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Small States' Security Strategies Need an International Energy

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Small States' Security Strategies Need an International Energy DIIS POLICY BRIEF MAY 2021 SMALL STATES’ SECURITY STRATEGIES NEED AN INTERNATIONAL ENERGY DIMENSION What can be learned from the Danish Nord Stream and Baltic Pipe negotiations? Denmark encountered a number of unforeseen obstacles when negotiating the Nord Stream RECOMMENDATIONS and Baltic Pipe gas pipelines, and the country ■ Small states should include energy in strategic ended up standing exposed and alone. A better documents pertaining to foreign and security politics of energy alliances and better strategic policies, as energy is a tool in the security toolbox preparation are key lessons for small states like of the great powers. Denmark when dealing with the problematic combination of security and energy. ■ Self-sufficiency in energy does not mean that a country is shielded from the dynamics of international energy. Denmark has been self-sufficient in its energy supplies since the mid-1990s, and energy has been dealt ■ Small states should strive to build enduring political with largely as a technical issue pertaining to the alliances focused on energy. accessibility, affordability and accountability of energy ■ Small states should prioritise sending experts to the sources. This position fed into an understanding of NATO Centre of Excellence for Energy Security in energy crises as something that largely happened order to stay on top of the international security elsewhere. So, when Denmark got caught up in situation concerning energy. international energy geopolitics concerning the two Nord Stream pipelines that are intended to bring natural gas from Russia to northern Germany, and accession of new eastern European member states to when the Baltic Pipe planned to start pumping the EU, the Danish-Russian diplomatic relationship Norwegian gas to Poland, the country had to make up deteriorated. The incoming prime minister, Lars Løkke a strategy on the go. Being self-sufficient in natural Rasmussen (who replaced Anders Fogh Rasmussen), gas from the Danish gas fields in the North Sea, the was much less of a knight of principles than his issue for Denmark was not the gas: the problems predecessor. So, when the Russian-owned gas of the Nord Stream and Baltic Pipe were almost company’s application landed on his desk, he saw a exclusively political for Denmark. Taking the three political issue that could be dealt with pragmatically. negotiating processes as examples of how Denmark The benefit would be a better diplomatic relationship developed strategies on the go, other countries can with Russia and perhaps new export opportunities for learn from the Danish experience. Danish companies. (Russian) energy as a weapon The result of the change of prime minister in Energy is a central aspect of the security strategies Denmark was approval of the Nord Stream 1 pipeline of the great powers. Smaller countries like Denmark construction in late 2009. Indeed, after heavy Russian should take this into account when formulating PR work, all approvals were obtained in the region. The security strategies to avoid contributing to over- first Nord Stream pipeline was ready to send natural dependence on a single energy supplier and the gas from the Yamal Peninsula to Germany in 2011. vulnerability this entails. Denmark is caught standing alone As far back as the 1990s, the Russian prime minister In short, Denmark saw Nord Stream 1 mainly as a Yevgeny Primakov announced that Russia would use means of improving relations with Russia and largely energy as a weapon in its foreign-policy toolbox. The ignored the security aspect. Fast forward to 2017, Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines should therefore be when the application for Nord Stream 2 landed on a seen as a way for Russia to gain the upper hand in the desk in the Danish Energy Agency. By now Denmark European region. The EU currently imports almost had become much more hesitant towards Russia, as 40% of its natural gas from Russia through pipelines had the rest of Europe, largely due to Russia’s running through Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic Sea. annexation of Crimea in 2014, which was a wake-up This has led many countries, especially in eastern call for Western countries. Europe and the Baltic region, to sound the alarm: too much dependence on Russian energy is considered Denmark’s Baltic neighbours had long argued that risky. Indeed, Russia has several times showed its energy was not just a mundane commodity: it could willingness to use energy as a weapon, as in 2006, also be used to destabilise other countries. The EU when a gas dispute ended in the transit of gas through had created an ‘Energy Union’ in 2015 with the open Ukraine being shut down in the midst of a cold winter. goal of reducing its dependence on Russian gas imports. Furthermore, American appeals to the Danish Nord Stream 1 was considered normal politics government to withstand Russian pressure were In 2009, Denmark became the first country to agree to growing stronger by the day. Denmark could no longer Russia laying pipes in the Baltic Sea. At this time, all continue to see energy as just a way of increasing other countries bordering the Baltic, except Russia and trading relations with Russia or a political issue to be Germany, were opposed to plans to pump 55 billion dealt with through the normal channels. The security cubic metres of natural gas from the Russian town aspects of energy slowly emerged as a national of Vyborg to Lubmin near Greifswald in northern security issue in Denmark, but there was no explicit Germany. Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania strategy in place. and Poland all opposed the project for various reasons, including the danger of Russia using the Cold War experience taught that small countries often pipeline as a way to obtain military intelligence. defy ‘singularisation’, or the situation of being caught standing alone in front of the enemy. This, however, is In Denmark, the calculation was different in kind. After effectively what happened in respect of Denmark’s Denmark had hosted the World Chechen Conference handling of Nord Stream 2: the country was left alone in 2002 and had played a role in ensuring the as the forward post for months due to the lack of a clear strategy and solid alliances on energy issues. island of Bornholm through the exclusive economic The Danish Parliament rushed to do something. As zone (EEZ). It would therefore avoid Danish territorial the only country that was being asked to build in its waters, and the new continental shelf legislation would territorial waters, Denmark began to seem like the not apply. decisive nail in the coffin for Nord Stream 2. However, at that time Danish legislation did not specify that foreign and security issues could be taken into The difference between territorial waters and an account when making decisions about underwater exclusive economic zone (EEZ) is that the first confers full sovereignty over the waters, whereas the second pipelines. A change in legislation concerning the is merely a ‘sovereign right’ which refers to the coastal continental shelf to include foreign and security issues state’s rights below the surface of the sea. in evaluating underwater pipeline construction sought to remedy this. Suppliers of EU gas imports, 2018 However, even though the legislation was passed in November 2017, it did not solve Denmark’s problem. It 0% bought it some time, but also extended the time 20% Denmark was ‘singularized’, i.e. isolated. The NS2 Russia 40.1% consortium was impatiently awaiting an answer from 40% Norway 18.5% the Danish Energy Agency. In August 2018, the consortium submitted another application for the 60% Algeria 11.3% Qatar 4.5% pipeline. This time the route would go northwest of the 80% Others 25.6% 100% Nord Stream 2 and the Baltic Pipe projec FINLAND Nord Stream pipeline Disputed area btw Nord Stream 2 pipeline Poland and Denmark New Baltic pipelines until November 2018 Existing Baltic pipelines Narva Bay Exclusive economic zone Territorial waters Baltic Sea ESTONIA NORWAY SWEDEN RUSSIA LATVIA DENMARK LITHUANIA North Sea BELARUS RUSSIA POLAND Lubmin near Greifswald GERMANY BALTIC PIPE PROJECT NORD STREAM 2 The pipeline running 800-950 kilometers long will connect The offshore pipeline will run 1,225 kilomenters in total the North Sea to Poland through the Baltic Sea , connectiong Narva Bay to the Ger- Capacity: 10 bcm of natural gas per year from Norway to man town of Lubmin on the Bay of Greifswald. Denmark and Poland and 3 bcm of natural gas per year from Capacity: 55 bcm of natural gas per year Poland to Denmark Sources: Geopolitical futures, European MSP Platform DIIS POLICY BRIEF MAY 2021 Denmark capitalized on the Russian energy threat acquired EEZ south of Bornholm. With three routes Underneath the surface, a new pipeline project now in play, everyone held their breath. One route emerged as yet another complication in the pipeline would go through Denmark’s territorial waters, debacle for Denmark. Poland had long wanted to two through the EEZ. One could be blocked by stop depending on piped Russian gas and had gone Denmark; the other two could only be blocked if the shopping for gas elsewhere. The ‘Tommeliten’ gas environmental and economic risks were too great. field in Norway was considered a great opportunity, only Denmark was in the way. Geographically, that is: The final round for Denmark started on 28 June in order for the Norwegian gas to reach Poland, the 2019. NS2 strategically withdrew the application Baltic Pipe had to run across Danish land and sea. through Danish territorial waters and effectively checkmated Denmark. Putin chipped in during an Unfortunately, since the 1970s, Denmark and Poland energy conference in Moscow in October: ‘Denmark have had an ongoing border dispute due to large is a small country which has come under strong overlapping claims to the EEZ.
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