Contents

Introduction ...... 03

Is Eastern Europe Transiting from Communism to Fascism? Evgenii Dainov ...... 04

Church and Communism: Bulgarian Orthodoxy at Stake Iskren Ivanov ...... 09

The Romanian Judicial System: Current Issues and the Necessity of Avoiding Regress Dragoș Călin ...... 15

An Ideal of Unmanipulated Public Communication Plamen Makariev ...... 21

Bulgaria’s Media Landscape 30 Years After the Fall of Communism Mariya Neikova ...... 25

Strengthening Social Resilience as a Means to Protect from Hybrid Threats Yantsislav Yanakiev ...... 29

The Oligarchy’s State Lyubomir Avdjiiski ...... 36

Empathy, Deliberation, and Democracy in Present-Day Bulgarian Society? Julia Stefanova ...... 40

Reflections on Social Inclusion Maya Tcholakova ...... 49

From Posts to Polls: Instagram as the New Norm for Electoral Engagement Borislav Baev and Maria Mileva ...... 55

1 Fulbright International Seminar Conference Proceedings

Evgenii Dainov Iskren Ivanov Dragoș Călin Plamen Makariev Mariya Neikova Yantsislav Yanakiev Lyubomir Avdjiiski Julia Stefanova Maya Tcholakova Borislav Baev and Maria Mileva

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Bulgarian-American Commission for Educational Exchange 2020

www.fulbright.bg Introduction

his collection features studies by lecturers and kariev ( University) and Professor Dimitar Vatsov participants in the 2019 Fulbright International (New Bulgarian University) introduced the topics of TSeminar “Strategies for Strengthening Democra- “unmanipulated communication” and propaganda cy: 30 Years after the Fall of the Berlin Wall,” which took strategies. The panel of journalists and informational place in Sofia, September 24-30, 2019. It was spon- specialists: Professor Maria Neikova (Sofia University), sored by the State Department (ECA) and organized Professor Velizar Shalamanov (Bulgarian Academy of by the Bulgarian-American Fulbright Commission, with Sciences) and journalist Ruslan Trad (De Re Militari) the support of the State Department’s Bureau of Edu- outlined contours of the current media-scape, the chal- cational and Cultural Affairs. We hosted a stellar group lenges to decision making in the time of info-wars and of lecturers and diplomats and outstanding, motivat- the challenges to reporting from conflict zones. The day ed seminar participants from the following countries: concluded with the Fulbright Commision’s own Maria the US, , the UK, Ukraine, , Germany, Kostova in tandem with Professor Makariev demon- Portugal, Canada, the Netherlands and . Aca- strating public opinion manipulation through social demics, policy makers, political scientists and repre- media (Troll Farms) and curated media debates (the sentatives of civil society and religious denominations Istanbul Convention). discussed the issues of “captured/facade” democracy, judicial reform, informational security, social cohesion Social cohesion and justice were the focus of day five. and empathy. Brainstorming, learning and exchanging Professor Yantsislav Yanakiev (Bulgarian Defense In- ideas, the participants formed a comprehensive view of stitute) presented a highly professional, security-based the current challenges and solutions facing democratic approach to national and social resilience, while US dip- development of the region 30 years after the Fall of the lomat John Beyrle shared memories of his service as Berlin Wall. ambassador to Bulgaria and Russia, while emphasizing the importance of consistency on the path of democ- The opening day placed the post-communist transi- racy. Attorney at law Fred Rooney, civil society activist tion into historical perspective with Dr. Damian Valdez and lawyer Lyubomir Avdjiiski, and CEO of Arete Youth (Cambridge University) and Professor Evgenii Dainov Foundation Radost Chaprazova offered fascinating (New Bulgarian University). Their outline of the histori- views on concrete steps for inclusion and empower- cal tensions underlying the appearance and decline of ment. Lena Borislavova and Alexandrina Dimitrova, communist ideology was followed by a walking tour two successful civil society leaders, presented a work- highlighting the signs of socialism lingering in Sofia. shop on fund-raising for charities.

Day two was devoted to “togetherness,” thus , The final day was dedicated to Empathy and Moral the 2019 Cultural Capital of the European Union, was Education. Professor Julia Stefanova (Sofia University) the perfect setting for such discussions. The Plovdiv introduced the concept of empathy as a catalyst for Historical Museum hosted us for two lectures devoted social change, followed by Professor Vladimir Levchev to the situation of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church dur- (AUBG), who traced the path of the Bulgarian intelli- ing communism and to current Orthodox communities’ gentsia during the transition. The panel of religious and revival through charity activities and pilgrimage. civil society leaders: Mr. Maxim Delchev (Shalom), Svet- la Baeva (FineActs) and Pastor Evgeny Naydenov (Bul- Day three took us through the labyrinth of captured garian Evangelical Church), offered the much-needed and facade democracy with highly informative lectures avenue of hope with which to conclude our intellectual by Dr. Victor Andrusiv (CEO of the Ukraine Institute of explorations. Professor Maya Tcholakova (South-West the Future) and Professor Emilia Zankina (American University) added the final touch with her practical ex- University in Bulgaria). Dr. Reynaldo Ortiz (City Univer- ercise on social inclusion and community building. Our sity of New York) introduced participants to the chal- illustrious participants offered their solution plans and lenges to democracy in Latin America. The panel ses- policies in a contest of creativity, informed decision- sion featured two leading Bulgarian political scientists making and genuine care. from Sofia University—Professor Stoycho Stoychev and Professor Lyubov Mincheva—as well as two influential In the year since the conference was held, the Covid-19 judges, Dragoș Călin (Romania) and Evgeny Georgiev pandemic and the concomitant economic and politi- (Bulgaria), who discussed the balance between public cal crises it has triggered make the question of how to opinion and rule of law. The dimensions of the “crimi- strengthen democracy even more urgent. Thus, we of- nalized state” were presented by Professor Mincheva, fer this selection of papers by conference participants while Dr. Andrusiv completed the day with a thought- as a way to continue and broaden the important con- provoking workshop on the “Future of Democracy.” versations we began last year.

The concept of Truth and the problem of disinformation We would like to thank the authors, the conference lec- were the focus of the next day’s discussions. Two re- turers, as well as all FIS 2019 participants and support- nowned Bulgarian philosophers, Professor Plamen Ma- ers for their commitment!

3 Is Eastern Europe Transiting From Communism to Fascism?

Evgenii Dainov

n the beginning of the 1990s, an academic bon mot choice of place for this drama. The Czechs, unlike most was making the rounds during conference coffee other East Europeans, did not see the Soviet Union as Ibreaks: “Now that the nations of Eastern Europe an oppressor. On the contrary, they were grateful for have thrown off the alien ideology of communism, they the fact that, following the dissolution of their state are free to return to their indigenous tradition of fas- by Adolf Hitler in 1939, in 1945 the incoming Red Army cism.” Few really believed this, although Vaclav Havel had restored the sovereignty of Czechoslovakia, albeit and Ralf Dahrendorf were already fretting about this in a limited form. From this gratitude arose the Czech possibility. tolerance for the Soviet type of “socialism” imposed on them after 1948. By 1968 what the Czechs wanted was A generation later, with the extreme xenophobic and re- simply a new kind of softer socialism—“socialism with a ligious right resurgent, we have to ask ourselves again: human face.” Is the ideology of communism being replaced by some kind of fascism? And what exactly does Victor Orban, When this relatively modest ambition was crushed the self-proclaimed ideologue of “new Europe,” mean with the help of T-54s, East Europeans came to sev- when he proclaims: “the elite of 1968 is leaving the eral important conclusions. First: the communistic type scene and we have to answer but one single question: of “socialism” was not subject to reform; it could only who is coming to replace it? And to this question we be overthrown and replaced with something different. must, modestly, respond: we are?”1 Second: open revolution was not an option—or was not as long as the Kremlin was willing to respond with the Every story has a beginning. This one started, indeed, Red Army. A long and careful process of attrition would in the turbulent year of 1968. A new kind of revolution- have to be undertaken, wresting power from the com- ary youth movement shook the world, West, South and munists piece by piece. East. The aim was the same everywhere: definitive lib- eration of the individual, combined with the establish- How was this attrition to be attempted? By the early ment of a society founded on new values such as peace, 1970s it was becoming clear that, although the world solidarity, community, equality, fairness and love. youth rebellion had not attained its declared aims, it had produced at least one solid achievement. It had, in To the East of the Iron Curtain, such ideas were es- the words of Theodor Adorno, broken off the “smooth pecially poignant. The communist system, at the time transition to a totally administered world.”2 The struc- advertising itself as “socialist,” was intent on eradicat- tures of power were henceforth porous and permeable; ing both individuals and communities. The communists they could be penetrated and influenced. were attempting to construct truly totalitarian states, in which individuals were not autonomous subjects, but In the West, following the end of its youth revolution, mere cogs in the machinery of the state, obediently car- the idea took hold of engaging in piecemeal change rying out the orders of their superiors; and communities by entering into existing institutions—the “long march were deliberately atomized, so as to eradicate all possi- through the institutions,” recommended by German ble sources of solidarity, out of which opposition might student leader Rudi Dutschke. In the East, this was spring. East Europeans demanded the recovery of indi- not deemed possible (except partially in Hungary), be- vidual freedom and the lifting of the state’s heavy hand cause institutions were under the complete control of from their communities. the ruling Communist Parties and their secret police. But the East had something that the West had lost: Matters came to a head in Prague, where the rebellion the ideal of community. In the West, after the end of was stamped out by the tanks of the Soviet Red Army the 1960s the idea of constructing a new society based and its regional allies. There was historic irony in the on community feelings had disappeared; what was left

1 Bernard Guetta, L’Enquete hongroise (puis polonaise, italienne et autrichienne), (Paris: Flammarion, 2019), 98-99. 2 Theodor W. Adorno and Herbert Marcuse, “Correspondence on the German Student Movement,” trans. Esther Leslie, New Left Review, no. 233 (January/February 1999): 123-136, www.newleftreview.org/issues/I233/articles/theodor-adorno-herbert-marcuse-correspondence-on-the- german-student-movement.

4 standing was the urge for individual liberation. In the Immediately, they faced the question: What next? East, with individual liberation evidently impossible, people turned to the idea of changing society by con- Every single revolutionary throughout the region strug- structing “humanized” communities outside the pe- gled to choose between the only two options that rimeter of the state. seemed available. One was to build on the work of “par- allel societies” and reconstruct the entire society along By the second half of the 1970s this idea, increasing- lines different from both Eastern communism and ly called “civil society,” was dominant. Ultimately, it is Western capitalism. The other option was to concen- rooted in the thought of one of Europe’s greatest (and trate on the urgent task of overcoming the complete inexplicably underrated) philosophers, the Czech thinker economic wipeout of the early 1990s by implementing Jan Patočka. He wrote that in the central and eastern rapid and dramatic reforms, in order to re-establish part of Europe, states were not as deeply rooted—and economic life on the foundations of private property therefore not as legitimate—as in the West. What was and free enterprise. rooted, and therefore truly legitimate, were the nations and the intellectuals who spoke on their behalf. From As was then the rule, the Czechs formulated most this came the conclusion that these societies had both clearly these two options. As early as The Power of the the right and the real opportunity to lead organized Powerless, Vaclav Havel had argued for the first option, lives outside of and parallel to the state. writing that the end of communism would not be a lo- cal event. The freeing of Eastern Europe would ignite Thus was born the concept of “civil society”—of a space a worldwide “fundamental restructuring of the situa- between the private sphere and the state, in which peo- tion of human beings in the world and their relations ple get together in their capacity as citizens to address with each other.” Havel conceptualized liberation from common issues that transcend their private affairs. By communism as a continuation of work left undone in the end of the 1970s, this concept was both energized 1968 and proposed a new kind of Republic based on the and brought into sharper focus by another great Czech values and attitudes underpinning the “civil societies” of thinker (and illustrious future president) Vaclav Havel, the region. Let us call this project “the Havelian Repub- in an underground text called The Power of the Power- lic.” Havel was to stick to this project until the end of his less.3 His message was simple and effective. For various life, gradually fleshing it out with more detail, such as reasons, the regimes no longer had the luxury to govern social relations based on love and development based with “pure, brutal and arbitrary violence.” Total violence on care for the environment. had been replaced with total lying. The road to freedom, therefore, was to refuse to live in the lie—“to live in truth,” In the harsh realities of the early 1990s, however, as Havel put it. People living in truth could carry on their with Havel already president, his vision clashed with lives as if there was no dictatorship, at least in their pri- that of his prime minister, Vaclav Klaus, whose job it vate sphere and in civil society. Gradually, a “parallel so- was to pull the country out of economic collapse. For ciety” would be constructed, based on solidary-inspired Klaus, the fundamental task of the “transition” was to values and principles, which would in the end swamp the achieve a functioning market economy through the ef- official institutions. Ultimately, the servants of the re- forts of a highly centralized state. Citizens would be gime themselves would abandon it, because they were represented only through political parties; civil society also the victims of lying and deceit and would prefer to was to be dissolved as a thing of the past, which may live, instead, in truth. No violent upheaval or punitive ret- have been useful then, but was very dangerous now, ribution would be necessary to overcome communism. because it “placed itself between the citizen and the state.”4 By the second half of the 1980s, such “parallel societ- ies,” complete with underground universities and un- The Klaus vision carried the day, from the shores of derground media, were in existence, to a greater or the Baltic to the beaches of the Black Sea. The newly lesser extent, in all “socialist” countries, with Poland, freed countries decided to become an exact copy of Czechoslovakia and Hungary taking the lead. During the West (minus the West’s solidarity, given the harsh- the closing months of 1989, the participants in these ness of the economic reforms necessary to construct “parallel” circles came out into the open, leading the an- a capitalist economy). There would be no decentraliza- ti-communist revolutions. These revolutions remained tion of power or a humanist “Havelian Republic.” The peaceful (“Velvet”) because their leaders stuck firmly to East opted for what it believed was a “Thatcherite” Havel’s vision. Knowing that the communists would not model of society, in which economic rationale over- unleash armed terror, and at the same time confident ruled all other considerations; and the state, while that most communists were secretly wishing to “live in highly centralized, would not “interfere” in economic truth,” revolutionary leaders in the various countries im- matters. The driving motivation of society would no plemented negotiated transfers of power and achieved longer be freedom, but wealth. consensus to move on to constitutional democracy.

3 Vaclav Havel et al., The Power of the Powerless, (London: Hutchinson, 1985). 4 Martin Myant, “Klaus, Havel and the Debate over Civil Society in the Czech Republic,” Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 21, no. 2 (2005): 248-267, DOI: 10.1080/13523270500108758.

5 Margaret Thatcher herself, always a sharp observer, as “keeper of the treaties,” that rule of law, separation was aghast at things done in the name of “Thatcher- of powers and freedom of speech be effectively imple- ism,” pointing out forcefully the risks inherent in the mented. East European model of “Thatcherism”: This pressure was, for the ruling elites, as surprising as The capitalism which I support—and which it was unwelcome. They thrived on the concentration of is practised in the West—is not a free- power and the absence of accountability and oversight. for-all in which the powerful are able to The last thing they needed was someone from the out- exploit their position at the expense of side pointing fingers. Rather than trying, as had their fairness, decency and the common good. predecessors, to imitate the West, the new elites openly Capitalism can only function when there envied the tyrannical-oligarchical model already taking is a strong and just rule of law, to which shape in Russia. By the mid-2000s, with Russian input, everyone, including government, is an- these elites launched nationalist-xenophobic parties as swerable... Capitalism, above all, requires counterweights to the pressures coming from Brussels. confidence in order to operate. And such confidence can only be created by a just Then came the shock of the 2008 financial crash. The rule of law applying to everyone equally.5 former socialist countries were not, as it happens, hit very hard by it; indeed, the Poles simply refused to Weakly rooted states and two generations under dic- believe that there was a crisis going on, continued to tatorial rule did not, obviously, bode well for a “just rule carry on as usual and avoided it entirely. The shock of of law.” What in fact happened was closer to a “free- the crash was cultural and psychological, because it for-all,” giving rise to the “Wild East” of the 1990s. Nev- revealed the underlying fragility of the “Klaus project,” ertheless, the “Klaus project”—to be like the West—re- under which the economy was everything and the he- mained legitimate throughout the region. Its legitimacy, gemonic ideal was to get rich. The crash illustrated that however, was a thin one. From the West, the East took just getting rich was not a sustainable ideal. A more du- only consumerism and the primacy of economic con- rable ideology was needed. siderations; more fundamental “Western” values, such as rule of law, protection of freedoms and dispersal of Not surprisingly, the elites turned to the notion of a power, were not really understood. strong state. A nation devoted to the idea of a strong state would not only endure economic problems, but With the inclusion of these countries into EU and NATO, also stand up to Brussels, interpreting pressure to im- a sense of “arrival” set in. The European Commission plement EU treaties as an attack on sovereignty. Be- was content with its new members, citing their bal- cause most of this pressure had to do with human rights anced budgets. The Americans were also content, as and freedoms, it was relatively easy to depict “Brussels” the European East proved more willing than the West as a den of out-of-control “liberals” who, in the name to take part in their military coalitions. of some kind of free-floating individuality, were out to destroy the historic nations of Europe. As frequently happens, the sense of “arrival” was im- mediately challenged by a new set of frustrations. It did Every retreat from (the liberal) doctrine of individual not take long for the East and Central Europeans to human rights inevitably leads to some kind of collectiv- notice that, in spite of all their sacrifices and hard work, ist centralization of power. Liberalism is about free and they were still behind the West in terms of living stan- equal individuals coming to agreement after reasoned dards. The ruling elites were, in turn, frustrated by the discussion. Authoritarianism is about groups of people realization that membership in the EU limited rather coming to agreement after a conflict that produces than expanded their options. winners and losers. Not surprisingly, the new East Eu- ropean Right soon reached for the concept of conflict During the late 1990s, using the weakness of institu- as the engine of progress, as developed by the Nazi tions and the absence of proper rule of law, these elites philosopher Carl Schmidt. What the East likes about emerged as budding oligarchies, composed of men Schmidt is not only his embrace of violent conflict and who had done well out of the “Wild East.” These were war, but also his understanding of sovereignty as the the men predicted by Margaret Thatcher—the power- right to “make exceptions”—to break the rules. The re- ful groups who would be “able to exploit their position sult has been the Eastern extreme Right’s celebration at the expense of fairness, decency and the common of violence, rule-breaking and conflict. good.” The last thing these new elites wanted was the limitation of their will by a “just rule of law.” Internally, Immanuel Kant’s free, equal and universal individual is they faced little danger of being thus limited. At the depicted as a monster; in order to recover his human outcome of the “Klaus project,” civil society was in tat- essence, that free individual (for the extreme Right, al- ters. Effective pressure came from the outside—from ways a “he”) must re-think himself as a greater being, the constant demands of the European Commission, a member of a collective “identity.” Hence the East-

5 Margaret Thatcher, “A Window on the West,” speech to Forum of Eastern and Central European Entrepreneurs, October 22, 1991: www.margaretthatcher.org/document/108288.

6 ern far-Right’s penchant for pitting pithy slogans, such ginning with the German Romantic movement and end- as “God, Nation, Family,” against “Liberty, Equality, ing with Nazism. “Culture” has considerable attraction Brotherhood.” What the oligarchic elites particularly for many people in the former Eastern pact, because it like about “God, Nation, Family” is that there is no eases the frustration of being unable to “catch up with conceivable interpretation under which this triad could the West” on the West’s own terms. We, the thinking include free speech, rule of law and an independent ju- runs, may be poorer and rowdier than the West, but un- diciary. like the West we have preserved our culture; we are the real Europe. As Mr. Orban has been frequently saying: Shifting the focus from Kant’s autonomous individual “We used to think that Europe was our future; now we to some kind of collective body shifts the entire ground know that we are Europe’s future.” of politics, i.e. the way people structure relations of power among themselves. The collective body becomes The model of an illiberal state, based on national cul- the subject and the bearer of rights; individuals are ture, may be possible in the East, with its weakly rooted left with the obligations. This is clear in the following states, but is not really exportable westwards, where citation from a lengthy speech delivered by Hungarian states (and, indeed, “civilization”) have much stron- Prime Minister Victor Orban on July 24, 2014: ger roots. The model is difficult to export for another reason also: the heterogeneity of European societies. ...until now we have known three forms of The xenophobia that usually accompanies attempts state organization: the nation state, the to overturn the Enlightenment is simply not feasible in liberal state and the welfare state. And such settings. the question is, what’s next? The Hungar- ian answer to this question is that the era The two countries that are most advanced on the road of the work-based state is approaching. to an illiberal state are Hungary and Poland. They are We want to organize a work-based soci- also the two most homogeneous countries in terms of ety that, as I have just mentioned, under- ethnicity and religion. In both places, well over 90 per- takes the odium of stating that it is not cent of the population is Hungarian and Christian or liberal in character.6 Polish and Christian. These are the only two countries in Europe that can actually afford to be xenophobic, i.e. This illiberal, work-based state has been held up as a to hate everyone who is different. As early as the year model to all of Eastern Europe and, indeed, to the “lib- 2000, Hungarians (followed by Poles) demonstrated an eral” West that is doomed to fail, according to Mr. Orban astonishing degree of xenophobia. For 63 percent of and his allies, if it does not abandon liberalism. This kind Hungarians (compared to 24.6 percent of , of collectivist state cannot abide the rule of law and this not particularly known for their tolerant nature) it was is the reason that the judiciary has been under attack in inadmissible to have immigrants as neighbors; 84.4 per- Hungary, Poland, Romania and Bulgaria. Indeed, in the cent did not want homosexuals as neighbors and 68.6 closing months of 2019 the Polish Supreme Court came percent—people of Roma descent. Fully three-quarters out with a declaration that Poland would have to con- of all Hungarians and Poles demanded even then strict sider leaving the EU if “Brussels” continues to pressure control over, or an outright ban on, foreign workers.7 the Polish state to respect judicial independence. The model of the illiberal state is difficult to export and, Leaving, however, is not an option seriously considered as the results of the elections to the European parlia- by the East European oligarchies. Most just want to ment of 2019 demonstrated, the peak of this ideology be left alone to increase their grip on society and its may have already passed. resources. In terms of ideology, however, there is a current which is trying to work out how to take over But is it fascist? Who are the “we” that Mr. Orban claims the EU and turn it into a copy of Mr. Orban’s illiberal are coming to replace the “elite of 1968”? state. The key word here is “culture” and the idea runs like this: Europe has abandoned its cultural heritage in In 1995, Umberto Eco came up with 14 points, with the favor of the non-cultured ideology of individual rights help of which we could judge whether somebody was and liberalism; it is now the turn of the East, where a fascist.8 The East European far right scores rather this culture has been preserved, to “save” Europe by convincingly on most of these: it has a cult of tradi- helping it return to its (Christian) culture by abandon- tion, hates modernity, demonstrates an appetite for ing the principles of liberalism and overturning the heroic action, sees disagreement as treason, revels in heritage of the Enlightenment. conflict, is obsessed with plots generated by foreign- ers and their domestic agents, uses abusive language The pitting of (national, Christian) “culture” against and is highly macho and misogynist. And yet, we see (liberal, cosmopolitan) “civilization” is an old story, be- neither political prisoners (although we do see state

6 Viktor Orban, speech at 25th Balvanos Summer Free University and Student camp (2014): available at: www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/ the-prime-minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-orban-sspeech-at-the-25th-balvanyos-summer-free-university-and-student-camp. 7 Loek Halman, The European Values Study: A Third Wave. Sourcebook of the 1999/2000 European Values Study Surveys, (EVS/WORC/Tilburg University, 2001). 8 Umberto Eco, “Ur-Fascism,” New York Review of Books, June 22, 1995: 12-15, www.nybooks.com/articles/1995/06/22/ur-fascism/.

7 persecution of dissidents), nor labor camps, nor a Backsliding we have observed, but it is closer to the fully-fledged fascist ideology along Mussolini’s “every- populism of Donald Trump or Nigel Farrage than to thing in the state, nothing outside the state, nothing some indigenous tradition of East European fascism. against the state.” The “we” that threaten to be coming are not a new master race; work-based illiberal states are not the fu- Not least, not all East European elites have embraced ture of Europe. That future must, however, be seriously xenophobic nationalism. Given that the overriding aim conceptualized. is to preserve monopoly power in order to have privi- leged access to public resources, some elites (Bulgar- And this is where the positive intellectual tradition of ians and Romanians come to mind) refuse to become Eastern Europe must surely kick in. With the “Klaus proj- seriously involved in nationalist ideology, preferring to ect” no longer relevant, what of the “Havelian Republic” stay populist, while occasionally sniping at Brussels. as a future prospect for Europe? What could possibly be In any case, local and presidential elections held over wrong with re-starting the debate about free human 2018-2019 have demonstrated that the “liberal” forces beings living together in communities bonded by love, in in the Eastern societies are now mounting resistance, peace and in solidarity with their natural environment? with the ruling parties losing the major cities to “liberal” Would it be so dangerous if we, following Vaclav Havel’s coalitions, while Slovakia enjoys a “Green” President. later speeches, were to add the concept of Gaia to the Kantian philosophy of freedom? When called on to explain themselves, most East Euro- pean elites would talk of “conservatism.” This they are In place of Klaus’ project (“compete so as to find happi- not, for they can point to nothing in existence that they ness in individual consumption”), it seems reasonable to want to conserve. At the cutting ideological edge—and revive the Havelian vision of “cooperate so as to thrive in mostly in severe places like Hungary and Poland—we a love-based community.”9 see and hear pure reactionaries: people who want to kick history back to pre-Enlightenment times and re- The new anti-humanist East European Right has de- establish a system based on fundamental inequality, clared war on “1968.” Debating the merits of the “Have- which they call “hierarchy.” It remains a mystery why lian Republic” today could prove to be a reasonable re- such people, mostly minor servants and petty intelli- sponse both to such distasteful provocations and to the gentsia, believe that they themselves would end up as entire ideological attempt to write off the Enlighten- the masters under such a system. ment in Europe.

References:

Adorno, Theodor, and Herbert Marcuse. Halman, Loek. The European Values Orban, Viktor. Speech at 25th Balvanos “Correspondence on the German Student Study: A Third Wave. Sourcebook of Summer Free University and Student Movement.” Translated by Esther Leslie, the 1999/2000 European Values Study Camp, 2014. www.kormany.hu/en/ New Left Review, no. 233 (January/ Surveys. EVS/WORC/Tilburg University, the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister- February 1999): 123-136. 2001. s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-orban- www.newleftreview.org/issues/I233/ sspeech-at-the-25th-balvanyos-summer- articles/theodor-adorno-herbert- Havel, Vaclav, et al. The Power of the free-university-and-student-camp. marcuse-correspondence-on-the- Powerless. London: Hutchinson, 1985. german-student-movement. Raworth, Kate. Seven Ways to Think Myant, Martin. “Klaus, Havel and Like a 21st Century Economist. London: Eco, Umberto. “Ur-Fascism.” New York the Debate over Civil Society in Penguin, Random House, 2017. Review of Books, June 22, 1995: 12-15. the Czech Republic.” Journal of www.nybooks.com/articles/1995/06/22/ Communist Studies and Transition Thatcher, Margaret. “A Window on the ur-fascism/. Politics 21, no. 2 (2005): 248-267. DOI: West.” Speech to Forum of Eastern and 10.1080/13523270500108758. Central European Entrepreneurs, October Guetta, Bernard. L’Enquete hongroise 22, 1991. www.margaretthatcher.org/ (puis polonaise, italienne et autrichienne). document/108288. Paris: Flammarion, 2019.

Evgenii Dainov is a professor of political science at New Bulgarian University. After graduating from Oxford and reaching the rank of lieutenant in the Bulgarian Army, he specialized at Sciences Po in Paris under Alain Lancelot and at the IMRD Institute in Moscow under Alexey Salmin. The author of ten academic and non- academic books, he has contributed to over 30 edited collections, published in four languages. A founding member of the Green Movement party, Dainov is active in protest politics and in the media. He is also a professional composer and guitar player, as well as a founding member of the Bulgarian Musical Associa- tion (rock and pop composers).

9 Kate Raworth, Seven Ways to Think Like a 21st Century Economist, (London: Penguin, Random House, 2017).

8 Church and Communism: Bulgarian Orthodoxy at Stake

Iskren Ivanov

1. Introduction thodox Church and State.1 At the heart of this sacred co-existence lies the concept of Caesaropapism. There istory shows that separation between Church is no single definition of what Caesaropapism is. Ac- and State is a basic aspect of all modern repre- cording to Honcharenko, “The emperor, the monarch sentative democracies. However, if this separa- is a supreme protector of the Church while the Church H justifies his authority by the anointing ritual act.”2 This tion does not exist, the consequences are literally cata- strophic: democracy dies, replaced either by a theocracy definition of Caesaropapism argues that monarchy is or by an oppressive political regime that eliminates re- an explicit condition for the existence of a legal and ligious pluralism in favor of the state. The purpose of stable relationship between Orthodox Church and this article is to analyze the relationship between the State. Geanakoplos describes Caesaropapism as “def- Bulgarian Orthodox Church and the Bulgarian Com- inite correlation, expressed or unexpressed, between munist government in the period 1944 to 1989. I shall the emperor’s policy of control (or lack of control) over argue that: the church and his policy with regard to the construc- tion of the churches.”3 This theory fills the gap between Church and State by using a clear political formula— l The Bulgarian Communist government utilized the the religious body is either in charge or subordinated Bulgarian Orthodox Church as a tool to strengthen to the civil authority. Kalkandjieva describes Caesaro- and expand its political and cultural influence; papism as a “specific mode of church-state relations where the secular power presides over the religious l Orthodoxy in Bulgaria under Communism was one and the state ruler functions as the head of the largely influenced by Gumilyov’s Eurasianism—an church.”4 Her theory is based on the presumption that ideological concept that furthers Russia’s geopoliti- the Church is completely subordinated to the State. cal interests on the ; Moreover, Kalkandjieva’s definition does not consider monarchy as an explicit condition for the legal exis- l The Communist persecutions against the Bulgar- tence of the relationship between Church and State. ian Orthodox Church had disastrous consequences, which even today cast a shadow over Orthodoxy in Based on the definitions above I shall define Caesaro- Bulgaria. papism as a sacralization of the Church–State rela- tionship, where the State has significant tools to set In this research I shall contribute to the field of po- the agenda, while the Church justifies the actions of litical science in two aspects. First, my paper proves the government, regardless of the form of the political that Communist ideology is incompatible with religion. regime. Although Orthodox political culture is based Second, although Bulgaria is no longer a Communist on Caesaropapism, it has a dichotomous character. I state, my study shows that Bulgarian Orthodoxy is shall argue that there are two types of political culture still influenced by the Eurasian idea. This relationship in Orthodoxy. Each of them has its own peculiarities is very dangerous because it allows Russia to remain that reflect and shape the political attitudes of Ortho- an important geopolitical actor in Bulgaria even after dox Christians. the Cold War. The first type is Byzantine Orthodox political culture 2. Orthodoxy and Statecraft: What Is Orthodox (Byzantine Caesaropapism). It emerged in the 6th cen- Political Culture? tury AD during the reign of the Byzantine Emperor Jus- tinian the Great. The core of this tradition is the Jus- A starting point for this paper is the concept of Ortho- tinian Code, a unique document that combines ancient dox political culture. It is expressed in the political, cul- Roman law and the Ten Commandments of God. This tural and philosophical relationship between the Or- Code contains the concept of a Church-State Sympho-

1 Sotiris Roussos, “Eastern Orthodox Perspectives on Church–State Relations and Religion and Politics in Modern Jerusalem,” International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church (February 2007): 112-113. 2 Дмитро Гончаренко, “Концепція «симфонії» церкви і держави як підґрунтя православного цезарепапізму,” Cherkasy University Bulletin: Phi- losophy (2019): 100-101. 3 Deno Geanakoplos, Church Building and “Caesaropapism,” A.D. 312-565 (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1966). 4 Daniela Kalkandjieva, “Caesaropapism,” in Encyclopedia of Political Thought, ed. by Michael Gibbons (Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell, 2014), 40-52.

9 ny.5 The concept of the Symphony allows religious and the greatest temptation of the Orthodox Church still secular authority to exist in a millennial balance that remains ethno-phyletism. Ethno-phyletism national- guarantees the stability of the political system and the izes the Orthodox Church and divides Orthodox Chris- independence of the Orthodox Church.6 tians by nationality.14 Moreover, it transforms Ortho- doxy into a very useful political tool. A typical example The second type is the Eurasian Orthodox political cul- of this is the Moscow Patriarchate, which manipulates ture (Russian Caesaropapism). Although Russia had the political attitudes of the Russian people in favor of adopted Christianity earlier, this type of Caesaropa- President Putin’s administration. pism was established under the reign of the Russian Emperor Peter the Great. What Peter did was a major 3. Gumilyov’s Eurasianism and Bulgarian reform in the Russian Orthodox Church. The position of Orthodoxy Russian Patriarch (head of the Church) was abolished. It was replaced by a Committee—the Most Holy Gov- Orthodoxy on the Balkans has always been tempted by erning Synod, consisting of bishops and civil servants, ethno-phyletism, especially after the establishment of appointed by an Imperial Decree.7 This act marked the the Bulgarian Exarchate. However, after Balkan states final stage in the emergence of the Russian Caesaro- successfully declared their national independence papism. The Church was absorbed by the State. It is from the , the Patriarchate of Con- obvious that this type of Church–State relationship is stantinople was forced to recognize the ecclesiastical totally different from the Symphony of Justinian. independence of all Balkan nations. Ethno-phyletism continued to generate nationalism but slowly lost its Is there a connection between Orthodox political cul- significance due to political reasons. The main purpose ture and democracy? Part of academia has already of the Bulgarian Exarchate after the Liberation was adopted the concept of the “monotheistic monarchy”: to gain recognition for its independence from the Ecu- the “sacred analogue” between Christ the Pantocra- menical Patriarchate. However, after 1944, the Bul- tor and the Emperor Autokrator.8 However, this vision garian Exarchate faced a new challenge that threat- is deeply misleading. The concept of ​​the “sacred” re- ened the unity of the Orthodox Church: Eurasianism. lation between monarchy and Orthodoxy belongs to Eusebius of Caesarea, who states that religious and There are three periods in the development of Eurasian- political activities are inseparable therefore monarchy ism: the classical Eurasianism of the founding fathers, is celebrated on Heaven and Earth.9 But we should not Gumilyov’s Eurasianism and the Neo-Eurasianism of forget that at the date of his writings on monarchy, Alexander Dugin.15 Communism in Bulgaria was seri- Eusebius had long since left the Orthodox Church and ously influenced by the Eurasian concept of Gumilyov. converted to Arianism.10 Orthodoxy’s attitude toward According to Gumilyov’s philosophy, Eurasia can exist democracy is hidden in the words of the Apostle Paul: on the basis of three principles: Eurasian collective self- “Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers. For consciousness, a Eurasian-style planned economy, and there is no power but of God: the powers that be are a strictly centralized society.16 Moreover, Eurasia should ordained of God.”11 Therefore, the Church must en- always have a strong charismatic leader to unite the courage citizens to participate actively in the political Eurasians by leading them to victory. By following this process. Only clergy is ineligible for political participa- philosophy, Gumilyov legitimates the Soviet regime. tion—monks, priests and bishops are forbidden to par- ticipate in the political elite not for religious but for po- Gumilyov’s Eurasianism also had a huge impact on litical reasons.12 The State should exist because after Bulgarian Orthodoxy during the Communist era. Al- Original Sin, people need a form of government that though this influence is more political than philosophi- guarantees their peaceful coexistence.13 Nevertheless, cal, its impact is significant. The idea that the - “Eur

5 Otniel Bunaciu, “The Call to Live a Christian Life Using the Theology of Karl Barth to Reflect on Understanding the Relationship Between Church and State in Romania,” European Journal of Science and Technology (2002): 130. 6 Deno Geanakoplos, Church and State in the : A Reconsideration of the Problem of Caesaropapism (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1965). 7 Cyril Toumanoff, “Caesaropapism in Byzantium and Russia,” Theological Studies 7, no. 2 (May 1946): 213-243, Sage Publications. 8 Aziz Al-Azmeh, “Monotheistic Monarchy,” Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies 4, no. 10 (Spring 2005): 133-149. 9 Harold Drake, In Praise of Constantine: A Historical Study and New Translation of Eusebius’ Tricennial Orations, (Berkley: University of California Press, 1976). 10 Averil Cameron, “Eusebius’ Viva Constantini and the Construction of Constantine,” In Portraits. Biographical Representation in the Greek and Latin Literature of the Roman Empire, ed. by Simon Swain (Oxford: Clarendon Press Oxford, 1997), 145-146. 11 Romans 13:1-2. 12 Michael Radu, “The Burden of Eastern Orthodoxy,” Religion in World Affairs, Orbis 42, no. 2 (Spring, 1998): 283-300. 13 Eric Gregory, “Before the Original Position. The Neo-Orthodox Theology of the Young John Rawls,” Journal of Religious Ethics 35, no. 2 (June, 2007): 180. 14 Andrew Louth, “Orthodoxy and the Problem of Identity,” International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church 12, no. 2 (August, 2012): 96- 104. 15 Mark Entin, “The New Role of Russia in Greater Eurasia,” Strategic Analysis 40, no. 6 (October, 2016): 590-603. 16 Лев Гумильов, Черная легенда. Друзья и недруги Великой степи (Москва: Екопрос, 1994).

10 asian Man” is part of the Eurasian “Super-Ethnos” tined to replace God in the minds of the people became corresponds exactly to the interests of the Bulgarian a key message of the Komsomol organizations, which Communist Party. Communist propaganda was try- were educating adolescents in how to serve the Party ing to convince Bulgarians that the future belongs to and its Leader. Later, this cult even acquired material the Communist Man.17 This concept also justifies the dimensions—’s body was embalmed ideas of the so-called Stakhanov movement, originally and placed in the very center of Sofia in a specially established in the Soviet Union in 1935. The narratives built Mausoleum. This symbolic act is a reference to the of the “new man,” “the Man of Socialism,” and “the mummy of Lenin, which is still reposing in the center of man of labor” went deep into the communist rhetoric Moscow. This political act was clear and unambiguous. in Bulgaria after 1944. This new man, deprived of the It was a symbol of respect to Soviet communism and a old prejudices of religion, was considered to be at the sacralization of the Leader. Gumilyov’s idea of ​​the Eur- heart of the new “super-ethnos.” asian charismatic Leader—the Leader of the People— was realized in the person of George Dimitrov. He was The concept of the Eurasian “super-race,” which should sacralized and deified. And the Mausoleum became his be headed by a single strong leader, also served exactly temple, laid out for future generations. the interests of the Bulgarian Communist Party. Gumi- lyov’s super-race theory denies religious pluralism and in- 4. Church-State Relations under Communism dividualism.18 God is replaced by the Leader (the Vozhd). (1944 – 1989): Basic Implications This theory is supplemented by the ideas of Russian Pan- Slavists, who seek to create a huge Slavic-Orthodox belt Despite all the narratives and ideological dimensions to counter the declining Western influence. In this sce- of Gumilyov’s Eurasianism, Orthodoxy in Bulgaria pre- nario, the Communist Party in Bulgaria utilized the con- served its original public role to a much greater extent cept of Gumilyov to generate and maintain the “Slavic than in Russia. Despite the systematic attempts of the consciousness” of the Bulgarians. The Orthodox Church state to undermine the authority of the Church, the was transformed into a patriotic organization, a guard- Bulgarian Communist Party was aware of the fact that ian of Bulgarian traditions and culture. This new religious it would be much easier to transform the Church into patriotism provoked hatred against “the others”: Catho- an instrument of influence by configuring the legal-nor- lics and Protestants, who were considered “agents” of mative borders of religious freedoms in Bulgaria. Western influence in the country.19 The of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria, Eurasian collectivism and the establishment of the adopted in 1947 (the so-called Dimitrov Constitu- Eurasian empire are the two concepts that constitute tion) repealed the . According to the core of Gumilyov’s Eurasianism.20 In a free demo- Article 78 of the the church is cratic society, each person is free to exercise and to separated from the state, while the state guarantees enjoy his or her basic rights and freedoms. However, the freedom of religious beliefs (Народно Събрание individualism is inconsistent with Eurasian collectiv- на Народна Република България, 1947). The Con- ism. Moreover, it is considered destructive, as it could stitution also prohibits religious organizations from lead to the collapse of the Eurasian Empire—the USSR. seeking political representation. This act of the Com- Therefore, every Eurasian is obliged to abandon his/ munist government prevented the establishment of her personal interests in the name of the State. Ac- Christian Democratic parties that were largely sup- cording to Gumilyov the true Eurasian can only exercise ported in Western Europe at that time. Moreover, re- his rights and freedoms within the collective thinking, ligious communities in Bulgaria were legally deprived because Eurasian collectivism supports the identity of of political representation. The Church had the right the Eurasian empire.21 This concept had detrimental of self-government, but this privilege was limited by effects on Orthodoxy in Communist Bulgaria as it vio- the National Assembly, which passed a new Law on lates the intimate nature of the Christian community Religion. In this way, the political elite was given the and subordinates it to the state. Sunday Schools were opportunity to systematically impose pressure on the shut down. Children were educated in a spirit of loy- Orthodox Church. The true intentions of the Commu- alty to the Communist regime as part of the collective nist leader Georgi Dimitrov were evident in his speech, group thinking. Many priests and laymen, who refused which took place in the Rila Monastery on the occasion to take this path, became “enemies of the people.” of the 1000th anniversary of its founding. After a brief content analysis of the text, it is obvious that there Gumilyov’s ideas were embraced quickly and success- are three basic highlights of his view on Church’s role fully in Bulgaria. The concept of ​​a leader who is des- in Communist Bulgarian society.

17 Nevena Dimitrova, The New Man Project in Bulgarian Philosophical Culture (1944-1989) (Warsaw: Wschodnioeuropejskie Czasopismo Naukowe, 2016). 18 Alexander Titov, Lev Gumilyov, Ethnogenesis and Eurasianism (London: University College London Press, 2005). 19 Ina Merdjanova, “Uneasy Tolerance: Interreligious Relations in Bulgaria after the Fall of Communism,” Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe 26, no. 1 (2006): 1-11. 20 Richard Sakwa, “Russia as Eurasia: An Innate Cosmopolitanism,” in Europe and Asia beyond East and West, ed. Gerard Delanty (Austin: Taylor and Francis, 2006), 215-227. 21 Лев Гумильов, Черная легенда.

11 First, Dimitrov described Bulgarian bishops as “use- rious tension not only with Orthodoxy, but with other less bearded and stupid old men.”22 In other words, he religions such as Islam. Bulgarian Christians officially denied their legitimacy by displaying the vision that had the right to visit Churches but they were forced to despite the Constitution, the Communist government work on religious holidays. Muslims were later forced to would have the final word on religious affairs. Itbe- change their names, which created serious tensions in came clear that the secular authority had no intention society because Islam forbids renaming.26 of complying with Article 78 of the Constitution. In sum, both marginalized Bulgarian Or- Second, Dimitrov divided the Bulgarian clergy into thodoxy to the position of a religion that served the in- two: “Judaic and progressive priests.”23 The latter are terests of the state. The religious rights and freedoms those who cooperate with the new government for the of the citizens were de jure protected, but de facto they good of the people and their happiness, while the for- were systematically violated by the so-called People’s mer are enemies of the State, who corrupt the Bulgar- Militia. The most important normative act, which lim- ian people. This division left a huge wound in the Or- ited religious freedoms and the Orthodox Church’s in- thodox Church. Part of the clergy quickly became part dependence, was the Act on Religion, passed by the Na- of the “progressive” group—most of them voluntarily. tional Assembly in 1949. The supreme principle of this The Judaic traitors were either brutally repressed or Act lies in the separation between Church and State. executed in the name of the people. The Bulgarian Orthodox Church was granted the right of self-government, while Orthodoxy was declared a Third, Georgi Dimitrov emphasized that “our Church “traditional religion” of Bulgaria (Народно Събрание на is special, it is the Church of the people.”24 This state- Народна Република България, 1949). Other denomina- ment desacralized the Bulgarian Orthodox Church in tions got the right to build their own temples and to con- the eyes of the people. The Orthodox Church is supra- duct their own religious rites. The Act on Religion defined national and universal—anyone can become Orthodox the Orthodox Church in a very interesting manner—in regardless of their origin, nationality, race, ethnicity form, content and spirit, it was called “the People’s and political beliefs.25 The nationalization of the Or- Democratic Church” (Народно Събрание на Народна thodox Church “in the name of the people” can be Република България, 1949). Unfortunately, neither considered as one of the most devastating acts of “people’s” nor “democratic” are notions applicable to the the Communist regime. This symbolic step by Georgi real significance of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church. The Dimitrov had two consequences: it guaranteed that Communist State just decided to place the Church in a the Church would continue to hold an important place subordinate position, by transforming it into a state in- in society, but at the same time it also deprived Or- stitution. There were several restrictions that placed the thodoxy of its mission—to be a spiritual home for all Church in a subordinate position to the State. Bulgarian Orthodox Christians. The first restriction declared new eligibility criteria for A new Constitution was adopted later, in 1971. It was priests: they had to be Bulgarian citizens who have not named after the new General Secretary of the Bul- been convicted of crimes and who did not maintain garian Communist Party—. The Zhivkov canonical relations with foreign countries (Народно Constitution officially prohibited religious discrimina- Събрание на Народна Република България, 1949). The tion and guaranteed all citizens’ religious rights and activity of foreign religious organizations on the ter- freedoms. Moreover, Article 52 of the Constitution ritory of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria was strictly permitted the creation of new religious organizations prohibited. Any foreign appointments were subject to (Народно Събрание на Народна Република България, approval by the Head of the Department on Religious 1971). However, this “liberalization” of the Constitu- Affairs. Many Bulgarian citizens lost their right to serve tion came at a very high price. Article 53 officially le- as priests, while some religious communities even lost galized atheist propaganda by stipulating that religion their leaders. This was the case with some Protestant cannot be a reason for citizens not to fulfill their legal congregations because pastors were appointed directly obligations (Народно Събрание на Народна Република from the U.S. and the UK. България, 1971). This article created a serious discrep- ancy in the text. It was clear that despite the Consti- The second restriction concerned religious institutions— tutional guarantee of religious freedom, Bulgarian they were subject to the state. Moreover, the Depart- citizens could not enjoy their religious freedoms and at- ment on Religious Affairs enjoyed the right to fire clerics tend religious rituals because some of those traditions in case of anti-state activity. Many priests were fired were in violation of the laws. This, in turn, created se- because they criticized Communism and Marxism dur-

22 Ivaylo Znepolski, The East-Orthodox Church and the Communist Regime in Bulgaria (Sofia: Maison des Sciences de l’Homme et de la Société, 2010). 23 Daniela Kalkandjieva, “Monasticism in Bulgaria,” in Monasticism in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Republics, ed. Ines Murzaki (New York: Routledge, 2016), 19-41. 24 Spas Raikin, “The Communists and the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, 1944–48: The Rise and Fall of Exarch Stefan,” Religion in Communist Lands 12, no. 3 (1984): 281-292. 25 Terrence Fullerton, “A Unidimensional Measure of Christian Orthodoxy,” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion (1982): 317-326. 26 Milena Mahon, “The Turkish Minority under Communist Bulgaria—Politics of Ethnicity and Power,” Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans 1, no. 2 (1999): 149-162.

12 ing the Liturgy. The Holy Synod was responsible for the in the past. There are three basic challenges to the actions of all priests, which created a huge gap between peaceful co-existence between the Bulgarian Orthodox bishops and priests. There were many cases of bishops Church and the State in contemporary Bulgaria. who helped their priests to avoid anti-state propagan- da allegations, but there were also cases where priests Orthodox patriotism generated by the communist re- were abandoned by the Synod. Under the pressure of gime has led to religious intolerance within society. The State Security services, some bishops were forced to vision of being Orthodox as “Bulgarian” and “tradition- co-operate with the State. al” today dominates the attitudes of citizens. Bulgar- ian Catholics and Bulgarian Protestants are considered Third, the Act on Religion established the position of a parts of communities that are hostile to Bulgarian tra- Director on Religious Affairs, who was granted the right ditional values. Moreover, any attempt to maintain a to intervene directly in the affairs of the Church. An dialogue with those communities is condemned by Bul- example in this regard was the prohibition of religious garian Orthodox Christians as a vicious ecumenism that ordinances, celebrations and holidays that disturb pub- puts the Orthodox character of Bulgarian culture at risk. lic order (Народно Събрание на Народна Република This false conservatism provokes polarization in society. България, 1949). The director had the right to intervene Orthodoxy under these circumstances is a very useful and to impose disciplinary sanctions on the church. In tool in the hands of conservatives against their ideologi- this way, the Holy Synod fell under the direct pressure cal opponents. Similarly, there are many initiatives, such of the state. Orthodox Christians were tracked as to as the resistance to Pope Francis’ visit to Bulgaria and to whether they attended services and were forced to co- the establishment of Protestant communities in smaller operate with State Security services. Bulgarian towns throughout the country.

Fourth, the Law explicitly prohibited priests and bish- One of the most serious consequences of the Com- ops from criticizing public authorities during services munist past is the so called “Eurasian complex.” Russia (Народно Събрание на Народна Република България, continues to be the center of gravity for most Orthodox 1949). The official sanction for such a violation was Christians in Bulgaria. The Kremlin is identified with the a fine. However, there were numerous cases in which Orthodox fraternal values ​​that are inherent in Bulgar- priests and even bishops did not obey this prohibition. ians in opposition to the declining Western liberalism Bishop Parthenius of Levka constantly criticized Com- that the EU and NATO are trying to impose on us. This munism and Marxism in his sermons, denouncing their allows Moscow to use Orthodoxy in its so-called hybrid ideological validity. He was repeatedly warned and warfare strategy and to impose those pseudo-Ortho- threatened by the State Security Service. The corre- dox attitudes on Bulgarian citizens. The statement that spondence archives between the Department on Re- Bulgaria belongs to the Eurasian cultural space is not ligious Affairs and the Council of Ministers explicitly only supported by citizens and politicians, but also by mentioned that “every effort should be made to pre- part of the Bulgarian clergy. The Russian influence in the vent Bishop Partenius from being elected Orthodox Bulgarian Orthodox Church causes the defamation of Metropolitan, because this shall make him a potential significant events for the Orthodox world, such as the candidate for Patriarch—Head of the Bulgarian Ortho- Great and Holy Council of the Orthodox Church and the dox Church.”27 After one of his most critical sermons protests against Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew’s against the regime, the bishop was poisoned and died visit to Bulgaria. at the hospital that evening. The politicization and institutionalization of the Bulgar- The Religions Act of 1949 proved that all constitutional ian Orthodox Church are the third great challenge to guarantees in the field of religion remained simply on Bulgarian Orthodoxy today. The well-spread narratives paper. Although formally, the principle of religious self- about the Orthodox Church as a social workshop gen- determination was guaranteed, its application was erate strong national awareness. In fact, the main task impossible. Orthodoxy fell under the shadow of the of the Orthodox Church is transcendental. It should not Communist state. Many of the controversial provisions be associated with secular acts, for that would again in the Act had disastrous consequences for Orthodoxy turn it into a “democratic” and “people’s” Church, an in- after the end of the regime. stitution that serves the interests of the state.

5. Conclusion: The Bulgarian Orthodox Church— In conclusion, the wounds inflicted on the Bulgarian Then and Today Orthodox Church by the Communist regime are deep and serious. Overcoming them requires time, patience, Where is the Bulgarian Orthodox Church today? Al- and consistent efforts, both from the Church and from though Bulgaria was successful in the building of de- the state. And from all Bulgarian citizens regardless mocracy, most Bulgarian public attitudes still remain their faith.

27 Момчил Методиев, “Алтернативният ‘Патриарх’,” Списание Християнство и култура (2010): 11-26.

13 References:

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Iskren Ivanov is a senior lecturer in political science and international relations at Sofia University St. Kli- ment Ohridski. He is also a guest professor at three European universities: University of Paris III: New Sor- bonne, the Catholic University of Lille, and the University of Granada. Dr. Ivanov defended his PhD thesis at Sofia University and successfully completed a SUSI Scholarship Program in U.S. National Security Policy- making at the University of Delaware, Newark. His research interests are focused on U.S.-Russia relations, post-Soviet politics in Eastern Europe and the geopolitical philosophy of Eurasianism.

14 The Romanian Judicial System: Current Issues and the Necessity of Avoiding Regress

Dragoș Călin

Legal changes in Romania the past two years have been Between 1945 and 1989 the rule of law was flagrantly heavily supported by Romanian Constitutional Court rul- affected by the establishment of a deeply undemocrat- ings that completely ignored the legal opinions of the ic communist regime. In those times, citizens’ rights and Venice Commission and CVM recommendations. These freedoms were an utopia, private property was disre- changes have reached a climax in the Superior Council of garded, the state confiscated the houses and land of Magistracy’s institutional inability to be a real guarantor millions of people, and the intellectual elite of the coun- of the independence of justice and to succeed in prevent- try was physically eliminated. ing increasing assaults on judges and prosecutors. As a result, Romania has visibly deviated from rule-of-law As of January 1, 2007, Romania, a semi-presidential re- standards. Such a context threatens to quickly spread public, according to the Constitution of 1991, became a within the European Union, endangering years of dia- member of the European Union. Article 148 paragraph logue and progress which once seemed irreversible. (2) of the Romanian Constitution accepts the priority of the application of European Union law.1 Facing this challenge, the European Union has to stand up for its values, as enforcement of Romanian rule of law Romania also joined the Council of Europe on October needs reestablishment through the legal means of an in- 7, 1993, becoming a party to the European Convention fringement procedure, the only such process able to re- on Human Rights2 (June 20, 1994) and to the 14 ad- move the breaches of article 2, article 4 par. 3 and article ditional Protocols. When inconsistencies are found be- 19 par. 2 of the Treaty on European Union, related to ar- tween the pacts and treaties on fundamental human ticle 47 of the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the rights ratified by Romania and domestic laws, the inter- European Union as it has been interpreted in the jurispru- national regulations prevail.3 dence of the European Court of Justice. Any delay in tak- ing action would result in irreversibly affecting the rights The judicial system inherited from the communist era and freedoms of every single European citizen. was deeply reformed, thanks to the 1991 Constitution, which was revised in 2003. But secondary legislation ad- 1. Introduction opted in Romania prior to its accession to the European Union in areas such as judicial organization, the status omania has traditionally been a democratic state, of judges and prosecutors, and the Superior Council the standards of democracy being established of Magistracy, has been characterized by violations of mainly by the Constitution Bills of 1866 and 1923. principles such as judges’ independence. This has made R 4 the judiciary system seem unstable and ineffective.

1 See: Dragoș Călin, “The Constitutional Court of Romania and European Union Law,” International and Comparative Law Review 15, no.1 (2015): 59-86; Daniel-Mihail Şandru, Constantin-Mihai Banu, and Dragoș Călin, “The Preliminary Reference in the Jipa Case and the Case Law of the Romanian Courts on Restriction on the Free Movement of Persons,” European Public Law 4 (2012): 623-641. 2 Formally the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms – editor’s note. 3 That also includes the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, which prevails against the national regulations and case law unless the Constitution or domestic laws contain more favorable provisions. This is stated in article 20 paragraph (2) of the Romanian Constitution. 4 For details, see: Horatius Dumbravă and Dragoș Călin, “Die mühsame Demokratisierung der rumänischen Justiz,” Betrifft JUSTIZ 100 (December 2009): 200-204, www.betrifftjustiz.de/wp-content/uploads/texte/Ganze_Hefte/BJ%20100_web.pdf [last accessed on July 17, 2019]; as well as Horatius Dumbravă and Dragoș Calin, “The Evolution of the Judicial System in Romania During the Past 60 Years,” Revista Forumul Judecătorilor 1 (2009): 123-131, www.forumuljudecatorilor.ro/wp-content/uploads/Art-18-forumul-judecatorilornr-1-2009.pdf [last accessed on July 17, 2019].

15 However, the European Commission Decision 2006/928/ This is the historical context in which Romanian mag- EC of December 13, 2006, established a Cooperation istrates staged unprecedented protests,8 largely sup- and Verification Mechanism (CVM) to monitor the prog- ported by university professors and students, as well as ress made by Romania in achieving specific benchmarks civil society9 and actors.10 in the field of judicial reform and the fight against cor- 5 ruption. Within this mechanism it was noted that the In principle, the and the branch in European Commission had identified unresolved issues, Romania should immediately consider the Opinion is- in particular regarding the accountability and efficiency sued on October 20, 2018, by the Venice Commission so 6 of the judiciary system of Romania. In the context of that the destruction of the magistracy is avoided. This Romania joining the European Union in 2007, the justice is crucial for compliance with standards of rule of law system of the former communist state seems to have in Romania in numerous aspects regarding the amend- changed and efforts were made to align with judicial ments made to the laws of judiciary, and it cannot be systems of the democratic states of Western Europe. endlessly disregarded. Recent public developments But all this happened before 2017. have seriously endangered the independence of the ju- diciary and the trajectory of Romania within the Euro- In this study we will present facts concerning the Ro- pean Union and the Council of Europe, as previously as- 7 manian Laws on the Judiciary and the repeated and certained by the European Commission and GRECO.11 unprecedented attacks on judges and prosecutors in 2018-2019. l The legislature and the executive from Romania are bound to immediately reconsider the system of ap- 2. The Laws on the Judiciary pointing/discharging prosecutors in senior manage- ment functions, in order to provide the conditions Three bills addressing Romanian judiciary laws were initi- for a neutral and objective appointment/discharge ated in August 2017, with long debates in Parliament be- process by maintaining the role of some authorities, ing carried on till the summer of 2018, when much modi- such as the President and the Superior Council of fied and amended versions of the controversial laws Magistracy (SCM), which are capable of counterbal- were enacted. After a request lodged at the end of April ancing the influence of the Ministry of Justice. Laura 2018, the Venice Commission issued a preliminary opin- Codruța Kovesi was discharged from her office of ion on July 13, confirmed by the final one in October 2018 Chief Prosecutor of the National Anticorruption Di- (CDLAD(2018)017-e Romania, adopted by the Commis- rectorate under the Decree no. 526/2018 issued by sion at its 116th Plenary Session). GRECO assessed the the President of Romania as a result of the Decision same bills in March 2018 (Ad-Hoc Report on Romania - no. 358 of 30 May 2018 of the Romanian Constitu- Rule 34, adopted by the Group of States against Corrup- tional Court.12 Moreover, the Venice Commission tion during the 79th Plenary Reunion Strasbourg, 19-23 suggested that, in the context of a broader reform, March 2018), while the European Commission through the principle of independence should be added to the the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism performed list of principles that govern the activity of prosecu- a similar evaluation in November 2018. tors.13

5 Published in the Official Journal of the European Union L 354 of December 14, 2006. 6 By Decision no. 2 of January 11, 2012, the Constitutional Court of Romania considered that, by being a member of the European Union, Romania has the obligation to apply this mechanism and follow the recommendations established by this framework, according to the provisions of art. 148 paragraph (4) of the Constitution, according to which “the Parliament, the President of Romania, the Government and the judicial authority shall guarantee the fulfilment of the obligations resulting from the accession documents and from the provisions of paragraph 2.” 7 When we refer to “Laws of Justice,” we take into consideration the Law no. 303/2004 on the Status of Judges and Prosecutors, the Law no. 304/2004 on the Organisation of the judiciary and the Law no. 317/2004 on the Organisation and Functioning of the Superior Council of the Magistracy. 8 See webpages: www.nineoclock.ro/2019/03/01/protest-at-bucharest-tribunal-against-the-govt-emergency-ordinance-no-7-all-cases-except- for-emergencies-to-be-postponed-for-a-week/ [last accessed on July 17, 2019]; www.nineoclock.ro/2019/03/05/bill-amending-geo-7-2019- put-to-public-debate/ [last accessed on July 17, 2019]. 9 See webpage: facem.declic.ro/campaigns/cerem-comisiei-europene-sesizarea-curtii-de-justitie [last accessed on July 17, 2019]. 10 See webpage: www.romania-insider.com/actors-protest-justice-romania-2019 [last accessed on July 17, 2019]. 11 For a radiography of the Romanian magistracy and Romanian politics, see: Reinhard Veser, “Staatsanwälteentlässt man nicht,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, October 27, 2018, search.proquest.com/docview/2125503809?accountid=134368 [last accessed on July 17, 2019]; Thierry Portes, “La Roumanie, pays d’un seulparti,” Le Figaro, December 18, 2018, www.lefigaro.fr/international/2018/12/17/01003- 20181217ARTFIG00212-la-roumanie-pays-d-un-seul-parti.php [last accessed on July 17th, 2019]; Michael Peel and Valerie Hopkins, “EU Steps Up Criticism of Romania over Rule of Law,” Financial Times, October 25, 2018, www.ft.com/content/0b74c360-d862-11e8-a854-33d6f82e62f8 [last accessed on July 17, 2019]. 12 “The Romanian Constitutional Court has backstabbed the Romanian President in his efforts to protect the independence of the chief anticorruption prosecutor. On 30 May 2018, the Constitutional Court ordered the President to dismiss the chief anti-corruption prosecutor via presidential decree. Before, the President had refused the proposed dismissal by the Minister of Justice based on an Advisory Opinion of the Superior Council of Magistracy that stated that the reasons brought forward against the chief prosecutor were not substantiated enough to justify a dismissal.” See: Bianca Selejan-Guțan, “The Taming of the Court—When Politics Overcome Law in the Romanian Constitutional Court,” Verfassungsblog, June 6, 2018, verfassungsblog.de/the-taming-of-the-court-when-politics-overcome-law-in-the-romanian-constitutional- court/ [last accessed on July 17, 2019]. 13 CDL-AD (2014)010, paragraph 185.

16 l The limitations proposed with regard to the freedom Alternatively, there was a proposal to use special- of expression of judges and prosecutors should be ized prosecutors in concert with efficient procedural eliminated, and the provisions regarding the material safeguard measures. The Venice Commission estab- liability of magistrates should be reviewed, modify- lished that “the use of specialized prosecutors in such ing the mechanism for deploying recourse action. cases [corruption, money laundry, trade of influence, etc.] was successfully engaged in many states. The The Venice Commission states that criteria are not concerned offences are specialized and can be better provided for carrying out an evaluation by the Min- investigated by specialized personnel. Moreover, the istry of Public Finance, a body of the central public investigation of such offences often requires persons administration, and that such an institution, which with special expertise in very specific fields. Provided is not part of the judicial system, does not represent that the deeds of the specialized prosecutor are sub- the best solution with regard to its inclusion in this ject to an adequate judicial control, it brings many procedure, as it is not possible for it to have a role in benefits and there are no general objections to such the assessment of the existence or causes of judicial a system.”15 errors. These could be established through disciplin- ary proceedings. In 2019, the new special section started investiga- tions against the former chief prosecutor of the l It is necessary for the legislature and the executive to DNA, Laura Kovesi, who had earlier applied for the cancel the establishment of a separate prosecutor’s position of chief European prosecutor. Kovesi, who office structure for the investigation of offences had gained support from various European coun- committed by judges and prosecutors. tries as well as political groups within the Europe- an Parliament, was summoned to the section days The Section for the Investigation of Judiciary Of- before her first hearing in Brussels. Another move fences was established as part of the Prosecutor’s by the special section was to request that the DNA Office attached to the High Court of Cassation and decline its jurisdiction over the investigation against Justice, which shall allow for the forwarding of doz- the chief of the ruling party and president of the ens of claims of high-level corruption on the dockets Chamber of Deputies in this period, Liviu Dragnea, of the National Anticorruption Directorate by simply on corruption offences.16 filing fictitious complaints against a magistrate. This diverts a significant volume of the National Anticor- l Lawmakers in Romania should waive the provisions ruption Directorate’s (DNA) activity, which was con- which set forth a double period of training at the Na- stantly praised in CVM Reports.14 tional Institute of Magistracy (four years instead of two years). Under Decision no.33/2018, the Constitutional Court dismissed as unfounded the unconstitutionality criti- In the opinion of the Venice Commission published cisms regarding the effects which the enforcement on October 20, 2018, doubling the period of train- of this new prosecutor’s office structure generates ing at the National Institute of Magistracy, com- on the jurisdiction of other already existing struc- bined with other modifications (such as changing tures, the regulation of rules which refer to the stat- the structure of the panels, anticipated retirement, ute of the prosecutor, the creation of a new discrimi- etc.) could seriously affect the “efficiency and qual- natory regime not founded on objective and rational ity of the judicial process.” Moreover, the institu- criteria, the modality of regulating the institution of tional blockage that could be generated by the the chief prosecutor of this section, and the jurisdic- aforementioned provisions affects even the appli- tion of the General Prosecutor of the Prosecutor’s cation of justice and its independence both in the Office attached to the High Court of Cassation and institutional component, which concerns the proper Justice to solve the conflicts of jurisdiction which operation of the judicial system, and also in its per- occur between the structure of the Public Ministry. sonal component, which refers to the independence Nevertheless, in its Opinion of October 20, 2018, the of the judge. Venice Commission suggested reconsidering the es- tablishment of a special section for the investigation l Based on the new provisions, meritocracy shall be of magistrates. eliminated from the magistracy; for example, the ac- tual promotion to the superior prosecutor’s offices

14 In the Report regarding the progress made by Romania in the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (November 2017), the European Commission stated that “in general, a positive assessment of the progress achieved in the reference objective n°3 (fight against high-level corruption) is based on an independent National Anticorruption Directorate, which to be capable of carrying out its activity with all the available instruments and to continue to obtain results.” In this report it is provided that the National Anticorruption Directorate continued to obtain results despite the fact that it had dealt with significant pressure. Moreover, the European Commission states that “in case of pressures with negative effects on the fight against corruption, the Commission might be constrained to reevaluate such conclusion.”

15 CDL-AD (2014)041, Interim Opinion regarding the draft law on Special State Prosecutor’s Office of Montenegro, paragraphs 17, 18 and .23 See, for details, www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2014)041-e [last accessed on July 17, 2019].

16 See, for details, Bianca Selejan-Guțan, “New Challenges Against the Judiciary in Romania,” Verfassungsblog, February 22, 2019, verfassungsblog.de/new-challenges-against-the-judiciary-in-romania/ [last accessed on July 17, 2019].

17 and courts will be done based on subjective criteria, The activity of the Judicial Inspectorate raises many i.e. “assessment of activity and conduct within the concerns in terms of public perception, because by last three years” at the High Court of Cassation and strictly following online the statistics of the High Justice being combined with a formal interview be- Court of Cassation and Justice rulings in disciplin- fore the Plenary of the Superior Council of Magistra- ary matters (as the current SCM no longer publishes cy, eliminating the practical and/or theoretical writ- on the site its rulings in disciplinary matters since ten examinations and enforcing a visible promotion 2017, despite orally assumed transparency) one can control system.17 find that between January 2017 – September 2018 there were 29 disciplinary actions upheld and an- l Retirement of the Romanian magistrates shall be other 27 rejected, all concerning judges, while with possible at the age of 42-43. regard to prosecutors 11 were upheld and 12 were rejected, with the percentage of “magistrates found The amendment introduces the possibility for re- innocent” being 50% of the total submitted to dis- tirement of judges and prosecutors who have 20 ciplinary SCM panels (sometimes the High Court of to 25 years of seniority in magistracy even be- Cassation and Justice overturned SCM judgements fore reaching the age of 60. A massive retirement initially confirming the approach of the Judicial In- among judges and prosecutors18 automatically spectorate). Some High Court rulings even found leads to an overburdening of the courts and to ac- the disciplinary proceedings formally invalid, which tual blockages of the operation of the judicial sys- shows blatant systemic deficiencies or flagrant mis- tem. Therefore, the regulations in question have a carriages of justice, inconceivable for the perfor- direct impact on the fundamental right of access mance level expected from the Judicial Inspectorate. to justice and the right of the citizens to case reso- At the same reference time, more than 75% of the lution within a reasonable period, being contrary Judicial Inspectorate’s acts concerning alleged mis- to Article 21 of the Romanian Constitution (delays conduct of magistrates were rejected, a major part in resolving cases because of the necessity to re- of them because statute of limitations has passed as docket the cases as a result of judges before whom they had not been filed in a timely manner. evidence has been directly submitted or who have participated in court investigation or debates ceas- Moreover, numerous disciplinary acts target the Gen- ing their activity, dismissal of the cases as a result eral Prosecutor of Romania or the Chief Prosecutor of of the expiration the statute of limitation, etc.). In the Anticorruption Directorate, as well as their deputies the Opinion of the Venice Commission, it was stat- alongside other judges and prosecutors who publicly ed that such an amendment represents a real dan- and individually fought the bills on the Judiciary, while ger for the continuation of the fight against -cor relevant national and international bodies (the Venice ruption in Romania. The pension levels calculated Commission, GRECO, the European Commission) have for retired judges and prosecutors currently exceed also found this inappropriate. Especially since no final the amount of the salary received by the judges disciplinary sanction was enforced in any of these cas- and prosecutors in office by 30%, thanks to more es, the Judicial Inspectorate’s activity creates a nega- favourable fiscal provisions. tive impression both domestically and internationally. l The reorganisation of the Judicial Inspectorate shall unjustifiably enforce the prerogatives of the head 3. Repeated and Unprecedented Attacks on inspector who shall appoint, among the judicial in- Judges and Prosecutors spectors, those who shall occupy the management positions (as a result of a simple evaluation of the In December 2017, more than one thousand Romanian management projects specific to each management judges, prosecutors, and magistrates-in-training silent- position), practically controlling the selection of the ly protested in front of their institutions, holding their judicial inspectors, managing and controlling the in- robes or the Constitution, but most of them showing spection activity and the disciplinary investigation printed versions of the common oath they took when activity, being the main authorising officer and the sworn into office at the beginning of their career.19 Bu- only holder of disciplinary action. charest, Cluj, Constanța, Timișoara, Iași, Galați, Craiova,

17 The written examination was eliminated from the competition for promotion in the position of judge at the High Court of Cassation and Justice.

18 See Romanian Judges’ Forum Association “White Paper – Amendments to the Laws of Judiciary – Potential Collapse of the Romanian Magistracy,” available at www.forumuljudecatorilor.ro/index.php/archives/3137 [last accessed on July 17, 2019]. The replies received from various judicial authorities can be found at the web pages: www.forumuljudecatorilor.ro/wp-content/uploads/Raspuns-Alina-Palancanu.pdf; www.forumuljudecatorilor.ro/wp-content/uploads/ICCJ-date-statistice.pdf; www.forumuljudecatorilor.ro/wp-content/uploads/Raspuns-MJ-DOC-2018-02-27-161342.pdf; www.forumuljudecatorilor.ro/wp-content/uploads/Raspuns-CSM-4260.pdf; www.forumuljudecatorilor.ro/wp-content/uploads/Raspuns-CSM-1594.pdf; www.forumuljudecatorilor.ro/wp-content/uploads/Raspuns-PICCJ-499-2018.pdf; www.forumuljudecatorilor.ro/wp-content/uploads/Vechime-peste-20-ani.pdf [last accessed on November 17, 2018].

19 See: video.euronews.com/mp4/EN/NW/SU/17/12/19/en/171219_NWSU_2502163_2502229_66000_232813_en.mp4 [last accessed on July 17, 2019].

18 Pitești, Brașov, Bacău, Baia Mare, Suceava, Botoșani, fight… to the end” outlines the serious threat to the in- Brăila, Satu Mare, Oradea, Călărași, Miercurea Ciuc, dependence of justice. Also, in a TV show following this Zalău, Slatina, Târgoviște, Târgu Mureș, Tulcea, Piatra event, the President of the Chamber of Deputies, Nico- Neamț, Sf. Gheorghe are the main cities where magis- lae Liviu Dragnea, threatened the DIICOT prosecutors trates protested against the actions of the Parliament. not investigating a pending complaint in the perfor- mance of their duties, accusing them of “risking paying On April 4, 2019, representatives of the Romanian a heavy price” for the solution.21 Judges’ Forum Association, the Movement for the De- fence of the Prosecutors’ Status Association and the By the Plenum Decision no. 50/14.03.2019, the request Initiative for Justice Association met in Brussels with of the Romanian Judges’ Forum Association was ad- senior officials of the European Commission and the mitted for “the defense of the independence of the European Parliament, including the First Vice-President judiciary system as a whole” regarding the new alle- of the European Commission, Mr. Frans Timmermans, gations by the President of the Chamber of Deputies, in an action that concerned the state of justice in Ro- Liviu Nicolae Dragnea, on 16 December 2018. The SCM mania, and which included a flash mob organized by Plenum noted that, given the nature of the politician in Romanian magistrates in collaboration with their col- question’s position, he should use moderate language, leagues in Belgium in front of the Brussels Palace of especially as some of the cases and investigations were Justice. underway. Such limitations on political language used were clearly overstepped when it was suggested that The protest at the Brussels Palace of Justice (Rond- justice is selective or must be restarted. Dragnea did point piétonnier at Place Poelaert) lasted for about an not express simple value judgements about the judicia- hour, attended by approximately 30 Romanian magis- ry system, but made factual and concrete statements trates who were applauded on the open stage and en- that do not correspond to the reality of the cases as couraged by dozens of Belgian and German judges, as finally resolved. Dragnea also referred to the existence well as Belgian lawyers. For the first time in history, of thousands of convicted persons, even though they magistrates from a member state other than Belgium were actually innocent, as well as hinted at generalized protested in Brussels for the rule of law. practices, such as alleged abuses by prosecutors during the investigations and judicial decisions being the result Romanian judges and prosecutors did not protest of collaboration with the prosecutor. against one political party or another (an activity strictly forbidden without a doubt),20 but against public policies adopted in the field of justice, affecting them 4. Conclusions directly as the main stakeholders, along with each and every citizen or resident of the country. In Romania, as an effect of enforcing the amendments made to the laws of judiciary, the number of judges and In reply to all the social movements fighting the -cur prosecutors shall be reduced (in the short term, by at rent legislative changes, on June 9, 2018, the Social least 25%, if no measure is found to fight the effects of Democratic Party and government partners organized early retirement); de-skilled, by waiving the meritocrat- a large-scale rally against the magistrates in Bucharest ic promotion exams; and overworked, by increasing the (with over 150,000 participants). The messages explic- volume of activity. It will be possible for the judiciary to itly targeted justice, with the rationale that political be supervised through the head of the Judicial Inspec- power would prevail over the independence of “unre- torate and the special Section for the Investigation of formed” institutions, calling for the termination of so- Judiciary Offences within PICCJ. The prosecutors shall called “abuses” as a form of pressure on magistrates de facto lose their independence, control over them be- who have criminal cases, even in the deliberation stage, ing implicitly exercised by the Ministry of Justice, a po- which is a very dangerous precedent. The harshness of litical factor, which shall be allowed to offer them guid- the political discourse, ranging from the cataloguing of ance regarding methods for the efficient prevention of magistrates to making generalizing statements about and for fighting against crime. magistrates as “corrupt,” “Stalinist,” “secular,” “tor- tured,” culminated in the absolutely unacceptable ap- So far, ten preliminary requests have been lodged with plication of the name “rats” to the principle defenders the European Union Court of Justice by Romanian of democracy and to the whole “scenario” of the politi- courts under an accelerated procedure, having been cal rally. “Props” and the so-called “will of the people” asked to do so by the Romanian Judges’ Forum Associ- were used to protect “elected” officials from being held ation, concerning the interpretation of the Cooperation criminally liable. The use of the statement of “street and Verification Mechanism pursuant to its establish-

20 See: www.forumuljudecatorilor.ro/wp-content/uploads/Protestele-magistratilor-din-Romania-18-21-decembrie-2017.pdf [last accessed on July 17, 2019].

21 See the web page: www.digitaljournal.com/news/world/romanian-judges-protest-ruling-party-chief-s-attacks/article/524407 [last accessed on July 17, 2019]. The Romanian Judges’ Forum Association sent to the Superior Council of Magistracy a request to defend the independence of the judiciary against the attest attacks of the leading representatives of the legislative and executive power, which materialised in the speeches of some political leaders on June 9 and 10, respectively. For details, see TCA Regional News, Chicago, June 11, 2018, search.proquest.com/docview/2052750933?accountid=134368 [last accessed on July 17, 2019].

19 ment by the Commission Decision 2006/928/CE of 13 fundamental rights. Under Article 2 of the Treaty on December 2006. Questions were raised regarding the European Union, “The Union is founded on the values interpretation of the legal nature of the CVM as an act of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, issued by an EU institution and therefore legally bind- equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, ing for our country, as well as the provisions of art. 19 including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. par. 2 of the EU Treaty in terms of holding responsible These values are common to the Member States in a Member States to implement necessary means in order society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, toler- to ensure proper safeguards in areas regulated by EU ance, justice, solidarity and equality between women Law, namely those regarding independent disciplinary and men prevail.” proceedings conducted against judges, apart from any outside political influence, which could involve an in- In 2019, more than 12 years after its accession to the terim appointment of a Chief Inspector by the Govern- European Union, Romania continues to be subjected ment as well as the establishment of a special section to a Cooperation and Verification Mechanism in order for the criminal prosecution of judges and prosecutors. to align its judicial system with the standards of the states with democratic traditions. Therefore, it is unac- The European Union is a union based on the rule of ceptable to return to regulations existing before 1989 law, in which the acts of its institutions are subject by bringing the justice system back under political con- to review for their compatibility with, in particular, trol and by an unjustifiable extension of the powers of the Treaties, as well as general principles of law and the Minister of Justice.

References:

Călin, Dragoș. “The Constitutional Court Peel, Michael, and Valerie Hopkins. “EU Selejan-Guțan, Bianca. “New of Romania and European Union Law.” Steps Up Criticism of Romania over Rule Challenges Against the Judiciary in International and Comparative Law of Law.” Financial Times, October 25, Romania.” Verfassungsblog, February Review 15, no.1 (2015): 59-86. 2018. www.ft.com/content/0b74c360- 22, 2019. verfassungsblog.de/new- d862-11e8-a854-33d6f82e62f8. challengesagainst-the-judiciary-in- Dumbravă, Horatius, and Dragoș Călin. romania/. “Die mühsame Demokratisierung der Portes, Thierry. “La Roumanie, pays d’un rumänischen Justiz.” Betrifft JUSTIZ seulparti.” Le Figaro, December 18, 2018. ———. “The Taming of the Court–When 100 (December 2009): 200-204. www.lefigaro.fr/international/2018/12/ Politics Overcome Law in the Romanian betrifftjustiz.de/wp-content/uploads/ 17/01003-20181217ARTFIG00212-la- Constitutional Court.” Verfassungsblog, texte/Ganze_Hefte/BJ%20100_web.pdf. roumanie-pays-d-un-seul-parti.php. June 6, 2018. verfassungsblog.de/ the-taming-of-the-court-when-politics- ———. “The Evolution of the Judicial Şandru, Daniel-Mihail, Constantin- overcome-law-in-the-romanian- System in Romania During the Mihai Banu, and Dragoș Călin. “The constitutional-court/. Past 60 Years.” Revista Forumul Preliminary Reference in the Jipa Case Judecătorilor 1 (2009): 123-131. and the Case Law of the Romanian Veser, Reinhard. “Staatsanwälteentlässt www.forumuljudecatorilor.ro/wp- Courts on Restriction on the Free man nicht.” Frankfurter Allgemeine content/uploads/Art-18-forumul- Movement of Persons.” European Public Zeitung, October 27, 2018. search. judecatorilornr-1-2009.pdf. Law 4 (2012): 623-641. proquest.com/docview/2125503809?acc ountid=134368.

Dragoș Călin is judge at the Bucharest Court of Appeals (since April 2009); EU law trainer at the National Institute of Magistracy, Bucharest (since 2006); associate researcher at the Institute for Legal Research of the Romanian Academy-Centre for European Legal Studies (since 2010); founding member and co-pres- ident of the Romanian Judges’ Forum Association (since 2007); director of the Romanian Judges’ Forum Review (since 2009); vice-president of GEMME - European Group of Magistrates for Mediation (May 2010- May 2012); founding member (2009) and vice-president of the International Conference for Mediation and Justice (2012-2016); member of the Association of European Magistrates for Human Rights (since 2011); member of the Franco-Romanian Lawyers Association (since 2009); and member of the Association of Magistrates of the European Union (since 2007). He holds a PhD in law from the University of Bucharest; his dissertation was dedicated to The Dialogue between Constitutional Courts and the Court of Justice of the European Union (2018). Judge Calin is the author of numerous books and articles in the field of law published in Romania, France, Spain, Germany, Great Britain, Japan, Portugal, Czechia, Armenia and Ar- gentina.

20 AN IDEAL OF UNMANIPULATED PUBLIC COMMUNICATION

Plamen Makariev

Introduction article) I mean communication which meets the stan- dards of public deliberation. Coming back to legitimiza- owadays it is almost a truism that one of the tion, this means that from the perspective in question, a greatest dangers for democracy is the manipula- norm or practice should be regarded as legitimate if it has Ntion of public communication. Democracy being been justified by a discussion of the public-deliberation- the political paradigm of exercising popular sovereignty, type. Within the paradigm in question it is assumed that it is obvious that manipulations of this sort disrupt the if a discussion conforms to the criteria of public delibera- relationship between the interests and the will of the ma- tion, this makes it “immune” to manipulation. jority of a country’s population, on the one hand, and the manner in which political power is exercised, on the other. What is “Manipulation of Legitimizing Public Whilst authoritarian and totalitarian regimes “fake” de- Communication”? mocracy by brutal oppression, antidemocratic forces do this today in a more subtle way—by “perverting” pub- All legitimizing public communication involves present- lic communication. During the Cold War free and open ing some purportedly legitimate norms or policies as public communication was regarded as an alternative corresponding to the addressees’ own beliefs. Legitimiz- to government control over mass-media, academic and ing communication is manipulative if the public is being artistic activities. At present, new forms of imposing persuaded that such a correspondence exists when, in authoritarian tendencies in social life are thriving, which fact, it does not. Furthermore, legitimizing communica- do not rely on restricting rights and freedoms, but rath- tion is manipulative also in the sense that those who er on making use of people’s social energy by diverting are performing it are not deceiving themselves—in good it in an “aikido-like” manner in a direction that suits cer- faith—that the abovesaid correspondence exists. They tain group interests, rather than the general one. The know it does not and are consciously deceiving the pub- Internet is an especially “fertile” environment for the ap- lic. As James Fishkin writes, “A person has been manipu- plication of such techniques. Fake news, trolling, flam- lated by a communication when she has been exposed ing, etc. provide plenty of opportunities to win “hearts to a message intended to change her views in a way she and minds” for causes which have little to do with the would not accept if she were to think about it on the common good. basis of good conditions.”1

Of course, here I am approaching this vast subject- Therefore, what we have here is an objective contradic- matter within certain limits. I will focus my attention on tion between actual beliefs, on the one hand, and actual the manipulations of public communication concerning characteristics of norms, social facts, or institutional ar- the legitimization of social norms and practices. In my rangements to which those beliefs are related, on the opinion they are of the greatest political importance other. Jürgen Habermas refers to this with the term “dis- nowadays, especially in “young” democracies such as torted” communication.2 In other words, from the per- Bulgaria. Whether a given law should be adopted by spective of authors like Habermas and Fishkin, a manip- the Parliament, whether a certain international con- ulative message in the most general sense is one which vention should be ratified, whether some public policy motivates its addressee to take a decision in a way that should be implemented—this depends very much on the is not determined by her, but by the message’s author. outcome of public discussions. No government in recent years has dared to ignore public opinion when it comes But what if we believe that some persons, possibly in- to politically important decisions. And if one manages cluding ourselves, have the right to mislead others into to manipulate a debate of this kind, one gets precisely approving things that, in fact, are at odds with their be- the result one wants. liefs? In other words, should we assume that manipula- tions of this sort are necessarily immoral and socially Moreover, I am dealing with this matter from the perspec- unacceptable? What about a “well meant” manipula- tive of a particular philosophical paradigm—the theory tion? What if in a certain situation one feels that she and practice of public deliberation. Actually, by “an ideal knows better than some people what would be good for of unmanipulated public communication” (the title of this them and, consequently, that it would be morally justi-

1 James S. Fishkin, When the People Speak: Deliberative Democracy and Public Consultation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 6. 2 Jurgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996), 148, 182, 308.

21 fied to persuade them to accept a certain state of af- The proceduralist approach to legitimacy characteristic fairs as legitimate, in spite of knowing that they would of the paradigm of public deliberation does not pretend not do this, if, in Fishkin’s words, they had the opportu- to be a mechanism for “producing” absolute legitimacy. nity to think about it “on the basis of good conditions.” It is important, however, that even in the case of self- In this regard, we must bear in mind that such manipu- deception, this self-deception is on the part of the agent lations also conflict with the very concept of legitimi- who decides what is or is not legitimate for herself. The zation. Any legitimizing public communication that agent may be incorrect about the correspondence be- consciously misleads its addressees constitutes, to put tween her beliefs and the actual norm or policy whose it in Habermasian terms, a strategic action (i.e. a kind legitimacy she is assessing. The agent’s own beliefs may of purposive-rational action, one oriented toward suc- also be wrong in view of her actual interests, as well as cess3), which pretends to be communicative (one ori- those of others. However, what is important to the le- ented toward reaching understanding/Verständigung);4 gitimacy of a norm or social fact is whether or not the that is, here we have an objective internal inconsistency agent makes a decision herself—in a responsible (in the within legitimizing communication itself. modernist sense of the word) manner, or, on the con- trary, lets someone else decide what is legitimate or il- Besides, even “well meant” manipulation cannot have a legitimate for her. properly legitimizing effect on so-called “civilizational” grounds. A number of authors claim, and I share their This also holds true for the basic beliefs which serve, in view, that the basic substantive assumption in this re- the situation described here, as a frame of reference gard is that a social norm or practice is legitimate only for assessing the legitimacy of norms or social facts. if it is worthy of approval by a person who corresponds They, too, are subject to change under certain condi- to the modern ideal of a human being, i.e., someone tions, of course. Otherwise the model of legitimization who makes a decision in an autonomous and respon- discussed here would be characterized not by modern- sible way.5 In other words, this understanding of public ism but by simple dogmatism. In any case, however, legitimization is modernist in character. The key term in any such change should be made in continuity with the this respect is, in the opinion of certain writers, agency.6 overall set of beliefs of the agent, which constitutes the agent’s identity. Such a change needs to take place as Put differently, a person cannot exercise her agency in a successive step in the self-development of this set of approving or disapproving social norms and practices if beliefs, so as not to impair its integrity. At the same she does not do so in accordance with her own will, for time, the agent needs to recognize and be aware that example, in situations of coercion, blind trust in some- she is changing (as a result of being under pressure from one else’s opinion on the matter under consideration, new experiences or because her basic set of beliefs has and so forth. This would also be the case when she proved to be, under some circumstances, internally in- yields to certain emotions, to personal or group idiosyn- consistent) this frame of reference herself. crasies, or to communication that is not open to all pos- sible relevant contributions. The type of communication whereby she is to be convinced that the norm or prac- The “Protective” Criteria tice in question is justified in light of her beliefs must make available all relevant information on all relevant So, what should a public debate look like, in order to topics, and all possible interlocutors must be allowed to ensure that there is no place for manipulations within speak because each one, in principle, might be able to it? In his book Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity, reveal certain truths that could weaken or undercut the and Democracy, James Bohman proposes the following force of otherwise legitimizing messages. conditions, which he thinks are necessary for the “ideal procedure” of deliberation: “the inclusion of everyone All this is not to say that recognition of the legitimacy of affected by a decision, substantial political equality in- some norms or social facts cannot be wrong even when cluding equal opportunities to participate in delibera- it is achieved and justified by a procedurally correct tion, equality in methods of decision making and in de- public debate. Even if a public that is most informed termining the agenda, the free and open exchange of about the issue under discussion arrives, in a procedur- information and reasons sufficient to acquire an under- ally perfect way, at the conclusion that a given norm or standing of both the issue in question and the opinion of social fact meets its legitimacy criteria, it may turn out others, and so on.”7 that the said norm or social fact will actually have det- rimental consequences for the individuals and groups Bohman obviously does not claim that this definition is concerned—if the information, on the basis of which the exhaustive, but that it includes the main characteristics discussion has been conducted turns out to be wrong. of public deliberation which are also pointed out by other

3 Jurgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1 (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984), 302. 4 Habermas, Communicative Action, 305. 5 Jostein Gripsrud, “Scholars, Journalism, Television—Notes on Some Conditions for Mediation and Intervention,” in Television and Common Knowledge, ed. by Jostein Gripsrud (London and New York: Routledge, 1999), 37. 6 Peter Muhlberger, “Human Agency and the Revitalization of the Public Sphere,” Political Communication 22, no. 2 (2005): 163-178. 7 James Bohman, Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity, and Democracy (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996), 16.

22 scholars. The “publicness” of this form of deliberation reach will be based not on the balance of advantage but consists in its “openness,” or in other words, its “inclusiv- on the balance of argument.”10 ity”—everyone who feels affected by the deliberated de- cision has the right to join in. This also presupposes pub- What can make us evaluate in good faith all of the argu- licness in the more elementary sense of the word, that is, ments presented in such communication, especially if “the that the debates are conducted “before the eyes” of the better argument” is not in our own best interest? Is it at public, as it were. Everyone has the right to know what all possible to give up our selfishness in the name of the position each of the participants is defending and, more reasonableness of deliberative decision-making? Is such a importantly, with what arguments. This is precisely what methodology realistic? Some authors deny the very pos- enables the inclusion, at any stage of the debate, of new sibility that people may voluntarily admit that another’s participants who think that the issue being discussed af- argument is right if it is not in their own best interest: fects them, so that their position must be taken into ac- “The key question for those who believe that ‘differences’ count in order to reach a legitimate consensus—provided, can be worked out through conversation is whether or not of course, that they can substantiate that this is indeed anyone can be convinced to do or support something that the case. Here—and Bohman makes this point perfectly is not in their own best interest. It seems unlikely.”11 clear—the individual participant’s social status and other characteristics do not matter. Everyone is equal insofar Still, most authors are of the opposite opinion and be- as arguments are the only thing that matters, regardless lieve that the procedure of public deliberation can work of who presents them. in practice. One of their main arguments is that a com- pletely effective motive to participate with integrity in Joshua Cohen suggests another, quite a comprehensive public deliberation can be the subject’s desire to keep and list of the requirements that a debate must meet in or- affirm their public authority, their legitimacy, and their der to have legitimizing functions.8 Cohen’s list includes reliability as a participant in democratic political life. seven such conditions. In my opinion, the first four (as listed in Cohen’s essay) are the most noteworthy. They If the superiority of a given argument over the alterna- are: rationality, openness (inclusivity), freedom from co- tive ones is unquestionable in the eyes of the public, yet ercion, and equality of the participants. we refuse to admit it, we are likely to lose the public’s trust. All the more so if we are invited to justify our posi- In the literature on this issue, we also often encounter tion and have to resort to manipulative rhetorical de- a laconic definition: public deliberation is a debate gov- vices that can easily be exposed as such by the parties erned by “the unforced force of the better argument.”9 In concerned who have the right to take part in the debate a sense, this definition replaces almost all other require- (according to the criteria for public deliberation). ments that protect public communication from being manipulated. If the participants in a debate form their In a somewhat different context, Jon Elster12 intro- stances on the debated issues solely on the basis of rea- duced a formula, which can also be used as a descrip- soned arguments, then this means that they will not be tion of this type of motivation: the “civilizing force of influenced by coercion, authority or charisma, or any rhe- hypocrisy.” The possibility that ostensibly correct partic- torical means of appealing to their hearts and minds. ipation in public deliberation may be guided by hidden strategic motives indeed calls into question the model Undoubtedly, the criteria for public deliberation presup- of public deliberation. However, I believe that the solu- pose the integrity of participation in the process of col- tion to this problem should be sought along the same lective decision-making. If we are aware that the other lines as that of the very motive for demonstrating cor- side’s reasoned objection to our argument is more con- rectness, be it hypocritical or not. If our conduct is being vincing but do not admit it publicly and keep insisting on watched by a critical public, it does not matter whether our position, we will block public deliberation. Public de- our motives are genuine or we are merely pretending. liberation is possible only if the better argument always There would be a problem if we assume that the effect prevails. Recognition of the force of the better argu- of “civilizing hypocrisy” may be sporadic; that at a given ment is viewed in public deliberation theory as the most moment we may pretend “for appearance’s sake” that important safeguard against the manipulation of public we are participating in decision-making in good faith, communication. “So defined, deliberation presupposes only to disregard, or even to obstruct, the agreed-upon a willingness on the part of the participants to listen decision when we are no longer being watched by any- to one another with an open mind rather than sticking one. However, in the theory of public deliberation there doggedly to their own prior views and positions. Insofar is no such assumption. On the contrary, it relies precisely as this presupposition holds, the agreements that they on the constant, critical activity of the public.

8 Joshua Cohen, “Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy,” in The Good Polity: Normative Analysis of the State, ed. by Alan Hamlin and Philip Pettit (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 17-34.

9 Habermas, Facts and Norms, 306.

10 Ian O’Flynn, “Deliberative Democracy for a Great Society,” Political Studies Review 13, no 2 (2015): 210.

11 Lawrence Susskind, “Arguing, Bargaining and Getting Agreement,” in The Oxford Handbook of Public Policy, ed. by Michael Moran, Martin Rein and Robert E. Goodin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 274.

12 Jon Elster, “Introduction,” in Deliberative Democracy, ed. by Jon Elster (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 12.

23 Historicism is another important characteristic of the Thus, in the final analysis, the “civilizing force of hypoc- public-deliberation paradigm. A critical public sphere risy” turns out to be bound to the power mechanisms cannot be formed overnight; it is something that is which do function in society. The most effective motive developed over time. This is why the current existing for a politician to safeguard and affirm the public le- practices of public deliberation are far from the ideal gitimacy of her political conduct comes from her aware- of how the public sphere should function, and also why ness that her “political fate” depends on the electorate. instances of “incorrect” decision-making through public However, not all forms of public deliberation are directly deliberation are not infrequent. However, this is not re- related to the exercise of political power. The literature garded from the perspective of the theory in question on this subject points out various patterns in the delib- as evidence that it is of a utopian nature. eration of publicly significant issues where certain pro- cedural rules are observed in order to prevent the ma- Concerning this discrepancy, it should also be noted that nipulation of public communication, which is necessary the very core of the deliberative model—the motive to in order to reach legitimate decisions. Without claiming strive to meet the expectations of the public by respect- to be exhaustive, I will mention spontaneous grassroots ing the arguments which it finds to be the most convinc- networks, neighborhood councils, citizens’ juries, con- ing—is bound to the procedures of classical representative sensus conferences13, deliberative opinion polls, focus democracy. Would one need public prestige and public groups14 and, of course, the multiple virtual discussion trust if there were no elections or if power relations did forums such as social networks and internet forums, as not depend on the will of the majority? The proponents well as some forms of debates in the traditional print of the deliberative model themselves do not deny that at and broadcast media. present it is a supplement to representative democracy.

References:

Bohman, James. Public Deliberation: Gripsrud, Jostein. “Scholars, Journalism, Habermas, Jurgen. Between Facts and Pluralism, Complexity, and Democracy. Television—Notes on Some Conditions Norms. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996. for Mediation and Intervention,” In Television and Common Knowledge, O’Flynn, Ian. “Deliberative Democracy Cohen, Joshua. “Deliberation and edited by Jostein Gripsrud, 34-52. for a Great Society.” Political Studies Democratic Legitimacy.” In The Good London and New York: Routledge, 1999. Review 13, no 2 (2015): 210. Polity: Normative Analysis of the State, edited by Alan Hamlin and Philip Petti, ———. The Theory of Communicative Papadopoulos, Yannis, and Philip Warin. 17-34. New York: Basil Blackwell, 1989. Action, vol. 1. Boston: Beacon Press, “Are Innovative, Participatory and 1984. Deliberative Procedures in Policy Making Elster, Jon. “Introduction.” In Deliberative Democratic and Effective.” European Democracy, edited by Jon Elster, 1-18. Hendriks, Carolyn. “Deliberative Journal of Political Research 46, no 4 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Governance in the Context of Power.” (2007): 445–472. 1998. Policy and Society 28, no 3 (2009): 173-184. Susskind, Lawrence. “Arguing, Fishkin, James S. When the People Bargaining and Getting Agreement.” In Speak: Deliberative Democracy and Muhlberger, Peter. “Human Agency and The Oxford Handbook of Public Policy, Public Consultation. Oxford: Oxford the Revitalization of the Public Sphere.” edited by Michael Moran, Martin Rein University Press, 2009. Political Communication 22, no. 2 (2005): and Robert E. Goodin, 269-295. Oxford: 163-178. Oxford University Press, 2006.

Plamen Makariev teaches political philosophy at Sofia University. His spheres of research interest include: political philosophy, philosophy of religion, and philosophy of education. Professor Makariev is a member of the editorial boards of three international philosophy journals and a chairman of the Expert Council on Religion at the Ministry of Education and Science of Bulgaria. He specialized at Vienna University and the Catholic University of America. Prof. Makariev is the author of a number of articles (most recently “The Limits of Tolerance from the Perspective of Their Public Legitimization,” Balkan Journal of Philosophy, 11/1, 2019). He is the editor and co-editor of seven volumes (the latest is The Role of Religions in the Public Sphere: The Post-Secular Model of Jürgen Habermas and Beyond, Washington D.C., CRVPh, 2015). He is also the author of four research monographs, most recently The Public Legitimacy of Minority Claims: A Central/ Eastern European Perspective, London and New York, Routledge, 2017.

13 Carolyn Hendriks, “Deliberative Governance in the Context of Power,” Policy and Society 28, no 3 (2009): 173. 14 Yannis Papadopoulos and Philip Warin, “Are Innovative, Participatory and Deliberative Procedures in Policy Making Democratic and Effective,” European Journal of Political Research 46, no 4 (2007): 445.

24 Bulgaria’s Media Landscape 30 Years After the Fall of Communism

Mariya Neikova

Bulgaria—Basic Data Radio 1 Rock, Radio City, Radio NRJ, Radio Veronika, , Antenna, Nova News), BSS Media (Radio l Population – slightly under seven million people Veselina, , , Magic FM), Oberon l Territory – 110,910 sq km (42,855 sq miles) Radio Max (Radio Fresh, Radio FM+, Z Rock, Melody, l GDP – around 110 billion leva 105.,6 Novinite Sega), bTV Radio Group (N-JOY, bTV l NATO member – since 2004 Radio, JazzFM, ClassicFM/Alma Mater), Darik (Darik, l EU member – since 2007 Darik Nostalgie), as well as the regional stations of Bul- garian National Radio (Radio , Radio Stara n Bulgaria in 2018 there were 239 newspapers,1 116 Zagora, Radio Plovdiv, Radio Blagoevgrad, Radio Shu- television2 and 83 radio3 operators according to data men, Radio Sofia, Radio Varna, Radio Burgas, and Radio Ifrom the National Statistic Institute. At first glance Vidin). The leading five by audience share are Fresh Me- this looks like a pluralistic media field. dia, BSS Media, Oberon Radio Max, BTV Radio Group and BNR. According to data also for 2018 available from the Bul- garian Media Map by the Piero97 Agency,4 the top ten Both in TV and Radio the tendency for forming signifi- press media by circulation are: Telegraph, Monitor, 24 cant chains is visible. Chasa, Weekend, Capital, Trud, EVA, Standart, Econo- mist, and Elle (all of these are newspapers, with the ex- In the meantime the two public broadcasters, BNR and ception of the magazines EVA, Economist and Elle).5 BNT, “are being pushed towards greater commercial- ization of programs, becoming more vulnerable to vest- The most influential players on the TV field are two ed interests (mostly through external productions). This large private operators: Nova Broadcasting Group is first and foremost a threat to their ability to freely (whose channels include Nova, , , and publicly voice critical opinions seeking to highlight , , Fox, , , Na- problematic issues in government and society,” writes tional Geographic, , 24 Kitchen, AXN, Orlin Spassov.6 Disney, City TV, Nickelodeon, Nick Junior), and bTV Me- dia Group (whose channels include bTV, bTV Cinema, Media legislation also was established during the past bTV Comedy, bTV Action, bTV Lady, .bg, Cartoon 30 years. In the wake of 1989, the printed press was Network), and the public operator—Bulgarian National governed by the principles laid down in general legisla- Television (BNT1, BNT2, BNT3, BNT HD, BNT4, and BNT tion. The Radio and TV Act was adopted in 1998. World). Other laws that regulate media are the Electronic National radio programmes of note include Radio Hori- Communications Act (2007), the Copyright and Relat- zont (), Hristo Botev (Bulgar- ed Rights Act (1993), and the Law on the Compulsory ian National Radio), and . There are also Deposit of Printed and Other Works and for Announc- several radio groups: Fresh Media (BG radio, Radio 1, ing Broadcasters and Media Service Providers (2009).

1 Issued newspapers. National Statistical Institute, 20.06.2019, www.nsi.bg/en/content/4573/issued-newspapers. 2 TV operators. (Programming license holders and registered only.) National Statistical Institute, 22.05.2019, www.nsi.bg/en/content/4631/tv-operators. 3 Radio stations. National Statistical Institute, 22.05.2019, www.nsi.bg/en/content/4621/radio-operators. 4 Piero97 is a leading Bulgarian brand in advertising, established 1997. 5 “Bulgarian Media Map for 2018,” Piero97, uploaded July 2019, www.piero97.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Bulgarian-Media-Map-for-2018-piero97.com_.pdf. 6 Orlin Spassov, “Public Service Media in Bulgaria: Lack of Sustainability,” in A Pillar of Democracy on Shaky Ground. Public Service Media in South East Europe (Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2019), 84, www.kas.de.

25 Media-related regulation also can be found in laws on In 2018, the highest proportion of respondents (68%) health, medical products in human medicine, consumer reported that they were mainly informed by television. protection, administrative offenses and penalties, and Television remains a very important and influential child protection. source of news in Bulgaria.

The Council for Electronic Media—which was estab- The second most important media that people trust is lished in 1997 as the National Radio and Television the Internet—16% say they received their news there. Council, but switched to its current name in 2001—li- Only about 2% trust radio or newspapers. censes, registers and supervises the activities of media service providers. In its activities the Council should be Analysts see a significant deterioration in public evalu- guided by the interests of the public, it must defend the ation of the freedom and objectivity of the press and freedom and pluralism of speech and information and television compared to the survey data in 2015 and the independence of the electronic media. An important 2016. The proportion of respondents who agree with prerogative of CEM is the selection and appointment of the statement that, in principle, newspapers in Bulgaria the directors general of BNT and BNR. are free to criticize government, dropped from 56% in 2015 to 41% in 2018, i.e. by 15%. In the field of self-regulation, the situation was strange, with the existence of two ethical codes for nearly two The public assessment of the objectivity of the press in years: the Code of Ethics for the Bulgarian Media the case of high-level crime is rather negative. In 2018, (2004), and the Professional and Ethical Code (2013, only 21% of those polled believe that if a senior govern- Bulgarian Media Union). Although the Bulgarian Media ment official becomes involved in a crime, the newspa- Union was short-lived, this example of an increasingly pers in the country would tell the truth about the case. polarised news media field illustrates aggravating divi- The share of those who are convinced of the objectivity sions in Bulgarian society. The polarization did not stop of newspapers fell by 11% between 2016 and 2018. The with BMU’s disappearance. largest share of respondents (53% in 2018) do not think that the newspapers would tell the truth if a senior gov- Complex developments led Bulgarian media to a sad ernment official becomes involved in a crime. situation of confrontation: Between 2015 and 2018, negative growth in the objec- ...in which the media is increasingly instru- tivity of television shows a similar trend. In 2018, the mentalized as an extension of the political, largest share of the respondents (50%) believe that if economic and judicial power in Bulgaria. It a senior government official is involved in a crime, the poisons the environment and leads to the television in the country would not tell the truth about hardening of the adherents and adversar- the case. Only 25% of people think that television would ies of each party, a condition which cannot tell the truth about the case, which is 17% less than the produce a constructive discussion on real 2016 results. problems. In such circumstances, however, there is no way, or it is extremely difficult, The media in Bulgaria have reached a high level of pub- to fulfill the stated basic objective, en- lic distrust. shrined in the short preamble of the Code of Ethics for the Bulgarian Media: “to re- On the occasion of the 25th anniversary of November spect the right of the public to receive and 10—the date in 1989 which symbolizes the beginning of disseminate credible information so that the process of democratization in Bulgaria, Georgi Lo- citizens can play an active role in a trans- zanov offered one periodization of the historical devel- parent democracy.7 opment of Bulgarian media sector, “the media time of the transition.”8 He suggests three different stages. This The past 30 years were also the time of a rapid Internet first is one Lozanov defines as “romantic.” That was a penetration (66%) and greater use of digital media. time when the media inherited from the socialism “nei- ther could absorb the unleashed word flow, nor satisfy All this development is reflected by the low confidence the mass hunger for new content.”9 Thus, the number of in the Bulgarian media. Analysis of public attitudes new print media outlets increased explosively. Print was towards democracy, rule of law and fundamental hu- the medium of that first period. man rights in 2018 prepared by the Open Society Insti- tute - Sofia in mid-June 2019 show such trends. This is Lozanov puts forward two important conclusions from the institute’s third consecutive survey and is based on that first stage: first, about the two big narratives of data from three nationally representative public opin- the transition—“the social one of the left and the anti- ion polls, the last of which was conducted in April 2018. communist of the right”—when we did not yet know

7 Vyara Angelova, Mariya Neikova, and Zhana Popova, “News... up close.” Report commissioned by AEJ-Bulgaria, 2017.

8 Georgi Lozanov, “Periodization of the Media Work During the Transition,” in Media in Bulgaria: 25 Years Later (National Scientific Practical Con- ference: NBU Printing Press, 2015), 38–43.

9 Lozanov, 41.

26 that “freedom of opinion is not in itself a guarantee of News Corporation entered the TV market selected as media independence and the quality of journalism.”10 the first privately owned national television operator). The second conclusion states: profit became a legiti- In both cases the Commission for Protection of Com- mate aim in the media sector and was “specifically en- petition found a convenient “loophole” in the Law on shrined in the Radio and Television Act.”11 At that time Protection of Competition to leave the situation un- the local market started to attract foreign investors, in- changed. For print media, the established dominance cluding world players such as Westdeutsche Allgemeine of WAZ was interpreted as bringing benefits to the Zeitung (WAZ) and Murdoch. technological development of the industry, and for TV “balancing factors” were found with regard of the ex- The second stage was the market stage. “It was no lon- pected digitization of the broadcast.17 Refraining from ger so important who said what in the media, but how effective regulation has allowed large-scale concen- many people wanted to hear it, see it and read it and trations of capital. what kind of revenue it could bring,” writes Lozanov, as- serting that the medium of the second period was the The third episode is titled “incest”—ten years ago opti- television.12 mism attracted several foreign companies to the Bul- garian media market. The example of the radio market The third stage could be named “corporate” and ac- was telling: “as of 2006, a total of 20 of the approxi- cording to the author it started with a transformation mately 30 Sofia stations were owned by four foreign of media ownership and the withdrawal of big foreign companies.”18 Outside the element of the market, Fil- investors as a consequence of economic crises. During eva connects the defects of the media system to the the third period, Lozanov summarizes, “the information painful topic of Bulgarian media owners and their be- picture is often deliberately distorted to protect the hind-the-scenes links with stakeholders interested in ambitions of the beneficiaries of the corporate scheme, media silence while pursuing group economic or politi- and falls into the professional framework not so much cal interests.19 of journalism as of PR, most often black, which could be suspected to be the main reason for the fall of the “And what is the result?” Fileva answers her own ques- country in the international rankings for freedom of tion: “Two publishing unions, two codes of ethics, a expression.”13 The Internet has established itself as the missing ethics committees, a missing circulation desk. medium of the period. This is the result of the allowed incest between media, money and power, most clearly and prominently in the On the same occasion Petranka Fileva presented the interplay of roles between bankrupt banker Tsvetan quarter center of post-socialism through three epi- Vasilev and the media of Delyan Peevski’s family. The sodes with problems in the functioning, regulation and result is due [to many factors] including ‘the silence of self-regulation of the Bulgarian media market. The first regulators.’”20 episode she named “the birth of a defective market.” The motto of the first episode would sound like this, Fi- The last five years only aggravated the negative trends leva writes: “Transition distortions concentrated in the in the Bulgarian media field. media sector both in relation to the total volume of ar- tificially created large private capital and to the magni- 2019, the year we marked the 30th anniversary of the tude of the economic catastrophe in 1996-1997.”14 This beginning of democratization in central and eastern Eu- first episode was characterized by the entry of the Ger- rope, ended in Bulgaria with a seeming restart of pub- man press group WAZ, which quickly took a dominant lic conversations about the freedom of speech and the position. “Disturbed freedom of competition becomes state of the media. In the beginning of December 2019, a problem for both the liberalization of the market and a debate was initiated in Parliament on the govern- the democratization of the media,”15 concludes Fileva. ment’s policy of guaranteeing freedom of expression. Earlier that same month Prime Minister Boyko Borissov Second episode—“the silence of regulators”16—was a had a two hour “frank conversation” with Christophe time of concentration of market power that has led Deloire, secretary general of Reporters without Borders to the dominant position of large foreign investors (RWB). Bulgaria occupies 111th place in the organiza- in print (WAZ) and television (bTV, Rupert Murdoch’s tion’s World Press Freedom Index. According to Deloire

10 Lozanov, 41. 11 Lozanov, 41. 12 Lozanov, 42. 13 Lozanov, 43. 14 Petranka Fileva, “Defects of Bulgarian Media Market in Three Episodes,” in Media in Bulgaria: 25 Years Later (National Scientific Practical Con- ference: NBU Printing Press, 2015), 129–130. 15 Fileva, 130. 16 Fileva, 131. 17 Fileva, 132. 18 Fileva, 134. 19 Fileva, 134. 20 Fileva, 135.

27 bullying of the media in Bulgaria through legal mecha- As a summary here are some important issues and nisms, lack of editorial independence, lack of transpar- trends that Bulgarian media has faced during the past ency of media ownership, and conflicts of interest are three decades: the main reasons for the deteriorating media environ- ment. l Media ownership—finding out who the real media owners are remains problematic; A total of three working groups were created so far to l Rapid arrival of large foreign media owners; creation change the Radio and TV Act, but without clear criteria of publications by local power brokers and wealthy and goals. businessmen; profitable growth of magazines dedi- cated to celebrity, lifestyle and gossip; This is how we have arrived at the current situation of l During the last 10 years: mass flight of Western in- the Bulgarian media. In “Digital News Report 2019” by vestors, replaced by local or regional players seeking the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism it is more influence than business; portrayed as follows: “In the early 1990s, each politi- l External influences on the media, pressure on cal party had its own newspaper. Today they each have journalists, including working without permanent their own TV channel... The links between stations and contracts; political parties range from shared business links and l Lack of freedom in the media field and suspicion of interests right through to direct ownership... Newspa- corrupt practices; pers in Bulgaria have come under considerable financial l Sensationalism—crimes, disasters and incidents lead pressure in recent years... economic weakness has left the news stream in the most popular TV and online Bulgarian media increasingly reliant on funding from lo- media, creating a “catastrophic agenda”; cal oligarchs or foreign foundations.”21 l General fatigue with the media situation in Bulgaria: constant repetition of same problems—obscure media ownership, pressure on journalists, the power – media – money association; l As a consequence—diminishing trust in the media.

References:

Angelova, Vyara, Mariya Neikova, and Fileva, Petranka. “Defects of Bulgarian Spassov, Orlin. “Public Service Media in Zhana Popova. “News... Up Close.” Media Market in Three Episodes.” Bulgaria: Lack of Sustainability.” In A Report commissioned by AEJ-Bulgaria, In Media in Bulgaria: 25 Years Later. Pillar of Democracy on Shaky Ground. 2017. National Scientific Practical Conference: Public Service Media in South East NBU Printing Press, 2015. Europe. Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V., Antonov, Stefan Antonov. “Bulgaria.” www.kas.de, 2019. In Digital News Report 2019. Reuters Lozanov, Georgi. “Periodization of the Institute for the Study of Journalism, Media Work During the Transition.” 2019. reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/ In Media in Bulgaria: 25 Years Later, sites/default/files/2019-12/DNR_2019_ National Scientific Practical Conference: FINAL.pdf NBU Printing Press, 2015.

Maria Neykova is a lecturer at the Faculty of Journalism and Mass Communication, Sofia University St. Kliment Ohridski. She teaches the following courses: Theories of International Relations; World Politics in the Media; The Balkans in Modern International Relations; The EU and the Balkans. Professor Neykova has taught some of the most well-known and respected Bulgarian journalists.

21 Stefan Antonov, “Bulgaria,” in Digital News Report 2019 (Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, 2019), reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2019-12/DNR_2019_FINAL.pdf.

28 Strengthening Social Resilience as a Means to Protect from Hybrid Threats

Yantsislav Yanakiev

1. Introduction First, these are former Warsaw Pact countries, new democracies with comparatively unstable political and he purpose of this article is to stimulate an ex- economic situations, as well as low trust in institutions pert discussion on two interrelated concepts of and political processes. Second, the NATO Nations and building social resilience and countering hybrid the EU Member States (MS) situated on the Eastern T flanks of both organizations experience a lack of nat- threats. Additionally, we will suggest some ideas about possible good governance approaches to manage and ural resources, which deepens energy dependency on enhance social resilience as a means to countering hy- Russian supplies. Third, in countries like Bulgaria, there brid threats. exist close cultural and religious ties with Russia that can be utilized as a tool for influencing public opinion and decision-making processes. Additionally, in Latvia, There are several factors and conditions that make the Lithuania and Estonia there exist comparatively large topic of hybrid activities in current and future conflicts Russian minorities that can also be instrumental in important and relevant. First of all, we are witnesses implementing hybrid strategies. Fourth, in some of the of an increasing blurring between the lines of conven- countries, there is a comparatively high level of corrup- tional, irregular and hybrid activities with expansive tion, and the media is not fully transparent. Last, but use of non-military actors. In addition, hybrid activities not least, in some of the NATO nations and the EU MS are implemented on the edge between peace and war, on the Eastern flank of the organizations there is a lack preventing the application of international rules for the of capacity for interagency cooperation, inefficient law regulation of armed conflicts. Besides, they target the enforcement, and a lack of legal and political means for most important achievements, values, and principles addressing hybrid threats. All these factors and condi- of democratic, open society. Moreover, usually it is dif- tions enhance Russian influence and prevent the suc- ficult, and in some cases impossible, to identify and to cessful implementation of strategies to counter hybrid attribute the “brains” behind the hybrid activity. There- threats. fore, only perpetrators can be detectible. Last but not least, the massive use of new digital technologies and sophisticated social influence techniques is typical for 2. The Concepts of Social Resilience and Social hybrid activities. The final purpose of these activities is Vulnerability to target open society, cultural boundaries and demo- cratic ideology as a means of creating instability. For Without going into deep discussion on the topic, we in- that reason, more effort is needed to build resilient tend to introduce several perspectives on defining so- bonds between state governance, security forces and cial resilience in order to establish a basis for a common society to create a full range of capabilities to counter understanding of the concept and its relation to coun- hybrid activities. tering hybrid threats.

The problem with hybrid threats is particularly impor- Most popular is the community resilience perspective. tant for the countries situated on the Eastern flank of One of the first definitions of social resilience by Neil the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Adger is quite brief, and it focuses on “the ability of European Union (EU). There are several arguments why communities to withstand external shocks to their so- NATO and EU Eastern flanks need special attention. cial infrastructure.”1

1 Neil Adger, “Social and Ecological Resilience: Are they Related?” Progress in Human Geography 24 (December 2000): 361.

29 According to Susan Cutter and Christina Finch, social Based on a critical review of academic literature on resilience is “the ability of a community system to re- the issue, Markus Keck and Patrick Sakdapolrak de- spond and recover from disasters and it includes those fine social resilience as being comprised of three di- inherent conditions that allow the system to absorb mensions: “1. Coping capacities—the ability of social impacts and cope with an event, as well as post-event, actors to cope with and overcome all kinds of adversi- adaptive processes that facilitate the ability of the ties; 2. Adaptive capacities—the ability to learn from social system to re-organize, change, and learn in re- past experiences and adjust to future challenges in sponse to a threat.”2 everyday life; 3. Transformative capacities—the abil- ity to craft sets of institutions that foster individual John Cacioppo, Harry Reis and Alex Zautra take a simi- welfare and sustainable societal robustness towards lar approach in defining community social resilience. future crises.”6 They describe the concept as: To summarize, most definitions of social resilience out- the capacity to foster, engage in, and sus- line one or two perspectives: 1) reactive recovery, and/ tain positive relationships and to endure or 2) stability after traumatic events, such as, for exam- and recover from life stressors and social ple, natural disasters. In addition, social resilience is not isolation… Social resilience, unlike other only a dynamic and relational concept but also a deeply forms of personal resilience, therefore is political one. Finally, one can identify the adaptive and intrinsically multilevel and includes an in- transformative dimensions of social resilience. dividual’s (a) characteristic ways of relat- ing (e.g., agreeableness, trustworthiness, In addition to the research on social resilience, many fairness; compassion, humility, generos- social scientists have employed the broader concept of ity, openness); (b) interpersonal resources vulnerability to examine both the magnitude of a dis- and capacities (e.g., sharing, attentive lis- ruption that a social community can absorb and the tening, perceiving others accurately and likely speed of its recovery when confronted with stress empathically, communicating care and (Brooks, Adger & Kelly 2005; Cutter & Finch, 2008; respect for others, responsiveness to the Adger et al. 2011). needs of others, compassion for and for- giveness of others); and (c) collective re- In brief, both concepts of social resilience and social sources and capacities (e.g., group iden- vulnerability have a close connection with the pre- tity, centrality, cohesiveness, tolerance, paredness of a society or a community to counter openness, rules for governance).3 hybrid threats because as a rule, hybrid strategies focus on previously identified social vulnerabilities Another perspective in defining social resilience is the (e.g. week/failed state, internal conflicts, divided socio-ecological one presented in the work of Richard society, lack of political consent about the future of Haigh and Dilanthi Amaratunga. Social resilience is de- the society, corruption, inefficient law enforcement, scribed as “the ability of an ecosystem to respond to lack of natural resources and dependency of foreign a perturbation or disturbance by resisting damage and states, etc.) recovering quickly. Such perturbations and disturbances can include events such as fires, flooding, windstorms, insect population explosions, and human activities such 3. Hybrid Warfare: The Old Paradigm Enhanced as deforestation, fracking of the ground for oil extrac- by New Digital Technologies and Vulnerabilities tion, pesticide sprayed in soil, and the introduction of of Democratic Societies exotic plant or animal species, etc.”4

Judy Burnside-Lawry and Peter Rogers represent the The critics of the concept of hybrid warfare introduced 7 organizational and institutional perspective of resil- by Frank Hoffman often provide arguments that war ience, which is defined as “the ability of an organization has always been a mixture of different military, politi- or an institution to anticipate, prepare for, and respond cal, economic, propaganda, etc. activities in order to and adapt to incremental change and sudden disrup- achieve the political end-state and to win over the en- tions in order to survive and prosper.”5 emy. This article supports this statement. How old are

2 Susan L. Cutter and Christina Finch, “Temporal and Spatial Changes in Social Vulnerability to Natural Hazards,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 105, no. 7 (February 2008): 2301. 3 John T. Cacioppo, Harry T. Reis, and Alex J. Zautra, “Social Resilience. The Value of Social Fitness with an Application to the Military,” American Psychologist 66, no. 1 (January 2011): 44. 4 Richard Haigh and Dilanthi Amaratunga, “Moving from 2015 to 2030: Challenges and Opportunities for Higher Education in Developing Resilience to Disasters,” Proceedings of the 8th International Conference of Faculty of Architecture Research Unit (FARU), University of Moratuwa, Colombo, Sri Lanka (December 2015): 5 www.researchgate.net/publication/303669775_Moving_from_2015_to_2030_challenges_and_ opportunities_for_higher_education_in_developing_resilience_to_disasters. 5 Judy Burnside-Lawry and Peter Rogers, “Communication Research to Build Societal Resilience,” International Journal of Disaster Resilience in the Built Environment 7, no. 1 (2016): 3. 6 Markus Keck and Patrick Sakdapolrak, “What Is Social Resilience? Lessons Learned and Ways Forward,” Erdkunde 67, no. 1 (March 2013): 14. 7 Frank Hoffman, “Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Warfare,” Potomac Institute for Policy Studies (2017).

30 hybrid activities? If we look back to the tracts of Sun terminology leads to a different understanding, and in Tzu, we can see that the idea of winning a war or a bat- some cases misunderstanding, of terms. We do not in- tle without entering in direct military conflict dates to tend in this article to go deeply into the terminological at least the fifth century BC. discussion. This is a topic of serious expert debate. We simply highlight the issue that there is a clear need for We are going to provide three of the lessons of the fa- common understanding and usage of these terms be- mous strategist: 1) “For to win one hundred victories cause this is a basis for common policies and practices in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To sub- within the framework of NATO and the EU to protect due the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill”; 2) from any forms of hybrid activities. “Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in For the purposes of this article, we are going to use breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting”; and the terms “hybrid threats” and “hybrid activities.” The 3) “The best victory is when the opponent surrenders of hybrid threat is a phenomenon resulting from conver- its own accord before there are any actual hostilities... gence and interconnection of different elements, which It is best to win without fighting.”8 together form a more complex and multidimensional threat. These lessons are convincing enough that hybrid strate- gies and tactics have always been explored in the his- We include the whole family of terms such as “hybrid tory of warfare. What is new now is the exceptional warfare,” “hybrid strategies,” “hybrid operations,” “hy- massive use of digital technologies, propaganda, social brid tactics,” “hybrid attacks,” etc. under the umbrella influence technics, and exploitation of the vulnerabili- term “hybrid activities.” All of these activities can be ties of democratic societies in order to achieve political used by a state and/or non-state actors, applying co- goals backed by the threat of the use of military force ercive and non-coercive methods to achieve their stra- or state-funded paramilitary organizations. tegic goals. It is important to underline that if the term “hybrid warfare” is used, this definitely means the use To summarize, as a rule, hybrid activities are focused of or threat of use of military force. on previously identified vulnerabilities within demo- cratic societies. Therefore, building social resilience is a Our position is that there is a need to develop a taxon- key factor in mitigating vulnerabilities and countering omy of hybrid activities in order to support the process hybrid threats. Moreover, all dimensions and levels of of standardization of terminology in NATO and the EU. social resilience should be considered (individual, team, organization/institution, community, and society). Fi- nally, the main challenges related to countering hybrid 5. NATO’s Approach to Building Resilience and threats are: (1) establishing responsibility and inten- Countering Hybrid Threats tionality of adversary actions; (2) lack of international law enforcement and good global governance. Besides the theoretical discussion on the concepts of social resilience and vulnerability concerning countering hybrid threats, it is important to highlight that there are 4. Hybrid Activities: Too Many Definitions and a durable practical political and defense applications. For Lack of a Unified Understanding of the Problem example, the concept of resilience has been endorsed by NATO’s Heads of State and Government at the War- The academic literature review shows a broad spec- saw Summit, 8-9 July 2016 as “an essential basis for trum of terminology used to define the family of hybrid credible deterrence and defense and effective fulfill- activities such as “hybrid warfare”;9 “hybrid conflict”;10 ment of the Alliance’s core tasks,” and they committed “hybrid operations”;11 “hybrid campaigns”;12 “hybrid at- “to enhance resilience, i.e. to maintain and further de- tacks”;13 “hybrid tactics”,14 etc. The lack of a common velop the Alliance members individual and collective ca- definition is not only a terminological issue. Different pacity to resist any form of armed attack.”15 In addition,

8 Sun Tzu, The Art of War (Leicester, UK: Allandale Online Publishing, 2000): 4-7, sites.ualberta.ca/~enoch/Readings/The_Art_Of_War.pdf. 9 Frank Hoffman, “Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Warfare,” Potomac Institute for Policy Studies (2017). 10 Bianca Torossian, Tara Görde, and Lucas Fagliano, “Hybrid Conflict. Neither War, nor Peace,” in Strategic Monitor 2019-2020, Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (2020). www.clingendael.org/pub/2019/strategic-monitor-2019-2020/hybrid-conflict/. 11 Jan Joel Andersson, “Hybrid Operations: Lessons from the Past,” European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), October 28, 2015, www.iss.europa.eu/content/hybrid-operations-lessons-past. 12 European Commission, “Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council: Increasing Resilience and Bolstering Capabilities to Address Hybrid Threats,” last modified June 13, 2018, eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52018JC0016&from=GA. 13 Axel Hagelstam, “Cooperating to Counter Hybrid Threats,” NATO Review, November 23, 2018, www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2018/11/23/cooperating-to-counter-hybrid-threats/index.html. 14 Nicu Popescu, “Hybrid Tactics: Russia and the West,” European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), October 28, 2015, www.iss.europa.eu/content/hybrid-tactics-russia-and-west. 15 North Atlantic Council, “Warsaw Summit Communiqué, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw, 8-9 July 2016,” para 72, last modified March 29, 2017, www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm.

31 NATO Heads of State and Government welcomed the their respective areas of competence, would examine Resilience Guidelines approved by Defense Ministers in the applicability and practical implications of Articles June 2016, which included the need for assessment and 222 TFEU in case of a terrorist attack or disaster, as the development of plans for the continuity of govern- well as Article 42(7) TEU in case a wide-ranging and ment, continuity of essential services, security of criti- serious hybrid attack occurs. Also, the High Represen- cal civilian infrastructure, and support to military forces tative, in coordination with the MS, will integrate, ex- with civilian means (North Atlantic Council, Compen- ploit and coordinate the capabilities of military action dium of Baseline Requirements 2016; North Atlantic in countering hybrid threats within the Common Secu- Council, Factsheet on baseline requirements 2016). rity and Defense Policy. Finally, equally importantly, ac- tions have been outlined to build resilience in areas such NATO policy on countering hybrid threats, enhanc- as cybersecurity, critical infrastructure, protecting the ing resilience, improving situational awareness and financial system from illicit use and efforts to counter strengthening deterrence has been confirmed during violent extremism and radicalization.19 the Brussels Summit in 2018, including invoking Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, as in the case of armed attack.16 The official definition of hybrid threat used 7. Enhanced Cooperation between the NATO by NATO is “a type of threat that combines conven- Alliance, the European Union and Partners in tional, irregular and asymmetric activities in time and Countering Hybrid Threats space.”17 Since 2016, NATO and the European Union have identi- fied countering hybrid threats as a priority for coopera- 6. EU’s Approach to Building Resilience and tion.20 The importance of hybrid threats for NATO and Countering Hybrid Threats the EU is so serious that it requires joint planning and actions. Critical measures were defined in the Council According to the European Union’s Joint Communica- conclusions on the Implementation of the Joint Dec- tion to the European Parliament and the Council Joint laration by the President of the European Council, the Framework on countering hybrid threats, hybrid cam- President of the European Commission and the Sec- paigns are “multidimensional, combining coercive and retary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza- subversive measures, using both conventional and un- tion. They include enhancing staff-to-staff sharing of conventional tools and tactics (diplomatic, military, time-critical information between the EU Hybrid Fu- economic, and technological) to destabilize the adver- sion Cell and the relevant NATO counterpart, includ- sary. They are designed to be difficult to detect or at- ing exchanging the analysis of potential hybrid threats; tribute, and can be used by both state and non-state intensifying cooperation and undertaking shared trend actors.”18 analysis of misinformation, including through social media targeting the EU and NATO; Integrated Politi- The EU also emphasizes that strengthening resilience cal Crisis Response arrangements and NATO’s Crisis to hybrid threats and reinforcing capabilities are pre- Response System; and raising awareness on existing dominantly Member States’ responsibilities. However, and planned resilience requirements for the benefit of EU institutions have already taken a number of actions Member States/Allies (Council of the European Union to help reinforce national efforts. 2017; European Council 2018).

First, the European Commission is developing security To conclude, in our view, there are several important risk assessment methodologies, indicators of hybrid steps to be taken in the framework of the two orga- threats and a survey of MS to identify areas vulnerable nizations. First, we must identify existing resilience in- to hybrid threats. In addition, the EU Hybrid Fusion Cell dicators and monitoring mechanisms of hybrid threats was established within the EU Intelligence and Situa- at national, NATO and EU levels, and to formulate sug- tion Centre. The National Contact Points are connected gestions for improving situational awareness and en- to the EU Hybrid Fusion Cell. Moreover, the Centre of hancing resilience as the best deterrence against hybrid Excellence for countering hybrid threats was estab- threats. Second, we need to highlight the role of arti- lished in Helsinki in 2017. Additionally, it was decided ficial intelligence, big data analytics and other innova- that the Commission and the High Representative, in tive technologies for dealing with unknown-unknowns

16 North Atlantic Council, “Brussels Summit Declaration, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels, 11-12 July 2018,” last modified August 30, 2018, www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_156624.htm.

17 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions,” NATO Standardization Office (NSO) 2019 AAP-06, Edition 2019.

18 European Commission, “Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council: Increasing Resilience and Bolstering Capabilities to Address Hybrid Threats,” June 13, 2018: 2.

19 European Commission, “Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council: Increasing Resilience and Bolstering Capabilities to Address Hybrid Threats,” June 13, 2018.

20 European Commission. “Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: Joint Framework on Countering Hybrid Threats a European Union Response,” April 6, 2016.

32 in countering hybrid threats. Third, we should identify national security policy and doctrine to be flexible and necessary capabilities that lead from early warning to proactive, not reactive. Besides, there is a need to de- early response to hybrid threats. velop a more comprehensive, whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach towards building and sus- taining social resilience. In this regard, the improvement 8. SWOT Analysis: A General Idea about the of coordination and cooperation among government Resilience of Bulgarian Society agencies, non-governmental organizations, and private individuals is a must. Furthermore, a key opportunity to The main purpose of this paper is not to present a thor- protect from hybrid threats is joint, multinational, and ough assessment of the level of resilience of Bulgarian interagency education and training for crisis manage- society with respect to hybrid threats. This is a complex ment so as to build a hybrid mindset among security and resource-consuming task that needs unified efforts sector experts. Last but not least, the effective tackling by the state institutions. Here we will just summarize of hybrid threats will only be possible through the of some ideas as a basis for further comprehensive re- blending all actors and available instruments: military search that is needed. forces, diplomacy, humanitarian aid, political processes, economic development, and technology. In order to make a detailed assessment of the resil- ience of a society, it is necessary to thoroughly com- Among the most dangerous threats that can lead to pare and understand both the strengths and weak- potential problems and the success of hybrid activities nesses, as well as the threats and opportunities that against Bulgaria are the continuing disintegration of exist together within the society. After making a com- society and the widening of areas of societal vulner- prehensive comparison and estimation of those crite- abilities. Additionally, the lack of a political will to build ria and knowing the possible threats, we can develop an effective early warning system to recognize hybrid a more efficient approach towards building social re- activities is another important factor contributing to silience against emerging security threats, including the reduction of social resilience. Furthermore, the in- hybrid ones. adequate and insufficient legal and doctrinal basis to counter hybrid threats further weakens the sustainabil- The following rows present the summary of identified ity of our society. Moreover, the lack of effective inter- strengths, weaknesses and opportunities of Bulgarian agency and international cooperation leads to weak- society, as well as threats that might be instrumental in ness in countering hybrid threats. Finally, inadequate countering hybrid activities. policy responses due to the underestimation of hybrid threats can also diminish the efforts to protect from Among the most important strengths of Bulgarian so- any form of hybrid activities. ciety is the membership of the country in NATO and the EU, as well as the existing regional security cooperation 9. How To Enhance Social Resilience As a Means in South-Eastern Europe. In addition, the established interagency cooperation in crisis management at the of Countering Hybrid Threats? national level is also an important factor that guaran- tees enhanced resilience. The next strength is the stable First of all, emerging security threats, including hybrid macroeconomic environment and comparatively low di- ones, require dealing with the unknown-unknowns21 rect taxes. that can be defined as future circumstances, events, or outcomes that are impossible to predict and to plan One of the main weaknesses of Bulgarian society is the for. This calls for the development of proactive gov- lack of coherent legal and political strategies for ad- ernment-led comprehensive approaches increasingly dressing hybrid threats. Moreover, as it was mentioned complemented by whole-of-society strategies aimed before, the nature of hybrid threats creates difficulties at managing risks and building a resilient society. These in identifying adversary actions and main actors, which strategies must be developed in a way that defines the requires an improvement of the early warning system. best directions for the concentration of resources from Furthermore, among the most important weaknesses different stakeholders so as to counter hybrid threats is the high level of poverty, as well as political, intereth- (government, civil society, the private sector, and indi- nic and religious tensions, the high level of corruption, vidual citizens). Besides, public-private cooperation on lack of trust in the state institutions and politics, etc. security, as well as the development and modernization Finally, Bulgaria is highly dependent on foreign natural of civilian and military capabilities need to be enhanced. resources, which also significantly reduces the social sustainability of our society. The development of innovative legal concepts and frameworks is one of the best ways to address hybrid Among the most important opportunities to protect threats adequately. In addition, government organi- the Bulgarian society from hybrid threats is the need zations need to be open to innovative legal concepts to consider every possible and needed change in the and alternative approaches in order to address hybrid

21 Donald Rumsfeld, press conference by US Secretary of Defence, June 6, 2002, NATO HQ Brussels, [last accessed on June, 23 2020], www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s020606g.htm.

33 threats effectively. The existing stovepipe security insti- of security sector institutions is not effective enough tutions might not be suitable anymore. Thus, it is nec- to counter hybrid threats. There is a clear need for im- essary to expand or change the missions of current in- proved interagency cooperation and coordination, as stitutions in the security sector (i.e. new responsibilities well as the commitment of the private sector, civil soci- and functions for intelligence and counterintelligence ety, and even each individual citizen. Finally, in order to agencies and armed forces, boosting strategic commu- be successful against hybrid strategies, the keywords nication) or creating new organizations, if needed. All are the whole-of-government and whole-of-society ap- this should be lined up with innovative methods in edu- proach. cation, training, exercises, and evaluation in countering hybrid activities. Many open questions can be seen as challenges for democratic societies in their efforts to counter hybrid threats. They need additional research, political think- 10. Conclusions ing, and actions to enhance social resilience and to build stronger democratic societies. One of the most As was emphasized in the introduction, the goal of important topics is how to identify and prevent Russian this article is to stimulate an expert discussion on the hybrid strategies that undermine the cohesion of the role of social resilience in countering emerging security Alliance by questioning within the Eastern flank coun- threats, including hybrid ones. We consider it important tries the wisdom of NATO membership as a strategic to encourage an expert discussion on these topics be- political choice. In addition, there are important institu- cause building social resilience has become a strategic tional challenges such as the implementation of Article task when countering hybrid threats. 5 of the Washington Treaty, consensus-building, and decision-making in the case of a hybrid attack against Hybrid activities can be successful only when they are one or several NATO nations. We see a similar situation focused on existing societal vulnerabilities. Therefore, in how Article 42(7) TEU can be evoked in practice in any society needs to identify and monitor its strengths, case of a wide-ranging and serious hybrid attack. Like- weaknesses or vulnerabilities, opportunities for reac- wise, the dilemma of deterrence against hybrid threats, tion, or even pro-active measures and potential threats the attribution of attackers and striking back or strik- well in advance before the escalation of a crisis. In addi- ing pre-emptively in case of state or non-state hybrid tion, to recognize the most appropriate way to counter attacks are also topics that deserve certain attention. emerging security threats, it is vital to develop and ap- Additionally, it is of key importance to discuss the is- ply robust mechanisms and metrics to measure social sue of creating an innovation culture in security sec- resilience. In general, hybrid strategies are very difficult tor institutions so as to be able to quickly evaluate the to identify. Usually, they are long-lasting, complex and security environment and to apply a holistic approach multidimensional processes targeting social identity, to identify, prevent and protect from hybrid threats. A values, norms and beliefs, public perceptions and atti- change to the traditional military mindset is necessary tudes, etc. As a practice, they are difficult, if not im- to be able to understand the rapidly changing security possible, to predict. For that reason, our preparedness environment due to the expansion of the battlefield be- should be concentrated on dealing with unknown-un- yond the pure military realm and the increasing the role knowns. This means a substantial change in the organi- of its non-military aspects. Last but not least, the focus zation, structure, functions, and operation of the secu- must be on how to counter hybrid threats by building rity sector. Actually, the existing stovepipe organization and sustaining a whole-of-society approach.

References:

Adger, Neil. “Social and Ecological Brooks, Nick, Neil Adger, and Mick Kelly. Council of the European Union. “Council Resilience: Are they Related?” Progress in “The Determinants of Vulnerability and Conclusions on the Implementation of Human Geography 24 (December 2000): Adaptive Capacity at the National Level the Joint Declaration by the President 347–364. and the Implications for Adaptation.” of the European Council, the President Global Environmental Change 15 (2005): of the European Commission and the Adger, Neil, Katrina Brown, Donald 151-162. Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Nelson, Fikret Berkes, Hallie Eakin, Carl Treaty Organization.” (5 December Folke, Kathleen Galvin, et al. “Resilience Burnside-Lawry, Judy, and Peter 2017). Implications of Policy Responses to Rogers. “Communication Research to Climate Change.” Wiley Interdisciplinary Build Societal Resilience.” International Cutter, Susan, Lindsey Barnes, Melissa Reviews: Climate Change 2, no 5 (2011): Journal of Disaster Resilience in the Built Berry, Christopher Burton, Elijah 757–766. Environment 7, no. 1 (2016): 2-3. Evans, Eric Tate, and Jennifer Webb. “A Place-Based Model for Understanding Andersson, Jan Joel. “Hybrid Operations: Cacioppo, John, Harry Reis, and Alex Community Resilience to Natural Lessons from the Past.” European Union Zautra. “Social Resilience. The Value of Disasters.” Global Environmental Change Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), Social Fitness with an Application to the 18, no. 4 (2008): 598– 606. (28 October 2015), www.iss.europa.eu/ Military.” American Psychologist 66, no. 1 content/hybrid-operations-lessons-past. (January 2011): 43-51.

34 Cutter, Susan, and Christina Finch. Hagelstam, Axel. “Cooperating to North Atlantic Council. “Factsheet on “Temporal and Spatial Changes in Counter Hybrid Threats.” Baseline Requirements for National Social Vulnerability to Natural Hazards.” NATO Review, November 2018. Resilience and Resilience Guidelines.” Proceedings of the National Academy of www.nato.int/docu/review/ AC/98(IP) N (2016)0002, September 7, Sciences of the United States of America articles/2018/11/23/cooperating-to- 2016. 105, no. 7 (February 2008): 2301-2306. counter-hybrid-threats/index.html. North Atlantic Treaty Organization. European Commission. “Joint Hoffman, Frank. “Conflict in the 21st “NATO Glossary of Terms and Communication to the European Century: The Rise of Hybrid Warfare.” Definitions.” NATO Standardization Parliament, the European Council and Potomac Institute for Policy Studies Office (NSO) 2019 AAP-06, Edition the Council: Increasing Resilience and (2017). 2019. Bolstering Capabilities to Address Hybrid Threats.” June 13, 2018. Keck, Markus, and Patrick Sakdapolrak. North Atlantic Council. “Warsaw “What is Social Resilience? Lessons Summit Communiqué, Issued by the European Commission. “Joint Learned and Ways Forward,” Erdkunde Heads of State and Government Communication to the European 67, no. 1 (March 2013): 5-19. participating in the meeting of the Parliament and the Council: Joint North Atlantic Council in Warsaw, 8-9 Framework on Countering Hybrid North Atlantic Council. “Brussels July 2016.” Threats a European Union Response.” Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads April 6, 2016. of State and Government participating Popescu, Nicu. “Hybrid Tactics: Russia in the meeting of the North Atlantic and the West.” European Union Institute European Council. “Joint Declaration on Council in Brussels, July 11-12, 2018.” for Security Studies (EUISS), 28 October EU-NATO Cooperation by the President 2015. www.iss.europa.eu/content/ of the European Council, the President North Atlantic Council. “Compendium hybrid-tactics-russia-and-west. of the European Commission, and the of Baseline Requirements, Resilience Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Guidelines, Initial Evaluation Criteria and Rumsfeld, Donald. Press conference by Treaty Organization.” July 10, 2018. Initial Best Practices.” Civil Protection US Secretary of Defence. June 6, 2002, Group, Transport Group, Joint Health, NATO HQ Brussels, [last accessed on Haigh, Richard, and Dilanthi Agriculture and Food Group, Industrial June, 23 2020]. www.nato.int/docu/ Amaratunga. “Moving from 2015 to Resources and Communications Services speech/2002/s020606g.htm. 2030: Challenges and Opportunities Group, October 4, 2016. for Higher Education in Developing Sun Tzu. The Art of War. Leicester, UK: Resilience to Disasters.” Proceedings North Atlantic Council. “Compendium Allandale Online Publishing, 2000. of the 8th International Conference of Baseline Requirements, Resilience sites.ualberta.ca/~enoch/Readings/ of Faculty of Architecture Research Guidelines, Initial Evaluation Criteria and The_Art_Of_War.pdf. Unit (FARU), University of Moratuwa, Initial Best Practices.” AC/23-N (2016) 0012 (INV); AC/329-N (2016)0012 (INV). Torossian, Bianca, Tara Görde, and Lucas Colombo, Sri Lanka (December Fagliano. “Hybrid Conflict. Neither War, 2015): 215-225. www.researchgate. North Atlantic Council. “Enhancing nor Peace.” Strategic Monitor 2019-2020, net/publication/303669775_Moving_ Resilience through Civil Preparedness, Hague Centre for Strategic Studies from_2015_to_2030_challenges_and_ NATO Baseline Requirements for (2020). www.clingendael.org/pub/2019/ opportunities_for_higher_education_in_ National Resilience and Associated strategic-monitor-2019-2020/hybrid- developing_resilience_to_disasters. Resilience Guidelines.” Civil Emergency conflict/. Planning Committee, September 7, 2016.

Yantsislav Yanakiev is a full professor of sociology at the Bulgarian Defense Institute Prof. Tsvetan Lazarov. He graduated from the Naval Academy in Varna. He served as a commissioned officer at the Varna Naval Base, the Navy Headquarters and the Ministry of Defense. He holds a PhD in sociology from the Institute of Sociology at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences and Doctor of Science degree in sociology from the same institute. From 2011 to 2018 Professor Yanakiev was director of the Defense Advanced Research Institute of Rakovski National Defense College. He specialized as an International Research Fellow at the NATO Defense College in Rome, at Cologne University and G.S. Marshall Centre for International Security Stud- ies in 2012. He was a Fulbright Visiting Scholar at the Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute (DEOMI), Patrick Air Force Base, FL from October 2012 to March 2013. Professor Yanakiev has been the principal Bulgarian representative to the NATO Science and Technology Organization, Human Factors and Medicine Panel since 2005. He currently chairs the Task Group on “Human Systems Integration Approach to Cyber Security.” Professor Yanakiev received the Individual Scientific Achievement Award of NATO Science and Technology Organization for 2018.

35 The Oligarchy’s State

Lyubomir Avdjiiski

hirty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, we ceived more than 17 Billion euros from European Union could say that democracy and rule of law are val- Funds over its 12 years of membership. That means Tues. They are not legal terms or legal procedures. 1.5 Billion per year, which is just 2% of the GDP. But We would also be right to assert that there is façade the largest portion of the money is going to a couple democracy and rule of law only on paper in Bulgaria. holdings well known for their strong ties with political parties—especially with the Movement for Rights and As Daniel Ritter, a professor and political sociologist Freedoms (MRF). MRF is a centrist party that claims from Stockholm University describes it: to represent minorities in Bulgaria and is part of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe—the Façade democracy—a type of authoritar- largest liberal political union in Europe now. As the for- ian regime that for instrumental reasons mer chairman of this party said in a meeting with his embraces Western political values and Bulgarian Turkish voters: “I am the instrument of power norms, such as democracy, human rights, that distributes portions of funding in the state. How and individual liberty... [T]his transforma- will an MP solve the problem with projects and their fi- tion helped the autocratic regimes main- nancing? The power is in my hands.”2 tain and even strengthen their profitable connections to the West.1 According to the OLAF’s 2017 Report, Bulgaria, Roma- nia and Hungary are the three countries with the most I shall argue that social cohesion and social justice can- investigations closed with recommendations by OLAF.3 not exist if there is not justice and rule of law at all. Corruption in Bulgaria has many faces and manifes- I will go even further—if you try to implement social tations—state capture, nepotism, lobbying legislation, justice through social programs and just transferring abuse of power, replacement of democracy (de jure) money from one part of the world to another, from with oligarchy (de facto)—but in reality they all repre- one social class to another, you will create even stron- sent different symptoms of one and the same disease. ger social division within society. Populists from both The “contagion” has come so far that the current chair- parts of political spectrum keep promising free educa- man of the Supreme Court of Cassation, Lozan Panov, tion, free healthcare and higher wages and pensions. has stated the following: “If the Bulgarian oligarchy has Left- and right-wing politicians promise to resolve the a state, then any attempt to put power back into the “Roma issue.” National-socialists such as Ataka and hands of citizens can really be called a coup. It is a sys- VMRO suggest more intensive involvement on the part tem that has recruited a great human and material re- of law enforcement and police departments. Socialists sources to build a well-functioning machine; which skill- and democratic socialists suggest that if we give more fully uses the services, the media, the economy, politics money to education and social programs, everything and, of course, the judiciary.”4 will be fine, especially in a period of elections. According to a March 2016 European Parliament sur- At the same time, it is obvious that most of the money vey, “The Cost of Non-Europe in the Area of Organized from European and national funds are granted to the Crime and Corruption,” Bulgaria loses around one-fifth most corrupted oligarchs in Bulgaria. It means that we of its GDP per year due to corruption practices. Within are funding the Mafia. We are not solving the problem, the EU, only Romania’s economy pays a similar price but rather deepening it. As of 2019 Bulgaria has re- for corruption.5 For yet another year Bulgaria ranks at

1 Daniel Ritter, The Iron Cage of Liberalism: International Politics and Unarmed Revolutions in the Middle East and North Africa (Oxford University Press, 2014), Chapter 3. 2 Ahmed Dogan, “The Power Is in My Hands,” June 25, 2009, YouTube video, 2:00, www.youtube.com/watch?v=CsPSl5PKwxM. 3 European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), “The OLAF Report 2017 - Eighteenth Report of the European Anti-Fraud Office, 1 January to 31 December 2017,” European Commission (October 5, 2018): 41. 4 Lozan Panov, “If the Bulgarian Oligarchy Has a State, Then Any Attempt to Put Power Back into the Hands of Citizens Can Really Be Called a Coup,” Mediapool.bg, December 11, 2015, www.mediapool.bg/ako-oligarhiyata-ima-darzhava-vseki-opit-vlastta-da-badevarnata-na- grazhdanite-mozhe-da-se-nareche-prevrat-news242986.html. 5 European Parliament, “The Cost of Non-Europe in the Area of Organized Crime and Corruption,” Annex II – Corruption (March 2016): 42, www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/579319/EPRS_STU(2016)579319_EN.pdf

36 first place among the European Union member states resentative among them was. Sonia Naydenova, who on Transparency International’s Corruption Perception had the authority to request a printout of the council Index for 2019. That means Bulgaria is the most corrupt members’ business phones, expressed her intention to country in the region for another year.6 do so. Following her statement, she was replaced as SJC representative by the majority of the other mem- Other quotations from the chairman of the Supreme bers of the SJC. Court are indicative: A similar scandal took place in 2013 when another [Bulgarian Oligarchy] is a system that phone conversation leaked and revealed how former has recruited great human and material Sofia City Prosecutor Nikolay Kokinov told Prime Min- resources to build a well-functioning ma- ister Borisov: “What are you laughing at. You chose him chine, which skillfully uses the services, [the Attorney General].”9 the media, the economy, politics and, of course, the judiciary. Her actions are not These cases show only one thing: the judiciary and the divulged but kept secret. Her mistakes are executive branch have developed secret (but often il- not displayed, but silenced and hidden. luminated) dependencies to the extent that constitu- Her adversaries are being persecuted and tional statements of separation of powers and inde- her secrets are very carefully guarded and pendence of the judiciary are just cheap clichés. The cannot be revealed... Unfortunately, no solution here is the reduction of the Parliamentary quo- one can tell when a democracy perishes, ta in the Supreme Judicial Council from 11 to 7 mem- when rule of law degrades and becomes bers and the election of these members by a qualified just empty packaging. There is no definite majority of two-thirds of the total number of Members measure, but the events in Bulgaria in re- of Parliament. Such a measure will be in accordance cent years remind me of the historical con- with the international judicial principle that judges text in which national-socialism evolved, should be elected with a professional quota prevailing. and I therefore believe that we are moving confidently towards authoritarianism.7 2. The Prosecutor’s Office

Where are the Main Problems? Another key problem within the Bulgarian judiciary is the model and structure of the Bulgarian Prosecutor’s 1. Supreme Judicial Council office, which follows the model of the Soviet Union Prosecutor’s office and the current model in the Rus- One of the major weaknesses of the Bulgarian judiciary sian Federation. is the enormous political influence over the governing body of the judiciary—the Supreme Judicial Council There is enormous and uncontrollable power concen- (SJC). I will provide two brief examples: At the begin- trated in the figure of the attorney general. This figure, ning of 2016, it became clear that the Prime Minister on the other hand, is not independent from the political Borisov had his own agent among the members of the oligarchy, while there is no effective procedure for his Supreme Judicial Council (a body which theoretically removal from power. Because of the lack of account- should be totally independent from political parties), ability and the abuse of power by the prosecutor’s of- who reports to him in real time what decisions were fice and by the attorney general himself, Bulgaria has being made. This fact was revealed by the chairman of been punished numerous times by the European court the Supreme Court of Cassation, Lozan Panov. Judge for human rights. Panov read to the media a message that was sent to Prime Minister Borisov by a member of the Council and In its opinion, entitled “The Systemic Problem with the then forwarded by Borisov to Panov himself: “Lozan Ineffectiveness of the Investigation in Bulgaria 2015,” Panov again offered to invite you to the SJC on the the European Court of Human Rights stated: “In over notes on both khaki. We did not accept it.8 Several SJC 45 judgments against Bulgaria, it was found that the members, including Sonia Naydenova, the SJC Official authorities had failed to comply with their obligation to Representative at the time, were shocked and asked carry out an effective investigation and considered that each council member to print out their cellphone re- these recurrent shortcomings disclosed the existence of cords in order to find out who the Prime Minister’s rep- a systemic problem.”10 The European Commission adds

6 Transparency International, “How Does Your Country Measure Up,” Corruption Perception Index 2019 (January 17, 2020): 2. 7 Lozan Panov, “Bulgarian Oligarchy.” 8 Lozan Panov, “Lozan Panov Received Strange SMS from the Prime Minister,” btvnovinite.bg, January 14, 2016, btvnovinite.bg/bulgaria/lozan-panov-poluchil-stranen-sms-za-janevagejt-ot-premiera.html. 9 Boiko Borisov, “A Voice Memo of Borisov, Naydenov and Kokinov Reveals Behind the Scenes in the State,” btvnovinite.bg, April 26, 2013, btvnovinite.bg/bulgaria/boiko-borisov-miroslav-naidenov-i-nikolai-kokinov-prihvanati-v-skandalen-razgovor.html. 10 European Court of Human Rights, “Systematic Problem with the Ineffectiveness of the Investigation in Bulgaria,” ECHR 070 (2015), hudoc.echr.coe.int/app/conversion/pdf/?library=ECHR&id=003-5027227-6176041&filename=003-5027227-6176041.pdf.

37 that “While this [citation from the ECtHR—author’s 3. Bulgarian Court System note] is obviously a matter affecting law enforcement as a whole, it is clear that the problems are rooted in The new Specialized Criminal Court was established 11 the prosecution and the judiciary.” The investigation is in 2010 by the same political majority in Parliament. led by the Prosecutor’s Office, so it is logical to look for Since, numerous legal analysis and legal opinions have problems in this institution in the first place. been released. Out of 2,200 judges in Bulgaria, 18 will be selected to solve the problems of terrorism, orga- The 2015 report of the GRECO to the Council of Eu- nized crime and governmental corruption. Thus, on rope on Bulgaria’s progress in the fight against corrup- the one hand, good European practices for establish- tion noted: “Overall, public confidence in the specialized ing an independent (including the rest of the prosecu- bodies and the criminal justice system remains low and tion) but reporting anti-corruption prosecutorial body the sense of impunity for perpetrators of corruption is were rejected without debate. On the other hand, 12 increased.” In the end of 2019, a selection procedure there are measures that have compelling reasons and for a new attorney general took place. Key journalists unclear reasons. In Austria and Romania, for example, from national media were fired because of their criti- where there are specialized prosecutor’s offices, cases cism of the newly selected attorney general and his pre- are heard by the general courts and not by specialized decessor, both supported by the Movement for Rights courts, specifically to avoid the encapsulation and focus and Freedoms and by Borisov’s government. of corruption pressure on a small number of judges.

What Should Be done? What Should Be Done? l Reduction of the attorney general’s power and ex- The Specialized Criminal Courts should be dissolved pansion of accountability and transparency with law and closed. enforcement as a whole—the Prosecution Office, po- lice departments, the National Security Agency. Summary l Amendment of the regime of release and account- ability of the attorney general through Constitu- First, we have a corrupt government and political class. tional amendments, even if this would change the Bulgaria is the most corrupt state in EU and one of the case law of the Court of Cassation. The lack of con- most corrupt in Europe. Second, we have authoritarian trol over the leadership of the prosecution leads to a Prosecutor’s office that has 7% of public trust and has lack of accountability of the institution itself, which is shown no results in the fight against corruption. dangerous for the democratic model and rule of law in the country. Third, we receive European funds that make the ma- fia even stronger and expand its economic and political l The prosecutor’s office should be open to external power. monitoring and evaluation by anyone concerned. It is necessary to publish timely activity reports, to pro- Finally, we have populism that claims to resolve the vide a wide range of information upon citizen’s re- problem if we spend more money on its programs and quests, and to initiate public presentations and dis- projects. If we want to establish effective social cohe- cussions by the prosecutor’s office. sion and social justice, we have to build a state based on rule of law and to save democracy. The first step in l Provisions should be made for a constitutionally de- that direction should be the reform of the Prosecutor’s fined regime for investigating the attorney general Office and the judiciary. in case of reasonable suspicion of a crime. The body investigating the actions of the attorney general should be independent from him and not subordi- nate to what is currently the responsibility of the GSP prosecutors.

11 European Commission, “Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on Progress in Bulgaria under the Co-operation and Verification Mechanism,” January 27, 2016: 6, ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2016/EN/1-2016-40-EN-F1-1.PDF. 12 Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption (GRECO), “GRECO Report on Bulgaria,” Council of Europe, May 13, 2015, www.coe.int/en/web/portal/news-2015/-/asset_publisher/9k8wkRrYhB8C/content/greco-report-on-bulgaria?_101_INSTANCE_9k8wkRrYhB8C_.

38 References:

Borisov, Boiko. “A Voice Memo of Borisov, European Commission. “Report from the Panov, Lozan. “If the Bulgarian Oligarchy Naydenov and Kokinov Reveals Behind Commission to the European Parliament Has a State, Then Any Attempt to Put the Scenes in the State.” btvnovinite.bg, and the Council on Progress in Bulgaria Power Back into the Hands of Citizens April 26, 2013, btvnovinite.bg/bulgaria/ under the Co-operation and Verification Can Really Be Called a Coup.” Mediapool. boiko-borisov-miroslav-naidenov-i- Mechanism.” January 27, 2016, p. 6, bg, December 11, 2015. nikolai-kokinov-prihvanati-v-skandalen- ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/ www.mediapool.bg/ako-oligarhiyata- razgovor.html rep/1/2016/EN/1-2016-40-EN-F1-1.PDF. ima-darzhava-vseki-opit-vlastta-da- badevarnata-na-grazhdanite-mozhe-da- Council of Europe’s Group of States European Court of Human Rights. se-nareche-prevrat-news242986.html. against Corruption (GRECO). “Systematic Problem with the “GRECO Report on Bulgaria.” Council Ineffectiveness of the Investigation ———. “Lozan Panov Received Strange of Europe, May 13, 2015, www.coe. in Bulgaria.” ECHR 070 (2015), SMS from the Prime Minister.” int/en/web/portal/news-2015/-/ hudoc.echr.coe.int/app/conversion/ btvnovinite.bg, January 14, 2016. asset_publisher/9k8wkRrYhB8C/ pdf/?library=ECHR&id=003- btvnovinite.bg/bulgaria/lozan-panov- content/greco-report-on-bulgaria?_101_ 5027227-6176041&filena poluchil-stranen-sms-za-janevagejt-ot- INSTANCE_9k8wkRrYhB8C_. me=003-5027227-6176041.pdf. premiera.html. Dogan, Ahmed. “The Power Is in European Parliament. “The Cost of Ritter, Daniel. The Iron Cage of My Hands.” June 25, 2009, YouTube Non-Europe in the Area of Organized Liberalism: International Politics and video, 2:00. www.youtube.com/ Crime and Corruption.” Annex Unarmed Revolutions in the Middle East watch?v=CsPSl5PKwxM. II – Corruption (March 2016): 42, and North Africa. Oxford University www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/ Press, 2014. European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF). etudes/STUD/2016/579319/EPRS_ “The OLAF Report 2017 - Eighteenth STU(2016)579319_EN.pdf Report of the European Anti-Fraud Office, 1 January to 31 December 2017.” European Commission (October 5, 2018): 41.

Lyubomir Avdjiiski is the executive director of the Center for Monitoring of Justice. He is a co-founder and member of the Initiative Committee of the Justice for All Initiative, 2015-2017, as well as a former member of the executive board of the Da, Bulgaria Movement and coordinator of the Justice Department within the Movement. Lyubomir had also been a legal expert at the Institute for Market Economics and a member of the Civil Council to the Supreme Judicial Council. He is author of more than 70 analyses and articles on the topics of judicial reform and the General Prosecutor’s Office in Bulgaria and Romania.

39 EMPATHY, DELIBERATION, AND DEMOCRACY IN PRESENT-DAY Bulgarian SOCIETY?

Julia Stefanova

y area of expertise and research is in literature Feeling, Thinking and Deliberation.1 When I put a ques- (mainly English and American), literary history tion mark at the end of my title, quite spontaneously by Mand theory, communication, and such stuff, the way, I suddenly thought of the four question marks which means that it has a lot of touch-points with the that Vassil Levski, our great national hero of the second theme of my paper, even though I do not have a degree in half of the 19th century, put after the word “Narode” sociology or psychology. Last but by far not least, I boast (My people) at the end of his famous notebook. Schol- decades of action-packed existential experience, which ars, historians, biographers, and writers still ponder on so far has given me myriad opportunities to empathise, their meaning. The meaning of my question mark is far deliberate, advocate and even practice democracy, for less enigmatic. I am a democrat by instinct and by conviction. In more general terms, I find the theme interesting (it has pro- What does the word or term “empathy” stand for? A voked much scholarly interest lately), significant, topical, personality predisposition, a talent we are born with even urgent, especially with regard to democracy. and may have inherited; a learned skill or a social value? The word “empathy” is derived from the ancient Greek I hope you will agree with me that today democracy is “empatheia,” i.e. physical affection or passion; as a term in a state of crisis worldwide. One of the slogans of the in psychology it appeared for the first time in 1908 in global wave of protest against climate change is “Cli- the works of the American experimental psychologist mate crisis=Democratic Crisis.” The express targets of Edward Tichener as a translation of the German term the protesters are world leaders and politicians and Einfuhlung (feeling into, as opposed to sympathy—feel- their lack of concern about the future of our planet ing for). The opposite of empathy is alexithymia, i.e. a and the whole of humankind. Democracy, very broadly deficiency in understanding, processing or describing and idealistically speaking, is about living harmoni- emotions in oneself or the others, a total lack of emo- ously together, doing things together, acknowledging tional intelligence. one another’s equal rights and freedoms, all for the common good. Herein lies the intrinsic connection be- There is a famous statement in the Gospel of Matthew tween democracy, empathy and deliberation, as I will based on Christ’s teaching which could easily be as- attempt to show. sociated with empathy: “Therefore all things whatso- ever ye would/ that men should do to you; do ye even The title of my paper “Empathy, Deliberation, and De- so to them.”2 This is known as the Golden Rule and is mocracy in Present-Day BG Society?” carries overtones also found in Hinduism, the Old Testament and Confu- of the title of an excellent book written by Michael Mor- cianism. In Confucius it is “Don’t do unto others what rell and published in 2010: Empathy and Democracy: you don’t want done unto you.” The Golden Rule is an

1 Michael Morrell, Empathy and Democracy: Feeling, Thinking and Deliberation, (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2010). 2 Matthew 7:12.

40 important moral precept, a code of social behaviour 3. Peyo Yavorov, “Armenians,” 1896 which instructs us to desist from harm, as in Confu- cius, but also to work for the good of others, as in the Изгнаници клети, отломка нищожна Gospel of Matthew. от винаги храбър народ мъченик, дечица на майка робиня тревожна Literature is an endless source of empathy. It teaches и жертви на подвиг чутовно велик – empathy and even requires empathy, for its effect re- далеч от родина, в край чужди събрани, lies heavily on what Coleridge calls “suspension of dis- изпити и бледни, в порутен бордей, belief” and the ability of the reader to empathise with те пият, а тънат сърцата им в рани, the character, the author, the story. A good example of и пеят, тъй както през сълзи се пей. this is catharsis in Greek tragedy (a term coined by Ar- istotle in his Poetics) which means purification, a purga- Wretched exiles, rare survivors tion of emotions, particularly pity and fear through art, Of a brave and martyr race through empathising with the tragic heroes. Another Children of a captive mother example, much more recent, is the remarkable chapter Heroes with no resting place. 17 (part 1) of ’s Under the Yoke entitled “The Far from home in squalid hovels Performance” which depicts the performance of The Sick and pale from lack of sleep. Life and Death of Long-Suffering Genoveva by Ludwig See them drink to drown their sorrows Tieck. Hear them sing and, singing, weep!

In literary criticism there is a notion “affective fallacy” [No translator credited] used to evaluate a literary work on the basis of the emotional response of the reader. Some authors, espe- cially poets, are more empathetic than others, i.e. some 4. Nikola Vaptsarov, “Report,” 1940 are better able to identify with what they describe. The English romantic poet John Keats calls them “chame- ...... leon poets” as opposed to the poets of what he calls the Та аз съм просмукан от мъка “egotistical sublime.” In a letter to his friend Benjamin и чукам на вашата съвест Bailey of 1817 he says: “If a sparrow should come to my за нещо по-висше, което е вплетено window, I take part in its existence and pick about the в нашия спомен, gravel.”3 което гневно в гърдите напира, умира и пак се заражда I have chosen a few poetic examples of empathy from в сърцето и носи прекрасното име a miles-long list: Родина! ...... 1. John Donne, Meditation XVII, Devotions upon Emer- gent Occasions. 1624 Аз мисля, че първата капка, която от своята кръв за света ще пролея, No man is an island entire of itself; every man ще бъде за мойте поробени братя, is a piece of the continent, a part of the main; ще бъде за Нея! if a clod be washed away by the sea, Europe ...... is the less, as well as if a promontory were, as well as any manner of thy friends or of thine И тъй – към доклада. Докладвам направо – own were; any man’s death diminishes me, аз страдам! because I am involved in mankind. Но някой ще каже тогава: “Забравяш – And therefore never send to know for whom въпроса е толкова личен... the bell tolls; it tolls for thee. Ти можеш да страдаш,тъй както обичаш, но твоята мъка ще трогне малцина.” 2. John Keats, “Ode to a Nightingale,” stanza 1, 1819 Грешите – аз страдам за свойта Родина. Аз страдам за вас, и за себе си страдам... My heart aches, and a drowsy numbness pains My sense, as though of hemlock I had drunk, The above excerpts seem to raise the question of the dif- Or emptied some dull opiate to the drains ference between empathy and sympathy. Empathy and One minute past, and Lethe-wards had sunk: sympathy are quite close, even interchangeable terms, ‘Tis not through envy of thy happy lot, but not exactly identical. Empathy usually means under- But being too happy in thine happiness,— standing what others are feeling because you have expe- That thou, light-winged Dryad of the trees rienced the same or similar thing or you can put yourself In some melodious plot in their shoes. Poets can do it because by definition they Of beechen green, and shadows numberless, are more sensitive than others. They are like good ac- Singest of summer in full-throated ease. tors. Sympathy involves acknowledging another person’s

3 John Keats, Letters of John Keats: A New Selection, ed. Robert Gittings, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970).

41 emotional hardships, providing comfort and assurance, home in Florida, Makai had no idea he was about to get but not necessarily having experienced them. his own superhero welcome. As soon as he walked into his classroom, his three-year-old pre-school classmates The texts I have selected also illustrate the three types jumped up and began hugging him, telling him that they of empathy psychologists such as Daniel Goleman,4 missed him. All this shows that the roots of empathy Paul Ekman,5 Justin Baristo,6 and others speak about: can be found at a very early age and it can and should cognitive, emotional, and compassionate. Cognitive be developed as early as possible. Of course, this very empathy is the ability to understand how a person feels much depends on the parents and their motivation to and what they might be thinking (Armenians); emo- cultivate pro-social behaviour in their children. tional (affective) empathy is the ability to share the feelings of another person or identify with an object, From a biological or neurological point of view, empathy especially on an aesthetic basis, as in “Armenians” and resides in the amygdala (two almond-shaped clusters “Ode to a Nightingale.” Compassionate empathy (em- of neurons located in the two hemispheres of the brain) pathic concern or intellectual empathy) goes beyond and its connections with the visual zone of the cortex. simply understanding others and sharing their feelings. The amygdala is the temple of emotions and empathy. It actually moves us to take action, to help however we However, the doors of the temple will open and empa- can, it has to do with a sense of belonging, involvement thy will flow between people only when their bodies and and responsibility, as in the examples from the Gospel reactions are synchronized. Empathy requires calm and of Matthew, John Donne, and Nikola Vaptsarov. receptivity and only then can the subtle signals of oth- ers’ feelings be caught and imitated by our own emo- As I mentioned earlier, there is no definitive answer to tional brain. In other words, each one of us, humans, re- the question “what is empathy?” On the basis of sys- gardless of our racial, ethnic, anthropological or gender tematic experiments, however, psychologists and neu- characteristics are biologically capable of basic empa- rologists have arrived at the conclusion that the rudi- thy but, like any other ability or talent, it needs to be ments of empathy appear during the earliest stages consciously and systematically developed and cultivat- of growth, almost on the first day of birth. Infants get ed and ultimately brought to a higher, socially signifi- upset when they see or hear another baby crying. Ex- cant level, the level Donne or Vaptsarov speak about, perts say that young children are capable of empathy i.e. compassionate, intellectual, empathic concern. even before they are aware that they are independent human beings. Of course, this may be due to simple imi- Bulgarians are no exception to the generality of human- tation, even imitation of somebody else’s pain, but still kind. Like people in the rest of the world, we do have it is a rudimentary manifestation of empathy or what the biological mechanisms to be empathetic as well as psychologists call “motor mimicry.” You imitate the feel- the intellectual and cultural resources to develop empa- ings of somebody else so that you can feel the same. thy as a social value. However, few would disagree that we still have a long way to go before we fully accom- In Nietzsche’s book The Birth of Tragedy there is a state- plish this goal. On the other hand, it would be unfair to ment quite to the same effect: “Empathy with the soul say that Bulgarians are generally deficient in empathy, of others is originally nothing moral, but a physiologi- whether cognitive, emotional or compassionate. I am cal susceptibility to suggestion,” i.e. physical imitation. sure most of you can come up with dozens of examples In his Origin of Inequality, however, Rousseau assumes of empathy shown by Bulgarians on various occasions. that the moral sense is innate, i.e. we are born with “an There is even an annually updated Register of Worthy innate repugnance at seeing a fellow creature suffer.” Bulgarians available on the Internet where you can find This is compassion or what he calls “pitie.” hundreds of examples of ordinary men and women of all age groups and social backgrounds taking care of Contemporary neuropsychologists have established old people; men and women rescuing victims of acci- that at the age of two and a half or three motor mimic- dents and disasters, risking and sometimes even losing ry tends to disappear, i.e. at the time when children be- their lives; people donating money to cure sick children; come aware that they are different and the anxiety of financially helping very poor families, single mothers, old others is not their own. However, in contradiction to sci- men and women, especially during charity campaigns ence, a few weeks ago I saw a video of a very touching organized by the media around Christmas, Easter, New story on the Internet. A three-year-old boy was visiting Year and other holidays. A few weeks ago, I heard on TV family with his mother in the Bahamas when hurricane about a 13-year-old boy from who donated Dorian struck and they were stuck at the house of the all his savings amounting to 4000 leva to financially dis- boy’s grandmother. The house suffered heavy damage— advantaged families with children. He had received this the roof flew off but the boy was not in the least scared. sum from his family and relatives at his christening cere- At one point in the aftermath of the storm Makai (that mony. Yuli Alexandrov made an entirely independent de- was his name) put on his Spider Man life vest because cision to do this and thus helped 46 children. Yet another he wanted to help. “I am going to save the children in striking story happened a little more than a month ago the water,” he said to his mother. After returning to his in downtown Sofia. Street car No12 full of passengers

4 Daniel Goleman, Emotional Intelligence, (New York: Bantam Books, 1995). 5 Paul Ekman, Emotions Revealed: Recognizing Faces and Feelings to Improve Communication and Emotional Life, (New York: Times Books, 2003). 6 Justin Barista, EQ Applied: The Real-World Guide to Emotional Intelligence, (Borough Hall, 2018).

42 pulled up at a stop on Graf Ignatiev Street and suddenly disregard on the part of politicians and government it started moving backwards on the tracks. It turned out officials towards people with disabilities and parents that the driver had gotten off the tramcar to get her- of children with disabilities. The economic inequalities in self a cup of coffee and a snack but had forgotten to our very divided society may also be attributed to the activate the brake. A young man waiting at the tram unconcern of those in power who seem to live in a bub- stop saw what was happening and immediately jumped ble and only hypocritically pretend to care about the rest on the tramcar. As he himself admitted later during a of the people and our national interests. TV interview, he had never driven a street car in his life. Luckily for the passengers and the passers-by, he found It is no exaggeration to say that the picture is getting the brake and slammed it on so that the street car was darker and darker. My deep conviction is that the under- brought to a halt. What the young man did is an excel- lying reason for all these social abnormalities is the lack lent example of empathic concern (by the way he said of empathy practically at all levels. As I pointed out ear- that he did not consider himself a hero) and a total ab- lier, we all are born with the potential to be empathetic; sence of such concern on the part of the driver. empathy sprouts in us almost at birth but if it is not regularly watered and properly nourished, it will gradu- There are enough inspiring examples of empathy in our ally wither away and turn into its opposite, threatening history as well: heroes who sacrificed themselves for to destroy the entire society. a national cause such as Levski, Botev, the tragic he- roes of the April Uprising, the Bulgarian volunteers in A few months ago, while going through my collec- the Russo-Turkish Liberation War, the Balkan Wars, the tion of old books, I accidentally came upon a slender two World Wars, etc. An exceptional mass display of booklet entitled Oпит за психологически анализ на compassionate empathy was the rescue of the Bulgar- българския обществен живот7 (Essay on a Psycho- ian Jews in 1943 through a nationwide campaign. On logical Study of Bulgarian Public Life) by Dr. Nikola December 20, 1943, the 27-year-old Bulgarian air force Krastnikov, a well-known Bulgarian neurologist and officer Captain Dimiter Spisarevski crashed his plane psychiatrist from the first half the 20th century. It was into the leading bomber of the Allied forces and thus, published in 1922, i.e. 97 years ago, and republished in together with other Bulgarian pilots, prevented another 2008. The book offers a critical yet very accurate analy- major bombing of Sofia during the last phase of WWII. sis of the main traits and above all the flaws of the Bul- garian national character as manifested in public life. However, the general picture today is by far not so reas- Written by a doctor, the text reads like a diagnosis of a suring. Few would disagree that the examples of lack serious disease which requires long therapy but is not of empathy, of indifference and unconcern coming from incurable. The saddest thing about it, however, is that people from the whole spectrum of Bulgarian society it sounds almost 100% true when applied to the pres- are increasing at an alarming rate, and in many cases, ent-day situation. Let me summarize Dr. Krastnikov’s they stand in a cause-effect relationship with danger- main findings: 1) The development of the Bulgarian na- ous acts of violence, aggression and even murder. Over tion does not show symptoms of mental degeneracy, the last years or perhaps decades every single day we as is the case with other and older nations. On the con- have been assaulted by media reports of rapes, mur- trary, the mental development of the Bulgarians shows ders and various forms of domestic violence—men (less symptoms of underdevelopment; 2) The Bulgarians frequently women) beating, sometimes to death, their possess energy, intelligence and common sense, but spouses or partners. According to a recent survey, every their predominant concerns are materialistic; they are third or fourth woman in Bulgaria has been a victim of mainly focused on material possessions and private domestic violence, including rape and murder; only last property; 3) The Bulgarians are very family-oriented year, in 2018, thirty-four women in Bulgaria, whose pop- people, but this is a social feeling with a relatively small ulation is now below seven million, have officially report- scope which needs to be broadened to incorporate the ed domestic violence. Animus Foundation reports 20 larger community; 4) Bulgarians are hard-working, more cases. For comparison, the number of such women but their motivation to work hard seems to stem from in Spain is 47 (pop. 50M); 123 in France (pop. 67M) and their strong attachment to their families and prop- 145 in Italy (pop. 60M). Reckless driving resulting in fatal erty. Collective work or work for a public purpose is crashes is another manifestation of unconcern (we top not attractive to most of them because their collec- the list of deaths on the road in the EU: 64 dead per one tive sense is not well developed. (This can be explained million against an average of 20 in the EU). The list goes by historical reasons: angaria –unpaid work during the on with examples of abusive behaviour on various occa- Ottoman rule; state-enforced voluntary work under sions and in various places, including the Bulgarian Par- socialism; total reliance on and distrust of the state); liament; total disrespect for seniors and school teach- 5) Bulgarians are typically driven by self-love, ambition ers; criminal neglect of patients by doctors (a shocking and vanity. These traits are cognate with slander, envy example is the recent murder of the seven-year-old girl (the most disgusting of them all), cruelty, arrogance, in the village of Sotirya who allegedly was not given greed, lust for power, and lack of compassion (em- proper first aid by the doctor from the emergency unit pathy), especially among educated people and politi- and was left to die); intolerance and hostility towards cians (the intelligentsia). According to Krastnikov these ethnic and other minorities (this is reciprocal-though); negative characteristics originate in an undeveloped,

7 Никола Кръстников, Опит за психологически анализ на българския обществен живот, второ издание, (Велико Търново: Надежда, 2008).

43 not decayed, moral sense. In public life the absence of Then follows a long list of examples of hotel owners moral sense (conscience) underlies corruption and the and restaurant managers treating their tourists in a use of political power (joining a party) for personal disappointing manner. All this sounds painfully familiar. enrichment rather than for the public good. A person And in the end: “This greed cannot be the work of good with a moral sense is good, gentle, emotional, calm, citizens, who do not think about the here and the now simple, loyal, trusting, hardworking, concerned. In one alone. It comes from selfish and mindless people who word, he/she possesses empathy. This is what Homo do not care about the future, who do not give a damn empathicus is like. Empathy in public life (of the third about tomorrow, who do not take into account that kind) is synonymous with social feelings or social emo- with what they do, they create a bad impression on the tions. Krastnikov argues that Bulgarians are deficient tourists whose number will most likely decrease during in social feelings or their social feelings are also unde- the next season. Who is going to be the loser then? Ap- veloped. This explains why public opinion is weak, peo- parently, those who are mindless and greedy.” The years ple are generally indifferent, passive, and prefer to stay are 1925 and 1937. with the status quo rather than “take arms against a sea of troubles and by opposing end them” as Hamlet A couple of months ago I came upon a sociological says. What is more, they tend to violate or disregard survey on Bulgarian values conducted by sociologists the law, whereas politicians and parties typically put from the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences for the pe- their own interests above the national interests. riod 2016-2019. Originally, the purpose of the project was to establish the reasons why the share of the grey Disposition to the higher social emotions can be inher- economy is so high in Bulgaria—30%—and why the level ited, but when there is little or nothing to inherit, they of tolerance regarding the shadow economy is so high. should be developed from an early stage. The survey showed that 81% of Bulgarians put mate- rialistic concerns before their priorities—accumulation Regarding the development of social feelings (emphat- of money, capital, property, material possessions. This ic concern), Krastnikov is quite sceptical about his own goes hand in hand with a fairly lenient attitude towards generation and the adults of his time. However, he is violation of law; 61% of the respondents acknowledge optimistic about the younger generation and sees the that they are inclined to break the law or try to find cure in education, more particularly in emotional edu- ways to get around it, if this will help them fulfil their cation. Sad as it may sound, today, 97 years later, I am materialistic goals. more than inclined to say that I, too, am quite sceptical about the adult generations (Baby Boomers and Gen- Dr. Krastnikov makes a very important point which is eration X) but much more hopeful about the younger totally relevant today, namely that a high IQ has noth- ones (GenY and Z). What happened to evolution? Let ing to do with EQ. Moral emotions, empathy of the me give two more, no less telling, examples. This year, three kinds, are not connected with intellectual devel- according to official statistics, the number of tourists, opment and vice–versa. Through perseverance and especially foreign tourists, has dropped by more than hard work adults with a certain amount of intelligence 10%., i.e. we have lost about 100,000 visitors. The rea- may achieve remarkable results, but this does not make son given by the Bulgarian Ministry of Tourism is the them emotionally mature and socially aware. The child’s increased competition from Greece, , Egypt, Mo- soul is the best soil for sowing the seeds of empathy rocco, and other destinations. This may be true but is that may last a lifetime. Adults are capable of acquir- by far not the whole truth. A significant portion of the ing some knowledge and mastering certain rules and truth is contained in the numerous comments, more skills, but in many cases, they will apply them mechani- precisely complaints, from tourists visiting Bulgaria: cally or out of necessity, not genuinely. Empathy as a high prices, especially when matched to the quality social feeling may develop to become a national feeling, of food and services at hotels, restaurants, beaches, a sense of belonging to a nation, and rise even higher— public transport, etc. The majority of the interviewees empathy with other nations and concern for the world declare that next year they would rather go to Greece, as a whole. A good example is the global movement Turkey, or elsewhere. for the protection of the environment and combating climate change led by Greta Thunberg, a teenage girl A few weeks ago, I read an intriguing article on the In- from Sweden. ternet entitled: “About our Native Resorts in Past Con- tinuous Tense: We Are Greedy, We Are Insatiable.” The Today, in the age of the Internet, the information del- title is borrowed from a comment made by a Bulgarian uge and the onslaught of artificial intelligence, we need tourist and published in a newspaper in August 1937 more than ever, and before it is too late, a major and a (82 years ago): “It’s all because we are Bulgarians, the genuine overhaul of our educational policies, including Bulgarians from Aleko’s Bai Ganyo... We were not born a strong emphasis on emotional education enhancing to make money in an honest way. Because we want to empathy, enhancing higher social emotions and civic grab it all now. We are greedy, we are insatiable.” In a consciousness. It is sad that Dr. Krastnikov’s analysis much earlier issue of Varnenski vestnik (Varna News- makes so much sense today. He is critical but not pessi- paper) from 1925 one reads: “It pains us to acknowl- mistic, especially with regard to the younger generation edge that those Bulgarian citizens who benefit directly and the role of education. His observations on the na- from the tourists have not gotten rid of their vanity and tional character may not be universally valid for all Bul- greed and resort to outrageous forms of exploitation.” garians; they may be generation-specific; e.g. they may

44 not apply to the millennials, just like Bai Ganyo is not the ings: 1) long and careful consideration or discussion as Bulgarian genotype or a group photo of all Bulgarians. in the sentence “After much deliberation we arrived at The narrator of his adventures in Europe is also Bulgar- a compromise”; and 2) slow and careful movement or ian, but of a different breed. Empathy can be taught in thought as in the sentence “He opened the box placed the family, in the kindergarten and at school. There are by someone on the table with deliberation.” In other certain good examples, like the Empathy Club for pre- words, deliberation is about the thoughtful weighing school children opened in 2015 by Dr. Nadie Karagyo- of options helped by reason, logic and care, and does zova in Kubrat or the Kids Academy of Good Manners present an important stage in formulating intentions, established by Nevena Basarova-Dicheva. However, making choices (including voting) or taking decisions. these are still isolated examples, on a small scale, and Viewed in a narrow context, deliberation is typically mainly in the bigger towns and cities. What we need is used in legal settings by a jury (in countries with a jury a critical mass of such institutions and programs not system) before they arrive at an appropriate verdict, only in elite schools and institutions targeting children weighing carefully all arguments and information pro- of relatively well-off and educated families. The big vided by the plaintiff and the defendant. An excellent goal is to reverse the negative trend of the gradual ex- example of deliberation by a jury is the 1957 American tinction of Homo Empathicus in favour of the rise of movie “12 Angry Men.” Homo Insensatus. It is equally important that there is an effective synergy between educational institutions Deliberation is also used in decision-making concerning and institutions at the government and municipal levels public matters at a city, municipal and national level. which are expected to organize prevention and exercise The discussions usually involve participants with diver- strict control. gent political, ideological, scientific or other views. Rem- brandt’s famous painting of 1636 “The City Council of The absence of empathy is a serial killer. Last year on the the Hague” is an excellent illustration of a model discus- road to the town of Svoge over 20 innocent and decent sion. The faces of the participants exude calm, concern, people died because someone had made money by not dignity and good will. I wonder how a Bulgarian artist using the right material for the road asphalt; the fire on would depict a deliberating city council or Parliament in August 14 under Highway 79 can easily be explained by Bulgaria today or earlier. lack of concern for the others—drivers, pedestrians, peo- ple breathing polluted air, etc. The killers of the young In the world of politics and policy, public life in general women Victoria and Veronika, and the seven-year-old girl deliberation is usually associated with decision-making, Kristin were persons with prior criminal records. Howev- voting and political equality, although the latter seem er, no control whatsoever was exercised over them after to be a somewhat different value. According to James they were released from prison; no effort whatsoever Fishkin, a scholar with a substantial contribution to the was made to reintegrate them through education, work theory of deliberation, deliberative polling and delibera- and psychological counselling. These are shocking exam- tive democracy, political equality involves equal consid- ples of total unconcern for the others. eration of everyone’s preferences, i.e. everyone has the same voting power with or without deliberation.8 De- Whatever empathy may be, one thing about it is cer- liberation is the weighing of competing considerations tain: it is a key element of communication, whether through discussion. Fishkin distinguishes between five interpersonal, intrapersonal or intercultural. It has to types of deliberation: do mainly with the emotions, with sensibility, with the amygdala; nonetheless, it is not totally dissociated from 1) informed—arguments are supported by claims based reason, from sense, especially the third kind—compas- on accurate facts; 2) balanced—arguments are met by sionate, intellectual, pro-social empathy which works contrary arguments; 3) conscientious—participants are in cooperation with reason. Actually, what works more willing to talk and listen with civility and respect; 4) sub- with reason is the second item of discussion today—de- stantive—arguments should be considered sincerely on liberation. their merits, not how they are made or who is making them; 5) comprehensive—all points of view held by sig- In a broad sense, deliberation is another important nificant portions of the population should receive atten- characteristic of communication. Similar to empathy, it tion. These criteria are relatively undemanding and do is inherent as long as we are born with the capacity to not require any special style or quality of thought. Delib- reason, to reflect and use logic, just as we are born with eration seems attainable. In representative or indirect the capacity to speak a certain language. But similar to democracy (the most common type in Europe and the empathy, it needs to be cultivated through education US, including Bulgaria) the politicians and legislators and training. The obvious connection between empathy elected by the people are often less deliberative than and deliberation is that they both relate to our attitude the wider public because they are constrained by their towards others—whether these are family members, constituencies and parties, whereas the public is freer friends and relatives, co-workers, or politicians, espe- from such constraints and can alter their views easily. cially political or ideological opponents, groups, par- But the wider public typically knows little about politics ties. “Deliberation” as a noun has two general mean- and this shows in conventional polling based on random

8 James Fishkin, “Deliberative Polling,” in The Oxford Handbook of Deliberative Democracy, ed. by Andre Bächtiger et al., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).

45 sampling. Conventional polling pioneered by George to the Constitution, as well as making the chief prose- Gallup serves political equality because it involves sim- cutor more responsible and accountable to Parliament. ple random sampling by lot, but there is very little delib- Before the polling only 48% were in favour of this solu- eration in it. The typical respondent has barely thought tion. In 2007 a second deliberative poll was organized about the question before being interviewed and can in Sofia on policies regarding the Roma in Bulgaria by call on very little relevant information. As Fishkin points the Center for Liberal Strategies, the Bulgarian Na- out, the off-the-top-of-the-head answers sociologists tional Television, Alpha Research and other NGOs. It get from interviewees “reflect normal, everyday levels turned out to be another very useful event establish- of inattention and disengagement.” How could the level ing a good civic practice. The question is how many of of deliberation be raised if not for the whole public, at the ideas, suggestions, conclusions have been taken least for a random sample thereof? Fishkin’s answer into consideration by our policy makers. The Bulgarian is through what he calls deliberative polling, which is Debate Association is doing a lot of useful work in this at the basis of so-called deliberative democracy. To regard by providing training and national contests, and quote him again, “Deliberative polling exposes random organizing events for young people, students and pupils samples to balanced information encouraging them to from all over the country. The Fulbright Commission is weigh opposing arguments in discussions and then har- also part of this initiative by supporting the Bulgarian vesting their more considered opinions.” This method English Language Speech and Debate (BEST) Tourna- seems to cater at once to political equality and delib- ments. eration. Political equality stems from random polling (every citizen has a chance to participate); deliberation Deliberative democracy is about making more mem- lies in the learning, thinking and talking that distinguish bers of the public knowledgeable, about making public deliberative polls from conventional ones. This solution opinion better informed and better founded. It encour- of combining political equality and deliberation is as old ages talking to one another, considering diverse points as antiquity and goes back to ancient Athens, where of view; identifying issues and values, sparking new deliberative microcosms of several hundred citizens ideas, making decisions. In short, it is about educat- chosen by lot made key decisions. What, very briefly, ing citizens; like any other concept or idea, deliberative does deliberative polling entail? It starts with drawing democracy has been subject to various critiques. What and interviewing a random sample. Those agreeing to are the main objections? The three main objections ac- participate are sent carefully balanced briefing materi- cording to Fishkin are: 1) defeatist, i.e. deliberation is als laying out the major arguments for and against cer- impossible, the public is too confused, inconsistent and tain policy proposals. They provide the starting point for ignorant, not worth consulting about policy issues; 2) the discussion. The participants are then brought to a extenuationist, i.e. deliberation is unnecessary, a waste single site for the deliberations, typically lasting a week- of time; 3) alarmist, i.e. deliberation is harmful. It can be end. The deliberations alternate between discussions in done but can alter preferences for the worse. Certain randomly assigned small groups and putting questions groups and their preferences are advantaged in public to panels of experts and policy makers in plenary ses- discussion. Within discussion groups majorities tend to sions. The small groups are led by trained moderators become larger and opinions more extreme. who maintain an atmosphere of civility and mutual re- spect. The panellists in the plenary sessions respond to All three critiques may have reasonable grounds but the questions formed in the small groups. The answers my conviction is that deliberative democracy is a very of the panellists are often debatable and therefore it good thing. True, it is hard to achieve, yet not altogether is important that the panellists represent a balanced impossible and therefore well worth trying. The more set of perspectives. Then the participants answer ques- people are exposed to it, the better. What is even better tions about their views before the event and again at than deliberative democracy, however, is a democracy the end of the deliberation. in which there is a balance between empathy and delib- eration, i.e. between sense and sensibility. Deliberative The Center for Deliberative Democracy at Stanford Uni- and empathetic democracy as opposed to aggrega- versity, whose director is Professor James Fishkin, has tive and antagonistic democracy is infinitely better but organized dozens of deliberative pollings and events in equally hard to attain. It is almost an ideal because how cooperation with local NGOs and research centers in can minorities empathise with majorities, how can you many countries in the world, e.g. Australia, Ireland, Den- achieve equal consideration for all? Deliberation expos- mark, China, Greece, UK, Italy, USA, including Bulgaria. es citizens to a variety of viewpoints and the opportu- nity to weigh them fairly and be attentive. Empathetic In 2002 Bulgaria was the site of the first national de- democracy encourages people to listen with respect liberative polling in Eastern Europe. A sample of 281 and understanding to one another, to communicate ef- Bulgarian citizens deliberated on the national issue of fectively, to compromise, to avoid conflict and to reach crime. It turned out that after the event many partici- legitimate decisions that take into account everyone’s pants altered their views: 93% stated that they learned view point. a lot during those two days; three-fourths of them stated that the debate helped them clarify their own The question that interests me more, however, is to positions on how to combat crime. Sixty-nine percent what extent, if at all, all this is applicable to our brand of the respondents came to the informed conclusion of democracy, the Bulgarian brand, to democracy the that the issue could be resolved through amendments Bulgarian way. I do not want to sound defeatist, to

46 use Fishkin’s categorizations, but I have to admit that absent or only demagogically or rhetorically referred to. I have serious reservations about the feasibility of de- Thus, the main goal of persuasion in an election cam- liberative and empathetic democracy in Bulgaria today, paign is to differentiate one alternative from another. judging by the specific features of Bulgarian democracy All this is a common flaw of representative and aggre- and the way government functions here. gative democracy in general. Today there is a general disillusionment with democracy and small wonder that The British business corporation Economist Intelligence it is under attack today practically all over the globe. Unit assesses annually the state of world democracy in 165 independent states and two territories on the ba- The present situation in Bulgaria is not an exception, sis of five categories—political pluralism, electoral pro- but to my mind there are at least three additional, cesses, civil liberties, functioning of government, politi- typically Bulgarian factors, that seem to account for cal participation and political culture. Depending on the the faulty performance of our native brand of democ- scores on 60 indicators within these categories, each racy: 1) Democracy as it started to unfold after 1989 country is then classified as one of four types of regime: found us unprepared. A similar thing happened after full democracy, flawed democracy, hybrid regime and the liberation from the five-centuries-long Ottoman authoritarian regime. In 2018 the Top Five full democra- domination in 1878, which had severed us from Europe cies were: Norway, Iceland, Sweden, New Zealand and and its cultural evolution. However, in two or three de- Denmark; the bottom five were: Chad, Central African cades Bulgarians, highly motivated to catch up with Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Syria, and Europe, made Brobdingnanian steps forward and per- North Korea. Bulgaria is a flawed democracy and occu- formed miracles in culture, education, and even tech- pies 46th place on the list of 167 countries—a little above nology. The political culture of the public must have the middle. The good news is that we are categorized been lower than the 2010 EU index, yet the seeds of as democracy, albeit flawed, and our general score is democracy were sown and did bear fruit, albeit inter- 7.03 out of 10, while countries like Turkey (a hybrid re- mittently. After the establishment of the totalitarian gime—something between authoritarian regime and regime in 1944 lasting close to half a century, Bulgaria flawed democracy), Macedonia, Serbia, Romania, Po- was for the second time torn away from Europe and land and Hungary are slightly behind us. The worrying European civilization and everything that goes with it. news is that nothing has changed since 2006; in 2015 Small wonder that the Big Change in 1989 found us we scored higher—7.1—and have been going down ever unprepared and undeveloped, to use Krastnikov’s ter- since. This year we are at the level of 2008, although we minology again. 2) The second and very important fac- joined EU in 2007, i.e. 11 years ago. Besides, our low- tor is that in 1989 democracy was introduced in large est score is on political culture. Of course these are only part by the same members of the ruling communist numbers, figures and fractions. Statistical data are a nomenklatura and their henchmen—state security useful and important tool of analysis and assessment, agents, turncoats, would-be democrats, and clueless but they can hardly show the real picture, the way we but greedy opportunists. They had no idea of empathy, perceive, feel or think about reality. Technically speak- sympathy, to say nothing of deliberation. The most ing, we do meet the requirements for representative shocking example of a total absence of social empa- democracy common in most countries in Europe and thy, of criminal unconcern on the part of the socialist the US: political pluralism (138 political parties, 66 of government for the Bulgarian nation was the way they which have registered for the oncoming local elections); covered up the truth about the Chernobyl disaster. As division of legislative, executive and legal power; peri- for democracy, these people did not understand it, nor odic parliamentary elections. did they bother to understand it, although they did like and still do like some of its advantages which operate According to the leading American political sociologist in a capitalist context—private property, wealth, free Larry Diamond, democracy has four key components: market, mobility, the pursuit of happiness etc; 3) The 1) a political system for choosing and replacing govern- third factor which derives from the first two is that ment through free and fair elections; 2) active partici- democracy in Bulgaria is to a large extent simulated, pation of the people as citizens in politics and civic life; fake, sham—“shamocracy,” as the buzz word goes. We 3) protection of human rights; and 4) rule of law.9 The are anxious to catch up with Europe and the West as present type of representative democracy common in fast as possible, borrowing or imitating foreign mod- many countries, including Bulgaria, is also termed “ag- els and methods. This is okay and in a lot of cases it gregative” because it relies on an aggregation of inter- works fine, but quite often the transfer is done ina ests and bargaining. It does not preclude deliberation, mechanically, superficial and indiscriminate manner, debates and exchange of arguments and even changes without much deliberation. I do not want to underrate of initial positions. The big difference is that in aggrega- the genuine gains of democracy—relative freedom, tive democracy people form their positions on the basis free, easy and fast access to incredible amounts of of personal interest. Parties create their platforms to information because of globalization and the revolu- respond to the private interests of their circle of con- tion in information technology, mobility, ample supply stituencies. The universal values, general national in- of consumer goods and supplies. All of this is real and terests, and arguments based on justice are normally genuine. Yet many things are not genuine.

9 Larry Diamond, “What Is Democracy,” lecture, Hilla University for Humanistic Studies, January 21, 2004, diamond-democracy.stanford.edu/speaking/lectures/what-democracy.

47 For example, on paper we do have a division of power— we can proudly say that we have accumulated a criti- legal, executive, legislative—and the respective institu- cal mass (not mess) of people: educated, informed, tions which are supposed to be independent, but in ac- competent, honest, responsible, concerned, (i.e. em- tual fact, they are not. Few would disagree that it is the pathetic, deliberative, and pro-social) who will at long executive power, i.e. the Council of Ministers and whoever last set things right. I would also like to go back to stands or sits behind the scenes, that pull the strings. On the beginning, echoing Dr. Krastnikov, and say that I paper there is freedom of expression—speech, and press, am sceptical about the present adult generations but the media—but we all know what happened at the Bul- I am optimistic about the younger ones. Looking for- garian National Radio recently. Too bad to be true. In the ward to the future, I will turn back again to the Rev- traditional ranking of Reporters without Borders we oc- erend John Donne and his perfect summing up of ev- cupy 111th place in terms of freedom of speech and press erything that I’ve been trying to say or imply with so and media, which is much lower than in 2008 and 2010. many words: It appears that we are more anxious to get approving pats on the back by the big brothers than look after our No man is an island entire of itself; every man own national interests; it looks as if we do not have a is a piece of the continent, a part of the main; genuine interest in ourselves and in others like us. This if a clod be washed away by the sea, Europe means that we lack both empathy and deliberative skills. is the less, as well as if a promontory were, as As for the latter, the ongoing election campaign provides well as any manner of thy friends or of thine ample proof that we are still far from where we should own were; any man’s death diminishes me, be—no serious and constructive debates and discussions because I am involved in mankind. about what is good and what is bad for everyone, not And therefore never send to know for whom just for the parties and their followers. Instead, what we the bell tolls; it tolls for thee. are seeing is an endless flow of highfalutin words, empty promises, inflated statistics, attacks, abuses, dirt, false However, with Brexit breathing down our necks, this information, scandals, etc. brilliant piece of thought and language sounds some- what ironic. It looks like the bell may toll for Britain. So, to cut a long and sad story short, I would like to But, in the final account, we should be more concerned reemphasize the importance of being earnest (and about ourselves and our being a part of Europe and ev- honest) about education so that in the final account erything valuable that we believe it still stands for.

References:

Barista, Justin. EQ Applied: The Real- Fishkin, James. “Deliberative Polling.” Morrell, Michael. Empathy and World Guide to Emotional Intelligence. In The Oxford Handbook of Deliberative Democracy: Feeling, Thinking and Borough Hall, 2018). Democracy, ed. by Andre Bächtiger et al. Deliberation. University Park, PA: Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. Pennsylvania State University Press, Diamond, Larry. “What Is Democracy,” 2010. lecture, Hilla University for Humanistic Goleman, Daniel. Emotional Intelligence. Studies, January 21, 2004. New York: Bantam Books, 1995. Кръстников, Никола. Опит за diamond-democracy.stanford.edu/ психологически анализ на speaking/lectures/what-democracy. Keats, John. Letters of John Keats: A българския обществен живот, второ New Selection, ed. Robert Gittings. издание. Велико Търново: Надежда, Ekman, Paul. Emotions Revealed: Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970. 2008. Recognizing Faces and Feelings to Improve Communication and Emotional Life. New York: Times Books, 2003).

Julia Stefanova has extensive experience as a Sofia University professor, researcher, translator, educator and manager. She holds a doctoral degree in English literature. Her numerous publications in English and Bulgarian are in the field of English literature of the 18th century and Romanticism, literary theory, interna- tional education and liberal education. As a recipient of a Fulbright award, she taught , literature and culture at the University of California in Los Angeles. Dr. Stefanova is the founding executive director of the Bulgarian-American Commission for Educational Exchange and managed the Fulbright pro- gram in Bulgaria from 1993 to 2014. Currently, she is a member of the Fulbright Commission Board.

48 Reflections on Social Inclusion

Maya Tcholakova

Abstract: This paper builds on the ideas and examples How To Understand Social Inclusion? developed in the brainstorming session on social in- clusion campaigns, but goes further by describing the Social inclusion is a complex notion and must be dealt author’s thoughts on Bulgarian specificity in the years with carefully. Social inclusion is on the policy agenda of transition to the present day in addressing socio- worldwide, but it does not have a one-size-fits-all defi- cultural challenges and social inclusion. Inspired by nition. It is often used interchangeably with the terms the motto of empathy, the paper does not focus on “inclusion” and “integration” which can be found in both the policies and legislation that promote and support political documents and scholarly publications. Most inclusion. Instead, it tries to highlight only a few ex- often, social inclusion is seen as the opposite of social amples of social inclusion/exclusion that illustrate how exclusion. This is true insofar as social inclusion relates much it depends on the attitudes and beliefs, on the to a positive action designed and implemented to over- understanding of the human needs for acceptance come the effects of social exclusion. As Dimova put it,2 and care, and on humility. “social inclusion is a leitmotif of the social policies of all European countries, due to the awareness that the so- Introduction cial exclusion of large masses of people from the areas of work and social life has become an explosive factor.”

nstead of the traditional introduction, I will start with Among various interpretations, social exclusion is de- the words of Diane Richler, the past president of In- fined as “a process whereby certain individuals are Iclusion International: “Inclusion is not a strategy to pushed to the edge of society and prevented from par- help people fit into the systems and structures which ticipating fully by virtue of their poverty, or lack of basic exist in our society; it is about transforming those sys- competencies and lifelong learning opportunities, or as tems and structures to make it better for everyone. In- a result of discrimination. This distances them from job, clusion is about creating a better world for everyone.”1 income and education opportunities as well as social To make the world better for everyone depends not only and community networks and activities. They have little on political activity and economic realities, but also on access to power and decision-making bodies and thus the attitudes and actions of civil society, various com- often feel powerless and unable to take control over the munities and each individual citizen. Problem solving decisions that affect their day-to-day lives.”3 goes through the frank recognition and formulation of the problem, sincere commitment to finding solutions, Based on the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the and taking small steps towards solving major social European Union, social inclusion is defined as having the problems through the lens of personal responsibility opportunities and resources to participate fully in eco- and participation. nomic, social and cultural life and to enjoy a standard

1 Home Page, Commit to Inclusion, www.committoinclusion.org. 2 Dushka Dimova and Ivaylo Kusev, Social Policy and Social Activities. Analyses, Essays, and Technologies (Sofia: Trakia-M, 2003), 16. 3 European Commission Directorate-General for Employment and Social Affairs, Joint Report on Social Inclusion (Luxembourg: Unit E.2, 2004).

49 of wellbeing that is considered normal in the society in constructed negative mark attributed to members of which they live.4 The World Bank Group defines social minority groups for the purpose of their moral devalu- inclusion as: 1. The process of improving the terms for ation and rejection by society.”10 Thus, the spectrum of individuals and groups to take part in society; 2. The stigmatized/socially devalued groups may comprise process of improving the ability, opportunity, and digni- a variety of groups that do not “satisfy” the common ty of those disadvantaged on the basis of their identity perceptions of “normality.” to take part in society.5 Attitudes and perceptions matter for social inclusion Obviously, both social inclusion and social exclusion because people act on the basis of how they feel and have a complex nature. Furthermore, both constructs which groups get included and excluded, and on what are multidimensional and intersectional. Individuals and terms, is shaped by people’s attitudes about each other groups are excluded or included based on their identity.6 and about themselves.11 Research evidence shows that People may feel excluded or included on the grounds of the experience of being excluded can have long-term one or multiple dimensions of identity, that is: “Individu- negative consequences for human and social capital.12 als are simultaneously members of different groups and Moreover, internalization of negative stereotypes can, may be excluded because of one of their identities but “for instance, lead to low self-esteem, low aspirations, not another. The notion of ‘intersectionality’ is based on and potential group discouragement.”13 In social-psy- the understanding that people are simultaneously situ- chological terms, representatives of the stigmatizing ated in multiple social structures and realms, which in- and stigmatized groups inhabit different moral-psychic teract in complex ways to influence human experiences, worlds and have incompatible personal biographies.14 social relations, and outcomes.”7 Very often, many factors overlap and interact in a In other words, each individual is part of many collec- complex way to produce multiple disadvantages and tives/social locations, including gender, age, nationality, exclusion. For example, there are extreme cases of ethnic group, religion, sexual orientation, socio-econom- disadvantaged Roma communities that can be found ic status, education, etc. Social exclusion is individually in many countries and are sharply demonstrated in experienced and can occur on the grounds of single or Bulgaria. What characterizes the social exclusion of multiple dimensions of one person’s identity. As Harrell some Roma communities are poor housing conditions and Bond noted: “the salience of different dimensions in ghettoized areas with poor or lacking infrastructure, of identity for individuals and communities is influenced a complete absence of or lower education level and by the status of social locations.”8 Furthermore, “hav- lack of qualifications, which result in unemployment or ing privilege along one dimension of diversity does not low-paid jobs, combined with discriminatory attitudes mean that privilege exists on all dimensions. For exam- on the basis of ethnicity and marginalization. It is ple, a white, heterosexual, female is privileged with re- without a doubt that the vicious circle described above spect to her race and sexual orientation, but not in the reproduces not only poverty but long-term and persis- context of gender. Sometimes it is more difficult to see tent social exclusion from generation to generation. As how we are privileged along one dimension (e.g., edu- Fernández noted, “in extreme cases, situations of ex- cational status) if we do not benefit from privilege on clusion can lead to the breakdown of relationships and other dimensions.”9 the isolation of individuals, producing a deficit in terms of social cohesion.”15 Though social exclusion is closely related to poverty, very often it has nothing to do with the latter. Peo- Many researchers emphasize the multilayered and sub- ple who do not experience income shortfalls may also jective nature of social inclusion. Wilson and Secker16 feel excluded on the grounds of their belonging to a point out that social inclusion is a multidimensional stigmatized group. Stigma is a broadly spread phe- concept which encompasses physical aspects (e.g., nomenon which can be explained as “a prejudicially housing), psychological aspects (e.g., a sense of belong-

4 Joint Report on Social Inclusion. 5 World Bank, Understanding Poverty/Topics, Social Inclusion, www.worldbank.org/en/topic/social-inclusion. 6 World Bank, Inclusion Matters: The Foundation for Share (October 9, 2013): 5. 7 World Bank, Inclusion Matters, 74. 8 Shelly P. Harrell and Meg A. Bond, “Listening to Diversity Stories: Principles for Practice in Community Research and Action,” American Journal of Community Psychology, 37, no 3-4 (July, 2006): 373. 9 Harrell and Bond, “Listening,” 373. 10 Doncho Gradev, Stigma and Personal Biography (Sofia: Iztok-Zapad, 2010), 11-12. 11 World Bank, Inclusion Matters, 22-23. 12 World Bank, Inclusion Matters, 55. 13 World Bank, Inclusion Matters, 82. 14 Gradev, Stigma, 16. 15 Oscar Fernández, “Training or Social Exclusion: Competences for the Social Inclusion of Groups at Risk,” Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences 132 (May, 2014): 155. 16 Ceri Wilson and Jenny Secker, “Validation of the Social Inclusion Scale with Students,” Social Inclusion 3, no 4 (2015): 53.

50 ing), social aspects (e.g., friendships), and occupational Mike Jay describes this practice in the following way: aspects (e.g., leisure17), it operates on an individual or “For more than 700 years its inhabitants have taken group level and relates to the extent to which people the mentally ill and disabled into their homes as guests are accepted and feel they belong within different so- or ‘boarders.’ The family care system, as it is known, cial contexts. What is most important is how people is resolutely non-medical. When boarders meet their from stigmatized and marginalized groups perceive new families, they do so, as they always have, without social inclusion. For example, Koller, Le Pouesard and a backstory or clinical diagnosis. If a word is needed to Rummens state: “no research has specifically examined describe them, it’s often a positive one such as ‘spe- how children with disabilities perceive social inclusion.”18 cial,’ or at worst, ‘different.’ A boarder is treated as a Based on a qualitative meta-analysis of 15 primary re- member of the family: involved in everything, and par- search reports, Hall concludes19 that social inclusion for ticularly encouraged to form a strong bond with the people with disabilities consisted of three elements: children, a relationship that is seen as beneficial to involvement in activities, maintaining reciprocal rela- both parties.”24 Furthermore, as Ray Cavanaugh men- tionships, and a sense of belonging. They experienced tioned, “the Geel community showed remarkable com- social inclusion in various contexts at the infrastruc- passion, particularly for an era when most any sort of tural, interpersonal, and personal levels.20 Factors that psychological aberration was viewed as being due to contribute to social inclusion as either facilitators or demonic influence or possession.”25 constraints included “the opportunities available, the attitudes and awareness of others, the work environ- Geel is an example of how social inclusion could be ment, the existence of advocates and volunteers, the promoted and become a genuine characteristic of the quality of service providers, and access to information, community. The undeniable advantages of this sys- services, activities, and education; personal abilities tem, recognized by observers in the 19th century, lies and skills, self-advocacy, transportation, and the natu- precisely in the social integration of the mentally ill in ral supports they received from others.” the family and the local community, in the opportuni- ty to work and participate in all types of social activ- It should be noted that positive perceptions, including ity and to develop their preserved abilities and skills.26 feelings of participation, belonging, and being respected McCrary further emphasizes the cultural practice that in society, promote self-esteem and a sense of securi- “cultivates a heightened social inclusion with long-term ty.21 Thus, social inclusion requires overcoming negative support that allows boarders to both give and receive beliefs and stereotypes about excluded groups, which care.”27 The practice of giving and receiving care on the cannot be undone in a few years of “inclusive policy.”22 basis of openness and interpersonal contact can reduce stigmatization and create inclusive communities. How- Thinking about an example of social inclusion of a mar- ever, “without the existence of welcoming and flexible ginalized community, I recall an inspiring story that communities, a right to social involvement may only ex- could probably illustrate what social inclusion should ist in speech or may not exist at all.”28 Though the last look like and what the individual consequences of the words refer to the above described practice, in my opin- inclusion might be. This story is also known as the “The ion they can be extrapolated to the current situation of Geel Question.” numerous excluded individuals and groups.

Geel is a small town in the Flemish part of Belgium, which is famous for the unique model of home care Reflections on the Bulgarian Approach for patients with mental health disorders. Originating from the legend of Saint Dymphna, the patron saint At the end of the second decade of the 21st century, 30 of the mentally ill, it is often perceived as a forerun- years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, our country faces ner of the modern psychiatric community programs.23 many challenges connected with growing cultural and

17 Claire Le Boutillier and Anna Croucher, “Social Inclusion and Mental Health,” British Journal of Occupational Therapy, 73, no 3 (2010): 136–139. 18 Donna Koller, Morgane LePouesard and Joanna Anneke Rummens, “Defining Social Inclusion for Children with Disabilities: A Critical Literature Review.” Children and Society, 32, no 1 (January, 2018): 7. 19 Sarah A. Hall, “The Social Inclusion of People with Disabilities: A Qualitative Meta-analysis,” Journal of Ethnographic & Qualitative Research, 3, no 3 (2009): 171. 20 Hall, “Social Inclusion,” 172. 21 World Bank, Inclusion Matters, 85. 22 World Bank, Inclusion Matters, 26. 23 Ray Cavanach, “Inspired by Dymphna, Belgium Town Welcomes Mentally Ill,” National Catholic Reporter, May 15, 2015, www.ncronline.org/news/world/inspired-dymphna-belgium-town-welcomes-mentally-ill. 24 Mike Jay, “The Geel Question” Aeon, 09 January, 2014, Accessed on May 10, 2016, aeon.co/essays/geel-where-the-mentally-ill-are-welcomed-home. 25 Cavanach, “Dympha.” 26 Eugene Roosens and Lieve Van de Walle, Geel Revisited. After Centuries of Mental Rehabilitation. (Antwerp-Apeldoorn: Garant, 2007). 27 Lorraine Krall McCrary, “Geel’s Family Care Tradition: Care, Communities, and the Social Inclusion of Persons with Disabilities,” Journal of Literary & Cultural Disability Studies, 11, no 3 (2017): 286. 28 McCrary, “Geel’s Family Care Tradition,” 299.

51 social heterogeneity. Unfortunately, the serious socio- refugees and others are still widespread and persistent. economic changes during the years of transition have For example, regarding migrants, Bulgarians occupy the had a diverse and often destructive impact on vari- top position as the most intolerant across the EU.31 It ous social groups. Some Bulgarian citizens managed is well documented in the scholarly literature that ste- to adapt to the new conditions, generally through in- reotypes and prejudices are very stable and resistant to dividual coping strategies, while another part became change. The usage of pejorative language in social and marginalized and occupied the lowest levels of the so- traditional media not only reproduces but creates nega- cial scale. The ongoing economic and political reforms tive attitudes towards minority groups. during the transition years have exacerbated negative trends for some groups of citizens, including predomi- In a self-reflective manner, we need to realize that we nantly Roma communities, people with disabilities, and have been overcoming a difficult legacy in many areas other vulnerable groups. Structural problems have an of life. The process of changing our mentality is probably impact on an individual and group levels in a spectrum one of the most difficult, time-consuming and contro- of experiences of inferiority, isolation, and marginaliza- versial challenges in these past thirty years. We must tion. At a societal level, the consequences of the pro- also recognize that such changes happen slowly. When I longed and difficult transition have manifested in the was involved in a Tempus project concerned with the in- breakdown of social bonds and the overall absence of a troduction of inclusive education in Bulgaria in the 1990s, sense of mutuality, empathy and tolerance. The deepen- there was skepticism among the professional commu- ing social differentiation has further increased cultural nity that this could happen given the rigid and long-es- distances, thus leading to socio-cultural segmentation. tablished traditions in the special schools’ system. Today, two and half decades later, the relevant legislation was Measures have been undertaken to combat poverty gradually adopted in Bulgaria, and systematic efforts and social exclusion. Bulgaria is among the states began to be made to introduce inclusive education as where the risk of poverty of the population is higher the term implies—education for all. Inclusive education, than the EU average.29 The abovementioned strategy an embodiment of the concept of the inclusive society, aims at developing and implementing a unified, consis- has been affirmed as a legitimate opportunity to learn tent and sustainable policy on social inclusion, based on in the least restrictive environment. This means radical an integrated approach and cross-sector cooperation school reform that makes the school equally accessible at national, regional, provincial and municipal levels and and appropriate to all, regardless of the type and extent requires that all stakeholders working to combat pov- of individual needs that children demonstrate or might erty and social inclusion unite their efforts.30 The main demonstrate at any time during their school careers. target groups defined are: persons of non-working age: What is happening in our schools today is far from per- children, older persons; families with children; disadvan- fect, but nonetheless it is far from the segregated educa- taged groups on the labor market and out of it; vulner- tion that existed only 30 years ago. Children with special able representatives of the Roma community; persons educational needs have the right and the opportunity to with disabilities; homeless persons and persons living in study in the least restrictive environment as a legitimate poor housing conditions; working poor. option. Roma children, as part of children with special needs, due to a number of specificities in their ethnic and Apart from the modernized legislation and policies, how- social status, enjoy the same rights and opportunities. ever, we must be aware that as a part of the democratic However, as Gould32 mentioned with respect to the so- and globalizing world, Bulgarian society has been pass- cial inclusion of Gypsy, Roma and Traveler children, real ing through a controversial process of changing values. inclusion means more than “a formal inclusion whereby The time of globalization is a time of a mixture of identi- schools have met their legal duty and pupils are on roll in ties and more or less a clash of cultural and existential a school, rather it is about preventing the discrimination, values. Efforts must be focused on solving people’s eco- disadvantage, and exclusion of all pupils,33 especially nomic problems along with the prospects of tolerance those from vulnerable groups such as GRT pupils, so that and respect for diversity as a way of self-assertion, es- pupils feel a sense of belonging and comfort in the set- pecially when ethnic, religious, language and other dif- ting.” I would say that this is rather true for the situation ferences are perceived as an immanent characteristic in Bulgarian schools today as well. of individual existence. We must be honest and confess that in Bulgarian society, in general, negative attitudes One of the most significant reforms in the social and prejudices against large minority ethnic or confes- sphere throughout the transition period in Bulgaria sional communities, people with disabilities, those with concerns the care system for children and the de-in- different sexual orientations, people with mental illness, stitutionalization process, particularly. The Childhood

29 2019-2020 Action Plan for the Implementation of the National Strategy for Reducing Poverty and Promoting Social Inclusion, www.strategy.bg/FileHandler.ashx?fileId=9429 30 National Strategy for Reducing Poverty and Promoting Social Inclusion, 2013-2020. 31 Anna Krasteva, “Bulgarian Migration Paradox,” European Website on Integration (2019), ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/librarydoc/the-bulgarian-migration-paradox-migration-and-development-in-bulgaria. 32 Siobhan Gould, “Promoting the Social Inclusion and Academic Progress of Gypsy, Roma and Traveller Children: a Secondary School Case Study,” Educational Psychology in Practice, 33, no 2 (2017): 129. 33 Mel Ainscow, Tony Booth and Alan Dyson, Improving Schools, Developing Inclusion (London: Routledge, 2006).

52 for All national project aimed to promote social inclu- The Role of Humility sion by closing the geographically isolated social insti- tutions for children and young people with disabilities Humility is a concept that ostensibly has nothing to do and providing accommodation at residential services with inclusion. However, what I have realized so far based of a family type located in the community, foster fami- on my experience including Fulbright, is that inclusiveness lies, relatives, or even reintegration into their biological is a life-long commitment and a way of thinking. For me, families. As a result, the institutions were closed down thinking in an inclusive way involves thinking in a humble and the disabled children and young people received way. A humble person is open to others’ points of view. a chance to participate in local community life on the Humility implies a permanent self-reflection on our own basis of their individual needs, abilities, and desires. culturally shaped knowledge, beliefs and biases con- Although it is a positive action in itself, the process of nected with the statuses of the social locations that we de-institutionalization has demonstrated numerous currently occupy. It includes quitting the comfort zones setbacks regarding the outcomes for the beneficiaries created by stereotypes, being open and learning to listen of the reform—the disabled children themselves. Obvi- to the stories of others, abandoning cultural arrogance ously, nothing has changed dramatically in the model and accepting that we all are but a small part of a larger of care. Very recently, Disability Rights International picture. Nothing has been granted for sure and for long. published a report titled A Dead End for Children: Bul- People may become disadvantaged and excluded on vari- garia’s Group Homes, stating that as a result of the ous grounds but also at different life stages and due to de-institutionalization, Bulgaria has replaced a sys- various circumstances. If we look for a moment at the ex- tem of large, old specialized institutions with newer, perience of many of the current migrants and refugees, smaller facilities of a family type/small group homes we will certainly recognize that at least a part of them that are still operating as institutions. Based on visits were well-situated in many areas of life in their native to 24 group homes, five day-care centers, four larger countries. Forced by reasons beyond their control they residential institutions for children and adults, two suddenly become at risk of exclusion in almost all life do- schools, and other programs throughout Bulgaria, mains—political, economic, social, and cultural. Could any the report highlights that these new facilities actually one of us be sure that this will not happen to us as well? separate children with disabilities from society and What we need to not forget is our human vulnerability contribute to their continued social isolation and that and the universal human needs for acceptance and care. “little effort has been made to promote true inclusion in families or society at large.”34 “The tyranny of low Speaking about the future, in his first TED talk Pope expectations for children with disabilities is the most Francis linked progress with equality and social inclu- pervasive problem I observed throughout Bulgaria” is sion. He made a remarkable statement to people in po- an ascertainment that, unfortunately, relates not only sitions of power: “The more powerful you are, the more to those placed in residential homes but also to chil- your actions will have an impact on people, the more dren with special educational needs, Roma children, responsible you are to act humbly. If you don’t, your and others at schools. The report further accuses Bul- power will ruin you and ruin the other.” The next mes- garia of building a system of segregated environments sage concerns all of us: “the future of humankind isn’t for people with disabilities, which constitutes a form exclusively in the hands of politicians, of great leaders, of de jure discrimination on the basis of disability,35 of big companies ... The future most of all is in the hands thus representing a pure example of social exclusion. of those people who recognize the other as ‘you’ and themselves as part of an ‘us.’ We all need each other.”36 Undoubtedly, large-scale reforms are not possible with- out the support of the entire society, including the cen- tral government, local authorities, and professionals Conclusion from various fields, civil society organizations, and local communities. However, what is also needed are efforts and transformations made at the personal and com- Overcoming exclusion and building inclusive societies de- munity levels. pends heavily on political and economic instruments, as well as on our willingness to understand and the ability to empathize with the other. Much effort is needed, even more than we can imagine, to rethink the processes of integration, to challenge stereotypes, to achieve balance in social and intercultural relations that can predeter- mine social, economic, and cultural cohesion in society.

34 “A Dead End for Children: Bulgaria’s Group Homes,” Disability Rights International (2019). 35 “Dead End.” 36 “Pope Tells Leaders in First TED Talk: Act Humbly or Power will Ruin You,” Guardian, April 26, 2017, www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/apr/26/pope-francis-gives-ted-talk-urging-world-leaders-to-be-a-bit-more-humble.

53 References:

Ainscow, Mel, Tony Booth and Alan Gould, Siobhan. “Promoting the Social Koller, Donna, Morgane LePouesard, and Dyson. Improving Schools, Developing Inclusion and Academic Progress of Joanna Anneke Rummens. “Defining Inclusion. London: Routledge, 2006. Gypsy, Roma and Traveller Children: Social Inclusion for Children with a Secondary School Case Study.” Disabilities: A Critical Literature Review.” Caritas Bulgaria. “Bulgarian Migration Educational Psychology in Practice, 33, Children and Society, 32, no 1 (January, Paradox: Migration and Development no 2 (2017): 126–148. 2018): 1–13. in Bulgaria.” Common Home Series, 2019. Accessed on January 14, 2020. Gradev, Doncho. Stigma and Personal Krasteva, Anna. “Bulgarian Migration www.caritas.bg/cms/wp-content/ Biography. Sofia: Iztok-Zapad, 2010. Paradox.” European Website on uploads/2019/05/za-saita_migracionen- Integration (2019). ec.europa.eu/ paradox_5.pdf. Guardian. “Pope Tells Leaders in First migrant-integration/librarydoc/the- TED Talk: Act Humbly or Power will Ruin bulgarian-migration-paradox-migration- Cavanach, Ray. “Inspired by Dymphna, You.” April 26, 2017. and-development-in-bulgaria. Belgium Town Welcomes Mentally Ill.” www.theguardian.com/ National Catholic Reporter, 15 May, technology/2017/apr/26/pope-francis- Le Boutillier, Claire, and Anna Croucher. 2015. www.ncronline.org/news/world/ gives-ted-talk-urging-world-leaders-to- “Social Inclusion and Mental Health.” inspired-dymphna-belgium-town- be-a-bit-more-humble. British Journal of Occupational Therapy, welcomes-mentally-ill. 73, no 3 (2010): 136–139. Hall, Sarah A. “The Social Inclusion of Dimova, Dushka and Ivaylo Kusev. Social People with Disabilities: A Qualitative McCrary, Lorraine Krall. “Geel’s Family Policy and Social Activities. Analyses, Meta-analysis.” Journal of Ethnographic Care Tradition: Care, Communities, Essays, and Technologies. Sofia: & Qualitative Research, 3, no 3 (2009): and the Social Inclusion of Persons Trakia-M, 2003. 162-173. with Disabilities.” Journal of Literary & Cultural Disability Studies, 11, no 3 Disability Rights International. “A Dead Harrell, Shelly P. and Meg A. Bond. (2017): 285-301. End for Children: Bulgaria’s Group “Listening to Diversity Stories: Principles Homes.” (2019). for Practice in Community Research and Roosens, Eugene, and Lieve Van de Action.” American Journal of Community Walle. Geel Revisited. After Centuries European Commission Directorate- Psychology, 37, no 3-4 (July, 2006): of Mental Rehabilitation. Antwerp – General for Employment and Social 365–376. Apeldoorn: Garant, 2007. Affairs, Joint Report on Social Inclusion, Luxembourg: Unit E.2, 2004. Jay, Mike. “The Geel Question.” Aeon, Wilson, Ceri, and Jenny Secker. 09 January, 2014. Accessed on May 10, “Validation of the Social Inclusion Scale Fernández, Oscar. “Training or Social 2016. aeon.co/essays/geel-where-the- with Students,” Social Inclusion 3, no 4 Exclusion: Competences for the Social mentally-ill-are-welcomed-home. (2015): 52-62 Inclusion of Groups at Risk.” Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences 132 (May, World Bank. Inclusion Matters: The 2014): 154-159. Foundation for Shared Prosperity. October 9, 2013.

Maya Tcholakova earned a master’s degree in special education and a Ph.D. in pedagogy and is currently associate professor at the Faculty of Public Health, Health Care and Sports of the South-West University Neofit Rilski in Blagoevgrad. Her academic record includes scholarly publications in the field of special and inclusive education and social work. She served on the Council of Ministers’ Administration of the Republic of Bulgaria (2005-2009). Tcholakova is a member of the Academic Council for Refugee Issues at the UN- HCR, Bulgaria, and of the Management Board of the Bulgarian Association of Social Work Education. She was a Fulbright Scholar at the University of Central Florida in 2019.

54 From Posts to Polls: Instagram as the New Norm for Electoral Engagement

Borislav Baev and Maria Mileva

articipating in social media has become a tool for tion and manages to actively involve vast volumes of political leaders around the world. Staying rel- users at the same time. It also allows freedom of ex- Pevant depends on many factors, but one of the pression, as long as posts do not violate the general most important ones is being consistent in their strat- terms of usage. Although often frowned upon in cer- egy by coherently expressing their agenda and values. tain countries around the world,1 Instagram is highly With technology becoming an inseparable part of our celebrated everywhere and especially in democratic lives, modern-day politicians have to find a way to sat- countries that advocate freedom of speech and free- isfy their audience’s cyber necessities. dom of expression.

In this paper we will analyze the contrast between the Global political leaders have noticed the potential in means of expression of political leaders on social me- connecting through Instagram, but two particular poli- dia and the outcome of their efforts. It is important ticians have been a leading example of how to success- to note that we will only be observing examples from fully use the platform to their advantage. Canadian two liberal democracies that both present high levels of Prime minister Justin Trudeau and Indian Prime min- democratic indicators, such as pluralism, maintenance ister Narendra Modi are two of the most prominent of universal human rights and civil liberties. leaders in the world not only in real life, but on social media as well. They both manage to not only influence The social media platform that we have chosen for this their electorates to act and vote in real life, but also to argument is Instagram due to its unique focus on visuals spread the democratic values that both of them eager- (pictures and videos) as a means of communication that ly support, with the help of the social media platform requires minimum effort to acquire. Instagram is one of Instagram. the most popular social media platforms in recent years, providing its services to around 1 billion people world- Upon opening each of their Instagram profiles one will wide in 2019. Influencer (DB) is the main online platform notice many similarities—they are followed by a vast through which statistical data about the profiles of the number of people who constantly seek to be connected leaders of the observed countries was obtained. Influ- to them. The work of entire teams of PR profession- encer (DB) is a licensed platform-measuring tool for key als perfecting every single post, image or video is also statistical data of prominent figures on social media. clearly visible, in order to achieve this precise effect. Ev- ery publication is coherently directed to specifically ap- Instagram is one of the most powerful social media peal to the audience and to create the perfect political platforms because of its influence on its users. It pro- image. With the rise of visual media as the forefront of vides the perfect environment for visual communica- political communications, Instagram becomes the new

1 J. Cummins and L. Martin, “Social Media, Public Opinion, and Security Cooperation in Saudi Arabia,” Journal of International Security Assistance Management 4 (2015): 115-125.

55 battlefield that politicians need to adapt to in order to an elections. The biggest change in voter demograph- appeal to the masses.2 ics clearly comes from the increase in the numbers of young voters aged 18 to 24 years old. The elections In a recent paper, Lalancette and Raynauld3 conducted were an incredible success both personally for Trudeau a coherent analysis of the influence social media has and for his winning the majority of seats upon the electorate. Particular interest was focused in the House of Commons.7 on visual media, which was defined as the forefront of political communications. Stemming from this adop- It is important to note that Trudeau’s political image tion of visual media’s influence we have to explore Ins- has been Justin Trudeau’s ultimate success when it tagram as more than a networking application, but as comes to policy making. Regarded as a celebrity poli- a platform for the manifestation of political agendas. It tician he is often considered as the obvious continua- engages an audience that gradually increases with the tion of his father’s public image and therefore a part of boom of primarily visual social media.4 the “Trudeau” Brand. He is also considered to have an even more successful continuation of his father Pierre Trudeau and Modi seem to be doing exactly that. Both Trudeau’s career. However, Justin Trudeau managed to political leaders have huge electorates consisting of mil- take this level of political communication to yet another lions of people, whom they must appeal to and to keep level and to digitize it with his social media profile.8 engaged, in order to gain political support. A large por- tion of their popularity has been attained due to their His social media presence is especially noticeable within innovative ways of using social media. Credit for their its 3.3 million followers.9 In 2017 political communica- success can be given to the pioneering implementation tion experts Mireille Lalancette and Vincent Raynauld of a major communication tool—their presence on In- justified his success due to the excellent image manage- stagram. Moreover, a direct correlation can be found ment his online profile on Instagram maintains through between their popularity in social media and the voting focusing on important topics with each publication. Ac- turnout of younger generations in their countries. cording to their analysis his narrative manages to touch on important areas of government activity while at the During the 2015 Canadian elections, Justin Trudeau’s same time including content revolving around public Liberal Party managed to win the majority of parlia- events and important holidays.10 mentary seats. Simultaneously Trudeau became one of the most popular democratic politicians not only in However, if Trudeau has the advantage of a family Canada but also worldwide. At that time Trudeau’s so- background and celebrity status, youth and appear- cial media image became much more consistent than ance,11 Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi succeed- his opponents’ and gained him significant popularity ed by taking another path. Modi managed to peak by among the younger generations. His political image introducing new technologies to rural areas of India generated an aura of authenticity and defined a shift and thus successfully establishing a tech-savvy image from institutionalized political representation.5 of himself. Publicizing his motto of “Modi-fied India” (Zain), he managed to accomplish what is now the Definite proof of this can be found in the voting turnout most-followed political social media account. In itself, in the 2015 general elections when 68% of the popula- his triumph was regarded as Modi’s signature “high- tion cast their vote. According to the Office of the Chief tech populism.”12 Mahurkar and Pradhan13 stated that Electoral Officer this percentage had not been so high Modi’s Bhartiya Janta Party (BJP) formed a team of since 1997.6 Further proof of this is the clear compari- well-trained IT professionals to execute their election son between the 2015 elections and the 2011 Canadi- campaign, in addition to the volunteers pledging their

2 Kirill Filimonov, Uta Russmann, and Jakob Svensson, “Picturing the Party: Instagram and Party Campaigning in the 2014 Swedish Elections,” Social Media + Society, (July 2016), www.doi.org/10.1177/2056305116662179. 3 Mireille Lalancette and Vincent Raynauld, “The Power of Political Image: Justin Trudeau, Instagram, and Celebrity Politics,” American Behavioral Scientist 63, no. 7 (June 2019): 888–924, www.doi.org/10.1177/0002764217744838. 4 Filimonov et al., “Picturing the Party.” 5 Lalancette and Raynauld, “The Power of Political Image,” 888–924. 6 “Voter Turnout by Age Group—Elections Canada,” Elections Canada, 2015, accessed July 10 2020, www.elections.ca/content.aspx?section=res&dir=rec/eval/pes2015/vtsa&document=table1&lang=e. 7 “Voter Turnout by Age Group—Elections Canada.” 8 Lalancette and Raynauld, “The Power of Political Image,” 888–924. 9 Alex Marland, Brand Command: Canadian Politics and Democracy in the Age of Message Control (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2016). 10 Lalancette and Raynauld, “The Power of Political Image.” 11 Lalancette and Raynauld, “The Power of Political Image.” 12 Christophe Jaffrelot, “The Modi-centric BJP 2014 Election Campaign: New Techniques and Old Tactics,” Contemporary South Asia 23, no. 2 (May 2015): 151–166, www.doi.org/10.1080/09584935.2015.1027662. 13 Uday Mahurkar and Kunal Pradhan, “On the Modi Trail: Inside the Most Audacious Prime Ministerial Campaign Ever Mounted in India,” India Today (November 30, 1999), www.indiatoday.in/magazine/cover-story/story/20140224-narendra-modi-bjp-prime-ministerial-candidate- campaign-social-media-800175-1999-11-30.

56 personal affiliation to BJP’s political cause.14 This cam- The most interesting fact about both campaigns paign not only went viral in India, but to also brought is that they have discovered an extremely efficient the younger generation closer to Modi’s political causes means of communication with their electorates and and agenda. in particular the young generation through unique ap- proaches. Soon after Trudeau and Modi digitized their According to the 2014 Indian general election’s exit political platforms, the world followed, and as we can polls, it was first-time voters aged 18 to 22 who backed now see more and more politicians seem to follow the BJP more strongly than any other demographic their strategy.18 group. Modi’s rhetoric of transformation and his capac- ity to appeal to young voters proved yet again the sig- The social media success of both of the politicians not nificance of discovering methods to connect with voters only makes them extremely relatable but it also pro- through mediums that attract them. This also demon- vides their followers a never-before-seen experience. strates the substantial role of technology and its con- This kind of direct communication with politicians has stant advance. Therefore, each campaign must adjust never been experienced on such a large scale before, to fit the times.15 effortlessly bringing masses of people into direct com- munication with their representatives regardless of Another great advantage that Modi has over other their class or economic status. The only requirement politicians online is that he is a pioneer among world for this communication to be successful is for the re- leaders on social media platforms. Embracing the new spective electorate to own a smartphone device. This popular technology managed to establish him as “one connection establishes not only a more transparent of the people” and to provide him with an incredible way of governance by direct communication with the number of followers that increase and almost double in ones in charge, but also results in more accountability volume every year (Influencer(DB), n.d). being demanded by the citizens. In this way democ- racy becomes not only the most attractive, but also a Year after year Indian PM Naredra Modi remains the more productive, comprehensive and accessible type most-followed world leader, according to the Twiplo- of system.19 macy study—a Burson Cohn & Wolfe research project inspecting the behavior of political actors on social me- If we observe Trudeau’s campaign in 2015 and Modi’s dia. Modi even replaced Barack Obama in the top spot campaign in 2014, we can see that they are both re- with 6.8 million followers and also had the most-liked liant on robust engagement. They have both worked post of a world leader in 2018.16 Currently the Indian diligently on creating a globally famous, democratic PM has approximately five times more followers than in and likable political profile that not only allows their fol- 2018 (Influencer(DB), n.d.). lowers to associate with them personally, but also with the values and political agenda that they represent.20 If we observe the 2015 Canadian elections and the 2014 This ultimately has the potential of spreading more and Indian elections, there is a quite striking similarity in more democratic values worldwide. both. The turnout in both elections managed to exceed 67%, with greater numbers of young people voting and However, social media is not yet the most popular chan- with the majority in the elections being won by leaders nel of communication to electorates. According to Po- and parties generally supported by younger voters.17 litico and Cross Screen Media’s marketing analytics The data presented in this article suggests that the research and projections, most of the official political clear emergence of a powerful platform allows populist debates, campaigns, advertisements, and news will still rhetoric to be manifested on a grand scale, influencing be distributed by traditional media. TV is still the lead- the electorate and thus delivering notable results. It is ing dissemination device when it comes to political dis- important for democracies worldwide to take note and course. This directly correlates to the worldwide trend consider the probable consequences of an authoritarian of voting turnout being predominately dominated by and undemocratic leader spreading their strategic pro- the older generations (45-60 years).21 paganda through the next big invention in the world of mass communications. Such a risk could pose imminent Nevertheless, with the rise of new technologies and threat to democracy globally, or it could multiply govern- the occasional leapfrogging of different countries, new ments’ soft power, as in the cases of India and Canada. world leaders are expected to be up to the challenge.

14 Ali Zain, “Rise of Modi’s Tech-Populism in India,” Moment Journal 6 no. 1 (June 15, 2019): 199-208, www.doi.org/10.17572//mj2019.1.199208. 15 Justine Dodgen, “A Civic Engagement Lesson from the Social Media Politician,” Bedrosian Center, October 24, 2014, bedrosian.usc.edu/a-civic-engagement-lesson-from-the-social-media-politician/. 16 “World Leaders on Instagram 2018,” Twiplomacy, accessed July 10, 2020, twiplomacy.com/blog/world-leaders-instagram-2018/. 17 “Voter Turnout by Age Group—Elections Canada.” 18 “World Leaders On Instagram 2018,” Twiplomacy, accessed July 10, 2020, twiplomacy.com/blog/world-leaders-instagram-2018/. 19 Christophe Jaffrelot, “The Modi-centric BJP 2014 Election Campaign: New Techniques and Old Tactics,” Contemporary South Asia 23, no. 2 (May 2015): 151–166. www.doi.org/10.1080/09584935.2015.1027662. 20 Lalancette and Raynauld, “The Power of Political Image.” 21 Advertising Analytics and Cross Screen Media, “2020 Political Spending Projections,” Politico, 2019, www.politico.com/f/?id=0000016b-b029-d027-a97f-f6a95aca0000.

57 Due to the growing decline of TV consumerism by the jor influence advance during the last ten years marked younger generations, social media is expected to be the by a shift from bottom to top in terms of U.S. approval next leading platform for political communication.22 ratings among Saudis. The research summarizes that this is most likely not due to U.S. Foreign Policy, but The successes of these politicians online are to a great because of social media that gives young Saudis an extent the product of an impeccable team of PR experts avenue for dissent against their government (Holmes, that have put together a very consistent, easy-to-com- 2012). We can use this data to justify the fact that for prehend political profile of each of those individuals.23 politicians, having profiles on social media is something The reason why Modi and Trudeau are both continuous- of paramount importance, because of the opportunity ly very successful and popular among their followers is for creation and implementation of soft power and the because they have managed to provide a congenial im- spread of democracy. age of themselves that is not only politically adequate domestically, but also internationally perceptive. Successful social media representation is vital and ex- tremely necessary for modern world leaders. The fact Social media enables the creation of online public plac- that two of the most committed politicians online, es where ideas can be openly disseminated. These new Justin Trudeau and Narendra Modi—both in the top methods of engagement let the public connect with ten most-followed political leaders worldwide on Insta- their government and advance the flow of political in- gram Influencer(DB) (n.d.)—lead youth polls is evidence formation.24 of the upcoming shift of focus toward social media celebrity politics. If we observe their approaches and If we look at Trudeau’s and Modi’s Instagram profiles, investigate the reasons behind their success, we can we see that they are both extremely focused on how reach the conclusion that leaders of tomorrow should their image is perceived by international audiences find a way to connect to the public via new technologies as well. We notice a great number of photos of dip- and use those avenues to convey their message to their lomatic visits, UN summits and important regional electorate. Being the first to do so by creating a team meetings on both of their accounts. In this way Insta- focused on working with their digital appeal, Trudeau gram and other social media platforms become a new and Modi have had the opportunity to create engage- immediate channel of diplomacy and peacekeeping ment and promote democracy on both domestic and (Influencer(DB), n.d.). international soil.

This data might be seen as showing very little progress This analysis of two democratic world leaders’ Insta- in terms of the spread of democratic values, but on the gram profiles sheds light on the implications of social contrary it is in fact favorable, especially compared to media permanent campaigning, as well as its notable countries that do not advocate democracy. Cummins impact on the electorate. Investigating the shaping of and Martin25 in their research entitled “Social Media, the online images of such leaders and the respective Public Opinion, and Security Cooperation in Saudi Ara- results of their campaigns will allow us to gain more bia” note that Saudi Arabia teens appear to be grow- information about the power of new channels of com- ing fonder of American politics simply because of plat- munication and the various strategies for spreading forms such as Facebook, Twitter and Instagram. The democratic values, increasing voter turnout and im- predominantly liberal content in social media and the proving citizen participation through online discussion freedom of expression on the platforms suggest a ma- and engagement.

22 “2020 Political Spending Projections.” 23 Lalancette and Raynauld, “The Power of Political Image.” 24 Diana Owen, “The New Media’s Role in Politics,” in The Age of Perplexity: Rethinking the World We Knew, (Madrid: BBVA, Open Mind, Penguin Random House Grupo Editorial, 2017), 106-122. 25 Cummins and Martin, “Social Media.”

58 References:

Advertising Analytics and Cross Jaffrelot, Christophe. “The Modi- Marland, Alex, Thierry Giasson, and Screen Media. “2020 Political Spending centric BJP 2014 Election Campaign: Anna Esselment. “Welcome to Non- Projections.” Politico, 2019, New Techniques and Old Tactics.” Stop Campaigning.” In Permanent www.politico.com/f/?id=0000016bb029- Contemporary South Asia 23, no. 2 (May Campaigning in Canada, 3–27. d027-a97f-f6a95aca0000. 2015): 151–166. doi.org/10.1080/09584 Vancouver: University of British 935.2015.1027662. Columbia Press, 2017. Cummins, J., and L. Martin “Social Media, Public Opinion, and Security Lalancette, Mireille, and Vincent Owen, Diana. “The New Media’s Role Cooperation in Saudi Arabia.” Journal Raynauld. “The Power of Political Image: in Politics.” In The Age of Perplexity: of International Security Assistance Justin Trudeau, Instagram, and Celebrity Rethinking the World We Knew, 106- Management 4 (2015): 115-125. Politics.” American Behavioral Scientist 122. Madrid: BBVA, Open Mind, Penguin 63, no. 7 (June 2019): 888–924. Random House Grupo Editorial, 2017. Dodgen, Justine. “A Civic Engagement doi.org/10.1177/0002764217744838. Lesson from the Social Media Politician.” Twiplomacy. “World Leaders On Bedrosian Center (October 24, 2014). Mahurkar, Uday, and Kunal Pradhan. Instagram 2018.” Accessed July 10, bedrosian.usc.edu/a-civic-engagement- “On the Modi Trail: Inside the Most 2020. twiplomacy.com/blog/world- lesson-from-the-social-media- Audacious Prime Ministerial Campaign leaders-instagram-2018/. politician/. Ever Mounted in India.” India Today (November 30, 1999). Zai̇n, Ali. “Rise of Modi’s Tech-Populism Elections Canada. “Voter Turnout by Age www.indiatoday.in/magazine/ in India.” Moment Journal 6 no. 1 (June Group.” Accessed July 10 2020. cover-story/story/20140224- 15, 2019): 199-208. www.elections.ca/content.aspx?section= narendra-modi-bjp-prime-ministerial- doi.org/10.17572//mj2019.1.199208. res&dir=rec/eval/pes2015/ candidate-campaign-social- vtsa&document=table1&lang=e. media-800175-1999-11-30.

Filimonov, Kirill, Uta Russmann, and Marland, Alex. Brand Command: Jakob Svensson. “Picturing the Party: Canadian Politics and Democracy in the Instagram and Party Campaigning in Age of Message Control. Vancouver: the 2014 Swedish Elections.” Social University of British Columbia Press, Media + Society, (July 2016). 2016. doi.org/10.1177/2056305116662179.

Borislav Baev is an alumnus of the American University in Bulgaria with majors in political science and journalism. Baev is a freelance journalist and analyst focusing on political marketing, protests and civil disobedience. He plans to pursue a career in foreign affairs and diplomacy.

Maria Mileva is an alumna of the American University in Bulgaria. Mileva graduated in 2019 with majors in political science and journalism. Mileva is passionate about social justice issues, freedom of speech and democracy. She hopes to pursue a master’s degree in public policy in the near future.

59 www.fulbright.bg

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