DOCSLIB.ORG

Anxiety's Ambiguity

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Anxiety's Ambiguity View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by University of Essex Research Repository ANXIETY’S AMBIGUITY VIA KIERKEGAARD & HEIDEGGER Jeffrey Haynes1 PhD Dissertation Department of Philosophy University of Essex October 2015 1 Thank you to Béatrice Han-Pile and Daniel Watts for their helpful conversations and helpful comments on drafts of this dissertation. 2 ABSTRACT This dissertation produces a systematic account of anxiety, and does so by way of interpreting the account of anxiety given to us by Kierkegaard and Heidegger. The methodology of this dissertation is such that it interprets the anxiety in Kierkegaard through Heidegger’s lens, and also interprets the anxiety in Heidegger through Kierkegaard’s lens. By this method this dissertation harmonizes the accounts of anxiety in Kierkegaard and Heidegger, and in this way produces a systematic account of anxiety by way of these two authors. In particular, this dissertation argues that anxiety in both Kierkegaard and Heidegger has a particular structure: that it is ambiguous, which means that it is structurally constituted by an antipathy (a repulsion) and a sympathy (an attraction). In harmonizing Kierkegaard’s and Heidegger’s accounts of anxiety in this way, this dissertation produces a systematic account of ambiguous anxiety. 3 CONTENTS INTRODUCTION. 5 I. Kierkegaard: Anxiety Interpreted Retrogressively . 20 A. Anxiety Rightly Used: The Absurd Telos . 25 APPENDIX. The Psychotic Telos . 45 B. The Dialectic of Sin . 64 C. Anxiety Misused: The Dialectic of Strict Sin . 79 D. Disguised Anxiety . 107 II. Heidegger: Anxiety Interpreted Progressively . 121 A. The Dialectic of Inauthenticity . 124 B. Disguised Anxiety . 133 C. Anxiety Misused: The Dialectic of Strict Inauthenticity . 139 D. Anxiety Rightly Used: The Absurd Telos . 166 APPENDIX. The Psychotic Telos . 186 CONCLUSION. 205 BIBLIOGRAPHY. 214 4 I think [Johann Sebastian Bach] would have been delighted by any sound that was born out of a respect for the necessity, the abstract necessity, of [his] structures2 Glenn Gould 2 Gould G., ‘Glenn Gould discusses his performances of the "Goldberg Variations" with Tim Page (Excerpt)’, in Bach: Goldberg Variations, BWV 988 (1981 Recording) [Expanded Edition] [CD] (Sony Classical/Legacy, 2004); track 32, 20:25 – 20:35. 5 INTRODUCTION The aim of this dissertation is to produce a systematic account of anxiety, and do so by way of interpreting the account of anxiety given to us by two thinkers: Kierkegaard and Heidegger. The method of this dissertation is such that on the one hand I will interpret the concept of anxiety in Kierkegaard through Heidegger’s lens, and on the other hand I will also interpret the concept of anxiety in Heidegger through Kierkegaard’s lens. It is through this double interpretation that I will attempt to produce a systematic account of anxiety. The choice of Kierkegaard and Heidegger here is motivated by the fact that the concept of anxiety is central to these two authors’ major productions. Regarding Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous writings, Haufniensis’ 1844 The Concept of Anxiety3 is, of course, Kierkegaard’s key text regarding anxiety, and yet his other pseudonymous texts revolve around this one in such a way that any full appreciation of Anxiety must be supplemented by the other pseudonymous writings. In approaching Kierkegaard’s concept of anxiety I will approach his pseudonymous writings in this way: I hold Anxiety to be at the core of that pseudonymous oeuvre, and I will use various other pseudonymous writings to supplement Anxiety. Regarding Heidegger’s 1927 Being and Time4, one of the central concepts in that book is the concept of anxiety. Indeed anxiety is literally at the center of that text in that it is the central concept at both the end of ‘Division One’ and the beginning of ‘Division Two’ and thus also marks the divide. Thus I approach Being and Time in this way: I hold that the concept of anxiety is at the core of Being and Time, and I will use the rest of Being and Time, and indeed some of the other writings of Heidegger from around this same period, as supplements. Anxiety is at the heart of Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous oeuvre as well as at the heart of Heidegger’s Being and Time – like that white icicle at the core of Picasso’s last Weeping Woman. And while the concept of anxiety is central to Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous productions as well as Heidegger’s magnum opus, I use these two thinkers in this dissertation to produce a systematic account of anxiety. Again this will be done by way of the method of interpreting the anxiety in Kierkegaard through Heidegger’s lens, and also interpreting the anxiety in Heidegger through Kierkegaard’s lens. Through this method I will produce an interpretation of anxiety in Kierkegaard which harmonizes with my interpretation of anxiety in Heidegger, and my interpretation of anxiety in Heidegger will harmonize 3 Kierkegaard, S., The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Orienting Deliberation on the Dogmatic Issue of Hereditary Sin, trans. R. Thomte and A. B. Anderson (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1980); hereafter Anxiety or CA. Vigilius Haufniensis is the pseudonymous author of this text. 4 Heidegger, M., Being and Time, trans J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson (Harper & Row: New York, 1962); hereafter SZ. References will cite German page numbers. 6 with my interpretation of anxiety in Kierkegaard: in short through my method I will produce a systematic account of anxiety drawing from these two thinkers. * This dissertation has two parts. Part I interprets anxiety in Kierkegaard (that is, Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous oeuvre, using Anxiety as the centrepiece and various other pseudonymous writings as supplements), and part II interprets anxiety in Heidegger (that is, uses the concept of anxiety at the core of Being and Time as the centrepiece, and uses the rest of Being and Time and various other writings of the same period as supplements). But since I am always implicitly interpreting the anxiety in Kierkegaard by way of Heidegger, and vice versa, this means that part I is always implicitly interpreted by way of part II, and part II is always implicitly interpreted by way of part I. In this way a balance between the two parts will be achieved, such that all the central concepts of each part will be mirrored in the other part. But, in accordance with the nature of a mirror image, the movement of each part, as I will now specify, is inverted: for part I has a retrogressive movement, while part II has a progressive movement. Part I interprets anxiety in Kierkegaard, always implicitly by way of Heidegger, and interprets anxiety retrogressively. As I will argue in detail, anxiety, within Kierkegaard’s writings themselves, has a particular structure – anxiety is ambiguous, that is, it has an antipathetic (repulsion) and sympathetic (attraction) aspect. I specify that, in Kierkegaard, there are three different encounters which spirit may have with this ambiguous anxiety, and interlinked with each of these encounters are three different corresponding modes of spirit. For, as I will detail in this part of the dissertation, anxiety can be encountered in such a way that it is manifest – that is, its antipathetic and sympathetic aspects are manifest – and one uses this anxiety as a springboard to perpetually spring into the mode of spirit called faith; anxiety can be encountered in such a way that it is manifest – its antipathetic and sympathetic aspects are manifest – and yet one uses this anxiety as a springboard to perpetually spring into the mode of spirit called sin; and finally anxiety can be encountered in the mode of spirit called spiritlessness such that anxiety does not show itself as it is, but shows itself in a heavily disguised form – and here the disguise is such that the sympathetic aspect is completely covered over while the antipathetic aspect partially shows itself. Now, in order to give a detailed interpretation of anxiety in Kierkegaard, I hold that we must track the movement through the three encounters of anxiety, showing how each encounter is related to the next. Haufniensis tells us that when anxiety is encountered such that it gives rise to faith, this is ‘anxiety rightly used’, and thus this encounter is the telos which one ought to achieve. Thus when I say that part I interprets anxiety retrogressively, this means that we will track the movement through the three encounters of anxiety by first dealing with manifest ambiguous anxiety rightly used which gives rise 7 to faith, then dealing with manifest ambiguous anxiety misused which gives rise to sin, and finally dealing with ambiguous anxiety as it shows up in spiritlessness in disguise – and in proceeding retrogressively in this manner, I detail how each encounter is related to the next. Part I tracks the retrogressive movement through anxiety: a repulsion away-from the telos. Part II interprets anxiety in Heidegger, always implicitly by way of Kierkegaard, and interprets anxiety progressively. As I will argue in detail, anxiety, within Heidegger’s writings themselves, has a particular structure – anxiety is ambiguous, that is, it has an antipathetic (repulsion) and sympathetic (attraction) aspect. I specify that for Heidegger there are three different encounters which Dasein may have with this ambiguous anxiety, and interlinked with each of these different encounters is a different corresponding mode of existence. For, as I will detail in this part of the dissertation, anxiety can be encountered
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Making a Difference: Academic Pathologies and the Anxieties of Knowing
    MAKING A DIFFERENCE: ACADEMIC PATHOLOGIES AND THE ANXIETIES OF KNOWING Professor Michael A. Peters An inaugural professorial lecture MAKING A DIFFERENCE: ACADEMIC PATHOLOGIES AnD THE Anxieties Of knOwInG Michael A. Peters first published in 2013 wilf Malcolm Institute of Educational Research faculty of Education The University of waikato Private Bag 3105 Hamilton, 3240 new Zealand http://www.waikato.ac.nz/wmier/ ISBn 978-0-9922497-1-7 © wilf Malcolm Institute of Educational Research All rights reserved. no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior permission of the copyright owner. Printed by waikato Print, Hamilton, new Zealand Wilf Malcolm Institute of Educational Research, Faculty of Education, The University of Waikato MAKING A DIFFERENCE: ACADEMIC PATHOLOGIES AnD THE Anxieties Of knOwInG Michael A. Peters Professor of Education Based on an Inaugural Professorial Lecture delivered at the University of Waikato, Hamilton, New Zealand on 26 March 2013. Michael A. Peters Michael A. Peters, Professor of Education, has written dozens of books and hundreds of papers and chapters on education, philosophy and politics but one paper has evaded him for the past decade. In his inaugural lecture, Professor Peters pursues this illusive paper, theorising the concept of “academic pathologies” and examining what he calls the “anxiety of knowing”. During the lecture, he draws upon the work of Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard, widely considered one of the foundational thinkers of existentialism, the American film-maker Woody Allen and Jacques Derrida, among other thinkers, to talk about the culture of the academic self.
    [Show full text]
  • The Philosophy of Anxiety
    Trinity College Trinity College Digital Repository Senior Theses and Projects Student Scholarship Spring 2013 The Philosophy of Anxiety Julie B. Daniels Trinity College, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalrepository.trincoll.edu/theses Part of the Other Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Daniels, Julie B., "The Philosophy of Anxiety". Senior Theses, Trinity College, Hartford, CT 2013. Trinity College Digital Repository, https://digitalrepository.trincoll.edu/theses/333 THE PHILOSOPHY OF ANXIETY By Julie Daniels A Thesis Submitted to the Department of Philosophy of Trinity College in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Bachelor of Arts Degree May 3, 2013 1 Table of Contents Intentions 4 Part One: The Fundamental Project I. What is Dasein? 10 II. What is Dasein’s Project? 12 III. The Private Sphere 14 IV. The Other 21 Part Two: Anxiety as Attunement I. Primacy and Repetition 25 II. Anxiety as Dizziness 35 Part Three: The Philosopher and the Psychiatrist I. Medard Boss on Liberation 42 II. Leslie H. Farber on WilL 44 III. The Opposite of Anxiety 48 2 “That anxiety makes its appearance is the pivot upon which everything turns.” -Søren Kierkegaard 3 Intentions Anxiety has been a constituent of my being since I was a LittLe girL. Before I began the study of phiLosophy, my moments of panic were exacerbated by my inabiLity to articuLate the overwheLming sensations and emotions brought about by anxiety. I feLt compLeteLy aLone; as my anxiety increased, so too did the space between myseLf and others. No one talks about anxiety, and in the instances I attempted to describe to those around me what was happening ‘inside me’, it seemed no one couLd reLate.
    [Show full text]
  • The Concept of Anxiety
    THE eONCEPI' OF ANXIETY KIERKEGAARO'S WRITINGS, VIII THE CONCEPT OF ANXIETY A SIMPLE PSYCHOLOGICALLY ORIENTING DELIBERATION ON THE DOGMATIC ISSUE OF HEREDITARY SIN by S0ren Kierkegaard Edited and Translated with Introduction and Notes by Reidar Thomte in collaboration with Albert B. Anderson PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY Copyriglll 0 19'0., Pti.rcrt<ltl UNill'mi1l Pms P,,6lislld 6y P,I_""I Unillmity Pms, Ptii_1, twwJmq I" ~ Uoild Kh~; Pti"CttQfl Uni"tlSity Prm, Oridttlln, Wm s.us<'X AI1R,jp~4 "'"6Nq sfConpu C'''''CfI''I-iQ·N/bMII o"w KH'*'t-d, S#frq A.6~, fIIJ.IIH. ~tI1M«pI sf·n:My· T III1IIl.IIion rf &J1ric1 AlIFf. Bib~y;,. IndJtJn Inia. 1. $1'11, OftgiMl. 2.~, Rdft/oIu. J. AMiny. I. 'lktmlr, RdtL.,. It. AnMrHtI, AIMf, 192'. 1tI. Trtlt. 81720.KS2 19'0 2JJ'.14 19·J217 ISBN ()'691·07244-2 ISBN ()'69t.fJ20tt.6 (pWt.) E4i~1 ,""",WI sf /his ""'" IIIIf MIl MJisId 6y • gNlltfrom ""'IIm.. ~, 'fiwIr,,141 btllffo J«ifty.... 111 ~/9""1U" III ,\1iIUlNp"b'/, Mi'/ltnOf4 P'II,,«1OIl tMvmity Pms ....,., 'If prilirH Dol «i4:fm p4ptr ""I _I tht ,1IlU611tffor ptmW_ ..rJ 41U11W1i'1 sf ~ Commiu« OIl I'tH1'lIi<IH CwiMlilltJ for &.lit Lorlftlllty sf iht COIIIItll "" "''''Nq RntHIIW 18 19 20 ISlIN·IJ: 978·0·69]·0201 1·2 jpbk. ) CONTENTS HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION Vll The Concept of Anxiety 1 PREFACE 7 INTRODUCTION 9 Anxiety as the Presupposition of Hereditary Sin and as Explaining Hereditary Sin Retrogressively in Terms of Its Origin 25 1. HISTORICAL INTIMATIONS REGARDING THE CONCEPT OF HEREDITARY SIN 25 2.
    [Show full text]
  • Yasemin AKIS YAMAN, Ph.D. Curriculum Vitae
    Yasemin AKIŞ YAMAN, Ph.D. Curriculum Vitae Villanova University Phone: 215-512-7826 Department of Theology and Religious Studies e-mail:[email protected] Villanova, PA, 19085 Areas of Specialization Søren Kierkegaard, Existentialism, Philosophy and Religion. Areas of Competence Philosophy and Literature, Philosophy and Cinema, Rumi, Albert Camus. Education Ph.D. Mugla Sıtkı Kocman University 2007-2014 Philosophy Dissertation: The Concept of Anxiety in Søren Kierkegaard M.A. Mugla Sıtkı Kocman University 2005-2007 Philosophy Thesis: The Concept of ‘Absurd’ in Albert Camus and Jean-Paul Sartre. B.A. Mugla Sıtkı Kocman University 2001-2005 Philosophy Academic Appointments Faculty Villanova University 2016-…. Head of Philosophy Mehmet Akif Ersoy University 2015- 2017 Department Assistant Professor Mehmet Akif Ersoy University 2014- 2017 Research Assistant Mugla Sıtkı Kocman University 2009- 2014 Guest Editor Özne Philosophy Journal, Fall/ 2016 Kierkegaard Special Issue Co- Editor Özne Philosophy Journal, Spring/ 2013 Philosophy and Feminism Special Issue Summer Scholar Howard and Edna Hong Kierkegaard Library, 2015 St. Olaf College (USA) Summer Scholar Howard and Edna Hong Kierkegaard Library, 2014 St. Olaf College (USA) Visiting Scholar Southern Illinois University (USA) 2010- 2011 Publications -Book 1. Søren Kierkegard’da Kaygı Kavramı (The Concept of Anxiety in Søren Kierkegaard), Ayrıntı Yayınları, Istanbul: 2015, ISBN 978-975-539-972-0 -Book Sections 1. Suicide; The Existential Crisis of the Man, ACTA KIERKEGARDIANA supplement 6 (2016), KIERKEGAARD CIRCLE, TRINITY COLLEGE, UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO., ISBN: 978-0-9878168-4-9. 2. Freedom, Anxiety and Sin: Kierkegaard and the Temporal Progression of Experience, Inter-Disciplinary Press, 2014, ISBN: 978-1-84888-233-1. 3.
    [Show full text]
  • Download Preprint
    The Rabbit and the Mountain Lion: Anxiety and its Opposite Stuart T. Doyle [email protected] Is it not intrinsic to the nature of the male, beasts as well as men, to fight and to contend? It’s what we were born to do, it’s in our blood. −Steven Pressfield, Gates of Fire The Question What is the opposite of anxiety? The facile answer would be that calmness or tranquility is the opposite of anxiety. That answer is true in a sense, but calmness is mostly just the absence of anxiety. Some opposites are vacuous, merely absences; cold is technically just an absence of its opposite, heat. There is however another kind of opposite; a substantive opposite. For example the opposite of a friend is a foe. A foe is its own sort of entity, not just the absence of a friend. So what is the substantive opposite of anxiety, and what does it do? What does it’s existence imply for the practice of psychiatry and the study of psychology? A starting point for finding the answer is to look more closely at what anxiety is. There are multiple ways to conceptualize anxiety, but for now consider the ethological paradigm in the study of fear and anxiety. This perspective contextualizes fear and anxiety as systems that humans and animals use to defend against threats (Mobbs et al, 2015, p. 1). In short, the answer to ‘what is anxiety’ is answered by shifting the question to ‘why is anxiety.’ Ethologically 1 speaking, anxiety is the physiological, cognitive, and behavioral state which in the past, has made humans and animals ready to deal with potential dangers in the future.
    [Show full text]
  • Missed Appropriations: Uncovering Heidegger's Debt to Kierkegaard in Being and Time
    University of Denver Digital Commons @ DU Electronic Theses and Dissertations Graduate Studies 1-1-2016 Missed Appropriations: Uncovering Heidegger's Debt to Kierkegaard in Being and Time Kenneth David Geter University of Denver Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/etd Part of the Continental Philosophy Commons, and the Metaphysics Commons Recommended Citation Geter, Kenneth David, "Missed Appropriations: Uncovering Heidegger's Debt to Kierkegaard in Being and Time" (2016). Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 1195. https://digitalcommons.du.edu/etd/1195 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate Studies at Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact [email protected],[email protected]. MISSED APPROPRIATIONS: UNCOVERING HEIDEGGER’S DEBT TO KIERKEGAARD IN BEING AND TIME A Dissertation Presented to the Faculty of the University of Denver and the Iliff School of Theology Joint PhD Program University of Denver In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy by Kenneth D. Geter August 2016 Advisor: Jere O’Neill Surber ©Copyright by Kenneth D. Geter 2016 All Rights Reserved Author: Kenneth D. Geter Title: MISSED APPROPRIATIONS: UNCOVERING HEIDEGGER’S DEBT TO KIERKEGAARD IN BEING AND TIME Advisor: Jere O’Neill Surber Degree Date: August 2016 Abstract It is widely held that Martin Heidegger appropriated several existential concepts from Søren Kierkegaard in his 1927 work, Being and Time. Most scholars agree that Heidegger did not sufficiently credit Kierkegaard. What was the extent of the appropriation, and why did Heidegger not duly cite Kierkegaard? This work will focus on the concept of anxiety which appears throughout Being and Time and which was influenced by the concept of the same name presented in Kierkegaard’s 1844 work The Concept of Anxiety.
    [Show full text]
  • “How Do We Understand Anxiety? a Heideggerian Approach to Modern
    “How do we understand anxiety? A Heideggerian approach to modern psychiatry”. Examination number: 9876603 MSc in Philosophy The University of Edinburgh 2009 1 Exam no: 9876603 I have read and understood the University of Edinburgh’s guidelines on plagiarism and declare that this dissertation is all my own work except where I indicate otherwise by proper use of quotes and references. Name: Siobhan M. Mowat Exam Number: 9876603 Signed: Date: 2 Exam no: 9876603 Abstract. The aim of this dissertation is to critically engage with anxiety on a psychiatric level, to develop an understanding of its role as a symptom of mental ill-health as it compares with the Heideggerian concept of intrinsic meaning within anxiety, and to then proceed to a discussion of the potential for an amalgamated view that ultimately best serves the interests of the individual. Psychiatry often dismisses anxiety as a potentially dangerous and undesirable interruption of one’s everyday life; I shall demonstrate, through the philosophy of Heidegger, that this is precisely why it holds higher meaning and significance for Dasein , as an opening up of man’s inherent potentiality for authentic human existence. The final stage will be a direct comparison of the two approaches, examining the implications that they have for the future position of psychiatry in society, particularly in terms of individual self-awareness. What is the role of psychiatry now and is this the role that it should take? How does psychiatry’s neglect of the higher meaning in anxiety affect the doctor-patient relationship? Is there any aspect of anxiety that Heidegger’s theory in fact neglects? And most importantly, is there scope for a Heideggerian approach to mental health that incorporates both the ontological and the ontic experiences of Dasein in anxiety? 3 Exam no: 9876603 Contents.
    [Show full text]
  • Despair As Eternal Damnation of the Self: a Biblical Anthropology in Outline
    European Journal of Science and Theology, June 2017, Vol.13, No.3, 163-173 _______________________________________________________________________ DESPAIR AS ETERNAL DAMNATION OF THE SELF A BIBLICAL ANTHROPOLOGY IN OUTLINE Igor Tavilla* University of Parma, Dipartimento A.L.E.F., Via M. D’Azeglio 85, Parma, Italy (Received 10 February 2017, revised 6 March 2017) Abstract The Bible had deeply influenced Kierkegaard‟s anthropological view. In „The Concept of Anxiety‟ (1844) and in „The Sickness unto Death‟ (1849), he developed an original „psychology of faith‟, focusing on anxiety and despair, as strictly related to the dogmatic concepts of sin and atonement. The aim of this paper is to investigate the biblical framework of Kierkegaard‟s anthropology, in order to enhance the grasp of the concept of despair. From its definition as „sickness unto death‟, despair comes to indicate the eternal damnation, as the perpetual dying of the self, caused by sin. According to anti-Climacus despair consists in fact in the missrelation between the self and the Power that established it. Also Vigilius Haufninesis incidentally refers to despair as he talks about „the punishment of eternal destruction and exclusion from the presence of the Lord‟ (2 Thessalonians 1.9). Lexical evidences and biblical quotations clarify the close connection both between despair (Fortvivlelse) and doubt (Tvivl) and between doubt and offense (Forargelse). Finally, it is possible to recognize in „despair as weakness‟ and in „despair as defiance‟ two different types of „pertinax dubitatio‟. Keywords: despair, damnation, doubt, offense, Bible 1. Introduction Biblical references play a fundamental role in Kierkegaard‟s anthropological view. As a good example of psychological reflection attaching itself to the Bible, Vigilius Haufniensis refers to Usteri‟s explanation of the fall.
    [Show full text]
  • Leap of Faith in Leap Beyond
    2020 THESIS Leap of Faith in Leap Beyond An artistic-pedagogical enquiry: How do I as an art pedagogue implement ideas of ‘Leap of Faith’ in a rehearsal process for a performance? V ERN A L A I N E MASTER’S DEGREE PROGRAMME IN THEATRE PEDAGOGY ABSTRACT DATE: AUTHOR MASTER’S OR OTHER DEGREE PROGRAMME Verna Laine Master’s Degree Programme in Theatre Pedagogy NUMBER OF PAGES + APPENDICES IN THE WRITTEN TITLE OF THE WRITTEN SECTION/THESIS SECTION Leap of Faith in Leap Beyond 45 pages + 3 pages of appendices TITLE OF THE ARTISTIC/ ARTISTIC AND PEDAGOGICAL SECTION Leap Beyond (by Humppila, Laine, Lehtonen). Premiere 04/03/2020 at 7pm in Teatterisali, Theatre Academy The artistic section is produced by the Theatre Academy. The artistic section is not produced by the Theatre Academy (copyright issues have been resolved). No record exists of the artistic section. The final project can be published The abstract of the final project can be Yes Yes online. This permission is granted for published online. This permission is an unlimited duration. No granted for an unlimited duration. No In this thesis the author introduces a concept (leap of faith) and traces back its practical application as an artistic-pedagogical premise and method in the making of a performance (Leap Beyond). The central concept and the concepts surrounding it have been explored by the author previously in another artistic research context (wherein the author theorised a possible approach to actor movement training based on the concept of a leap of faith) and have been expanded and explored further in this thesis.
    [Show full text]
  • Existential Scrooge: a Kierkegaardian Reading of a Christmas Carol Shale Preston* Macquarie University
    Literature Compass 9/11 (2012): 743–751, 10.1111/j.1741-4113.2012.00909.x Existential Scrooge: A Kierkegaardian Reading of A Christmas Carol Shale Preston* Macquarie University Abstract This article examines Charles Dickens’s A Christmas Carol (1843) through the lens of Søren Kier- kegaard’s philosophical concept of anxiety. Owing to its enduring popularity, A Christmas Carol rarely elicits rigorous explication, much less philosophical exegesis. This critical blind spot, how- ever, should not prevent those interested in establishing a nexus between literature and philosophy from examining it as a serious and important artefact within the history of ideas. A Christmas Carol is indeed historically important, so much so that it may have influenced or even inspired Søren Kierkegaard’s The Concept of Anxiety (1844). This work, published on 17 June 1844, put forward the nature of anxiety and explored the ways in which it became manifest. For Kierkegaard, anxi- ety must precede the qualitative leap of faith which is freedom. Indeed, it is only through anxiety that the self can come to understand its relation between the finite and the infinite, the temporal and the eternal. A seminal existential text, it influenced a range of thinkers including Heidegger, Sartre, Jaspers and Tillich. It is timely, however, to propose that one of the key concepts of anxi- ety that Kierkegaard expounds in this extraordinary work, that of ‘the demonic’ or neurotic indi- vidual, was actually anticipated 6 months earlier, in the fictional form of Ebenezer Scrooge, in Charles Dickens’s widely published and translated popular masterpiece, A Christmas Carol.
    [Show full text]
  • The Actual Author of This Dissertation
    Henrik Jøker Bjerre The Actual Author of This Dissertation Groucho Marx once told an audience that before he would begin to speak, he had something important to say. On the face of it, this decla- ration describes rather precisely what it means to write a preface: You state some introductory or clarifying remarks before moving on to the actual subject at hand. Groucho’s expression has a certain comical efect, however, because it also postulates a rather paradoxical ability: being able to “say” something before, and thus without, “speaking”, as if there is a saying that is somehow qualitatively diferent from speak- ing. But how can you say anything without speaking? By miming it? And what does it mean for that which follows? Is speaking somehow less than saying something, or, on the contrary, the only case where anything really gets across at all? A preface contains a similarly asymmetric relation to the text it intro- duces. It states something that is not really part of the text itself, but has to be stated before the actual writing begins. Sometimes, a pref- ace can solemnly summarize a work’s world-historical signifcance, like when Wittgenstein in the preface of the Tractatus claimed to have “solved the problems of philosophy and shown how little was thereby 131 accomplished”1. At other times, it is the preface which is profane or immaterial, giving only dull information about the bureaucratic con- ditions of the appearance of the text. In any case, the expression “before I speak, I have something import- ant to say” shows something about an urgency of getting the opening right, of approaching the text in the right manner.
    [Show full text]
  • Age of Anxiety STUDYING EXISTENTIALISM OFFERS INSIGHTS INTO the MODERN ERA
    THE COMPLEAT MUSICIAN These days, in many places, anxiety fits the mood. It is credited or blamed for disturbing, even surreal, turns of events. All over the world, people are voting, literally or figuratively, to reject something and risk something else. Age of Anxiety STUDYING EXISTENTIALISM OFFERS INSIGHTS INTO THE MODERN ERA. BY JAMES MOYER The Concept of Anxiety was the strikingly modern title that the 19th-century Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard gave to one of his books. Kierkegaard faces this unpleasant emotion and makes it central to his view of human freedom. Anxiety is as old as humanity, but the book seems also to imply that anxiety is modern, and that more and more people will feel it, if not face it. These days, in many places, anxiety fits the mood. It is credited or blamed Above: James Moyer PHOTO: PETE CHECCHIA for disturbing, even surreal, turns of events. All over the world, people are voting, literally Top left: Søren Kierkegaard, Martin Heidegger, or figuratively, to reject something and risk something else. and Jean-Paul Sartre are among the authors of existentialism covered in a course offered last fall. Curtis students may be rather insulated from such events, and are aware of their PHOTO OF HEIDEGGER: LANDESARCHIV BADEN-WÜRTTENBERG insulation—which makes them not so insulated, after all. “My being is highly conflicted,” ARCHIVES writes one of my students. “At Curtis, we are extremely shielded in comfort, and what is happening in the ‘real world’ seems not to happen to us.” Kierkegaard’s analysis of anxiety is so trenchant and enduring because of the use he says we should make of it.
    [Show full text]