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Strategic Assessment Assessment Strategic Volume 17 | No. 3 | October 2014 Volume 17 Volume The “Special Relationship” in the Test of Time: US Policy during Operation Protective Edge | Zaki Shalom Hizbollah and the Next War with Israel: | No. 3 No. Experience from Syria and Gaza | Benedetta Berti and Yoram Schweitzer | October 2014 The Weight of the Demographic Factor in Israel’s Strategic Considerations on the Palestinian Issue | Kobi Michael The Rise of the Islamic State Organization | Ephraim Kam The End of the Syrian Revolution: Between Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s Islamic Caliphate and Bashar al-Assad’s Baath Regime | Eyal Zisser Between Ankara and Tehran: How the Scramble for Kurdistan Can Reshape Regional Relations | Micha’el Tanchum Shifts in Israel-Africa Relations | Herman Butime Changing Direction? Updating Israel’s Nuclear Doctrine | Louis René Beres Strategic ASSESSMENT Volume 17 | No. 3 | October 2014 CONTENTS Abstracts | 3 The “Special Relationship” in the Test of Time: US Policy during Operation Protective Edge | 7 Zaki Shalom Hizbollah and the Next War with Israel: Experience from Syria and Gaza | 19 Benedetta Berti and Yoram Schweitzer The Weight of the Demographic Factor in Israel’s Strategic Considerations on the Palestinian Issue | 29 Kobi Michael The Rise of the Islamic State Organization | 41 Ephraim Kam The End of the Syrian Revolution: Between Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s Islamic Caliphate and Bashar al-Assad’s Baath Regime | 55 Eyal Zisser Between Ankara and Tehran: How the Scramble for Kurdistan Can Reshape Regional Relations | 67 Micha’el Tanchum Shifts in Israel-Africa Relations | 81 Herman Butime Changing Direction? Updating Israel’s Nuclear Doctrine | 93 Louis René Beres Strategic The purpose of Strategic Assessment is to stimulate and ASSESSMENT enrich the public debate on issues that are, or should be, on Israel’s national security agenda. Strategic Assessment is a quarterly publication comprising policy-oriented articles written by INSS researchers and guest contributors. The views presented here are those of the authors alone. The Institute for National Security Studies is a public benefit company. Editor in Chief Amos Yadlin Editor Mark A. Heller Associate Editor Judith Rosen Managing Editor Moshe Grundman Editorial Board Shlomo Brom, Moshe Grundman, Yoel Guzansky, Mark A. Heller, Ephraim Kam, Anat Kurz, Gallia Lindenstrauss, Judith Rosen, Amos Yadlin Editorial Advisory Board Dan Ben-David, Azar Gat, Efraim Halevy, Tamar Hermann, Itamar Rabinovich, Shimon Shamir, Gabi Sheffer, Emmanual Sivan, Shimon Stein, Asher Susser, Eyal Zisser Graphic Design: Michal Semo-Kovetz, Yael Bieber Tel Aviv University Graphic Design Studio Printing: Elinir The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) 40 Haim Levanon • POB 6997556 • Tel Aviv 6997556 • Israel Tel: +972-3-640-0400 • Fax: +972-3-744-7590 • E-mail: [email protected] Strategic Assessment is published in English and Hebrew. The full text is available on the Institute’s website: www.inss.org.il © All rights reserved. ISSN 0793-8942 Abstracts The “Special Relationship” in the Test of Time: US Policy during Operation Protective Edge Zaki Shalom Throughout Operation Protective Edge, the Obama administration stressed that it recognized Israel’s right to defend itself against rocket and missile fire and the threat from the tunnels. However, it repeatedly demanded that Israel’s military campaign be proportionate and that it avoid escalation and harm to civilians as much as possible. In various incidents during the operation in which civilians were either killed or wounded, the administration criticized Israel’s military actions. Nevertheless, in the fifty days of fighting, it did not take meaningful steps to restrict Israel’s freedom of action. This US attitude demonstrates anew that the special relationship between the two countries, which has existed for many years, is stable and durable even in the face of serious disagreements that arise from time to time. Keywords: Protective Edge, Hamas, Obama administration, IDF Hizbollah and the Next War with Israel: Experience from Syria and Gaza Benedetta Berti and Yoram Schweitzer The article assesses Hizbollah’s current domestic and regional status, examining how the organization has adapted to the challenge of fighting with the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria. After analyzing Hizbollah’s current position and strategy, it delves deeper into the question of the “potential next war” between the Lebanese Shiite organization and Israel, highlighting relevant lessons the organization might be drawing from Israel’s war against Hamas in the summer of 2014 as well as from its own current involvement in Syria. The war in Syria provides Hizbollah with the opportunity to enhance its military capabilities and hybrid warfare skills, which could lead to both improvement and increased reliance on more conventional standoff tactics in the next war with Israel. In addition, the lessons from the last Gaza war, including Israel’s political and psychological vulnerability to Strategic Assessment | Volume 17 | No. 3 | October 2014 3 ABSTRACTS 4 attacks on its critical infrastructure and targeted cross-border operations, can assist Hizbollah in sharpening its operational concept and strategy. Keywords: Syria, Hizbollah, Hamas, 2006 war, hybrid warfare The Weight of the Demographic Factor in Israel’s Strategic Considerations on the Palestinian Issue Kobi Michael In the debate about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, demography often figures center stage. Many of the supporters of the two-state solution have | Volume 17 | No. 3 | October 2014 17 | No. Volume | concluded that the demographic reality is working against Israel, such that the country is liable to lose its Jewish majority in the western land of Israel and hence its Jewish democratic character, or have the one-state solution imposed on it, which would spell the end of the Zionist vision. Those who oppose the two-state solution and/or those who see no urgency in resolving Strategic Assessment Strategic the conflict cite a different demographic picture that points to a growing Jewish majority in the next few decades, even in the absence of a division of the land. This essay examines the importance of demography in Israel’s overall strategic considerations. After reviewing the competing schools of thought, it concludes that despite the importance of the demographic factor, changes in demographics – in either direction – do not fundamentally change either Israel’s essential strategic position or the motivation of those seeking to delegitimize it. Keywords: demography, Israel, Israeli-Palestinian conflict, strategy, delegitimization The Rise of the Islamic State Organization Ephraim Kam The success of the Islamic State organization (IS) reflects an amalgam of strengths and weaknesses. Its forces are mobile, fast, and capable of surprise; they combine the capabilities of a small army with terror tactics and are not highly vulnerable. IS has also grown through the power of its success, obtaining more funds and arms, attracting more volunteers, and building a large stronghold in Iraq and Syria, where governments are not able to cope with the organization. Iraq and Syria depend, respectively, on aid from the United States and Iran, which have limited their operations against IS to airstrikes that not are sufficiently effective. A political approach to combat the group is likewise not forged easily. On the other hand, ABSTRACTS 5 the Islamic State is a small organization with limited ability to take over more territory. In Iraq, Sunni support for IS is limited, its adversaries are beginning to organize against it, and the scales will likely tip toward the organization’s weaknesses. Most Muslims have reservations about its approach, and the potential to realize the vision of an Islamic caliphate is limited. However, the process of obstructing the group will take time, and the organization will not disappear quickly. Keywords: Islamic State, ISIS, Iraq, Syria The End of the Syrian Revolution: Between Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s 3 | October 2014 17 | No. Volume | Islamic Caliphate and Bashar al-Assad’s Baath Regime Eyal Zisser Following three and a half years of civil war in Syria, the end of the turmoil is not in sight. Bashar al-Assad has succeeded in surviving, but Strategic Assessment Strategic the establishment of an Islamic caliphate by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has helped maintain the bloody standoff, thereby in effect dividing Syria into small sub-states: an ISIS state in eastern Syria and western Iraq, a Baath stronghold under the Assad dynasty in central Syria, and autonomous enclaves of rebel groups fighting against both the Syrian regime and ISIS. Whether Assad manages to defeat his opponents, or whether the rebels are successful, the winner or winners in the struggle are liable to discover that very little is left of Syria – a country that only a few short years ago was regarded as a paragon of stability governed by a strong and invulnerable regime. Keywords: Syria, Bashar al-Assad, ISIS Between Ankara and Tehran: How the Scramble for Kurdistan Can Reshape Regional Relations Micha’el Tanchum On June 30, 2014, Kurdistan Regional Government President Masoud Barzani announced that he would seek a referendum on Kurdish independence. In the wake of the subsequent political and military developments in Iraq, the article questions whether and to what extent Turkey and Iran can leverage their relations with the Kurdish rivals of Barzani’s Kurdish Democratic Party to prevent independence or to constrain an independent Kurdish government from exercising autonomy in its foreign relations. Concluding that neither Turkey nor Iran will be able to prevent an independent Kurdistan, ABSTRACTS 6 the article suggests that an independent Kurdistan will find an enduring relationship with Israel to be vital to securing its national interests as Erbil seeks to preserve its autonomy between the respective demands of Ankara and Tehran. Keywords: Independence, Kurdistan, Turkey, Iran, Rojava, KRG, PKK, PUK Shifts in Israel-Africa Relations Herman Butime In formulating ties with Africa, Israel has largely been motivated by | Volume 17 | No.

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