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Russian Analytical Digest No 11: Corruption

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Russian Analytical Digest No 11: Corruption No. 11 5 December 2006 rrussianussian aanalyticalnalytical ddigestigest www.res.ethz.ch www.russlandanalysen.de CORRUPTION ■ ANALYSIS Fighting against Corruption, and Struggling for Status 2 Diana Schmidt, Bremen ■ TABLES AND DIAGRAMS International Level: Russia’s Formal Anti-Corruption Commitments 6 In Russia: Anti-Corruption Initiatives (Online Portals) 6 Corruption and Anti-Corruption as Viewed by the “Public Opinion Foundation” 7 Scale and Relevance of Corruption According to Polls Conducted by the Levada Center 9 Polling Institution VTsIOM (with Links to the Government) on Corruption in Russia 12 Transparency International: Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) 2006 (Selected Countries) 16 ■ REGIONAL REPORT Will Moscow Crack Down on Far Eastern Corruption? 18 Oleg Ssylka, Vladivostok Research Centre for East CSS Center for Security Otto Wolff -Stiftung DGO European Studies, Bremen An ETH Center Studies, ETH Zurich rrussianussian aanalyticalnalytical russian analytical digest 11/06 ddigestigest Analysis Fighting against Corruption, and Struggling for Status Diana Schmidt, Bremen Abstract Anti-corruption eff orts have gained new impetus through more determined governmental commitment in Russia in 2006. We have seen anti-corruption measures ranging from traditional high-level arrests, the rati- fi cation of the United Nations (UN) and Council of Europe (CoE) Conventions on corruption, increased collaborative engagement with international eff orts, as well as intensifi ed activities by the Duma Anti-Cor- ruption Commission and provision of support, resources, and contact points for civic involvement in the anti-corruption fi eld. But, as in the early 2000s, it is too soon to be content with these actions. Moreover, since the relations and fi nancial fl ows between foreign donors and Russian non-governmental organiza- tions have become subject to state control, new tensions have arisen at the intersection of international and domestic eff orts. Th ese include struggles over who gets the most recognition for initiating measures in this fi eld and providing information on corruption in Russia. While such cleavages are most pronounced in Moscow, they should not be ignored in cross-regional and international collaboration. Anti-Corruption during the Putin Era fi ed this year, and to both discipline and protect the y the late 1990s, when Russia was increasingly law enforcement personnel and judges in their func- Bseen as an unreliable actor in international rela- tioning within the domestic context. Chaika further tions and a poor recipient of Western fi nancial assis- stressed that, given the systemic nature of corruption, tance, the fi nancial ministers of the G-7 stressed the anti-corruption must not be regarded as a one-time critical need for Russia to fi ght corruption. Th is call action, but understood as a continuous and joint ef- was re-iterated at the 2006 G-8 Summit in St. Pe- fort, involving both state and society, which does not tersburg, which indeed triggered a joint international allow pauses or forbearance. anti-corruption document, and, in conjunction with Th ese confessions of state failure in the fi ght which, Russia ratifi ed the UN and CoE Conventions against corruption evoke the question: What has on corruption. Th ese are not merely milestones of a been done against corruption under the Putin ad- steady anti-corruption policy in Russia. Governmen- ministration? From the very beginning of his presi- tal, non-governmental, and foreign eff orts have taken dency, Putin had emphasized the country’s corruption twists and turns over the last years. Corruption, which problem and underlined his anti-corruption commit- should have been the focus of the various eff orts, has ment. Since the beginning of Putin’s tenure, Russia meanwhile grown and diversifi ed, as reported by has ratifi ed the most signifi cant conventions: the Transparency International’s Corruption Perception CoE Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure, and Index (CPI) and INDEM studies released in 2005. Confi scation of the Proceeds from Crime in 2001, the Th e 2006 CPI released on 6 November 2006 seems to UN International Convention for the Suppression of the only confi rm a worrisome situation. Financing of Terrorism in 2002, the UN Convention Offi cials continue to call for strengthening law against Transnational Organized Crime in 2004, the and order in Russia. President Putin’s Address to the UNCAC (UN Convention Against Corruption) and Coordination Meeting of Law Enforcement Agency the CoE Criminal Law Convention on Corruption in Directors on 21 November 2006 and a speech made 2006. Moreover, albeit not an OECD member-econ- by Prosecutor General Yury Chaika one week later omy, Russia has applied to accede to the OECD Anti- criticised the unchanged ineff ectiveness of the law Bribery Convention and become a participant in the enforcement system in recent years – despite improve- OECD Working Group on Bribery in 2001. Russia is ments in its fi nancing, staffi ng, structures, and, ac- also a participant in the OECD-hosted regional Anti- cordingly, overall potential. Underlining that corrup- Corruption Network for Transition Economies (ACN) tion problems keep growing while control mechanisms – and thus party to the Istanbul Anti-Corruption Action keep failing, both speakers emphasised the urgent Plan for the post-Communist region. So far, however, need for improving the legal foundations of corrup- Russia has managed to avoid subjecting itself to the im- tion prevention. Th is goes in line with the necessity plementation monitoring under the ACN and failed to to start implementing the provisions of the UN and actively work with the network, particularly regarding CoE Conventions on corruption, which Russia rati- its knowledge-sharing mandate. Other actions on the 2 rrussianussian aanalyticalnalytical russian analytical digest 11/06 ddigestigest international scene in late 2005 contradict Russia’s ap- directing the blame domestically, a move that was not parent commitment to fi ghting corruption, including unaff ected by internal power struggles and individual controversial support for Russian offi cials convicted motivations. Th e authorities pointed the fi nger at no- during the UN Oil-for-Food Program or the appoint- torious corruption-prone elements of society, includ- ment of the former German chancellor as chairman of ing the customs services, the usual unspecifi ed masses the Russian-German pipeline consortium. of businessmen and civil servants, or even “Russia’s Domestically, administrative reform, while criti- southern areas.” President Putin and then Prosecutor cized by Russian anti-corruption advocates for having General Vladimir Ustinov supported a new series of slackened off , has been pursued on a number of fronts corruption probes that hit senior security, legal and during the restructuring of federal agencies and re- customs offi cials as well as regional leaders. Following gional governance reforms, frequently on the grounds Putin’s Address, 14 federal level offi cials were dis- that corruption, traffi cking, and patronage will be re- missed, 6 high functionaries put on trial, dozens of duced. Still, such eff orts seem too scattered while a regional offi cials investigated. While more committed frequently demanded specifi c anti-corruption policy Duma deputies and activists had frequently blamed has not been adopted. According to opinion polls, the the investigation and prosecution agencies for their failure to eff ectively counteract corruption is consid- failure to act, Ustinov in turn tended to redirect the ered as one of the main shortcomings of President blame on “certain biased media outlets” for hinder- Putin (see Table xx). ing their operations and publishing accusatory articles sponsored by criminal groups. 2006 – Russia Resumes the Fight Against After Putin replaced Ustinov with Chaika in June Corruption 2006, the new Prosecutor General praised the offi ce’s ollowing intensifi ed press reporting on the CPI ability to fi ght corruption in terms of its political will Fand INDEM surveys’ claim that corruption had and functions, while acknowledging a need for re- increased during the Putin era, the Russian govern- form. Yet, whether the (ongoing) restructurings of the ment had to begin addressing the issue with new Prosecutor General’s offi ce will fi nally lead to tackling vigor. 2006 was announced as a critical year in the judicial reform as a way to address corruption remains Duma’s struggle against corruption and President Pu- to be seen. Chaika, the former Justice Minister under tin admitted in his 2006 State of the Nation Address Putin and earlier the Prosecutor General under Yeltsin, that “despite all the eff orts we have made, we have set off by removing several prosecutors claiming that still not yet managed to remove one of the greatest they were incompetent or corrupt, including, among obstacles facing our development, that of corruption”. others chief military prosecutor Alexander Savenkov. Also at the 10th International Business Forum in St. Th is move has caused consternation among soldiers’ Petersburg in June 2006, Putin himself addressed the rights activists, since Savenkov has been reputed to be necessity of anti-corruption initiatives in his open- qualifi ed and fair, concerned about investigating army ing speech, underlining that “it is not easy to combat crimes, and has publicly criticized Defense Minister these negative practices … But we have never ceased Sergei Ivanov for failing to prevent hazing, a serious this fi ght against corruption, and intend to
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