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Between Two Caesars: the Christians

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Between Two Caesars: the Christians ESSAY BETWEEN TWO CAESARS: THE CHRISTIANS OF NORTHERN IRAQ ROGer Petersen & MattHew CanCian eligious and ethnic minorities live a precarious existence during Rcivil wars. In a war between the incumbent state and an insurgent challenger, minority group leaders may pick one side over the other. However, if they choose the loser they will be open to charges of collaboration and become vulnerable targets of vengeance. On the other hand, if the minority chooses to stay out of the fight altogether, the failure to mobilize may itself leave them defenseless. Moreover, some civil wars and insurgencies are more complicated than others. Multiple actors fighting or competing for control of the state make things even more complicated, especially if minority groups themselves fragment into multiple factions. In our brief account here, we 1.5 million Christians lived century, their numbers be- will describe the formation in Iraq, including many came miniscule. and fragmentation of self-de- Assyrians in northern Iraq fense forces (militias) within around Mosul. By the time During several visits to the the Christian population of ISIS swept through north- region, we’ve tried to learn the Nineveh Plains. We will ern Iraq in 2014, that figure more about the Christians trace the development of their may have fallen to roughly of Iraq, particularly in the post-2003 self-defense force, 400,000. If significant num- area of the Nineveh Plains. the crisis of the Islamic State bers do not return, the Iraq In the fall of 2014, the senior of Iraq and Syria’s (ISIS) at- War and its aftermath could author—Petersen—conducted tack, and the current frac- lead to a near elimination a focus group session with 15- tured state of Christian forces of a religious minority with 20 Christian refugees from in the area. The situation of roots going back nearly 2,000 Qaraqosh who found safety the Nineveh Plains militias years; some Christian groups in Jordan after fleeing ISIS. illustrates how evolving po- carry deeper ethnic identities In the summer of 2017 in litical relations can open a that are even older. It would Erbil, capital of the Kurdistan broad set of strategic choices. not be the first time a sizable Regional Government (KRG), In turn, we will show how ethno-religious minority Cancian interviewed several different actors will have in- has disappeared from Iraq’s officers in the Nineveh Plains centives to choose differently mosaic of peoples. In 1900, Guards (NPG), the largest across this set of options. Jews comprised one-fourth of Christian self-defense force. Baghdad’s population, total- At the time of the American in- ing about 50,000 residents. Generally speaking, minority vasion in 2003, an estimated Over the course of the next group political leaders have a 38 A soldier from the Nineveh Plains Protection Unit takes cover and returns simulated fire during react to contact training on May 18, 2016. Staff Sgt. Sergio Rangel. Source: US Army. range of choices in deciding the adjacent Nineveh Plains members of the Iraqi Army whether and how to mobilize chose differently. In the and Intelligence Services to their populations in armed summer of 2004, a Christian be the backbone of the group, groups. First, they can simply self-defense force was orga- and they in turn recruited try to stay neutral and not nized in Qaraqosh (also called younger Christians to be ju- mobilize at all. Second, they al-Hamdaniya, Bakhdida, or nior soldiers. can encourage their mem- Baghdeda), a Christian city bers to join one side’s armed that is the largest city in the From an initial force of just forces as individuals in hopes Nineveh Plains. It lies 20 245, the group expanded to of winning favor with that miles from Mosul, and crit- over 1,000 members who pa- group. Third, they can mobi- ically in the “disputed terri- trolled and manned check- lize militias and associate that tories” between Kurdish and points inside the city. While force with one of the combat- Iraqi Government control. at first they were unarmed, ants. On top of these choices, the KRG eventually provid- minority leaders must also According to officers in the ed them Kalashnikov rifles. consider whether to mobilize self-defense force, the prime The decision to align with as a unified entity or as a sub- mover was a Catholic priest the Kurds, rather than the group. Mobilizing as a sub- from the town, Father Louis Government of Iraq (GOI), group may allow the group Qassab. In response to ISIS was likely influenced by to pursue political goals or violence in Mosul, he con- the strong ties that Sarkis spoils, but it will also reduce tacted Sarkis Aghajan, an Aghajan has with the Barzani the group’s leverage while Assyrian politician who was family. There are reports increasing its vulnerability. the Minister of Finance and that he grew up in Iran with the Economy in the KRG from Nechirvan Barzani, the After 2003, the Christians in 1999-2006. Sarkis Aghajan Prime Minister and neph- Mosul proper basically chose contacted a trusted lieutenant ew of President Massoud neutrality. Nevertheless, tar- who had served in the Iraqi Barzani, and that Aghajan geted killings and kidnap- Army, Fuad Arab (a nom de was even in the Kurdish pesh- pings drove them out of the guerre), to organize a force of merga (military forces). On city. Reacting in part to the Christians in Qaraqosh. Fuad the other hand, American fate that befell their brethren Arab in turn enrolled a net- documents published in in Mosul, the Christians of work of Christians of former WikiLeaks indicate that in 39 private he complained about previous hegemony in the own groups but still main- Kurdish incursions on what area prevented splintering tained ties with the Kurds: he believed were historically because the peshmerga in the these groups include Dwekh Christian lands. Still, from an area was the clear partner for Nawsha, the Nineveh Plains early stage the force, dubbed assistance. After 2014, the Protection Units (NPU), and the Nineveh Plains Guards, Kurds’ reliability was ques- the Nineveh Plains Forces received material aid from tioned when ISIS overran (NPF). As it became clear the KRG and kept the area every major Christian town that Baghdad would liberate safe from the bloodshed that except al-Qosh in the north. most of the Nineveh Plains, plagued Mosul until the inva- Additionally, it wasn’t clear the NPU and NDF strength- sion of ISIS in August 2014. whether Erbil or Baghdad ened their relationships with would eventually liberate the GOI, which is now their In sum, while violence raged the Nineveh Plains from ISIS main partner. Finally, one in nearby Mosul, Christian control (assuming ISIS would force, the Babylon Brigade, leaders in Qaraqosh made be defeated). completely broke with the a decision to organize their Kurds and threw themselves own militia, people it with In effect, two polities were in with central government Christian veterans of the Iraqi now competing to be the le- as members of the Popular Army, and tie it to the most gitimate government in the Mobilization Units. powerful political actor in Nineveh Plains: the KRG and the region, the KRG and its the GOI. Neither was strong Remaining closest to the peshmerga. Other leaders enough nor had the will to KRG are members of the in smaller and less vulner- displace the other. Both could NPG, now officially mem- able localities chose not to produce mobile and local se- bers of the Zeravani forces mobilize an armed force; curity forces. For Christian under the KRG’s Ministry of this choice was safe given organizations, the choice set the Interior. As such, they re- the perceived power of the broadened to include the fol- ceived salaries and training peshmerga and the NPG. lowing realistic options: from the KRG. In the summer There was only one signif- of 2016, the junior author vis- icant Christian militia, so 1) Do not mobilize at all; ited them as they trained in there was no fragmentation. stay neutral Bnaslawa with members of 2) Mobilize and inte- the Western Coalition. Five After taking Mosul in June grate with the existing hundred of them were re- 2014, ISIS paused brief- Christian militia (NPG) ceiving a two-week refresher ly before turning its sights course, and morale seemed eastward in August. Losses 3) Mobilize an indepen- high. Abu Hakem (a nom de from ISIS’ advance did not dent group and ally close- guerre), their commander, include just Christian lives ly with the KRG claimed that they had 2,600 and property. First, Christian 4) Mobilize an indepen- members but planned to confidence in Kurdish protec- dent group and ally close- expand to 3,500. While tion declined when the pesh- ly with the GOI they had hoped to return merga was unable to defend to Bartella and Qaraqosh the Nineveh Plains. Second, 5) Mobilize an indepen- during the upcoming Mosul dent group and occupy and perhaps as a result of operation, these areas wound a position between the the first, Christians in the KRG and GOI up being liberated from ISIS region fractured into sever- by the central government. In al militias. While there had As it happened, organizations the summer of 2017 during always been different politi- covered the range of options. a return visit, the junior au- cal parties, before 2014 these Some Christians stayed in the thor witnessed that the NPG differences did not result in NPG, which was closest to continued to guard refugee the creation of competing the Kurds. Some split from camps for Christians in the armed groups.
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