Skymark Airlines (BC)
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19 August 2014 Asia Pacific/Japan Equity Research Airlines (Airlines (Japan)) / MARKET WEIGHT Japanese airline sector Research Analysts M&A PROPOSAL Timothy Ross 65 6212 3337 [email protected] Skymark for sale? Figure 1: Small but well formed Airline landing slot market share, Haneda Airport Japan Airlines Others 33% 10% Skynet 4% Skymark 5% Starflyer 4% ANA 44% Source: Diio-Mi ■ Media speculation: The Nikkei today led with a story outlining AirAsia's (AK) purported interest in acquiring all or part of Skymark Airlines (BC). AK management has denied this on Twitter and to us in person, however the speculation does suggest that BC may be in play. ■ All about Haneda: BC's recent woes have been well documented: 1Q FY3/15 losses and outstanding liabilities in respect of its A380s have been covered in the press including a Bloomberg report on 1st August 2014. The key issue for any potential acquirer would be how to realize the value of its Haneda Airport (HND) slots, which while only 6% of the total, represent the company's principal attraction in our opinion. The slots have no secondary value so their worth can only be realized if BC is sold as a going concern. ■ Little downside to incumbents: Scenarios include BC continuing in its current form, it being acquired, and its slots being reallocated upon liquidation. Whatever happens, we see limited near-term pressure on Japan Airlines (JL) or ANA Holdings (NH) (both rated OUTPERFORM). Any attempts to turn BC around would take time, capital and management focus that would likely see diminished short-term competition for both carriers, and perhaps their gaining share for nothing at a highly prized airport. One of them might bid for BC, but even this would make more sense than for a foreign company to acquire the maximum holding of 33% permitted. DISCLOSURE APPENDIX AT THE BACK OF THIS REPORT CONTAINS IMPORTANT DISCLOSURES, ANALYST CERTIFICATIONS, AND THE STATUS OF NON-US ANALYSTS. US Disclosure: Credit Suisse does and seeks to do business with companies covered in its research reports. As a result, investors should be aware that the Firm may have a conflict of interest that could affect the objectivity of this report. Investors should consider this report as only a single factor in making their investment decision. CREDIT SUISSE SECURITIES RESEARCH & ANALYTICS BEYOND INFORMATION® Client-Driven Solutions, Insights, and Access 19 August 2014 Skymark for sale? The media's linking of AK with BC – whilst wide of the mark – suggests to us that the AirAsia counts itself out of company my be engaged in an effort to generate a cash infusion while its key landing slots any process… at HND still hold their value. AK's identification as a potential bidder is logical as an acquisition would short circuit the start-up process that the airline is currently working its way through and would have delivered a beach-head at HND, which we see as the missing key for most LCCs looking to target the important Tokyo metro market. However, AK has distanced itself from the suggestion as we believe that the capital and …but it could have been the management skills required do not play to AK's strengths. These have been proven in window-shopping starting airlines rather than in rehabilitating them, with most of its spare cash used to finance new aircraft rather than paying for the intangibles that BC's HND slots represent. To be clear, there is no certainty that any of acquisition of BC would pass clear title to those slots (although foreigners, fo whom any equity stake is limited to a non-controlling 33% maximum, would not endanger the airline's future access if they participated). We believe BC may be preparing for a sale as this is the only means by which the value of …as BC's HND slots its HND position can be released. There is no secondary market for the sale of the slots so represent most of its value their value can only be unlocked by a sale of BC equity. We think it is likely that AK (along at present with any number of other airlines) has examined the company's financial data, if only to appraise the strength of a prospective competitor. When we look at the airline's fleet, it owns (or finances on-balance sheet via an SPV) only eight of its 33 aircraft and most of these are narrow bodies, so its fleet is unlikely to anchor any valuation of its equity. Figure 2: Skymark Airlines fleet composition Owned Leased Order A330 2 1 7 B738/Max 6 24 4 A380 6 Total 8 25 17 Source: Ascend Another deterrent for AK is that its fleet is all Airbus-based and the cost of running a dual JL is the most likely acquirer fleet strategy is unlikely to be attractive. However, both NH and JL have large fleets of of BC, in our view, although B737 NGs. Both could probably absorb the airline more easily into existing structures than would likely gain in the any other player and JL especially could use an acquisition to redress the slot allocation event of slot redistribution… imbalance relative to NH that it perceived when the last slots were made available in October 2013. While this makes it a more probable acquirer than NH (who might be forced to the table for more defensive reasons), status quo is probably not a bad option for the two majors either. At present, BC's competitive positioning is withering along with any remaining cash balances and should it fail to convince another airline to purchase it, JL and NH would likely get the rump of its slots on reallocation. If successful in the sales process, there is likely to be some downtime and loss of brand momentum while a reorganization takes place that should allow both JL and NH to cement their dominance at the airport. It is also important to remember that all of BC's slots are fully utilized, so even a sale to another player does not introduce more capacity. One of the major obstacles to any acquisition – partial or complete – is the issue of BC's …and its A380 order could A380 order and the penalties that cancellation could incur (together with the loss of pre- always be renegotiated with delivery payments that currently sit on BC's balance sheet). However, this would likely fall new ownership – giving away in the event of a sale, with new ownership negotiating a termed out switch to the Airbus more leverage in delivery plans. A work-around could for example include possibly converting the next few Japan years' worth of A380m deliveries for more A330s delivering five years hence. Airbus would no doubt relish the opportunity to increase its share of the Japanese majors' orderbooks. Japanese airline sector 2 19 August 2014 Companies Mentioned (Price as of 18-Aug-2014) ANA Holdings (9202.T, ¥255, OUTPERFORM, TP ¥275) AirAsia (AIRA.KL, RM2.38, OUTPERFORM, TP RM2.9) Airbus (AIR.PA, €44.13) Japan Airlines (9201.T, ¥5,840, OUTPERFORM, TP ¥6,525) Skymark Airlines (9204.T, ¥180) Disclosure Appendix Important Global Disclosures I, Timothy Ross, certify that (1) the views expressed in this report accurately reflect my personal views about all of the subject companies and securities and (2) no part of my compensation was, is or will be directly or indirectly related to the specific recommendations or views expressed in this report. 3-Year Price and Rating History for ANA Holdings (9202.T) 9202.T Closing Price Target Price Date (¥) (¥) Rating 06-Sep-11 255 280 N * 28-Oct-11 237 290 10-Jan-12 217 270 21-Feb-12 243 290 17-May-12 215 240 09-Nov-12 166 220 O 06-Dec-13 208 NR 10-Jan-14 226 230 N * 24-Feb-14 229 235 04-Jun-14 226 265 O N EU T RA L 30-Jul-14 251 275 O U T PERFO RM N O T RAT ED * Asterisk signifies initiation or assumption of coverage. 3-Year Price and Rating History for AirAsia (AIRA.KL) AIRA.KL Closing Price Target Price Date (RM) (RM) Rating 24-Aug-11 3.45 4.55 O 23-Nov-11 3.55 4.35 22-Feb-12 3.65 4.75 27-Aug-12 3.53 4.40 11-Sep-12 3.19 3.80 21-Nov-12 2.85 3.70 27-Feb-13 2.86 3.40 21-Aug-13 2.98 3.30 21-Nov-13 2.48 3.20 18-Dec-13 2.29 3.00 O UT PERFO RM 14-Mar-14 2.46 2.90 * Asterisk signifies initiation or assumption of coverage. Japanese airline sector 3 19 August 2014 3-Year Price and Rating History for Japan Airlines (9201.T) 9201.T Closing Price Target Price Date (¥) (¥) Rating 19-Dec-12 3,695 NR 10-Jan-14 5,220 6,725 O * 24-Feb-14 5,090 6,525 * Asterisk signifies initiation or assumption of coverage. N O T RAT ED O UT PERFO RM The analyst(s) responsible for preparing this research report received Compensation that is based upon various factors including Credit Suisse's total revenues, a portion of which are generated by Credit Suisse's investment banking activities As of December 10, 2012 Analysts’ stock rating are defined as follows: Outperform (O) : The stock’s total return is expected to outperform the relevant benchmark*over the next 12 months. Neutral (N) : The stock’s total return is expected to be in line with the relevant benchmark* over the next 12 months.