the "special relationship" appeared in both

Time and Newsweek. Both magazines gave cover play to Saudi

Arabia's development boom. (6)

American journalists all of the sudden found it easier to obtain visas to the kingdom. And finally, the plethora of consultants and lawyers assisting the Saudis began to grow by leaps and bounds. By May of 1978, the polls showed a more favorable public image of Saudi Arabia in the U.S. Said a

Senate Foreign Relations committee staffer, "It is a full court press." Another was quoted:

(3) Daniel Southerland, "Saudis* Quiet Persistent F-15 Lobbying Effort," Christian Science Monitor, (May 15, 1978.) p. 2

(6) Richard Harwood and Ward Sinclair, "Lobbying for Warplane Brings Saudis Out of Isolation," Washington Post, 7 May 1978, p. 1. 53

There is a changed atmosphere, no doubt about it. You are seeing an evolution. There is an enhanced perception up here about the Arab cause. And they're doing a helluva lot better public relations job. They're learning very well. (7)

The Saudis had learned very well. For the first time, an Arab state had taken on the powerful pro-Israel lobby in the corridors of the United States Congress and won. This was a radical departure from the 50s and 60s, when all Arab efforts to appeal to the U.S. were in vain.

It is worthwhile to examine several Arab negotiating efforts with the Unites States, simply because history provides prototypical support for the Saudi lobbying strategy. In most instances where the country in question made its request of the United States on the grounds that its security was threatened by the growing Communist-backed threat, the U.S. responded. The first memorable cases were in the late 1950s. Lebanon experienced civil disturbances in

1958 that were in part inspired by power struggles between conservative and pro-Nasser forces. President Camille Chamoun pleaded for aid on the grounds that Soviet-backed Nasserists were threatening Lebanon's sovereignty, and therefore jeopardizing U.S. interests. Eisenhower and Dulles promptly responded with a contingent of Marines. Soon afterward, the

U.S. and Britain pumped dollars and paratroopers, respectively, into Jordan to save King Hussein from the sort of leftist coup that toppled and killed his cousin Faisal

(T) Richard Harwood and Ward Sinclair, "Lobbying for Warplane Brings Saudis Out of Isolation," Washington Post, 7 May 1978, p. 1. 54 in Iraq, Indeed, through thick and thin, Hussein has continued to receive American aid and weaponry largely because the U.S. can ill-afford a leftist coup in Jordan.

In vivid contrast, Nasser's request of Dulles that the

U.S. finance the Aswan High Dam project fell on deaf ears, simply because there was not sufficient evidence in Dulles' mind that such support of Nasser would further U.S. strategic interests to any great degree. This pattern has repeated itself over and over again throughout the history of America's dealings with the Middle East. In 1975, the Lebanese government failed to demonstrate the immediacy of a

Communist-inspired threat, and as a result received little or no help from a gun-shy American administration not yet recovered from the fiasco in Southeast Asia.

On another scale, the positive equation worked for

Anwar al-Sadat. Prior to his visit to Jerusalem, he could hardly have hoped for any U.S. aid, especially military. Yet just five months after he visited the Israeli Knesset, the

Carter administration was requesting that Congress sell the man that once was Israel's most implacable foe a squadron of relatively sophisticated F-5 jet fighters.

This brings us to Saudi Arabia. The oil-rich kingdom made it a point to stress to the American government that the planes were necessary to protect against a possible Soviet inspired threat. Prince Bandar let this be known to the press during one of his visits to Washington in the spring of 1978: 55

Rather than Israel, the prince said, the widening Soviet military presence in the Horn of Africa is one big source of worry and the communist government of South Yemen another. South Yemen, he said, is being built up militarily by the Soviet Union to the point that it looks like a launching pad for attacks against Saudi Arabia... The Soviets, he said, already have delivered Mig 21 fighters to South Yemen. The prince, who is one of the Saudi air force's pilots, said his country's aging squadrons of British Lightning fighters are no match for the more modern Mig 21s already in South Yemen, (8) Still, despite all this idealogical and historical support, the Saudis were forced to stay with the soft sell.

This was the case for several reasons. First, for most congressmen, the Middle East was a new subject, requiring as much as anything an educational campaign. Second was the hard fact that Americans are sensitive to the notion that Arabs are buying up influence with their oil money. So, the first stage of the "soft sell" involved the enlistment of the professional lobbyists charged with the task of changing America’s image of the Arabs, This was the groundwork that preceded the visits of the Saudi leaders to the U.S., and it worked quite well. (9)

With regard to the thorny issue of the American perception of Arab oil money buying up the country, however, the Saudis had well placed assistance in influential places.

Lobbying hard behind the scenes on their behalf were some rather powerful American corporations with a large stake in

Saudi Arabia:

(8) George C. Wilson, "Study Backs Saudis Needs for F15s," Washington Post, 30 April 1978, p. 2

(9) Steven Roberts, "Arab Lobby's Specialty: Soft Sell, Tough Message," New York Times, 1 May 1978. 56

...Former Vice President Nelson Rockefeller was reported 'deeply involved' in negotiating with Saudi Arabia for a development corporation that would use Saudi money in food and energy projects primarily in the United States but also in underdeveloped lands... In a related development, the Coca-Cola company was reported by the New York Times yesterday to be accelerating a campaign to enter the Arab market with major new energy projects in Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Both are contingent, it was said, on its removal from the Arabs' blacklist of American companies doing business with Israel or companies which have Jewish Americans in important management positions. (10)

This pattern was repeated over and over again as more

and more corporations became involved in Saudi Arabia. The

fact that President Carter was well-connected with Coca-Cola

may or may not be incidental, but there is little doubt that

pressure was brought to bear upon the administration from

American interests afraid of antagonizing the Saudis.

Perhaps the most important allies the Saudis had in the

American business community were the oil companies. Aramco

and its subsidiary companies (Mobil, Exxon, Sunoco, and

Texaco) had a vital stake in persuading the U.S. to go forward with the sales. First, they would reap a measure of the

Saudis' goodwill, and second, the planes would naturally

enhance their sense of security with respect to the safety of

the Arabian peninsula's oil resources. While there is little

in the way of documentation regarding oil corporation pressure on the administration to sell the aircraft, it is an established fact that most elements in the oil industry

favored the sale of F-15s to Saudi Arabia.

(10) Joseph Polakoff, "Saudis Launch Massive PR Push for American Support," Nashville Observer, 8 April 1978, 57

In addition to the oil companies were roughly sixty

prominent corporations that built parts or components for the

F-15. Their importance cannot be exaggerated, for they are

spread out all over the U.S., covering nearly half the

states. Hundreds of thousands of jobs were affected by the decision, a factor that put unusual pressure on nearly half of

the U.S. Senate. The loss of a contract such as that for the production of 60 sophisticated jet fighters would have meant

severe economic hardship at a time when the economy could

ill-afford additional difficulties.

Among the companies involved were such names as Alcoa,

Bendix, Brunswick, Collins Radio, Douglas Aircraft, General

Electric, Goodyear, Honeywell, Hughes Aircraft, IBM, Kaiser

Aluminum, Litton, McDonnell-Douglas, Sperry Rand, Teledyne,

Magnavox, Philco-Ford, Pratt and Whitney and Raytheon. These companies consequently brought pressure to bear upon the

Congress to act in favor of the sales; their views are known to have had some impact on the legislators involved.

Another reason the Saudi lobbying effort was so successful was the fact that the influx of so much hard cash

in payment for the aircraft would be no small boost for the

U.S. balance of trade. This obviously was a positive factor in the administration's thinking. But there were negative incentives as well, and these were far more important; 58

His (Carter's] financial advisers have warned him that erosion of the Saudi connection might well result in shifting some of the multibillions of dollars invested in U.S. government securities and U.S. banks elsewhere and reduce the $5 billion in non-military U.S. purchases programmed for 1978." (11)

This was suggested by many financial experts who feared a resulting panic if the Saudis took such action. No threat was ever made by the Saudis to take such action, nor would it have been practical on their part. Nevertheless, the possibility was there, and it could not be totally discounted. After all, no one predicted an oil embargo and the ensuing 500% price hike in 1973-74.

Lurking in the back of every American decision-maker's mind was the real fear that Saudi Arabia would respond to an

American refusal by a reduction in oil exports accompanied by higher prices. Although no official threats were made, the

Saudis did make it clear that this would be an option. Sheikh

Ahmed Zaki Yamani, the Saudi oil minister, was quoted in the

Washington Post;

[if the sale of the F-15s was rejected] "We will have a feeling that you are not concerned with our security and don't appreciate our friendship." (12)

(11) Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, "Behind the F-15 Fight," Washington Post, 1 May 1978.

(12) Peter Osnos and David B. Ottaway, "Saudis Are Investing Plane Deal With Important Political Significance," Washington Post, 4 May 1978. 59

And from Prince Saud, the usually restrained foreign minister:

There would be questioning undoubtedly and undoubtedly the effect would be a réévaluation in the assessment of what the extent of our relations with the United States should be. (13)

The latent fear that these remarks might contain a

veiled threat and the accompanying fear that the Saudis might

turn somewhere else, such as France, was worth all the

lobbying efforts the relatively inexperienced Saudis could

ever have hoped to mount. It is important that the Saudis

never actually threatened, for most observers agreed that this

would have practically killed the deal. Far better to keep

the threat implicit than to appear to be bullying the most

powerful nation in the free world.

The success of the Saudi lobbying effort was

attributable to several other factors as well. First, the

Arab image in the United States was enhanced immeasurably by

the immense popularity of Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat in

America. His trip to Jerusalem, to a great extent, reduced

the myth of the Arab "barbarian" in the U.S. It became more

difficult for the pro-Israel lobby to paint all Arabs as

determined to destroy Israel. That and the determined effort

by the Saudis to convince the nation that the weapons were

truly for defensive purposes proved all-important in the final

analysis.

(13) Peter Osnos and David B. Ottaway, "Saudis Are Investing Plane Deal With Important Political Significance," Washington Post, 4 May 1978. 60

In that context, the Saudis helped themselves

tremendously by refraining from threats while continuing high

production levels and advocating pricing moderation in OPEC

councils. Added to this were the frequent high-level

get-acquainted meetings with key senators and the immediate

point-by-point rebuttals from Riyadh of efforts to distort

Saudi actions and policy statements.

The Israelis themselves were a factor. As it became

more and more evident that the deal would pass, they and their

supporters became pronouncedly more shrill. The pro-Israel

lobby, by its attacks on Brzezinski, Lipshutz, Carter and

other officials, alienated many senators that might have

otherwise gone along with Israel automatically.

In the end, however, it seems that a combination of the

fact that American officials were truly convinced that the planes were for defensive purposes, and a real fear among U.S.

officials of what the Saudis might do if refused, accounted

for the decision to go ahead with the sale. In any event, the

F-15 deal was the first major victory for an Arab nation on

the U.S. political battlefield, and it set the stage for bolder and more determined efforts by Saudi Arabia and other

Arab states to cut into the long-standing Israeli monopoly on the "special relationship" with the United States. What future success the Arabs enjoy in this regard will be largely attributable to how well they learn and apply the lessons of the 1978 battle. CHAPTER V

POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

U.S.-Saudi Relations

In general, Saudi Arabia has been supportive of U.S. peace efforts in the Middle East and strongly opposed to the expansion of communist influence on the Arabian Peninsula.

Saudi Arabia has played a major role in assisting United

States foreign policy objectives in the Gulf and the Middle

East as a whole, especially in influencing other Arab countries in which the United States has limited support:

Over the years, the two countries have enjoyed a good relationship, and indications are that the Saudis want to continue this relationship. Consequently, foreign military sales issues and their applications to Saudi defense needs must be viewed in context with overall U.S. interests in that area of the world. (1)

Saudi Arabia's vast wealth as a result from revenues from her massive oil reserves and its willingness to use oil as an instrument of political leverage (Arab Oil Embargo

(1) U.S. Congress, Perspectives on Military Sales to Saudi Arabia, Report to the Congress by the Comptroller General of the United States; (October 26, 1977) ID-77-19A, p.7.

61 62

1973-74) against the West has thrust Saudi Arabia into a

political leadership role among its fellow Arab states. As a

result, Saudi Arabia now enjoys considerable political clout

in the area. Another reason Saudi Arabia is so important

politically is its geographic and strategic location. Saudi

Arabia occupies the largest part of the Arabian Peninsula and

has common borders with several Arab states, with the Red Sea

on the West--access to the Suez Canal--and the Persian Gulf on

the East--Strait of Hormuz.

Saudi Arabia is vital to the United States for political, economic, and geographic reasons. Therefore, there are no immediate prospects for limiting U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia. To the contrary, present U.S. policy is to support the Saudi Arabian Government effort to obtain a modern defense capability. This support is expected to continue in the foreseeable future. (2)

Saudi Arabia (and the entire Gulf region) is indeed an

area of major concern to the United States. It will

undoubtedly remain so for some time to come; the United States

is deeply concerned about the security of Saudi Arabia. Thus,

this security interest must be followed through with continued

relations. (3) Consequently, in its new and powerful role,

Saudi promotion of friendly, mutually beneficial relations,

Saudi Arabia has been thrust to the front rank of U.S. allies,

strategically placed immediately behind Western Europe and

Japan.

(2) U.S. Congress, Perspectives on Military Sales to Saudi Arabia, Report to the Congress by the Comptroller General of the United States; (October 26, 1977) ID-77-19A, p. 6,

(3) Herman F. Eilts, "Security Considerations in the Persian Gulf," International Security, 5 Pall 1980 p.80. 63

In regard to U.S. policy objectives against which U.S.

arms sales to Saudi Arabia ought to be measured. Assistant

Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

(now U.S. Ambassador to Egypt) Alfred (Roy) Atherton, Jr. said;

Saudi Arabia has long been an important factor and its views have long been influential in the region of the Middle East. Saudi Arabia also wields considerable and growing international influence which has been effectively brought to bear to support our efforts to forge a peace settlement and in support of moderated governments in the area, while at the same time working to check the expansion of Soviet influence and the radical forces in the region. (4)

Thus, the situation is such that a Congressional

refusal to sell the F-15s to the Saudis might undermine the

U.S. policy objective of encouraging Arab moderation, a goal

that cannot practically be achieved without Saudi Arabian

support.

Refusal of the Sale

When asked by Walter Cronkite what he thought would happen if the U.S. rejected the sale of F-15s to Saudi Arabia,

Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal replied;

I think the reaction would be a reaction of disappointment and I am not talking here about the government position or anything. The relationship between our two countries is much more widespread. Ordinary people are involved in this, people who have viewed themselves as a country that has strong relations with the United States; even at a time when the relations of the United States in our part of the world were not strong, they were very strong and healthy

( 4 ) U.S. Congress, House, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Arms Sales Policy; Proposed Sale of Arms to Iran and Saudi Arabia. Hearing before a subcommittee on Foreign Assistance. Testimony by Alfred L. Atherton, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, (hereafter cited as "Hearings on U.S. Arms Sales Policy"). 94th Cong., 2nd Sess., p.52. 64

with Saudi Arabia. They consider themselves people of Saudi Arabia, friends of the United States. Undoubtedly from this base and to have a legitimate requirement, and nobody in Saudi Arabia doubts that our requirements are legitimate, that they are of a peaceful nature, that they are for the defense of our country. If this legitimate requirement by a friend is refused, I think it will be a disappointing thing for all Saudi Arabians, whether they are government officials or ordinary citizens. (5)

Support from the Department of State

The State Department's support of the Carter

Administration's proposal to sell Saudi Arabia 60 F-15s could

clearly be seen in the following summary of remarks by

Secretary of State Vance at a State Department briefing on

March 24, 1978;

The Secretary told reporters that he disagreed with Prime

Minister Begin's assessment that if Saudi Arabia received the

60 F-15s it would become a confrontation state. Mr. Vance

said that Saudi Arabia is not a confrontation state and that

the Saudi government has indicated to the administration that

these aircraft would not be based at Tabuk but at a point

other than one from where they would face real danger. He

added that the reason for supplying Saudi Arabia with F-15s

was that these were "very effective interceptor aircraft."

Saudi Arabia, Vance said, has a larger land mass and a limited

number of people and because of these factors it had a radar

coverage problem which the F-15, with its very effective

radar, could solve. He added that the F-15 was "a valid

(5l Interview with Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister H.R.H. Prince Saud Al-Faisal, Walter Cronkite, CBS, (transcript) 12 May 1978. 65 requirement" which would not upset the balance of power in the region and which would in fact further the peace process. (6)

Additional support for his argument was provided by the

Secretary in his letter to the U.S. Congress dated February

14, 1978. He pointed out the growing political role which

Saudi Arabia now plays and the advantages of selling the aircraft to Saudi Arabia. He told members of Congress that;

Saudi Arabia is of immense importance in promoting a course of moderation in the Middle East--with respect to peacemaking and other regional initiâtives--and more broadly in world affairs, as in petroleum and financial policy. The Saudi government has a legitimate requirement to modernize its very limited air defenses. For several years, we and they have recognized the need to modernize their air force with an advanced interceptor. They have asked for a limited number of F-15s, the first of which would not be delivered for several years. We believe their request is reasonable and in our interest to fulfill. (7)

The Department of Defense also played an important role in the sale, as it repeatedly stated that it would be in the

U.S. interest to encourage Saudi Arabia to continue to look to the United States as the primary source of guidance for modernizing the Saudi armed forces.

U.S.-Israeli Relations

Much of the apparent Israeli oppostion is not just directed at the sale but to the strong U.S.-Saudi relationship. Trade, financial and strategic relationships

(6) Cyrus R. Vance, "State Department Briefing," March 24, 1978.

(7) Cyrus R. Vance, Letter to Congress on the Sale of Aircraft to the Middle East Countries, February 1978, No. 75. 66 between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia worry the Israelis. Some

Israelis seem to find it difficult to recognize that American interests in the Middle East now include not only the unequivocal security of Israel but also the significant and growing U.S. stake in Saudi Arabia and the area as a whole. (8)

U.S. Commitment

While there was no Arab love for the Shah, the failure of the United States to attempt to aid him hurt American credibility in the area. It was made worse by what was perceived to be Washington's inept handling of the Shah's departure. In effect, Washington was seen as betraying a friend. Thus, the question of U.S. dependability in time of crisis inevitably arose. The rest of the nations in the

Middle East were awaiting anxiously to see whether the United

States would reciprocate Saudi Arabia's friendship by selling it the F-15s. The sale of the aircraft would show not only

Saudi Arabia but the entire Middle East that the United States was indeed commited to Saudi Arabia's security needs. Since a unilateral American military action to protect the oil fields would have a negative reaction in the area, the U.S.' second best choice was to sell Saudi Arabia the P-15s and enable it to effectively defend the oil fields themselves.

(3) Fred Dutton, (Special Consultant to the Suadi Arabian government) "Questions on the President's Authorization of U.S. Sale of F-15 Planes for the Defense of Saudi Arabia," 1978, p. 4. 67

The P-15s as a part of the RSAF would not only give Saudi

Arabia one of the most sophisticated defense systems but just

as important, it would act as a deterrent for any would-be

attackers. (9)

In order to get the package passed, the Carter

administration had to prove to friends of Israel that the

aircraft in Saudi Arabian hands were no danger to the security

of Israel. It did this in several ways: the administration

attempted to play down the threat posed to Israel by Saudi

F-15s. Administration officials were careful to talk of the

aircraft as an "air-to-air fighter," not as a fighter-bomber,

implying that it could not be used effectively to attack

targets in Israel. Carter also pointed out that the Saudi

F-15s would not be delivered until 1981, and that the Israelis

didn't have to worry about the possibilities of transfering

the aircraft to hostile Arab states in the event of a war. He

argued that the F-15 requires a formidable amount of ground

support equipment, is very difficult to operate and demands

hundreds of hours of training in expensive ground simulators.

Besides, pilots from other air forces could not be trained in

Saudi Arabia or anywhere else without detection by the United

States and/or Israel. (10)

(9) Herman P. Eilts, "Security Considerations in the Persian Gulf," International Security, 5 (Fall 1980), p.96.

(10) Tom Gervasi, "Eagles, Doves, and Hawks," Harpers, May 1978, p.20. 68

Independent experts like Dale R. Tahtinen, of the

American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, said the deal would not upset the military balance and "in fact, it reinforces Israel's qualitative advantage." (11) The sale of

F-15s to Saudi Arabia would increase the Saudis political influence in the area, thus enabling Riyadh to take control of regional issues. The denial by the U.S. to sell the Saudis the P-lSs they requested could have been interpeted not only by the Saudis but by other Arab states as evidence of a lack of American concern for the Arabs' genuine security needs. On the other hand, the sale to the Saudis would have been looked at by Saudi Arabia's neighbors as firm evidence that the

United States plans to maintain its policy to support its friends. (12)

Oil Linkage

During the CBS interview with Prince Saud al-Paisal,

Walter Cronkite asked how refusal of the sale would affect

Saudi oil policy, Saud replied that:

There is no link. You know that this question is asked again and again, in every issue that arises between Saudi Arabia and the United States. First it was on the laws of boycott; if this happens will you reduce production or raise prices? There is no direct link. There is no way that you would equate a barrel of oil with an F-15 or whatever. But the important element is really not this. We have shown in coming to decisions in regards to oil production and oil prices that along with the criteria we

(11) Newsweek, 27 February 1981.

(12) U.S. Congress, House, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, "Hearings on U.S. Arms Sales Policy," Testimony by Alfred L. Atherton, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affiars. 94th Cong., 2nd Sess., p.17. 69

take for our own economic well being, and the well being of the Saudi Arabian citizen, we take the criteria of the international economy and the demand aspects for oil. We're willing to do what we can to meet the problems that are faced in this regard. One of these elements that we think has to be solidified is the goodwill among countries to reach understanding on these major economic issues that deal with oil and the energy problem. We're willing to go the length of the road if it is required of Saudi Arabia. We don't link our decision on the sale of planes. But the the sale of the planes is important, I think in the overall relations of the people to people, of the basic understanding that is required to underline any basic feeling that we will look at each other's problems and we will respond to the requirements of each other. (13)

Senate Opposition

According to an article by Neil MacNeil in Time magazine (May 29, 1981), the controversy over the F-15 sale might never have come to the Senate floor at all if Frank

Church (Foreign Relations Committee chairman-to-be) had not backed out of an agreement made with other senators on the

Committee. MacNeil noted that Church claimed he would have stayed with the deal made with the other senators if there had been a clear consensus in the committee. Another view, wrote

MacNeil, was that Church really changed his mind because the

Israelis changed their minds. Prime Minister Begin had first said on Meet the Press that he would acccept the package deal, although unwillingly. But around May 9 the Israeli government signaled its embassy in Washington that it really opposed the package deal completely and that the embassy should do whatever it could to influence the vote. According to Senator

(13) Interview with Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister H.R.H. Prince Saud Al-Faisal, Walter Cronkite, CBS, 12 May 1978. 70

Byrd, "At the last minute, they came out against the sale."

MacNeil pointed out that the fact was that the Israeli

ambassador did call Senator Church shortly before the

committee vote and informed him that Israel had definitely

changed its mind and was against the entire deal, (14)

Although many senators opposed the sale, one senator

ironically took a surprising early stand in favor of the deal.

The reason it was ironic is that the senator was Abe Ribicoff,

Jewish himself, and a long-time supporter of Israel. The

senator from Connecticut publicly assailed the Jewish lobby as

"self-appointed spokesmen... who do a great disservice to the

U.S., to Israel and to the Jewish community," and privately

cirticized AIPAC's former director, Morris Amitay, who was

once his assistant. Even though he received extremely harsh

criticism from fellow American Jews, Ribicoff insisted that he

would not budge, "even if I have to stand alone."

His position had great influence over other pro-package senators, who reasoned that if Ribicoff could oppose his fellow Jews, they too could be defended against Jewish criticism. (15)

(14) Neil MacNeil Report, "How a Deal Was Made--and Unmade," Time, (May 29, 1978) p.23.

(15) Ibid. p.24. 71

Battles on the Hill

The vote was a milestone. It was the worst defeat suffered in Congress by Israel and its U.S. supporters. It was an indication that the Senate now agreed with three sucessive Presidents that the U.S. should pursue a more evenhanded Middle East policy, one that protects Israel's security and supports its moderate Arab neighbors as well. It was also a hard-won and welcome victory for Jimmy Carter. (16)

When it was all over, the Carter proposal to sell Saudi

Arabia 60 F-15s as part of an entire Middle East plane sale

produced one of the toughest Washington lobbying battles in

history. When the situation looked darkest. Carter and his

aides rose to the occasion, turning in one of the most

skillful selling jobs the Senate could ever remember. The

President not only used his staff aides, but such high

officials as Secretaries Vance and Brown, and even solicited

help from prominent Republicans such as Gerald Ford and Henry

Kissinger, as well as from financier David Rockefeller. Even

when Senate approval of the sale seemed assured. Carter did

not let his guard down. In the final days of Senate

deliberation, especially over the weekend, the President

called at least two dozen senators, including Republicans, to

plead with them to support his package deal. The phone calls

paid off; the G.O.P. senators voted 26 to 11 in favor of the

President. Ironically, the Democrats rejected the package, 33

to 28; nevertheless. Carter won the victory he so desperately

needed.

(16) "F-15 Fight; Who Won What," Time, (May 29, 1978) , p. 18. 72

Although the pro-Israel lobby groups responded shrewdly to the surprising sophistication of the Arab lobby, the usually we11-organized lobbying effort was hampered by confused signals from Israel, as well as by some indecision in

Jewish American ranks. In the final analysis, the result may not have been an Arab lobby victory as much as a rare loss for the pro-Israel lobby in Congress. (17)

(17) Neil MacNeil Report, "How a Deal Was Made--and Unmade," Time, (May 29, 1978) p.24. CHAPTER VI

ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS

Oil

Saudi Arabia is the world's largest exporter of oil and

is believed to possess over 25 percent of the world's proven

oil reserves. Saudi influence is based on the ability to vary

production within a wide range and thereby be a decisive

factor in the amount and price of oil available for the world

market. Thus, it enjoys the unprecedented advantage of

determining its own revenue by increasing or decreasing oil

production. For example, in 1975 Saudi Arabia had the

capacity to produce about 11.5 million barrels per day (mbpd)

but produced only about 6.8 mbpd. Today, when Saudi Arabia's

economic needs call for it to produce no more than 6 to 7

mbpd, it is producing well over 10 mbpd to maintain economic

stability in the West. Saudi revenue from oil royalties and

taxes in 1973 was $6,500 million. In 1974, oil revenues

leaped to $28,000 million; by 1979, oil revenues made a giant

leap to $65,000 million. (1)

(1) Jon Kimche, "What Price Saudi Stability," Midstream (February, 1980) p.6.

73 74

The importance of Saudi Arabia to the well-being of the world hardly requires elaboration. The thinly populated kingdom produces 20 percent of the non-Communist world's oil, 17 percent of the oil imported by the U.S., and as much as 40 percent of the oil consumed by France and Japan. A threat to the House of Saud, which united the country less than half a century ago, would jeopardize access to the world's most strategic commodity. (2)

Politically, the disturbance of Saudi oil would

certainly place the economies of the West in a state of

chaos. In economic terms, the manipulation of the revenue

received from oil sales could also place the Western economies

in a state of disarray, especially if Riyadh decided to change

its attitude toward the United States. An example of what a

shift of attitudes could mean was experienced in the fall of

1978, when Saudi Arabia shifted some of its deposits from the

United States to France, Germany, Japan and Switerzland. The

transfer of funds resulted in the steep fall of the value of

the dollar on international markets, from which the U.S.

currency has not yet recovered. (3)

The involvement of Saudi Arabia in United States finance, governmental and private, and in United States industry as customer and financier, has gone so far that it could not be broken without inflicting major damage to the entire financial, banking and commercial system of which Saudi Arabia is now a part. Nor is this purely an American concern. The chain reaction of any breach in the Saudi-American linkage would cut deep scars into the economies of Europe and Japan. (4)

(2) David B. Tinnin, "The Saudis Awaken To Their Vulnerability," Fortune March 10,' 1980 p.48.

(3) Fred Dutton, (Special Consultant to the Saudi Arabian government) "Questions on the President's Authorization of U.S. Sale of F-15 Planes for the Defense of Saudi Arabia," 1978, p.14.

(4) Jon Kimche, "What Price Saudi Stability," Midstream (February, 1980) p.4. 75

The U.S. was obviously hesitant to jeopardize this

Saudi-American linkage by acting capricously and refusing to

sell the kingdom the 60 P-15s it requested. Indeed, in the

thinking of the administration, the sale would not only

protect the relationship between the two countries, but would

strengthen it as well.

Although Saudi Arabia has never equated the sale of the

F-15s with oil, one must remember that Saudi Arabia has

consistently been credited with moderation in OPEC pricing councils. The sale undoubtedly was seen as helping to promote continued Saudi moderation among the hawks in OPEC. The

Saudis in fact have always served as a moderating influence,

fighting price increases within OPEC on the practical grounds

that higher oil prices would mean higher-priced Western exports to the developing nations, and on the political grounds that higher oil prices would have a destabilizing effect on the Western economies, which would be directly inconsistent with Saudi

Arabian policy. (5)

U.S.-Saudi Trade

On June 8, 1974, after two days of discussion, the U.S. government concluded a cooperative agreement with Saudi Arabia

to assist the kingdom in its development. A Joint Commission

(5) U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service; Foreign Affiars and National Defense Division, Bryan Soderholm-Difatte, "Proposal F-15 Sale to Saudi Arabia: A Pro/Con Analysis," December 20, 1977. 76 on Economic Cooperation was established under U.S. Secretary of the Treasury William Simon and Secretary of State Henry

Kissinger. It included a number of Defense, State and Treasury

Department specialists as well. The Saudis were represented by Crown Prince Pahd, Oil Minister Sheikh Ahmed Zaki Yamani and Finance Minister Mohammed Aba al-Khail. The agreement between the two nations was geared toward the promotion of industrialization, trade, manpower, training, agriculture and science and technology programs. Under a soon-to-be-reached cooperation agreement, U.S. professional and technical advisers from government and private industry would assist

Saudi Arabia in development in these areas. This agreement added to the stability of the Saudi-U.S. "special relationship," which was shaken during the Arab oil embargo of

1973-74, The cooperation agreement was also the beginning of the quid-pro-quo that would take place between the two countries. (6)

In addition, the United States has long been Saudi

Arabia's largest trading partner. Saudi purchases from the

U.S. have grown from $1.5 billion as recently as 1975 to $5 billion in 1978. Currently U.S. companies have a backlog of orders for projects in Saudi Arabia worth over $25 billion.

These have created hundreds of thousands of additional jobs for Americans. The number of U.S. business firms in Saudi

(6) U.S. Congress, Perspectives on Military Sales to Saudi Arabia, Report to the Congress by the Comptroller General of the United States; (October 26, 1977) ID-77-19A, p.4-6. 77

Arabia is increasing daily, and according to information provided by U.S. officials, more than 270 firms have offices in Saudi Arabia. According to the Comptroller's report to

Congress, there are some 25,000 Americans in Saudi Arabia,

Currency

Saudi Arabia's holdings of substantial foreign currency reserves have been invested in a constructive manner, supportive of U.S. economic interests. The vast majority of those investments are in U.S. dollar-denominated securities, and a substantial portion represent holdings of U.S. government, U.S. government agency and U.S. corporate debt.

In addition, Saudi Arabia has consistently supported the retention of the U.S.dollar as the pricing medium for oil.

Dr. Odhe Aburdene, Vice President, Treasury Department of the First National Bank of Chicago, has calculated the net transfer of oil profits and dividends in the five years from 1974 to 1978 at $9,000 million. The estimated figure for 1979, which reflects the extraordinary increase in price and profits, is put at $3,000 million--a total of $12,000 million dollars since 1974. (7)

Saudi Arabia plays a major role in U.S. banks.

Somewhat more than 60 percent of its foreign holdings were in the United States. According to Kimche, Saudi official sources claimed that the actual proportion held on U.S. account was closer to 70 percent--$70 billion. Saudi Arabia has invested many billions of dollars in U.S. government securities, as well as obligations of various public

(7) Jon Kimche, "What Price Saudi Stability,' Midstream, (February 1980) p.4. 78 agencies and several major industrial corporations which have sought Saudi funds. These Saudi reserves have, in effect, released many billions in American capital reserves to stimulate the creation of at least a million additional

American jobs and the construction of tens of thousands of homes. In the international market, the Saudis have contributed greatly to the support the dollar by relieving pressure on U.S. public debt markets, recycling petroleum dollars and bolstering the Free World's economic system through such vehicles as the World Bank and the IMF, the latter to which it recently loaned over $10 billion.

U.S. Military Expenditures in Saudi Arabia

From fiscal year 1950 through September 30, 1976, U.S. military sales agreements with Saudi Arabia totaled over $12.1 billion. Sales began increasing in fiscal year 1972 and from then through September 1976 they amounted to about $8.3 billion. (8)

The Saudi budget for fiscal 1974-75 for all armed forces, numbering 43,000, and for the para-military National

Guard was $1,800 million. Two years later, the Saudi armed forces had been increased to 61,000 men and the defense budget had increased four-fold to $7,500 million. For the fiscal year 1979-80, the Saudis budgeted for their armed forces an ncredible $14,200 million, with estimates as high as $20,000 million* The Saudis calculated that around 60 percent of

(8) U.S. Congress, Perspectives on Military Sales to Saudi Arabia, Report to the Congress by the Comptroller General of the United States; (October 26, 1977) ID-77-19A, p.4-6. 79

their defense budget is directly or indirectly transfered to

the U.S. All of this, they hinted, could have been

jeopardized if the United States had failed to sell them the

F-15s. (9)

Plainly, the economic arguments, implicit and explicit,

in support of the sale were very strong. Such was indicated

by the substantial activity coming from the business community

in support of the sale in a short lobbying time.

(9) Jon Kimche, "What Price Saudi Stability," Midstream (February 1980) p. 4. CHAPTER VII

STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS

The Saudis have been relying for their air defense on

aging British-made Lightning aircraft, which U.S. military

experts concluded in 1974 were obsolescent and would have to

be phased out beginning in 1978 because of metal fatigue and

other basic problems.

To no one's suprise, the Israelis reacted to the

proposed F-15 sale to Saudi Arabia with alarm and great

concern. Israeli officials were not only fearful that their

country would lose the monopoly on possession of sophisticated

U.S. weaponry, but that the sale would set a precedent--increased U.S. arms sales to Arab States— something

they did not feel they could afford. The Israelis knew that

the only argument that might stop the sale would be an all-out

crusade to convince the U.S. Congress and public alike that

the sale would present a threat to their security. Moshe

Dayan's statement that the sale would cause "a serious threat

to Israel's security" would soon come to be the Israeli slogan

and paramount argument against the sale. Menachem Begin's government contended that the sale would strengthen the Saudi

80 81 air force to such an extent that it would make it imperative that Israel keep its bases in the occupied Sinai, which it was scheduled to evacuate in agreement with the Sinai Accords.

Technical Data

The F-15 would in fact give Saudi Arabia an air-fighter capability surpassed only by that of Israel in the region.

The sophistication of the F-15s would allow Saudi Arabia to defend itself with the confidence that it possesses one of best defensive aircrafts in the world.

The F-15 is a high-performance fighter specifically designed for tactical air superiority missions, but equally capable of performing air-to-ground support missions. The

F-15 has been catagorized as one of the most sophisticated combat aircraft yet designed. The F-15 has been advertised by both its manufacturer, McDonnell Douglas, and the United

States Air Force as the best plane of its type (fighter) in operation, or on the drawing boards, in anybody's air force--including that of the Soviet Union. An all-weather fighter capable of speeds beyond Mach 2.5, the F-15 is armed with a 20 mm cannon and four medium-range radar guided AIM-7F

Sparrow and short-range heat-seeking AIM 9L Sidewinder air-to-air missiles. The aircraft is designed to find, identify, engage and destroy any aircraft now in existence or expected to be a threat through the 1980s. In combat simulations the F-15 has downed MiG-25 Foxbats flying at altitudes of 70,000 feet and speeds of Mach 2.7. Although 82 official verification has yet to be provided, Israeli pilots flying the F-15s have claimed that during a dog-fight over

Syrian air space in December of 1980, they shot down at least

3 MiG-25s flown by Syrian pilots (Washington Post). The F-15 has a look-up/look-down radar as well as a shoot-down capability. It is capable of mission turn-around times of twelve minutes. It can rapidly respond to warnings to intercept enemy aircraft and is said to be unparalleled in maneuverability and climbing acceleration. It also has an excellent air-to-ground capability and can deliver its air-to-ground ordnance with accuracy. The F-15 can carry up to 15,000 pounds of external air-to-ground ordnance, reportedly without sacrificing its air-to-air capabilities.

Unofficial sources estimate the P-15's combat radius at about

500 miles for an air superiority mission and from 300 to 900 miles for ground strike missions. (1)

(The following facts are taken from Tom Gervasi's

"Arsenal of Democracy: American Weapons Available For

Export.");

Powered by two General Electric F-lOO engines, it can easily reach speeds of Mach 2.54 (1,676 mph). In the air-interceptor role, with four AIM-7F Sparrow air-to-air missiles, three external fuel tanks and two additional FAST

(T) John Taylor, W.R., ed, Janes's All the World's Aircraft, 1976-77, (New York: Franklin Watts 1976), pp.327-328; Dms Market Intelligence Report, McDonnell Douglas F-15 Eagle, (McDonnell Aircraft Company: April 1977); F-15 Eagle; The Free World's New Standard, (1976); Furlong, R.D.M, Operational Aspects of the F-15 Eagle, (International Defense Review, June 1975), vol. 8, pp.362-371. 83

Pack conformai fuel pallets which will extend its range, the aircraft can carry a total of 31,376 lbs. of fuel, giving it a maximum potential rage of 3,362 miles, or a maximum combat radius of 1,681 miles. Its peak altitude is 103,000 feet, and when an early F-15 first climbed to 98,425 feet (more than 18 miles above the earth's surface) in just 3 minutes and 43 seconds, it shattered 8 world time-to-climb records including, by more than 36 seconds, the previous record held for that height by the Soviet MiG-25.

At combat weight with half its internal fuel (about

5,572 lbs.), the aircraft's powerful turbofan engines, each with 26,000 lbs of thrust, give it a thrust-to-weight ratio of

4.1 to 1, (unofficially) the highest ratio for any aircraft in the world. As a result, the Eagle (McDonnell-Douglas' nickname for the F-15) can pull a turn of more than 14 degrees per second, as compared with a maximum of 11 degrees per second in the F-5E, and during that turn it can sustain gravitational forces of more than five times its own weight without losing air speed. On full afterburner at 15,000 feet, it will accept forces of more than 7g. while at the same time maintaining an airspeed of 460 mph. This makes it the most maneuverable aircraft currently in the air, able to climb faster and turn more sharply than any other and giving the pilot who files it "a distinct edge," according to General

Robert Dixon, head of the USAF's Tactical Air Command. "There is no air superiority fighter in existence," he added, "that can match its combat capability." 84

The F-15 is both a figher interceptor and a fighter-bomber. Mounting a multi-barreled General Electric

M61A1 Vulcan 20mm cannon, which fires at variable rates of from 4,000 to 6,000 rounds per minute, it can fly an air interceptor mission with a combat radius of just under 600 miles on internal fuel alone (about 11,146 lbs.), carrying with it four each of the latest AIM 9L infrared homing

Sidewinder and AIM-7F Sparrow air-to-air missiles. By adding two PAST Pack comformal fuel pallets, which add another 8,800 lbs. of fuel, it can carry the same load of ordnance to an increased combat radius of 1,068 miles. For mixed air-to-air and air-to-ground missions, it can retain its Sparrow missiles and 950 rounds of 20mm ammunition for its gun, while also carrying a variety of alternate bomb loads for the same distances. These loads include eighteen MK82 560-lb. Snakeye demolition bombs, or three MK84 2,054-lb. demolition bombs, or nine BLU-27/B fire bombs, each with 790 lbs. (100 gallons) of

Napalm or fifteen CBU 5/B 680-lb. anti-personnel fragmentation bomblet dispensers.

For an increased combat radius of 1,209 miles in the fighter-bomber role, the F-15 can exchange its PAST Pack fuel pallets for three external fuel tanks, giving it a total of

22,576 lbs. of fuel, the weight of which somewhat reduces the ordnance it could carry. But its load could still include its

20mm ammunition, its four Sparrow missiles. Tow ECM

(Electronic Counter Measures) pods to jam the homing mechanisms of hostile air-defense missiles, along with three 85

2,276 lb. MK84 electro-optically guided precision bombs, or

7,000 lbs. of any other type of bomb previously mentioned. (2)

In short, the F-15 is the most sophisticated combat

aircraft yet designed. Brig. Gen. Fred Kyler described the

F-15's ability in the following way: "We don't have any particular concern about our ability with the Eagle. The other

side has some good stuff, but whatever they threw at this

bird, it would still be like shooting into a rain barrel for

us." (3)

Implications of the Data

The above technical data states the obvious: the F-15

is the most sophisticated fighter in the world, although, as

the technical data clearly points out, its sophistication is concentrated in its defensive capabilities. These facts make

the F-15 the most suitable aircraft for Saudi Arabia's military needs: defense of its borders and oil fields. A

threat to Israel would result only if Israel decided to attack

Saudi Arabia, according to the Saudis. In fact, the recently purchased F-5s pose a threat to Israel based on Israel's own

logic, but no complaint was ever lodged. it was only when the

F-15 sale was proposed that Israel decided to oppose Saudi

Arabian arms purchases. Just as the F-15 would have no

trouble reaching Israel from Saudi Arabia, the Saudis point

(2) Tom Gervasi, "Arsenal of Democracy; American Weapons Available For Export," (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1977) p.88. (3) Paul Martin, "The Look Of Eagles," Newsweek (April 24, 1978) p.19. 86 out, the F-15 would have similarly little difficulty reaching

Saudi Arabia from Israel. Following that logic, the F-15 is a threat to any country, even the U.S., but even the Israelis would agree that it is unlikely that Saudi Arabia would attack the U.S.

In fact, the proximity of Israel puts her within easy striking distance for most aircraft in the area, including the

F-5 which Saudi Arabia already posseses (launched from Tabuk).

For that matter, Israel is well within range of existing Egyptian Mig-23s and Mig-27s, Sukhoi Su-7s, Mirage IIIEs and Tupolev TU-16s, Jordanian F-SAs and F-104As, Syrian Mig-23s, SU-7s, Mig-17s and F-86Fs, Iraqi MiG-21s, MiG-23Bs and Hawker Hunter bombers, Iranian F-4Es and F-5Es and BAG Lightning bombers and F-5Es already in the Saudi inventory. (4)

According to the Saudis, it is Israel which is threatening Saudi security, not the reverse. It is Saudi

Arabia which requires secure borders, more so than Israel.

Israel has in fact flown over Tabuk on many occasions, thus crossing Saudi airspace, despite U.S. and Saudi objections.

Israeli naval maneuvers off the Saudi shore also were undertaken in late March of 1978. The Israelis have often pointed out that Tabuk is only six minutes flying time from

Israel, disregarding the fact that Tabuk was 15 minutes away until Israel occupied the Sinai. (5)

Tom Gervasi, "Arsenal of Democracy; American Weapons Available For Export," (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1977) p.88.

(5) Fred Dutton, (Special Consultant to the Saudi Arabian government) Questions on the President's Authorization of U.S. Sale of F-15 Planes for the Defense of Saudi Arabia," 1978, p. 8. 87

Thus, the argument that the F-15 {in Saudi Arabia's hands) is a threat to Israel is demonstrably groundless. If a threat did exist, it is common knowledge that Israel's remarkable defense systems make her practically invulnerable to any air attack. History has proven this; Syria, which is a stone's throw from Israel, has been thus far unable to penetrate Israeli airspace.

Alternatives to the F-15

In having to guard the largest concentration of oil

reserves in the world, the Saudis could hardly have a

more crucial military mission, requiring the best

available interceptor, the F-15. U.S. defense

officials offered the Saudis a test-flying choice of

the P-14, F-15, F-17 and the F-18 at the time the

detailed, technical military studies were made. (6)

Saudi Arabia rejected the other aircraft as not compatible enough with present equipment or requiring too many additional pilots, or not available within the needed time period or otherwise less well suited to their air defense requirements. The United States (Pentagon) had many reasons of its own to sell the Saudis the F-15; thus, it was in both countries' interest to agree on the F-15 over other U.S.-made planes.

f^) Fred Dutton, (Special Consultant to the Saudi Arabian government) Questions on the President's Authorization of U.S. Sale of F-15 Planes for the Defense of Saudi Arabia," 1978, p.8. 88

In short, the Saudis not only preferred the F-15, but

it is also apparent that the Saudis wanted to purchase their

military equipment from the United States. However, this does

not mean that the Saudis had no alternative. If the United

States could not have supplied the F-15s to Saudi Arabia, the

kingdom would obviously have not abandoned its goal of

acquiring an air defense system sophisticated enough to defend

its territory. American refusal to sell the Saudis the F-15

would have merely forced them to turn to France or Britain for

the nearest alternative available. It seems evident that upon

American refusal, the Saudis would immediately have turned to

France to purchase their Mirage. More alarming, the Saudis

already indicated that if they are to obtain equipment other

than the F-15, they may have to contribute research and

development funds to insure that the alternative plane

approaches the sophistication of the F-15. Thus, it is

possible that British-French technology along with Saudi funds

could combine to develop an aircraft so sophisticated that it

would surpass the technological advantage held by the

American-made F-15. It should also be noted that fighters

purchased by Saudi Arabia from France or Britain would not be

subject to U.S. controls. The above facts all add up to one

inescapable conclusion: it was in the national interest of

the United States to sell Saudi Arabia the F-15 fighters it

requested. (7)

(7) Fred Dutton, (Special Consultant to the Saudi Arabian government) Questions on the President's Authorization of U.S. Sale of F-15 Planes for the Defense of Saudi Arabia," 1978, p.12. 89

Speculating about what might happen in the event the sale were postponed or refused, Saudi Ambassador to the U.S. Ali

Abdallah Alireza wrote:

Since the Kingdom's obsolescent Lightnings must in any event be replaced, Saudi Arabia would be forced to consider alternatives, including the purchase elsewhere of existing sophisticated aircraft and the possibility of helping to finance the development by someone else of advanced aircraft comparable to the F-15. (8)

The British, and even more so the French, have reportedly stepped up their negotiations with Saudi Arabia concerning the sale of advanced aircraft now under development. The fact that an arms cooperation agreement covering technical assistance and production including France,

Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states of Qatar and the United Arab Emirates was signed on

March 4, 1978, in Paris, indicates that the Saudis were not bluffing when they stated that the U.S. was not the only arms dealer in the world. Saudi Arabia could get the aircraft from

Prance or Britain, but it is not the aircraft that are of paramount importance; rather, it is the U.S. commitment that comes with the planes. (9)

In a logistical sense, Saudi Arabia could make a strong argument for purchasing up to six squadrons of F-15s (120

(8) Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, (Washington, D.C.) Press Release, Statements by Saudi Ambassador Ali A. Alireza to all Members of the U.S. Senate and House of RepresentatTve, March 15, 1981, p.1.

(9) Fred Dutton, (Special Consultant to the Saudi Arabian government) Questions on the President's Authorization of U.S. Sale of F-15 Planes for the Defense of Saudi Arabia," 1978, p. 12. 90

aircraft). According to the U.S. Defense Department, Saudi

Arabia has five major areas which it considers "vital areas"

that are separated from each other by hundreds of miles. An

F-15 squadron could be located in each one of the five major

geographic areas, with the sixth "operational conversion"

training squadron available to train or convert pilots and

technicians to the system. Six squadrons deployed in this

manner would greatly enhance Saudi Arabia's air defense system

by providing the assured effectiveness of the advanced

fighters' capabilities to each of the widely separated "vital

areas." Saudi Arabia, however, recognizing its limited

manpower, chose to limit its request to only three squadrons,

or 60 aircraft (two fighters on loan for demonstration

purposes were added to the sale, accounting for the final

total of 62 planes sold). (10)

To replace their F-5s, the Saudis considered the U.S.

F-14, F-16 and the F-18, all containing the latest technology

in fighter aircraft, possessing of high performance

capabilities, with relatively minimum operation and ease of

maintenance. Although the F-16 is a more effective

air-to-ground aircraft, the F-15 possesses extensive radar

coverage with a look-down, shoot-down capability, needs only

one crew member (the F-14 requires a two-man crew), and is

equipped with two engines.

Unlike the F-16, the F-15 is configured to have an

all-weather missile capability. The F-18 was eliminated from

(10) U.S. Department of Defense, Analysis of the Saudi Arabian Request to Purchase F-15 Fighter Aircraft," Unclassified Summary, March 16, 19787 5^ 91

the list of possibilities because it was still in the developmment stage and would not be ready for delivery until

some time after the P-15 delivery date. (11)

In conclusion, the F-15 fighter was the most efficient

and logical choice given the Saudis air defense requirements.

The F-15 maximizes the capabilities that can be developed as a credible deterrent and defense against an air attack.

Support for Manpower and Material

The Saudi air force has the ability to absorb three

squadrons (60) of F-15s if introduction of the system

in-country begins at the planned delivery date. The first

F-15S would not be delivered to Saudi Arabia until early 1982,

and those would have to be used for training purposes. In

fact, 15 of the 60 are to be used for training, and with the

F-15s slated to replace the British Lightnings, the increase

in the number of interceptors will be very low. The first

squadron of F-15s with full defense capability will not be in

service until at least 1983.

It is no secret that Saudi Arabia will be heavily dependent upon U.S. personnel for the operational maintenance of its F-15s. According to the GAO Report, a squadron of

F-15s--twenty planes— requires 270 maintenance technicians.

However, to insure that absorbability of the F-15 operational

(11) U.S. Department of Defense, Analysis of the Saudi Arabian Request to Purchase F-15 Fighter Aircraft,** Unclassified Summary, March 16, 1978, p. 7, 92

requirements are met, impact on other programs and required

skill levels must be considered. To meet this demand, Saudi

Arabia is sending mechanics to a special technician training

program which is underway in the U.S. that should produce

1,000 technicians by April 1981. During the same period, the

in-country RSAP school should provide another 500 technicians

for the F-15 fighter force, for a total of 2,885 fighter

technicians against a requirement for 2,550 technicians.

According to current training projections, there will be

enough RSAP pilots to man both the F-15 and F-5 fighter forces

by October 1981, (12)

As of March 1977, 912 Department of Defense personnel and approximately 2,961 contractors were involved in providing management, training and services for Saudi Arabia under military sales agreements or commercial contracts. More increases are planned for the near future. (13)

The Foreign Military Sales price to Saudi Arabia for an

F-15, including administrative fees and a surcharge for a portion of the original F-15 research and development costs,

is $25 million. The sixty aircraft will cost the Saudis $2.5

billion, or $41.6 million each. The extra $1 billion in the

Saudi sale is for the expensive ground simulators (made by

Goodyear Aerospace Corporation). (14)

(12) U.S. Department of Defense, Analysis of the Saudi Arabian Request to Purchase F-15 Fighter Aircraft," Unclassified Summary, March 16, 1978, p.7.

(13) U.S. Congress, Perspectives on Military Sales to Saudi Arabia, Report to the Congress by the Comptroller General of the United States; (October 26, 1977) ID-77-19A, p.25. (14) Tom Gervasi, "Eagles, Doves, and Hawks," Harpers, (May 1978) p.20. 93

Stationing the F-15s

According the the 1978 Comptroller's Report to

Congress, Saudi Arabia plans to station its P-15s at Dhahran

(in the Eastern Province), at Taif (in the Jeddah-Mecca-Medina complex), and possibly at Khamis Mushayt (in the south). The report clearly points out that these are the only three Saudi air bases that can support the permanent basing of P-15 aircraft. It is important to note that the Saudis gave explicit guarantees to the U.S. government that they would not station any p-15s at Tabuk as a main operation base. The report also shows that Tabuk, Jidda, Dhahran, Riyadh, Taif and

Khamis Mushayt have Hawk missile systems which effectively protect the F-15 from air attack. (15)

Possibility of Transfer

Saudi Arabia has never used its air force nor has it ever been considered a confrontation state in any of the

Arab-Israeli conflicts of the last thirty years. The Israelis point out that in the event of a war against its Arab neighbors, Saudi Arabia could transfer the P-15s to Arab confrontation states engaged in fighting with Israel, and have indicated, in fact, that the danger of their possible use or transfer for use in such a war would require the Israelis to seriously consider making a pre-emptive strike against the

Saudi F-15s and their bases, even if the Saudis had not yet

(15) U.S. Congress, Military, Economic, And Political Factors Concerning The Sale of F-15s to Saudi Arabia, Report by the Comptroller General of the United States; (May 1, 1978) PSAD-78-97, appendix I. 94 committed themselves to fighting. Israeli fears of such a

transfer are heightened by the fact that the Saudis are said

to have transferred a squadron of U.S.-supplied Bell 205

Iroquois helicopters to Egypt during the October 1973

War,(16) The Saudis have also participated in military maneuvers with Jordan and Syria, during which some of their

American P-5s were used by Jordanian forces. However, although Israel claims it has never threatened Saudi Arabia,

it has stated that in any future conflict those nations that provide money to the Arab confrontation states should not assume that they will go unpunished. Israel also threatened

that if the Saudis receive the P-15s it will probably be necessary to launch preemptive strikes against Saudi air force

bases.

The sophistication of the P-15 makes it nearly

impossible to transfer the plane for use against Israel by any another Arab confrontation state because none of them, without

the ground support, pilot and maintenance training that only

the U.S. can provide, would be capable of flying the P-15.

Some even argue that the complexity of the aircraft, in fact, makes it extremely unlikely that even the Royal Saudi Air

Force (RSAP)— after numerous years of U.S. training— could effectively fly the P-15 in combat against the Israelis. (17)

(16) U.S. Congress, House, Testimony by Morris J. Amitay (former executive director of the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee,) and by Professor Kurth, during hearings on U.S. Arms Sales Policy, pp.70,77.

(17) U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division; Bryan Soderholm-Difatte, "Proposed P-15 sale to Saudi Arabia: A Pro/Con Analysis," (December 20, 1977) 78-25P, p.14. 95

The sophistication of the plane will, in all likelihood, force

the Saudis to be dependent for a long period of time upon U.S.

personnel for the operational maintenance of the aircraft. As

the New York Times pointed out in an editorial supporting the

proposed sale:

Pear of transfer of P-15s to other states is unwarranted since it requires a formidable array of ground equipment and is not easy to fly. Even pilots who might master it could not handle its weapons systems without scores of hours in expensive ground simulators. And it would be virtually impossible to train other nations' pilots in Saudi Arabia without American and Israeli detection. (18)

Ironically, some argue that the sophistication of the

P-15 fighter--the fact that makes the transfer of the fighter

very unlikely--is so great that the U.S. should reconsider the

sale to the Saudis. This point is exemplified by one

Congressional critic of the sale who argued that "the P-15s

have a whole order of complexity and sophistication that makes

this whole deal very questionable." (19)

Saudi Arabia lacks the trained manpower to operate and

maintain the P-15, or for that matter the P-5, independently

of the U.S. The Comptroller's Report to Congress warned that

any future purchases of advanced fighter aircraft will only

add to the maintenance and support problems of the Saudi air

(18) New York Times, 18 February 1978, p.9.

(19) Ibid. 96

force. Therefore, any transfer of the aircraft is highly

unlikely. (20)

With regard to maintenance, the sale of the 62 F-15s

would require a total of 900 technicians, a requirement beyond

Saudi Arabia's current capability. Even assuming that the

number of technicians capable of being trained on the F-15 are

available to the Saudis, it is extremely doubtful whether

Saudi pilots and technicians can learn to maintain the P-15 at

even minimal operational requirements, thus making Saudi

Arabia heavily dependent upon the United States. (21) Thus,

the possibility of Saudi Arabia transfering the aircraft over

to an Arab confrontation state for use against Israel is very

unlikely without detection by Israel and/or the United States,

and would be highly unfeasible on technical grounds.

Furthermore, faced with a variety of threats from a

number of different directions, it makes neither military nor

any other kind of sense for the Saudis to give up their

principal air defense system in order to transfer it to

another country and risk the sudden neutralization of it by

Israel or anyone else. It would be illogical for Saudi Arabia

to transfer its best defense system to another country and

leave its oil fields and cities open to aerial attack. The

commitment of the Saudis, their own vulnerability.

( 2 0 ) . U.S. Congress, Perspectives on Military Sales to Saudi Arabia, Report to the Congress by the Comptroller General of the United States; (October 26, 1977) ID-77-19A, p. 25.

(21) New York Times, 1 November 1977, p.5 97 the nature of the F-15s, the continuing control of the U.S. and, most convincingly, the critical importance of the overall

Saudi-U.S. relationship for both countries, all add up against

the misuse or transfer of the aircraft by the Saudis.

Furthermore, it is also important to remember that the first

F-15s would not arrive in Saudi Arabia until the end of 1982.

Thus, by the time the Saudis would have absorbed the F-15s, even to the point of only 50 percent efficiency, it would be well into the mid-1980s. Consequently, any immediate concern over the use of the F-15s in any future local conflict is less than reasonably justified.

The United states Air Force pointed out why it would be unfeasible for the Saudis to use the F-15 as an offensive weapon in the following text which was taken from testimony given by the Chairman-designate of the JCS, Gneral David

Jones, USAF: "To use the F-15 offensively against neighboring countries would be a mistake. This is particularly so vis-a-vis Israel, whose air strength is, and will be, so much greater. Not only would the F-15 be relatively ineffective in an offensive mode, and the risk of loss of the aircraft be high, but its use away from Saudi Arabia would leave vital oil facilities, urban centers and military installations without necessary air defense cover. From the standpoint of military planning, it would make no sense whatsoever for Saudi Arabia to acquire an aircraft with the characteristics of the F-15 98 with an idea of using it as a ground attack aircraft, I am confident that the Saudis have no such intention." (22)

Compromising U.S. Technology

There are several points to be clarified with respect to the argument that the U.S. would be compromising the technology of the P-15 (to the Soviets via hard-line Arab states) if those aircraft were sold to the Saudis. First, the

Saudis are sensitive about allowing foreigners any significant or active role in defense matters. Second, it would be naive of any official to state that the Soviet Union still lacks extensive technical data and knowledge of the P-15's operations in terms of its use by Israel and NATO, as well as the U.S. itself. Third and most interesting, if any F-15 were to fall into hostile or radical hands, it is likely to be during a future Arab-Israeli conflict (probably in an

Israeli-Syrian dogfight), when an Israeli F-15 will face the possibility of being shot down over neighboring territory.

Controlling Munitions

The United States could exercise control over the F-15s by simply controlling the distribution of munitions and spare parts. Cutting off the munitions and spare parts to such a sophisticated machine could leave the fighters powerless in a few days. The F-15 requires extensive and sophisticated ground support facilities and systems, highly sophisticated

(22) Harold Brown, "White House Press Release: Letter from Secretary Harold Brown to Senator John Sparkman," May 12, 1978. 99 replacement parts, substantial and specialized pilot training and a readily controllable special armaments inventory, all subject to substantial American control. Therefore, in the unlikely event that Saudi Arabia decides to use the fighters against Israel, the United States could immediately cut off all support services for the F-15s, leaving the Saudis effectively helpless. (23)

The Issue of Additional Equipment

Although in 1978 the Carter administration justified the F-15 sale as wholly defensive in nature and assured the

Senate that it would not sell the Saudis the additional equipment required to increase the F-15's offensive capabilities, many observers, including the Reagan

Administration, believe that recent developments (the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the revolution in Iran and the subsequent Iraqi-Iranian war, and the dialogue between North and South Yemen) have altered the situation in the Gulf region immensely, thus adding to the already present external security threats facing Saudi Arabia. These new factors made it imperative that the Saudi request for additional equipment for the aircraft, first denied, be reconsidered. After all, since President Sadat lost much of his authority in the Arab world in the aftermath of Camp David, the responsibility of playing a leadership role in Arab politics and the Islamic world devolved in even greater measure upon Saudi Arabia, (24)

(23) Fred Dutton, (Special Consultant to Saudi Arabian government) Questions on the President's Authorization of U.S. Sale of F-15~Planes for the Defense of Saudi Arabia," 1978, p.10,

(24) National Association of Arab Americans, (Press Release) "Summary of Main Points in NAAA Position Paper on Air-Defense Sale to Saudi Arabia," May 1981, p.12. 100

Former Defense Secretary Harold Brown committed the

additional equipment to Saudi Defense Minister Prince Sultan

in a June 1980 meeting in Geneva, However, in mid-summer of

1980, President Carter refused to accede to repeated requests

by Brown to provide AIM 9L air-to-air missiles and additional

fuel tanks out of concern that the issue would be used against

him by the Jewish community in the upcoming election.

The Israelis argue that to sell any additional

equipment to Saudi Arabia would not only jeopardize their

security but would present a serious credibility problem for

the U.S. government, also placing in jeopardy future

administration commitments to Congress and thus increasing the

inconsistency of U.S. foreign policy in the area.

Regarding the proposed sale of AWACS early-warning

radar planes, the Center for Defense Information determined

that the sale of the F-15 would mean that an additional sale

of an advanced radar system would be required in the future.

Because of Saudi Arabia's large area and long borders, the

likely candidates would be either the Grumman E-2C Hawkeye or

the Boeing E-3A (AWACS). (25) The Reagan administration has

argued that the sale is necessitated by the serious deterioration of security conditions in the oil-rich Gulf area

(which is vulnerable to attack). The AWACS would enhance the capability of a thinly-spread air-defense system in the

kingdom, while combating growing threats to Saudi Arabia and

(25) American Israel Public Affairs Committee, Memorandum: "F-15s to Saudi Arabia--A Threat to Peace," January 1978, p.3. 101

other U.S. friends in the region from the Soviet Union and other sources. The Saudis regard the sale of the AWACS as an explicit U.S. commitment to Saudi security. In addition, the

GAO believes that using the F-15 independently, without tactical warning or command and control systems, is not an effective way to employ the F-15 in an air defense role. CHAPTER VIII

REGIONAL REACTION

The Saudis are not merely buying an inventory of weapons for display's sake, but are involved in a thorough and systematic program to develop from the ground up a complete military infrastructure, including airfields, naval port facilities, radar and communication systems, supply depots and related logistical support and maintenance and repair facilities, as well as thorough training of personnel to maintain, operate, repair, command and administer the weapons and facilities. (1) The infrastructure is being built in such a way as to provide future growth to meet its defense needs, and the F-15 is counted upon to play an integral role in meeting these outstanding security requirements.

In light of this, the F-15 sale had advantages as well as drawbacks vis-a-vis Saudi Arabia's relations with its neighbors in the region. However, there is a conspicuous lack

(1) U.S. Congress, Perspectives on Military Sales to Saudi Arabia, Report to the Congress by the Comptroller General of the United States; (October 26, 1977) ID-77-19A, P.19A.

102 103

of published material on the Arab reaction simply because few

if any of the Arab states chose to comment on the issue. The

region in 1978 was (as it still is) in a state of flux and any

change in the balance of power,especially as drastic as the

influx of 60 F-15s, was a factor with which to be reckoned.

In that context, most of the nations in the region, not the

least the confrontation states, adopted a wait-and-see

attitude.

As far as Saudi Arabia's neighbors in the Gulf were

concerned, the sale was a godsend. Weak and fearful of

Soviet-sponsored disruption, nations such as Kuwait, Bahrein,

Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates have long been

dependent on the Saudis and indirectly upon the U.S. for their

security. Thus, the aircraft represented the best of both

worlds for these states; American technology and protection

without incurring the potential hazards of

nationalist-inspired internal disruption inherent in an

American presence in that part of the world. The Saudis would

fly the aircraft and assume the role of senior partner in a

Gulf military cooperative.

For Iraq, the aircraft posed a substantial problem. In

1978, Saddam Hussein was involved in a risky effort to

consolidate his power on the eve of an assumption of the

titular leadership of Iraq (he was to succeed fully by July of

1979). Although he was the real power behind his father-in-law

President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr, Saddam was determined to take

the reins of leadership in the Gulf region; militarily. 104

politically and to whatever extent possible, economically.

Obviously, an influx of American technology of the magnitude

of the F-15s and the accompanying advisers was a threat to his

grand design. This situation was no doubt muddled further due

to the fact that Saddam was still unsure of his relationship

with the Soviets. One thing was certain, however: he was not

particularly fond of the idea of the conservative Saudis

flying state-of-the-art fighter aircraft with the full

cooperation and assistance of their American patrons. He was

even less pleased by the fact that he was powerless to control

the situation.

Many of the Gulf states saw the Iraqis as a threat;

Kuwait was still involved in a border dispute with the Iraqis

stemming from Iraq's long-held view that Kuwait is part of its

territory. The basic fact was, however, that everyone, the

Saudis included, was afraid that Iraq might export its

socialist dogma. Worse, they were afraid of the unknown

extent of Soviet involvement there, and of the possibility

that the U.S.S.R. might be using the Ba'ath regime as a

springboard to the heart of the Gulf.

To a great extent, the unfolding events in South Yemen

lent credence to the Gulf states* worst fears. A hard-core

Marxist regime set up shop there and was pointed directly at

the Saudi underbelly. It was stocked, trained and populated by

Moscow's Cuban surrogates; this was part of the reason the

Saudis wanted the aircraft so badly. 10 5

In any event, this helped explain the desire of the

Gulf states to see Riyadh succeed in its effort to convince

Washington of the need for the F-15s. The chief reason, however, lay at the other side of the Persian Gulf. Mohammed

Reza Pahlavi had established in Iran a veritable hardware store of American technology exceeded in volume and sophistication only by that accumulated in Israel, Although this military machine was relatively untested, Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states were beset by the real fear that the

Shah, whom they were convinced was a raging megalomaniac, intended to expand his empire across the Gulf. Whether or not this fear was legitimate, the Arab Gulf states were convinced of the need for some sort of counterweight to his power. The

F-lSs and the American advisers that came with them helped provide this.

For his part, the Shah could not have been pleased with the decision. Rebuffed a year earlier in his quest for several highly-sophisticated AWACS surveillance planes, he may have grown somewhat disturbed over his steadily slipping influence in Washington (which through no coincidence dropped in direct proportion to his loss of control over the mobs of demonstrators in Tehran). He undoubtedly felt a sense of betrayal at the Carter administration's obvious inclination to shift the weight of responsibility for Gulf security over to the Saudi pillar. In any case, he said relatively little in public about the sale; his position was not strong enough. 106

Anwar al-Sadat, for all his bellicose criticism of the

Saudis, felt that the F-15 deal was crucial to the success of

his concept of Gulf security. He envisioned ultimately a

joint American, Egyptian and Saudi defense alliance that would

bear the responsibility of policing the Gulf and protecting

its oil supplies from the Russians. Sadat was well aware of

the danger for the Saudis in too visible an American

presence. Thus, he favored the F-15 deal as a means of

providing needed security without upsetting the stability of

the region.

The other reason Sadat saw for the sale was one that

was shared in Amman by King Hussein. In a large measure, the

deal was a barometer by which Egypt and Jordan, America's

other influential friends in the Arab world, could judge the

strength

of the American commitment. To them, the package was crucial

because on its success or failure rested the future of their policies toward the superpowers and of a quick settlement to

the Palestinian question. An affirmative reply would go a

long way toward reassuring them, not to mention the Saudis, of

America's resolve, not just toward the abovementioned problems, but also toward the Soviet threat. Refusal of the package would have probably necessitated a réévaluation of

both Sadat's and Hussein's policies toward the U.S. (As it

turned out, Hussein did have a falling out with the United

States, but not as a result of the F-15 deal.) 107

To a great extent, however, everyone, and especially

the U.S.S.R., Libya, Syria, South Yemen, the PLO and Iran, was

waiting and watching to see just how strong the U.S. was

willing to let Saudi Arabia become. None of the socialist

states was pleased at the thought of the conservative Saudi

monarchy moving so strongly into the American camp or of it

accumulating so much military strength. They knew fully that

none of those aircraft would ever be used against Israel, and

thus were of no use to them. Indeed, the consensus among all

the abovementioned actors was that the deal bode ill for the

Rejectionist Front, simply because it strengthened America's

position in the region. Worse, it signalled a possible moderation of the Saudi stand. In the aftermath of Sadat's

trip to Jerusalem, there was a real fear among these nations when the deal was announced that the Saudis might be losing

interest in the Arab-Israeli struggle because of their growing

concern about the Shah and the Soviets. Much of this concern

is undoubtedly attributable to the volatile nature of

inter-Arab politics and rivalries, but it was nevertheless a major factor.

Israel's reaction has been addressed in earlier

chapters. Nevertheless, it merits a brief review in the context of regional struggles. For all their public anxiety over the sales and the threat posed by the F-15s to their

security, the Israelis had other reasons for opposing the

transaction. Besides the fact that it represented the first major defeat ever for the pro-Israel lobby in the United 108

States, the F-15 deal bore other implications for Israel. For

the first time, there was real fear in Jerusalem that the

Israeli hold on American policy in the region was slipping.

Put simply, they were jealous. At the same time, they

realized that an improved Saudi position could seriously

damage their own, for Saudi Arabia had to a great extent

broken the Israeli monopoly on the transfer of sophisticated

American weaponry to the Near East.

Even worse, the Israelis were fearful that this

foreshadowed future American concessions to the oil-rich

Saudis. There is some evidence that suggests that Begin

thought Jimmy Carter weak and vacillating, and thus may have held the real fear that he would eventually acquiesce to Arab demands for evacuation of the territories occupied in the 1967 war. This theory is borne out by the unusually rapid expansion of Israeli settlements after the F-15 deal.

Although the Israelis had been building settlements for some time, the construction proceeded at a much faster rate after the spring of 1978. Added to this was the decision to invade southern Lebanon in the spring of 1978, while the F-15 debate was still going on. All of this seemed to suggest a real fear

in Israel that the Jewish state's only real ally in the world was turning away in the face of overwhelming economic pressure from the world's largest exporter of oil. The P-15 sale was essentially the embodiment of all these fears as far as the

Israelis were concerned. 109

By the spring of 1978, the climate in the region was

marked by fear and paranoia. As much as at any other time,

the adage "thy friend today, thine enemy tomorrow" held true

everywhere from Gibraltar to the Indian Ocean. Specifically,

however, the fear among the Rejectionist Front countries was

of an American-backed moderate faction in the Arab world

financed by Saudi petrodollars. American influence and Saudi

money could well spell the undoing of such nations as Syria,

Libya and Iraq, which had a stake in the continued

radicalisation of the Palestinian resistance.

Indeed, though the Saudis had little influence in the

Arab world prior to 1967, they now wielded formidable

patronage, especially among such states as Egypt and Jordan:

According to an Embassy official, Saudi Arabia historically has not been influential in the politics of the Arab countries. However, its large oil reserves and its willingness to use oil as political weapon in dealing with Western countries have catapulated it into a political leadership role among the Arab nations. Saudi Arabia's vast oil revenues have also made it a major financier of military and economic development in several Arab nations including Egypt, Jordan and North Yemen. (2)

To underestimate the fear Saudi power inspired in

Damascus, Tripoli and Baghdad would be naive. Hafez al-Assad,

Muammar al-Qaddafi and Saddam Hussein had (and still have) one

thing in common: the compulsion to fill the vacuum of

leadership in the Arab world left in the wake of Gamal Abdel

Nasser's death. To all three, Saudi Arabia posed a threat,

for several reasons.

(2) American Israel Public Affairs Committee, Memorandum: "F-15s to Saudi Arabia— A Threat to Peace," January 1978, p. 2. 110

First of all, Saudi money was capable of swaying other nations away from the rejectionist line. Unless any of these men was able to establish a consensus within the Arab world, his dream of leadership would be doomed to failure. And the plain truth was, the Saudis would not allow any of the three to take over the mantle of leadership; they had enough trouble with Nasser. For their own part, the other powers were jealous of the Saudis' oil wealth (although Iraq and Libya are rather wealthy in their own right.) This was especially true in the case of Assad, who has taken a rather dim view of the

Saudis (some Levantine Arabs tend to disdain Gulf Arabs; this is no doubt a vestige of the proud days of the Ommayad and

Abassid rule). To forfeit their dreams to Saudi wealth and influence was unthinkable to these leaders. To this end, they worked diligently throughout the 1970s, despite their dislike for each other, to ward off attempts at moderation of the

Palestinian resistance.

However, the F-15 sale introduced a totally different factor to the equation. Saudi oil wealth was now to be legitimized through the introduction of American hardware, in the form of the most sophisticated plane on earth. This posed some rather dangerous problems. First, the Saudis would soon have a distinct military advantage over their neighbors.

Second, the U.S. would have a foothold in Saudi Arabia, and thus in the Arab world. Third, they would assume leadership of a vast portion of the Arab world dissatisfied with the rejectionists, but still looking for leadership. Fourth, any Ill

such leadership would come, quite obviously, at their

expense. For these men this was intolerable. However, there

was nothing they could do, short of encouraging the Soviets to

subvert the conservative monarchies of the Gulf. Most ironic

is the fact that Assad was (and still is) financed heavily by

Saudi Arabia.

So stood matters in the spring of 1978. The Saudis

knew fully the jealousy inspired by their excursion into the

Western arms bazaar (they were also negotiating with Britain,

France and West Germany). In fact, one of the reasons they

requested the aircraft was to convince the more radical

elements in the Arab world that the American connection was

worthwhile. The Saudis distrusted Assad, Qaddafi and Saddam

as much as the three men feared and distrusted the Saudis.

Although such situations are commonplace and part of the

Byzantine nature of Arab politics, the stakes were much more

dangerous in 1978. And again, those stakes inspired the

Saudis' to submit the request for the F-15s.

Whether the Saudis really desired a leadership role in

the region when they made the request is a difficult question

to answer. Some observers suggest that Saudi Arabia by its

very nature shuns the limelight. Others claim that leadership

was not desirable because it inspired subversion. But there

is always the possibility that the Saudi leadership smelled

power, and the F-15s were the first salvo in an offensive

aimed at wresting political command of the Arab and Muslim

worlds. 112

But the primary reason behind the Saudi request was the

fear of internal disruption and external invasion, and the

belief that the F-15s would be an impressive, if not a wholly

practical deterrent. Not to be ignored is the fact that the

Saudis genuinely wished to put to rest the snickers of

contempt arising from their lack of conribution to the Arab

military effort in the previous Arab-Israeli wars. The royal

family was determined to assemble a fighting machine that

would inspire a healthy respect in the region:

Defense Minister Prince Sultan told graduating Saudi Air Force cadets: All we own is at the disposal of the Arab nation and will be used in the battle against the common enemy. (3)

King Khaled told the New York Times in May of 1976 that: When we build up our military strength we have no aims against anybody except those who took by force our land and our shrines in Jerusalem--and we know who that is. We also believe that the strength of Saudi Arabia is a strength of the whole Arab and Islamic world. We always intended to make use of all military equipment that might help build our military strength. (4)

Finally, this raises another dimension to the Arab

reaction. Despite all the fears of the confrontation states

stemming from the Saudi arms purchases, there was an

excitement over the prospect of such sophisticated weapons in

Arab hands, and of the fear they inspired in Israel. Even if

T3) Christian Science Monitor, (December 5 1974).

(4) American Israel Public Affairs Committee, Memorandum: "F-15s to Saudi Arabia--A Threat to Peace," January 1978, p.4. 113 they were never used, they were an equalizer of sorts. In tandem with anti-aircraft batteries provided by the Soviets, they would force the Israelis to think twice before engaging the Arabs again. In any case, the possibility still existed that Arab pilots might soon fly the F-15s into battle against the Israelis. This was a prospect that undeniably intrigued

Arab leaders.

The deal definitely resulted in mixed emotions throughout the Arab world. The same nations that looked upon

Saudi Arabia with envy, and as a threat, felt at the same time a sort of pride at the strides the Arab world had made with respect to its dealings with the West in the space of just several years. No matter what the political inclinations of a particular Arab leader, he had to consider seriously the implications of Saudi Arabia's resounding success in the halls of the united States Congress at the expense of the heretofore unchallengeable pro-Israel lobby. CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION

The sale of the 62 F-15 fighter aircraft to Saudi

Arabia was truly a watershed in the Arab relationship with the

United States. For the first time ever, an Arab state successfully undertook a sophisticated lobbying effort in the

U.S. against heavy opposition from the pro-Israel lobby and won. The decision affirmed, at least for the time being, a

"special relationship" upon which both sides were dependent.

Most importantly, it bought time for both sides; the U.S. was able to lay the groundwork for a strategic plan that, it was hoped, would result in an American presence in the Gulf for years to come as a counterweight to the growing Soviet presence in the area.

For the Saudis, it provided a measure of proof to doubters in the Arab world of America's willingness to "play fair ball" with the Arabs. This was critical in the Saudi point of view, for the lack of American pressure on Israel for a settlement of the Palestinian question accompanied by Saudi

Arabia's generosity in oil pricing and production levels as

114 115 well as its cooperation with the U.S. threatened to reduce its

influence among the less patient countries of the Rejectionist

Front. Now the Saudis could say, with some justification,

that the Americans were a valuable and, indeed, an

indispensable ally.

No less important were the implications of the sale

upon the future of the pro-Israel lobby in the United States.

Prior to the P-15 battle, they had won every major and minor

encounter in the Congress of the United States, Never challenged since the inception of the state of Israel, AIPAC

and the other action groups enjoyed the support of an

overwhelming majority of both houses of Congress, not to mention seven presidents. They represented a formidable

voting bloc capable of altering election results in at least

seven metropolitan areas. The debate in the Senate over the

aircraft was the first major defeat ever for those forces.

This was no doubt encouraging to the Saudis and other Arabs, who felt that each setback for the pro-Israel factions would

further pave the way for bolder U.S. action on the Palestinian question.

The F-15 sale, however, was a different matter. This

was essentially the first major post-energy crisis

confrontation between pro-Israeli and pro-Arab forces. For

the first time, an Arab state entered such a battle with real

power at its disposal. The Carter administration ran the real

risk, if the battle was lost, of being locked out of Gulf

security arrangements as well as of facing the prospect of 116 higher oil prices and reduced exports from the Saudis and the potential loss of an important market.

This was obviously a new contingency with which the pro-Israeli forces had to contend. The importance of the administration's support cannot be exaggerated; in the past.

Congress could vote with Israel knowing that it was acting in tandem with the administration. Now however, a repudiation of the sale would result in a direct confrontation between the

Democrats, who were the majority in the Senate, and the

Democratic administration. As a result, AIPAC and the other political action groups defending Israel's interests found themselves in a head-on battle against the president, a number of senators and the might of Saudi Arabia's oil wealth. For them, this was obviously an unfamiliar, uncomfortable and a dangerous position.

The Saudi triumph, in a real sense, was also an administration triumph. The president could justify the sale on the same grounds as did the Saudis ; national security and the special relationship. Saudi Arabia needed the aircraft to protect the oil fields, which are crucial to the Western world's economic security. In addition, they would be an affirmation of the "special relationship" which has existed between the two nations since the 1930s. In the final analysis, given these arguments, there was little anyone could say to stop the transaction. 117

The F-15 deal was a precedent with respect to the future lobbying efforts of other Arab nations. By stressing national security as the major reason for the request rather than the Israeli threat, the Saudis enhanced their argument immeasurably in American eyes. The administration could justify the sales far more easily on these grounds than on any other. The future advantages for the Arabs were numerous if this argument was indeed to be used as a prototype. Other

Arab states, claiming that the threat posed by the Soviet

Union and its client states required American military aid, could make similar requests of the U.S. The U.S., in turn, would find it difficult to refuse without undermining its policy of countering Soviet advances in the Gulf, and indeed, possibly encouraging such nations to make an accomodation with the Russians as a means of preserving their security.

The U.S. could almost assuredly accede to such demands without losing face, simply by justifying them with the

Soviet-threat argument. The Arabs, in turn, would not run a major risk by purchasing American weaponry as long as they did not allow U.S. bases on their soil. Individual arms purchases would reduce the ability of the pro-Israel factions in the

U.S. to claim that the Arabs were amassing weapons in order to threaten Israel. Were the Arabs to demand, en masse, without real justification, an arsenal from the U.S., Congress would be compelled to deny the request out of fear for Israel's security. Nations acting alone out of fear of the Soviet

Union are much more difficult to refuse, however. 118

In the long-run, such an approach would probably benefit the U.S. Given the benefit of "getting its foot in the door," the road might have paved the way for future cooperation with the Arabs toward a solution of the

Palestinian problem. This, ultimately, would be the most effective means of eliminating Soviet influence in the area.

The Arabs, especially the Saudis, have no desire to further their involvement with the Russians; indeed, were it not for the U.S. support of Israel, it is doubtful whether any major

Arab state could stomach cooperation with the Soviets. Their system is inimical to the beliefs which guide the foreign policy and, indeed, the day-to-day life of the Arab and Muslim worlds.

Just as important is the Arab commitment to economic development; they discovered long ago that their future in this field rested with the United States rather than the

Soviet Union. The Aswan Dam fiasco proved this better than any other single event. The Soviet-planned dam project has been a total failure since its inception, and was part of the reason Sadat ultimately decided to eject the Soviets in 1972.

The other major reason was the utter inability of the Russians to get along with the Arabs. This pattern has been repeated in Syria and Iraq. In short, the Arabs realize that they have a strong stake in Washington, if only because the U.S. is the only nation that can persuade Israel to change its policies.

Cooperation between the Arabs and the U.S. would effectively demolish the Israeli argument that strengthening 119 the Arab world would lead to more Soviet involvement, and in the long-run, a Palestinian state that would result in the destruction of Israel, The Saudis in 1978 were partially out to prove to the U.S. that strengthening the Arabs would lead to less, not more Soviet influence in the region. They were convinced that the Arab states, given an American willingness to solve the Palestinian question satisfactorily, would move toward the West in due time.

The effects of the 1978 F-15 sale have yet to be felt in the U.S. and in the Arab world; events in the area have occurred with such alarming rapidity as to make any assessment premature. Since the spring of 1978, Egypt and Israel have signed a peace treaty which has failed to reach fruition, Iran has crumbled into anarchy, taking with it the presidency of

Jimmy Carter, Afghanistan has been invaded and occupied by

Soviet troops, Iraq and Iran are in a state of destructive warfare that has seen oil facilities on both sides burned to the ground, Lebanon has fallen deeper and deeper into violence and anarchy, with Syria and Israel squared off once again in an attempt to assert control over the embattled nation's future, the Arab world has seen Israel conduct a daring raid into Iraq over Saudi airspace to destroy Saddam Hussein's nuclear reactor, and the United States has elected a new president seemingly unafraid to use military power to protect

American interests anywhere in the world.

In the wake of all this turmoil, Saudi Arabia has become convinced of the need for additional security. After 120 an Iraqi aircraft flew across the Gulf undetected during the height of the war in September of 1980, the Saudis requested more hardware for the P-15s, followed by an additional request for five of the highly-sophisticated AWACS early-warning surveillance planes. In December of 1980, the U.S. sent over four such aircraft, manned by American technicians, to protect the Saudis from future incursions. The Saudis since then have become convinced of the need to own the aircraft outright, to avoid being labeled as American puppets and to begin the admittedly long journey toward military self-sufficiency.

What the Saudis failed to anticipate was the vehement oppostion this would precipitate in the U.S. Initially, the outgoing secretary of defense, Harold Brown, seemed to have made a commitment to defense minister Prince Sultan that the aircraft would be sold. The incoming Reagan administration told Brown that it did not want a final decision to be made before it studied the matter thoroughly. In early 1981, a decision was made by the new administration to sell part of the offensive equipment requested by the Saudis (extra fuel tanks and sidewinder missiles, but not in-flight refueling equipment or portable bomb racks). Although unhappy about the decision, the pro-lsrael lobby determined that a fight with a popular pro-Israel president just two months into his administration would be harmful, and consequently did not fight the deal.

But a month later, after rumors were leaked to the press, it was confirmed by administration sources that the 121

Reagan administration was indeed planning to propose to

Congress the sale of five AWACS aircraft to the Saudis. At this point, the Israeli lobby, acting with the encouragement of a defiant Menachem Begin, pledged to fight the AWACS deal with all its might. On the floor of the House, 43 members denounced the sale with varying degrees of outrage. It soon became evident that the President did not have the support of the Senate either. Congressional leaders told Reagan that the sale would be rejected by both houses if proposed as it stood. Meanwhile, the American press, led by such columnists as George Will and William Safire, issued a steady drumbeat of criticism of a decision it agreed with stunning unanimity would be potentially fatal to Israel's security.

The Saudis, clearly upset by the vociferous opposition, launched a quiet campaign of their own to convince the administration to go ahead with the package. But within the

Reagan councils, there was a division in the ranks. Secretary of State Haig, already on the ropes for his handling of his job, had long urged the later consideration of the AWACS deal on the grounds that it had no chance of passing the Congress at the time. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger advocated the linking of the F-15 additional equipment and the AWACS into one package. As events were to later prove, Haig was right. Paced with the prospect of a defeat that could potentially damage the chances for passage of his mammoth economic reconstruction program, Reagan decided to postpone his proposal until a more favorable time. 122

Although the Saudis were amply warned that such an

impasse was imminent, they were dismayed and quite openly

upset. They had taken great pains to warn through public and

private channels that the package was a litmus test of the

"special relationship" between the two nations, and that a

refusal or even a reluctance would lead to a potentially

serious rift.

But even this strategy seemed to backfire. Opponents

in the U.S. seized the opportunity to ask what the Saudis

proposed to offer in return for American assistance. There

was talk of public support for Camp David, repudiation of the

PLO, of closer military cooperation and even of U.S. bases on

Saudi territory. However, Alexander Haig visited the Middle

East in early April of 1981, and was politely but firmly told

that passage was crucial, but that Saudi Arabia did not agree

with Camp David, was still firmly behind the PLO, could not

commit itself to close military cooperation because of the

political sensitivity of such a move and that bases were

absolutely and completely out of the question, now and in the

future. In addition, the Saudis politely rejected Haig's

strategic policy of developing a regional consensus for

dealing with the Soviet threat in the area, especially since

they interpreted his efforts as an attempt to put the

Arab-Israeli conflict on the back burner. The Saudis countered

by suggesting American support for Palestinian

self-determination, for total Israeli withdrawal from the

occupied territories and Jerusalem and for an American presence "just over the horizon," in the Indian Ocean. 123

On top of all this, oil minister Sheikh Ahmed Zaki

Yamani came to the U.S. in mid-April and stated flatly that

Israel, not the Soviet Union, was Saudi Arabia's real enemy.

This came after the administration spent weeks assuring

Congress that Saudi Arabia agreed with the administration's assessment that the Soviet threat was the real danger to the

Middle East. The skeptios, long convinced that the Saudis actually wanted to use the aircraft against Israel, all attacked the sale, using the Saudis' own rhetoric against them. The administration at this point, became convinced that the package had no chance for passage in such an atmosphere and decided to put off formally proposing it to Congress for an indefinite period.

The Saudis were thus reduced to essentially two arguments in favor of the sales; they need them because of the dangers arising from the growing instability in the area, and as a reward for their years of friendship, manifested in

relatively cheap oil and consistently high production rates.

They have continued to stress these points for several years now.

Saudi Arabia is under fire now more than ever in the

history of the bilateral relationship. It is criticized for

its refusal to support a treaty which it is convinced has no

future, for refusing to renounce the PLO (a move which would

be political suicide for the Saudi regime, a fact that seems

to be lost on many American leaders), for selling oil at high prices (Saudi Arabia is criticized for giving its oil away in 124

the Arab world) and for being dangerously unstable. Yet the

Saudis continue to appeal to the U.S. for the right to buy weapons in order that they may protect themselves from threats not only to their own lifeline, but that of the West as well.

They are unable to understand the American refusal to see cooperation with Saudi Arabia as in the mutual interests of two interdependent nations. Above all, they are at a loss to explain what they perceive to be a blind and irrational support for Israel. In the Saudis' eyes, Israel is the only obstacle in the way of harmonious relations between the Arab world and the West, the U.S. in particular.

In order to understand the Saudi motivation behind the

F-15 deal of 1978 and the 1981 package, one must first consider where the Saudis have been and what they see as their future. Saudi Arabia has in many ways moved from the 18th century to the 20th century in the short space of twenty years. Overnight, schools, plants, factories, pipelines, roads, hospitals, universities, communications systems, banks and a modern economy have sprouted up out of a warring tribal society. For a people accustomed to having its children die for want of a doctor and knowing only the degrees of foreign

(Ottoman) domination for generations, these are accomplishments of which Saudi Arabians are fiercely proud.

They are currently in the midst of an agonizing moral dilemma brought on by rapid development and the inevitable conflict with the sacred tenets of a religion which is their life and culture, pure and simple. In addition, they now face an 125

outside threat, communist-inspired insurrection within its own borders. They must at. the same time contend with Israel, which possesses East Jerusalem and the holy shrines of Islam, with the sanction of their closest ally in the Western world.

The Saudis believe very much in, and are committed to, the principles of capitalism and free enterprise. They have long been convinced that the future of their nation's development lies in close and friendly cooperation with U.S.,

Japan and the other Western nations. In order to clear the way for such cooperation, they must move quickly to solve the quarrel between Israel and the Palestinians; they believe deeply that with the solution of this problem will come the end of the Soviet Union's influence among the nations of the region. A basic characteristic of the Saudis is their need for stability. They have become convinced that the F-15 and the AWACS are vital to their security. Indeed, they are now attempting to discreetly convince the U.S. that a decision in favor of this equipment will go a long way toward persuading the other skeptical Arabs that cooperation with the U.S. is worthwhile after all. This, according to the Saudis, along with an active U.S. effort to solve the Palestinian question, will go farther toward achieving the regional stability for which the U.S. is striving than the current American policy.

This then is the cornerstone of the Saudi argument;

American support for Saudi Arabia's security as well as the security of its friends will be but a first step toward convincing the other Arabs that, after nearly forty years, the 126

United States has finally realized that it has friends in the region other than Israel and that the Arab world could, and would, be committed to goals in the Middle East similar to those of the U.S.— an Arab world whose security is as important to the West as Israel's, if not more so.

In a real sense, the ongoing battle for the aircraft is a microcosm of the effort to develop a completely new agenda for the solution of the problems that have beset the Middle

East, as well as for the effort, to usher in a new era of economic and strategic cooperation between the developed and the developing world.

To conclude, the Carter administration's sale of 62

F-15s to Saudi Arabia was fully consistent with U.S. national interests, as has been demonstrated in the preceding pages.

The sale will have little significant effect on the Middle

East arms balance, nor will it pose a threat to Israel's security. The Israelis, as the preceding text has indicated, are fully capable of countering the F-15s with a far greater number of their own. The sale of the fighters will allow

Saudi Arabia to defend its oil fields, while at the same time give the U.S. a measure of control over circumstances in the region. How this strategy will ultimately affect the future of the region is unclear; in a large measure, the Saudis are banking the progress of their national defense program on it.

They can only hope the U.S. is ultimately commited to their security, though they are aware that it cannot, be as committed 127

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