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The UK's Foreign Policy Towards Afghanistan and Pakistan

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The UK's Foreign Policy Towards Afghanistan and Pakistan 1 House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee The UK’s Foreign Policy towards Afghanistan and Pakistan Written Evidence This is a volume of submissions, relevant to the inquiry ‘The UK’s Foreign Policy towards Afghanistan and Pakistan’, which have been reported to the House. Only those submissions written specifically for the Committee have been included. 2 List of written evidence 1 Foreign and Commonwealth Office 3 2 The Henry Jackson Society 73 3 Christian Aid 84 4 Oxfam GB 88 5 British and Irish Agencies Afghanistan Group (BAAG) 100 6 James Fergusson, author and journalist 109 7 Matt Waldman, independent Afghanistan analyst 114 8 Gerard Russell MBE, Research Fellow, Harvard Kennedy School’s Carr Center for Human Rights Policy 124 9 Dr Sajjan M. Gohel, International Security Director, Asia-Pacific Foundation 130 10 Professor Sultan Barakat & Mr Steven A. Zyck, Post-war Reconstruction & Development Unit, University of York 175 11 Professor Philip M. Taylor, University of Leeds 183 12 Andrew Watt 187 13 Chris Coverdale, Campaign to Make Wars History 194 14 BBC World Service 205 15 Professor Shaun Gregory 213 16 Roman Solodchenko 217 17 Correspondence between the Chair and the Prime Minister 221 18 Supplementary written evidence from Sir Sherard Cowper-Coles KCMG LVO 222 3 Written Evidence from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office SUMMARY Why Afghanistan and Pakistan Matter to UK Interests 1. Afghanistan and Pakistan are this Government’s top priorities in Foreign Affairs. Violent extremism in both countries poses a threat to UK interests and to regional stability and claims the lives of thousands of civilians and security personnel. Extremism and the instability it causes also hold back good governance, development and economic progress in both countries. It is in Britain’s national interest to work with international allies and with the governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan to reduce the threat from violent extremism and shore up long-term stability in the region. Afghanistan 2. The UK’s objective is to prevent Afghanistan once again becoming a place from which al- Qaeda and other extremists can attack the UK and our interests. Our policy has four main goals: 1. A more stable and secure Afghanistan 2. The conditions for withdrawal of UK combat troops by 2015, including capable Afghan National Security Forces 3. An Afghan-led political settlement that represents all Afghan people 4. Regional political and security co-operation that supports a stable Afghanistan. 3. The UK will work with the Afghan government, regional partners, international allies and multilateral institutions to achieve these goals. From 2015 UK forces will no longer have a combat role in Afghanistan. But this will not signal the end of our engagement in Afghanistan. Our civilian and economic support will intensify over the next five years as we move away from international military intervention and Afghanistan stabilises further. We will also continue UK training and support for the Afghan National Security Forces. 4. It is for the Afghan people to shape a political settlement which reflects the needs and aspirations of all Afghan people. Britain will support an eventual settlement that is representative, gives no one group disproportionate influence, upholds human rights and the rule of law and reflects Afghanistan’s culture and Constitution. 5. On Afghanistan the total civilian programme expenditure is expected to be in excess of £220 million in 2010-11. This is made up of Department for International Development (DFID), Ministry of Defence (MOD) and Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) funds with contributions from the jointly managed Conflict Pool. Pakistan 6. The UK is committed to an enhanced, long-term strategic Partnership with Pakistan with four key strands: 4 • To help Pakistan overcome its short and long-term challenges from violent extremism, reducing significantly the threat to Pakistan and UK citizens; • To help Pakistan tackle her longer-term structural challenges, relating to governance, the economy and development, including tackling the significant problems of accelerating population growth and limited educational opportunities; • To work with Pakistan to make the region safer and more secure, taking account of Pakistan’s legitimate interests but also those of others; • To deepen our bilateral ties, acknowledging the very strong historical and cultural links between the UK and Pakistan, as exemplified by the million strong Pakistan community in the UK. 7. In particular, the Government will work to help Pakistan entrench a democratic, accountable and functioning civilian government. In support of the Strategic Partnership, the Government has re-invigorated the UK-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue and is committed to advocating international support for Pakistan through engagement with the US and multilateral fora such as the Friends of Democratic Pakistan. 8. The UK and Pakistan also share strong economic, cultural, and familial ties. The UK is the second largest bilateral overseas investor in Pakistan and the fourth largest trading partner (over £1 billion of bilateral trade annually). There are around one million British people of Pakistani heritage in the UK, and there is substantial migration from Pakistan to the UK. In 2009-10, 79,222 visas were issued to Pakistani nationals globally. The positive potential of the Diaspora links is enormous and it is important that we continue to support these connections. We welcome the establishment of the British-Pakistan Foundation. 9. The UK currently contributes £665 million over four years (2009-10 to 2013-14) in development assistance, and further amounts in support of counter-terrorism, conflict prevention and defence assistance. The UK’s total spending on assistance to Pakistan for financial year 2009-10 is £158.8 million. Effectiveness of UK policy towards Afghanistan and Pakistan Afghanistan 10. The Government in coming into office undertook a stock take of UK policy towards Afghanistan and endorsed the current strategy. The Government fully supports the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the International Security Assistance Force’s (ISAF) strategy in Afghanistan: to assist the Afghan Government in exercising its authority and influence throughout the country, paving the way for reconstruction and effective governance. That requires the protection of the population, the provision of more effective governance at every level and the creation of an Afghan security force that is able to maintain security and prevent the return of al-Qaeda. 11. We believe that, alongside the Afghan Government and international partners, we are pursuing the right strategy in Afghanistan. Work on increasing the size and capability of the Afghan National Army (ANA) is ahead of schedule. The right and necessary number of 5 forces are now deployed in Afghanistan. There have been two sets of Afghan-run elections in two years, giving Afghan people a say in the future of their country. 12. The London Conference on 28 January marked a clear commitment to a political strategy to complement the military surge. The Kabul Conference on 20 July – the first international conference on Afghanistan in Afghanistan – followed this up. It set out the Afghan-led Kabul process, which aims to accelerate Afghanistan’s ability to govern itself, to reduce dependence on the international community, to enhance Afghanistan’s security forces and to provide better protection for the rights of all its citizens. The international community will need to support the Afghan Government in delivering this. The UK is intensifying and reinvigorating our development efforts in line with the Afghan Government’s priorities. This includes a forty percent increase in UK development aid. We will work closely with the Afghans, the United States and others to accelerate the stabilisation effort in central Helmand and the 81 key districts identified under the ISAF plan. It is right to maintain the effort because any lesser alternative would have serious consequences for Afghanistan, Pakistan and for our own national security. 13. The Helmand Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), headquartered in Lashkar Gah, is a UK, civilian-led, multinational team helping the Afghan Government deliver effective government and security across Helmand Province. The PRT works to a single Helmand Plan agreed with the Afghan Government and international partners in 2006. The plan is structured around seven themes: Politics and Reconciliation; Governance; Rule of Law (Justice, Police and Prisons); Security; Economic and Social Development; Counter Narcotics; and Strategic Communications. Pakistan 14. Our bilateral relationship with Pakistan is central to the delivery of our policy. The priority attached to Pakistan by the UK Government is evident from the number of high-level visits to the country since the general election in May 2010: there have been visits from the Deputy Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary in September 2010 and June 2010, respectively; and the International Development Secretary and Baroness Warsi, Minister without Portfolio at the Cabinet Office, have both visited twice. The Prime Minister also hosted President Zardari at Chequers in August 2010 and there have been numerous inward visits by Pakistani ministers. 15. One way an effective approach will be expressed is through a two-way strategic relationship founded on increasing levels of trust between our two peoples and governments across an increasing span of business. We believe that
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