DOCSLIB.ORG

Dread According to Kierkegaard Mark H Stone* Aurora University, Aurora, IL, USA

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Dread According to Kierkegaard Mark H Stone* Aurora University, Aurora, IL, USA ISSN: 2572-4037 Stone. Int J Psychol Psychoanal 2017, 3:018 DOI: 10.23937/2572-4037.1510018 Volume 3 | Issue 1 International Journal of Open Access Psychology and Psychoanalysis REVIEW ARTICLE Dread According to Kierkegaard Mark H Stone* Aurora University, Aurora, IL, USA *Corresponding author: Mark H Stone, Aurora University, Aurora, IL, USA, Tel: 6305547250, Fax: 6305547260, E-mail: [email protected] with in psychology, and I must therefore call atten- Abstract tion to the fact that it is different from fear and An explication of Kierkegaard’s concept of dread provides similar concepts which refer to something definite, insight into the life and mind of one of the first existentialists noted for giving particular attention to the subjective individ- whereas dread is freedom’s reality as possibility ual. His view of dread shows it to be much deeper and more for possibility. complex than anxiety by invoking an awesome expanse of freedom and possibility. This awesomeness is frequently an The cryptic remark, “freedom’s reality as possibility overwhelming state of being contrasted to becoming and for possibility”, is common to Kierkegaard’s style how- further still to the eternity of non-being. These terms became ever confusing it appears upon first reading. the essential topics of later existentialist writers. Selected quotations from Kierkegaard show him to be insightful about Anxiety is commonly associated with a matter of the human psyche and unafraid to expose his personal concern; some problem or fear perplexing the individu- thoughts and feelings to public view. Kierkegaard’s irony, al. By contrast, dread, according to Kierkegaard, invokes satire, and disjointed method of communication hinder an “awesome freedom” by way of anticipating some yet to initial reading until his unique style of expression becomes clearer to the reader. Successive reading shows Kierkeg- occur experience hanging over a person in such a way aard to be a dutiful student of Socrates, his literary mentor. as to possibly cloud the mind by impeding perception, thought, and action. Sullivan [5] explained, “Dread is Keywords far more than the purely conversational sense… It is a Dread, The individual, The crowd, Qualitative leap, Soul, sort of shuddery, not-of-this-world component, a curi- Socrates ous survival from a very emotional experience”. Sullivan considered the role of dread be carefully differentiated Introduction from all other manifestations of anxiety. The Danish noun “angst” is defined in the Ordbog of Imagine a long period of incessantly dreary, rain- th Vinterberg & Herløv (5 edn) [1] to be “dread, apprehen- soaked days that seemingly never end producing a de- sion, fear” given in that exact order. Therefore, angst, as bilitating effect upon ones’ physical and mental state. used by Kierkegaard, should be defined as dread. Lowrie Such a state acts as a heavy weight; an enormous ball [2] correctly translates angst in the title of Kierkegaard’s and chain attached securely to the neck causing the book as The Concept of Dread. Lowrie [2] further adds, head to hang low incapacitating all thought, feeling and “We have no [English] word which adequately trans- action. lates Angst”. Thomte [3] chooses to use anxiety in the Stolorow, et al. [6] relate a case study that describes title of his edition of the text, which I believe leads the the influence of dread: reader astray. That is because American usage of angst misses the mark of the concept that Kierkegaard wants Steven began treatment with a vague and gener- to describe. Kierkegaard [4] himself explains, alized sense of doom and a pervasive fear . His fears centered generally on his dread of becoming One almost never sees the concept dread dealt depressed, which he associated with a loss of con- Citation: Stone MH (2017) Dread According to Kierkegaard. Int J Psychol Psychoanal 3:018. doi. org/10.23937/2572-4037.1510018 Received: February 17, 2016: Accepted: May 18, 2017: Published: May 20, 2017 Copyright: © 2017 Stone MH. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited. Stone. Int J Psychol Psychoanal 2017, 3:018 • Page 1 of 8 • DOI: 10.23937/2572-4037.1510018 ISSN: 2572-4037 trol over his mind and body . Steven’s early life died November 4, 1855, in Kjøbenhavn (Copenhagen), was punctuated by pervasive feelings of loneliness or Merchant’s Harbor, Denmark at age 42. Kierkegaard and emotional isolation, his dread of feeling and has earned renown as an existentialist. Friedman [9]) depressive affects. considered him “The real founder of the philosophy of existence by his emphasis upon the existential subject”. The authors go on to describe the devastating effects that Steven’s dread produces. Their continuing use of A religious existentialist is how other philosophers “dread” seems clearly appropriate to describe how per- classify him along with such writers as Buber, Rosenz- vasive Steven’s condition had become, and showing weig, Berdyaev, Marcel, and Tillich. His use of religious how dread dominated his psyche. terms and emphasis upon a critique of Christianity turns some people away from considering what he has to say. For Kierkegaard, dread is first manifest as an antic- Kierkegaard ironically deemed himself a missionary to ipatory state. Dread in this sense impairs not just the Christians. recollection of past matters as does fear; dread pro- duces a sense of being overwhelmed together with an Always an excellent student, Kierkegaard earned ominous foreboding that entangles the individual thus special recognition for his studies in History, Latin, preventing progress in any activity. Such dread is over- Greek, and Hebrew. He was a student of philosophy and whelming. It appears somewhat similar to agoraphobia religion in Berlin before submitting his dissertation On when, for example, a person suddenly becomes over- the concept of irony with particular reference to Soc- whelmed upon entering a “big-box” store; accosted by rates in 1841 [10] to the University of Copenhagen. Ki- the blinding lights and bedazzled by all the seemingly erkegaard’s own classification of writings designated his endless possibilities. early works to be aesthetic/philosophical culminating in Concluding Unscientific Postscript [11]. His religious Fear, by contrast, usually concerns some object, cir- writings followed this major publication.The Concept of cumstance, or creature. These fears are usually focused Dread [4] belongs to the earlier philosophical category. and situational. We might fear snakes, but absent from our immediate environment, such fear is minimized. Kierkegaard reported a happy childhood albeit Other fears are internal and may appear similar to strongly influenced by his father’s deep mournfulness dread. Stone [7] found people’s reported fears to be and religiosity. Kierkegaard’s own disposition to melan- either situational, based on specific external fears, or choly was attributed to his father whom he described as internalized ones. Absent a height producing a scaring “the most melancholy man I have known”. Kierkegaard feeling, there remains only the remembrance of a fear writes [12], of heights. By contrast, fearing embarrassed by the an- In the two ages of immediacy (childhood and ticipation of some public performance shows this form youth), with the dexterity reflection always pos- of fear to be more in line with dread. It might be con- sesses, I helped myself out, as I was compelled cluded that probably all fear emanates from within. to do, with some sort of counterfeit, and not be- Nevertheless, dread remains the best word to convey ing quite sure of myself and the talents bestowed and distinguish Kierkegaard’s Danish word “angst” used upon me, I suffered the pain of not being like the to connote an ominous forebodingness distinguishable others - which naturally at that period I would have from anxiety and fear. given everything to be able to be, if only for a short Kierkegaard in his Journal [8] writes, time. Dread is a desire for what one dreads, a sympa- Kierkegaard was lanky and ungainly in his move- thetic antipathy. Dread is an alien power, which ments suffering the torments of his schoolmates. His lays hold of an individual, and yet one cannot fear quick wit and intelligence served as an antidote to this oneself away, nor has a will to do so; for one fears cruelty, and his verbal retorts became a longstanding what one fears one desires. Dread then makes the hallmark of his behavior. With trades people he was individual impotent. kind and conversant. By contrast, his verbal retorts to critics were well-known. Kierkegaard met numerous This potent statement is typical for Kierkegaard. He times for long conversations with the Danish King who sometimes uses the same two words in opposition, apparently enjoyed these talks and desired even more comparing and contrasting his ideas and feelings in stark conversations. contrast to one another, and often expressing these words in ways that catch our attention. Understanding By 1834, Kierkegaard’s father had lost his wife and Kierkegaard requires more thought than first garnered three children to early deaths; only Peter the eldest (29) from an initial reading. His troubled syntax was noted by and Søren (21) the youngest were still living at this time. all his translators, and it perplexes us as well. Peter destined to enter the clergy regarded his young- Søren kierkegaard er brother Søren as the prodigal son. They were never close. From his twenties onward Kierkegaard alternated Søren Aabye Kierkegaard was born May 5, 1813, and between maniacal exaltation and depression, exhibiting Stone. Int J Psychol Psychoanal 2017, 3:018 • Page 2 of 8 • DOI: 10.23937/2572-4037.1510018 ISSN: 2572-4037 what we might diagnose today as a bipolar condition.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Robert R. Cook S~Ren Kierkegaard
    EQ 87:4 (1987), 311-327 Robert R. Cook S~ren Kierkegaard: Missionary to Christendom It was, we understand, Professor Gordon Rupp who coined the usejUl word 'rebunk' to denote a more positive activity than the much more common practice of 'debunking' ideas and people. Mr Cook, a teapher at the Scott Theological College in Kenya, offers an essay which falls into this helpful category of showing us what we may learn from a figure who has not always been appreciated by evangelical Christians. I. A Reappraisal Evangelicals have tended to be very wary of Kierkegaard. His profound influence on the early Barth is well known and the consequent Neo-Orthodox obsessions with God as utterly trans­ cendent and revelation as irrational and non-propositional have been profoundly regretted. Similarly Bultmann's lamentable disinterest in the Jesus of history can clearly be traced back to Kierkegaard,1 In fact a wide variety of modernist themes are embryonically present in lesser known strands of his thought. For example, does not the following sound like an extract from a Tillich sermon?: '.. while the jesting phrase winds its way drolly through the rest of the conversation, the speaker may privately have a rendezvous with the deity, who is present as soon as the uncertainty of all things is thought infinitely.'2 Or when Kierkegaard asserts that the sincere idol worshipper is enjoying a relationship with the living God for ' ... if only the mode of this relationshp is in the truth, the individual is in the truth even if it should happen to be thus related to what is not true',3 he is surely an unwitting precursor of such religious pluralists asJ.
    [Show full text]
  • Kierkegaard on Selfhood and Our Need for Others
    Kierkegaard on Selfhood and Our Need for Others 1. Kierkegaard in a Secular Age Scholars have devoted much attention lately to Kierkegaard’s views on personal identity and, in particular, to his account of selfhood.1 Central to this account is the idea that a self is not something we automatically are. It is rather something we must become. Thus, selfhood is a goal to realize or a project to undertake.2 To put the point another way, while we may already be selves in some sense, we have to work to become real, true, or “authentic” selves.3 The idea that authentic selfhood is a project is not unique to Kierkegaard. It is common fare in modern philosophy. Yet Kierkegaard distances himself from popular ways of thinking about the matter. He denies the view inherited from Rousseau that we can discover our true selves by consulting our innermost feelings, beliefs, and desires. He also rejects the idea developed by the German Romantics that we can invent our true selves in a burst of artistic or poetic creativity. In fact, according to Kierkegaard, becom- ing an authentic self is not something we can do on our own. If we are to succeed at the project, we must look beyond ourselves for assistance. In particular, Kierkegaard thinks, we must rely on God. For God alone can provide us with the content of our real identi- ties.4 A longstanding concern about Kierkegaard arises at this point. His account of au- thentic selfhood, like his accounts of so many concepts, is religious.
    [Show full text]
  • Søren Kierkegaard's View of Faith Found in Fear And
    SØREN KIERKEGAARD’S VIEW OF FAITH FOUND IN FEAR AND TREMBLING AND PRACTICE IN CHRISTIANITY David Pulliam Submitted to the faculty of the University Graduate School in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Master of Arts in the Department of Philosophy Indiana University September 2016 ii Accepted by the Graduate Faculty, Indiana University, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts. Master’s Thesis Committee __________________________________ Dr. Samuel J.M. Khan, PhD __________________________________ Dr. Cornelis de Waal, PhD __________________________________ Dr. David Pfeifer, PhD iii David Pulliam Søren Kierkegaard’s view of Faith found in Fear and Trembling and Practice in Christianity In this paper I discuss two key works written by Søren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling and Practice in Christianity, under the pseudonyms Johannes de Silentio and Anti-Climacus respectively. I focus on three questions: what is Johannes view of faith, what is Anti-Climacus’ view of faith and how are these Kierkegaard’s conclusions? I argue that stemming from Johannes’ and Anti-Climacus’ points of view, Kierkegaard’s view of faith is the aligning of the self in a trusting relationship with the God-man. One outside of faith can perceive faith to be a paradox or find faith offensive; one must have faith to avoid offense and overcome the paradox. Chapter 1 focuses on the connection between Kierkegaard and his pseudonyms using his work The Point of View. In this chapter I map out Kierkegaard’s method of communication and the purpose for his use of pseudonyms. Chapter 2 focuses on Johannes’ view of faith in Fear and Trembling.
    [Show full text]
  • Making a Difference: Academic Pathologies and the Anxieties of Knowing
    MAKING A DIFFERENCE: ACADEMIC PATHOLOGIES AND THE ANXIETIES OF KNOWING Professor Michael A. Peters An inaugural professorial lecture MAKING A DIFFERENCE: ACADEMIC PATHOLOGIES AnD THE Anxieties Of knOwInG Michael A. Peters first published in 2013 wilf Malcolm Institute of Educational Research faculty of Education The University of waikato Private Bag 3105 Hamilton, 3240 new Zealand http://www.waikato.ac.nz/wmier/ ISBn 978-0-9922497-1-7 © wilf Malcolm Institute of Educational Research All rights reserved. no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior permission of the copyright owner. Printed by waikato Print, Hamilton, new Zealand Wilf Malcolm Institute of Educational Research, Faculty of Education, The University of Waikato MAKING A DIFFERENCE: ACADEMIC PATHOLOGIES AnD THE Anxieties Of knOwInG Michael A. Peters Professor of Education Based on an Inaugural Professorial Lecture delivered at the University of Waikato, Hamilton, New Zealand on 26 March 2013. Michael A. Peters Michael A. Peters, Professor of Education, has written dozens of books and hundreds of papers and chapters on education, philosophy and politics but one paper has evaded him for the past decade. In his inaugural lecture, Professor Peters pursues this illusive paper, theorising the concept of “academic pathologies” and examining what he calls the “anxiety of knowing”. During the lecture, he draws upon the work of Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard, widely considered one of the foundational thinkers of existentialism, the American film-maker Woody Allen and Jacques Derrida, among other thinkers, to talk about the culture of the academic self.
    [Show full text]
  • "A Human Being's Highest Perfection": the Grammar and Vocabulary of Virtue in Kierkegaard's Upbuilding Discourses
    Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers Volume 33 Issue 3 Article 4 7-1-2016 "A Human Being's Highest Perfection": The Grammar and Vocabulary of Virtue in Kierkegaard's Upbuilding Discourses Pieter H. Vos Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy Recommended Citation Vos, Pieter H. (2016) ""A Human Being's Highest Perfection": The Grammar and Vocabulary of Virtue in Kierkegaard's Upbuilding Discourses," Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers: Vol. 33 : Iss. 3 , Article 4. DOI: 10.5840/faithphil201661461 Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol33/iss3/4 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. “A HUMAN BEING’S HIGHEST PERFECTION”: THE GRAMMAR AND VOCABULARY OF VIRTUE IN KIERKEGAARD’S UPBUILDING DISCOURSES Pieter H. Vos Focusing on the grammar and vocabulary of virtue in Kierkegaard’s upbuilding works, it is argued that the Danish philosopher represents a Christian conception of the moral life that is distinct from but—contrary to Alasdair MacIntyre’s claim—not completely opposed to Aristotelian and Thomistic virtue ethics. Although the realities of sin and salvation transcend virtue ethics based purely on human nature, it is demonstrated that this does not prevent Kierkegaard from speaking constructively about human nature, its teleology (a teleological conception of the self) and about the virtues.
    [Show full text]
  • The Authenticity of Faith in Kierkegaard's Philosophy
    The Authenticity of Faith in Kierkegaard’s Philosophy The Authenticity of Faith in Kierkegaard’s Philosophy Edited by Tamar Aylat-Yaguri and Jon Stewart The Authenticity of Faith in Kierkegaard’s Philosophy, Edited by Tamar Aylat-Yaguri and Jon Stewart This book first published 2013 Cambridge Scholars Publishing Layout and cover design by K.Nun Design, Denmark 12 Back Chapman Street, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2XX, UK British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Copyright © 2013 by Tamar Aylat-Yaguri, Jon Stewart and contributors All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner. ISBN (10): 1-4438-4990-1, ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-4990-6 TABLE OF CONTENTS List of Contributors vi Introduction vii Acknowledgements xvi List of Abbreviations xvii Chapter One Jacob Golomb: Was Kierkegaard an Authentic Believer? 1 Chapter Two Shai Frogel: Acoustical Illusion as Self-Deception 12 Chapter Three Roi Benbassat: Faith as a Struggle against Ethical Self-Deception 18 Chapter Four Edward F. Mooney: A Faith that Defies Self-Deception 27 Chapter Five Darío González: Faith and the Uncertainty of Historical Experience 38 Chapter Six Jerome (Yehuda) Gellman: Constancy of Faith? Symmetry and Asymmetry in Kierkegaard’s Leap of Faith 49 Chapter Seven Peter Šajda: Does Anti-Climacus’ Ethical-Religious Theory of Selfhood Imply a Discontinuity of the Self? 60 Chapter Eight Tamar Aylat-Yaguri: Being in Truth and Being a Jew: Kierkegaard’s View of Judaism 68 Chapter Nine Jon Stewart, Kierkegaard and Hegel on Faith and Knowledge 77 Notes 93 CONTRIBUTORS Tamar Aylat-Yaguri, Department of Philosophy, Tel-Aviv University, Ramat-Aviv, P.O.B 39040, Tel-Aviv 61390, Israel.
    [Show full text]
  • The Philosophy of Anxiety
    Trinity College Trinity College Digital Repository Senior Theses and Projects Student Scholarship Spring 2013 The Philosophy of Anxiety Julie B. Daniels Trinity College, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalrepository.trincoll.edu/theses Part of the Other Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Daniels, Julie B., "The Philosophy of Anxiety". Senior Theses, Trinity College, Hartford, CT 2013. Trinity College Digital Repository, https://digitalrepository.trincoll.edu/theses/333 THE PHILOSOPHY OF ANXIETY By Julie Daniels A Thesis Submitted to the Department of Philosophy of Trinity College in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Bachelor of Arts Degree May 3, 2013 1 Table of Contents Intentions 4 Part One: The Fundamental Project I. What is Dasein? 10 II. What is Dasein’s Project? 12 III. The Private Sphere 14 IV. The Other 21 Part Two: Anxiety as Attunement I. Primacy and Repetition 25 II. Anxiety as Dizziness 35 Part Three: The Philosopher and the Psychiatrist I. Medard Boss on Liberation 42 II. Leslie H. Farber on WilL 44 III. The Opposite of Anxiety 48 2 “That anxiety makes its appearance is the pivot upon which everything turns.” -Søren Kierkegaard 3 Intentions Anxiety has been a constituent of my being since I was a LittLe girL. Before I began the study of phiLosophy, my moments of panic were exacerbated by my inabiLity to articuLate the overwheLming sensations and emotions brought about by anxiety. I feLt compLeteLy aLone; as my anxiety increased, so too did the space between myseLf and others. No one talks about anxiety, and in the instances I attempted to describe to those around me what was happening ‘inside me’, it seemed no one couLd reLate.
    [Show full text]
  • Fear and Trembling, Translated and Introduced by Alastair Hannay (Penguin Classics, 1985)
    Table of Contents Title Page Copyright Page Preface Attunement Speech in Praise of Abraham Problemata Preamble from the Heart Problema I Problema II Problema III Epilogue FOR THE BEST IN PAPERBACKS, LOOK FOR THE Søren Kierkegaard 1813-1855 PENGUIN BOOKS Published by the Penguin Group Penguin Group (USA) Inc., 375 Hudson Street, New York, New York 10014, U.S.A. Penguin Group (Canada), 90 Eglinton Avenue East, Suite 700, Toronto, Ontario, Canada M4P 2Y3 (a division of Pearson Penguin Canada Inc.) Penguin Books Ltd, 80 Strand, London WC2R 0RL, England Penguin Ireland, 25 St Stephen’s Green, Dublin 2, Ireland (a division of Penguin Books Ltd) Penguin Group (Australia), 250 Camberwell Road, Camberwell, Victoria 3124, Australia (a division of Pearson Australia Group Pty Ltd) Penguin Books India Pvt Ltd, 11 Community Centre, Panchsheel Park, New Delhi - 110 017, India Penguin Group (NZ), 67 Apollo Drive, Rosedale, North Shore 0745, Auckland, New Zealand (a division of Pearson New Zealand Ltd) Penguin Books (South Africa) (Pty) Ltd, 24 Sturdee Avenue, Rosebank, Johannesburg 2196, South Africa Penguin Books Ltd, Registered Offices: 80 Strand, London WC2R 0RL, England This edition published in Penguin Books (UK) 2005 Published in Penguin Books (USA) 2006 Translation copyright © Alastair Hannay, 1985 All rights reserved Reprinted from Fear and Trembling, translated and introduced by Alastair Hannay (Penguin Classics, 1985). Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Kierkegaard, Søren, 1813-1855. [Frygt og bæven. English] Fear and trembling / Søren Kierkegaard; translated by Alastair Hannay. p. cm. — (Penguin great ideas) eISBN : 978-1-101-00714-3 1. Christianity — Philosophy. I. Hannay, Alastair.
    [Show full text]
  • The Concept of Anxiety
    THE eONCEPI' OF ANXIETY KIERKEGAARO'S WRITINGS, VIII THE CONCEPT OF ANXIETY A SIMPLE PSYCHOLOGICALLY ORIENTING DELIBERATION ON THE DOGMATIC ISSUE OF HEREDITARY SIN by S0ren Kierkegaard Edited and Translated with Introduction and Notes by Reidar Thomte in collaboration with Albert B. Anderson PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY Copyriglll 0 19'0., Pti.rcrt<ltl UNill'mi1l Pms P,,6lislld 6y P,I_""I Unillmity Pms, Ptii_1, twwJmq I" ~ Uoild Kh~; Pti"CttQfl Uni"tlSity Prm, Oridttlln, Wm s.us<'X AI1R,jp~4 "'"6Nq sfConpu C'''''CfI''I-iQ·N/bMII o"w KH'*'t-d, S#frq A.6~, fIIJ.IIH. ~tI1M«pI sf·n:My· T III1IIl.IIion rf &J1ric1 AlIFf. Bib~y;,. IndJtJn Inia. 1. $1'11, OftgiMl. 2.~, Rdft/oIu. J. AMiny. I. 'lktmlr, RdtL.,. It. AnMrHtI, AIMf, 192'. 1tI. Trtlt. 81720.KS2 19'0 2JJ'.14 19·J217 ISBN ()'691·07244-2 ISBN ()'69t.fJ20tt.6 (pWt.) E4i~1 ,""",WI sf /his ""'" IIIIf MIl MJisId 6y • gNlltfrom ""'IIm.. ~, 'fiwIr,,141 btllffo J«ifty.... 111 ~/9""1U" III ,\1iIUlNp"b'/, Mi'/ltnOf4 P'II,,«1OIl tMvmity Pms ....,., 'If prilirH Dol «i4:fm p4ptr ""I _I tht ,1IlU611tffor ptmW_ ..rJ 41U11W1i'1 sf ~ Commiu« OIl I'tH1'lIi<IH CwiMlilltJ for &.lit Lorlftlllty sf iht COIIIItll "" "''''Nq RntHIIW 18 19 20 ISlIN·IJ: 978·0·69]·0201 1·2 jpbk. ) CONTENTS HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION Vll The Concept of Anxiety 1 PREFACE 7 INTRODUCTION 9 Anxiety as the Presupposition of Hereditary Sin and as Explaining Hereditary Sin Retrogressively in Terms of Its Origin 25 1. HISTORICAL INTIMATIONS REGARDING THE CONCEPT OF HEREDITARY SIN 25 2.
    [Show full text]
  • Søren Kierkegaard Newsletter
    Søren Kierkegaard Newsletter A Publication of the Howard and Edna Hong Kierkegaard Library NUMBER 66: December 2016 Contents ‘ ANNOUNCEMENTS AND NEWS 2 BOOK REVIEWS The Isolated Self: Irony as Truth and Untruth in Søren Kierkegaard's On the Concept of Irony by Brian Söderquist 2 Reviewed by Will Williams Kierkegaard and the Refusal of Transcendence by Steven Shakespeare Reviewed by Lucas Piccinin Lazzaretti 5 Unto the Abyss of Despair—Kierkegaard’s Aesthetic Sphere of Existence (走向绝望的深渊——克尔凯郭尔的美学生活境界) by Wang Qi (王齐) 6 Reviewed by Chingshun J. Sheu ARTICLES Philosophical Fragments: The Infinite Comic Drama Anthony Eagan 8 Tribute to David Kangas Martin Kavka 16 Tribute to Per Lønning Rune Engebretsen 18 Editor: Gordon D. Marino Editorial Intern: Lucas Shurson Assistant Editorial Intern: Emily Shimota Managing Editor: Eileen Shimota Assistant Editor: Begonya Saez Tajafuerce Assistant Editor: Rafael García Pavón Assistant Editor: Catalina Elena Dobre Assistant Editor: Leo Stan Assistant Editor: Christina Danko 1 ANNOUNCEMENTS AND NEWS Professor Anthony Rudd will deliver the lecture in spring 2017. International Kierkegaard Conference Though an exact date has not been established yet, the Library will host the Eighth International Kierkegaard Conference in the summer of 2018. Dr. Richard Purkarthofer will give the plenary lecture. In addition, for more information from the Hong Kierkegaard Library and other news from Kierkegaard scholars and related groups around the world, please see the website of the Hong Kierkegaard Library at http://wp.stolaf.edu/kierkegaard/. K. Brian Söderquist. The Isolated Self: Irony as Truth and Untruth in Søren Kierkegaard's On the Concept of Irony Copenhagen: Søren Kierkegaard Research Centre and C.
    [Show full text]
  • Søren Kierkegaard Philosophical Fragments, Concluding Scientific Postscript – Excerpts1 PHIL101 Prof
    Søren Kierkegaard Philosophical Fragments, Concluding Scientific Postscript – excerpts1 PHIL101 Prof. Oakes updated: 3/18/13 10:24 AM Section III: How do I know? Reading III.5 Søren Kierkegaard (1813-1855) was a Danish philosopher who is best known for his interpretation of Christian faith and for his contributions to what would become known as ‘existentialism’. In both cases, a primary focus of Kierkegaard’s work is the immediate quality of our lived experience. What, exactly, is it like to be a human? What constitutes the best form of human life? As we will see, both in the following excerpts and in those in our Ethics section (Section IV), Kierkegaard thinks that our conceptual thought poses a significant potential obstacle to living well – or, more precisely, an obstacle to our living at all, in a sense. Not that Kierkegaard is anti-intellectual in either the theological or ethical context: conceptual thought plays a crucial role in proper human life, he maintains. But we can become “lost” in our concepts, he thinks, and thus fail to live the vital, vivid lives that are otherwise possible for us. In the following passages, Kierkegaard calls attention to this dualism in our relationship with God, the dualism of our objective, conceptual form of thought, on the one hand, and a subjective, “inner” state, on the other. Conceptual thought is the province of reason, and so Kierkegaard first considers belief in God in terms of what reason and the conceptual mind can tell us. Finding this approach unsatisfactory, Kierkegaard then considers belief in God in subjective terms.
    [Show full text]
  • Kierkegaard on Indirect Communication, the Crowd, and a Monstrous Illusion Antony Aumann Northern Michigan University, [email protected]
    Northern Michigan University The Commons Faculty Works 2010 Kierkegaard on Indirect Communication, the Crowd, and a Monstrous Illusion Antony Aumann Northern Michigan University, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://commons.nmu.edu/facwork Part of the Continental Philosophy Commons, Esthetics Commons, and the History of Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Antony Aumann, “Kierkegaard on Indirect Communication, the Crowd, and a Monstrous Illusion,” in Robert L. Perkins (ed.), International Kierkegaard Commentary: Point of View (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 2010) 295-324. This Conference Paper in Published Proceedings is brought to you for free and open access by The ommonC s. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Works by an authorized administrator of The ommonC s. For more information, please contact [email protected],[email protected], [email protected], [email protected]. Kierkegaard on Indirect Communication, the Crowd, and a Monstrous Illusion Antony Aumann One thing that continues to attract people to Kierkegaard’s writings is his inexhaustible literary creativity. Unlike many thinkers, he does not express his philosophical insights in straightforward academic prose. He delivers them to us under pseudonyms, through narratives, and in an ironic or humorous style. Even in his seemingly straightforward works, we find trickery and “profound deception.”1 Part of what makes Kierkegaard’s literary style of philosophical interest is the theory that lies behind it, his so-called “theory of indirect communication.” The most exciting and provocative aspect of the theory concerns the alleged importance of indirect communication. In several places throughout Kierkegaard’s writings we find the claim that there are some ends only indirect communication can accomplish—a claim not meant to entail the guaranteed success of indirect communication, only its ability to do what direct communication cannot.
    [Show full text]