Terrorism in the Middle East: a Comparison of Al-Qaeda and Hamas

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Terrorism in the Middle East: a Comparison of Al-Qaeda and Hamas TERRORISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST: A COMPARISON OF AL-QAEDA AND HAMAS A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES OF MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY BY SEVİNÇ EBRU TEMEL IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE IN THE PROGRAM OF MIDDLE EAST STUDIES MAY 2019 Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences Prof. Dr. Tülin Gençöz Director I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Masters of Arts. Assist. Prof. Dr. Derya Göçer Akder Head of Department This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Masters of Arts. Dr. Richard Dietrich Supervisor Examining Committee Members Prof. Dr. Recep Boztemur (METU, HIST) Dr. Richard Dietrich (METU, HIST) Prof. Dr. Hayriye Erbaş (Ankara Uni., SOS) I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work. Name, Last Name : Sevinç Ebru Temel Signature : iii ABSTRACT TERRORISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST: A COMPARISON OF AL-QAEDA AND HAMAS TEMEL, Sevinç Ebru M.S., Graduate Program of Middle East Studies Supervisor: Dr. Richard Dietrich May 2019, 149 pages The aim of this thesis is to analyze al-Qaeda and Hamas, which are two of the organizations that come to mind when it comes to terrorist activities in Middle East, compare them under headings including their ideologies, goals, spheres of influence, their position in the international arena, and, finally, introduce a new and realistic approach to the perception of terrorism in the Middle East by revealing the mistaken belief and ideas about Hamas. It is seen that there has appeared a tendency of using terrorism side by side with Islam especially due to the bloody terrorist acts of al- Qaeda and that Hamas has been affected with this perception. There are still arguments claiming that Hamas should be included in the list of terrorist organizations, although the perception of it in world public opinion has begun to change after it joined the parliament following its becoming a political party after 2006, and as a result of election victory. Therefore, in this study, it has been attempted to reveal the differences between Hamas, and al-Qaeda, whose terrorist character is so obvious, and which identifies itself with Islam, by comparing the two, and "what Hamas is" and "what it is not" are both examined. This study has revealed iv that uniform evaluations made on Hamas with a reductionist approach cannot present an objective analysis, and thus there emerged a need to conduct realistic academic studies which focus on the essence of Hamas that is missing in the literature and is not affected by personal feelings. Keywords: Terrorism, Hamas, al-Qaeda, Palestinian Issue, Resistance Movement v ÖZ ORTADOĞU’DA TERÖR: AL-QAEDA VE HAMAS MUKAYESESİ Temel, Sevinç Ebru Yüksek Lisans, Orta Doğu Araştırmaları Programı Tez Yöneticisi: Dr. Richard Dietrich Mayıs 2019, 149 sayfa Bu tezin amacı, Ortadoğu’da terör denildiğinde akla gelen yapılardan ikisi olan El- Kaide ve Hamas’ı analiz etmek, ideolojileri, amaçları, etki alanları, uluslararası arenadaki konumları ve güncel durumları başlıkları altında karşılaştırmak ve nihai olarak Hamas hakkında yanlış bilinen nitelikleri ortaya koyarak Ortadoğu’da terör algısına yeni ve gerçekçi bir yaklaşım getirmektir. Özellikle El-Kaidenin kanlı terör eylemleri neticesinde günümüzde İslam ile terörü yan yana hatta iç içe kullanmak gibi bir eğilim geliştiği ve bu algıdan bir direniş hareketi olan hamasın da nasibini aldığı görülmektedir. Her ne kadar 2006 sonrası partileşmesi ve seçim zaferi neticesinde parlamentoda yerini almasının ardından Hamas hakkında dünya kamuoyundaki algı nispeten farklılaşmaya başlamış olsa da hamasın terör örgütü listelerinde yer alması gerektiğini savunan görüşler halen mevcuttur. Bu nedenle bu çalışmada Hamas’ı el kaide gibi terörist niteliği tartışma götürmeyen, kendini İslam’la bir tanımlayan bir örgütle kıyaslamaya tabi tutarak farklılıkları göz önüne serilmeye çalışılmış, hamasın aslında “ne olduğu” ile beraber “ne olmadığı” da incelenmiştir. Bu çalışma ile Hamas’a dair şimdiye kadar indirgemeci bir yaklaşımla yapılmış tekdüze değerlendirmelerin makul, gerçekçi ve objektif bir analiz ortaya vi koyamayacağı ve bu doğrultuda özellikle Hamas’a dair literatürde eksik kalan öze dönük, hissiyattan uzak gerçekçi akademik çalışmaların gerekliliği de ortaya çıkarılmıştır. Anahtar Kelimeler: Terörizm, Hamas, El-Kaide, Filistin Meselesi, Direniş Hareketi vii To My Beloved Family viii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisor Dr. Richard Dietrich for his guidance, advice, criticism, encouragement and insight throughout the research. I owe my deepest gratitude to my parents, Ayşe Temel, Hüseyin Vehbi Temel, Serdar Temel for their special encouragement and support for every phase of my educational life. Without them I could not finish this thesis. I would also like to thank to my friend, Ceylan Ergenoğlu for her support and hospitality throughout my master education. ix TABLE OF CONTENTS PLAGIARISM ........................................................................................................ iii ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................ iv ÖZ ............................................................................................................................ vi ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .................................................................................... ix TABLE OF CONTENTS ......................................................................................... x LIST OF FIGURES ................................................................................................ xii LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ............................................................................... xiii CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................ 1 2. A BRIEF INTRODUCTION ABOUT TERRORISM ......................................... 6 3. TERRORISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST IN THE CONTEXT OF AL-QAEDA AND HAMAS .............................................................................................................. 13 3.1. What is Al-Qaeda? ....................................................................................... 13 3.1.1. Historical Background of Al-Qaeda ................................................... 13 3.1.2. Foundation/Founding Fathers ............................................................. 16 3.1.3. Ideology .............................................................................................. 21 3.1.4. Main Targets and Strategy .................................................................. 27 3.1.5. Organizational Structure ..................................................................... 31 3.2. What is Hamas? ........................................................................................... 40 3.2.1. Historical Background of Hamas ........................................................ 40 3.2.2. Foundation / Founding Fathers ........................................................... 41 3.2.3. Ideology .............................................................................................. 45 3.2.4. Main Targets and Strategy .................................................................. 48 3.2.5. Organizational Structure ..................................................................... 51 4. COMPARISON AND CONTRAST .................................................................. 57 4.1. Geographical / Sphere of Influence ............................................................. 57 4.2. Ideological ................................................................................................... 61 4.3. Based on Targets .......................................................................................... 66 x 4.4. International Responses ............................................................................... 71 4.5. Current Positions ......................................................................................... 80 5. CONCLUSION .................................................................................................. 86 REFERENCES ....................................................................................................... 93 APPENDICES APPENDIX A: HAMAS CHARTER .................................................................. 101 APPENDIX B: TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET ............................... 138 APPENDIX C: TEZ İZİN FORMU/THESIS PERMISSION FORM ................. 149 xi LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1. View of al-Qaeda processes which highlight the core functional areas for organizational activity ...................................................................... 34 Figure 2. Organizational structure and hierarchy of al-Qaeda ............................... 35 Figure 3. Hamas’s internal structure ...................................................................... 56 xii LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS EU European Union PA Palestinian Authority PLO Palestine Liberation Organization UN United Nations US United States xiii CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION The fear of terror, which has been
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