Burma Policy Briefing Nr 10 March 2013 The Kachin Crisis : Peace Must Prevail The recent political unrest and military vio- Conclusions and Recommendations lence in the Kachin and northern Shan states has been on an unprecedented scale, • The government should halt all offensive raising serious questions over the goals of operations against the KIO and other the quasi-civilian government of President armed ethnic forces. Armed conflict will Thein Sein and its ability to control the na- worsen – not resolve – Burma’s ethnic and tional armed forces (Tatmadaw). Since political crises. The violence contradicts assuming office in March 2011, Thein Sein promises to achieve reform through dia- has received praise from around the world logue, and undermines democratic and for a “reformist” agenda that has seen many economic progress for the whole country. political prisoners released, Aung San Suu • Ethnic peace must be prioritised as an Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) integral part of political, economic and win seats to parliament, ceasefires with the constitutional reform. Dialogue must be majority of armed ethnic opposition groups, established to include ethnic groups that and a gradual liberalisation of media, are outside the national political system. business and other aspects of national life. • Restrictions on humanitarian aid to the These are trends that the international victims of conflict must be lifted. With community has been keen to encourage, hundreds of thousands of displaced with UN General-Secretary Ban Ki-moon persons in the ethnic borderlands, a long- and US President Barack Obama among term effort is required to ensure that aid world leaders visiting Burma/Myanmar.1 truly reaches to the most vulnerable and This honeymoon period is now over. As needy peoples as part of any process of 2012 progressed, perceptions of the real peace-building. nature of change under the Thein Sein gov- • Economic and development program- ernment were challenged by a series of dis- mes must benefit local peoples. Land- turbing events in which serious violence grabbing and unsustainable business and mass displacement of civilians occur- practices must halt, and decisions on the red in several parts of the country. These use of natural resources and regional dev- included communal conflict in the Rakhine elopment must have the participation of state in which 147 people died and more local communities and representatives. than 110,000 (mostly Muslims) were dis- • The international community must play placed,2 and dozens of serious injuries, in- an informed and neutral role in supporting cluding Buddhist monks, in a police crack- ethnic peace and political reform. Human down on protestors at the Letpadaung cop- rights’ progress remains essential, all ethnic per mine, a joint-venture project between groups should be included, and economic the Tatmadaw-owned Union of Myanmar investments made only with the consulta- Economic Holdings and a Chinese subsi- tion of local peoples. diary of a state-owned arms manufacturer.3 Burma Policy Briefing | 1 The most protracted violence, however, by powerful military and business interests took place in northeast Burma during a under the former State Peace and Develop- government offensive against the Kachin ment Council (SPDC) regime and that this Independence Organisation (KIO), an policy has been continued under the new armed ethnic opposition group calling for government. ethnic rights and autonomy.4 Until the Events in the Kachin region are also being Thein Sein government came to power, the closely watched in other borderland areas Kachin region had witnessed 17 years of where other ethnic groups, some of which ceasefire. But since fighting resumed in have only recently agreed ceasefires, believe June 2011, thousands of casualties killed or that a similar array of tactics – including a injured – as well as more than 100,000 fast-moving mix of military pressures, internally displaced civilians – have been peace offers, land-grabbing, political stasis reported.5 and outside business deals – are being em- Although President Thein Sein several ployed in their territories to advance gov- times announced halts to army offensives ernment interests and undermine ethnic in the Kachin region,6 Tatmadaw attacks unity and opposition at this vital moment continued nonetheless, unveiling an unpar- in the country’s history. A perception re- alleled show of force, including aerial bom- mains that senior figures in Burma’s ruling bardments during December 2012 and elite are playing a strategic game of “divide January 2013 against KIO positions around and rule” for time in order to build a new Laiza where thousands of civilians were incarnation of military-dominated govern- sheltering. At a time of supposed peace and ment. reform, such images of military violence After twenty months of fighting, the dam- caused shock waves in both Burma and age to community relations in the Kachin abroad. region is incalculable. Grave human rights Clearly, at a time of state transition, the abuses have been reported, countless prop- political and ethnic challenges facing erty and lives destroyed, and entire com- Burma are complex. After five decades of munities displaced from their homes since military rule and repression, sustainable government operations started in June 7 and meaningful reforms are likely to take 2011. There also remains a risk of violence time. On a positive note, any visitor to the spreading, with Shan, Palaung and other country can see the reduction in political ethnic parties similarly accusing govern- restrictions compared to just two years ago, ment forces of coercive tactics in adjoining 8 especially in Yangon and the main conur- districts of the Shan state. bations. These have brought a new mood of hope for change. Urgent action is required to address the political and humanitarian crisis. Following Many legacies of the past, however, still Thein Sein’s latest announcement on 18 remain, and the violence in the Kachin January of a unilateral ceasefire against the region has happened under the new politi- KIO, opportunities should exist for dia- cal system, holding the present government logue and reconciliation to resolve conflict, accountable for explanations and actions. and preliminary peace talks have restarted. Of especial concern, the intensity of army But in many areas low-intensity attacks by offensives in the Kachin region has streng- government forces have continued, while thened opposition beliefs that a policy to Kachin and other nationality leaders com- marginalise the Kachin and other national- plain that there is little indication that the ity peoples in northeast Burma was started new peace talks will address the underlying 2 | Burma Policy Briefing political and ethnic crises that have long ences continue to exist between the coun- needed to be solved. try’s Burman Buddhist majority, who most- ly inhabit the central plains, and ethnic It is therefore vital that all fighting is imme- minority peoples in the borderlands, who diately halted, real political dialogue make up an estimated third of Burma’s 60 started, and humanitarian aid allowed to all million population. communities affected by the conflict. If Burma is to see a long-wanted era of peace The Kachin conflict is among the most pro- and democracy, armed violence should be tracted of Burma’s ethnic wars. Resistance ending – not resuming under the new to central government rule has continued political system. The Kachin crisis has now through all four political eras since inde- become a test case for how old injustices pendence. The Kachin Independence Orga- will be addressed. nisation was formed in 1961, following discontent over perceived ethnic inequality A HISTORY OF UNREST and discrimination, government neglect and plans to make Buddhism Burma’s state Political and ethnic conflict has continued religion. Most Kachins are Christians and through each political era in Burma since closely inter-linked by clan traditions. In independence in 1948. Every change in subsequent years, the KIO rapidly grew political system (in 1948, 1962, 1988 and into one of the best-organised armed oppo- 2011) has been followed by volatility and sition forces in the country, with health, then peace talks that have sought to bring education and other departments across the the opposing parties together. These in- Kachin state and northern Shan state where clude the 1963-64 nationwide “Peace Par- an estimated 100,000 Kachins also live. ley” under Gen. Ne Win’s “Burmese Way to Socialism” government, the post-1989 Despite its militant pedigree, across the ethnic ceasefires under the State Law and years the KIO has been among the leading Order Restoration Council (SLORC: sub- voices for dialogue and national unity to sequently SPDC) regime, and, most re- bring opposing parties in the country cently, the “Union Peace Making” initiative together. Early demands for separatism of President Thein Sein. were replaced by federal goals, with the To date, none of these dialogue processes KIO becoming a founder member of the has brought inclusive peace to the country. ethnic National Democratic Front (NDF) In consequence, continuing political and in 1976. The KIO also held peace talks with ethnic conflicts have remained a funda- the Ne Win government in 1963, 1972 and mental reason for Burma’s post-colonial 1980-81 before its late chairman Brang decline to the bottom of international Seng agreed a ceasefire with the military 11 league tables in every field from economic SLORC government in 1994. After im- to humanitarian affairs.9 mense loss of life, the Kachin region was at peace for the first time in over three The consequences have been profound. In decades.12 the early 21st century, many borderlands remain under the control of over 20 armed Today the 1994-2011 ceasefire period is ethnic opposition forces, and there are widely regarded as one of lost opportuni- large ethnic minority regions that have ties. The Kachin region became one of the never come under central government fastest-changing borderlands during the authority since independence.10 As a result, SLORC-SPDC era.