Social morphogenesis as enactive agency Active inference, evolutionary transition, and the deep roots of complex societies

Avel Gu´enin–Carlut avelguenin.github.io May 21, 2021

Kairos Research kairos-research.org Table of Contents

Introducing active inference to cultural evolutionists

Clarifying active inference

Emerging agency as active inference

1 Introducing active inference to cultural evolutionists The Free Energy Principle [17, 11, 18, 1] Dynamical systems, given sufficiently regular boundary conditions, spontaneously self-organise so as to minimise their expected variational free energy, effectively maximising evidence for the world-model they enact.

(En)active inference is the process by which dynamical systems climb evidence gradient, ie autonomously enact adaptive agency [31].

from Friston [18]

Dynamics as inference

2 (En)active inference is the process by which dynamical systems climb evidence gradient, ie autonomously enact adaptive agency [31].

from Friston [18]

Dynamics as inference

The Free Energy Principle [17, 11, 18, 1] Dynamical systems, given sufficiently regular boundary conditions, spontaneously self-organise so as to minimise their expected variational free energy, effectively maximising evidence for the world-model they enact.

2 Dynamics as inference

The Free Energy Principle [17, 11, 18, 1] Dynamical systems, given sufficiently regular boundary conditions, spontaneously self-organise so as to minimise their expected variational free energy, effectively maximising evidence for the world-model they enact.

(En)active inference is the process by which dynamical systems climb evidence gradient, ie autonomously enact adaptive agency [31].

from Friston [18] 2 Active inference can work by altering one’s environment to fit their expectations, which corresponds to the evolutionary process known as niche construction [8, 13]. from Veissi`ereet al. [39]

Humans in particular build shared expectations through engagement with common social and material affordances, allowing adaptative cultural niche construction [23, 6] by thinking through other minds [39, 40].

Cultural niche construction as active inference

3 Humans in particular build shared expectations through engagement with common social and material affordances, allowing adaptative cultural niche construction [23, 6] by thinking through other minds [39, 40].

Cultural niche construction as active inference

Active inference can work by altering one’s environment to fit their expectations, which corresponds to the evolutionary process known as niche construction [8, 13]. from Veissi`ereet al. [39]

3 Cultural niche construction as active inference

Active inference can work by altering one’s environment to fit their expectations, which corresponds to the evolutionary process known as niche construction [8, 13]. from Veissi`ereet al. [39]

Humans in particular build shared expectations through engagement with common social and material affordances, allowing adaptative cultural niche construction [23, 6] by thinking through other minds [39, 40].

3 • Occam’s razor : Is Active Inference effectively predictive of new facts about human cognition ? [7, 14, 42] • The Optimisation problem : If Active Inference is verified, how is everything not always adaptive ? [9, 10, 16] • The Enactive objective : Can Active Inference account for non-representational engagement with a landscape of affordances ? [2, 4, 5, 16, 22, 26]

Common criticism to Active Inference

4 • The Optimisation problem : If Active Inference is verified, how is everything not always adaptive ? [9, 10, 16] • The Enactive objective : Can Active Inference account for non-representational engagement with a landscape of affordances ? [2, 4, 5, 16, 22, 26]

Common criticism to Active Inference

• Occam’s razor : Is Active Inference effectively predictive of new facts about human cognition ? [7, 14, 42]

4 • The Enactive objective : Can Active Inference account for non-representational engagement with a landscape of affordances ? [2, 4, 5, 16, 22, 26]

Common criticism to Active Inference

• Occam’s razor : Is Active Inference effectively predictive of new facts about human cognition ? [7, 14, 42] • The Optimisation problem : If Active Inference is verified, how is everything not always adaptive ? [9, 10, 16]

4 Common criticism to Active Inference

• Occam’s razor : Is Active Inference effectively predictive of new facts about human cognition ? [7, 14, 42] • The Optimisation problem : If Active Inference is verified, how is everything not always adaptive ? [9, 10, 16] • The Enactive objective : Can Active Inference account for non-representational engagement with a landscape of affordances ? [2, 4, 5, 16, 22, 26]

4 Clarifying active inference The Active Inference framework does not add anything to the explanation of how cognition or culture works.

It provides physical grounding to the study of cognition [11] by explaining why dynamical systems must self-organise toward adaptive

coupling with their environment. Self-organised adaptive coupling

Explanation and (scientific) prediction

5 It provides physical grounding to the study of cognition [11] by explaining why dynamical systems must self-organise toward adaptive

coupling with their environment. Self-organised adaptive coupling

Explanation and (scientific) prediction

The Active Inference framework does not add anything to the explanation of how cognition or culture works.

5 Explanation and (scientific) prediction

The Active Inference framework does not add anything to the explanation of how cognition or culture works.

It provides physical grounding to the study of cognition [11] by explaining why dynamical systems must self-organise toward adaptive

coupling with their environment. Self-organised adaptive coupling

5 The Active Inference framework does not entail that living systems manage to find an optimum in free-energy, making them always adaptive.

It entails that existing living systems have historically integrated information helping them gravitate around the stablest attractors they could actually explore [12]. Only historyless systems need reach an optimum.

Optimality and history

6 It entails that existing living systems have historically integrated information helping them gravitate around the stablest attractors they could actually explore [12]. Only historyless systems need reach an optimum.

Optimality and history

The Active Inference framework does not entail that living systems manage to find an optimum in free-energy, making them always adaptive.

6 Optimality and history

The Active Inference framework does not entail that living systems manage to find an optimum in free-energy, making them always adaptive.

It entails that existing living systems have historically integrated information helping them gravitate around the stablest attractors they could actually explore [12]. Only historyless systems need reach an optimum.

6 Agents under active inference do not engage with their niche by integrating cognitive representations of its features.

Predictive knowledge is embodied in the material structure and enacted in the situated activity of an agent [31]. A state-of-the-art statistical model of the woodlice’s niche From [? ]

(Cognitive) prediction and enaction

7 Predictive knowledge is embodied in the material structure and enacted in the situated activity of an agent [31]. A state-of-the-art statistical model of the woodlice’s niche From [? ]

(Cognitive) prediction and enaction

Agents under active inference do not engage with their niche by integrating cognitive representations of its features.

7 (Cognitive) prediction and enaction

Agents under active inference do not engage with their niche by integrating cognitive representations of its features.

Predictive knowledge is embodied in the material structure and enacted in the situated activity of an agent [31]. A state-of-the-art statistical model of the woodlice’s niche From [? ]

7 Emerging agency as active inference The dense, hierarchical settlements known as City-States developped as the result of long-distance trade [37] and taxation [34], accelerated by the later development of bookkeeping [19] and other institutions [38]. Unknown source

City-States as collective organisms The coevolution of functional specialisation of individual [41], writing as a new information system [21], and centralised administration [35] make the evolution of City-States a clear case of evolutionary transition toward collective organism.

The City-State complex

8 City-States as collective organisms The coevolution of functional specialisation of individual [41], writing as a new information system [21], and centralised administration [35] make the evolution of City-States a clear case of evolutionary transition toward collective organism.

The City-State complex

The dense, hierarchical settlements known as City-States developped as the result of long-distance trade [37] and taxation [34], accelerated by the later development of bookkeeping [19] and other institutions [38]. Unknown source

8 The City-State complex

The dense, hierarchical settlements known as City-States developped as the result of long-distance trade [37] and taxation [34], accelerated by the later development of bookkeeping [19] and other institutions [38]. Unknown source

City-States as collective organisms The coevolution of functional specialisation of individual [41], writing as a new information system [21], and centralised administration [35] make the evolution of City-States a clear case of evolutionary transition toward collective organism.

8 The emergence of collective organisms is precedented in biological history [36, 41], and is materialised as a closure of constraints in collective organisation [27].

From Mont´eviland Mossio [27]

Constraint closure as active inference The constraints embodied in the structure of a system, if they work to adaptively maintain themselves, enact a world model characteristic of cognitive under the Active Inference framework [31, 20]

Enacting collective agency

9 Constraint closure as active inference The constraints embodied in the structure of a system, if they work to adaptively maintain themselves, enact a world model characteristic of cognitive under the Active Inference framework [31, 20]

Enacting collective agency

The emergence of collective organisms is precedented in biological history [36, 41], and is materialised as a closure of constraints in collective organisation [27].

From Mont´eviland Mossio [27]

9 Enacting collective agency

The emergence of collective organisms is precedented in biological history [36, 41], and is materialised as a closure of constraints in collective organisation [27].

From Mont´eviland Mossio [27]

Constraint closure as active inference The constraints embodied in the structure of a system, if they work to adaptively maintain themselves, enact a world model characteristic of cognitive under the Active Inference framework [31, 20] 9 Variational free-energy minimisation occurs across scale in living systems, in a way that generates creative evolution trough bioresonance [24] and grounds their nested organisation [30, 29, 3, 15].

from Ramstead et al. [30]

Cultural evolution in the collective brain [28] Multiscale population structure accelerate the process of cultural adaptation [32, 25, 33], and enables variation in the cultural niche to generate innovation in collective phenotype.

The cultural evolution of collective agency

10 Cultural evolution in the collective brain [28] Multiscale population structure accelerate the process of cultural adaptation [32, 25, 33], and enables variation in the cultural niche to generate innovation in collective phenotype.

The cultural evolution of collective agency

Variational free-energy minimisation occurs across scale in living systems, in a way that generates creative evolution trough bioresonance [24] and grounds their nested organisation [30, 29, 3, 15].

from Ramstead et al. [30]

10 The cultural evolution of collective agency

Variational free-energy minimisation occurs across scale in living systems, in a way that generates creative evolution trough bioresonance [24] and grounds their nested organisation [30, 29, 3, 15].

from Ramstead et al. [30]

Cultural evolution in the collective brain [28] Multiscale population structure accelerate the process of cultural adaptation [32, 25, 33], and enables variation in the cultural niche to generate innovation in collective phenotype.

10 Conclusion • Active Inference provides physics-first formal ontology for the study of cognition across scales, and self-organisation in general. • It focuses on how ”agents” coevolve across scales by integrating information about their niche, and imprinting expectations into it. • It grounds the evolutionary study of cognition and culture in the adaptive integration of material and social constraints on human activities.

Conclusion

11 • It focuses on how ”agents” coevolve across scales by integrating information about their niche, and imprinting expectations into it. • It grounds the evolutionary study of cognition and culture in the adaptive integration of material and social constraints on human activities.

Conclusion

• Active Inference provides physics-first formal ontology for the study of cognition across scales, and self-organisation in general.

11 • It grounds the evolutionary study of cognition and culture in the adaptive integration of material and social constraints on human activities.

Conclusion

• Active Inference provides physics-first formal ontology for the study of cognition across scales, and self-organisation in general. • It focuses on how ”agents” coevolve across scales by integrating information about their niche, and imprinting expectations into it.

11 Conclusion

• Active Inference provides physics-first formal ontology for the study of cognition across scales, and self-organisation in general. • It focuses on how ”agents” coevolve across scales by integrating information about their niche, and imprinting expectations into it. • It grounds the evolutionary study of cognition and culture in the adaptive integration of material and social constraints on human activities.

11 References

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