Chapter 1 Murad Giray and His Times 1 The Context of the Crimean Khanate Ruled by Murad Giray The short reign of Murad Giray (1678–83), son of Mubarek Giray Sul- tan, coincided with a groundbreaking period in the relations between the Ottoman Empire and its European neighbors. The new khan replaced Selim i Giray, who was deposed by the Ottomans as a result of the defeat of the Ottoman-Crimean army during the first siege of Chyhyryn (1677). This un- successful campaign was linked to the northeastern policy of the Sublime Porte. The Ottomans were deeply concerned with the Polish-Russian truce of Andrushovo in 1667. The agreement sanctioned the division of Ukraine into two parts, i.e., the Left Bank Ukraine, ruled by Hetman Ivan Samoilovich, who recognized Russian patronage, and the Right Bank Ukraine, ruled from Chyhyryn by Hetman Petro Doroshenko, who in 1667 still recognized Polish suzerainty. Moreover, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth had to agree to other territorial concessions to achieve peace with Muscovy. To sum up, the Truce of Andrusovo strengthened the position of Muscovy vis-à-vis the Pol- ish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. For this reason, it posed a threat to the Ot- toman’s Crimean policy of maintaining a balance of power between the two northern states. The peace, therefore, changed the political situation in the Black Sea region unfavorably for Bahçesaray and Istanbul. Moreover, the Ot- tomans and the Tatars were faced, once again, with the problem of the raids by the Cossacks, who were no longer involved in the Polish-Russian conflict. Doroshenko, however, preferred to become an Ottoman vassal, and thus have a new chance to unite the Ukrainian territories divided between Moscow and Warsaw, rather than pillage Turkish and Tatar territories. The Ottoman sul- tan, who formally accepted Doroshenko as his vassal in 1669, was well aware that the Cossacks could be very dangerous allies if not properly handled. The Ottomans could not give the task of commanding them to the Crimean Khan- ate, the Cossacks’ former rival in the Black Sea region. The Tatars, even if they had been trusted, were not powerful enough to control the Cossacks. Accord- ing to Dariusz Kołodziejczyk, the supervision of the new vassal was an impor- tant reason for the Ottoman conquest of Podolia (1672).1 In 1676, the Ottoman Empire and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth concluded the Armistice 1 Kołodziejczyk (ed.), The Ottoman Survey Register, 3–5. © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���9 | doi:�0.��63/97890043843�3_003 <UN> 40 Chapter 1 of Zhuravno, which ensured the Ottoman possession of Podolia till 1683. The truce enabled the Sublime Porte to go to war with Muscovy over control of the Right Bank Ukraine in 1677. The Ottoman army only succeeded in con- quering the most important fortress of the region, i.e., Chyhyryn, at the end of the second campaign (autumn 1678). This victory hastened the end of the war and the Ottoman-Russian peace that was concluded in Bahçesaray in 1681. The negotiations resulted in two documents: a treaty between Murad Giray and Tsar Fedor Alekseevich, and the khan’s temessük2 containing provisions of the future Ottoman-Russian treaty. According to the traditional pattern, the conditions of the latter were first negotiated and ratified by the khan. Then, the Crimean ruler sent the aforementioned temessük to the grand vizier, who in turn presented it to the sultan for approval. The Ottoman ruler issued an- other document to confirm his acceptance of the provisions negotiated by the khan. Subsequently, Russian envoys arrived in Istanbul to ask the sultan to issue a formal ‘ahdname,3 in accordance with the Tatar-Russian agreement stipulated in Bahçesaray. Eventually, Mehmed iv issued the demanded instru- ment of peace, which consisted of provisions negotiated in Bahçesaray, with some minor additions.4 The Treaty of Bahçesaray (1681) prolonged the period of relative peace in the Black Sea region, a peace that began after the second siege of Chyhryn and lasted until 1683. In that year, Murad Giray participated in a new Ottoman cam- paign, which culminated with the second siege of Vienna. Both the Ottomans and the Tatars tried to name the person responsible for the catastrophe. The Ottoman grand vizier, Kara Mustafa Paşa, pointed at the Crimean khan. Ottoman chroniclers expressed diverging opinions on the subject.5 Accounts given by Crimean authors provide quite different information on this event. The manner in which Crimean chroniclers presented the reign of Murad Giray suggests that they harbored strong feelings on the subject. Before moving into a detailed analysis of the diverse images of the khan presented by Crimean 2 In Ottoman chancery language, temessük referred to a note about state affairs; it was usually sent from a lower official to a higher one. 3 In the Ottoman chancery, the term ‘ahdname referred to a treaty unilaterally granted by the Ottoman sultan to a foreign ruler. 4 C.B. O’Brien, “Russia and Turkey, 1677–1681: The Treaty of Bakhchisarai,” Russian Review 12, no. 4 (1953), 259–268; Smirnov, Rossia i Turtsia, 165–168; Polnoe sobranie zakonov rossiiskoi imperii (St. Petersburg, 1830), 2:290–292, 389–392. 5 While Cebeci Hasan Esiri (a participant of the Vienna campaign, his dates of birth and death remain unknown), and Defterdar Sarı Mehmed Paşa (1656?–1717) blamed Murad Giray, Huseyn Hezarfen (ca. 1611–1691/2) maintained that the grand vizier was responsible for the defeat. Silahdar Mehmed Ağa (1654–1720) condemned both the khan and the grand vizier for the unsuccessful campaign; see Abrahamowicz (ed.), Kara Mustafa, 157–159, 219, 252, 298. <UN>.