Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
VOLUME 84 NUMBER 3 MAY 1977 Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes Richard E. Nisbett and Timothy DeCamp Wilson University of Michigan Evidence is reviewed which suggests that there may be little or no direct intro spective access to higher order cognitive processes. Subjects are sometimes (a) unaware of the existence of a stimulus that importantly influenced a response, (b) unaware of the existence of the response, and (c) unaware that the stimulus has affected the response. It is proposed that when people attempt to report on their cognitive processes, that is, on the processes mediating the effects of a stimulus on a response, they do not do so on the basis of any true introspection. Instead, their reports are based on a priori, implicit causal theories, or judg ments about the extent to which a particular stimulus is a plausible cause of a given response. This suggests that though people may not be able to observe directly their cognitive processes, they will sometimes be able to report accu rately about them. Accurate reports will occur when influential stimuli are salient and are plausible causes of the responses they produce, and will not occur when stimuli are not salient or are not plausible causes. "Why do you like him?" "How did you solve litical candidates (Gaudet, 1~55) or detergents this problem?" "Why did you take that job?" (Kornhauser & Lazarsfeld, 1935), why they In our daily lives we answer many such ques chose a particular occupation (Lazarsfeld, tions about the cognitive processes underlying 1931), to go to graduate school (Davis, 1964) our choices, evaluations, judgments, and be or to become a juvenile delinquent (Burt, 1925), havior. Sometimes such questions are asked by why they got married or divorced (Goode, social scientists. For example, investigators 1956) or joined a voluntary organization (Sills, have asked people why they like particular po- 1957) or moved to a new home (Rossi, 1955) or sought out a psychoanalyst (Kadushin, 1958), or failed to use a contraceptive tech The writing of this paper, and some of the research nique (Sills, 1961). Social psychologists rou described, was supported by grants GS-40085 and BNS75-23191 from the National Science Foundation. tinely ask the subjects in their experiments why The authors are greatly indebted to Eugene Borgida, they behaved,~chose,or evaluated as they did. Michael Kruger, Lee Ross, Lydia Temoshok, and Amos Indeed, some social psychologists have advo Tversky for innumerable ideas and generous and con cated the abandonment of the social psychol structive criticism. John W. Atkinson, Nancy Bellows, Dorwin Cartwright, Alvin Goldman, Sharon Gurwitz, ogy experiment and its deceptive practices and Ronald Lemley, Harvey London, Hazel Markus, Wil have urged that subjects simply be asked how liam R. Wilson, and Robert Zajonc provided valuable their cognitive processes would work if they critiques of earlier drafts of the paper. were to be confronted with particular stimulus Requests for reprints should be sent to Richard E. situations (Brown, 1962 j Kelman, 1966). Nisbett, Research Center for Group. Dynamics, Insti tute for Social Research, University of Michigan, Ann Recently, however, several cognitive psy Arbor, Michigan 48109: chologists (Mandler, 1975a, 1975b j Miller, 231 232 RICHARD E. NISBETT AND TIMOTHY DECAMP WILSON 1962; Neisser, 1967) have proposed that we (1962) has provided an excellent example of may have no direct access to higher order men- ., our lack of awareness of the operation of mem tal processes such as those involved in evalua orial processes. If a person is asked, "What is tion, judgment, problem solving, and the your mother's maiden name?", the answer ap initiation of behavior. The following quotations pears swiftly in consciousness. Then if the per will serve to indicate the extent to which these son is asked "How did you come up wi th investigators doubt people's ability to observe that?", he is usually reduced to the inarticulate directly the workings of their own minds. "It answer, "I don't know, it just came to me." is the result of thinking, not the process of It is a substantial leap, however, from re thinking, that appears spontaneously in con search and anecdotal examples concerning per sciousness" (Miller, 1962, p. 56). "The con ception and memory to blanket assertions structive processes [of encoding perceptual about higher order processes. In the absence sensations] themselves never appear in con of evidence indicating that people cannot cor sciousness, their products do" (Neisser, 1967, rectly report on the cognitive processes under p. 301). And in Neisser's next paragraph: "This lying complex behaviors such as judgment, general description of the fate of sensory in choice, inference, and problem solving, social formation seems to fit the higher mental pro scientists are not likely to abandon their prac cesses as well" (p. 301). Mandler's (1975a) sug tice of quizzing their subjects about such pro gestions are still more sweeping: "The analysis cesses. The layman is even less likely to of situations and appraisal of the environment abandon his habit of asking and answering such ... goes on mainly at the nonconscious level" questions. (p. 241). "There are many systems that cannot A second problem with the new anti-intro be brought into consciousness, and probably spectivist view is that it fails to account for the most systems that analyze the environment in fact, obvious to anyone who has ever ques the first place have that characteristic. In most tioned a subject about the reasons for his be of these cases, only the products of cognitive havior or evaluations, that people readily and mental activities are available to conscious answer such questions. Thus while people usu ness" (p. 245). And finally: "unconscious pro ally appear stumped when asked about per cesses ... include those that are not available ceptual or memorial processes, they are quite to conscious experience, be they feature analy fluent when asked why they behaved as they zers, deep syntactic structures, affective ap did in some social situation or why they like or praisals, computational processes, language dislike an object or another person. It would production systems, action systems of many seem to be incumbent on one who takes a posi kinds" (p. 230). tion that denies the possibility of introspective It is important to note that none of these access to higher order processes to account for writers cites data in support of the view that these reports by specifying their source. If it is people have no direct access to higher order not direct introspective access to a memory of mental processes. In fact, when the above quo the processes involved, what is the source of tations are read in context, it is clear that the such verbal reports? source of the speculations is not research on Finally, a third problem with the anti-intro higher. order processes such as "thinking," spectivist view is that it does not allow for the "affectIve appraisal," and "action systems," possibility that people are ever correct in their but rather research on more basic processes of reports about their higher order mental pro perception and memory. Recent research has cesses. It seems intuitively unlikely ,that such made it increasingly clear that there is almost reports are always inaccurate. But if people are no conscious awareness of perceptual and mem sometimes accurate, several questions arise. (a) orial processes. It would be absurd, for example, What is the basis of these accurate reports? (b) to ask ~ subject about the extent to which he Are accurate reports fundamentally different ,relied qn parallel line convergence when mak in kind from inaccurate ones? (c) Is it possible ing a jtl.dgment of depth or whether he stored to specify what sorts of reportswill be accurate X.the mea~ings of animal names in a hierarchical and what sorts will be inaccurate? '.Dtree fashion or in some other manner. Miller The first part of this article is concerned with ':B,~: \ " .~ ;.::., i'UQj:~~ VERBAL REPORTS ON MENTAL PROCESSES 233 a review of the evidence bearing on the accur by the manipulations; (b) even when they are acy of subjective reports about higher mental able to report the existence of the responses, processes. The second part of the paper pre subjects do not report that a change process oc sents an account of the basis of such reports. curred, that is, that an evaluational or attitudi We shall argue for three major conclusions. nal response underwent any alterations; and (c) subjects cannot correctly identify the 1. People often cannot report accurately on stimuli that produced the response. the effects of particular stimuli on higher order, inference-based responses. Indeed, sometimes A wareness of the Existence they cannot report on the existence of critical of the Response stimuli, sometimes cannot report on the exist ence of their responses, and sometimes cannot The central idea of insufficient justification even report that an inferential process of any or dissonance research is that behavior that is kind has occurred. The accuracy of subjective intrinsically undesirable will, when performed reports is so poor as to suggest that any intro for inadequate extrinsic reasons, be seen as spective access that may exist is not sufficient more attractive than when performed for ade to produce generally correct or reliable reports. quate extrinsic reasons. In the view of Fest 2. When reporting on the effects of stimuli, inger (1957) and other dissonance theorists, at people may not interrogate a memory of the titude change occurs because the cognition "I cognitive processes that operated on the stim have done something unpleasant without ade uli; instead, they may base their reports on im quate justification" is dissonant and therefore plicit, a priori theories about the causal con painful; and the person revises his opinion nection between stimulus and response.