Air Force Chief of Staíf Gen Merrill A. McPeak
Commander, Air University Lt Gen }ay W. Kelley
Commander, Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education Col Gary A. Voellger
Editor Lt Col Richard B. Clark
Associate Editor Maj Gwendolyn D. Fayne
Professional Staff Hugh Richardson, Contributing Editor Marvin W. Bassett, Contributing Editor Steven C. Garst, Director of Art and Production Daniel M. Armstrong, Ulustrator Thomas L. Howell, Prepress Production Manager
The Airpower Journal, published quarterly, is the professional journal of the United States Air Force. It is designed to serve as an open forum for presenting and stimulating innovative think- ing on militáry doctrine, strategy, tactics, force structure, readiness, and other national defense matters. The views and opinions expressed or implied in the Journal are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the official sanction of the Department of Defense, the Air Force, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government. Articles in this edition may be reproduced in whole or in part without permission. If repro- duced, the Airpower Journal requests a cour- tesy line.
JOURNAL Sprlng 1993, Vol. VII. No. I AFRP 50-2
Editorial 2
The “Staff Experience” and Leadership Development Gen John A. Shaud, USAF, Retired 4
The Operational Levei of Nuclear War Fighting: Missing or Unnecessary? Dr Steven Metz 13
The Douhet Society: A Recipe for Your Professional Development Program? Lt Col Kimble D. Stohry, USAF 21
One Target, One Bomb: Is the Principie of Mass Dead? Lt Col Edward Mann, USAF 35
Disabling Systems: War-Fighting Option for the Future Lt Col Alan W. Debban, USAF 44
Stealth, Sea Control, and Air Superiority Capt James H. Patton, Jr., USN, Retired 52
Results of the 1992 Airpower Journal Reader Survey 62 Ricochets Letters 3 Net Assessment Reviews of Current Literature 66 Contributors 95 EDITORIAL
Its Time to Put Up or Shut Up
RIPING HAS long been considered a don’t meet accepted standards for writing, G GI’s privilege—if not a constitution- documentation, or professional courtesy. ally protected right. You know—criticiz- Far from promoting the “company line,” ing the situation but then going along with we have complete freedom in selecting whatever comes down from above. In the articles for publication. In fact, no one days of authoritarian military command- “up the chain” from the editor even knows ers, it was probably a useful outlet for what will appear in the next issue. Our reducing resentment toward unrelenting only guidance is to use good judgement masters. However, in today’s climate of and to insure that opinions are identified enlightened leadership and team building, as such and not mistaken for Air Force such grumbling is probably not necessary policy. Although articles by DOD people and can be counterproductive. Imagine undergo a security and policy review in the good we could do by redirecting that accordance with AFR 190-1, Public Affairs energy to provide meaningful, construc- Policies and Procedures, we have found tive criticism and feedback. that censorship or idea management is not Some folks who see Airpower Journal as a part of that process. The review is sim- just another vehicle for promoting Air ply a safeguard against the inadvertent Force policy would prefer that we print publication of classified material or mis- more dissenting views—more articles crit- stated policy. By no means is it a vehicle icai of the way the Air Force does busi- for squelching articles that challenge Air ness. Actually, the Journal is an open Force policy. fórum for discussing the use of aerospace The bottom line is that Airpower Journal power at the operational levei of war, so is a conduit for Air Force people, but we opposing views are not only tolerated but can’t print what you don’t submit. If you encouraged. Current leadership knows have new or different ideas, it is your pro- that the Air Force would be hard-pressed fessional responsibility to share them with to expand its thinking without new ideas. your colleagues rather than just grouse The suggestion that APJ should print about how bad things are. dissenting opinions is evidence that such We can only surmise that some people opinions exist. Unfortunately, very few are afraid that their opinions will come people who hold those opinions are will- back to haunt them. That’s a shame! ing (or able) to put them on paper, sign Suppressing good ideas that could have their names, and submit them for publica- improved the Air Force (or perhaps even tion. Consequently, we receive only a saved lives) for the sake of protecting small number of manuscripts that take on one’s career is the worst kind of cow- the establishment or challenge current ardice. Then again, mavbe weYe just fol- policy. On occasion we reject some of the lowing the GI tradition of griping when we criticai manuscripts we do receive—not don’t really mind current conditions so because of their stance but because they much after all. RBC
2 Letters to the editor are encouraged. AII corre- objectives. More simply put, it kept us from spondence should be addressed to the Editor. frittering away air power in Maj Gen Carl Airpower Journal. 401 Chennault Circle, Spaatz’s “small packets (divided) among sev- Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6428. We reserve the eral armies or corps." ríght to edit the material for overall length. Air campaign planning occurs at the opera- tional levei of war. The TACS operates at the tactical levei. As Major Fawcett found out, FEBA FRICTION there doesn’t appear to be a problem with how the TACS does its jobs. The problem is using it 1 found Maj John Fawcett’s article, “Which to determine what and when missions will be Way to the FEBA?” (Fali 1992), compelling; accomplished. This disconnect is more than however, I disagree with his belief that there definitional. Major Fawcett learned a practical was no hole in doctrine. It is illuminating to lesson in the problem with the Army’s AirLand study Major Fawcett’s article through the doc- Battle doctrine. As long as air power is trinal templates provided by Col Dennis M. regarded by the Army as “flying artillery” Drew’s “Desert Storm as a Symbol” and Lt Col instead of “modern cavalry,” ALOs like Major Jay L. Baird’s letter with Col Phillip S. Fawcett will find themselves in a doctrinal Meilinger’s response in the same issue of malaise at the operational levei of war. Airpower Journal. US Army Field Manual (FM) 100-15, Corps Maj Edward J. Felker, USAF Operations, States, “The rear, close, and deep Castle AFB. Califórnia operation of the battle are linked and indepen- dent. However, the primacy of close opera- tions must be recognized.” Not only is the pri- Maj John Fawcett’s article "Which Way to the macy of the close battle asserted, FM 100-15 FEBA?” (Fali 1992) poses very interesting and goes on to State that if the commander is unable timely questions for the close-air-support to "win key engagements at the FLOT, he will (CAS) world. As the Air Force and Army work not benefit from rear or deep operations, no out the future of CAS roles in light of our matter how successful.” It is this Army "doc- Desert Storm experience and future shrinking trinal” tenet of the relationship between the budgets, I will address several of Major close and deep battle that created the dilemma Faw cett’s points from my perspective as a Major Fawcett found himself unable to resolve. fighter duty officer (FDO) with the 604th Air The tactical air control system (TACS) is the Support Operations Center (ASOC) and a plan- glue binding individual aircraft sorties to the ner with the 5th Air Control Group in Korea. land component commander's specific needs. First of all, the classic definition of close air The apportionment process divides total air support involving air power attacking hostile capability among the air tasks to be performed. targets in close proximity to friendly surface Rather than addressing missions (the what and forces is still valid. Major Fawcetfs suggestion when). the air control process concentrates on that CAS has too much “conceptual baggage” to how and where. This entire system is fueled by be a useful term is not on target. The definition the Army’s belief in the primacy of the close is not restrictive to any of the Services, and climactic battle. everybody in any of the armed forces in our Herein is the doctrinal problem for airmen. country or those of our close allies understands The reason air power zealots emphasized cen- the basics of the term. Besides, as Major tralized control and decentralized execution Fawcett also pointed out, if it walks like a was to allow air power’s inherent flexibility to duck, quacks like a duck, and looks like a mass at the proper location. time, and in suffi- cient numbers to achieve the commander’s continued on page 64
3 THE STAFF EXPERIENCE” AND LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT
G en John A. Shaud, USAF, Retir ed
The typical staff officer is a man past middle life, spare, wrinkled, intelligent, cold, noncommittal, with eyes like a codfish, polite in contact, but at the same time unrespon- sive, cool, calm and as damnably composed as a con- crete post or plaster of Paris cast; a human petrífication with a heart o f feldspar and without charm or the friendly germ; minus bowels, passions or a sense of humor. Happily they never reproduce and all of them finally go to hell. —Gen George S. Patton, Jr.
ENERAL PATTON^ rather astute This fact is well recognized and observations may reflect some of accounted for in the process of selecting your own concerns as you pre- individuais for promotion to general offi- Gpare to embark on the always cer. The key factors in that decision challenging and sometimes rewarding process are that the individuaFs career path known as the “staff experience.” provide evidence of weapon (and/or sup- That path is one well traveled. Those who port) system competence, command com- have trod it include virtually all of the petence, and staff competence. Each type sênior leadership of today’s Air Force and of competence is essential, and all are the vast majority of past leaders who have interrelated by that common denominator helped make our Air Force great. Career for success—effective leadership! The patterns vary widely, but rare is the officer purpose of this article is to share with you who avoids staff duty completely. And a philosophy of leadership that will play a that is appropriate. Mastering the art of major role in your experience as a staff success as a staff officer is very much a officer. part of the process of mastering the art of Competent and effective leadership is leadership that will propel you into posi- not something you are bom with. It is tions of increasing challenge and responsi- something you hone and develop over bility in all aspects of your profession. time in a wide variety of situations. The
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& 6 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1993 nerstone of effective leadership. The key yourself. Each element continues to task is translating that intellect into some- apply. The difference as a staff officer is thing your subordinates can appreciate, that you have, for the most part, left grasp, and act upon. behind the realm of the flight line and Compassion at the wing levei means a entered the less glamorous realm of the sensitive caring for, and understanding of, paper chase. However, even though it the people in your command. It means may appear to you to be less glamorous, it “walking in their moccasins.” It means is no less important in the scheme of your appreciating where they are coming from, professional development. what their concerns are, what their fami- Intelligence at the staff levei still means lies’ concerns are, what motivates them, a clear understanding of the mission. It and what fails to motivate them. It means also means understanding what it will ensuring that they understand not only take, on a personal levei, to succeed at what the mission is but also why they are accomplishing this mission. Your focus is called upon to carry out that mission. As now considerably different since the mis- commander of the Strategic Projection sion no longer involves sorties. Therefore, Force in the early eighties, I had to direct you must understand not only a particular deployments frequently, often for long issue, but also the structure of the staff periods of time, with little advance notice. organization—how it works. Not to There was nothing I could do to change understand the ins and outs of the organi- that requirement or to lessen the fre- zational structure and process means risk- quency or duration of such outings. What ing nonparticipation by default. New offi- I could do was explain why these sacri- cers on the staff frequently find them- fices had to be made. When the troops selves tasked with only the simplest mis- understand the “why” behind the task- sions, not because they lack academic ings—and, at least as important, when the acumen, drive, or personal competency families understand—morale across the but because they first need to become board improves tremendously. That was familiar with how the system works. A important for the people involved. It was local-area checkout is always useful, espe- also vital to mission success. cially in the Pentagon. Likewise, intelli- Energy, at every levei, means “making it gence includes the ability to speak happen.” It means doing all those things cogently and to write clearly. It means to see that the mission is accomplished. It mastering the basic tools of the staff offi- can mean different tasks at different lev- cer trade. eis. but the heart of the matter is doing it, Compassion at the staff levei assumes being there, being prepared, and making it many forms. In today’s Air Force, it is happen. You can have the intelligence of particularly important to be sensitive to Einstein and the compassion of Mother how people are affected by structural reor- Teresa, but if you lack energy, nothing is ganization. The good news is that—with going to happen. It involves your pres- enough qualified people—any organiza- ence. For the operational commander, tional structure will work. Some struc- that means getting on the flying schedule. tures, of course, work better than others. For the support commander, that means But the bad news is that the trauma that getting away from your desk and being out accompanies any restructuring affects where your people are doing the work. everyone involved and is inevitable. Assignment as a staff officer to the People who direct reorganizations must be Pentagon or another headquarters staff sure that the desired result is worth the doesn’t mean putling the ICE principies inherent trauma. Every levei of the staff on hold. It means adapting them to the organization must be sensitive to the new circumstances in which you find effects of restructuring. The current members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are quintessential staff officers They are (left to right) Gen Cart E. Mundy, USMC; Gen Gordon R. Sullivan, USA: Gen Merrill A McPeak. USAF; Adm Frank B Kelso II. USN: Gen Colin L. Powell. USA (chairman); and Adm David E. Jeremiah, USN (vice-chairman).
It is important to be well aware of professional while inwardly praying, “who’s who” in your particular area of "Please, Lord, don’t let them ask me any responsibilitv on the staff. Be sensitive to questions today.” By year two, the action where your people are on the learning officer is not only eager to answer ques- curve in terms of staff competence and tions, but stands ready to “build a watch” ability. The measure of an individuaTs whenever offered half an opportunity. By competence is much more readily observ- year three, the officer is combat ready, able in an operational arena. It’s easy to crisp, and concise, and can frequently know who is flight-lead qualified and who provide answers that are better than the is still flying with an instructor. Staff questions asked. Some officers move competence is less readily apparent. You through these stages faster than others. cannot determine it merely by gauging an Some are less adroit at manipulating the individual’s rank, time in Service, or back- staff maze. The challenge for you as the ground. On the staff. which is something leader on the staff is to know where your of a meritocracy. competence manifests people are on the learning curve. If you itself in subtle stages. In year one, the don’t, you may have a staff “flight lead” new action officer attends meetings look- working for you and not fully utilize and ing every bit the part of the seasoned staff develop that officer’s talent. That would
7 8 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1993
be unfair to the officer concerned and to Most officers are intimidated by the joumey from the the mission with which you are charged. flight Une to the Pentagon parking lot and only wish to Energy at the staff levei means just what see this picture in their rearview mirrors. The judicious use of ICE, however. helps ensure that the staff it meant at the wing levei. Understand experience is a rewarding one. what must be done and then do it. Make it happen. Learn the organizational struc- ture. Become adept at the drill of staff you are part of such a large enterprise, it is work. Don’t avoid the tough coordination. difficult—but not impossible—to see the Don’t take the easy way out. Find out results of your labor and thereby derive what the other players are thinking and much feedback and personal satisfaction. doing. Learn what your boss and other Worry about your appearance. Don’t look key players need and, importantly, when tacky by wearing uniforms you would each one needs it. Providing information have discarded years ago if they were part without allowing sufficient time for your of your civilian attire. Lead from your leader to assimilate it is not useful. That strengths. Do those things that worked for would be like- briefing new targets after you when you were a leader on the flight departing the initial point. Work out at line. Keep your self-confidence up. the base gym or the Pentagon O fficers’ However, don’t be too proud to learn and Athletic Club. Take care of yourself. No use new insights you will observe at the one else will. Crew-rest rules are perma- Pentagon—a real plus resulting from a nently waived. Make time for your family tour there. Do your job with enthusiasm, if you happen to have one. They need you and you will soon be a staff leader—and to survive in northern Virgínia, and you might even get to go back to the field need them for your survival. early. Pentagon bosses also return to the Unfortunately, Patton's comment about field and remember people who were the the typical staff officer does have a certain most helpful. truth to it. Staff work, especially at the By following these principies of suc- Pentagon, can be impersonal. Because cessful leadership at the wing and head- STAFF EXPERIENCE" AND LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT 9 quarters staff leveis, you will be rewarded questions. No one asks the “Why are we with positions of increasing challenge and doing this?” question of superiors as read- responsibility. Although the possibilities ily as Americans. You must get your peo- are nearly endless, one example of such a ple to do this, or they will waste incredi- challenge might involve assignment to a ble amounts of time doing ineffective joint coalition staff. The Suprem e work. In addition, for hierarchically Headquarters A llied Powers Europe minded nations, putting opposing views (SHAPE) is one such staff which has on a staff summary sheet is a flagrant act evolved over more than 40 years. In three of disloyalty. Promote the idea that in a years as the SHAPE chief of staff, I learned “commander’s estimate of the situation,” that the principies of ICE continued to analysis of opposing courses of action is a apply. And the likelihood of your partici- requirement and is always useful. As we pation in a joint coalition staff in this say in the game of bridge, one peek is post-cold war world has increased by an worth two finesses. Convincing your order of magnitude. international staff of all this may be the Intelligence on a coalition staff means, difference between victory or defeat when as always, a clear understanding of the you debate a major issue. mission at hand and the ability to convey Compassion on the coalition staff that understanding to others. On the includes keeping the factors of language coalition staff, as is the case with any new and history in mind. Consideration of leadership situation, new variables enter others in the staffing process means help- the equation. My primary mission was to ing to make sure that everyone operates coordinate the activities of the staff to pro- from a common base. Each member of the duce the best possible support for the staff has to help in this important regard. Supreme Allied Commander, Europe English is the lingua franca at SHAPE, and (SACEUR). In addition to what you might all staff members supposedly possess a normally expect that to entail. I found that working knowledge of English. This, inci- I also had to be a negotiator, diplomat, dentally, is very good news for most taskmaster, and cheerleader. I learned Americans. But it’s important to remem- also that on the SHAPE staff (as well as on ber that fluency in any language is relative most coalition staffs), some of the most to each individual. On the coalition staff, important factors to be considered were a leader must consciously—and some- appreciating inherent differences in cul- times subtly—ensure that real communi- ture and language and possessing a solid cation takes place as business is trans- sense of historv. acted. Should the leader not know the A v ita l c o m p o n e n t o f in te r n a tio n a l language comprehension of immediate Street smarts is realizing the cultural dif- subordinates, they may fail under pressure ferences among nations. Their officers, when the time lines get short. No matter like ours, are part of a military hierarchy. how good the command and control Sys- They will respond to your leadership the tem, equipment does not guarantee under- same way they respond to that of their standing. At a staff meeting, for example, own officers of similar rank. But most all heads may be nodding in agreement nations are much more hierarchically ori- and all faces smiling. Does that mean that ented than the United States. You will all souls on board fully understand what like this at first and get the impression is transpiring? Not necessarily. The con- that you must be a more gifted officer than cerned and prudent leader must help you realized. But then it will occur to ensure that all players are on the same you—hopefully not as the result of a disas- wavelength without condescending to or ter—that one reason you are so comfort- embarrassing them. I learned that a casual able is that your people are not asking you question or request for comment can be 10 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1993 the best way to sample the levei of under- cohesive bond—high regard for the chain standing around the table. If you sense of command. But the staff leader of the that an individual (or individuais) may coalition must constantly remember that need some assistance in better grasping every issue between nations that the staff the proceedings, do your best to help out addresses has a history that sometimes and make a note for the future. goes back hundreds or even thousands of Compassion also means appreciating years. This history has played a major the role that history plays in the views of role in shaping and influencing the offi- others. Your fellow officers will come to cers with whom you will serve. They will the staff from different nations and will always be conscious of the historical sig- have been molded by significantly differ- nificance of issues under discussion, even ent cultures, customs, and traditions. when the American officer may not. Appreciating those differences goes far Unfortunately, history is not the average beyond learning the social courtesies, American officer’s best suit. Whereas the such as calling cards and handshakes. A typical American relies often on sports strong military ethic provides a vital and analogies (e.g., “this task is a six-inch putt”), his allied peer will frequently invoke history to form the analogy. Even The flags displayed in front of Supreme Headquarters when an American is aware of history, he Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) symbolize the cultural or she may not always be fully conscious diversity of that organization. American staff officers at SHAPE must rely heavily on the principies of ICE if of how that history is viewed by people they are to be effective team players in such an raised in different cultures. The good environment. news is that Americans are almost always STAFF EXPERIENCE" AND LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT 11
viewed as “honest brokers” because we do being sufficiently sensitive to avoid not carry a lot of historical baggage, and offending someone while you are trying to others will often defer to our judgement. get your message across. You may lose the However, the point is that history will debate and never know why. After all, in always play a major role in the ability of a coalition, every nation gets a vote. Your the members of the coalition staff to work effective leadership is expected. Do it, but together harmoniously to carry out the don’t get cocky about it. assigned mission. At least once during Energy in the coalition staff scenario your experience on an International staff, remains essentially the same as for any you will be on the receiving end of a well- other scenario. It means doing what it rehearsed national speech delivered with takes—making what must happen, hap- incredible emotion and incredibly bad pen. You can understand that a knowl- timing. Coalition staffs are the wave of edge of English and an appreciation of the future. As a member of the staff, you history are vitally important. But if you must remember that history is an then fail to expend the energy to do omnipresent player, and you must appre- appropriate study and research, you wind ciate how that history is viewed from the up being ineffective. Intellectually, you different vantage points of your superiors, can understand why your subordinates peers, and subordinates. If you ignore this should be proficient in the appropriate basic fact, you do so at your peril—risking, language, but if you don’t find a way to at best, minor embarrassment and, at measure that proficiency and act accord- worst, unnecessary losses on future fields ingly, the mission will suffer. You will of conflict. discover that getting anything done on a A final element of compassion on the coalition staff is somehow harder—much coalition staff is avoiding arrogance, harder—than equivalent work, even at the which is rarely a virtue in any culture. Pentagon. Such staffs are the wave of the Although arrogance can be a less-than- future, and they will tax your energy. desirable trait of any member of the coali- Intelligence, compassion, and energy— tion staff, Americans in particular must be and all the things each entails—are the careful to avoid this tendency. At SHAPE, keys to developing your professional lead- for example, the SACEUR has been an ership. They apply to any leadership sce- American since the alliance's inception. nario in which you can be placed. Their The United States, with all of its commen- careful application at every stepping-stone surate wealth and resources, is the largest in your growth better prepares you for the nation represented. American officers on challenges you will face on behalf of our the SHAPE staff may, if they are not care- Air Force. Your assignment to staff duty ful. unintentionally display a certain arro- is not a time-out from your leadership gance that is not warmly received by their development. It is very much an essential peers on the staff. Arrogance is never part of it. Make the most of the opportu- helpful. In this regard, compassion means nity. □ 12 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1993 Can’t Wait to Order the Airpower Journal???
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I Can Write Better than That! OK, then do it! Airpower Journal is always looking for good articles writ- ten by our readers. If you've got something to say, send it to us. We'll be happy to consider it for publication.
The Journal focuses on the operational levei of war—that broad area between grand strategy and tactics. We are interested in articles that will stimulate thought on how warfare is conducted. This includes not only the actual conduct of war at the operational levei, but also the impact of leadership, training, and support functions on operations.
We need two typed, double-spaced draft copies of your work. We encourage you to supply graphics and photos to support your article, but don't let the lack of those keep you from writing! We are looking for arti- cles from 2,500 to 5,000 words in length—about 15 to 25 pages.
As the professional journal of the Air Force, APJ strives to expand the horizons and professional knowledge of Air Force personnel. To do this, we seek and encourage challenging articles. We look forward to your submissions. Send them to the Editor, Airpower Journal, 401 Chennault Circle, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6428. THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF NUCLEAR WAR FIGHTING^
MISSING OR UNNECESSARY? Dr Steven Met z
N THE EARLY 1980s, the American tional levei of war in both basic and joint military’s rediscovery of the opera- doctrine. Further, military thinkers tional levei of war prompted a verita- revived campaign planning, which had ble explosion of articles, books, sym- lain dormant since World War II, and gave posia,I conferences, and courses at the Ser- increased emphasis to the central function vices’ staff and war colleges, all aimed at of the commanders in chief (CINC) of the understanding and mastering theater mili- regional unified commands in operational tary operations.1 On the applied side, war fighting. doctrine analysts incorporated the opera- This attention to the operational levei of
THIRD WORLD PROLlFERATlON 14 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1993 war is healthy because it focuses the atten- stress on purely military considerations tion of commanders and planners on a than does the strategic levei but pays more vital dimension of war fighting, thus mak- overt attention to political objectives than ing this levei of war a central component does the tactical levei. In a sense, then, of the continuing renaissance of the the operational levei is the highest point American military. In a very real sense, at which purely military factors are the resurgence in operational art bore fruit clearly paramount (given the overall polit- in the form of our victory in the Gulf War. ical objectives). Still, a major gap persists in thinking and The general concept of the operational doctrine on the operational levei of war: levei of war does not exclude nuclear we have paid almost no attention to the weapons, but neither does it explicitly role of nuclear weapons. incorporate them. Where, then, should operational-level commanders and plan- ners look for guidance on nuclear war fighting? Basic national defense doctrine discusses strategic nuclear deterrence but A Crucial Gap offers little on the operational levei of nuclear war fighting. “[M]ilitary com- Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense manders,” according to the Joint Staff, Dictionary of Military and Associated “require the freedom to act indepen- Terms, defines the operational levei of dently—within the context of their mis- war as sion and the overall aim—to exploit the levei of war at which campaigns and opportunities and to cope with unforeseen major operations are planned, conducted, difficulties as they occur in the dynamics and sustained to accomplish strategic objec- of conflict.”4 This is sound advice, but tives within theaters or areas of operations. such freedom clearly has limits. The Activities at this levei link tactics and strat- question is, Where do they lie? On the egy by establishing operational objectives specific topic of the operational levei of needed to accomplish the strategic objec- nuclear war fighting, basic doctrine notes tives, sequencing events to achieve the oper- only that “if the President decides in favor ational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sus- of employment [of nonstrategic nuclear tain these events.2 weapons], commanders must be given the wherewithal to employ these capabilities This definition indicates both the scope of in a timely fashion.”5 This is not much the operational levei of war—between guidance for operational-level planners. strategy and tactics—and key functions. It In the absence of general doctrine, most also implies certain vital characteristics. policy on the operational-level deploy- For example, in the American military the ment of nuclear weapons has developed operational levei of war is invariably joint, within specific regional contexts, espe- being the primary responsibility of the cially Europe. There, NATO’s Nuclear regional CINCs and their major subordi- Planning Group has grappled with opera- nates, including Service component com- tional-level nuclear issues for decades.6 manderç. Military formations at the oper- The section of the official National ational levei include numbered air forces. Securíty Strategy of the United States that Army corps, fleets, Marine expeditionary deals with nonstrategic nuclear forces also forces, and joint task forces.3 Geographi- focuses on Europe.7 What is missing is cally, operational war fighting takes place more general doctrine to guide planners in a theater of operations. Falling who must confront the various non- between the strategic and tactical leveis of European conflicts anticipated bv the new war, the operational levei places more national defense and military strategy. Admittedly, one can provide explana- Although we may not soon be able to “beat swords into tions for this gap; doctrine writers, after plowshares," US national policy will continue to emphasize the global control of weapons of mass all, are not stupid. Doctrine itself is a dis- destnjction. With that goal in mind, Soviet president tillation of historie military experience—a Mikhail Gorbachev and US president Ronald Reagan shorthand version of what works and sign arms limitation agreements. what does not—but there is no body of experience with operational-level nuclear war fighting to provide a foundation for doctrine. This alone, however, does not justify the paucity of analysis, debate, and tional employment of nuclear weapons thinking on the subject. Political consid- might diminish the utter horror that is erations also account for the absence of associated with them, erode psychological operational-level nuclear doctrine—any- barriers to their use, help lower the thing dealing with nuclear weapons is a nuclear threshold, and thus make the political powder keg. But is this an ade- world a much more dangerous place. quate rationale for an apparently glaring According to this line of reasoning, gap in our doctrine? Should we, in fact, the destruetiveness of thermonuclear have doctrine on the operational levei of weapons and the difficulties of controlling nuclear war fighting? escalation, once these weapons are used, combine to make nuclear war—whether strategic or operational—suicidai. Should We Have Because thinking about the employment of nuclear weapons could encourage us to Operational-Level forget their lethality, it is better to remain Nuclear Doctrine? blissfully ignorant than to risk nuclear disaster. One can argue both against and for the Similarly, American doctrine for the development of doctrine and analysis on operational-level use of nuclear weapons the operational levei of nuclear war fight- would greatly amplify the insecurity of ing. One opposing argument, for example, other nuclear or soon-to-be nuclear States, is that detailed guidance for the opera- thereby increasing the likelihood that they
15 16 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1993 would use nuclear weapons against us unnecessary. Advocates of this position preemptively. Although we see our own deny that there is any essential difference strategy as benign and defensive, we must between small-yield nuclear weapons and realize that as the world’s only remaining large-yield conventional weapons, such as superpower, we can easily and unwit- fuel/air explosives.11 From this perspec- tingly frighten smaller States. The devel- tive, we might need tactical-level doctrine opment of extensive analysis and doctrine to offer guidance on the employment of on the operational levei of nuclear war nuclear weapons but not operational-level fighting might terrify potential enemies doctrine. Existing doctrine, such as Joint and provoke dangerously irrational Test Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Unified and responses in a crisis. Joint Operations (January 1990), would be One may also argue that the use of adequate. Obviously, the response to this nuclear weapons runs counter to national position is that nuclear weapons are fun- values and policy. For example, a core damentally different than conventional American value is support for interna- ones—if not in destructiveness, at least in tional law, which places specific con- their psychological, moral, and political straints—including necessity, proportion- impact—and for that reason we do in fact ality, and humanity—on the use of mili- need an operational-level nuclear doc- tary power.8 Critics hold that the opera- trine. tional-level use of nuclear weapons would An argument that supports such doc- violate both the rule of humanity and—if trine and analysis, however, is based on such use is not in direct response to the the fact that the proliferation of nuclear first use of nuclear weapons by an weapons and the advances in associated enemy—the rule of proportionality. technology such as ballistic missiles make Simply having a capability, in other nuclear war increasingly likely. Our words, does not morally or legally justify post-cold war national security and mili- its use. It follows, then, that we should tary strategy call for continued American not plan for actions that are inherently involvement in all regions of the world.12 illegal, immoral, or evil. Although we will try to assure that the In addition, national policy continues to American military of the future is as good stress the global control of weapons of as or better than its cold war predecessor, mass destruction.9 To support this policy, it will undoubtedly be smaller. Thus, if we have withdrawn all ground-launched an operational-level American military and naval tactical nuclear weapons to the force finds itself outnumbered and facing continental United States.10 Planning for disaster, it might turn to nuclear weapons the operational use of nuclear weapons by as its only resort. This could easily have the American military would undermine occurred had Iraqi forces struck south this policy Of attempting to diminish the during the initial weeks of Operation chances that nuclear weapons will be Desert Shield. Furthermore, a future US used in crisis or conflict. Our friends, force may find itself the victim of a enemies, and citizens would find it diffi- nuclear first strike by a hostile regional cult to understand why we would plan for power. But by analvzing and developing something that our national policy doctrine on the operational use of nuclear opposes. Such contradictory behavior weapons now, the US military will be would create greater dissonance or inco- much better prepared in a crisis to offer herence in that policy. carefully reasoned advice to national deci- Another argument against the develop- sion makers. What we desperately want ment of operational-level nuclear doctrine to avoid, according to this line of reason- is not based on moral or political factors. ing, is being forced to “wing it" during a It simply maintains that such doctrine is war. OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF NUCLEAR WAR FIGHTING 17
In the 1960s and 1970s—at the height of the cold What Would war—military analysts believed that the intercontinental range and near-instantaneous launch of the Operational-Levei Minuteman missile (top) provided an effective deterrent Nuclear Doctrine to a nuclear face-off between the US and USSR. With the demise of the cold war. however. US aerospace Consist Of? doctrine may need to include conventional and tactical nuclear roles for weapons systems such as the B-2 If we do conclude that the United States (bottom) if these systems are to remain useful. needs operational-level nuclear doctrine, what would it consist of? Clearly, the full development of such doctrine would require extensive thinking, analysis, and consultation. The goal would be to pro- vide guidelines to the national command authorities (NCA) on whether nuclear weapons should be used at all in an oper- ational context. If the president decides in favor of such use, doctrine should sug- gest how, when, and where to employ nuclear weapons for maximum military, psychological, and political effect. At a minimum, then, doctrine should help mil- itary planners and commanders answer two kinds of questions during a specific war or military crisis. Et hical/political /st rategic questions would shape military advice to the NCA on whether the US should use nuclear weapons at the operational levei. For example, • Under what conditions is the use of nuclear weapons at the operational levei congruent with national values? Given 18 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1993
The ethical and political aspects of possessing and those conditions, are certain aspects of using nuclear weapons have always been volatile such use (e.g., targets, times, etc.) incon- issues. Military planners must consider such issues gruent with national values? when they advise the national command authorities about the operational use of these weapons. Here. a • Does national will support the use of group of antiwar, antinuclear, and antitechnology nuclear weapons? advocates protest at the Pentagon in November 1981. • Does international law support the use of nuclear weapons? • How will the use of nuclear weapons employ nuclear weapons if the president affect our global image or the political/ decides to use them. For example, moral element of our national power? • Are nuclear weapons militarily nec- • How will the use of nuclear weapons essary? What advantages do nuclear affect our diplomatic relationships and weapons have over high-yield conven- alliances in both the region under conflict and in other parts of the world? tional weapons? • What are the risks. especially in • What will the long-term environmen- tal impact be? terms of provoking a nuclear, Chemical, or biological counterattack? Are these risks • What will the long-term economic impact be? acceptable? • How will the use of nuclear weapons • Will the use of nuclear weapons seri- affect the campaign plan in terms of phas- ously erode psychological barriers to their future use? If so, is this risk acceptable? ing, tempo, and axes of advance or retro- grade? M ilitary/operational questions would • What specific strike packages and help planners and commanders actually targets will have the desired effect? Will OPERA TIONAL LEVEL OF NUCLEAR WAR FIGHTINC 19
demonstrations have the desired effect Conclusions without actual strikes? • Can nuclear weapons be used in an Sane people hope that no nation will offensive mode, or should they be ever use nuclear weapons, be they strate- reserved for last-ditch defense? gic, operational, or tactical. But hope • If nuclear weapons are used offen- alone is not enough. By thinking about sively, are friendly forces equipped and the unthinkable now, we could forestall trained to consolidate any advantages the possibility of having to do the gained? unthinkable later, on an ad hoc basis. • What psychological effect will The nature of nuclear weapons means nuclear weapons have on the enemy? that even operational-level doctrine must Will they break resistance or stiffen it? be totally imbued with what are usually What psychological effect will they have considered strategic-level issues, such as on friendly forces? the long-term political impact and the • What are the provisions for com- morality of military actions. This compli- mand, control, Communications, and cates the problem, but the foundation for intelligence? How much autonomy operational-level nuclear doctrine already should the CINC have, once the president exists because strategic thinkers are cur- approves the use of nuclear weapons? rently considering the role of nuclear How much autonomy should the CINC’s weapons in the new security environ- subordinates have? Are conventional ment.13 To augment this process, we need techniques for bomb damage assessment to combine NATO thinking on operational adequate? nuclear war fighting with the advice from • What are the combined-force consid- general literature on the operational levei erations? Should our allies be involved in of war, together with strategic-level analy- the decision to use nuclear weapons? sis of nuclear employment options under- Should they be involved in decisions lying the single integrated operational about strike packages and targeting? plan.14 The result could be coherent and • What are the civil-affairs considera- useful doctrine for the operational levei of tions? Are we prepared for emergency Ser- nuclear war fighting and, eventually, the vices and reconstruction? lessening of the nuclear threat. • How will the use of nuclear weapons affect options for ending the war?
Notes
1. Some of the clearest current thinking on the rediscov- 6. See William H. Park, "Defense, Deterrence, and the ery of the operational levei of war is in Clayton R. Newell, Central Front: Around the Nuclear Threshold," in NATO The Framework of Operational Warfare (London and New after Forty Years, ed. Lawrence S. Kaplan et al. (Wilmington, York Routledge, 1991). Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1990); and Carl H. Amme. NATO 2. Joint Pub 1-02, Department o f Defense Dictionary of Strategy and Nuclear Defense (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Military and Associated Terms. 1 December 1989. 264. Press. 1988). 3. Although Army corps and Marine expeditionary forces 7. George Bush, National Security Strategy o f the United are clearty designed as operational-level formations. the Air States (Washington. D.C.: White House, August 1991), 26. Force and the Navy are not similarly organized. Thus, num- 8. Joint Pub 0-1, 11-14. International law is not clear on bered air forces and fleets may be operational-level forma- the specific question of the legality of nuclear weapons, but tions if they fight as coherent units in a theater of operations. there have been several atlempts to explicitly outlaw these but—depending on the circumstances—a unit as small as a devices. In 1961, for instance, the United Nations General wing or a carrier battle group may also be on the operational Assembly passed a resolution dedaring that since the use of levei, particularly if it is part of a joint task force. nuclear weapons constituted a breech of the UN charter, it 4 |oint Pub 0-1. "Basic National Defense Doctrine," final thus violated intemational law. The failure of nuclear pow- draft. 24 July 1990.11-26. ers to recognize such efforts has led experts such as Gerhard 5. Ibid.. IV-34. von Glahn to conclude that “production of nuclear weapons, 20 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1993 coupled with fruitless endeavors to secure legal (express) size this notion in all their major statements about our prohibitions of such weapons, implies a present legality for national securíty strategy and foreign policy. See, for exam- them." Law among Nations: An Introduction to Public ple, George Bush, "United States Defenses: Reshaping Our International Law. 2d ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1970). Forces." Vital Speeches. 1 September 1990, 676-79; idem, 591. "State of the Union Address,” US Department o f State For further details on this debate, see Istvan Pogany, ed.. Dispatch. 4 February 1991, 65—67; idem, “Security Strategy Nuclear Weapons and International Law (New York: Saint for the 1990s,” Department of State Bulletin, July 1989, Martin's Press. 1987); Elliott L. Meyrowitz, The Prohibition 19-21; and James Baker, “Power for Good: American o f Nuclear Weapons: The Relevance o f International Law Foreign Policy in the New Era.” Department of State (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Transnational Publishers, 1990); Georg Bulletin, June 1989, 9. For good analyses of the new national Schwarzenberger, The Legality of Nuclear Weapons (London: security strategy, see James J. Tritten, "America Promises to Stevens and Sons. 1958); and Nagendra Singh, Nuclear Come Back: A New National Strategy,” Security Studies 1 Weapons and International Law (New York: Frederick A. (Winter 1991): 173-234; and Patrick J. Garrity and Sharon K. Praeger, 1959). W einer, “U.S. Defense Strategy after the Cold War," 9. Bush. National Securíty Strategy, 15-16. For a sum- Washington Quarterly 15 (Spring 1992): 57-76. mary of US initiatives in support of this nonproliferation 13. See, for example, Thomas F. Ramos, “The Future of policy. see President Bush, “Non-Proiiferation Efforts Theater Nuclear Weapons,” Strategic Review 19. no. 4 (Fali Bolstered,” US Department of State Dispatch. 20 July 1992. 1991): 41—47. 569-71. 14. On concepts of strategic nuclear employment, see 10. President Bush, "Nuclear Weapons Withdrawal Desmond Bali and Jeffrey Richelson, eds., Strategic Nuclear Completed." US Department of State Dispatch. 6 July 1992. Targeting (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986); 543. William C. Martel and Paul L. Savage, Strategic Nuclear War: 11. See, for example, Thomas W. Dowler and Joseph S. What the Superpowers Target and Why (New York: Howard II, "Countering the Threat of the Well-Armed Greenwood Press, 1986); Desmond Bali and Robert C. Toth, Tyrant: A Modest Proposal for Small Nuclear Weapons," “Revising the SIOP (strategic integrated operational planj— Strategic Review 19, no. 4 (Fali 1991): 34—40. Taking War-fighting to Dangerous Extremes," International 12. Bush. National Securíty Strategy. 2; and Gen Colin L. Securíty 14, no. 4 (Spring 1990): 65-92; and Richard Lee Powell, National Military Strategy of the United States Walker, Strategic Target Planning: Bridging the Gap (Washington. D.C.: Government Printing Office, January between Theory and Practice (Washington. D.C.: National 1992). 2. Key officials of the Bush administration reempha- Defense University Press, 1983).
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Lt Col Kimbl e D. S tohry, USAF
Who are the leading thinkers in today's Air Force? Name an Air Force otficer with a national reputation based on [operational expertise or] published works. Cart you think of an offícer who has established an Air Force-wide reputation as an air pow er theorist? —Lt Col Donald R. Baucom
HERE ARE today’s Mitchells? studies. Occasionally over coffee, folks This question haunted me as might discuss contemporary issues like I flipped through some the new uniform or the drawdown, but issues of Air University rarely do we conduct the “hangar flying” ReviewW in preparation for a seminar. The that is necessary for us to bond as profes- standard fare for most staff officers is defi- sionals. At Headquarters Fifth Allied nitely not reading theory, debating mili- Tactical Air Force (FIVEATAF)—a NATO tary doctrine, and poring over campaign headquarters in Vicenza, Italy—approxi- 22 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1993
mately 20 US military officers have been tions for a staff ride (an educational field experimenting for over a year with a pro- trip),3 and methods for forming such fessional development program: the groups at the composite-wing levei.4 As is Douhet Society.1 Our experience, though the case with any recipe, you may either not a well-worn cookbook, could prove follow or ignore these instructions, useful to officers who are interested in depending on the ingredients available in stirring up a voluntary program of self- your wing kitchen and the particular study or group study as they prepare for tastes of the people you will be serving.5 higher command and more responsibil- Headquarters FIVEATAF includes a ity.2 This article explains our vision for cross section of US staff officers in various the Douhet Society, the planning and career disciplines—fighter pilots, naviga- organizing required to create such a soci- tors, airlifters, missileers, radar officers, ety, the conduct of meetings, the prepara- air defenders, and so forth. Our officers, on the average, have 12 years in combat Leaming from history cart involve the study of zones,6 thousands of hours of flying time, geography. For example, Italy offers a varied terrain and a substantial amount of time in over- and a rich cultural history, both of which contribute to seas Service. Recognizing that we could interesting military studies for the Douhet Society. Here, one member calls on his personal interests and learn a great deal from each other, we con- expertise to lead a seminar. ducted a survey to check the feasibility of forming a society for professional devel- opment at headquarters.7 Since many officers were interested, we took steps to organize the society. More than likely, many officers in USAF units worldwide have similar opportunities to learn from each other and would enjoy sharing their experiences. Though our society at FIVEATAF includes mostly field-grade officers,8 all Air Force people have a need for professional development. In his foreword to Air Force Pamphlet (AFP) 36-13, O fficer Professional Development Guide, Gen Larry D. Welch, former Air Force chief of staff, writes that “professional development is a daily busi- ness.”9 As the Air Force makes itself leaner and meaner in accordance with the changes in force structure proposed by Secretary of the Air Force Donald B. Rice and Gen Merrill A. McPeak, current Air Force chief of staff, perhaps some of the changes that affect the "human dimen- sion” could put more emphasis on profes- sional development.10 Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force, gives officers the “vector” to develop themselves and their subordinates professionally.11 An organization such as the Douhet Society is a tool that commanders, units, or groups DOUHET SOC1ETY 23
of interested officers can use to achieve No program of professional develop- that end, and the better organized the tool, ment will be successful merely on the the better it will serve its users. One of strength of its mission statement and some the first steps in organizing a society for published objectives; rather, it will need professional development is writing a support from the organization’s command mission statement. element and its key sênior leaders. The statement that we came up with is, Indeed, sharing ideas and experiences Develop a voluntary society that helps US across ranks is one of the most attractive officers at FIVEATAF further their profes- features of this program. Giving the more sional development. The objectives of the mature (read “older”) officers a forum to society are to provide a forum for field- share their experiences can lead to infor- grade officers to mal mentoring, which—metaphorically— involves lighting a flame of inquiry in oth- 1. develop a concept of air power that is ers and returning periodically to trim the based on theory, history, and contemporary wick. Such informal mentoring flourishes developments;12 in a society for professional develop- 2. have adequate access to the means (i.e., ment.14 free books and study materiais) necessary to But is mentoring necessary in profes- accomplish number 1; sional development? Certainly, junior 3. develop a concept of the operational art; officers would profit from having mentors bridge the inevitable gaps in knowledge or 4. challenge the status quo by participating experience that become apparent during a in seminars and staff rides that are structured to generate well-reasoned, independent study of military history or theory.15 But thought based on a study of assigned lessons;13 and Seminars allow Douhet Soàety members of various 5. have some fun and bond as a team when ranks to discuss contemporary issues along with you do numbers 1—4. histórica! lessons leamed from campaign studies. 24 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1993
it takes time to develop the process by Table 1 which sênior officers guide and support General Donnelly s Reading List their younger colleagues,16 so initially, at least, you may have to encourage the men- Bradley, Ornar N. A Soldiers Story London: Eyre & tors to mentor! After a few good seminars, Spottiswoode, 1951. though, this process should be running Bradley. Ornar N , and Clay Blair A Generai s Life New smoothly.17 The truly difficult part of York: Simon and Schuster, 1983 organizing your society will be planning Copp, DeWitt S A Few Great Captains New York: your lessons. Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1980. ______. Forged in Fire New York: Doubleday & At this stage in the organization of the Company, Inc., 1982 Douhet Society, I presented a model of a Creveld, Martin van. Command in War. London: Har- three-year seminar lesson plan to our vard University Press, 1985. mentors to elicit their constructive criti- Gaston, James C. Planning the American Air War. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University cism. Strategically, this was a key meet- Press, 1982. ing for the society because, although I Hallion, Richard P. Strike from the Sky. Washington, already had the support of the command D C.: Smithsonian Institute Press, 1989. element, I did not want the mentors to Hemingway, Ernest. Men at War. New York: Bramhall think I was using this support to pressure House, 1979 Keegan, John. The Mask of Command. New York: them to participate. Therefore, soliciting Viking Penguin, 1987. critiques from sênior leaders in the head- Mrozek, Donald J Air Power and the Ground War in quarters gave them the chance to aid in Vietnam: Ideas and Actions. Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air the birthing of the society. I used their University Press, January 1988. Puryear, Edgar F., Jr George S. Brown. Novato, Calif.: comments as a basis for making minor Presidio Press, 1983. changes to the topics we would cover and ______. Nineteen Stars. Orange, Va.: Green then began ordering books and writing Publishers, Inc., 1971. actual lesson plans. Warden, John A., III The Air Campaign. Washington, Compiling a reading list is a criticai step D.C.: National Defense University Press. 1988. in creating a program of professional development. Undoubtedly, every officer from every Service has valid opinions libraries; some of my favorite titles are about which books are best. The most listed in table 3. Rather than spend a great practical task. though, may be selecting deal of money purchasing the books on the best available books. For example, our reading lists,20 though, we decided to table 1 is a list of books recommended to request them from US government agen- me in February 1991 by Gen Charles L. cies that offer free books (table 4) to inter- Donnelly, Jr., USAF, Retired.18 ested military officers (some agencies also Additionally, each Service publishes have free videos and films for the ask- lists of recolnmended books, many of ing).21 Usually, these agencies only which can be found in Europe at Stars and require that you make your request on a Stripes Bookstores (for reduced prices). valid military letterhead. Ordering a large The merchandising manager for Stars and reference library of these books gave our Stripes even furnished us copies of each society members the flexibility to pursue service’s current professional reading list independent research as well as studv for (table 2). Further, Gen Colin L. Powell, seminar lessons. chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, This phase of the preparation process. recently approved Joint Pub 1, Joint however, could take more time than you Warfare of the US Armed Forces, which think. For example, typing the book includes a useful reading list (table 2).19 orders can be laborious if you are not an Many officers are avid students of mili- accomplished typist.22 Also, because tary history and have extensive personal books will not miraculouslv appear in DOUHET SOCIETY 25
Table 2 Service Reading Lists
Army Goulden, Joseph C. Korea; The Untold Story oi the War. Grant, Ulysses S. Personal Memoirs MacDonald. Charles Brown Company Commander Marshall, S. L A Men agamst Fire Myrer, Anton. Once an Eagle. Pogue, Forrest C. George C. Marshall. Swinton, E D The Defence of Duffers Drift Navy Eisenhower, David Eisenhower at War. Keegan, John. The Mask of Command. Lehman, John F Command of the Seas. Potter, Elmer B., and Chester W Nimitz. Sea Power Prange, Gordon W. At Dawn We Slept Sharp, U. S. Grant. Strategy for Defeat. Smith, Perry M Assignment Pentagon Marine Corps Chandler, David G. Campaigns of Napoleon. Clausewitz, Carl von On War. Futrell. Robert Frank Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine. Herzog, Chaim The Arab-lsraeli Wars. Horne, Alistaire. To Lose a Battle Mahan, Alfred Thayer The Influence of Sea Power upon History. Slim, William Defeat into Victory Air Force Brodie, Bernard. From Crossbow to H Bomb. Creveld, Martin van Command in War. Keegan, John The Face of Battle. Liddell Hart, Basil Henry. Strategy. Paret, Peter. Makers of Modem Strategy ______. Supplying War Weigley, Russell Frank. The American Way of War. Joint Pub 1 Douhet, Giulio The Command of the Air. Handel, Michael I. Strategic and Operational Deception in the Second World War. Hastings, Max. The Korean War. Howard, Michael Eliot. The Theory and Practice of War. Keegan, John. The Face of Battle. Moorehead, Alan. Gallipoli. Summers, Harry G. On Strategy: A Criticai Analysis of the Vietnam War. Tedder, Arthur William. Wrth Prejudice
Table 4 Table 3 Free Books from Government Agencies Author s Suggested Titles
Bergquist, Maj Ronald E. The Role of Airpower in the Bdger, Daniel P Americans at War. Iran-lraq War D Este, Cario Bitter Victory Cardwell, Thomas A. Command Structure for Theater Doolittle, James H.. and Carroll V. Glines. I Could Never Warfare Be So Lucky Again. Kenney, George C. General Kenney Reports Epstein, Joshua M Conventional Force Reductions Meyer, John G. Company Command Henderson, George Francis. Stonewall Jackson and the Murray, Williamson. Strategy for Defeat: The Luftwaffe, American Civil War 1933-1945. Holley. I. B General John M Palmer. Citizen Sotdiers, Office of Air Force History. The Harmon Memorial Lee- and the Army of a Democracy. tures in Military History, 1959-1987 Holy Bble. Warden, John A., III. The Air Campaign 26 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1993
your unit mailroom the day after you send principal concern. For that reason, the the order, you should consider spending model for the Douhet Society’s three-year six to nine months on preparations before lesson plan (table 5)25 draws on material seminars begin.23 If necessary, you can available in a large reference library and hold seminars before your books arrive by emphasizes military theory, history, and relying on articles in military periodicals. contemporary developments, as well as After ordering books and films, you the careers of selected air leaders. should begin developing lesson plans. If Naturally, if you order fewer books than you are the only cook in your wing we did, you could treat some subjects in kitchen, you may have to do all the work greater depth.26 yourself. Ideally, though, several people You may wonder why we didn’t spend will be involved, thereby reducing the less time on theory and more on studying amount of time spent on this task. Since contemporary events such as Operation your source books have not yet arrived, Desert Storm. Our reasoning was that we you will probably do your research at the wanted to encourage our members to think base library, where a good selection of for themselves, avoid simple, spoon-fed sources is available.24 Again, accessibility ideas,27 and challenge the military status of material to society members should be a quo, if they did so for valid reasons.28
Table 5 Douhet Society Lessons
1991 1992 1993
Jan Preparation Phase Battle of Britain Campaign Interdiction Study (CS)
Feb Preparation Phase AFM 1-1 Ploesti Raid
Mar Preparation Phase FM 100-5 Drive to the Alps CS
Apr Preparation Phase Son Tay Raid/POWs Gen George Kenney
May Preparation Phase The Air Campaign Normandy/St. Lo Breakout CS
Jun Preparation Phase Gen Pete Quesada Battle of the Bulge CS
Jul Preparation Phase North África CS Implications of Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty
Aug Desert Storm Air Campaign: Sidly CS Mahan/Sea Power Lessons Learned
Sep Giulio Douhet and The Command Changes in NATO Strategic Bombing of the Air Theory/SteaHh
Oct Staff Ride to Northeast Italy Clausewitz Gen William Tunner/Over The Hump
Nov Air Doctrine OverView Salerno CS Campaign Planning
Dec Low-lntensity Conflict (LIC) Anzio/Cassino CS Nagasaki/Hiroshima and Nuclear War Theory DOUHET SOCIETY 27
According to Clausewitz, As for our study of military leaders, we theory exists so that one need not start afresh try to determine what these great captains each time sorting out the material and plow- learned from their martial sacrifices. ing though it, but will find it ready to hand J.F.C. Fuller comments that and in good order. It is meant to educate the mind of the future commander, or. more because generalship is so largely built on accurately, to guide him in his self-educa- character and personality, and because tion, not to accompany him to the battlefield; human nature remains constant, or practi- just as a wise teacher guides and stimulates a cally so, there is no war in history from young man’s intellectual development, but is which we cannot learn something about careful not to lead him by the hand for the leadership and command. Weapons, how- rest of his life.29 ever destructive they may be, do not cancel Theory, therefore, gives us the founda- out the need for courage, endurance, resolu- tions we need for further study. tion, cool-headedness, audacity, and all the Clausewitz also validates our emphasis other moral virtues which go to build up gen- on the study of historical examples by eralship, if only because, in the words of old pointing out that one can use them to Marshall Saxe: ‘‘The human heart is the starting point in all matters pertaining to • explain ideas, war."31 • show the application of ideas, • support statements, and Learning from history also involves the • deduce doctrine. study of geography. We take advantage of He cautions us, however, to use these FIVEATAF’s location and the source examples truthfully because the military, materiais available by doing sequential as it downsizes its forces, will ask for studies of World War II campaigns (table more from fewer people and therefore will 6), beginning with those that occurred in require those people to be of rigorous our area of responsibility (AOR).32 This intellectual and moral integrity.30 helps us learn about terrain, climatology,
Table 6 Example of a Seminar Lesson Plan
Title: Campaign Study—North África Theme: Military History Education Mode: Seminar Introduction: (From your preliminary research, give a paragraph summary ol the scope ot the lesson, as well as any personal observallons about it.) The campaign in North África is not fhe standard-fare campaign study. Operation Torch did not have a clearly defined military objective that would achieve a political end. The American forces made numerous mistakes at all leveis of leadership.. . . Lesson Objectives: (Be specifíc in hsting what you want each participam to gain from the seminar.) 1 From memory. describe the Mediterranean Theater of Operations in terms of terrain, strategic choke points, and time/distance relationships for modern aírcraft, land vehicles, and naval vessels. 2. Develop a working knowledge of the campaign from the perspective of air, land, and sea. 3. And so forth.__ Requirements: (List the lessons required reading.) Each officer will read 1. the attached handout. 2. T h e Decision to Invade North África (Torch),’ in Command Decisions (Washington, D.C.: US Army Center of Military History. 1987), 173-98. 3. and so forth. . . . Discussion Agenda: (Ask some searching questions that will require some thought about operational issues rather than learning by rote.) 1. Why did the Allies land at Morocco? Was it necessary? 2. What might have happened if the Nazis had used Spanish airfields? Did the Allied plan have a branch for this? 3. Where did the Allies take the most risk during Torch? Film: DF26149, North África—November 1942 to November 1943, may be shown. ily compile additional reading lists for your participants.34 You should also begin to gather maps because members find it helpful to associate names of battle sites with actual locations in the AOR. Further, if your videotapes have arrived, you may review them to supplement your lesson plans.35 Much of your work on the first lesson plan will entail discovery procedures, so the rest of the plans should take less time—a quantity that is also important to seminar participants because they have their own interests to pursue. For that rea- son, Douhet Society seminars are held only once a month (for no more than two hours),36 and assigned readings require no more than one hour’s preparation time per week. Deciding on the best time to conduct seminars can be tricky; certainly, you should avoid scheduling them when key leaders have their weekly staff or division meetings. Consider holding the seminars during normal duty hours. After all, pro- fessional development is not just an “after hours” activity. And if sênior mentors attend such meetings, their presence vali- dates this point. Your meeting room should accommo- date seminar-type seating and be equipped with a chalkboard or dry-marker The expertise of local military personnel is an asset to board, a viewgraph machine, a set of staff rides. These Italian army officers escorted Douhet Society members through antitank fortifications maps, a television set, and a videocassette in noitheastem Italy. recorder. Moreover, instructors may bring their own teaching aids. All of these items are quite helpful, but the instructors and factors of time and distance, as well as themselves are the proof of the pudding. any limitations involved in the opera- Because instructors need at least three tional-level moves of military forces in the months to prepare adequately for their AOR. Additionally, we think that study- seminars, you should give them a draft ing the campaigns sequentially helps us lesson plan. a set of videotapes, and an assess whether belligerents improved or additional packet of readings well in regressed in their conduct of the war. advance of their scheduled session. The Air University Review Index is a Although you may have to teach the First valuable reference at this stage of prepara- few seminars, as interest picks up, others tion.33 Because the book indexes articles will volunteer to help. For example, a by author, title, and subject, you can colonel in our group gave a superb lesson quickly see if anyone has previously pub- on low-intensity conflict (LIC) in El lished on your seminar topic and can eas- Salvador. Our sênior mentor delivered a
28 DOUHET SOC1ETY 29
moving lecture on the raid on Son Tay, staff ride or historical field trip.38 More North Vietnam. and his experiences as a specifically, a staff ride is a “systematic prisoner of war. A major is a trained preliminary study of a selected campaign, archaeologist who tours ancient battle- an extensive visit to the actual sites asso- fields in Greece and Turkey during his ciated with that campaign, and an oppor- leave time. We’ve booked him for a semi- tunity to integrate the lessons derived nar later this summer. More than likely, fr o m e a c h . ’’39 T h e D o u h e t S o c i e t y c o n - your wing has talent in abundance, and ducted an enjoyable three-day ride in the more peopie involved in teaching, the northeastern Italy—a section of our more interest there is in the program. In AOR—in September 1991.40 Be fore- fact, your participants may have so much warned. though, that staff rides are akin to fun that meeting once a month won’t be planning a major flying deployment inso- often enough. far as they require considerable prepara- Without a doubt, the success of your tion.41 seminars depends on the peopie who lead Prior to the trip, we assembled a study them. If the instructors are prepared, flex- packet that included highlights of the ible, motivated, and patient, everyone will area, copies of pertinent historical articles, learn something and have fun in the bar- and selected maps for calculations of time gain. As a courtesy, our seminar leaders and distance. After clearing the concept give the sênior mentor a talking paper on for the ride with the sênior mentor, we the lesson about a week beforehand. This began detailed preparations.42 A lengthy gives the mentor a chance to review the discussion of tips for planning staff rides material and prepare any remarks he may is beyond the scope of this article, but wish to make during the session. take our word that it’s worth the effort. A few procedural suggestions. We Our staff ride would not have gone as begin the seminar (and be sure you begin smoothly as it did without the assistance on time) by showing a 15-3Ò minute of an Italian army officer in our headquar- videotape on some aspect of military his- ters. He conducted all preliminary site tory. Not only is this informative, but it reconnaissance, booked hotels and restau- allows latecomers to stay in step with the rants, negotiated group rates at museums, seminar discussion. After the tape. the and arranged for English-speaking tour instructor briefly covers the lesson objec- guides in many locations. To reward him, tives and leads discussion on the ques- we chipped in to pay for his hotel and tions in the lesson plan. Although partici- meai expenses (since he was on leave). pation varies, depending on the subject, Our ride included visits to the Brenta, most peopie will take part in the discus- Tagliamento, Piave, and Isonzo rivers, all sion if you choose and order your ques- of which are criticai to the NATO land tions wisely. On the rare occasions when defense of the area; tours to the Gorizia discussion lags, you can have a “hip Gap and the World War I battle site at pocket” role-playing exercise ready (e.g.. Redipuglia/Colle S. Elia; a stop at the “Okay General ______[fill in with a ancient, star-shaped fortress city of participanfs name], if you were chief of Palmanova; a visit to an Italian army staff, what would you do in this situa- Alpini brigade at Tarvisio; and a guided tion?"37). More than likely. the allotted tour of the triborder area of Austria-Italy- time will expire before discussion does. Yugoslavia (now Slovenia). Other high- Before dismissing. pass out the lesson lights included brief map/situation exer- plan and handouts for the next session cises at Monte S. Simone, Vittorio Veneto, and thank everyone for attending. and Nervessa di Battaglia (along the Piave Another worthwhile entree in the River). Interspersed between the hectic professional-development cookbook is the schedule of mental push-ups, hiking, and 30 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1993 window gazing were some thought-pro- paign to talk shop. Only foolish people voking discussions over mouth-watering refuse to learn from the experiences of Italian meais. After returning, each partic- others. Let’s not wait until the start of the ipant wrote a formal analysis of “The next war to get ready professionally! Defense of Northeast Italy” for the sênior All USAF officers could stand to learn mentor. Needless to say, if time and more about different missions and special- money permit, we would like to conduct a ties. Whether it’s visiting the engine shop, staff ride every year.43 hopping a ride in a KC-135 tanker that is Despite all that’s been said, your reac- refueling your squadron, or driving out to tion still may be, “So what? I’m a captain the air-to-ground gunnery range to watch in a composite wing, and 1 hate reading A-lOs practice weapons delivery, there is books. How does this article apply to much we can learn from each other. me?” Well, it may not! But tactical pilots When people with whom you’ll go to war usually check with the intelligence sec- are across the flight line instead of across tion before they plan their flying missions, the country, you would miss a great and this article represents fresh “intel” opportunity by not taking the time to pick from a year-long campaign of profes- their brains. Will a “Horner Huddle,” a sional-development missions. Even if you “Mitchell Meeting,” a “Quesada Quorum,” hate reading books, I imagine I could get or a “Schwarzkopf Society" work at your your attention if I brought together some composite wing kitchen? Why not? You key planners of the Persian Gulf air cam- tell us. You’re the chef.44 □
Notes
1. Headquarters FIVEATAF (NATO) is subordinate to 3. American students of the operational art have con- Headquarters Allied Air Forces Southern Europe ducted staff rides for years. In 1910 students at the US Army (AFSOUTH) and is responsible for the air defense of Italy in Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, conducted a “vol- peace and war and for planning a full range of conventional untarv" (no mileage reimbursement) historical ride of and nuclear operations. It ensures readiness in the Southern Sherman's campaign through Geórgia. I.B. Holley, General Region through tactical evaluations and exercises. In lohn M. Palmer, Citizen Soldiers, and the Army of a wartime, it commands Italian air units, two tactical air con- Democracy IWestport. Conn.: Greenwood Press. 1982). 192. trol centers. and NATO-assigned reinforcements. 4. We chose "Douhet Society" in honor of Giulio Douhet. Headquarters FIVEATAF Public Information Office flver. “V who wrote The Command of the Air. General Douhet, an FIVEATAF'." November 1991, 1-2. Italian artillery officer. first articulated a theory of air power 2. Obviously, not evervone will be interested in profes- and influenced air power advocates around the world. sional development. Responses will range from “I don't Although we do not agree with evervthing Douhet zealously have time” to "The only history I need to know is the historv wrote or did. we thought it appropriate that the society of a Maverick missile from the pickle button to impact.” honor him since we are guests in his native land and are still Note also the observation of Maj Price T. Bingham in his indebted to him for some of air power's current doctrine. article "Professionalism in the Air Force." Air University Also keep in mind that choosing a name that has lineage Review 32. no. 4 soned that if noncommissioned officers were later interested Donnini. eds., Professional M ilitary Education for A ir Force (our initial survey showed no such interest), we could wel- Officers: Comments and Criticisms (Maxwell AFB. Ala.: Air come them at that time. University Press, June 1991), 18. The books that we ordered were to be used for professional 14. The sênior mentor should be the commander of the development. Most participants will be very happy to USAF unit that hosts a program of professional develop- receive the fine books that are available. Indeed, I have seen ment. People who voluntarily plan and organize such pro- interest increase dramatically after distribution of the USAF grams can do so as part of their additional duty. "Blue Book" series on World War n. Maj Gen Fox Conner's mentoring had a lasting effect on When you order books, aJlow for the normal turnover of General Eisenhower. The fact that Conner was interested in seminar participants. Anticipating newcomers, we ordered Eisenhower motivated the future president to study and 20 percent more books than we would have. Also make think. Lt Col Cole C. Kingseed. "Mentoring General Ike," arrangements for storing books that arrive while you (the one Military Review, October 1990, 26-30. who distributes the books) are on temporary duty. Good Gen George C. Marshall encouraged his young officers to administration is necessary because partial and late ship- read and analyze books; he also hardened them by generat- ments could occur overseas. ing “friction" in their tactical exercises. See also Omar N. 8. Lt Col Bruce L. Ullman offers the following goals for Bradley and Clay Blair. A General's Life: An Autobiography professional development on page 24 of his article "Officer (New York: Simon and Schuster. 1983), 63-73; and Forrest Professional Development for Lieutenants," Airpower C. Pogue, Education of a General, 1880-1939 (New York: Journal 4. no. 3 (Fali 1990): Viking Press. 1963), 250-53. 15. Interestingly, in the near future, those few officers Rank Need who return to flying jobs from staff positions might well find Newly comnussioned Solid grounding in officership that their captains have more combat experience than lhey. Company grade Leadership qualities geared towards 16. Some of our supporters do not attend seminars. One one's job USAF colonel in the headquarters has never attended a Field grade Knowledge and perspective to add meeting, yet he constantly feeds me thought-provoking arti- breadth cles that he has read. Many of them find their way into Colonels and Preparation for strategic scope in handouts that I prepare to complement the lesson plans. above planning/execution 17. Asking the right questions in the lesson plan and in class is helpful. If you know the general span of experience See also Lt Col Stephen C. Hall. "Shortchanging Our Young of seminar participants. you can ask questions that draw on Officers: Military Traditions Denied." Airpower Journal 1, those experiences. no. 2 (Fali 1987): 48-57. 18. General Donnelly, former commander of Allied Forces 9. AFP 36-13. Officer Professional Development Guide, Central Europe and commander in chief, US Air Forces in March 1989, 5. Europe, has lectured and written on air campaign planning. 10. “Sleeker, Cheaper Air Force Duds Tailored for the 19. Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces, 11 'Trim, Tough' Image.” Stars 6- Stripes, 2 Novem ber 1 9 9 1 , November 1991. See also Soldier Training Pub 25-I1-MQS, 1-2. See also Tomorrow's A ir Force: Reshaping the Future. 21 fanuary 1987 (Army); and Commandanfs Reading List, videotape. ca. November 1991. 21 March 1990 (Marine Corps). 11. AFM 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United 20. A number of good references can give you an idea of States A ir Force. 2 vols.. March 1992. Note the following what you should be reading. comments on professional development: AFM 1-1. Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States A ir I expect every airman and, in particular, every noncom- Force. 16 March 1984. If you have access to a library missioned and commissioned officer to read, study. and copy. annex B contains a selected bibliography and read- understand volume I and to become fu lly conversant with ing list. volume 11. The contents of these two volumes are at the A ir University Suggested Professional Reading Guide. heart of the profession of arms for airmen [emphasis Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University, 1989. This is the added). (Vol. 1, page v) "official" professional reading guide, according to Air Every officer (commissioned and noncommissioned) University. should make the professional development of subordi- B e rlin , R obert H. M ilita ry Classics. Historical nates a high-priority task. Painstaking preparation is Bibliography no. 8. Fort Leavenworth. Kans.: US Army required to sustain the quality of Air Force leadership in Command and General Staff College, Combat Studies peace and war. AU officers should be accountable for the Institute, January 1988. Dr Berlin answers his students' professional development of their subordinates. (Vol. 1, questions about what to read "to further explore the his- page 19) tory of war and the military profession" (page v). (Free) Eiserman, Maj Frederick A. War on Film: Military' History 12. This advice carne from a former instructor and mentor Education. Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: US Army Command of mine. Dr Harold Winton. and General Staff College, Combat Studies Institute. 1988. 13. "If the staff had to bow to superior rank merely A one-stop look at how and where to get good films and because it was superior without an opportunity to weigh videos on war. Though primarily geared towards an Army objections on their merits, then the army could never hope to audience, this bibliography could help you select formulate an objective military policy to present to the films/videos for your seminars. (Free) nation." Holley. 206. H allion. Richard P. The Literature of Aeronautics, Note also Cen David M. Schlatter's comment about Air Astronautics, and A ir Power. Washington, D.C.: Office of University's mission in 1946: "AU must orient all instruc- Air Force History, 1985. Written for Project Warrior, this tion on the future, pursue forward thinking, and resist con- bibliographic essay is of particular interest to scientists servatism Officers must be molded with the 'ability and and engineers. Airmen should also find it useful. (Free) capability for fundamental, original thought' (emphasis (essup, John E., ]r., and Robert W. Coakley. A Guide to the added] Lt Col Richard L. Davis and Lt Col Frank P. Study and Use o f M ilita ry History. Washington, D.C.: US 32 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1993 Army Center of Military History, 1979. This excellent (Official USAF Blue Book series and other good books on air guide is a useful tool for young officers embarking on a power) study of their profession. It has Information on what to National Defense University Press Iook for and where to find it. (Free) Fort Lesley J. McNair Miller, Samuel Duncan. An Aerospace Bibliography. 1971. Washington. D.C. 20139-6000 New Imprint. Washington. D.C.: Office of Air Force (202) 475-0948 History. 1986. Primarily for researchers. this reference includes information about books, periodical literature, (Contemporary books on military topics by defense authors) and authors. (Free) USACGSC/CSI Nye, Roger H. The Challenge of Command: Reading for Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-6900 M ilitary Excellence. Wayne, N.J.: Avery Publishing DSN 552-3897 Group. Inc., 1986. Colonel Nye wrote this book to answer the question. Sir. what should I read? He answers that (Leavenworth papers, bibliographies. research studies, and question nicely. some reprints of military classics) Paszek. Lawrence ). A Guide to Documentary Sources. 1973. New Imprint. Washington. D.C.: Office of Air Force Department of the Army United States Military Academy History, 1986. Primarily a research guide. this book helps you locate "primary and secondary documents on the Air Department of History West Point. NY 1099é Force." (Free) United States Military Academy. Professional Officers (Professional Officers Reading Guide) Reading Guide. West Point, N.Y.: USMA Department of History. 1990. Written from the soldier’s perspective, this Department of the Air Force guide encourages reading on war. Includes a good United States Air Force Academy selected bibliography. (Free) Department of History Westenhoff, Lt Col Charles M., comp. Military Air Power: USAF Academy, CO 80840-5701 The CADRE Digest o f Air Power Opinions and Thoughts. (Modern Warfare and Society, vol. 1) Maxwell AFB. Ala.: Air University Press, October 1990. This collection of quotes, comments, and bombast pre- Department of the Army sents readers a mosaic of thought on air power. Includes United States Army War College an excellent annotated bibliography. (Free) Strategic Studies Institute Carlisle Barracks. PA 17013-5050 In addition, Stars and Stripes Bookstores overseas provide a DSN 242-4205/4402 professional military reading program to their customers, as (Campaign Planning) well as discounts on bulk orders. Another good reference is Project Warríor—A Recommended Professional Reading List. A few more suggestions: (1) Give your local Property Ask your base librarian for a copy. Finally, good military Disposal Office an official letter that includes your unit periodicals like Airpower fournal. Air Force Magazine. DODIC supply number and the name of an individual autho- Military Review, US Naval Institute Proceedings, and so rized to pick up books. This could give you first cut at some forth, publish useful book reviews in each issue. good military history books that your base/post library may 21. Write or call the following agencies to request a list of be disposing of as salvage. (2) Visit your base/post library to their publications. All of these agencies have generously see what source books and films are available. (3) Check sent us free material. AFP 700-34. A ir Force Catalog of Visual Information Materials, (une 1989, for visual aids to supplement your seminars. AUCADRE/PTPB 401 Chennault Circle 22. We spent about 50 hours typing the package proposal. Maxwell AFB. AL 36112-6428 the initial survey, and letters to different agencies: three DSN 493-6452 hours telephoning overseas book agencies; 24 hours distrib- (A ir University Review Index. Air University Press books. uting books; and four hours developing each lesson plan. CADRE papers, Airpower Research Institute papers. etc.) Obviously, you should be sure that your boss and sênior mentor will give you the time and support that you need. Commander. US Distribution Publications Center 23. If vou are overseas. you may have to wait six to 10 2800 Eastem Blvd. months for your books to arrive. but don't let this keep you Baltimore. MD 21220 from getting started. In the meantime. you could be develop- DSN 335-7800 ing your entire portfolio of lesson plans. Remember that (US Armv Green Book series and other good books on land books are an “extra"; you can still develop professionallv by forces) discussing articles or listening to briefings. A credible cam- paign study. though. requires good reference books. Director, Marine Corps Historical Center 24. While you are waiting, you can compile a list of refer- Headquarters USMC ences from the information you requested from various agen- Washington Naval Yard cies (see note 21). For example. for the campaign study of Washington. D.C. 20374-0580 North África, you can select titles from the US Army Green DSN 288-3840 Books, the USAF Blue Books. and the History of the United (Official Marine Corps histories) States Naval Operations in World War II series and add the appropriate page numbers to the lesson plans after the books Headquarters USAF/CHO arrive. Bolling AFB 25. Note that we did not cover military captains from Washington, D.C. 20332-6098 antiquity, Pacific campaigns of World War 11. the Korean DSN 297-5794 War, the Vietnam War, or recent Arab/Israeli wars. These DOUHET SOC1ETY 33 are worthy topics. and the latter four would be weil suited 36. We did this to ensure that supervisors would allow for officers in those geographic areas. However. one-third of their people to participate—not to avoid complaints from our participants will turn over each year, so any in-depth participants. Suppurt froin the command element has been study we do must rely on basic theory and doctrine. But we good. did order books on topics we wouldn't cover so that partici- 37. Role playing is best conducted with the understand- pants could study them on their own. ing that the principie of nonattribution is in effect and that 26. For example. you could devote a series of lessons to all statements. regardless of who makes them, are subject to preparation for a staff ride. intense scrutiny. 27. I. B. Holley. Jr.. The Use o f M ilita ry History in the U.S. 38. Lt Gen F. Michael Rogers noted that "the military art Armed Forces, Contract no. MDA903-86-C-0326 cannot be mastered either solely in the classroom. as within (Washington. D.C.: Toborg Associates, Inc.. 1987). the graduate or precommission training, or solely by experi- 28. Ln an article on "The Military Professional" in the Air ence. as with participation in warfare or on-the-job training." University fíeview of January-February 1975, Gen Ira C. "Why Professional Military Education?” Air University Eaker exhorted readers to “examine continually all tradi- fíeview, July-August 1975, 5. tions. customs, and procedures of the past to see if they meet 39. William G. Robertson, The Staff fíide (Washington, today‘s needs and conditions. Hold on stubbornly to the D.C.: US Army Center of Military History, 1987), 5. See good but eliminate promptly those not pertinent to these appendix B for addresses and phone numbers of agencies times and requirements" (page 10). that assist in the planning of staff rides. 29. Carl von Clausewitz. On War, ed. and trans. Michael 40. A purist might not call our journey a staff ride Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton because we did not limit ourselves to one battle or campaign University Press. 1976), 141. and because we were not led by an expert historian. Rather, 30. Ibid., 141.170-74. our focus was on the operational defense of the area. 31. J.F.C. Fuller, Crant and Lee: A Study in Personality 41. I spent about 150 hours researching and preparing for and Generalship (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University a staff ride to Sicily. Although a real-world mission forced Press. 1957). 6. us to cancel the trip, I learned lessons that will be useful in 32. Look beyond Air Force-only accounts when you planning other rides. design and research campaign studies; that’s why we 42. Some practical questions to consider: Who is paying? ordered both Army and Air Force official histories. Do you rent a bus, drive a govemment bus, or take private Remember too that these readings will give you a good foun- vehicles? Can wives/family members attend at their own dation for writing a military strategy analysis and assess- expense? How many seminar participants have a valid gov- ment paper on US strategic air operations in Europe during ernment driver‘s license? World War II, as is required at Air War College. 43. Salerno, Anzio, Monte Cassino, and Gran Sasso are 33. Maj Michael A. Kirtland, A ir University fíeview Index some of the places we have in mind. (Maxwell AFB. Ala.: Air University Press. October 1990). 44. Professional development societies are tailor-made for You can request copies of articles from back issues of both composite wings because such programs tend to enhance the Air University fíeview and Airpower Journal from same bonding process that the wings are trying to achieve. AUCADRE/PTPB (see note 21). If you would like to have copies of our lesson plans, send 34. If certain joumals aren’t available at your library, ask a blank 5 1/4” or 3 1/2" diskette in a self-addressed stamped a librarian to request them through interlibrary loan. envelope to Headquarters FIVEATAF/FACDGC, APO AE, 35. We have ordered videotapes through Detachment 3. 09630. 1367th Audiovisual Squadron at Rhein Main Air Base, Germany. with excellent results. Winter 1992 IRA C. EAKER AWARD WINNER Mr Christopher M. Centner for his article Ignorance Is Risk: The Big Lesson from Desert Storm Air Base Attacks Congratulations to Mr Christopher M. Centner If you would like to compete for the Ira C. on his selection as the Ira C. Eaker Award Eaker Award, submit an article of feature winner for the best eligible article from the length to the Airpower Journal, 401 Chennault Winter 1992 issue of the Airpower Journal. Circle, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6428. The Mr Centner receives a $500 cash award for his award is for the best eligible article in each contribution to the Air Force’s professional issue and is open to all US military personnel dialogue. The award honors Gen Ira C. Eaker below the rank of colonel or equivalent and all and is made possible through the support of US government civilian employees below GS- the Arthur G. B. M etcalf Foundation of 15 or equivalent. Winchester, Massachusetts. 34 ONE TARGET, ONE BOMB IS THE PRINCIPLE OF MASS DEAD? Lt Col Edwar d Mann, U S A F lever (n) bar pivoted orx a fixed point weapon—especially if the enemy is to lift s o m e t h i n g . . . m e a n s o f po w e r unarmed. Sometime in the ancient past, or influence. warriors probably achieved a great deal of leverage by using sticks against other war- leverage (n) action or power o f a lever. riors who hadn’t yet figured them out. This was probably the original technologi- —The Oxford Minidictionary cal solution to the neverending problem of warfare: How do you gain sufficient lever- LEVER EXERTS real power— age over an enemy to defeat him and leverage—only when it pivots on achieve your political purposes? a fixed support point or fulcrum. Actually, the stick remains a pretty good Without the fulcrum, a lever is choice for hand-to-hand combat—no justA a stick. Warriors know that, under the doubt the reason why police officers carry right circumstances, a stick is not a bad billy clubs. Nonetheless, you won’t gain . 35 36 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPR1NG 1993 much by bashing people at random with rather, concentration of sufficient power at your stick. You need leverage to get the the proper time and place is the criticai most out of it, and this kind of leverage factor. Flavius Vegetius Renatus recog- requires a fulcrum forged from ideas— nized this principie in the fourth century principies, concepts, and strategies of a .d .: “An army too numerous is subject to employment. many dangers and inconveniences [but Technology and ideas have a dynamic since] victory in general is gained by a relationship. Sometimes concepts of small number of men,” one must concen- employment lead to new technologies; trate the best soldiers at criticai points.3 sometimes new technologies require dif- No less an authority than Napoléon ferent concepts of employment. Still, we himself said, “To keep your forces united, hold some principies of warfare to be to be vulnerable at no point, to bear down nearly—if not entirely—immutable. with rapidity upon important points— Concepts and strategies of employment these are the principies which insure vic- should not only be responsive to techno- tory” (emphasis added).4 Although tech- logical change, but should also be gov- nology had progressed considerably by erned by sound, enduring principies. Napoléon’s time, the principie of concen- In light of the effectiveness of air opera- trating combat power hadn’t changed tions during Operation Desert Storm, some much. That is, the massing of bows and people have challenged one of the suppos- arrows and men with swords in 400 B.C. edly immutable principies of warfare—the had much the same impact as the massing concentration of combat power (i.e., of cannons and muzzle-loading rifles 22 mass). Certainly, the fact that stealthy centuries later. bombers can now accomplish with a sin- During the next 150 years, technology gle weapon what not so long ago took advanced quite rapidly, while the concen- thousands of weapons should lead us to tration of force changed in application— reevaluate this principie. Discarding the but not in principie. Because of their fail- principie altogether, however, would be ure to fully understand the new applica- going too far. Instead, we should upgrade tion of mass, soldiers on two continents our understanding of its application in the paid huge prices in blood and treasure. new technological environment. The Specifically, in 1861 and again in 1914, application of stealth and precision deliv- vastly improved but essentially immobile ery technologies in accordance with a new firepower gave defensive forces preemi- understanding of the principie of mass nence over offensive forces, so that will provide tremendous leverage in massed offensives failed miserably against future combat environments and will be concentrations of rapid-fire defensive criticai to a .successful military resolution. weapons. The failure to recognize this To correctly evaluate this dynamic defensive advantage cost almost an entire between technology and mass, we must generation of young men their lives in the begin at the beginning. American Civil War and in World War I. For centuries, warriors have understood In World War II, however, the addition that “concentrat[ingJ combat power at the of heavy-duty firepower to mobile, mecha- decisive time and place”1 is a sine qua nized forces restored the advantage to the non for victory on the battlefield. In the offense. A properly executed offensive fifth century B.C., Chinese general and could break the enemy’s will so rapidly strategist Sun Tzu wrote, “If I am able to that defensive forces were reduced to rab- use many to strike few at the selected ble collected by the infantry that followed point, those I deal with will be in dire in the wake of the awesome mechanized straits.”2 But possession of greater power, force which achieved breakthrough and in and of itself, does not decide the battle; victory. Again, the efficacy of the princi- ONE TARGET, ONE BOMB 37 ple of concentration of force had not court-martial and removal from the armed changed, but people who applied it prop- Services. Nonetheless, during the 1920s erly in the light of new technologies won and 1930s, airmen began to view massed easy victories over adherents of the old air power as a shortcut to defeating an concept of mass. One of the technologies enemy. that became dominant in this new envi- In 1921 Giulio Douhet argued that ronment was air power. The massing of “modern aviation” was capable of win- air power at the tactical levei—a dream of ning wars independently of surface forces World War I airmen—became a reality in if an independent air force could meet the latter years of World War II. two conditions: (1) win command of the During World War I, Col (later Brig Gen) air and (2) exploit that advantage “with William (“B illy”) Mitchell became a forces capable of crushing the material strong advocate of the concentrated appli- and moral resistance of the enemy.”6 cation of air power. His crowning According to Douhet, this could be done achievement in that war was the accumu- by massing “battleplanes”—large bombers lation of a “strategic reserve” air force of equipped to defend themselves from pur- over 1,000 airplanes for the assault on the suit planes. The concentrated firepower salient at Saint-M ihiel, France, in of a formation of battleplanes would eas- September 1918. This force was “to be ily destroy the pursuit planes, which sac- put into a central mass and hurled at the rificed heavy armament in favor of speed enemy’s aviation, no matter where he and maneuverability. Further, the battle- might be found, until complete ascen- planes would choose the time and place of dancy had been obtained over him in engagement (insofar as they could fly the air.”5 The tactic was stunningly suc- routes of their own choosing) and thereby cessful. make the interceptors’ task that much After the war, Mitchell and others called more difficult. To use the phrase of a later for an independent air force, arguing that central control of air forces by an experi- enced airman would exploit the strengths In past wars, air forces had to use large numbers of of concentrated air power, while the con- aircraft to gain leverage over enemy air defense tinued subordination of air power to Systems and achieve military objectives. Here, B-17s ground forces would vitiate any such fill the skies over war-tom Europe, providing a classic advantage. MitchelTs ardor cost him a example of the principie of mass. 38 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1993 time, the bombers would always get literally thousands of bombs in order to through. Thus, it would be important not hit their target. Second, it took huge num- to dissipate strength in residual efforts bers of bombers to overload or gain lever- such as pursuit, but to carefully observe age over well-established air defense Sys- the ancient principie of mass.7 Indeed, tems. the fledgling US Army Air Corps used its However, the belief that bombers could B-17s and B-24s in just such a manner in successfully defend themselves proved to World War II.» be a serious error. Even though the mass- ing of bombers meant that fighters paid a price for their attacks, the exchanges were not favorable for the larger aircraft (cer- tainly not nearly as favorable as Douhet predicted).10 Not until large numbers of long-range escort fighters began protecting the bombers could the latter successfully conduct deep raids against heavily defended targets.11 In other words, the achievement of satisfactory target damage called for the heavy massing of both bombers and escort aircraft at the tactical levei. On a day-to-day basis, then, the Allied air forces could achieve only tacti- cal-level objectives. Operational- and strategic-level objectives were realized only through the cumulative destruction of targets. As late as the Vietnam conflict, this con- ception of the principie of mass was still operative, although “force packages” were somewhat smaller due to the increased During the Vietnam War. the massing of aircraft was carrying capacities and accuracy of still important. However. thanks to technological improvements, we could inflict the necessary amount bombers and fighter-bombers. In early of damage with fewer aircraft. B-52s such as this one 1965 a typical Rolling Thunder force pack- above. provided a powerful lever of force during the age contained just over 100 aircraft—as Linebacker campaign. did the Bolo counterair operation of December 1966—and Linebacker I mis- Because Allied air planners were aware sions over North Vietnam in late 1972 typ- of the value of massed attacks, the size of ically included 50-60 aircraft. (One may bomber raids grew as fast as resources at least partially account for the relatively allowed. For example, in 1942 and early small size of these packages by noting that 1943 when the mighty Eighth Air Force they carried a mix of conventional and was in its infancy and resources were laser guided munitions, the latter presag- strained, only 20-80 bombers conducted ing Operation Desert Storm.) Linebacker raids on enemy targets. These numbers II missions were conducted by nine-ship gradually rose, first to the low hundreds, “waves” of B-52 bombers (usually three then to 600 or 700, and finally to over waves totalling 27 aircraft) supported by 1,000. Even then, Allied air raids targeted various protection svstems (i.e.. internai only one or two main enemy complexes, electronic countermeasures [ECM], jam- for two reasons.9 First, given the current ming aircraft, and Wild Weasel aircraft) State of technology, the planes had to drop and were preceded by airfield strikes con- ONE TARGET, ONE BOMB 39 ducted by solo F-llls (again presaging extravagant dreams of early air power the- Desert Storm).12 orists. Although the Air Force addressed the Precision guided munitions (PGM) now problem of survivability in Vietnam some- make it possible to “mass” against a target what differently than it had in other con- with only a handful of airplanes (often- flicts, combat air patrols (CAP) protected times, just one plane is sufficient, espe- defenseless aircraft such as the F-4 fighter- cially if it is stealthy). Although this bomber, just as fighter escorts had pro- development should change our view of tected bombers in World War II. the application of mass, it does not alter Eventually, however, electronic support that ancient principie. Rather, it allows equipment and aircraft augmented CAP. us to shift our emphasis from the tactical For instance, detection equipment warned to the operational levei, the effects of of enemy radar observation and tracking, which were amply demonstrated in Desert both airbome and ground based (the addi- Storm. tion of radar-directed antiaircraft fire con- This shift in emphasis to the operational trol and surface-to-air missiles increased and/or strategic levei merits close the lethality of the ground-based threat). scrutiny. At the tactical levei, planners Further, raid packages now included elec- are interested in specific outcomes: Who tronic jamming aircraft such as the EB-66, won the engagement? Was the target as well as F-105 and, later, F-4 Wild destroyed? On the other hand, the opera- Weasel aircraft equipped with radar-detec- tional levei is concerned with cam- tion equipment and antiradiation missiles. paigns—achieving higher military goals Finally, B-52s and a few other large air- through the combined effect of winning craft relied on internai radar-jamming many battles (e.g., How have we affected equipment—just as fighter-bombers operation of the enemy’s command and depended on speed and maneuverabil- cor.trol?). The strategic levei, of course, is ity—to survive in the target area. Thus, our ultimate objective: Will the enemy do with the exception of the F - lll, 50-60 air- what we want him to do? Until we craft were still necessarv to achieve suffi- achieve strategic-level objectives, we must cient mass at the tactical levei. keep working at the tactical and opera- With the advent of Desert Storm. how- tional leveis. ever, dramatic video images made clear Two key advances from the Vietnam era that it no longer took hundreds of bombers effectively combined in Desert Storm to dropping thousands of bombs or even tens elevate the use of mass from the tactical to of bombers dropping scores of bombs to the operational levei. First, PGMs were destroy a single target. Now one aircraft, used routinely by aircraft that could pene- often delivering only one weapon, could trate enemy defenses either alone or in destroy one target (or at least one “aiming small numbers. Second, speed, stealth, point”). Bombing has become so precise advanced electronics, and the systematic that weapon Systems can routinely iden- destruction of air defenses ensured the tify not just the building or the room, but survivability of those aircraft (although we the corner of the room that will bring must remember that an aggressive enemy everything down—even the vent shaft that with an active air defense system could will put the bomb inside the shelter. This make survivability much less certain than extraordinary development must surely it was in Desert Storm). change our thinking about the employ- Still evident in the Gulf War were large ment of air power. We can now view the strike packages of 50-60 nonstealthy venerable military principie of mass from fighter-bombers which lacked precision a different perspective—one which allows targeting systems and/or PGMs. But solo us at last to fulfill many of the once- F-117s daily attacked the most heavily 40 A1RPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1993 defended target sets (often in Baghdad ously. Massing at the operational levei itself). receiving no battle damage yet con- instead of the tactical levei allows the sistently placing bombs within inches or attacker to overwhelm an entire target set feet of their precise aiming points. The or even several target sets in one attack. F-15E, F/A-18, and venerable F-lll and Accordingly, Desert Storm planners A-6E achieved similar results in only designed missions not only to inflict slightly less demanding environments, physical destruction, but to demoralize an although they usually required ECM and entire nation. Specifically, coalition air CAP.13 Thus, technical advances have forces overwhelmed the entire Iraqi inte- allowed us to overcome, at least for the grated air defense system and electrical present, the twin reasons for massing air- power grid in a matter of days (perhaps craft against an enemy target—to achieve even minutes) and then neutralized the the desired levei of destruction and to Iraqi system of command, control, and defeat target-area defenses. Communications (C3), as well as the Iraqi Now that solo stealthy aircraft can pene- air force. After dismantling the Iraqi air trate defenses and destroy most targets or defenses, coalition aircraft began inter- individual aiming points in a single strike, dicting supplies to fielded forces and the massing of strike packages against tar- finally attacked those forces directly.14 gets is probably counterproductive since it The surprise and violence of such an exposes aircraft and crews to enemy attack stuns the defender, and the levei of defenses without increasing mission effec- destruction across a large target set tiveness. However, three factors argue destroys any hope of recovery through against becoming overly reliant on stealth repair—especially when the enemy real- and PGMs: (1) future enemies may be izes that the next day’s attacks will be just more aggressive than the Iraqis, (2) not all as devastating and that he can do nothing air defense systems are as easily disman- about it. This represents a revolution both tled as those in Iraq and Kuwait, and (3) in warfare and in the application of the someone will eventually perfect an anti- principie of mass—but not in the princi- stealth defense system. pie itself. Even so, as long as we are able to oper- Air power thinkers have long stressed ate as we did in Desert Storm, we can now the necessity of assigning priorities to tar- achieve tremendous leverage by massing get sets. Of first importance is the attain- more productively at the operational and ment of air superiority: it was Colonel strategic leveis. Previously, the necessity MitchelTs aim at Saint-Mihiel and (then) of massing at the tactical levei produced Lt Gen Charles Horner’s in Desert Storm. operational and strategic effects that were Control of the air allows air forces to con- cumulative in nature. That is, hundreds centrate on other strategic target sets (e.g., of airplanes attacked only one or two electrical power, C3, etc., in the case of major targets each day, allowing the Desert Storm), interdiction, close air sup- enemy to begin repairs between attacks. port, or whatever is criticai to the militarv Bombers had to revisit targets after a few and political goals of the campaign. In weeks, and planners could only hope that short, with air superiority, the commander the attacks were outstripping the enemy's can do whatever is most in keeping with repair efforts. Thus, concentration on a the purpose of the campaign. Although air key target set would gradually dismantle forces formerly achieved their campaign that set and have an operational- or objectives laboriously over time, Desert strategic-level effect over time. Storm has shown us that we can attain our Now, by applying new technology to goals by attacking targets directly. effi- the principie of mass, a given force can ciently, and often simultaneously.15 effectively attack many targets simultane- This employment of air power leaves an ONE TARGET, ONE BOMR 41 STANDARD MISSION F-16s F-15s EF-111 s F-4Gs KC-135S Bomb Air Escorts Suppressors of Tankers Droppers Enemy Air Defenses STEALTH MISSION F-117S KC-10S Bomb Tankers Droppers One aircratt, one bomb, one target. Clearly, stealthy missions require dramatically fewer resources than do nonstealthy missions. 42 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1993 enemy prostrate and helpless, although he Although the F-111 is nonstealthy, electronic countermeasures and combat air patrol made it almost may not realize it until he perceives the as effective as the F-117 during Desert Storm. Here. systematic destruction of his fielded an F-111 proudly waits while it is groomed for its next forces. Indeed, the enemy cannot see combat mission. what you are up to and therefore cannot discern a logical recourse (even if he weather, munition size, and range of could, he is unable to relay orders to his weapon Systems all demand our careful forces in time for them to take effective consideration. Good navigation and target action). As in Desert Storm, friendly acquisition are criticai, both to accuracy forces in the air, on land, and at sea can and survivability, allowing for quick attack the enemy’s flank or rear, killing ingress to and egress from the target area. him before.he knows they are there. Precision guidance and munition size are Applied at the operational levei, mass directly related to the ability to destrov a achieves its purpose suddenly, inflicting given target, some of which will require psychological damage on the enemy— heavy, penetrating bombs.16 Electro-opti- damage that may constitute even greater cal, radar, infrared, and other technologies leverage than the physical destruction. are rapidly improving the nighttime and Nonetheless, a word or two of caution is weather capabilities of our aircraft, but necessary here. Despite recent advances true all-weather, all-condition targeting is in air power technology (e.g., stealth, yet to be developed. Finally, the infra- PGMs, electronic warfare, etc.), our ability structure of the forward basing that is nec- to mass at the operational levei remains essary to conduct operations at a given limited. Navigation, target acquisition levei remains dependent upon the range and tracking, precision guidance in bad of our weapon systems. ONE TARGET, ONE BOMB 43 These limitations notwithstanding, tives almost instantaneously. This kind of exploitation of precision targeting and thinking made us the victor in the Gulf stealth to apply mass at the operational War. Anticipating the next confrontation, and strategic leveis offers tremendous we must continue to develop such think- leverage in future battles. We must under- ing if we are to avoid falling victim to an stand that the principie of mass is still enemy who is thinking along the same necessary and that we can now apply it lines. Desert Storm not only demon- directly and decisively at the operational strated the tremendous leverage available levei. Although our air forces can still to war planners who apply new technolo- achieve strategic objectives cumulatively gies under ancient principies, but also (though much more quickly than before), revealed the phenomenal cost of failing to current technology gives them the option do so. □ of realizing many operational-level objec- Notes 1. Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1. Basic Aerospace Doctrine was due to Douhet's influence is a debatable point. Douhet, o fthe United States A ir Force. vol. 1. March 1992.1. iii-iv. 2. Sun Tzu, The A rt of War. trans. Samuel B. Griffith 9. See The Arm y A ir Forces in World War II: Combat (London: Oxford University Press. 1963). 98. Chronology, 1941-1945. comp. Kit C. Carter and Robert 3. Flavius Vegetius Renatus, "The Military Institutions of Mueller (Washington. D.C.: Center for Air Force History, the Romans." trans. Lt John Clarke, in fíoots o f Strategy: The 1991). 5 Greatest M ilitary Classics o f All Time. ed. Brig Gen 10. See Douhet. 381. where he posits an exchange of 100 Thomas R. Phillips (Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole Books, 1985). battleplanes for 200 pursuit planes. 125, 163-64. 11. Wesley Frank Craven and )ames Lea Cate, eds., The 4. “Military Maxims of Napoleon." in Roots o f Strategy. Arm y A ir Forces in World War II. vol. 2. Europe: Torch to 431-32. Pointblank. August 1942 to December 1943 (1949; new 5. Brig Gen William M itchell. "The Air Service at St. imprint, Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, Mihiel," The W orld‘s Work 38 (May-October 1919): 365. 1983). 682-83, 704-6. 6. Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air. trans. Dino 12. A ir War—Vietnam (New York: Bobbs-Merrill. 1978), Ferrari (1942: new imprint, Washington. D.C.: Office of Air 227, 244. 254-55. 285. Force History. 1983), 98. 13. Conduct o f the Persian G ulf War: Final Report to 7. Ibid., 116-20. In book 4 of The Command o f the Air. Congress. vol. 3 (Washington. D.C.: Department of Defense. Douhet develops this concept fully. The eventual victor 1991). T-74, T-182. sends waves of battleplanes against his enemy. Although 14. Ibid.. vol. 1. 100, 118, 121. 200-201. 203, 204-6. early losses are heavy, by the time all waves have arrived, 15. Ibid., 99. initially. Desert Storm comprised four enemy pursuit aviation is heavily damaged and eventually slightly overlapping yet sequential phases: strategic bomb- destroyed. The battleplanes can then do whatever they ing, establishment of air supremacy in the Kuwaiti theater of please over the enemy homeiand. and following just two operations, battlefield preparation, and ground campaign. days of terror, capitulation is assured (pages 291-394). Later, when forces allowed. planners decided to execute the 8. Robert Frank Futrell. Ideas. Concepts, Doctrine. Basic first three phases almost simultaneously. How could anv Thinking in the United States A ir Force. vol. 1. 1907-1960 enemy hope to recover from such an assault? (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press. December 1989). 16. Some hard and/or deeply buried targets call for bombs 78-83. Whether or not the massing of World War 11 bombers larger than 2,000 pounds. the maximum size carried by many US fighter-bombers. DISABLING SYSTEMS War-Fighting Option for the Future The accelerated rate o f military technologi- Lt Col Alan W. Debban cal developments makes each succeeding war in many ways radically different from the previous one. S AIR FORCE operations in —Michael I. Handel Operation Desert Storm dramati- cally demonstrated the effective- ness of high-explosive, precision tÍW \\\\\\x U guided munitions (PGM). Combat footage of air-delivered weapons hitting corners of buildings, plunging down ventilation shafts, and destroying individual tanks became a staple of the nightly news. To many observers, this PGM technology suc- cess story made the Gulf War different from previous conflicts, though the superi- ority of PGMs against point targets had been demonstrated to Air Force satisfac- ...... ««íiIIíMíIÍÍííííííÍÍSÍSÍHiIIÍÍÍÍÍÍÍIÍIÍÍÍÍIÍIÍÍÍÍ!. DISABUNG SYSTEMS 45 tion during sorties over North Vietnam.1 The United States may now stand on Desert Storm air operations convincingly the threshold of the development and answered government studies that were acquisition of a new class of technologies harsh in their assessments of PGM reli- that can overcome these problems and ability and capability.2 make the next war "radically different." At the same time, the “precision” of The pinpoint targeting advantages of PGMs could not eliminate the human suf- PGMs, when wedded to a large technologi- fering caused by collateral damage, even if cally diverse class of nondestructive or th is damage occurred as a direct result of “disabling” munitions, may provide deci- an adversary’s illegal actions. The outcry sion makers with additional force options over civilian loss of life when the Iraqi while reducing casualties and property military Communications bunker at Al damage. Firdos was struck caused a major uproar during the air campaign. Though it is debatable that the bunker would have been struck if intelligence reports had shown it was being used as a civilian per- “Disabling sonnel shelter, US forces had no option Systems”— What Are They? short of highly destructive munitions to neutralize this military facility. If Saddam Under various names, such as “low Hussein had continued with the use of lethal,” “nonlethal,” “mission kill,” and Western hostages as “human shields” “soft kill,” an attempt has been made to around potential targets, coalition forces categorize Systems that do not directly may have found targeting those facilities a purport to inflict casualties or cause large- very diffícult political issue. scale property damage. The term that A major postwar issue became the appears to have gained acceptance within inability of Iraq to repair its electrical gen- the Department of Defense (DOD) is dis- erating plants and the consequent failure abling. Paul Wolfowitz indicates that to restore water and sewage treatment Sys- these systems have the potential that may tems. This led to a media discussion in “allow you to achieve your military objec- the United States on the responsibility of tives with substantially reduced collateral coalition forces for civilian deaths in the casualties.” and he finds the concept that aftermath of the conflict.3 “we ought to exploit our technology to the 46 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1993 Table 1 weapons could provide a deterrent prior Possible Disabling Technologies to crisis development or could diffuse the and Applications crisis before it expands without resorting to conventional m assive destruction Technology Applications options.7 In short, disabling systems may provide a new first step in the application Pulse/Directed Energy Radar Systems, Computer of force when a show of force is insuffi- Nets, C3I cient. In addition to providing an intermediate Acoustic Projection Deception, Disorientation, Incapacitation force option, disabling systems provide a partial answer to concerns over excessive Bioengineering Degradation of Propellants or casualties and damage. Beyond the obvi- Explosivos (Energetics), ous moral high ground that can be Rubber or Silicone Seals attained if campaigns are won with mini- Microrobotics Electronic Systems mal human suffering (e.g., Desert Storm), the legal necessity to limit collateral dam- Information Science Computer Viruses age and suffering in combat is a clear requirement under the concept of “propor- Materials Development Pavement Deterioration or Adhesion, Nonvisible tionality" and fits in with the aims of dis- Taggants abling weapons.8 In fact, one of the “Seven Thrusts” of the new DOD Science maximum to achieve a military result” to and technology strategy, that of precision be “very interesting.”4 strike, is in part driven by the military and Though only a partial listing, table 1 operational requirement to reduce casual- presents some disabling technologies and ties.9 weapons applications that present both Finally, we should pursue these options unique opportunities and challenges. Ray now because US technology may be S. Cline. chairman of the Washington, mature enough to provide weapons capa- D.C.-based US Global Strategy Council, ble of meeting these goals. Advocates of summarized the requirements for the new these systems maintain that, when com- systems when he referred to the possible bined with the already demonstrated pre- use of such weapons in the Gulf War: cision guidance, enabling technologies are either here now or could be developed in It incorporates not only high-precision short order if sufficient resources were weapons but also comprehensive intelligence devoted to the programs.10 collection systems that allow pinpointing military targets with a minimum of casual- ties.5 Advantages and Disadvantages Why Now? The future uses of disabling weapons There are national policy imperatives can provide advantages that flow directly that suggest a need for military options from their low-damage intent. There may between taking no action in a crisis and be distinct political and psychological using highly lethal, traditional firepower. benefits accrued to governments of gener- A recent Rand study recommends that ally casualty-intolerant Western societies “DOD should avoid over reliance—in a (giving and receiving). Public pressures to crisis—on a doctrine of overwhelming eschew or terminate the use of force force.”6 The existence of disabling against third-world States, who may be DISABUNG SYSTEMS 47 willing to absorb great losses for political gain, can be minimized if the United States is shown to be conducting a “humane” conflict.11 The systems themselves theoretically can be applied across the spectrum of con- flict. Some writers in the field have con- centrated on small-unit special operations or tactical uses of disabling systems;12 however, strategic applications only await the development of air-deliverable dis- abling munitions. If available and used can be very expensive and lengthy. For during the Gulf War, munitions loaded example, though the targeting capabilities with microelectronic “kill” devices and of lasers are well developed, attempts to delivered in quantity against the Iraqi produce weapons using laser high-heat- radar and Communications defense nets generating potentials have taken years and could have caused strategic paralysis as have met with limited successes for a effectively as high explosives, but without number of technical reasons. the attendant risks of collateral damage. Even those weapons that have been Postconflict problems may also be available have not always met with eased. The environmental impact and the unqualified successes, and countermea- time period for restoration of physical sures may be easier to produce than the facilities necessary to the survival of a for- weapons themselves. In Vietnam, inca- mer adversary’s civilian population can be pacitating agents were used but were not lessened. A transition from war to peace considered totally effective due to disper- and the resumption of normal relations, sion and persistent problems. Cloud- assuming the government of the former seeding efforts to turn the Ho Chi Minh enemy cooperates, may thus be trail impassable met with minimal success expedited.13 during the same conflict.16 Weapons Finally, advocates of the new technolo- based on light or sound effects are likely gies feel that, once developed, they will be to be weather limited. Also, because of affordable as a munitions class. Basic sci- the very nature of disabling systems, entific research is already available, and adversaries may be able to recover war- no radically different systems should be fighting capabilities faster in an extended required. For the Air Force, current and conflict, thus leading to continuai target anticipated aircraft should be able to restrikes or use of destructive force. deliver the proposed weapons anytime Even if a promising technology is devel- and anywhere for maximum strategic oped into an effective weapon, supporting effect.14 technologies and systems may not be ade- Unfortunately, few of these systems are quate to apply it to full advantage. The actually available. With the exception of “comprehensive intelligence collection riot control agents, systems developed for systems” mentioned by Ray Cline must be special forces applications, and electronic even more timely and accurate than in the countermeasures equipment, most dis- Gulf War to isolate criticai adversary abling weapons are in the conceptual nodes vulnerable to disabling weapons. s t a g e o r a t a b a s i c t e c h n o l o g y l e v e i . 15 Well-publicized difficulties of Scud-hunt- While the developed weapons are ing efforts in Desert Storm illustrate the expected to be affordable, the road to problem of locating potential targets even “weaponeering" a promising technology, when advanced PGM attack capabilities or actually producing fieldable munitions, are available. 48 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPR1NG 1993 applying conventional firepower. Unfortunately, without a common term or readily identifiable “buzz” word, this commonality must be established in every paper, discussion, or discourse on the subject to find that particular forum’s defi- nition. The current terms themselves contain seeds of confusion or derision. For exam- While new technologies can solve old ple, a nonlethal weapon that kills even problems, they can also create new ones. one individual is certainly lethal to that Chief among these is the development and person. And what kind of veteran comes acquisition of new systems without a clear out of a war that uses disabling weapons? vision as to their use. (As much as we’d Of course, he or she is a disabled veteran. like it the other way around, technology The terminology problem leads directly historically has preceded strategy and to another major conceptual issue: these doctrine.) However, weapons develop- systems will not lead to bloodless battle- ment without the thoughtful establish- fields or victories. Individuais or struc- ment of requirements or concepts for tures that are near an explosive dispersai proper employment leads to unproductive point of even temporarily incapacitating efforts, which could prove fatal to overall agents are at risk of permanent injury or program development in an era of declin- damage. In some instances, an adversary ing military budgets.17 leader may recognize that he is in a war Finally, if disabling weapons are viewed only when he is receiving large casualties as revolutionary and not evolutionary, and damage.19 Overselling the potential their introduction could have a negative of disabling systems by promising per- effect upon our‘relationships with other fectly “clean” wars can lead to unrealistic military powers. Though not a certainty, a expectations and eventually unnecessary new type of “disabling” arms race could expenditures. occur that would “disable” a budget as The introduction of disabling weapons well as an adversary. Also, arms control certainly will not take the place of mili- efforts can be hindered when opposing tary forces capable of traditional conven- parties become reluctant to part with tional responses. Where a primary war existing systems if they have nothing to aim is to permanently destroy war-making counter new and unique weapons of capabilities, “hard-kill” systems will still potential enemies.18 be predominant.20 Disabling systems pro- vide an additional force option, not a replacement for current ones. Pitfalls to Development Any attempt to place disabling systems in a special category and divorce their Before a rational DOD evaluation of the development from that of other conven- total worth of disabling systems can tional systems is probably misguided. occur, the whole disabling concept needs Both the potential and the requirements a standard umbrella vocabulary. Terms in for disabling systems are derived from the use, such as nonlethal and low lethal, all evolutionary developments of precision contain at least two common elements. guidance systems and politically moti- First, they emphasize the nondestructive vated casualty-reduction imperatives. intent of the systems. Next, they view Development of the systems is a logical these systems as providing the additional convergence of these two trends and pre- force option between doing nothing and sents an extension of conventional war- DISABL1NG SYSTEMS 49 fighting capability, not a radically unique approach. Successful electronic counter- measures operations during Desert Storm are an example of the integration of dis- abling systems into air campaign opera- tions.21 Where Do We Go from Here? However, the ability of air power to The potentials and problems of the attack high-value targets within short time new technologies must be addressed. constraints and over long distances is a Considerations of strategy, doctrine, and key ingredient of Air Force “global the requirements of war-fighting com- reach—global power.”25 This advantage, manders should form the foundation for if coupled to disabling air-delivered muni- the development of new technologies. At tions, expands the potential of disabling the levei of tactical doctrine development, systems into all leveis of warfare. The there is recognition that there are opportu- need for systems capable of assessing nities inherent in disabling systems for damage caused by disabling (or nonlethal) AirLand Battle operations. According to weapons is already envisioned.26 the Army’s Training and Doctrine Certainly, construction of munitions deliv- Command (TRADOC), development of erable from current airframes will keep these systems might provide weaponry operational and training costs at reason- “that can disable or destroy an enemy’s able leveis and make funding and devel- capability without causing significant opment of disabling systems more likely. injury, excessive property destruction, or In his book War, Strategy, and widespread environmental damage.”22 Intelligence, Michael Handel notes, "The The new Air Force doctrine, while it endless number of military inventions is does not specifically name them, implies limited only by the imagination of the sol- that disabling systems may fit best in low- dier and the scientist.”27 The intersection intensity conflicts. The emphasis on an of military/political necessity and techno- evolving conflict paradigm involving logical innovation has fired the imagina- “self-restraint toward firepower oriented tions of soldiers and airmen, scientists, operations and a propensity to operate and policymakers into investigating the within complex constraints”23 fits the possibilities of developing and acquiring rationale for developing disabling sys- disabling weapons systems. Their integra- tems. Additionally, the vast number of tion into conventional war-fighting opera- military activities short of war provides tions will provide a significant addition to opportunities for disabling applications.24 force employment options. □ Notes 1. For example, see the description of extended opera- (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976). tions with gravity bombs and the eventual success of PGMs 31-92. in knocldng down the Paul Doumer and Thanh Hoa bridges 2. Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, in Col Delbert M. Corum et al.. Tale of Two Bridges and the Extended-Range Smart Conventional Weapons Systems Battle for the Skies over North Vietnam, USAF Southeast (Washington. D.C.: Government Printing Office. October Asia Monograph Series, vol. 1, ed. Maj A. ). C. LaValle 1988). 30; and United States General Accounting Office 50 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1993 (GAO). U.S. Weapons and the Low-lntensity Warfare Threat. 11. Morris, 58. GAO/PEMD-90-13 (Gaithersburg, Md.: GAO. March 1990), 12. Barbara Opall, "Labs Rush Nonlethal Arms for 7. Mideast Deployment," Defense News, 5 November 1990,1. 3. Most of the initial reports of civilian casualties from 13. Morris, 58. The difficulties of recovery from conflict disease after the Gulf War were generated by Rob Moodie et of even a partially industrialized society are portrayed in the al., Harvard Study Team Report: Public Health in Iraq after Harvard Study Team Report: Public Health in Iraq after the the G ulf War, May 1991. Harvard University School of Gulf War. Public Health. Boston, Massachusetts. The report postulates 14. Barbara Opall, “Pentagon Forges Strategy on Non- that the bombing campaign was responsible for the shut- Lethal Warfare,” Defense News. 17 February 1992, 1, 50; down of a significant portion of Iraqi civilian medicai facili- Cline. G l: Morris, 58. ties, due to the collapse of the electrical generating capacity 15. Morrison, 758. in Iraq. 16. Keay Davidson, “War without Death may be on its 4. Quoted in "Pentagon Eyes Minimum Lethality Way," San Francisco Examiner, 2 February 1992, 1; Weapons." Aerospace Daily, 6 March 1992, 377. Paul Morrison, 758. Wolfowitz identifies disabling as the proper term for these 17. Handel, 21. 25. Systems in this article. 18. Richard Burt, "New Weapons Technologies: Debate 5. Ray S. Cline. "Warfare’s New Era,” Washington Times, and Directions." in The Impact of New M ilitary Technology, 27 February 1991, Gl. ed. (onathan Alford (Montclair, N.J.: Gower and Allanheld. 6. Paul K. Davis and John Arquilla, Deterring or Coercing Osmun Publishers, 1981), 70. Opponents in Crisis: Lessons from the War with Saddam 19. Davidson, 1. Hussein, Rand Report R-4111-JS (Santa Monica. Calif.: 20. Morrison, 758. Rand Corporation, 1991), xi. 21. Cline. Gl. 7. Janet Morris, "Enter Nonlethal Weaponry," IEEE 22. Quoted in Morrison, 758. This was probably lifted Spectrum, September 1991, 58: David C. Morrison, "Bang! from a draft copy of TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, “ÃirLand Bang! You've Been Inhibited!" National Journal, 28 March Operations: A Concept for the Evaluation of AirLand Battle 1992. 758. for the Strategic Army of the 1990s and Beyond" which will 8. Cline, Gl. A good discussion of proportionality not be published, according to the Army Staff, Concepts. requirements in response to third-world terrorist incidents Doctrine & Policy Division (DAMO-FDQ), Pentagon. Similar can be found in Lt Col Richard J. Erickson, USAF, Legitimate comments alleged to reference an Army publication were Use of Military Force against State-Sponsored International found in the Davidson article. Terrorism (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, July 23. "M ilitary Activities Short of War" (essay G), in Air 1989), 146. Force Manual (AFM) 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the 9. V icto r H. Reis, Defense Science and Technology United States A ir Force, vol. 2, March 1992, 55. Strategy (Washington, D.C.: DOD Directorate of Defense 24. Ibid., 56-57. Research and Engineering, 16 July 1992). This new strategy 25. See Secretary of the Air Force Donald B. Rice, was confirmed as releasable to the public by the Directorate “Reshaping for the Future," statement before the House for Defense Information, Assistant Secretary of Defense Armed Services Committee, 20 February 1992, in House, (Public Affairs). National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993: 10. Cline, G l; Morris, 58. Alvin and Heidi Toffler, "War, Report of the Committee on Armed Services. House of Wealth and a New Era in History," World Monitor. May Representatives on H.R. 5006, 102d Cong., 2d sess., 1992. 1991, 46-52, though not referring to disabling-type systems 14. directly, postulate that the Gulf War demonstrated the dawn 26. Reis. II—16. of a new era in warfare, with the application of weapons 27. Handel. 23. based on information. not strictly on massed firepower. Basis of Issue AFRP 50-2, Airpower Journal, is the professional journal of the Air Force. 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The E ditor (PRESS HARD WHEN USING BALL POl‘ .'T PEN) SMORT Ti Tl E AND DATE UNIT O f RON CLASS SYMBOL REOUISITION REOUIREMENT A PR.P 5o-2 £A UK] (-)COPIES TO; ! f ROM: COMPLETE (Incluõe êH chtnçes) your e>Ase pd o ou. cusnuep. accoumt FOR FORMS USE ONLY R-EPRESEkJTATiVI |MONTMLY USACE ON HANO REMAHKS EMERGENCV 1 ONE TIME ESTABUSM M£W E6QUIREM6-NT O R . PO RESPONSE (— ' COPIES OF AFRP 50-2, FOLLOW UP7TRACER MISSEO SMORT 10 AIR.P0WSR UOURMAL. OTHER (Sptcily) DATE PREPARED SlGNATURE AND TITLE Af fvm 7t4t. fEB M PREviOUS EDITtON IS OBSOLETE. RON ANO ROMT REOUEST 51 STEALTH, SEA CONTROL, and AIR SUPERIORITY C apt James H. Patton, J r ., USN, R et ired About once each quarter century a technology appears that can really make a difference. Stealth is just such a technology. Its application will reduce attri- tion. . . . We dare not ignore the application of stealth techniques to all plat- forms. —Defense Science Board Summer Study, 1990 Psychological change always lags behind technological change. —Prof Sir Michael Howard F HISTORY is any guide, stealth tech- half century. However, analysts are just nology for combat aircraft will revolu- beginning to understand and embrace the tionize aerial warfare in the 1990s at impact of stealthy aircraft on Air Force least as much as stealth for sub- doctrine and tactics of air superiority. Imarines revolutionized naval strategy,This article shows how the use of low- doctrine, and tactics during the preceding observable submarines to gain control of the sea—by striking deep in heavily pro- It is now the case for air superiority, as tected waters and thereby clearing the technology has added stealth to the exist- way for the arrival of nonstealthy surface ing speed and range of air power. combatants—can help illustrate and In the great European air war of 1943, exploit the ongoing stealth revolution in the Luftwaffe demonstrated beyond any military aviation.1 reasonable doubt that the US Eighth Air Steaíth not only removes the need to Force’s heavy bombers could not regularly defer offensive strike operations against bomb targets deep in Nazi Germany with deep, well-protected targets until one “acceptable” losses unless they were establishes air superiority (or sea control, accompanied by long-range fighter in submariners’ parlance), but it also escorts. Since then, US Air Force doctrine helps create air superiority for the sake of and tactics have embraced the principie less survivable platforms. The employ- that securing control of the air by defeat- ment of the F-117 stealth fighter during ing the enemy air force is the unavoidable Operation Desert Storm proved that air- sine qua non of any well-planned air cam- borne stealth works.2 The challenge now paign. As formulated in the 1992 edition is to develop the air doctrine and tactics of Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1, Basic to leverage that revolutionary technologv. Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Technology, doctrine, and tactics are so Air Force, control of the air “normally interdependent that a significant change should be the first priority”; only with the in any of these factors creates pressures on appropriate degree of air control in hand the others to change or evolve. When will air forces “possess the versatility to such a major technological breakthrough deliver combat power on the enemy when as stealth occurs, one must reexamine and and where needed to attain military objec- revalidate existing doctrine and adjust tac- tives at any levei of war.”3 Much the tics—if not thoroughly revise them. This same sort of reasoning shaped naval was clearly the case for sea control when thought on sea control. nuclear propulsion added dramatic Through the years, these doctrines of air increases in speed and submerged and sea control have developed from the endurance to existing submarine stealth. most elemental truths, as articulated by great thinkers such as Gen William (“Billy") Mitchell and Adm Alfred Thayer Mahan. The strength of these truths, how- ever, lies in the enabling assumptions and Assisting in this doctrinal and tactical revolution are the already well-developed subsets of both air and sea doctrines that The Evolulion o i Stealth. The first submaríne to sink allow for the temporary establishment of an enemy warship was the CSS Hunley (above). an local air superiority and sea control. eight-man vessel that sank the USS Housatonic on 17 Superior aircraft armament, electronic February 1864. Over a century later. F 117s like the one below slipped into Baghdad on 17 January 1991 to warfare (EW) systems, and various con- begin the onslaught against Iraqi command. control, cepts and methods of war fighting4 have and Communications facilities. created a bubble of relative invulnerability around aircraft in hostile airspace for a unspoken “if thens” embedded in their limited time. Slowly maturing throughout brilliant sim plicity of statement. this century, however, has been a variant Prestealth doctrines of air or naval combat of local sea control which exploited a implied that, until your opponenfs forces completely different technology. Rather are destroyed, they will note your pres- than depending on a bubble of firepower ence, place themselves between your or confusion, submarines operated unmo- forces and your objectives, and require lested within a bubble of nonobservability you to engage them first. Therefore, if one (i.e., stealth). One can gain an under- follows this line of reasoning, air forces standing of the revolutionary impact of must first engage and destroy other air stealth technology on the achievement of forces, and fleets must first engage and air superiority by briefly reviewing the destroy other fleets in order to permit the doctrine and tactics of sea control prior to ensuing and successful prosecution of the and following the implementation of war. Air superiority and sea control justly stealth. remained at the top of prestealth Service priorities, and analysts developed and applied doctrine, technology, and tactics to underwrite this order. However, Stealth and Sea Control although command of the air and the sea Only by militarv command of the sea. by pro- continues to occupy their lofty doctrinal longed control of the strategic centers of positions in a world of stealthy weapon commerce, can such an attack be fatal: and systems, the means of obtaining air superi- such control can be wrung from a poxverful ority and sea control and the time for Navy only by fighting and overcoming it. doing so have changed significantly. —Capt Alfred Thaver Mahan. USN STEALTH, SEA CONTROL, AND AIR SUPERIOR1TY 55 The establishment of local sea control operating in waters shallower than 600 by stealthy submarines allows the prose- feet and by remaining submerged at 75 cütion of vital missions before one estab- percent of their test depth from an hour lishes more traditional sea control by before sunrise to an hour after sunset. destroying the opponenfs fleet. In the Even as prestigious a Figure as Adm Ernest Pacific theater during World War II, US J. King (the first and only man ever simul- submarines interdicted Japanese merchant taneously to serve as chief of naval opera- vessels steaming along criticai western sea tions and commander in chief of the US lines of Communications. In addition to Fleet) initially missed the significance of sinking 55 percent of all Japanese mer- employing his stealthy boats in support of chant shipping tonnage (70 percent during an offensive, sea-control mission. Instead, the first 24 months of the war before sea he favored employing submarines in a control was essentially established reconnaissance role—as scouts for the bat- throughout the Pacific), the submarine tle fleet.8 force also destroyed 38 percent (by ton- Thus, it took the employment of the nage) of the Imperial Fleet5—a significant submarine in a combat situation to over- contribution towards the ultimate sea come the established doctrinal mind-set of supremacy that permitted the unopposed peacetime operations. However, as Prof naval blockade and bombardment of Sir Michael Howard has pointed out, Japan.6 thought and employment processes lag From the distance of four decades, one behind technical change. Although some might infer that the doctrine supporting people quickly grasped the revolutionary submarine operations in World War II was impact of stealth in the laboratory of con- well understood and in place from the flict, many others strongly resisted it. start. This was far from the case, how- There occurred, therefore, a considerable ever, because the leverage offered by sorting out of submarine skippers in 1942 stealth in the achievement of sea control and 1943. The ones who were willing to was not immediately apparent to either operate their stealthy platforms in an the tactician or the operator; conse- aggressive manner—while preserving quently, the Navy employed the subma- rine in very conservative ways and in essentially defensive roles.7 Stealthy submarines such as the USS Dogfish (below) Thus. in 1942 commanding officers of were used primanly for reconnaissance dunng the first submarines avoided detection by not hatf of World War II 56 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1993 their low-observable properties—could 1. Stealth provides an extraordinary provide US naval forces with an enormous economy of effort and retum on invest- competitive advantage.9 By 1945, sub- ment, and epitomizes the substitution of marines were conducting offensive opera- technology for manpower. The force that tions in as little as 90 feet of water. imposed severe damage on the Japanese Further, daylight surface operations were economy, fleet, and total war-making commonplace, with submarines submerg- capability during World War II never ing only for attack or at the approach of exceeded 1.6 percent of US Navy person- hostile aircraft. Log entries documented nel.11 Even at the height of the cold war, the applications of stealth: “The Skipper with the additional responsibility for the noted through the periscope that the near- sea-based leg of the strategic nuclear est destroyer was passing about 75 yards deterrent, only about 7 percent of Navy to starboard.”10 Thus, even a protective personnel were submariners.12 screen of surface ships proved unable to 2. The best wartime employment of detect an attacking submarine. stealth is in offensive rather than defen- In the late 1950s and early 1960s, US sive roles. The SSN that directly supports nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN) a carrier battle group—thus acting essen- began to replace the existing fleet of tially as a submerged F-14 Tomcat air- diesel-electric submarines, adding craft—does have some viable defensive increased speed and endurance to inher- missions. However, the SSN’s strong suit ently stealthy platforms. Again, doctrine is employing stealth to avoid or penetrate and tactics were slow to evolve, as ana- opposing defenses and operate unsup- lysts only incrementally perceived the ported, either to strike protected assets greatly increased technical capabilities of deep in the adversary’s rear or establish these stealthy submarines. Finally, from sea control by destroying or disabling the mid-1980s on, the stealthy US enemy defenses.13 SSN became a trump card in any 3. As independent as it might seem, the NATO/Warsaw Pact conflict, holding the stealth platform, in most cases, is ulti- Soviet submarine-based strategic nuclear m ately operating in support of non- reserve at great risk, whether these ballis- stealthy follow -on forces. This will tic missile submarines were deployed in remain true so long as naval and air forces open ocean or tucked away in much-pub- are composed of both stealthy and non- licized defended “bastions.” The US stealthy systems. SSNs simultaneously retained the ability to engage all other significant Soviet naval vessels—surfaced or submerged. Innovative planning efforts such as the Stealth and Air Superiority Global war-game series at the Naval War College in Newport. Rhode Island, con- In the beginning, the Strategic Air Command cluded that this additional tasking would supported long range nuclear deterrence. Tactical Air Command, on the other hand. have gained enough sea control to allow supported the air power needs of the theater carrier battle groups to engage targets commander. But . . . one man's tactical is ashore in theaters such as the Kola another man’s strategic. . . . [FJrom my point Península or the northwest Pacific. of view, the difference between strategic and When one melds the results of these tactical is very fuzzy. cold war exercises into the combat experi- —Air Force Chief of Staff Gen Merrill A. McPeak ences of World War II, three key findings about stealth and sea control—as well as As planners in the USAF’s new Air their relationship to stealth and air superi- Combat Command struggle to define the ority—emerge: "fuzzy” difference between strategic and STEALTH, SEA CONTROL, AND AIR SUPERIORITY 57 tactical, they may find that the distinction mand, control, and Communications net. is no longer very useful. Indeed. the con- This also becomes a very difficult option tributions of “strategic” stealthy aircraft to in the absence of excellent intelligence, the establishment of "tactical" air superi- stealthy platforms, and precision guided ority should loom large in both doctrine munitions (PGM). and tactics. The Gulf War of 1991 gives us Any reasonably capable defender who much on which to build. During faces nonstealthy attacking aircraft will Operation Desert Storm, the 42 F-117s (2.5 have enough warning time to force his percent of USAF in-theater air assets) flew attacker to select the first option and only 2 percent of coalition fixed-wing sor- engage in air-to-air combat. But that ties, yet struck 40 percent of all the option may be the least desirable from a “strategic" targets—achieving hits with 80 US perspective in terms of the pace of the percent (1,619 hits and 418 misses) of the campaign and relative attrition rates. weapons they released—without losing an Stealthy attack aircraft armed with preci- aircraft or even being struck by enemy sion weapons now permit an air campaign fire.14 As the only manned aircraft to deliver bombs in downtown Baghdad, the US nuclear powered attack submarines (SSN) such as F-117 proved the value of stealth. It safely the USS Alexandria augmented stealth with increased attacked deep, well-protected targets long speed and endurance. Despite the SSN s defensive before conventionally established air capabilities, experiences from World War II through the superiority would have permitted such cold war show that stealthy submarines are best employed in offensive rather than defensive roles attacks by nonstealthy aircraft with a like degree of safety. More to the point here, many of the F-117 missions were also in direct support of achieving air superiority through the destruction of the enemy’s integrated air defenses. |J How can one achieve air superiority? The following are options for destroying an adversary’s air assets:15 II 1. Get them in the air. This is by far the most difficult challenge; in the past, plan- ners considered it the one most likely to occur. 2. Get them on the ground. Airmen point to the ease with which Israel gained air superiority in the Six-Day War of 1967, but destroying aircraft on the ground becomes more difficult when the enemy disperses, revets, and shelters his aircraft. “Shelter-busting” munitions certainly proved their worth in the Gulf War, but low-level attack of defended airfields by conventional aircraft remains dangerous— witness the loss of about 10 percent of the Tornado aircraft so employed.16 3. Neutralize them by reducing overall effectiveness. The goal is to paralyze the enemy’s air defenses or destroy his com- 58 AIfíPOWEfí JOURNAL SPRING 1993 to open directly with the third option and During Desert Storm. stealth fighters used precision proceed to the second and the first as the bombing to take out Iraqi targets such as this hardened aircraft hangar in Jalibah (above) and an important situation directs—that is, when it is pru- bridge in Nasaria (right, below). dent and effective to employ greater num- bers of less-stealthy cousins. Clearly, the Air Force should preserve its capability to the sites in question, having flown mount air-to-air offensives with non- through the air defense system unde- stealthy aircraft. However, stealth makes tected,18 and were minutes from success- it possible to invert the order of options fully attacking hardened air defense inter- for achieving air superiority. cept operations centers and dozens of Much has been made about the fact that other criticai air defense, leadership, and the first strike of Desert Storm's air cam- command and control targets.19 paign was directed against Iraqi air- Desert Storm's air campaign com- defense radars. AH-64 Apache heli- menced at 0300 local time on 17 January copters armed with Hellfire missiles con- 1991, and air superiority was essentially ducted the attack 21 minutes before H- established by daybreak—more by the hour.17 Implicit in such commentary destruction of the means for massing and about that opening blow is the point that controlling Iraqi air assets (option three) these early warning sites had to be taken than by the destruction of aircraft in the out before fixed-wing aircraft could pene- air or on the ground (options one and trate Iraqi airspace without suffering sig- two).20 One should note that stealth air- nificant losses. At the time of the Apache craft directly contributed to establishing attack, however, F-117s were well beyond air superiority, but not as a prerequisite to STEALTH. SEA CONTROL. AND AIR SUPERIORITY 59 their ability to destroy vital target sets ture the very essence of air power—flexi- such as fixed Scud missile facilities; lead- bility—by providing the planner with four ership and command and control nodes; diverse opening gambits: and research. manufacturing, and poten- 1. Conduct meaningful stealth strikes tial nuclear-storage sites. Had large num- without air superiority. bers of nonstealthy aircraft not yet arrived 2. Use stealth to establish air superior- and been standing by to participate (or ity. had not been necessarv for the prosecu- 3. Do it the “old” way (i.e., use non- tion of a smaller conflict or a limited stealthy force packages composed of a strike), stealth sorties in support of air variety of air assets [SEAD, EW, combat superiority could have been deferred until air patrol, and strike]). those other aircraft were staged and ready, 4. Various combinations of 1-3. and until air strikes required the suppres- sion of enemy air defenses (SEAD). Depending on the future scenario, the In any event, the establishment of air fourth choice is the most likely to apply superiority in Desert Storm was not because the Air Force will not be com- accomplished by a lengthy and costly posed of all stealthy aircraft, just as the process of destroying Iraqi airframes, but Navy will not be composed entirely of by the decapitation and intimidation of stealthy warships. Faced with this reality, the means of controlling them. Air we must review existing air superiority defense radars and ground-based fighter doctrine and tactics to ensure that we control centers proved to be ideal targets exploit our stealthy assets to the fullest. for stealthy attack aircraft armed with Although such a review should occupy a PGMs and vvill continue to be so in future significant amount of time on the part of regional conflicts. Therefore, the highly Air Force planners, two quick insights capable stealthy air forces to be composed about leveraging stealth in sea control of F-117s, B-2s, and F-22s—if fielded in should prove transferable to the thinking sufficient numbers—will provide new on stealth and air superiority. options to establish air superiority The first relates to the use of stealthy extremelv earlv in such conflicts and from combat platforms operating indepen- great distances. These new options cap- dently in nontraditional roles and mis- 60 A1RPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1993 sions. Consider, for example, a regional attack aircraft in an air superiority role scenario where an SSN is the first warship meets both components of air supremacy, on the scene, with a carrier battle group en as defined in AFM 1-1: “Aerospace con- route a week or 10 days behind. In such a trol assures the friendly use of the envi- case, the SSN’s optimum initial employ- ronment while denying its use to an ment is quite likely not traditional anti- enemy.”22 Stealthy aircraft not only submarine warfare against any of the assure friendly use through their inherent adversary’s conventionally powered sub- low observability but—when employed in marines deployed defensively. Those an offensive role against enemy air defenses represent little threat to the defenses, Communications nodes, and stealthy SSN, which can penetrate to aircraft/infrastructure—prevent the enemy attack key targets ashore, as well as mine from performing his mission in that same submarine ports. Thus, the SSN can keep airspace. in port those enemy submarines not yet Although some new thinking on the deployed and test the endurance of those impact of stealth on air doctrine and tac- already at sea.21 tics is beginning to emerge in public state- The second insight applies when less ments and documents issued by the Air stealthy units enter contested territory. Force, a submariner’s quick read of that The SSN can shift to an “offensive coun- service’s most recently issued doctrinal ternaval” sea-control campaign phase and policy statements suggests that the against enemy forces. (In the interim, the conceptual leap is yet to come. Thus, the SSN has collected a significant amount of “bomber road map”—despite its emphasis operational intelligence on those forces in on the important conventional role to be order to simplify the engagement.) In this played in the future by the long-range scenario, the stealthy platform first creates bomber force—does not make explicit the its own local sea control and then con- B-2’s important contribution to achieving tributes to establishing sea control for its air superiority. More recent statements nonstealthy colleagues. suggest a growing appreciation of that These two insights suggest the powerful capability.23 The contributions of stealth new capabilities that will accrue to an air to air superiority so clearly understood by component commander (ACC) who is Air Force planners who directed the armed with stealthy aircraft and who employment of F-117s during the Gulf seeks to establish air superiority in future War must now be incorporated by people regional crises. The ability of stealthy air- who draft Air Force doctrine, tactics, and craft to create local air superiority means force-structure road maps. that the ACC can hold at risk enemy Because of the technology that allows it defenses while neutralizing key targets. to proceed to a desired launch point and Then, if necessary, by shifting stealthy release weapons from a covert stance, a assets to an offensive counterair role, the stealthy combat platform acts as a power- ACC can quickly establish air superiority ful catalyst to the progressive enabling of with minimum losses, thereby preparing large numbers of less stealthy assets. With the battlefield for the effective employ- flexible capabilities extending across the ment of nonstealthy aircraft. In either entire set of missions in a traditional air event, the air commander must avoid the campaign, stealth aircraft represent the temptation to employ invaluable stealthy ultimate multimission airborne platform aircraft in accordance with traditional, and—if properly used—a most powerful prestealth air superiority doctrine and tac- tool in the US military’s kit. A future tics and thereby squander an immense regional conflict may demand the precise technological advantage. application of US militarv power—from Therefore, the employment of stealthy long range, at short notice, and with the STEALTH, SEA CONTROL. AND AIR SUPERIOR1TY 61 promise of minimum casualties on both stealth revolution, we must renew our sides. Stealth permits power projection efforts to revisit doctrine, revise tactics, without expending time or resources to and plan forces in order to employ the F- establish air or sea control in traditional 117, B-2, and F-22 most effectively in the ways. To capture fully the impact of the early establishment of air superiority. □ Notes 1. The a rtic le “S te a lth Is a Z ero-Su m G am e: A U nited States and World Sea Power (Englewood Cliffs. N.J.: Submariner’s View of the Advanced Tactical Fighter" Prentice-Hall. 1955). [Airpower Journal 5. no. 1 [Spring 1991): 4-17), written 7. Rear Adm Corwin MendenhalTs Submarine Diary (see before Operation Desert Storm. attempted to identify some note 6) provides a marvelous insight into the process of generic attributes of mobile stealth platforms—as recognized evolving tactics and doctrine. His book relates contempora- and derived frorn decades of operating modern nuclear sub- neously documented observations of 11 war patrols through marines—and to draw possible parallels to the emergent the eyes of a man who started the war as an unqualified advanced tactical fighter. Readers interested in the advan- ensign and ended it as a lieutenant commander and prospec- tages that will accrue to the stealthy F-22 in an air-to-air tive commanding officer. engagement may wish to review that article. The present 8. Montgomery C. Meigs. Slide Rules and Submarines article considers broader issues about all stealth aircraft, (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, based on combat performance of the F-117 in the Gulf War 1990), 49. and again as related to submarine experience. Thanks go to 9. On page 19 of Silent Victory: The U.S. Submarine War many of my Air Force friends for helping me draw these against Japan (New York: Bantam, 1975), Clair Blair, Jr., comparisons. notes that 2. Office of History. Headquarters 37th Fighter Wing, “Nighthawks over Iraq: A Chronology of the F-117A Stealth during the first year and a half of the war, dozens (of sub- Fighter in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm ,” marine captainsj had to be relieved for “lack of aggressive- Special Study 37FW/HO-91-1. 1991. ness” (a disaster. both professionally and emotionally, for 3. AFM 1-1. Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United the men involved) and replaced by brash devil-may-care States A ir Force. vol. 1. March 1992, 10-11. younger officers, some of whom would never have 4. Examples include attained command in peacetime. The general changeover took months to accomplish, and many valuable opportuni- • Providing fighter escort for strike aircraft. ties were lost before it became effective. • Concentrating heavily armed B-17 Flying Fortresses to control the airspace around them, thereby permitting preci- In Eagle against the Sun: The American War with japan sion davlight bombing of strategic targets deep in Nazi (New York: Free Press. 1985), Ronald H. Spector adds that Germany. “almost 30 percent of all submarine commanders were • Interfering with or neutralizing the enemy's detection, relieved for unfitness, or lack of results, during 1942 (andj tracking. and targeting functions through heavy employment about 14 percent were removed for these reasons during of EW and antiradiation missiles in suppressing his air 1943 and 1944" (page 482). defenses. 10. Mendenhall, 208. • Assuming that aircraft such as the F-4E Phantom, F-15E 11. The NSL Fact Book. 1989, 117. Strike Eagle. or F/A-18 Hornet on a strike mission 12. Submarine Roles in the 1990's and Beyond intrinsically maintain enough air-to-aira:apability to protect (Washington. D.C.: Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, themselves against defending fighters. Undersea Warfare, 18 )anuary 1992), iii. 13. When employed in this role. the nuclear-powered 5. The NSL Fact Book. 1989 (Annandale, Va.: US Naval attack submarine is a much closer cousin to the F-117 and Submarine League. 1989), 119-22. the B-2 than it is to the F-22. 6. Submarines were also often called upon to perform the 14. fames P. Coyne, "A Strike by Stealth," Air Force mission an aviator would call “interdiction" and a naval Magazine. March 1992, 38-44; Tony Capaccio, "F-117 officer “sea denial” (i.e.. Perhaps I don't own this road or Stealth Fighter Hit 80 Percent of Its Targets," Defense Week ocean. but you can't use it either!). For example, on the 13. no. 15 (13 April 1992): 1, 8; and "Nighthawks over Iraq." night of 1 June 1944, US submarines Shark and Pintado One might ask how the air war would have differed had the attacked a heavily escorted convoy to the west of and en F-117 not been available to strike the adversary's center of route to Saipan, sinking four troop and cargo ships. This gravity. Whether alternative tactics had been a Hanoi-type brief encounter. using only a handful of weapons, elimi- strike package or the nibbling away at peripheral enemy air nated the men and materiel of a (apanese division that defenses until the center could be attacked. the battle for air would have been in place to oppose the 43.000 marines who supremacy probably would have been lengthier and costlier went ashore two weeks later. The loss of supplies and without the stealth fighter. equipment in this submarine attack resulted in the rationing 15. John A. Warden III, The A ir Campaign: Planning for of ammunition to the remaining 32.000 Saipan defenders— Combat (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University sigmficantly and adversely affecting defensive plans. See Press. 1988), 41-58. Corwin Mendenhall. Submarine Diary (Chapei HilI, N.C.: 16. Air combat operations during Desert Storm demon- Algonquin Books of Chapei HilI, 1991): and E. B Potter, strated that sheltered enemy aircraft could be destroyed 62 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1993 without undue risk, given the proper mix of weapons and 20. Ibid.. 164. tactics. Some people may quibble with the Tomado exam- 21. In-port submarines also present a marvelous target for ple, but it seems clear that low-level. nonstealthy, offensive the tactical land attack missile (variant D) (TLAM-D), a land- counterair strikes against heavily defended largets will prove attack version of the Tomahawk cruise missile. whose dis- very costly. persed "cluster" munitions serve to make many additional 17. James P. Coyne. "Plan of Attack.” A ir Force Magazine, "main ballast tank vents” in these submarines, effectively April 1992, 40-46. submerging them for the duration of the conflict but with lit- 18. The Apache attack was timed for, and in direct sup- tle loss of life. port of, a "stream" of inbound nonstealthy Air Force fight- 22. A FM 1-1, vol. 1,6. ers. It would appear that this helicopter tasking was not dri- 23. Maj Gen Jay W. Kelley, "The Future of Heavy ven by any consideration that the F-117 could not attack Bombers" and "B-2 Support,” Policy Letter, June 1992, 1-2; these radar sites but that the Apaches could, thereby releas- US Air Force Issues Team, Air Force Issues Book, 1992 ing F-117s for sorties only they could safely undertake. Of (Washington, D.C.; Government Printing Office, 1992), course, the Apaches' (and Air Force Pave Lows') “nap-of- 14-15; and House, Committee on Armed Services, the-earth" brand of stealth made this use of rotary-wing Subcommittee on Procurement and Military Nuclear assets a tactical innovation in its own right. Systems, testimony by Gen John M. Loh, commander. 19. Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Tactical Air Command, and Gen George L. Butler, command- Congress (Washington, D.C.: US Department of Defense, er, Strategic Air Command, 102d Cong.. 2d sess.. 1 May April 1992), 153. 1992. RESULTS OF THE 1992 AIRPOWER JOURNAL READER SURVEY HE SUMMER 1992 issue of Airpower part of the Journal for 65 percent of the respon- Journal included a tear-out survey that dents, while only 3.8 percent like them the T asked how well weYe serving your professional least. “Ricochets” and “Net Assessments” are reading needs. Here’s a synopsis of what you the favorites of equal percentages of readers told us. (13.1) but are the least liked of 9.4 percent and Nearlv two-thirds (64.5 percent) of the sur- 10 percent of readers, respectively. Similarly, vey's respondents were active duty; 20 percent the same number of people like the editoriais were from the Guard or Reserve: and 15.5 per- as dislike them. Because "Notams" received a cent were retired military people or civilians. preponderantly negative response from our A high percentage (85.6) of the respondents readers, we have decided to discontinue that read Airpower Journal regularly, while 85.1 section as a regular feature. percent read major portions of it (53.8 percent Most respondents (81.3 percent) thought the read most or all of the Journal, and 31.3 per- Journal's material was readily comprehendible. cent read two or more feature articles per Twelve and one-half percent, however, indi- issue). Furt.her, 85 percent of our readers dis- cated that the writing was too difficult, while cuss APf articles with their colleagues. 4.4 percent thought it too easy. Our distribution calls for one copy of APJ for The majority of readers approved of our every five personnel on active duty. The sur- focus on the operational levei of war, only 6.4 vey shows that 70.5 percent put the copies percent preferring the tactical levei and 9.4 back into circulation but that 27.5 percent keep percent the strategy/policy levei. However. them. Since paid subscribers account for 17.6 15.6 percent weren't sure what the operational percent of the active duty respondents, appar- levei of war is. (We’U take that as a challenge.) ently 9.9 percent (27.5 minus 17.6) feel that our We got a mixed response to our question information is too valuable to part with. That‘s about whether the Air Force should have a sec- flattering, but we prefer that nonsubscribers ond professional journal that would deal with share the Journal with their associates. Lest we strategy/policy issues. Forty-three percent said get too puffed up, we should note that 1.9 per- yes, 30 percent said no. and 24.4 percent cent discard APJ after reading it. weren’t sure. The feature articles are the most appreciated The survey also revealed that people want to RESULTS OF READERSH1P SURVEY 63 read more articles on leadership. national secu- their levei, but the levei should be much rity affairs/policy, and campaign planning. higher.” Such responses probably mean that Overall, readers think that Airpower Journal our approach is “about right," a conclusion does quite well at providing an open fórum for that seems consistent with the fact that 81.3 discussing the operational levei of war (86.9 percent of the respondents said they felt com- percent favorable. 11.9 percent unfavorable). fortable reading our articles. That pleases us, but we still want to win over We also learned something about our read- the rest of you! ers’ tastes in authors. Several want articles by Our solicitation of suggestions for improving Air Force leaders: “Invite more Air Force icons AP/ produced a variety of responses. Several to write articles, or provide a synopsis of their readers made such comments as “maintain speeches.” Others suggested “more articles by focus. but don’t discourage articles outside the civilians.” Another praised our choice of operational levei” or “need more on interface authors, saying that a “good mix of sênior and of operational and strategic [leveis of war]." junior contributors is evident. Keep it up!" Evidently. we are in the ballpark but may need Actually, we do try to be an "equal opportunity to pay a little more attention to strategy and publication." We've published authors in policy. every rank, from chief master sergeant through Many readers asked for more debate and general, as well as civilians, civil servants, fewer articles that followed the party line. One retired people, and even Academy cadets. respondent said, “As long as you are perceived Other respondents wanted to see articles on a as the propaganda tool to indoctrinate the variety of topics, such as support functions, politically correct Air Force officer, you’ll con- military history, joint operations, logistics, tinue to be latrine reading material." A PME national policy, international affairs, and student offered this thought: “Publish criticai peacetime operations. Although we are quite articles. It wasn’t until I started Air Command willing to evaluate submissions on any of these and Staff College that I read anything criticai of topics, articles with the best chance for publi- USAF published by USAF. Thanks for your cation will show how the Air Force can good work. I appreciate AP/." Another reader increase its combat effectiveness at the opera- wrote, “Too often Airpower Journal does the tional levei. Further, we believe that APJ writ- party line. It needs to vary opinions on ers should use history only to help readers issues.” Actually, we’d be híappy to oblige understand operational-level issues. We rarely these readers. If the truth were known. we print history for its own sake, referring such receive precious few articles that challenge the submissions to several other good publications establishment. Airpower Journal is a reflection for whom history is stock-in-trade. One reader of what people are willing to put on paper and after our own hearts wrote, "Less emphasis on sign their names to. If you will submit articles doctrine and more emphasis on applying doc- criticai of the way the Air Force does business, trine at the operational levei.” Our reply is, we will be happy to evaluate them for publica- Send us your article; weTe ready! tion. On occasion we have rejected such arti- Finally, some readers had recommendations cles—not because they were criticai, but bearing on the Journal’s physical features and because they were poorly written, improperly frequency of publication: larger pages, differ- documented, or discourteous. In short, they ent typeface, more pages per issue, more/fewer failed to meet the standards we require of all photos and illustrations, and more issues per submissions. year (bimonthly or monthly). Unfortunately, Other readers had suggestions about the some of these variables (e.g., the size and num- appropriate levei of scholarship for Airpower ber of pages, the publication cycle, and the Journal. On the one hand, we got comments number of copies per issue) are set by the staff such as “do more to encourage average people of the secretary of the Air Force. But as we (as opposed to military intellectuals) to write" prepare layouts for future issues. we will cer- or "[publish] more concise, less scholarly/ tainly consider those suggestions that address stilted articles." On the other hand, some read- matters we do control. ers urged us to “improve the scholarship of the Your responses are valuable to us. articles: too many are poorly researched” or Generally, you seem satisfied with our empha- “[put] the articles more on the levei of Air War sis on the operational levei of war and give us College readings. The articles are good for the impression that our articles have an impact 64 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPR1NG 1993 on your thinking and discussions. Following articles that challenge the status quo. We will your advice, we will try to live down our image also keep your suggestions in mind when we as a party-line journal, but our success select articles and make decisions about our will depend on your willingness to send us layout. Thanks for your help! RBC Ricochets is going to work. The example cited by Major continued from page 3 Fawcett about his experience in the 8th Fighter Wing in Korea is still valid. The training duck, then it's CAS. whether the air power process there is relatively easy because the comes from USAF A-lOs, Army AH-64 Apache necessary classic components of the tactical air helicopters, or AV-8B Marine Harriers. control system—an ASOC (actually there are Similarly, it doesn’t matter who the ground three in Korea), a tactical air control center forces are—Army infantry troops, an armored (TACC), and tactical air control parties (TACP) battalion, or a Marine amphibious landing consisting of air liaison officers and enlisted force. The concept remains the same, and so terminal attack controllers—all exist in Korea should the name. today, training with elements of both the US Though the term CAS is still valid, another Army’s 2d Infantry Division and the Republic term needs to be pointed out and used—joint of Korea’s army units. That, with the OA-IO air attack Teain (JAAT). Though this term is and F-16 air power of the 51st Wing and 8th a doctrinal infant compared to CAS and is Fighter Wing, makes for quality training when still evolving. it generally means a joint attack the system is used on a day-to-day basis. on hostile targets. under Army control, utiliz- While this training can be done back in the ing both Army assets (usually helicopters and continental US (CONUS), opportunities out- tube artillery) with Air Force CAS assets such side of exercises involving the National as the A-10 or the F-16. I’ve seen JAATs con- Training Center at Fort Irwin, Califórnia, are sisting of a variety of assets directed against a meager. Everybody in the Air Force whose variety of targets. and not just against hostile mission statement includes close air support, targets in close proximity to surface troops. As whether active duty, Guard, or Reserve, needs the boundary lines of traditional air-to-surface to get involved, along with the ground ele- missions—air interdiction (Al), battlefield air ments of the system, like the ASOC and its interdiction (BAI), and CAS—disappear. JAAT TACPs. Guard and Reserve support is espe- is a player to cover targets in all of those cially important because much of the active areas. If you've ever seen the firepower of AH- duty A-10 force is reverting to Guard and 64 Apaches combined with A-lOs and F-16s Reserve control in the shrinking Air Force of carefuliy sequenced by the JAAT commander, the future. The establishment of the composite then you have to believe that this is a big part wing at Pope AFB, North Carolina, with its of the future of joint close air support. As this A-IO/OA-IO and F-16 fighters collocated with type of close-air-support/battlefield air the Army’s 82d Airborne Division and other interdiction mission develops, I expect the XVIII Corps assets is a step in the right direc- schoolhouses of the various Services and joint tion. But it is not enough. The next war proba- schools like the Air Ground Operations School bly is not going to give us the lead time we (AGOS) at Hurlburt Field, Florida, to better enjoyed for Desert Storm, and victory in com- articulate the definition and roles of joint bat requires that we "train like we're going to air attack. fight.” Major Fawcett made his points about the dif- ficulties of the tactical air control system/Army Capt John G. Setter, Jr., USAF air ground system (TACS/AAGS) in the per- Sevmour-Johnson AFB. North Carolina spective of the rush of the four-day ground war of Desert Storm. I don’t think anybody realisti- cally expected the TACS/AAGS to operate WHERE HAVE YOU BEEN? perfectly in light of the large scale and short duration of the war. Therefore, I agree with I read with interest and surprise your editorial Major Fawcetfs contention that the system ("Where Would You Like to Go?") on officer isn't broken. But it must be exercised if it PME in the Fali 1992 issue. It appears your BICOCHETS 65 basic premise is that “we have no clearly artic- Provide the nation with military personnel skilled ulated description of what we want our officer in the employment of combat forces—the conduct PME system to produce.” You also imply that of war. not múch has been done since AFM 53-1 was Provide officers with the skills and knowledge to published in 1966 to determine what we are make sound decisions in progressively more trying to produce from officer PME. I disagree. demanding command and staff positions within Quite a lot has been accomplished at Air the national security environment. U niversity, Air Force, and DOD leveis. Develop strategic thinkers and war fighters. Discussing all the efforts since 1966 would probably serve little value; however, describing Provide officers a broad base of joint professional the current situation may provide you and knowledge. your readers a more balanced assessment of Develop officers whose professional backgrounds where we are today. There is specific guidance and military education will improve the opera- on not only what we should produce but what tional excellence of joint military forces through- we are required to produce. This is contained out the spectrum of war. in a variety of sources. Perhaps the most rele- Improve the quality of military strategic thought. vant are AFR 53-8. US Air Force O fficer Professional Military Education System. 15 Develop officers skilled in attaining unity of effort across Service, agency, and national lines. October 1990, and the Military Education Policy Document (MEPD), 1 May 1990. Both Air War College and Air Command and AFR 53-8 defines the purpose and objectives Staff College have successfully passed a thor- of Air Force PME as well as the mission and ough accreditation process to ensure that they goals of each PME school. The primary pur- meet the above MEPD requirements. In addi- pose of Air Force PME is to educate “experts in tion, there have been numerous internai efforts aerospace power and to provide an under- by the schools to ensure that what they pro- standing of, and appreciation for, joint Service duce is in fact what the A ir Force needs. These operations.” The basic objective is to “enhance efforts range from curriculum reviews to new the professional military competence of Air mission statements (personally approved by Force officers through a program of education CSAF). Also, Rep Ike Skelton (chairman of the designed to broaden perspectives, increase House Armed Services Committee’s Panei on knowledge. and prepare officers to assume M ilitary E d ucation), who is thoroughly higher leveis of command, staff. and opera- involved in ensuring that the military educa- tional duties and responsibilities.” More guid- tion system produces competent service offi- ance translates these rather broad statements cers, specifically commented on improvements into specific requirements. Examples include: in Air University: Develop, impart, and preserve knowledge that is You have come a long way. You have come to the significant to the employment of aerospace power. top like cream. I compliment you and all those Increase understanding of war, its causes, doctrine, who have been instrumental in making . . . the strategies. and tactics. intermediate and sênior levei schools top notch. (HASC hearings, 20 February 1992) Increase understanding of how military forces, par- ticularly aerospace forces, are developed, sus- Your remark that "if we don’t know where tained. and employed in both peace and war. we are trying to go. it doesn't really matter which path we take” is not only unfair to the Further requirem ents include such areas as men and women who have diligently worked developing leadership attributes and increa- to improve Air Force PME, it is also inaccurate. sing understanding of national security and I believe we are certainly headed in the right international relations. direction, with specific guidance and a clearly The MEPD defines the objectives and poli- defined product. Air Force PME is committed cies of the chairm an, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to its charter— a charter echoed in AFM 1-1, regarding the schools that make up the military Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States education system of the armed forces. In Air Force, March 1992: regard to PME and joint PME, the document requires the Services to accomplish the follow- Professional military education should encourage ing objectives: criticai analytical thought, innovative problem 66 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1993 solving, and sound professional judgment. An EDITOR’S NOTE: As an open forum for objective approach to the problems of war and debate, we appreciate comments on all the specialized competence in the operational and contents of the APJ (including our carefully strategic employment of aerospace power should crafted editoriais). be the product of Air Force professional military education. Lt Col Stephen L. Havron, USAF Maxwell AFB, Alabama N E T AME N T Storm over Iraq: Air Power and the Gulf War teaches is that sophisticated aircraft using force bv Richard P. Hallion. Smithsonian m ultipliers can exploit speed. range, flexibil- Institution Press, 470 L’Enfant Plaza, Suite ity, precision, and lethality to make Global 7100, Washington. D.C. 20560, 1992, 383 Reach— Global Power a reality. pages, $24.95. Having laid the groundwork, Hallion gives us 40 pages on the developm ent of doctrine Storm over Iraq is a superb ch oice to begin and another 40 on executing the air campaign your library or to expand it. Either way I guar- over Iraq. This entire section holds your atten- antee it will become a cornerstone of how you tion like a Tom Clancv novel, and you forget think about the use of air power. It may be the that this is a scholarly, well-documented dis- benchmark by which we measure understand- course on the revolution in warfare. He con- ing of the debate over the revolution in warfare tends that air power makes it possible to wage that was heralded by Operation Desert Storm. war from the “inside out" by simultaneous Richard Hallion, an internationally recognized attacks on the leadership, key production, authority. is well qualified to address the topic. infrastructure, and popular support as well as He has dedicated his life to researching and on the fielded forces. understanding the history of air power. From His post mortem on the war begins on page his vantage point as the Charles A. Lindbergh 201 with a buildup to what worked, what did Professor of Aerospace History at the National not, and why. He notes that the “parallel Air and Space Museum, he is uniquely quali- attacks" made possible by stealth technology fied to explore the national security implica- meant that while the F-117As flew only 2 per- tions of the Gulf War. His underlying premise cent of the combat sorties. they attacked 40 per- is that the very nature of warfare was changed cent of the strategic targets in Iraq. By his by the events of Operation Desert Storm. analysis, one strike aircraft with two smart The first 120 pages of the book make an bombs did the job of 108 World War II B-17 excellent short history on the development of bombers armed with 648 bombs. This makes a air power. It is easy to read and is essential to striking contrast to his comments on the inabil- what follows. The author builds a very strong ity of the intelligence system to provide the case that what the history of militarv aviation data the operators were demanding. NET ASSESSMENT 67 In my opinion, anyone contemplating a L’Enfant Plaza, Suite 7100, Washington, D.C. future with the Air Force needs to read and 20560: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1992, understand chapter 8, "Questions, Answers. 375 pages, $29.95. and Conjectures.” Hallion tells us that while elements of AirLand Battle were present in As Milt Thompson explains in the "Author’s Desert Storm, we should not assume that the Note” to At the Edge of Space, he was “neither decisive application of the entire doctrine was a professional writer nor a historian” when he the reason for victory. To the contrary, he wrote this account of the X-15 flight-test pro- gram. However, as one of the 12 pilots of this makes the point that unique aircraft and as a veteran of 14 flights in air power can hold territory by denying an enemy the 22 months he was with the program, he is the ability to seize it, and by denying an enemy the supremely qualified to describe the people, use of his forces. And it can seize territory by con- places, equipment, and—above all—the drama trolling access to the territory and movement across it. .. . Air warfare tums a flank from above. of the X-15. Neither a slick story nor a dry his- unconstrained by terrain or natural barrier. . . . tory, the book is a personal telling of the flight- Only air power . . . can strike anywhere in the test program for the "last real exploratory air- woríd, anytime, hitting multiple targets in a way craft. ” that an army advancing along a front or a fleet Thompson begins—appropriately enough— steaming at sea cannot. . . . Neither armies nor not with a description of the X-15 but of the navies can be considered the primary instrument men who flew it. This is the strength of this of securing victory in war. (Pages 253-54) book—the fact that it looks at the human side He concludes that given the nonnuclear tech- of a very technical program. Such a focus nological superiority demonstrated by the gives the reader insight into what it was like to United States, nuclear weapons will increas- fly "at the edge of space” and what kind of ingly be considered the weapons of barbarians. pilot excelled at this exciting and dangerous Despite the fact that the author raises some work. He then examines the technical side of very important points for our consideration, the program—the X-15 itself and the involved there are two major criticisms of the book that operation that allowed the aircraft to do its job. need to be voiced. First of all, while he does The bulk of the book, however, is a descrip- not State blatantlv that the Army and Navy are tion of the 199 flights of this ambitious test irrelevant, he does seem to implv “Don’t call program, told through the stories of the men us, we’ll call you if we need you.” Second, his who flew the aircraft. The X-15 was created to generalizations from Desert Storm are depen- see if we were smart enough to design, build, dent upon that type of war. Iraq was a rela- and fly a hypersonic airplane. Thus, the X-15 tively well equipped conventional force with a pilots flew test missions to validate theory and top-down, information-dependent control Sys- wind-tunnel tests, operating a vehicle that tem. The effectiveness of the same methods could travei over six times the speed of sound and techniques have yet to be proven against a (twice as fast as a rifle bullet), climb above less conventional opponent or in a different most of the earth’s atmosphere (354,200 feet), environment. In anv event, the author has and reenter and land under pilot control. opened the discussion on the revolution in Thompson’s personal insight gives the reader a warfare and its future in a very well written feel for what it was like to be strapped into an and thoughtful piece. aircraft with 1,000 gallons of liquid oxygen, Finally, I would be remiss not to comment 1,400 gallons of ammonia, various tanks of on the eight appendixes that cover “Defense concentrated hydrogen peroxide, and an Technologies of the Post-Vietnam Era: A engine that could provide 60,000 pounds of Selective Perspective." This is a collection of thrust (four times the dry weight of the aircraft) one- and two-page svnopses of the criticai and a 50-foot flame. technologies that help define the revolution in This story also shows the dangers of flying warfare. high-performance aircraft. For example, not Lt Col Albert U. Mitchum, USAF only did Thompson have to make an emer- Maxwell AFB, Alabama gency landing in the X-15 after a premature engine shutdown, but he also had to eject from an F-104 during a preflight checkout of the At the Edge of Space: The X-15 Flight emergency landing sites used for the tests. All Program by Milton O. Thompson. 470 in all, the X-15 pilots made 10 emergency land- 68 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1993 ings and had two major accidents, one of Readers should not automatically include this which killed Maj Michael J. Adams, USAF, a book in the growing genre of pilots’ personal pilot on flight 191. A t the Edge o f Space tells recollections—accounts that serve mainly to of the many malfunctions that made each flight highlight their careers. This is not Linnekin’s an interesting one, showing the heroic and intention. Rather, he concentrates on the air- humorous sides of flying the X-15. craft—the nuts-and-bolts details—and the avia- When the program ended in 1968, it had pro- tors who flew them. Although Linnekin makes vided enough information to make it one of the no pretensions that his accomplishments were most successful flight-research programs ever extraordinary, he indirectly demonstrates that conducted. In addition to validating the way his was a career marked by valor and superb hypersonic aircraft are designed, it provided a proficiency in the cockpit. wealth of experience that was used to design The book is organized into 11 chapters, nine and fly the space shuttle. It also paved the way of which focus on single aircraft types: N2S for the current research in hypersonic vehicles Stearman, SNJ Texan, F6F Hellcat, F8F that may culminate in the national aerospace Bearcat, F4U Corsair, F9F Panther, F9F-6/8T plane, which would provide global access in Cougar, AD Skyraider, and F8U Crusader. The hours and a (relatively) cheaper “single-stage to remaining two chapters, “Other Jets” and “The orbit" means of launching satellites. Little Guys,” discuss several different jet types Furthermore, the X-15 is still the fastest aircraft and general-aviation aircraft, respectively. In in the world. the preface, Linnekin establishes a basic format Although this book is not without its flaws for each chapter: (it is repetitive at times and occasionally uses technical or pilot terms that are not defined • A general description of the airplane, including until later), Thompson more than meets his its historical significance, if any. • How it flew. This includes the sort of stuff each goal of capturing the human drama and techni- machine was expected to do in its operational cal accomplishments of the X-15 flight pro- environment. gram. The author's use of personal (and • Professional anecdotes aimed at the characteris- humorous) stories makes A t the Edge o f Space tics of the airplanes and their pilots while flying worthwhile reading for anyone with a desire to them. see the inside of a flight-test program. • Occasional personal anecdotes about the folks who flew the airplanes: straight arrows, wild Maj William P. Doyle, Jr., USAF hairs. or whatever in between they may have Peterson ÀFB, Colorado been while they were not flying airplanes. (Page xii) Eighty Knots to Mach 2: Forty-Five Years in Because of his background as a test pilot, the Cockpit by Richard Linnekin. US Naval Linnekin could have easily overwhelmed the Institute, Annapolis, Marvland 21402: Naval reader with the technical aspects and specifica- Institute Press, 1991, 408 pages, $27.95. tions of these aircraft. But it is this thorough knowledge that allows him to describe other- Are you an aviation enthusiast, armchair avi- wise complex mechanisms and procedures in ator, or someone who has more than a passing language that even a nonaviator will under- interest in aviation? If so, you should read stand. Linnekin’s concise depictions give each Eighty Knots to Mach 2 because it is both an aircraft a distinctive personality of its own. He anecdotal narrative of the author’s many years successfullv conveys the sensations of flying in of flying and a comprehensive technical study rich detail. while educating the reader about of the aircraft he flew. Richard Linnekin is the hows and whys that surround these diverse indeed qualified to write on this subject, hav- aircraft. ing spent 22 years as a naval aviator and test Linnekin also goes to great lengths to set the pilot. As the title suggests, Linnekin's breadth record straight concerning many of the popular of flying experience includes the lethargic N2S myths about naval aviation. One way he does Stearman trainer, the sleek Phantom II—capa- this is by citing accepted references on the sub- ble of Mach 2.3—and many other aircraft in ject (movies, television, and other books) and between. either discounting or corroborating them. Put sim ply, Eighty Knots to Mach 2 is a based on his personal experiences. Twenty- unique book in its purpose and organization. one pages of endnotes serve to support and NET ASSESSMENT 69 expand upon information presented in the unfolds. Violence, as a consequence of combat, chapters. is a manifestation of the nature of war, but not One fascinating aspect of Eighty Knots to a prerequisite. Recognizing that “change” in Mach 2 is its focus on the human factor—what war is rudimentary and crucial in the conduct sets naval aviators apart from their peers. of war, it is therefore necessary to analyze how Whether he intended to or not, Linnekin’s change is effected or, to the extent possible, anecdotes about his fellow aviators are controlled. Juxtaposed to change is a universal extremely amusing. If one word can be used to continuity in all warfare—the human ele- describe them, it would certainly be colorful. ment—the involvement of man’s psyche. Naval aviators share membership in an elite Circumstances can be created to produce fraternity, and their spirit of camaraderie is evi- advantages through the manipulation of the dent both in the air and on the ground. psychological influence—the morale factor. Linnekin steers clear of the clichês surrounding The mind can command brilliance, or fail to the “right stuff” and instead sheds light on achieve mediocrity, depending on the rate and what he calls the “real thing” (page 129). kind of psychological change it encounters. According to Linnekin, many young naval avia- The sixth century B.c. Chinese military theo- tors lived by the credo, “If you can't be good, rist Sun Tzu understood this relationship of be colorful" (page 84). war within the context of Taoist philosophy. In short, Richard Linnekin has brought life to According to Chinese thinking, the concept of the otherwise inanimate components of numer- a unified, dynamic balance in nature connects ous naval and general-aviation aircraft. In the the changing character of war to the intricate process, he sheds light on the brave men who and sometimes delicate workings of the human piloted these aircraft and debunks some of the mind. The Taoist perspective emphasizes the myths surrounding naval aviation. His exten- dynamic quality of all phenomena—the cease- sive experience as a naval aviator/test pilot and less transformation of all things and situations. many outside references lend credence to his The structure of this fluidity is a cyclical pat- story—one that is made even more readable tern based on the idea of opposites—yin and through his use of humorous anecdotes. What yang, each pair representing an implicit unity. Linnekin presents is not necessarily an autobi- Taoism, with its philosophic outlook and con- ography, but a portraval of the superior quali- ceptual structure of nature, permeates Sun ties that naval aviators of his era personified. Tzu's The Art of War. Within this mental These enduring traits can also be found in framework, he sought rational Solutions today's crop of naval aviators. Eighty Knots to founded on objective thinking by operating Mach 2 is one of those rare books that both outside the realm of emotion and by imparting entertains and educates, and it should be a impersonal twists to the views of Taoist “real- welcome addition to the libraries of aviators ity.” He considered the genius of generalship and nonaviators alike. to consist of effecting changes to battle condi- 2d Lt Michael S. Milner, USAF tions and manipulating them to gain an advan- Francis E. Warren AFB. Wyoming tage. As a counterpoise to an opponenfs actions, Sun Tzu envisioned a commander hav- ing the ability to adapt to existing situations by The Book of Stratagems: Tactics for Triumph presaging events to determine the appropriate and Survival by Harro Von Senger. Edited preemptive responses. A cheng or direct action and translated by Myron B. Gubitz. 375 was to be countered by a ch'i or indirect action: Hudson Street, New York 10014: Viking as reciprocai elements, they presented infinite Press, 1991, 397 pages. S24.95. permutations. By careful calculation and dis- passionate assessment of situations, he endeav- The fundamental truth of war is change, not ored to decide the outcome of battle through violence. The nature of war is in a constant the test of emotions. Sun Tzu elected moral State of transition derived from the infinite force and intuitive intellect as mechanisms to combinations of societal factors that character- understand the relationship of opposites and to ize its conduct. Each engagement, battle, cam- effect different situations to confound his paign. or war is unique to its time and is fought opponent. Master Tzu indicated that all war relative to a transient set of conditions or cir- was a matter of deception. cumstances, and even these evolve as combat In terms of The Art of War, the master war- 70 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1993 rior knows the psychology and processes of advantage, gaining a prize, encirclement, conflict so intimately that an opponenfs move enticement, and flight. One of the stratagems— is anticipated before it is enacted. T h e m aster called “Openly Repair the Walkway, Secretly warrior understands the relative relationships March to Chencang”—Von Senger refers to as between opposites and objectively employs “the stratagem of the hidden route march.” To stratagems in order to unbalance his opponent confuse the enemy or lull him into a false sense in relationship to the whole situation. By of security, a commander would outwardly "knowing,'’ the master warrior can be made execute a perfectly normal military operation aware of the situation before it happens and while secretly carrying out an unusual one. In avoid a predicament or can change the predica- another situation, accomplishing a diversion- ment to his advantage. Such mental acuity or ary maneuver to mask the real direction of an intuition is difficult to understand in the attack would constitute stratagem number six, Western context; it is coup d’oeil extraordi- “Clamor in the East, Attack in the W est.” naire. While these two stratagems are similar, there The Book of Stratagems: Tactics for are subtle differences to them; therefore, they Triumph and Survival places Sun Tzu in his- can be used individually to psychologically torical context. This compilation of the first 18 confuse the opponent or as “a chain of strata- legendary Thirty-Six Stratagems of ancient gems,” referred to as lianhuanji. The threat of China is a compendium of Eastern thought dis- an amphibious assault against the Kuwaiti tilled and honed by the practical application of beaches and the pinning down of the Iraqi generais, politicians. and businessmen for over forces along the Southern border of Kuwait five millennia. The contents of the Thirty-Six masked the real axis of attack for coalition Stratagems consist of only 138 Chinese charac- forces in the Persian Gulf war. To complicate ters; most of the idioms are expressed in com- Saddam Hussein’s mind, Gen Norman binations of three to four characters. These Schwarzkopf employed “the stratagem of disin- written characters were not intended to be just formation” by using the “Create Something abstract signs but an organic pattern—a gestalt from Nothing” stratagem. He permitted the of symbolic configurations with psychological broadcast media to “advertise” that an attack implications. These characters represented might be delivered against the Kuwaiti beaches aphorisms which preserved the full complexity by US marines. While Hussein watched of images and the suggestive power of the toward the Gulf, the main land thrust was pro- word. In each case, fables, parables, and actual jected in a classic turning movement around experiences were subsequently employed to the entire Kuwaiti theater against the Iraqi interpret or explain their meaning. The Book of army’s principal line of Communications. Stratagems incorporates the original Chinese These stratagems demonstrate the ageless characters and their meaning, their interpreta- wisdom of these potent and deceptively simple tions with references to the oldest known case tactics for various applications ranging from in which they were described, and the original battlefields to boardrooms to foreign policy. source tales from Chinese literature and history Packed with timeless insight and timely appli- in which they were used. Indeed, interpreta- cations, The Book of Stratagems crystallizes tion and illustration are essential, since the the wisdom of 50 centuries for life in the maxims by themselves would be largely incom- 1990s. The stratagems constitute a body of prehensible as stratagems without explanation practical knowledge which is far more valuable and example. This linguistic sparseness, how- than empty moralistic phrases. The essence in ever, leaves a great deal of latitude for interpre- the study of relationships is to understand the tation and illustration. mental nature of a subject: in war it is the psy- As Harro Von Senger points out ji—or strata- chological characteristics that can and ougbt to gem in the Chinese sense— ranges from a sim- be manipulated by the master warrior. ple trick or a spontaneous act based on “sheer Knowing the metaphysical aspects of a sub- presence of mind to com plex, carefully ject—the complementary synergism of oppo- planned behavior.” The stratagems are sites to the unified whole—is at the very root employed to produce one or more of the fol- of Eastern philosophy. Sun Tzu postulated lowing psychological effects: masking some- that when you know both yourself and others, thing which is true, pretending something you are never in danger; when you know your- w hich is untrue, gaining the initiative or self but not others, you have half a chance of NET ASSESSMENT 71 winning; and when you know neither yourself Eurocommunism in 1989, all from the point of nor others, you are in danger in every battle. view of a British Labourite. He understood the intricate relationship In addition, interspersed throughout The between the psychological element and the Cruel Peace are biographical chapters about changes in war. cold warriors—not necessarily those who are The Book of Stratagems is not a book on Sun best known, such as Kissinger and Tzu or his Art of War. however. it places his Khrushchev, but those whom Inglis deems thoughts and—more importantly—his method- important: Frank Thompson, George Kennan, ologv into context. Von Senger’s book puts Freeman Dyson, Willy Brandt, Philip Agee, Sun Tzu into historical perspective. Read this Neil Sheehan, Lord Peter Carrington, Edward book before embarking on the mental journey Thompson, and joan Didion. Among this through The Art of War. group, as well as others, are lnglis’s heroes. He openly lauds the Thompsons, Agee. Sheehan. Maj Michael R. Terry, USAF Grand Forks AFB. North Dakota Bertrand Russell, Gorbachev, Daniel Ellsberg, Nicaragua’s Sandinistas, and Brandt, and tips his hat to Kennan and Carrington. For exam- ple, to Inglis, the “extremely bright” Ellsberg is “that all-American character, the romantic The Cruel Peace: Everyday Life in the Cold puritan, a hard-working man of passionate War by Fred Inglis. 10 E. 53d Street, New commitment, intense feelings, and no less York 10022: Basic Books, 1991, 492 pages, intense conscience.” Sheehan is “the quiet, $28.00. upright, implacable hero” of the Pentagon Papers story (page 276). Both eminently readable and repugnantly By contrast, Inglis does not hesitate to vilify cvnical, The Cruel Peace tells a story that his heavies, who include Nixon, Johnson, many people believe—though it need not be Kissinger, Thatcher, and Reagan. These last believed merely because it is told. In one sit- two, he writes, “both of them narrow, even big- ting, Fred Inglis, a British professor of educa- oted, each blessed with luck, money, and a tion, gives a non- (if not anti-) American strong will—by the accidents of the electoral account of the cold war. from start to finish. Systems were brought to power at the same His vantage point is the political Left. not the moment and with the same vision" (page 423). extreme Left perhaps, but far enough Left for Reagan’s expression following the Reykjavik Inglis to find disillusionment in the remains of summit, says Inglis, is "plain dumb, as though the communist-socialist State and little hope in he has understood nothing of what has gone present-day Western democracy. on" (page 358). The title of this book—or at least the subti- To his credit, Inglis spins his brazenly tle—is misleading. The prospective reader will biased—but in that sense, honest—tale in a be mistaken, and happily so, if Everyday Life in truly attention-riveting manner. He has tamed the Cold War conjures up images of stay-at- the English language to respond well to his pen home mothers with wringer washing machines and can turn a phrase with the best of the mod- and hula-hooping children taught to crawl ern novelists. “The cold war was a perverted under their school desks in the event of nuclear monument to human creativity,” he writes, “a attack. True, Inglis gives some account of creatively ruinous combination of passions, things that touch ordinary people: he dis- interests, money, and technology; it was the cusses the films and literature that grew out of nightmare of the past weighing down the brain and aggravated the cold war. for instance. But, of the living." The result of his gift for words perplexingly enough, the title suggests a much is that one can enjoy a good read without more mundane tale than the one he finally pro- accepting the snide egotism by which Inglis vides. Instead. Inglis tells the story of the judges the past. “casting of the iron curtain"; the Berlin block- One cannot escape Inglis the cynic, however. ade: the Korean War; the “Red scare"; postwar His whining bathos and disillusionment is evi- Eastern Europe; the Berlin Wall; Suez in 1956; dent throughout. He proclaims, for example, Tet, Prague, and the Chicago Democratic con- that following World War II, “the British gov- vention in 1968; the rise and rule of Reagan ernm ent feebly attempted a motion or two of and Gorbachev; and—finally—the crumbling of independence— a nuclear device here, a 72 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1993 Byzantine adventure there—before taking its Despite the renewed interest in unconven- obsequious place as chief satrap to the Pax tional conflict, there has been a dearth of Americana” (page 34). He notes that the “baby- detailed histories on the developm ent of the boom” generation “that will be mismanaging American experience in “the wars in the shad- the world in the next millennium was being ows” and on the way such involvement is born as [Stalin] died” (page 37). And antiter- related to the past and current conduct of US rorism. to Inglis, is the US’s way of national security policy. Michael McClintock’s "reassert[ingl its imperial reach and authority.” book has helped to fill this gap. The 1986 bombing of Libya, for instance, “was At the outset of his study, the author effec- an act of cruel, mean-minded oppression . . . tively establishes the major factors that have conduct of which the liberal superpower will conditioned the formulation of US foreign pol- one day be ashamed" (page 353). icy. He makes a cogent analysis of how Should USAF personnel read The Cruel Washington has historically sought to recon- Peace? Yes. Not unequivocally, unabashedly cile the pursuit of national interests— as an ele- yes. But the book is worth reading because it ment of the realist school of global politics offers a different perspective than that gener- enunciated by Adm Alfred Thayer Mahan— ally proffered to American bearers of arms. with an ideological justification for American One need not fear subtle indoctrination from it. global com m itm ent. His descriptions of for the book is not subtle. But Inglis’s clear, President Woodrow W ilson’s pursuit of an witty, sometimes charming cynicism reveals activist policy to achieve the idealized goal of the pathetic detritus that remains for the arm- world peace and of President Harry Truman’s chair communist whose world has crumbled call for an effective response to meet the chal- but who can see no hope in the alternative lenges of the cold war provide the historical offered by the cold war victors. foundation for ensuing chapters. Capt David Kirkham, USAF McClintock then provides an excellent dis- USAF Academy. Colorado cussion of American doctrine on special war- fare from the early days of the O ffice of Strategic Services, which emphasized the con- duct of partisan warfare. He traces the devel- Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerrilla opments that led to W ashington’s involvement Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counter- in covert operations and psychological warfare. Terrorism, 1940-1990 by M ichael His assessment of the lessons learned from the McClintock. 201 E. 50th Street, New York experience of World War II is must reading for 10022: Pantheon Books, 1992, 604 pages. people who wish to understand the underpin- $30.00. ning of the development of doctrine associated with guerrilla warfare, counterinsurgency, and To the American public, unconventional counterterrorism. The author cogently ana- conflict evokes an image of the Green Berets. lyzes and illustrates how a doctrine and a capa- To policym akers, it offers both dangers and bility to engage in counterinsurgency were opportunities. To the m ilitary, it brings a developed in the Philippines and Indochina. sense of doctrjnal and operational uncertainty. His discussion of how a wide range of psycho- To all, it is at once both fascinating and trou- logical operations was employed against the blesome, for unconventional conflict in its Hukbalahaps (Huks) not onlv provides a basis many forms does not fit the American ideal on for understanding the genesis of the types of waging war. doctrine that would be applied in Vietnam. but After the decline of the Special Forces in the also is still relevant to contemporary coun- post-Vietnam era, President Ronald Reagan terinsurgency operations. reinstated the importance of having the capac- M cClintock provides a particularlv effective ity to engage in “sm all" or “dirty” wars under discussion of US involvement in Guatemala, the term low-intensity conflict (LÍC) as a m eans the Congo, and Cuba. It is striking to see the of meeting a perceived Soviet threat in the lack of both accountabilitv and congressional third world and com bating terrorism . oversight that took place when the American President George Bush has continued to public was either more innocent or ignorant of emphasize the need for a LIC capability as part the nature of Washington’s programs of regime of his declared war on drugs. destabilization. The author covers familiar NET ASSESSMENT 73 ground when he discusses the impact of icymakers and by people who will be involved President John Kennedy’s enchantment with in what one author has aptly called uncomfort- Special Forces and Washington's commitment able wars—uncomfortable for the policymakers to engage in counterinsurgency. His discussion but oftentimes deadly for the willing or unwill- underscores how events in Camelot led to the ing participants. formulation of doctrine that is still being Dr Stephen Sloan applied todav. Norman. Oklahoma The author’s discussion of counterterrorism as well as counterterrorism organizations illus- trates the fact that resorting to such tactics was an inherent aspect of US unconventional war- British Intelligence in the Second World War, fare long before our preoccupation with the vol. 5, Strategic Deception by M ichael international terrorist threat in the late 1960s Howard. 40 W. 20th Street, New York and the ensuing decades. He then provides a 10011: Cambridge University Press, 1990, chilling assessment of how the US applied the 271 pages, no price available. colonial and—more specifically—the French model of population control in Vietnam. A criticai aspect of the success in the overall McClintock effectively illustrates how plan for the recent Gulf war was the role President Jimmy Carter's focus on human played by strategic deception. a skill all too rights was often derailed by a national security much neglected by American military plan- apparatus that often turned a blind eve to the ners. Military historians have long recognized terror tactics employed by "friendly” regimes that the art of deception planning at the strate- in the third world. He also illustrates how the gic levei was one that the British worked to failure at Desert One was a defining moment perfection during World War 11 for the simple that would lead to a renaissance of special reason that they had to—particularly during operations under the Reagan administration. the lonely months of 1940 and 1941 when they The author’s discussion of what he calls the alone stood against the Third Reich. However, "special warfare revival” provides a succinct our knowledge of these efforts to date has been account of a reorganization that continues derived from journalistic accounts such as The today. His discussion of the development of Man Who Never Was, Bodyguard of Lies, and LIC is an exceedinglv well written historical Man Called Intrepid. What was lacking was a narrative of the development of a concept definitive study based on official sources on which has gripped the military establishment both what and how this was done. from the mid-1980s to the present. This void has been fulfilled by the final vol- McClintock’s evaluation of the development ume of the official series. British Intelligence of counterterrorism doctrine and capabilities in the Second World War, written by one of will be of particular interest to the specialist on this century’s most distinguished military his- terrorism. He ably indicates not only how the torians, Sir Michael Howard, former regius formulation of the doctrine raised fundamental professor at Oxford and current Robert A. moral questions but—more specifically—how Lovett professor of military and naval history covert action and preemptive terrorism repre- at Yale University. sented "an un-American wav of fighting war.” Sir MichaeFs focus is not only upon secu- He makes a telling case for the view that the rity—“concealing one's intentions from the operational ambiguities that often characterize enemy”—but more importantly ‘‘implanting in special operations—particularly with regard to lyour] adversary’s mind an erroneous image "direct action” (e.g., assassination. abduction, which will not only help to conceal true capa- and hostage taking)—are not amenable to con- bilities and intentions but will lead that adver- trol through the strictures of narrowly defined sary to act in such a way as to make [your own] legal terminology. task easier. . . . It is not enough to persuade the Instruments of Statecraft is a well-researched enemy to think something; it is necessary to and well-written book. One should not over- persuade him to do something." Thus, the task look the extensive notes, for they provide a that he lays out for the deception planner is a wealth of source material for the researcher daunting one. who wishes to pursue the topic. Michael Howard's account focuses on just how the McClintock's fine study should be read by pol- British planners attempted to meet this chal- 74 AIRPOWEfí JOURNAL SPRING 1993 lenge in the European theater of operations. owed little [to Zeppelin]; [and] little could be He begins with a useful description of how the done in the way of deception” during deception planning process was established in Crossbow, the British efforts to deceive the 1940—no easy task considering the tremen- Germans with respect to the effects of their V-2 dous variety of agencies involved to include campaign. Howard concludes that “deception not only the military Services, the operational d u r i n g . . . [ t h e ] c l o s i n g m o n t h s o f t h e w a r commands, and the various intelligence bodies seem s to have been an unsatisfactory and but also the Foreign Office and Home Office largely unsuccessful affair.” These efforts that had interests. He then discusses some of seemed to have been pushed aside in the rush the initial planning efforts, from those con- for operational success. ceived by “A” Force in the Middle East to Such caveats are useful for future air power deceive the Nazis as to the actual locations of planners. First, regardless of what intelligence the risky 1942 North African landings of technology brings to the modem battlefield, Operation Torch to the 1943 operations one must not overlook the importance of Cockade and Barclay to confuse Hitler with human intelligence (HUMINT). Second, com- respect to the continuation of Allied offensives manders as well as planners must be conscious in the Mediterranean. of the degree to which deception operations The major part of this book is devoted to must be integrated into operational plans lest what he calls “The Climax: Bodyguard.” in all this effort be to no avail, as it now appears which he outlines the how and what of the it was during the latter part of the Second 1944-45 deception operations Fortitude, World War. Zeppelin, and Crossbow, which were an inte- Dr Alexander S. Cochran gral part of Allied planning for operations on Maxwell AFB, Alabama the European continent in the last year of the conflict. These code names have been well known to military historians of this phase of The Chancy War: Winning in China, Burma, the war. What has been less well known have and índia in World War II by Edward been the actual details, a task that Howard Fischer. c/o Crown Publishers, Inc., 225 tackles with his accustomed authoritative Park Avenue S., New York 10003: Orion stvle, laying out both process and substance of Books, 1991, 250 pages, $23.00. these efforts as well as the degree to which each contributed to the conclusion of the One of the most neglected areas of study in European war. the history of World War II has been the Several points emerge from Sir M ichaeFs China-Burma-India (CBI) theater. Seen as analysis. First is the remarkable degree to important both then and since chieflv because w hich the process of these operations of geopolitical ramifications, the CBI has not depended upon an established system of "dou- been dealt with much bevond the levei of high ble agents." W ithout this network— the most diplomacy and the repercussions it held for famous of which was “Garbo"— it is clear that the postw ar fight for control of China. the vital intelligence feedback loop needed to Eschewing such a lofty perspective. Edward validate the^substance of these efforts simply Fischer tells in an interesting memoir what it would not have been there. But more impor- was like for the soldiers fighting— or support- tant are his judgments on the overall impact of ing the fighting— in the CBI theater. Written these operations, assessments that are clearly by a junior officer who arrived there in 1944. at odds with historical accounts written to The Chancv War is an interesting memoir of date. this backwater of military operations during Operations Cockade and Barclay floundered the con flict. In fact, Fischer begins his badly in North África because of faulty organi- account bv tying his title, The Chancy War, to zation and mistrust by commanders and opera- low priorities assigned to the theater by sênior tors. On aspects of Fortitude— the w idely Allied officials. A disheartened supplv known deception operation for Overlord— sergeant told him soon after he arrived in the "there is nothing available to indicate that this theater, “Over here, we are fighting a chancy deception contributed to the tactical surprise war. If you ask the States for something, there achieved on the Normandy beaches . . . the sur- is a slim c h a n c e y o u ’11 get it and a greater prise which the Allies achieved at Anzio . . . chance vou won’t. A chancy war!" (page 1). NET ASSESSMENT 75 Edward Fischer makes clear that World War I came upon five Americans who had seen much II in the CBI was primarily a war that relied on fighting. I was struck by how little credit they long logistical pipelines through some of the would give the japanese soldier, a tough competi- tor. In the European Theater, Americans saw harshest country on the planet. The subjects German soldiers as fellows they might well share a of supply and maintenance, and the problems bottle of beer with, and Italian soldiers as fellows associated with them, come through at every they could drink red wine with, but in Burma the turn. For instance, as a young logistics spe- Allies looked upon the Japanese as little more than cialist assigned to Fort Riley. Kansas, in mid- animais. Stilwell called the Japanese "these bow- 1944. Fischer was trained to handle pack legged cockroaches" and “bucktoothed bastards.” I mules for the Army. The first section of the think the setting led to these primitive feelings. In book is an interesting recollection of the Europe the war was waged through cities and Army's process of training mule handlers for towns and across cultivated fields, and mainly supply operations in difficult terrain, some- with the enemy at some distance; in Burma the jungle was primitive and the fighting often close thing that became virtually outmoded in the up, eye-to-eye. (page 50) postwar US Army. It was, however, a criticai component of the mobility element of the The dehumanization of the enemy was not so American-supported rebels in Afghanistan much the result of race, according to Fischer, during the 1970s, and some of the American as it was due to the circumstances of jungle foreign aid involved airlifting mules to rebels fighting— an intriguing idea that, unfortu- for use as pack animais in the mountains. nately, the author does not pursue. When Fischer arrived at the military base near This book is one of the better memoirs of war Myitkyina. Burma, he learned that he was not in the CBI theater in World War II. Well writ- needed. “We don’t use mules anymore,” a ten and insightful, The Chancy War is an superior officer told him. “We airdrop every- unusually detailed and vivid account of one thing now. Fly in low. Kick it out” (page 4). officer’s experiences in Asia during the last Fischer was quickly reassigned as a public months of the fighting. Fischer has produced affairs officer and assigned to help squire an interesting book that will be permanently around the media as the first convoys traveled useful to academics and, more important, up the Ledo Road to China. He also flew on interesting to nonspecialists. An important the famous Hump airlift from índia to China, addition to our understanding of the details of the tenuous aeronautical pipeline that kept soldier life in the China-Burma-India theater, China in the war between 1942 and early 1945. The Chancy War is well worth the attention of Later he was assigned to write official histories military historians or students of the era. of the Army in the theater. Fischer recounts Dr Roger O. Launius all of these episodes with insight and compas- Washington, D.C. sion. em phasizing the everyday life of Americans fighting a war in Asia. Edward Fischer has some telling anecdotes about the conduct of war in the jungles of the Eyeball to Eyeball: The Inside Story of the CBI. He describes many of the instances of in- Cuban Missile Crisis by Dino A. Brugioni. fighting between sênior military leadership in 201 E. 50th Street, 31st Floor, New York China, especially between Gen Joseph Stilwell, 10022: Random House, 1991, 622 pages, Lord Louis M ountbatten, and Generalissim o $35.00. Chiang Kai-shek. These are interesting but not nearly so telling as insights derived from A historical technothriller, this often spell- Fischer’s personal experiences recounted with binding account of the Cuban m issile crisis vigor in The Chancy War. recreates the tension and drama of those 18 In some instances. his narrative offers alter- days in October 1962 when the world stood on natives to conventional conclusions. Recent the brink of nuclear holocaust. Mr Brugioni’s historical scholarship has emphasized the title, taken from Secretary of State Dean Rusk’s racism of Americans as a means of explaining memorable quote, “We were eyeball to eyeball, the brutality with which the war against Japan and I think the other fellow blinked,” reminds was prosecuted. Fischer offers an intriguing us how close to war we cam e. Even Mr explanation of this brutality beyond the race Brugioni, who at the time was a sênior CIA issue: officer in the National Photographic 76 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1993 Interpretation Center, admits that at one point Navy bailout of the Air Force low-altitude during the crisis, he “succumbed to the general reconnaissance predicament became a muted mood of apocalypse” and told his wife to be classic of the Cuban missile crisis.” prepared to take their kids to his parents’ My only criticism of this book, and a minor house in Missouri. If the personalities and one, is that the editor should have caught the events chronicled in this book weren’t true, infrequent but nevertheless distracting redun- they could easily be the basis for a fictional dancies and inconsistencies. For example, best-seller. Mr Brugioni comes close to the Robert (“Bobby”) Kennedy’s observations about popular technothriller genre, but the history the British, “Those sons of a bitches have a buff in him tends to get in the way as he strives short memory," appears twice within 23 pages to fill in the details. but with different words in quotations. I The focus of this book is on the absolutely highly recommend this book, especially if you indispensable contribution of aerial reconnais- are interested in the answers to such questions sance photography to the discovery of the mis- as, Were there really nuclear warheads in Cuba siles and the ultimate resolution of the result- and, why did Oxford, Mississippi, appear on ing crisis. Developed during the Eisenhower the missile range maps used to brief the presi- administration, the Lockheed U-2 provided dent and other government officials? high-altitude photography, which enabled the Lt Col William F. Furr, USAF United States to discover the presence of offen- Maxwell AFB. Alabama sive missiles and bombers in Cuba. Later high- and low-altitude photos enabled the United States to prove to the world, beyond a shadow of a doubt, that these missiles and bombers Recurring Logistics Problems as I Have were being made operational at the same time Observed Them by Carter B. Magruder. that the Soviets were still denying their very Washington. D.C. 20374: US Army Center of existence. In the end, aerial reconnaissance Military History, 1991, 134 pages, $8.50. proved to be the only means available to verify the removal of the missiles and bombers. A Soldier Supporting Soldiers by Joseph M. But this book is about much more than just Heiser, Jr. Washington, D.C. 20374: US technology; it is about men and events. The Army Center of Military History, 1991, 323 contributions, strengths, and weaknesses of pages, no price available. each of the key players are vividly portrayed. The Lifeblood of War: Logistics in Armed For example, a chapter is devoted to examining Conflict by Julian Thompson. 8000 Westpark the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) as a body and as Drive, First Floor, McLean, Virgínia 22102: individuais. They are described as “a quartet Brassey’s, 1991, 390 pages, $39.95. playing different tunes,” whose recommenda- tions, according to Dean Acheson, were “usu- If you asked most military professionals ally premised upon the meticulous statement whether they would choose to read a book of assumptions that, often as not, are quite con- about logistics or logistics history, they would trary to the facts and yet more often than not probably say they’d rather go to the dentist. control the conclusion." Air Force Chief of Yet, most of them are probably familiar with Staff Gen Curtis LeMay is described as an offi- the aphorism “Amateurs talk about strategy cer with “beetle brows, jutting jaw, sagging while professionals talk about logistics.” jowls, shock of slicked-down black hair" who Logistics is about beans and bullets and trucks with his “ubiquitous brown cigar” was “pro- and fuel and numbers. The problem, of course, fane . . . demanding . . . restless for power.” is that next to generais with pearl-handled The book also describes how when the Air revolvers and multicolored attacking arrows on Force found out that the Navy was selected to maps. all those numbers are inherently boring. fly the low-level reconnaissance missions, These three authors have taken three different General LeMay insisted that the Air Force also approaches to this “boring" subject, with varv- be allowed to fly these missions, despite the ing degrees of success. fact that the RF-101C Voodoo was designed for In Carter B. Magruder’s short work. what you médium- and high-altitude reconnaissance. see in the title is what you get—an analysis of Nevertheless, in the spirit of jointness (every- recurring logistics problems he encountered in one gets a share of the pie), “the story of the over 40 years of Army Service (1917-61), NET ASSESSMENT 77 including why they recur, the form in which textbook and memoir is possible and even they are likeíy to recur, and suggestions for works fairly well for him, but his attempt to overcoming them. Among other topics, he interject his thoughts on leadership is where addresses supply requirements for overseas the book suffers. Not that logistics and leader- theaters, contingency planning, and mainte- ship are incompatible subjects—logisticians are nance of materiel. Magruder speaks with people and need to be led like anyone else. authority, having served in a number of impor- The problem comes when he tries to combine tant logistics positions. including G-4 for the logistics textbook, personal memoir, and lead- Mediterranean and European theaters of opera- ership philosophy into one slim 300-page pack- tions during and immediately following World age (which includes 60 pages of epilogue, War II, and deputy chief of staff for logistics. appendices, bibliography, and index). He’s got He retired as commander, US Forces, Korea some interesting things to say about all three, and Eighth US Army. but there’s no central thesis or focus. Magruder’s narrow focus can be regarded as The flaws evident with Magruder and Heiser both a strength and a weakness. Obviously, are not a problem in Julian Thompson’s work. there is no room to provide a lot of context, or There is no doubt this is a well-researched the ''big picture," but Magruder makes no logistics history. Thompson served 34 years as claims of being a historian or even of writing a a British Royal Marine, retiring as a major gen- history in the traditional sense. On the other eral. Although holding a number of staff and hand, his discussion is tightly organized and logistics positions, he is not a career logisti- well thought out, with appropriate examples. cian, nor is he a career historian. These facts Other weaknesses include the work's heavy pose no difficulty, however. In three parts, dependence on the author’s experiences in Thompson analyzes the effect of logistics on World War II and the long shadow cast by various campaigns and wars from the nuclear weapons over almost all his conclu- Assyrians of 700 B.c. to the Falklands cam- sions and recommendations (although the lat- paign of 1982, and even into the future. ter may have been unavoidable given the date The opening section is a very broad-brush it was originally written—1969). This is a treatment of the subject from 700 B.c. through book only a hard-core logistician could love. 1945 using selected campaigns, battles, and Given its brevity, however, it still has some wars to illustrate his points. The second part, useful information and things to think about by far the most interesting and useful, is a for the average military professional, regardless more detailed discussion of post-World War II of specialty. logistics including Korea, Vietnam, the Yom Joseph Heiser’s book is another that only a Kippur War, and Bangladesh. The final section specialist would seek out. It, too, is a first-per- details the Falklands campaign, his specula- son account of a logistician's career. Heiser tions regarding the central European NATO entered the Army during World War II in versus Warsaw Pact conflict that never was, response to the recruitment of civilian special- and his prognostications of future war. ists who could quickly assume military logis- The book is worth reading if for no other rea- tics duties. He stayed for 30 years, having son than Thompson’s analysis of Vietnam and risen from the rank of private as an ordnance the Falklands. He has a way of blending the specialist to lieutenant general as the Armv’s details of logistics with the “big picture” to deputy chief of staff for logistics. produce a good story as well as illustrating the Heiser describes his work as “part textbook lessons to be learned. The opening section is and part memoir,” and so it is. He approaches his weakest, since there appears to be no rhyme the subject from his personal experiences and or reason in his selection of examples, particu- then extrapolates from them to more general larly from very early military history. For principies. He also describes a second purpose exam ple, he chooses to briefly discuss in writing—to discuss his ideas on leadership Charlemagne, the Byzantine Empire, and the and opportunities for advancement in the mili- Crusades while ignoring the Romans, perhaps tary service. the most adept logisticians in the ancient This work is more “interesting" than world. From there, he skips forward to M agruder's but also contains some flaws. Napoléon, leaving the reader to wonder if noth- Heiser basically bites off more than he can ing logistically im portant happened in the chew for such a short monograph. Combining interim. Another, more amusing, irritation is 78 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPR1NG 1993 caused by Thompson’s propensity for culinary British governments were too unwilling to split analogies (e.g., “currant bun” deployments and with France in the 1920s, when that battered “club sandwich” battles), proving once again and weary country held to a “hardline” that the British and Americans may share a enforcement of the Versailles Treaty. Thus, common heritage, but not a common language. Britain followed the French lead in demanding Despite this "problem,” the book is interesting full compliance with the treaty terms, despite and instructive, and I recommend it to all mili- the economic hardship and domestic unpopu- tary professionals. larity they heaped on the German government. Even I, as a logistician, recognize that logis- By the 1930s and the coming of Hitler, succes- tics is not the most scintillating of subjects. sive British governments sought to deal with But the reader who is interested in expanding the Nazis even as they took a hard (and morally professional horizons looks beyond entertain- high) line with Benito Mussolini’s Italy. Even ment to educational value. All of these books after the Germans occupied the remainder of have something to offer the reader who is will- Czechoslovakia in March 1939, London still ing to put forth some effort, especially if the lacked a clear-eyed vision of the looming dan- reader is a logistician. Those who are search- ger. It guaranteed a virtually defenseless ing for an introduction to the subject should Poland, sought to make amends with Italy to stick with Thompson or, more appropriately, reforge the “Stresa Front” (as if the presence of Martin van Creveld's Supplying War and Italy in the Allied camp would have cowed Henry Eccles’s Logistics in the National Hitler), yet ultimately refused to negotiate seri- Defense. ously with Stalin’s Soviet Union, the one power that might have checked Nazi Maj Karen S. Wilhelm, USAF USAF Academy, Colorado Germany’s course. What emerges clearly from Lamb’s book is that the British establishment, from the very The Drifl to War, 1922-1939 by Richard Lamb. inception of Nazi rule, was more fearful of St. Martin's Press, 175 5th Avenue, New communism than of the consequences of com- York, New York 10010, 1991, 340 pages. ing to terms with the Nazis. How else can $24.95. Britain’s preoccupation with checking Mussolini’s Ethiopian adventure, while Hitler Over the past three decades, the story of the sought lebensraum in central and eastern outbreak of the Second World War has been Europe, be explained? Certainly manv conser- essentially deciphered. No reputable scholar vatives in the 1930s saw Hitlerite Germany as a now disputes that this conflagration was distasteful but necessary bulwark against the Hitler’s war. To say that Adolf Hitler neither spread of Bolshevism. Clearly the misbegotten wanted nor expected a world war in 1939 in no preference for Italian instead of Soviet aid to way relieves him or his country from the heavy check Hitler in 1939 is another manifestation responsibility of initiating this conflict. Yet, if of this preference. the central role of Hitler and Germany is now The D rift to War is a provocative, even con- firmly established in the historiography of the tentious book. If Lamb is correct in evaluating war, there remain numerous questions about British policy as inept, he is altogether too san- the role of the other powers in the birth of this guine in his assessment of Britain's ability to terrible struggle. stop Hitler. Could Britain have kept Hitler Richard Lamb’s The D rift to War deals with from coming to power through a policy that one such issue of perennial interest: the role of rewarded Weimar? Lamb himself points out British policy and policymakers in the coming that for much of the period, appeasement of war. W hy was it, he asks, that Britain took a Hitler was wildly popular, and British politi- much harder line toward the W eimar Republic, cians were neither the first nor the last of their reluctant to offer that troubled country any genre to allow themselves to be shaped by, con cession s. than she did tow ard Nazi rather than seeking to shape, public opinion. Germany, with whom Britain seemed posi- And why should British public opinion be tively eager to reach accommodation right up buoyed, or Hitler cowed. by the specter of to the outbreak of the war? T h e answ er is a intervention by Mussolini and his legions? complicated one, forming the bulk of the narra- Perhaps most importantly, Lamb does not fully tive of this book. In brief, Lamb argues that confront the bankruptcy of a policy that sought NET ASSESSMENT 79 to wield a great power’s continental influence bers—Greg Boyington, Tex Hill, Charlie Bond, through a military strategy of limited liability. John Petach, and so many others—emerge in In all the author’s criticisms of Britains allies, the vignettes that constantly pop up in the it must be kept in mind that “from the other book. What the reader discovers is that the side of the hill," it did often appear that AVG was not made up of patriots so much as Britain, before 1940. was determined to fight adventurers. As Tex Hill put it, “The thing that Hitler to the last Frenchman. Italian. or motivated me to go to China was, more or less, Russian. adventure. 1 had no particular dedication to Regrettably, Lamb’s efforts have been hin- anything.’’ Other than Chennault and a few dered bv poor editing. The book is marred by others, the members of the AVG declined numerous mistakes that induce perhaps unjus- induction into the American military forces, tified skepticism in this reader. So interesting even when given the opportunity to do so. The a book deserves better. AVG pilots were mercenaries and were in the game for the action and for Generalissimo Lt Col Gary P. Cox, USAF Maxwell AFB, Alabama Chiang Kai-shek’s bounty payments. The con- cept of the Flying Tigers as heroes was a cre- ation of Henry R. Luce, who coined the nick- Flying Tigers: Claire Chennault and the name in the 29 December 1941 issue of his American Volunteer Group by Daniel Ford. Time magazine. Smithsonian Institution Press, 470 L'Enfant Ford's work is based on a myriad of primary Plaza, Suite 7100, Washington. D.C. 20560, historical sources: personal diaries, letters, 1991, 450 pages, $24.95. interviews, and official documents. Adding even more detail to the book is his use of “They were heroes to a nation that needed Japanese primary sources as well. Extracting heroes.” Mr Ford’s description of the from Chennaulfs early writings in various pro- American Volunteer Group (AVG), popularly fessional military journals, Ford pulls together known as the Flying Tigers. succinctly explains Chennaulfs prophetic view that “World War II why the AVG was enshrined in the pantheon of would begin with a surprise attack from the American heroes. It is refreshing to read a air, and that the combat would be radically dif- book like this that rings the bell of reality ferent from that of all previous wars. . . ." No, rather than one that elevated Gen Claire this was not Billy Mitchell, it was Claire Chennault to John Wayne-like status. Chennault—a mighty visionary! Delightfully, Chennault fades into the back- The goal of the author is to separate myth ground once this book moves beyond the for- from reality. It turns out to be a formidable mative stages of the AVG's history, delightful task. Ford alludes to the maddening frustra- not because of any dislike for Chennault, but tion he faced as a researcher in Chennaulfs because it allows the individual members of diaries, discovering that Chennault made scant the AVG to step to center stage. And rightfully mention of significant events but wrote in great so, for like any flying unit it was team effort detail about his tennis and mah-jongg games. that achieved success. Similarly frustrating were the enormous dis- The format of this book is a chronological, crepancies in the combat "kills" recorded by month-by-month (at times, day-by-day) the Americans and those recorded by the account of the AVG, from its inception as a Japanese. The author makes some headway in volunteer group to its ultimate reconstitution resolving the discrepancies in these figures in the active Army Air Forces in 1942. after learning that the Japanese did not count Initialiy, the book’s emphasis is on the devel- an aircraft that crashed after leaving the scene opment and direction Chennault gave to the of an aerial battle as having been lost in that AVG. But after the organization reaches opera- particular action. Nevertheless, this still did tional status. the author shifts the focus from not account for all the discrepancies in the Chennault to the individual team members. As losses as reported by the Americans or the the combat activity in the story increases, the Japanese. He discovered so many factors lead- cockpit activity takes precedence over the ing to these discrepancies—double-counting, managerial decisions. With the reining in of undercounting, and outright exaggeration—that the overwhelming personality of Chennault, the true number of combat “kills” may never the individual personalities of the AVG mem- be known. On the whole, Ford does a credible 80 AIRPOWEfí JOURNAL SPRING 1993 job of separating myth from reality. However, were determined to get rid of him. At mid- in light of his lament more than once that night on 4 July 1942, the AVG passed into his- Chennault “did not leave much of a paper tory. Ford concludes his book, “All honor to trail" for the researcher to rely upon, one is left them.” A resounding “Hear! Hear!” to both the with the nagging question of just how accurate AVG and to Daniel Ford. are his interpolations of the sources he did use. Ron Callahan From the combat vignettes that appear on Placerville, Califórnia page after page, the boldness of the Flying Tigers in combat demonstrated that, above all, a successful combat pilot requires a belief in In Mortal Combat: Korea, 1950-1953 by John his own immortality. And even more, this Toland. William Morrow and Company, Inc., breed seemed to thrive on adversity. 1350 Avenue of the Américas, New York, Chennault did not fly combat missions as com- New York 10019, 1991, 624 pages, $25.00. mander of the AVG. For him, the greatest chal- lenge was to defend a 750-mile line of commu- In Mortal Combat is a highly readable his- nication along the Burma Road to Rangoon, as tory of the Korean War. John Toland, as well as western China—and to mount an aerial always, is the master of the popular history. offensive in Indochina—all with 48 aircraft. As you read In Mortal Combat, you come to Ford demonstrates that Chennaulfs AVG sur- understand the Korean War from the point of mounted these difficulties because of the view of the soldier in battle, yet Toland can intensity and cohesiveness of the Flying Tigers still tie together the strategic and operational as a fighting unit. threads that link these battles together. In overview, Flying Tigers is a researcher’s I particularly enjoyed Toland’s depiction of book. This is not said in a negative light, but the humanity of the participants. Toland inter- by way of forewarning. Four hundred pages of viewed many survivors of the battles, includ- almost day-by-day accounts do tend to get ing soldiers from the North Korean and rep etitiv e after a w hile. But it is a fruitful Chinese armies. Particularly provocative is the orchard for the researcher. This book is not a image of Chinese soldiers walking to the front glorification of the Flying Tigers. It is a serious from the Yalu, all the while seeing thousands research study, weaving together a narrative of fellow Chinese soldiers along the side of the from a bountiful harvest of primary source road, dead from starvation or battle wounds. material. Persistence in reading through this The cruelty of sending thousands of Chinese tome pays off in uncovering so many nuggets of troops into battle without proper logistics and insight into the events that occurred in that medicai support is striking. theater of operations. For example, one even- One section of the book that stands out is the tually realizes that there most definitely was a initial North Korean invasion. the fali back to growing feeling of mutiny among the pilots of Pusan, and the engagement of Task Force the AVG by 1942. A diligent reader will also Smith. Task Force Smith was an ill-advised discover that a series of coincidental encoun- engagement south of Seoul by poorly trained ters often make up the threads of a war. An American soldiers. It resulted in disaster. astute reader learns from the many stories mak- That same Task Force Smith is now the rally- ing up this book that underlying the decision ing cry for current US Armv efforts to preserve making in the China-Burma-India (CBI) theater operational readiness among its remaining was a four-way power struggle between forces during the current defense drawdown. Chennault, the British, Chiang Kai-shek, and There are other noteworthv sections. The Gen Joseph Stilwell. The list of little nuggets operational decisions and positioning of forces goes on and on, and readers can make their in the Pusan perimeter and Gen Walton own list as they peruse the book. Walker’s handling of the crisis will grab the General Chennault was one of the most pop- reader. The operational decisions for the ular commanders in American history. One- assault at Inchon as well as the tactical battles third of the original AVG pilots died in action. fought by Marine and Armv units during the But they received no official recognition for withdrawal from the Chosin Reservoir are also their combat victories or their time spent in the fascinating. AVG. Generais George Marshall and Hap Most readers will already be knowledgeable Arnold considered Chennault a maverick and about these aspects of the Korean War. What NET ASSESSMENT 81 Toland does is tie the strategic and operational country. A Neutrality Act, passed by Congress, decisions into the thoughts and feelings of the allowed the Federal Bureau of Investigation to soldiers who had to execute those decisions. investigate anyone suspected of aiding the It is that style that contributes to the intense British. Some Americans, however. in spite of readability of the book. the strict neutrality laws, volunteered to fly From the point of view of an airman, how- alongside the Royal Air Force (RAF) in stem- ever, there is a criticai element missing in this ming the Nazi onslaught. These airmen, history: the role of air power is given short known as Eagles, manned Number 71, 121, and shrift. There is no discussion about the initial 133 Squadrons, and Colonel Caine has written fight for air superiority with the North Korean a concise history of these men and their air force. Nor is there any discussion about the accomplishments. The Eagles were transferred impact of the Chinese air force on the opera- to the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) tional thinking of the Far East Air Forces and in 1942 after the United States entered the war. Gen Douglas MacArthur himself. There is one Avoiding past “hero” histories, this account paragraph that discusses the effects of our own traces the Eagle squadrons back to the air interdiction campaign on the Chinese army. Lafayette Escadrille, which had fought in Otherwise, no cause-and-effect relationship is France in 1916 prior to the entry of the United formed between the interdiction campaign and States into World War 1. This precedent the ground maneuver accomplished by United helped the various approaches to be utilized to Nations ground forces. get American pilots in RAF cockpits; some I liked this book. It was immensely readable were barely legal, having to operate undercover and it captivated me. For the airman inter- to avoid FBI detection, others using fancy ested in military history, this book provides hotels and operating in the open. many insights into the strategic and operational Once accepted. most pilots left through decisions as well as the tactical battles at the Canada by ship on the hazardous North front. However, for the airman wanting to Atlantic convoys and after a quick orientation learn about air power in the Korean War, flight on Hurricane or Spitfire aircraft, fought please look elsewhere. in the air battles that took place after the actual Perhaps John Toland's concluding remarks Battle of Britain. As more Americans arrived, in the book best summarize the themes of In additional squadrons were established. After Mortal Combat: three squadrons were operational, the RAF It is human nature that repeats itself. not history. decided that other Americans who carne over We often leam more about the past from the pre- would become replacements in these sent than the reverse. I also discovered that a vile squadrons for those airmen lost. Looking past person can occasionally tell the truth and a noble the outstanding mission results, Caine points person tell a lie; and that men don't make history out that some Americans had doctored their as often as history makes men; and that the course flight records, forcing the RAF to move one of history is unpredictable. Finally, that the history squadron to Northern Ireland for training. But of war can never be definitive. because of the press coverage and some of the Maj Daniel lordan, USAF RAF officers assigned to the squadron, most of Heidelberg, Germany the Eagle squadrons were in the heaviest action from 1940 to 1942. Integrated into British soci- ety and genuinely appreciated by the British Eagles of the RAF: The World War II Eagle public, these Americans received hospitality Squadrons by Philip D. Caine. N ational that later Americans would not see since their Defense Universitv Press, W ashington, D.C. large numbers led to friction with the local 20319, 1991, 415 pages. population. The missions varied from dogfighting over After Germany overran France and the Low the Channel, to two-ship sweeps over France Countries (Belgium and the Netherlands) in and the Lowlands, to boring convoy escort 1940 and was poised to attack Great Britain, duties in the Channel and top cover over mar- the United States was still neutral and offi- itime approaches to the British Isles. The cially unable to provide aid. President losses were at times staggering. Only when the Roosevelt’s administration, still in a depres- direct threat was removed with the Nazi inva- sion, faced a large isolationist sentiment in the sion of the Soviet Union in 1941 did the RAF 82 AIRPOWEfí JOURNAL SPRING 1993 have the opportunity to offer more training. and Asia, and the convictions of airmen with RAF Fighter Command was glad to have the “extraordinary political acumen" (page 4) who American Eagle squadrons, and as the combat had persuaded Roosevelt of air power’s merits experience of these squadrons became greater. through “spectacular, long-range flights and the British were reluctant to turn them over to other examples of efficiency” (page 5) follow- the USAAF. After Pearl Harbor, the USAAF ing the 1934 air mail fiasco. began to arrive in Britam to assist in air attacks Underwood contends that Gen William on the continent. The B-17 bombers were in ("Billy”) Mitchell and Gen Benjamin Foulois, workable condition, but the USAAF lacked a outspoken American proponents of air power good fighter. The members of the Eagle during the interwar years, alienated political squadrons had never jeopardized their citizen- leaders as well as Army and Navy chiefs in ship since they did not swear loyalty to the publicizing the need for a separate air force king. However, as Caine documents in his through controversial spectacles such as the book, a lot of Eagle squadron members had Ostfriesland sinking. After Foulois retired as legal trouble even as late as 1970! chief of the Air Corps in 1935, a new breed of After the decision was made to transfer the air leader, typified by Gen Oscar Westover, Eagle squadrons with their Spitfire fighters to Gen Frank Andrews, and Gen Henry H. the USAAF, some pilots stayed in the RAF and (“Hap") Arnold, worked to secure MitchelTs fought in the Far East and Malta. The three goal through harmonious relations with Service RAF squadrons became the Fourth Fighter counterparts and Roosevelt administration Group with three squadrons—the 334th (71), officials. For these airmen, “Billy Mitchell 335th (121), and 336th (133)—and went on to became a dual symbol of the right message but be one of the most successful fighter groups in the wrong presentation” (page 45). the USAAF. While most Air Force members Andrews was particularly successful in know about the Eagle squadrons, few know the working “within the system” to build support details, suffering, courage, and raw flying abil- for an Army Air Corps centered around the ity these Americans demonstrated. In this fifti- B-17. As commanding general of the General eth anniversarv year of World War II, this book Headquarters (GHQ) Air Force, he supported is an important contribution to the study of Roosevelfs efforts to stem fascist encroachment American involvement in the war. It is highly into Latin America with a flight of six B-17s to recommended reading for the Project Warrior Argentina for the inauguration of President programs and an excellent historical account of Roberto Ortiz in February 1938. The trip earlv Air Force operations. included a nonstop, 2,844-mile flight from Capt Gilles Van Nederveen, USAF Miami to Lima, Peru, in 14 hours and 35 min- Washington. D.C. utes, and received high praise from Time and Newsweek reporters. Yet Andrews refused to highlight the journey as an extraordinary The Wings of Democracy: The Influence of Air achievement. “By treating this spectacular feat Power on the Roosevelt Administration, as an everyday occurrence,” Underwood 1933-1941 by lefferv S. Underwood. Drawer observes, "Andrews quietlv built trust in the C, College Station, Texas 77843: Texas A&M Armv Air Corps and added validity to the Universitv Press. 1991. 234 pages, $39.50. spectacular claims about air power” (page 109). Additional B-17 flights to Latin America In May 1933, newly inaugurated President followed, and Roosevelt began to take note of Franklin Roosevelt sent a message to the the bomber‘s abilitv to serve as a primarv London Disarmament Conference advocating weapon for hemispheric defense. the elimination of bomber aircraft and all other The Munich Crisis later that vear caused the “offensi ve" weapons. Eight years later, president to consider air power’s potential as Roosevelt called for the production of 500 an offensive force. LJnderwood maintains that heavy bombers a month and implied his will- Roosevelfs increasing calls for aircraft produc- ingness to unleash an aerial armada against tion initially resulted more from a desire to Japanese cities. Air Force historian Jeffery S. send airplanes to Britain and France than from Underwood attributes the change in the presi- an intent to create a vast American air force. denta attitude to two factors: the savage By the summer of 1941, however. in the after- nature of the war that had embroiled Europe math of air power's success against naval NET ASSESSMENT 83 forces in the German assault on Crete. Sierra Hotel, Brian! At last a real story has Roosevelt believed that American bombers been given to the public about the SR-71 based in the Pacific could deter a Japanese Blackbird from someone who has flown her, strike against the Philippines, Guam. and Wake loved her, and understood her as well as she Island. Moreover, Secretary of War Henry would allow any to comprehend her complexi- Stimson thought that the fear of an aerial holo- ties. Through an interesting blend of pictures, caust against Tokyo would restrain the facts, and anecdotal history, Maj Brian Shul Japanese. "Thus,” Underwood writes. “four shares the unique experiences of flying one of years before the atomic bombs were dropped the world’s aviation legends. Sled Driver is a on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the United States unique book that offers the reader three government was considering a policy of atomic themes, yet ultimately delivers the excitement diplomacy—without the atomic bomb" (page of experiencing, perhaps even capturing, a bit 177). The attempt at aerial coercion failed of an enigma. because it assumed too much. Military chiefs First, the story is about the world's fastest discounted the Japanese carrier force, and jet. But as Shul points out in his introduction, political leaders placed inordinate faith in the “It is not a story of the making of the SR-71, ability of a meager number of bombers to stop a nor is it a technical digest of the many facts concerted Japanese advance. and figures about the plane.” Rather, the book Underwood's meticulous research of per- is about the experiences and emotions of fly- sonal papers, government documents, and Air ing. Shul leads his readers through a journey Corps archives. combined with straightforward that begins with the week-long interview and often understated prose, deftly illuminates process for candidates, a year-long training pro- the change in “political tactics” adopted by air gram, and finally through the thrills of flying leaders during the Roosevelt administration. reconnaissance missions at the edge of space. Underwood also paints a convincing picture of He next demonstrates his ability to capture why a pragmatic president embraced air power on film his unique experience of flying the on the eve of America’s entry into World War Blackbird. One can almost sense the magni- II. However, the author’s characterization of tude of the inspirational sights that Shul so Arnold as an advocate of area bombing of beautifully captures on film. He is an accom- Japanese cities in 1941 is subject to question. plished aviation photographer with the ability The Air Corps chief did indeed call for the to provide a médium through which few could development of incendiary ordnance following experience the art that is captured at the edge a spring trip to Great Britain and assured its of space. Sled Driver is an experience that eas- delivery to the Philippines before Pearl Harbor. ily captures the attention of aviation enthusi- Yet only after the failure of seven months of asts as well as those that just appreciate an precision raids to affect Japanese war-making interesting story and beautiful photography. capability in 1944—45 did Arnold push for a Finally, the reader cannot help but sense the new approach to bombing Japan. Although theme that engulfs the entire book—a love Underwood acknowledges in an appendix the story. From Shul’s opening introduction, in “army fliers’ continued faith in precision which he describes the machine’s sensuous bombing" (page 188), the image presented in design of blended metais and elegant lines, the the main text needs clarification. Neverthe- reader realizes that this is more than a story less, The Wings of Democracy offers students of about just another aircraft. “The SR-71 had a American air power history a solid account of lure for pilots all its own: it had an exciting the Air Corps's march towards autonomy dur- combination of grace, speed and danger.” Yet, ing the First nine years of the Roosevelt era. to those few who flew her, to reveal all that she Maj Mark Clodfelter, USAF could do, is unthinkable. It is like sharing inti- Maxwell AFB, Alabama mate secrets and establishing a personal rela- tionship with a fusion of titanium, fuel, stick, and throttles only to betray her confidences. The Sled was to those who flew her a very Sled Driver: Flying the World’s Fastest Jet by personal experience. Shul describes one of his Brian Shul with Kathleen 0'Grady. MACH experiences: “For a brief moment I was more ONE, Inc., 1017 Willow Street, Chico, than an Air Force pilot on a training flight. Califórnia 95927, 1991. 151 pages, $38.00. Our incredible speed became insignificant as 84 A1RPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1993 the jet seemed to stand still before the heavens. Puerto Rico, Brazil, and África showed how I was part of something larger and more pro- teamwork and bonding occurred during their found. I felt a joy to be at this place, at this “orphanhood.” Interestingly, Colonel Currier time, looking at these stars.” However, these mentions the same “empires” and rivalries were often precious moments stolen from a between major commands and specialties that jealous jet. are evident in today’s Air Force. The fraternity Unquestionably, this book will add to per- of first pilots considered copilots as appren- sonal libraries. Just as the Sled will continue tices. There were also walls between the pilots to stimulate conversation, Shul’s account will and navigators. Colonel Currier further pro- help to historically document the personal vides a look at leadership and trust at work in accounts of those who flew her and offer inter- the cockpit when he outlines the relationship esting discussion for those in search of fact and between his pilot and the credibility placed myth—the stuff of which legends are made. with the navigator. Currier witnessed such From one “Habu” to another—Thanks, Brian! trusting com m ents as “Currier, I’m going to Maj Hunter W. Vardaman, USAF land, and this better be Grottaglie, or your Maxwell AFB, Alabama name is mud with m e." In many strange situa- tions mentioned, aircrew cohesiveness was formed by “necessity and not by choice.” All Fifty Mission Crush by Lt Col D onald R. of Colonel Currier’s m ission debriefings are Currier, USAF Retired. Burd Street Press, 63 realistic and candid. His writing style is very West Burd Street, Shippensburg, readable, and he explains any technical terms Pennsylvania 17257, 1992, 176 pages, that might cause distraction. $24.95. Not all of the incidents recalled by the author took place in the air. Aircrew antics on the If you thrived on the suspense of watching ground are discussed, but probably not enough. the Memphis Belle run the German gauntlet in Given the tremendous losses during raids on World War II, or if you struggled with the Ploesti, Mostar, and Udine, the stories taking painful boys-to-men experiences of West place in the tents and mess halls further docu- Point’s Class of ‘66 in The Long Grey Line, ment the growth of these young, maturing avia- you’11 enjoy the worlds to which this book will tors. Colonel Currier addresses both types of take you. Colonel Currier’s reflections of his rem iniscences with stories of rowdy experi- World War II experiences are remarkably vivid ences and the dark realities of aircrews who considering the 40-plus years it took to bring did not return. W orse than the painstaking them to paper. Why the wait? Despite the sig- chore of going through the personal items of nificant emotional events that occurred during tentmates and other acquaintances to ship their his tours with the 449th Bomb Group, Colonel belongings home was the uncertainty of Currier was “indifferent to reunions in general whether these men were dead or were prison- and to a war-time reunion in particular.” Most ers of war. Sometimes their fate depended on of the friends he trained with were shot down which side of a river they fell. or replaced. After finding out that six out of I enjoyed this book for the most apparent the 10 men on his crew were still alive, he offerings— m ission debriefs and the docu- started talking to them about their experiences. mented reality of war. W ith little searching, I After a little reminiscing, “recalling the names ap preciated the big picture that C olonel of so many battles was a terribly moving expe- Currier's story gives. The story of men, given rience for me. I wanted to remember more. I little experience and focus, who went back up was ready to recall what I had long put behind into the air no matter how tragic the previous me.” mission. In an ominous environment of death The adventures of Currier’s B-24 crew start and despair, these men matured quickly and on a pathetic note. He laments, “I can hardly did their duty unquestioningly. Such devotion believe how ill-prepared we were to do the job to duty, honor, and country put these men in assigned to us." Currier recounts many sense- the com pany of Gen Douglas M acArthur by less and unfortunate mistakes in jolting detail. earning their "fifty mission crush." The crew started behind the curve and stayed stateside weeks after their group deployed 2d Lt Michel C. Escudie, USAF overseas. The accounts of their chase across Castle AFB, Califórnia NET ASSESSMENT 85 Flying Blind: The Politics of the U.S. Strategic for example, is a core mission of the Air Force, Bomber Program by Michael E. Brown. one that has defined its essence since its incep- Cornell University Press, Box 250, Ithaca, tion. Since military organizations are sensitive New York 14850, 1992, 350 pages, $47.50. to threats—strategic as well as bureaucratic—to their core missions, Brown suggests that strate- Flying Blind is an important original study of gic and bureaucratic developments are gener- the American weapon-acquisition process. ally responsible for triggering mainstream Author Michael E. Brown takes an exhaustive developments. look at how US military acquisition programs Contrary to their prominence in the litera- begin, the forces that shape them, and most ture on the subject, he finds no signiFicant sup- important, why they turn out as they do. The port for technological and economic argu- book’s foundation is a series of case studies of ments. Instead, he finds some support for weapon acquisition in the US strategic bomber bureaucratic accounts and a great deal of sup- programs. The outcome, “all too frequently, port for strategic explanations of how weapon was disastrous from an acquisition stand- development efforts begin. Bomber programs point.” are classic examples of such programs. For Brown, now a sênior research fellow at A main premise of this book is that the Air the International Institute for Strategic Studies Force, and the Army Air Corps and Army Air in London, this massive effort began almost a Forces earlier, were all “flying blind” in several decade ago as his PhD dissertation at Cornell respects when they began their bomber devel- University. At that time. he concentrated on opment programs. Three fundamental only five strategic bomber programs: the B-47, unknowns were present in their decision mak- B-52, B-70, B-58, and B-l. In the interim, he ing: unclear understanding of the nature of the realized that a comprehensive study of all the operational threat, unclear technological possi- main bomber programs that the US Air Force bilities for bomber development, and unknown (and its predecessors) had pushed for was nec- end results by setting performance require- essary to adequately analyze the role of organi- ments often far beyond the State of the art. zational forces throughout the complicated Regarding outcomes given development acquisition process. The result is an unprece- objectives, one of two basic procurement strate- dented examination of all 15 of the major gies can be employed: sequential and concur- post-World War II strategic bombers—from the rent. Sequential strategies are based on the propeller-driven B-35 (a B-2 look-alike) to the assumption that research and development stealthy intercontinental B-2 and everything in programs are laced with technological uncer- between. tainties that are best resolved by proceeding in The massive archival data for these case an orderly, sequential manner. On the other studies come from five main sources, many of hand, concurrent strategies try to speed up the them primary ones: declassified Air Force doc- acquisition process by initiating production uments and studies, aerospace industry docu- activities while development is still under way. ments and studies, interviews with policy Brown points out that concurrent strategies makers and program participants, congres- have dominated US weapon acquisition sional hearings and reports, and trade journals throughout most of the postwar period. and secondary literature. For the bombers, some of these programs The primary focus is weapon-acquisition were extremely ambitious technologically (e.g., activity that falis within established mission B-35, B-47, B-58, B-70, B-2), while others were areas. Most observers believe that four expla- only moderately ambitious (B-36, B-52, B-l, nations can account for military policy and, in B-lB). Others used highly concurrent procure- turn, the origins of weapon-acquisition pro- ment strategies (B-58, B-70, B-lB. B-2), while grams as related to core mission areas. The two featured highly sequential strategies, at explanations are strategic, bureaucratic, eco- least in their early stages (B-47, B-52). nomic, and technological. Brown comes on strong in pointing out that Major weapon system programs that are part the Air Force was flying blind when it repeat- of established mission areas are generally edly issued performance requirements for the started by the military Services. Each Service bombers that demanded major technological has core missions that make for uniqueness advances. It was also flying blind when it and sense of purpose. Strategic bombardment, imposed concurrency on its development and 86 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1993 production programs. Brown argues that mili- these traits are taken as a strength. However, tary organizations like the Air Force prefer con- in compacting this complex subject, Coakley current procurement strategies for a variety of has missed his intended audience. The com - strategic and bureaucratic reasons. plex issues covered are sometimes confusing to Yet concurrency has proven to be badly the uninitiated. In addition, an experienced counterproductive in most cases. Only when individual will probably find Coakley’s treat- there has been a combination of the two strate- ment simplistic or superficial. gies or a sequential strategy alone has the Air The basic premise of the book is that com- Force achieved qualified success in acquiring mand and control is the fundamental aspect of new bombers. In this respect, while some con- winning battles. Other aspects of fighting and sider the B-1A to be a total acquisition debacle, winning wars— security, logistics, doctrine, Brown asserts that it was actually a partial suc- tactics, and such— are seen as secondary at cess, "which is what one would expect from a best. Coakley w rites in the last chapter, program with fairly modest technological “Fighting Sm art,” that “command and control objectives and a mixed procurement strategy." is the basis for efficient operation at all times; What cancelled the program was a political in armed conflict, it is the basis for fighting decision by an incoming president due to smart. Capable C2 is the key to the flexibility excessive cost overruns. Moreover, a complete our leaders and forces need in the complicated success would be the venerable B-52, which international environm ent.” A ccording to used sequential strategies throughout its early Coakley, secondary aspects may at times con- development stages. flict. For example, Coakley cites the need for In summarizing his findings on the cost and strategic and operational control as sometimes performance problems that plague modern conflicting with a need for tactical flexibility. weapons programs, Brown tries to present pol- Military failure is viewed by Coakley as an icy recommendations designed to address inability to finetune these secondary aspects these issues. Paramount to real reform is the through an organization’s command and con- realization by Air Force leaders that the Service trol process. His sixth chapter, “A Matter of was “flying blind when it imposed concur- Balances,” is devoted to describing the need to rency on its technologically ambitious bomber strike an ideal balance between these conflict- development programs.” Yet the main obstacle ing aspects of operational warfare. to weapon acquisition reform will be the sub- The bulk of Coakley’s writing rests on the stantiallv formidable problem of "institutional above premise. If it is accepted, then most of bias.” Until the course is changed, future the book can be quickly read in a few evenings. weapon svstem acquisitions could follow the Coakley expands the readefs outlook by por- same types of paths as the modern strategic traying com m and and control under three bombers. major aspects: as a process and system, as Lt Col Frank Donnini, USAF technology, and as human and organizational Langley AFB. Virgínia interaction. Separate chapters are devoted to each of these aspects and then the whole dis- cussion is tied together in the last two chap- Command and Control for War and Peace by ters. The book is well organized and foot- Thomas P. Coakley. National Defense noted. The index is useful. Structurally, the University Press, Washington, D.C. 20319, only thing missing is a bibliography. 1992, 184 pages. However, if the basic premise is not accepted, the book then becomes incomplete Thom as P. Coakley has written an easy-to- because Coakley does not take the time to read book on com m and and control (C2) prove his fundamental assertion that command intended for individuais new to the command and control is indeed the single basis for vic- and control arena. Coakley writes, “The pri- tory on the battlefield. Coakley believes all marv goals of this book are to make C2 a topic doctrine and tactics issues are tied to the com - accessible to anyone with a stake in the mand and control structure. national security of the United States and to For example, he is quick to point out that our suggest a practical approach to difficult C2 superior command and control system gave issu es.” His book covers a w ealth o f topics in coalition forces the edge over Saddam an amazingly compact fashion. At first glance, Hussein's forces during the recent Gulf War. NET ASSESSMENT 87 However. according to William J. Perry in fear. The author mentions a major enemy “Desert Storm and Deterrence,” Foreign Affairs, underground tunnel system positioned just a Fali 1991. Hussein had a technicallv good com- few thousand yards from the lst Division field mand and control system before hostilities headquarters at Lai Khe, a mere 22 kilometers began. It just operated under a restrictive from Bien Hoa. The Vietcong could easily emplovment doctrine. Tactically. Hussein have been out there on that August night. made a decision to dig in. That, in hindsight. After all, who set off all those lethal rockets was a stxategic error. Finally. coalition forces that periodically hit Bien Hoa? orchestrated an unprecedented air campaign at Author Hugh L. Mills. jr.. left college after a the tactical. operational. and strategic leveis of semester, signed up for Officer Candidate war that paralyzed the Iraqi government and School, and leaped at the opportunity for heli- military and its command and control system. copter pilot training. He was assigned to D Robert Allan Doughty in The Seeds of Disaster: Troop (Air), lst Squadron, 4th Cavalry, and the The Development of French Army Doctrine lst Division’s crack hunter-killer teams in 1919-1939, explains how the French doctrine which he flew over 2.000 combat hours in of the late thirties also viewed war in terms of Vietnam, the majority of the time in his methodical, controlled battles. Supporting this beloved OH-6 “Loaches." Arriving in Vietnam doctrine was a well-developed command and in Januarv 1969, he quickly learned things that control system. According to Doughty, this flight school had not taught him, such things as doctrine led to the collapse of France in 1940. how to land without a tail rotor, "combatlike A fundamental question is thus left unan- autorotations, tricks of flying under in-country swered. What happens to a good command conditions—techniques that were not yet in the and control system when the strategic and tac- books" (page 30). tical war-fighting doctrine is flawed? The author describes the OH-6 as having a Additionally, are failures in tactics, strategy, personality of its own: “She was light, nimble and doctrine really tied to command and con- and extremely responsive to every control trol? input. While the Huey was stable and depend- This book will not be the last word in com - able—kind of like the faithful family sedan— mand and control. Nor should it be the first the OH-6 was like getting a brand new MGA for the reader. The uninitiated may find por- roadster. She was sexy" (page 32). At the same tions of Command and Control for War and time. the OH-6 was small and cramped. Peace confusing. I found it to be a good jump- Mills States that there were four basic parts ing-off point for further d iscussion and to the aeroscouts' (as the Loach pilots were thought. But it should not be the only book called) mission: conducting visual recons. read on the subject. making bomb damage assessments, evaluating Maj Nick Clemens, USAF landing zones, and screening for ground units. Washington. D.C. The scout portion of a Loach-Cobra team mis- sion was to find the enemy and, if fired upon, to drop smoke and call in the Cobra to shoot Low Levei Hell: A Scout Pilot in the Big Red up the place. The scout wasn't supposed to go One by Hugh L. M ills. Jr.. with Robert A. back to the battle area until the Cobra finished, Anderson. Presidio Press. 1 Pamaron Way, but Mills relates that he more often than not Novato. Califórnia 94945-1340. 1992. 305 got involved in the fray. The Loach was pages. S21.95. equipped with an M-60 machine gun operated by the crew chief. Mills had an optional mini- In August 1969. as I and another enlisted sol- gun. the General Electric 7.62-caliber electric dier of the lOlst Airborne Division hitchhiked Gatling gun that could fire 2.000 to 4.000 through the svening darkness from Saigon to rounds per minute, attached to the left rear of our home base of Bien Hoa. we realized our the cabin. He consistently used this gun. grave situation. As we trudged unarmed on an While the Loach pilots were either warrant unlighted rural road. the clichê we had consis- or commissioned officers. the crew chiefs were tentlv heard that "at night the roads belonged enlisted. Mills maintains that there was per- to the Vietcong" became more perceivable. haps no closer military camaraderie than that Had I been aware of the contents of this book. between the aeroscout pilot and his crew chief. mv anxiety would have turned to stark-raving Their lives depended on each other. And 88 A1RPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1993 when he became platoon leader, Mills made it This is an excellent account of the tremen- an important part of his business to ensure that dous job the OH-6 pilots did in Vietnam. The crew chiefs had well-maintained quarters, that reader gains enormous respect for all the com- their chow was good, that they were kept off bat units listed, including the tough and tena- strictly “bullshit” details, and that they got cious North Vietnamese Army regulars who, equal awards. Yet on the ground there with no air power, consistently managed to be remained a separation of the enlisted and the in places where they should not have dared to officer. Mills never mentions eating or “suck- be. T h is is M ills’s story of his first tour in ing" on a few beers with his crew chiefs. The Vietnam. He served a second tour. To write a crew chief could have a college degree and the narrative as exciting as Low Levei Hell will be pilot none and after the war they could stand difficult indeed. together in the same unemployment line, but in Dr George M. Watson, Jr. the US Army they were from two divergent Washington, D.C. classes. Within a few months, Mills’s combat experi- ence enhanced his confidence. He discovered Segregated Skies: All-Black Combat that he had developed an instinct, a warning Squadrons of WWII by Stanley Sandler. bell that sounded when danger was near. “It Smithsonian Institution Press, 470 L’Enfant was a feeling in my gut, coupled with a tingling Plaza, Suite 1700, Washington, D.C. 20560, on the back of my neck, almost as though it was 1992, 217 pages, $24.95. electrified. When I got that feeling, my senses automatically doubled guard” (page 65). When “With the nation gearing for war by 1940 and this happened to him. he usually found trouble. the subsequent advent of conscription, it might The author relates one thrilling combat be presumed that the American military would adventure after another. He was shot down, welcome blacks. Such was not the case. . . wounded. rescued other Loach pilots, assisted So begins Stanley Sandler in Segregated Skies, trapped infantry units, called in larger air a primer of sorts on the subject of Air Force strikes, saw buddies killed, hunted crack North integration. Over 50 years have passed since Vietnamese Army (NVA) regular units, enjoyed 11 black men and one regular Army officer getting even with the enemy, and eventually (Capt Benjamin O. Davis, Jr.) set out to prove tired of combat. It was tough flying under pres- that black pilots merited a place in the Army sure an average of five hours every day 30 Air Corps. From these 12 evolved a distin- days a month. It was strenuous flying con- guished group of pioneers known as the stantly in fear and attempting to second-guess Tuskegee Airmen. the enemy. Mills worried about his airplane, Sandler, a former professor of history at about his crew chief, and about learning scout- Northern Virginia Community College, has set ing skills well enough to survive. the context of their story within that of the US When training new pilots, M ills’s Armv and not simply the air component. This "Outcasts," as his unit was called. provided newest title in the Smithsonian History of advice from the school of hard knocks that Aviation series recounts the group’s battles on meant the difference between surviving or not. both sides of the Atlantic—against Hitler’s "Don’t hover, don’t return to the target area Luftwaffe in África and Europe and against Jim twice from the same direction or at the same Crow’s segregationist policies in the United speed, and don’t give Charlie a chance to antic- States and in the defense establishment. While ipate your movement or lack of it because he engaged in this two-front “war.” Sandler writes will shoot you out of the sky" (page 198). of another “hidden front" that the men also There are a couple of minor errors, such as endured: battling against those who expected, Bien Hoa being right next to Ton Son Nhut and wanted. the colored experiment to fail. It (page 28). Maybe it is from the air, but not was against this hidden front that the greatest from the ground. Also, the lst Division (Big battle was won. Red One) went home in March 1970, not 1971 Sandler begins the work by quickly detailing (page 298). The book could use a few more the history of blacks in America’s defense from well-placed maps. I constantly flipped back to the Civil War through post-World War I. when the only map in the front of the hook to locate a verv small number of blacks began to enter the many places mentioned. civil aviation. Complying with public law in NET ASSESSMENT 89 1941. the Army Air Corps drew up plans to After 1945, the Army Air Forces began call- begin the segregated training of 460 black ing for reports on how the Negro performed in enlisted personnel at Chanute Field, Illinois, combat. The authors of these reports, confus- and black pilot training at Tuskegee lnstitute in ing the words “intelligence” with “education” Alabama. Dr James Patterson, Tuskegee’s pres- in writing their reports, wrote that Negrões per- ident. was not happy with a "Jim Crow Air formed their duties at a lower levei due to Corps” at his institution. Yet he realized that, lower intelligence rather than a lack of educa- although segregated firom white military pilot tion. Fortunately, these reports sparked others trainees, "at least blacks were in the Air Corps” on the same subject refuting this flawed reason- (pages 19-22). Success in this black experi- ing. The aftermath of these reports showed ment, and over their hidden front, came in that, among other things, segregation was sim- small ways. ply not an efficient management tool. Officers at the Southeastern Army Air Corps Moreover, the 1948 presidential election Training Command (SEAACTC), headquar- came on the heels of these reports. Special tered at Maxwell Field, Alabama, treated the Counsel Clark Clifford advised President Harry project with “amused detachment.” Yet an S Truman to endorse the protection of minority early commander at Tuskegee, Col Noel rights to garner the black vote. Truman agreed, Parrish, remarked after the war that “no one which eventually resulted in the presidential could afford to be seen as opposing the idea order to desegregate the US military. either” (page 28). With this small victory in By 1949, Secretary of the Air Force Stuart hand, the newly formed 99th Pursuit Squadron Symington and Air Force Chief of Staff Gen moved out in April 1943 to fight against their Hoyt Vandenberg were diligently working to intended front—Hitler’s Luftwaffe. integrate the new service. For the pioneering Three additional segregated fighter Tuskegee Airmen, the "hidden front” of bat- squadrons (the lOOth. 301st, and 302d) soon tling those who had wanted them to fail was joined the 99th in Italy to form the 332d beginning to crumble. Fighter Group. The 332d battled their way up Sandler has written a concise and accurate the Italian península and joined Lt Gen Ira portrayal of black combat squadrons in World Eaker’s Fifteenth Air Force, successfully War II. His detailed account of day-to-day mis- escorting B-24 Liberators that were bombing sions of the 332d becomes laborious at times, Petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) targets. but the dogfighting accounts of the survivors While the 332d was engaged in combat, the offer quick compensation. The work is solid newly formed all-black 477th Bombardment and will be a complement to other works on Group was making a name for itself on other Air Force integration. As Sandler writes, "It fronts. Sandler quickly recounts the stormy would be difficult to imagine any progress tak- history of the 477th, especially the “Freeman ing place . . . without the pioneering Tuskegee Field 101,” who nearly mutinied over that aviation organizations” (page 157). This is the Indiana base’s segregated officer’s clubs. story of those pioneers who overcame hidden Sandler uses the 477th's story to show that and extreme obstacles and endeavored to through them, in effect, black military aviation ensure that “in peace or in war, there would be had won further moral victories. However, no more segregated skies." First Air Force commander Gen Frank Hunter, Capt Phillip L. Osborne, USAF no friend to the 477th or to black aviation, saw Kelly AFB, Texas no victories for the 477th. Hunter later bitterly recounted how he had received no guidance from his superiors on how to deal with the all- black group and resentfully added that Bataan and Beyond: Memories of an “General Arnold got orders from General American POW by John S. Coleman, Jr. Marshall, and he got his orders from Secretary Texas A&M Press, Drawer C, College Station, of War Stimson, and he got his orders from Texas 77843, 1978, 210 pages, $12.95. Mrs. Roosevelt’’ (emphasis added) (page 130). With the war in Germany won, Sandler writes, Brothers from Bataan: POWs, 1942-1945 by there remained one front left for these black Adrian R. Martin. Sunflower University pioneers—it was not the Pacific but their very Press, 1531 Yuma, Box 1009, Manhattan, survival at home. Kansas 66502, 1992, 334 pages, $21.95. 90 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1993 Few events in American military history are antiaircraft shells vainly “exploding just below as grim, and as gripping, as the story of those them” (page 11). who survived the fali of the Philippines. His description of the rapidly deteriorating While many readers of Airpower Journal have conditions during the defense is powerful. had the opportunity to meet survivors of the Performing scouting missions, eating python infamous Bataan Death March and to hear first- meais, and scrounging for disappearing sup- hand the incomprehensible brutality they suf- plies tell the story. Also heavy is the irony. A fered. the next generation will have to rely master sergeant who sold his seat on the last upon recorded sources to ponder the tragedy ship out of the Philippine Islands prior to the and learn its many lessons. These two vol- war for $50 did not survive captivity to spend umes make a solid contribution toward the the money. Perhaps more ironic is the fact that goal of passing on this valuable story to poster- in faithful obedience to international laws ity. (which would repeatedly and viciously be vio- Bataan and Beyond, number six in Texas lated by the adversary), Coleman obeyed a A&M's Centennial Series, is the personal directive to turn in “five 12-gauge shotguns we account of Capt John Coleman, Jr., who arrived were using” on intelligence-gathering patrols at Nichols Field near Manila just before the (page 31). outbreak of the war. From the outset of his When the surrender carne— a consequence story, one is drawn deeply into the swiftly of starvation rather than military superiority— flowing events so that by the time of the sur- he describes his fellow prisoners: “Their faces render on the Bataan península, the reader is were stoic. They looked like walking dead as emotionally exhausted as the defenders men. Little did they know or realize that the were physically drained. This is good writing. worst was yet to come” (page 69). Indeed, The simple, straightforward narrative is power- none could anticipate the ruthlessness of their ful because the events were all too real. captors. Coleman’s own survival was nigh Passing matter-of-factly over descriptions of unto miraculous. Suffering a fractured ankle the dead communicates with stark clarity that and a major shrapnel wound, emaciated and one had to deal with the imminent future and enduring bouts of malarial attacks, he was had little time to pause and take in the present dragged along in the death column bv other horror. Fortunately, the preservation of a com- troops seeking to offer what little aid they pact diary allowed for the detailed account of could. Having witnessed the murder of others this particular warrior, whose own traumatic who fell from the ranks, he says, “I was deter- experiences doubtless paralleled those of hun- mined not to fali out of the column" (page 77). dreds of others. Yet. not desiring to drag others down with “If ever there was a hell on earth, this was himself, Coleman withdrew from the grasp of administered to the 7,000 souls of some of the weakened American hands and fell to his bravest and most devoted of our military per- knees. Within moments, a bayonet was thrust sonnel" (page 93). Still, it was a torment from into his side, and “1 felt a grinding of bones and which some lessons, if we were willing to a streak of fire in my right side." He awakened learn them, can be redeemed. to find that he had been left for dead beside the Coleman shares a strict chronological road, laid between two cold Americans, one of account. beginning with his posting and con- whom was a Catholic chaplain who had his tinuing on through the attack and defense of rosarv beads on his chest (page 78). Sustained the Philippines, the surrender and merciless by a vision of his wife and children while he captivitv, and ending with his liberation and had been unconscious, Coleman amazingly return to the land for which he had sacrificed struggled to rejoin the column and march off to so much. With the falling of the first bombs. four vears of imprisonment. the reader becomes quickly enmeshed in the It is the objective descriptions of the numer- battle, joining "the air corps personnel |who) ous atrocities that magnifies their horror. To had not been issued a full complement of become hardened so quickly to marching on infantry equipment.” which would be sorelv the crushed flesh and bone of one’s comrades needed during the combat to come in the days itself (page 72) is a strong testimonv to the ahead. You sense their frustration as they human mind's abilitv to adapt to the incompre- “counted ninety-six heavy bombers flving at hensible. about twenty-one thousand feet” with their The remainder of Coleman’s account is NET ASSESSMENT 91 equally gripping. although mercifully less vio- on through his imprisonment, to his ultimate lent. We accompanv him to his imprisonment death. Ironically, it appears that his uncle was at Camp 0 ’Donnell, and eventually to his trans- fortunate enough to have escaped the Death fer to Japan. Along the way, we witness forced March itself. due to the fact that the command- labor, needless deaths due to the withholding er of his unit insisted to their captors “in the of availabie medicines, amputations, suicides, strongest possible terms that we had been on and despair. Yet even before the jubilation of short rations and were very weak and could the liberation, there were a few bright not possibly walk that far, and that the moments. One of the most moving occurred in Ja p a n e s e m ust . . . take us to 0 ' D o n n e l l by November 1942 as the prisoners were marched truck” (page 78). This demand was surpris- publicly to the hell ships that would transport ingly met, probably because their unit was them to forced labor camps in Japan. As they among the first to surrender and the Japanese passed a Filipino band, it began “playing ‘God had no idea how many prisoners would fali Bless America' and at first everyone yelled; into their hands during the days ahead. then there was silence. Tears were streaming Due to the fact that Martin’s uncle was a down our faces. . . . The bandleader could chaplain’s assistant, a number of the reflec- have been executed for this, if the Japanese had tions in the volume come from a Catholic known what he was playing” (page 105). priest with whom he worked before and during One of his most special memories followed the captivity. Martin notes that "after 120 the liberation, as “General MacArthur was interviews I have heard a Bataan veteran occa- helping fit the men with clothes.” He records a sionally condemn an officer or doctor, but personal chat in which MacArthur, upon learn- never have I heard one criticize a Chaplain. ing that he had served in the Air Corps, stated, . . . The tremendous pressure they worked “That was the biggest mistake I made at the under from 1941 to 1945 demanded heroism, beginning of the war. I did not believe that any and they accepted the challenge—and most airplane could sink a battleship" (page 188). went well beyond the call of duty” (pages While Coleman’s account is a personal one, 70-71). Brothers from Bataan is a collection of remem- Also in a religious vein, the following com- brances woven into a common framework by ments are taken from the diary of a doctor who the author. Martin draws upon the testimonies tended his comrades in the prison camp. In of numerous survivors to relate the story of his Japan, those who died were placed in a box uncle, who did not return from Japan; tragi- and taken to the local crematorium. Later the cally he died of tuberculosis shortly before the ashes were returned. Before the body left the liberation. In a sense, this could be the story of camp, however, officers and selected enlisted many of those who did not return to recount men were forced to attend a Shinto funeral. In their own trials. the words of the doctor, "What sacrilege and Martin’s narrative, filled generously with show, this Shinto funeral for OUR soldier” quotations consistent with his “oral history" (page 255). approach, does not read as smoothly as Martin’s study of the subject also offers a Coleman's work. However, this less-smooth wide range of vignettes into the plight of the presentation is also inseparably linked to the POW held by the Japanese: a Japanese officer volume's greatest strength: it conveys insights laying a wreath at an American Memorial Day and experiences from a number of Bataan sur- Service, POW self-administered justice, paying vivors. Thus, it is somewhat more comprehen- rice rations to have one’s arm broken to avoid sive than the experiences and perspective of a work details, and the giving of their POW sole POW. Martin acknowledges another limi- "pay” to the Red Cross before departing Japan. tation in his introduction; “One of the real These books tell a shared story with many challenges of portraying these terrible vears of common themes. However, each is worth- POW life was that much of the history of those while in its own right, and reading both pro- events in the Philippines and Japan exists vides a detailed picture of these dark days. today only in the cracks, crevices, and recesses Both contain helpful maps and photographs. in the minds of these 60-, 70-, and 80-year-old In addition, Martin’s book includes camp men." drawings and facsimiles of documents such as Brothers from Bataan follows the life of Japanese propaganda leaflets, the few post- Martin's uncle from his prewar school years, cards Sergeant Martin was allowed to send 92 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1993 home, the letters of regret received by his fam- learns basic flight maneuvers, pattern proce- ily, and even two cartoons drawn in the camp dures, and aerobatics. Between flying, ground by one of the prisoners. school, studying, physical training, and drill, Bataan taught lessons we should never for- Fletcher manages to periodically see his new get, and these two works can help us recall wife, who faithfully follows him to each base. them. One never knows what the future may Her presence helps ease the pressure of check- bring. Listen to Coleman: “When we lined up rides, which “every cadet hated and feared,” in the column |to begin the Death March], none the pressure of washing out (176 of 200 made it of us doubted that we would be treated in a through this phase), and the overall danger. decent and humane way, according to the Interesting anecdotes include the continued international law dealing with prisoners of quarantines and the constant State of alert war" (page 71). Years later he would have because of the fear of invasion by the Japanese. learned, “we had been gone o ver four years and The next phase of training, basic, begins with many times over those four years it looked as if a stark reminder of the inherent danger in fly- it would be impossible to live. There were ing—the display of aircraft wreckage at the many times it would have been much easier to front gate of War Eagle Field, Lancaster, die . . (page 193). Califórnia. This incident is almost prophetic. Chaplain, Capt, Robert C. Stroud, USAF During basic, Mister Fletcher would barely Poulsbo, Washington avoid killing himself on two solo flights, one during a spin and one when he lost an engine on takeoff. His 80 hours of dual and solo time Mister: The Training of an Aviation Cadet in in the BT-13A Vultee Valiant, a 4,490-pound World War II by Eugene Fletcher. monoplane with a 450-horsepower engine and University of Washington Press, Box 50096, a top speed of 156 mph, consist of formation Seattle, Washington, 1992, 190 pages, $19.95. flying, navigation and instrument training, night flying, and extensive pattern training, “Mister” Eugene Fletcher has crafted a con- especially at auxiliary airfields. The author cise, well-written, and well-researched memoir attempts to break the occasional monotonous of US pilot training during World War II. The description of flight school with brief discus- book progresses through all five phases of his sions of the rationing of consumer goods, his flight training—preflight, primary, basic, wife’s employment at the base in the dining advanced, and finally B-17 transition. hall, and get-togethers with friends. The author’s flying odyssey begins on 7 The last school in the cadet flying program, January 1943, when he reports to the Army Air advanced, begins at Douglas Army Airfield, Forces Classification Center at Santa Ana, Arizona, in August 1943. Using the twin- Califórnia. Here he spends three months engined, fabric-covered AT-17 Cessna undergoing basic military training and physi- “Bobcats," also known as the “bamboo cal fitness conditioning and learning physics, bomber," Fletcher logs 126 hours. The Bobcat radio code, meteorology, theory of flight, Army grossed at 5,700 pounds. and the 240-horse- organization, and many other subjects. Off- power engines gave it a top speed of 176 mph. base passes were few, primarily because of The instructors in this phase of training con- numerous quarantines due to measle out- sidered their students already pilots and there- breaks. Preflight was significant because it was fore gave concentrated instruction in instru- in that phase that Fletcher and fellow pilot ment flying, day and night formation. and nav- candidates were given the name “Mister,” a igation. title they would not shed until November of Although in advance flying school some of that year, when they would get their wings and the pressure was off, the hazards remained. as officer commissions. illustrated by Fletcher's near miss with a civil- The actual flight training begins in primary ian airliner. a landing at the wrong airfield on a flying school, and for the author this occurs at night solo navigation ride, losing an engine at Oxnard, Califórnia. During these three an auxiliary airfield, and the death of two stu- months, he logs 65 hours of “arduous and dan- dents the day before graduation. Despite haz- gerous" training in the Boeing-built Stearman ardous incidents, Fletcher and his class receive PT-13B biplane, a 2,700-pound, 220-horse- their wings and commissions as second lieu- power relic. With civilian instructors, he tenants on 3 November 1943, and with it the NET ASSESSMENT 93 satisfaction of no longer being referred to as college types in the company, even a Harvard “Mister.” graduate. Fletcher closes his book with a brief descrip- The company commanders were a fascinat- tion of B-17 transition and crew assignment at ing study in contrasts. Easy’s First commander, Roswell Army Airfield, New México, of the Herbert Sobel, was a widely disliked, if not thrill of flying the 55.000-pound Flying hated, martinet who was a master in what Paul Fortress with its four 1,200-horsepower Fussell has termed chickenshit. His pettiness, engines, and of his initiation as a B-17 aircraft demeaning antics, and sheer arrogance created commander. This training apparently pre- an extremely high levei of unnecessary stress pared him well for 35 combat missions in in the company. And yet one of the veterans of Europe, which is the subject of his first book, Easy Company States, "Herbert Sobel made E Fletcher’s Gang. Company.” And many agreed. The command- After reading this book, I was relieved that I ers that led Easy into combat, Dick Winters had earned my wings in 1983 and not 1943, and Ron Speirs, were men that inspired the and that my combat time was earned over weary, the exhausted, the scared, to perform Panama and Southwest Asia and not Nazi- feats that are nothing short of amazing. On D occupied Europe. All US Air Force undergrad- day, with what was in essence little more than uate pilot training students should be issued a reinforced squad, Captain Winters led an this fine book to understand the historical attack against a German firing battery, and its underpinnings of their training, to realize the supporting infantry, that threatened to turn crucial importance of safety and the conse- Utah Beach into a possible bloodbath. The quences of ignoring safety, and to gain an men of Easy Company destroyed the German appreciation of modem technology and flight- force in a truly remarkable feat of arms. The training procedures. performance of Easy Company under Captain Speirs in the Ardennes and later campaigns Capt Phil Bossert, USAF USAF Academy, Colorado was just as impressive. The attack by Easy at Noville may have been one of the outstanding small unit actions of the entire war. Band of Brothers: E Company, 506th Another reason Band of Brothers is an excel- Regiment, lOlst Airborne from Normandy to lent book is the craft and, well, love, that the Hitíer’s Eagle's Nest by Stephen E. Ambrose. author puts into the work. Better known for Simon & Schuster, 1230 Avenue of the his biographies of Eisenhower and Nixon, Américas, New York, New York 10020, 1992, Stephen Ambrose is also a very skilled military 335 pages. historian. He has a fine touch for letting the men and their stories flow from page to page. The saga of a Second World War unit from It is almost as if it were an adventure story its formation to its inactivation is an oft told rather than a military history. Only a small tale. It is a tried-and-true formula that usually handful of similar books accompíish this, produces a bland product with perhaps a dash Charles MacDonald’s Company Commander of spice here and there. Not so with Band of being one of the few that comes immediately to Brothers. Easy Company’s epic is one of the mind. best works on the American soldier in World From its formation in July 1942 at Camp War H. Toccoa, Geórgia, to its inactivation in Áustria Easy Company's story is stirring for many three years later, Easy Company saw the under- reasons, but several stand out from the very belly of the war: the brutality, the destruction, beginning. First, the men themselves. A cast- the senseless random way in which death was ing call could not have produced a better col- dealt out, and the weariness that only warriors lection of characters. These were men of the can know. At fu 11 strength, Easy Company had early days of the airborne—hard men. Their 140 officers and men assigned. Easy left the training was brutal. Of the many thousands battlefields of four campaigns with 48 men that began, only a few hundred remained to dead and over 100 wounded, many wounded wear the silver wings of the airborne. The more than once. Easy jumped into both company was filled by men hardened by the Normandy and Holland. It was part of the Depression and eager for action. Most had “Battling Bastards of Bastion Bastogne.” The only modest educations, but there were some men of Easy Company emerged from the war as 94 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1993 a special breed of men—men that fought with There are few books that can match this epic the “Screaming Eagles” of the lOlst Airborne tale of men, true citizen-soldiers, in combat. Division. In 1945, few units anywhere were as Stephen Ambrose is to be commended for admired as the lOlst Airborne, and Easy was bringing the story of Easy Company to life. It the class of the lOlst. is an exciting, vivid, and moving odyssey of Band of Brothers is more than just an excel- men that were truly a “Band of Brothers.” lent book. It is a superb military history. Maj Hubert D. Capps, US Army Arlington, Virgínia C □ N T T □ R S Gen John A. Shaud U SA f. Retired Steven Metz (BA and MA. IBS. USMA; MS. George Washing- University of South Carolina: PhD, ton University. PhD. Ohio State lohns Hopkins University) is an University), is director of the Air associate professor in the Depart- Force Aid Society. Arlington. ment of Regional and Warfare Lt Col Kimble D. Stohry (BS and Virgínia He retired in July 1991 as Studies. Air War College. Maxwell MS, Purdue University: MMAS. US chief of staff. Supreme Headquarters AFB. Alabama. He has served on Armv Command and General Staff Allied Powers Europe. Mons. the faculties of the US Army College) is a staff officer at Belgium He previously served as Command and General Staff College Headquarters Fifth Allied Tactical commander of the 57th Air Division, and Virginia Polytechnic lnstitute Air Force (NATO). Vicenza. Ilaly. A Minot AFB. North Dakota; of the 92d and State University. Dr Metz’s arti- pilot with more than 3.000 flying Bombardment Wing and 47th Air cles have appeared in Military hours. he has flown 0-2s. OV-lOs, Division. Fairchild AFB. Review. Parameters. Comparative and A-lOs. Colunei Stohry is a grad- Washington: and of Air Training Strategy, Stralegic Review. and uate of Squadron Officer School. Command. Randolph AFB. Texas lournal of Stralegic Studies He is Air Command and Staff College. Cenerai Shaud. who accumuiated the author of Eisenhower as Army Command and General Staff more than 5.600 flying hours as a Strategist: The Coherent Use of College, Army School of Advanced command pilot. also served at Korat Military Power in Peace and War. Military Studies, and Marine Corps Royal Thai AB. Thailand. and Tan Command and Staff College. Son Nhut AB. South Vietnam. General Shaud is a graduate of Squadron Officer School. Air Command and Staff College. and National War College 95 Lt Col Alan Wayne Debban (BS, Michigan State University: MS. Troy State University) is chief, Joint Lt Col Edward Mann (BS. Activities Branch, Technical Plans Capt (ames H. Patton, Jr.. USN, Pepperdine University; MA. Univer- Division, Directorate of Plans. Retired (BS. USNA; MS. University sity of Southern Califórnia) is a Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and of Rhode Island) is president of military doctrine analyst at the Operations, Headquarters USAF. Submarine Tactics and Technology. Airpower Research Institute, Center His previous assignments include Inc.. North Stonington. Connecticut. for Aerospace Doctrine. Research, Air Force research associate at the Captain Patton served seven tours on and Education (CADRE), Maxwell Mershon Center. Ohio State nuclear submarines, including com- AFB. Alabama. Previously, he University. and chief. B-lB mand of the USS Pargo (SSN 650), served as a pilot, instructor pilot, Standardization Evaluation Branch. and was a member of the faculty at flight evaluator. and flight com- Ellsworth AFB, South Dakota. He the Naval War College. He has pub- mander in the KC-135 and EC-135 was in the first group of flight lished articles in Airpower Journal. aircraft; as deputy director of the instructors for the B-lB at Dyess US Naval Institute Proceedings. AFB. Texas. Colonel Debban is a Strategic Air Command Airborne Comparative Strategy. Naval War Command/Control Division, Offutt graduate of Squadron Officer School. College Review. and Aerospace and Air Command and Staff College. and AFB. Nebraska: and as USAF Defense Science. research associate to the Inter- Air VVar College. national Security Studies Program. Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. Tufts University. Medford. Massachusetts. A gradu- ate of Squadron Officer School. Air Command and Staff College, and Air VVar College. Colonel Mann has also written for Army Times and Air Force Times. 96 Tear Out and Remove PLEASE PRINT PLEASE PLEASE PRINT PLEASE FEEL LIKEFEEL SPEAKINGUP? 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Summer Readings • The Leadership Imperativé • Precision Weapons A i t // ,