NUPI Forum for Development Studies No.1 – 2001

The Impact ofForum Multi-Party for Development Politics in StudiesSub-Saharan | No. 1-2001Africa 5 The Impact of Multi-Party Politics in Sub-Saharan Africa Nicolas van de Walle 1. Introduction A wave of democratisation spread through Africa in the early 1990s, representing the most significant political change in the continent since the independence period three decades before. Throughout Africa, significant political liberalisation resulted in the emergence of a free press, opposition parties, independent unions and a multi- tude of autonomous civic organisations. Botswana, Mauritius and Zimbabwe have conducted regular multi-party elections since their independence, and Senegal since 1979; but in 29 out of 47 states in the region, the first multi-party elections in over a generation took place between 1990 and 1994 (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997). In a smaller set of countries that had been non-democratic, these elections were fully free and fair and resulted in the defeat and exit from power of the erstwhile authoritarian head of state. By the end of the decade, only a small minority of states were not officially multi-party electoral democracies, even if the practice of democratic politics was often far from exemplary. Has the new, more open, political climate undermined economic reform in Africa? Has there been a negative (or positive) correla- tion between economic and political reform in the 1990s? What impact has democratisation had on the patterns that have characterised African politics in the past? It is important to understand the impact of democratisation on African economies because it can provide real insights into the dynamics of change in Africa’s contemporary political economy. At the beginning of the 1990s, the dominant point of view among observers of the African scene appeared to be one of optimism about the region’s politics, but pessimism about its economic pros- NUPI JUNE 01 6 Nicolas van de Walle pects. Rather curiously, today that assessment seems reversed. During the period 1994–98, as documented above, Africa witnessed its best economic results in over a decade. The International Financial Institutions (IFIs) have suddenly become cautiously optimistic about the region, relieved to be able to argue that their policy package is finally working. The usually cautious Economist went so far as to declare that ‘Sub-Saharan Africa is in better shape than it has been for a generation’, pointing out that its overall growth rate was 4.4 per cent in 1996, ‘higher than it had been for two decades’ (‘Emerg- ing Africa’, Economist, 13 June 1997). Some observers have retained their optimism (Diamond, 1997; Wiseman, 1999). However, the ethnic violence that put an end to the democratic regime in Burundi, factional street-fighting in the Congo’s capital in 1993 and then again throughout 1997 and 1998, and highly flawed second multi-party elections in Mali, Zambia and Madagascar have led many observers to belittle the degree of political liberalisation actually achieved in the past and the prospects for democratic consolidation (e.g. Monga, 1997; Ottaway, 1997). The countries that are increasingly viewed as stable and evolving in the right direction are regimes such as Museveni’s in Uganda, or Campaore’s in Burkina Faso, neither of which can qualify as con- solidating democracies. Note that as this essay was being written, Africa once again made the cover of the Economist, but this time under the title ‘The Hopeless Continent’ (13 May 2000), suggest- ing a marked change in attitude from the staff of the British news magazine! So how can the relationship between democratisation and economic policy-making be characterised? There is long and distin- guished academic tradition of studying the long-term relationship between democracy and growth, a slightly different set of issues from those addressed here, and one marked by a far more sanguine view of the relationship (e.g. Przeworski and Limongi, 1993; Dia- mond, 1992). When the wave of democratisation reached Africa in the early 1990s, most academic observers were pessimistic about the ability of African countries to combine successfully the ‘dual transitions’ of economic and political reform. The most common view was that ‘all good things’ did not happen at the same time and that one reform process would undermine the other (Bienen and Herbst, 1996; Callaghy, 1994; Gibbon, Bangura and Arve Ofstad, 1992; Widner, 1994; Jeffries, 1993), though to be sure, less pessimistic accounts could also be found (Healey and Robinson, 1992; Lewis, 1997). This pessimism appeared to be based, first, on the NUPI JUNE 01 The Impact of Multi-Party Politics in Sub-Saharan Africa 7 common assumption that democratisation would increase societal pressures on governmental decision-making. In this view, African- ists were echoing the view that democratisation in other regions of the world had resulted in a sharp increase in political participation. As noted by Haggard and Kaufman (1995: 152; see also Linden- berg and Devarajan, 1993; Hellman, 1998), ‘new democratic gov- ernments face exceptionally strong distributive pressures, both from groups reentering the political arena after long periods of repres- sion and from established interests demanding reassurance’. These observers were particularly worried about the impact of more open government on policy reform in Africa, where both processes were viewed as highly vulnerable to reversal. Second, and relatedly, by redistributing power from the executive to the more participatory legislative branch of government, democratisation was believed to weaken the autonomous power of the executive to design and implement policy, which in turn undermined the prospects for macroeconomic stabilisation. In a trench- ant essay, for example, Jeffries argued (1993: 20) that democratic politics would further weaken the already tottering African state and ‘exacerbate... problems of corruption, wastefulness and short- sighted economic policy formulation’. Jeffries concluded his analysis by criticising as naive donors such as the World Bank which believed that democratisation would improve the prospects for structural adjustment programmes. Instead, he concluded, donors should first promote ‘the development of more efficient and capable government bureaucracies’ (p. 34). These assumptions suggested that the wave of democratisation that hit Africa in the early 1990s represented a sharp historical dis- continuity in the mode of governance throughout the continent and in its relationship with the outside world. Today, with the benefit of a couple years’ hindsight, it is possible to make a first tentative assessment of the economic consequences of democratisation in Africa, and to examine these assumptions more carefully. In fact, as our data will reveal, there appears to be little significant differ- ence between the democracies and the non-democracies in sub- Saharan Africa (SSA) in terms of their economic performance over the last couple of years, in a context of modest economic improve- ment for the region as a whole. The more interesting issue is what this tells us about economic decision-making in Africa, and the evolving nature of continental political economy. The democratisation wave that swept the region constituted perhaps the most fundamen- tal political change since independence and therefore held out the NUPI JUNE 01 8 Nicolas van de Walle possibility that different patterns of economic decision-making would emerge. How would the corrupt and largely incompetent modes of governance described in these pages be affected by the move to multi-party electoral politics? Examining the impact of democratisation thus allows us to problematise the issue of change within the contemporary African political scene and distinguish the more per- manent structures within African politics from the merely epiphe- nomenal. The analysis starts in the next section with a review of the sali- ent dimensions of political reform in Africa in the early 1990s. I review some of the underlying reasons for the wave of democratisation that occurred in the region, and then argue that the extent of political reform was significant in most countries in the region, even if it usually fell well short of liberal democracy. A third section at- tempts a rigorous analysis of the impact of democratisation by making both longitudinal and cross-sectional comparisons of economic performance. The essay then turns its attention to explain- ing why democratisation appears to have so little effect on economic performance. I show that political reform in the 1990s did little to upset the major institutions of African politics, at least in the short term. 2. Africa’s Democratisation Wave, 1989–95 This essay’s first task is to characterise with some precision the degree of actual political change in Africa in the early 1990s. I start by briefly examining the underlying causes of democratisation and then assess the political change that occurred. The causes of democratisation Democratisation is always a complex process involving the inter- action of agency and structural factors, domestic and international ones, and economic and non-economic ones. The wave of democratisation that hit Africa in the early 1990s was no exception. Rather than attempt a comprehensive analysis, which has been provided elsewhere (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997; Joseph, 1999; Wiseman, 1995; Daloz and Quantin, 1997; Ihonvbere and Mbaku, 1998), I wish here to link the events of the early 1990s to the neopatrimonialism that has characterised African politics during the course of the last 20 years. The term ‘neopatrimonialism’ captures the thesis that most NUPI JUNE 01 The Impact of Multi-Party Politics in Sub-Saharan Africa 9 African states are hybrid regimes, in which patrimonial practices coexist with modern bureaucracy. Outwardly the state has all the trappings of a Weberian rational-legal system, with a clear distinc- tion between the public and the private realm, with written laws and a constitutional order.

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