SUDAN: SAVING PEACE IN THE EAST Africa Report N°102 – 5 January 2006 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 II. BACKGROUND OF THE CONFLICT....................................................................... 2 A. GEOGRAPHY, DEMOGRAPHY AND POLITICAL ECONOMY.......................................................2 B. POLITICAL HISTORY..............................................................................................................3 1. The Beja Congress and the struggle for regionalism.................................................3 2. The NIF: Inviting armed struggle, and getting it .....................................................4 3. The CPA: What peace dividend?...............................................................................6 III. POLITICAL DYNAMICS........................................................................................... 10 A. NATIONAL CONGRESS PARTY AND THE SECURITY ESTABLISHMENT ...................................11 B. THE EASTERN FRONT..........................................................................................................14 1. The Beja Congress...................................................................................................14 2. The Rashaida Free Lions (al-usud al-hurra) ...........................................................17 3. Formation of the Eastern Front................................................................................18 4. SPLM.......................................................................................................................19 5. Democratic Unionist Party (DUP)...........................................................................20 6. JEM and other national political forces ...................................................................21 IV. INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES TO THE CRISIS ............................................... 22 A. ERITREA .............................................................................................................................23 B. LIBYA .................................................................................................................................23 C. EGYPT.................................................................................................................................24 D. UN .....................................................................................................................................24 E. U.S. ....................................................................................................................................26 F. EU AND MEMBER STATES...................................................................................................26 G. AFRICAN UNION AND IGAD ...............................................................................................27 H. TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL WORKPLAN .......................................................................27 V. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 28 APPENDICES A. MAP OF EASTERN SUDAN ...................................................................................................30 B. MAP OF NDA-CONTROLLED TERRITORY............................................................................31 C. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .......................................................................32 D. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON AFRICA...........................................................33 E. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES ...................................................................................35 Africa Report N°102 5 January 2006 SUDAN: SAVING PEACE IN THE EAST EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS The low-intensity conflict between the government and could be willing to trade away its support for the Eastern the Eastern Front risks becoming a major new war with Front. If fighting does break out again between the two disastrous humanitarian consequences if the Sudan large neighbours, eastern Sudan, whose humanitarian People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) proceeds with situation is in some ways worse than Darfur’s, would its scheduled withdrawal from eastern Sudan this month. face a disastrous flood of refugees. Competition to fill the security vacuum could spark urban unrest, reprisals and worse. Yet, there is also a peace Credible negotiations are needed immediately to address opportunity. As a partner in the new Government of the simmering conflict in eastern Sudan but these are being National Unity and with troops in the East, the SPLM is in delayed because the Government of National Unity, with a position to broker a deal. Like Darfur and the South, the its SPLM contingent, and the international community East suffers from marginalisation and underdevelopment: are concentrating almost exclusively on Darfur. The legitimate claims for more power and wealth sharing in urgent requirement is to put an end to the piecemeal a federal arrangement should be addressed within the approach to peacemaking. The East needs to be framework of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement incorporated into a national process that builds on the (CPA) the government and SPLM signed in 2005. But CPA and includes Darfur. One forum may not be practical the SPLM needs to push for a provisional ceasefire and to resolve Sudan’s regional wars but a common framework use its influence in Khartoum to get serious negotiations. is needed to give continuity and consistency to disparate International partners, under UN leadership, should negotiations which have been strung out over the last facilitate the process. four years. The CPA has brought no peace dividend to either eastern The CPA provides the conceptual and substantive Sudan or the Darfur region of western Sudan. It dealt with framework to solve Sudan’s regional wars, in the East as the political and economic marginalisation of the South well as Darfur. It is based on the premise that the South’s but ignored the similar structural imbalance in the rest long marginalisation by the centre (Khartoum) and its of the country. The ruling National Congress Party (NCP) underdevelopment led to the civil war that lasted 21 years. and the international community are now bearing the To rectify those underlying causes, the NCP and the SPLM consequences of excluding other participants from the agreed to power sharing commensurate with the South’s long negotiations that were conducted at Naivasha in population as well as significant wealth sharing between Kenya. After hundreds of thousands of deaths and the the central government and the government of South displacement of millions in Darfur, the international Sudan. Since Khartoum and the Eastern Front alike say community is trying to salvage a peace in negotiations they recognise that the same underlying causes have conducted under African Union sponsorship at Abuja. contributed to conflict in the East (as well as Darfur and At the same time, however, it may be in the process of elsewhere in the North), the same elements of a solution repeating its mistake by largely ignoring another powder should be applied. keg. If this is to happen, the SPLM will need to use its leverage Under the terms of the CPA, the SPLM is obliged to as a member of the Government of National Unity and withdraw from eastern Sudan by 9 January 2006, though play a robust role. Though this means diverting some time fortuitously it is months behind schedule. Its former and energy from its major preoccupations in the South, partner, the Eastern Front, will seek to take over but the its new responsibilities in Khartoum make it uniquely NCP is unlikely to permit it to exercise uncontested competent to advance the policy. It has fought side by control. Its efforts to recover territory along the Eritrean side with the people in the East and knows the similarities border will be all the more dangerous because Eritrea of their situation with that of the South. Moreover, it has and Ethiopia are on the verge of renewing hostilities. a duty to ensure that its withdrawal from eastern Sudan Asmara wants to ensure at least Sudanese neutrality and does not create a security vacuum that could invite Sudan: Saving Peace in the East Crisis Group Africa Report N°102, 5 January 2006 Page ii escalation. It must insist on having strong and senior To Create a Credible Negotiation Process: representation on the government delegation and then press for an early start to credible negotiations with the 3. An eastern Sudan negotiating forum should be Eastern Front. established that includes: (a) a special envoy, appointed by the UN To prevent war in the East, the international community Secretary-General and accepted by the needs to work with the key regional actors, particularly parties, who serves as the lead mediator Eritrea, to underwrite comprehensive negotiations between and liaises with the UN Mission in Sudan; the Government of National Unity and the Eastern Front that can produce a sustainable peace based on the CPA (b) a secretariat, provided by the UN or another framework. Western governments should make it capable body, to give the mediation technical clear that they also want to take a major part in those capacity; and negotiations, not unlike what they did with the CPA and (c) international