View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by University of Essex Research Repository ANXIETY’S AMBIGUITY VIA KIERKEGAARD & HEIDEGGER Jeffrey Haynes1 PhD Dissertation Department of Philosophy University of Essex October 2015 1 Thank you to Béatrice Han-Pile and Daniel Watts for their helpful conversations and helpful comments on drafts of this dissertation. 2 ABSTRACT This dissertation produces a systematic account of anxiety, and does so by way of interpreting the account of anxiety given to us by Kierkegaard and Heidegger. The methodology of this dissertation is such that it interprets the anxiety in Kierkegaard through Heidegger’s lens, and also interprets the anxiety in Heidegger through Kierkegaard’s lens. By this method this dissertation harmonizes the accounts of anxiety in Kierkegaard and Heidegger, and in this way produces a systematic account of anxiety by way of these two authors. In particular, this dissertation argues that anxiety in both Kierkegaard and Heidegger has a particular structure: that it is ambiguous, which means that it is structurally constituted by an antipathy (a repulsion) and a sympathy (an attraction). In harmonizing Kierkegaard’s and Heidegger’s accounts of anxiety in this way, this dissertation produces a systematic account of ambiguous anxiety. 3 CONTENTS INTRODUCTION. 5 I. Kierkegaard: Anxiety Interpreted Retrogressively . 20 A. Anxiety Rightly Used: The Absurd Telos . 25 APPENDIX. The Psychotic Telos . 45 B. The Dialectic of Sin . 64 C. Anxiety Misused: The Dialectic of Strict Sin . 79 D. Disguised Anxiety . 107 II. Heidegger: Anxiety Interpreted Progressively . 121 A. The Dialectic of Inauthenticity . 124 B. Disguised Anxiety . 133 C. Anxiety Misused: The Dialectic of Strict Inauthenticity . 139 D. Anxiety Rightly Used: The Absurd Telos . 166 APPENDIX. The Psychotic Telos . 186 CONCLUSION. 205 BIBLIOGRAPHY. 214 4 I think [Johann Sebastian Bach] would have been delighted by any sound that was born out of a respect for the necessity, the abstract necessity, of [his] structures2 Glenn Gould 2 Gould G., ‘Glenn Gould discusses his performances of the "Goldberg Variations" with Tim Page (Excerpt)’, in Bach: Goldberg Variations, BWV 988 (1981 Recording) [Expanded Edition] [CD] (Sony Classical/Legacy, 2004); track 32, 20:25 – 20:35. 5 INTRODUCTION The aim of this dissertation is to produce a systematic account of anxiety, and do so by way of interpreting the account of anxiety given to us by two thinkers: Kierkegaard and Heidegger. The method of this dissertation is such that on the one hand I will interpret the concept of anxiety in Kierkegaard through Heidegger’s lens, and on the other hand I will also interpret the concept of anxiety in Heidegger through Kierkegaard’s lens. It is through this double interpretation that I will attempt to produce a systematic account of anxiety. The choice of Kierkegaard and Heidegger here is motivated by the fact that the concept of anxiety is central to these two authors’ major productions. Regarding Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous writings, Haufniensis’ 1844 The Concept of Anxiety3 is, of course, Kierkegaard’s key text regarding anxiety, and yet his other pseudonymous texts revolve around this one in such a way that any full appreciation of Anxiety must be supplemented by the other pseudonymous writings. In approaching Kierkegaard’s concept of anxiety I will approach his pseudonymous writings in this way: I hold Anxiety to be at the core of that pseudonymous oeuvre, and I will use various other pseudonymous writings to supplement Anxiety. Regarding Heidegger’s 1927 Being and Time4, one of the central concepts in that book is the concept of anxiety. Indeed anxiety is literally at the center of that text in that it is the central concept at both the end of ‘Division One’ and the beginning of ‘Division Two’ and thus also marks the divide. Thus I approach Being and Time in this way: I hold that the concept of anxiety is at the core of Being and Time, and I will use the rest of Being and Time, and indeed some of the other writings of Heidegger from around this same period, as supplements. Anxiety is at the heart of Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous oeuvre as well as at the heart of Heidegger’s Being and Time – like that white icicle at the core of Picasso’s last Weeping Woman. And while the concept of anxiety is central to Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous productions as well as Heidegger’s magnum opus, I use these two thinkers in this dissertation to produce a systematic account of anxiety. Again this will be done by way of the method of interpreting the anxiety in Kierkegaard through Heidegger’s lens, and also interpreting the anxiety in Heidegger through Kierkegaard’s lens. Through this method I will produce an interpretation of anxiety in Kierkegaard which harmonizes with my interpretation of anxiety in Heidegger, and my interpretation of anxiety in Heidegger will harmonize 3 Kierkegaard, S., The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Orienting Deliberation on the Dogmatic Issue of Hereditary Sin, trans. R. Thomte and A. B. Anderson (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1980); hereafter Anxiety or CA. Vigilius Haufniensis is the pseudonymous author of this text. 4 Heidegger, M., Being and Time, trans J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson (Harper & Row: New York, 1962); hereafter SZ. References will cite German page numbers. 6 with my interpretation of anxiety in Kierkegaard: in short through my method I will produce a systematic account of anxiety drawing from these two thinkers. * This dissertation has two parts. Part I interprets anxiety in Kierkegaard (that is, Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous oeuvre, using Anxiety as the centrepiece and various other pseudonymous writings as supplements), and part II interprets anxiety in Heidegger (that is, uses the concept of anxiety at the core of Being and Time as the centrepiece, and uses the rest of Being and Time and various other writings of the same period as supplements). But since I am always implicitly interpreting the anxiety in Kierkegaard by way of Heidegger, and vice versa, this means that part I is always implicitly interpreted by way of part II, and part II is always implicitly interpreted by way of part I. In this way a balance between the two parts will be achieved, such that all the central concepts of each part will be mirrored in the other part. But, in accordance with the nature of a mirror image, the movement of each part, as I will now specify, is inverted: for part I has a retrogressive movement, while part II has a progressive movement. Part I interprets anxiety in Kierkegaard, always implicitly by way of Heidegger, and interprets anxiety retrogressively. As I will argue in detail, anxiety, within Kierkegaard’s writings themselves, has a particular structure – anxiety is ambiguous, that is, it has an antipathetic (repulsion) and sympathetic (attraction) aspect. I specify that, in Kierkegaard, there are three different encounters which spirit may have with this ambiguous anxiety, and interlinked with each of these encounters are three different corresponding modes of spirit. For, as I will detail in this part of the dissertation, anxiety can be encountered in such a way that it is manifest – that is, its antipathetic and sympathetic aspects are manifest – and one uses this anxiety as a springboard to perpetually spring into the mode of spirit called faith; anxiety can be encountered in such a way that it is manifest – its antipathetic and sympathetic aspects are manifest – and yet one uses this anxiety as a springboard to perpetually spring into the mode of spirit called sin; and finally anxiety can be encountered in the mode of spirit called spiritlessness such that anxiety does not show itself as it is, but shows itself in a heavily disguised form – and here the disguise is such that the sympathetic aspect is completely covered over while the antipathetic aspect partially shows itself. Now, in order to give a detailed interpretation of anxiety in Kierkegaard, I hold that we must track the movement through the three encounters of anxiety, showing how each encounter is related to the next. Haufniensis tells us that when anxiety is encountered such that it gives rise to faith, this is ‘anxiety rightly used’, and thus this encounter is the telos which one ought to achieve. Thus when I say that part I interprets anxiety retrogressively, this means that we will track the movement through the three encounters of anxiety by first dealing with manifest ambiguous anxiety rightly used which gives rise 7 to faith, then dealing with manifest ambiguous anxiety misused which gives rise to sin, and finally dealing with ambiguous anxiety as it shows up in spiritlessness in disguise – and in proceeding retrogressively in this manner, I detail how each encounter is related to the next. Part I tracks the retrogressive movement through anxiety: a repulsion away-from the telos. Part II interprets anxiety in Heidegger, always implicitly by way of Kierkegaard, and interprets anxiety progressively. As I will argue in detail, anxiety, within Heidegger’s writings themselves, has a particular structure – anxiety is ambiguous, that is, it has an antipathetic (repulsion) and sympathetic (attraction) aspect. I specify that for Heidegger there are three different encounters which Dasein may have with this ambiguous anxiety, and interlinked with each of these different encounters is a different corresponding mode of existence. For, as I will detail in this part of the dissertation, anxiety can be encountered