Geoff Miller Senior Thesis Chapter Below Written for History
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Geoff Miller Senior Thesis Chapter below written for History 298a, composed during fall 2008 semester Chapter 1: "The World Cup of Peace" "The day that 25 million Argentines aim for the same goal, Argentina will be a winner not once, but a thousand times over"ill - Jose Alfredo Martinez de Hoz, Argentine Minister of Economy during the 1978 World Cup I: Preparing the Victory Argentina's "World Cup of Peace" started and ended triumphantly, at least for those in th charge. The three week long tournament culminated on June 25 , 1978, when the hosts defeated Holland three to one to bring the World Cup trophy to Argentina for the first time in the nation's history. The triumph prompted massive celebrations across the country, as a nation loudly, if not collectively, rejoiced in La Albiceleste's triumph on the biggest stage in world soccer. It also brought questions with few immediate answers. As mothers and relatives searched in vain for their "disappeared" relatives, international news sources and opinions openly doubted the validity of Argentina's on field triumphs and wondered what truly lay beyond the propaganda curtain drawn over the nation by its military rulers during June 1978. Thirty years after the tournament, Argentines still define and discuss EIMundial in myriad ways. This chapter examines the paradoxes of the 1978 World Cup, and seeks to establish the historical foundation needed to critically analyze the manner in which players, coaches, and fans remember Argentina's first world title. In 1966, FIFA selected Argentina to host the 1978 World Cup, the nth edition of the quadrennial tournament (Smith, 69). One decade later, a military coup replaced Isabel Peron's government with a military Junta, in the process changing not only the political direction of the nation but also its blueprint for hosting a successful tournament in 1978 (Mason, 71). The military quickly realized the importance of the World Cup. Athletically, it served as yet another opportunity for a soccer-mad Argentina to win the most prestigious, and to that time elusive, international title on the planet (Arbena, 120-122). Away from the field, hosting the World Cup emerged as a means of demonstrating the military regime's progress in transforming Argentina from its dark days under the Peron's to a peaceful, modern nation (Ibid.). On a local level, the World Cup also became Argentina's answer to Mexico, a nation that by 1978 had successfully hosted both a Summer Olympics in 1968 and a World Cup in 1970 (Ibid.). In order to ensure that the World Cup elevated Argentina's international reputation on and off the field, the military government accelerated plans for the tournament and declared the event a "national priority" (Archetti, 136). The previous regime of Isabel Peron had done little to prepare the country to host one of the largest sporting spectacles in the world, and General Jorge Vide la's Junta quickly organized and revamped the Ente Autarquico Mundial '78, or EAM, to oversee the construction of facilities and overhaul, with the help of an American based consulting group, the nation's image (Kuper, 213, Mason, 71). Although estimates of government spending differ, it is likely that the Argentinean Junta spent close to seven hundred million dollars on the World Cup, a number that dwarfed Spain's costs for the 1982 World Cup by around 300% and represented a tenth of the nation's entire spending for 1978 (Kuper, 211, Mason, 71). As spending on the World Cup reached unprecedented levels, Argentines joked that the World Cup's motto was in fact "Twenty-five million Argentines will pay for the World Cup" instead of "Twenty-five million Argentines will play in the World Cup" (Mason, 71, Kuper, 211). During the two years leading up to June 1978, the Junta built stadiums in Cordoba, Mar de Plata, and Mendoza, and renovated grounds in Buenos Aires and Rosario, including EI Monumental, the site of the opening ceremonies and final. Per FIF A regulations, Argentine authorities installed color television capabilities for broadcasts of the matches (Mason, 71). The host nation treated journalists to a newly minted press center, and completely renovated Buenos Aires' international airport ("World Cup has Political Tint," The Washington Post, 5/9/1978). To further assist the 50,000 expected international fans, authorities also provided bilingual hostesses outside stadiums (Mason, 71, Smith, 76). Out of the public eye, another set of more sinister plans was also under way. Despite intense government repression, guerilla groups such as the M ontoneros still posed a threat to the "stability" the Junta sought to establish in the country. On the eve of the tournament, security forces initiated "EI Barrido, " a security" [0 jperation" that sought to further cleanse the nation of subversives who might stage attacks during games and events, or even have the audacity to speak out against the military regime (Kuper, 213). A declaration by the Montoneros themselves promising an end to attacks during the World Cup did little to prevent government action ("Guerillas Vow Not to Halt World Soccer," The Washington Post, 3/26/1977). "Subversives" were not the only targets. Presenting a modern Argentina to the world meant denying the poverty that racked areas of the country. To prevent foreigners from viewing the villas miseries, or shantytowns, on the road to Rosario, the military government constructed a wall depicting middle class residences. (Kuper, 213). Without control of the press, modern facilities and denials of inequality would have fallen short of ensuring the positive depiction of Argentina that the military Junta sought and needed (Smith, 69). General Vide la's government was not the first Argentine regime to restrict freedom of the press, but its efforts to control journalists and mass media dwarfed the restrictions imposed by prior administrations (Ibid., 70-71). The Junta quickly imposed censorship regulations after the coup. On April 22nd, 1976, the Junta declared, "it is forbidden to inform, comment or make reference to ... subversive incidents, the appearance of bodies and the death of subversive elements ... includ[ing] victims of kidnap pings and missing persons" (Ibid., 71). As the World Cup drew neared, censorship extended from discussions of "disappeared" persons to commentary on La Selecci6n, coach Cesar Luis Menotti, and depictions of Argentina in foreign news sources (Ibid., 72-73). Defying censorship codes brought a heavy price. During the Junta's seven years in power, around seventy journalists "disappeared" (Ibid., 71). Tellingly, in 1977 the Junta disappeared twenty-one journalists, roughly twice the yearly average (Ibid.). It is certainly possible that the number of press members who "vanished" is higher in 1977 due to the efforts of the military government to consolidate control after the coup, but it seems just as likely that the press crackdown had roots in the Junta's desire to control domestic popular opinion leading up to the World Cup (Arbena, 123). Controlling domestic mass media outlets was only half the battle, and Vide la's Junta also quickly, and effectively, targeted foreign press sources. Leading up to the World Cup, both Amnesty International and several European organizations recognized the human rights violations present in Argentina. While Amnesty promoted an information campaign aimed at educating the foreign press, groups in France, Holland, and Sweden openly campaigned for their national sides and other teams around the world to boycott the tournament (Smith, 72, "La Otra Final"). Comite de Boycott du Mondial de Football en Argentine, or COBA, led the charge, publishing literature that visually depicted the 1978 World Cup's official seal, two hands holding a soccer ball, surrounded by barbed wire fences reminiscent of Nazi detention centers and concentration camps ("La Otra Final"). Argentina newspapers responded to foreign pressure by publishing scathing attacks on the "campaign[s] of lies" perpetrated outside the nation ("El Gnifico," quoted in Mason, 72) and th trumpeting the pre-destined victory that awaited the national team on June 25 , 1978. La Prensa's World Cup preview named Argentina one of the "cultural center[s] of unquestionable world focus" that "could not escape the responsibility to host an international soccer encounter, no matter. .. its magnitude" (La Prensa, quoted in Smith, 75). Other articles simply stated, "Argentina has already won the World Cup" (El Grafico, quoted in Mason, 72). Responding to foreign allegations was not enough, however, and although the Junta awarded close to 7,000 press credentials to foreign and domestic journalists, the Argentine government closely monitored who arrived in Argentina and what they subsequently wrote and said (Smith, 75). Vide la's regime briefly jailed a "leftist" Frenchjournalist, and other members of the foreign press corps found themselves similarly threatened. In one instance, Argentine journalists even attacked a foreign reporter who wrote about gunshots heard close to EI Monumental (Kuper, 214). The combination of domestic censorship and foreign intimidation certainly did not quell all criticism of Argentina's World Cup, but it did manage to quiet some of the most damaging attacks (Smith, 76). With preparations winding down, the focus of the Junta, the nation, and the world turned to the opening ceremonies. *** II: The Price of Glory Argentina started its run to World Cup glory on June 2nd, 1978, with a two to one victory over Hungary. The opening ceremony that preceded the game previewed the triumph that ensued, as General Videla declared that the 1978 World Cup would be the "World Cup of Peace" (Vide la, quoted in Mason, 72). Off the field, government repression had already turned this statement into a lie. Soon enough, events in Rosario would question the good will of the players and the intentions of Argentina's government on the field as well.