DOCSLIB.ORG

Migrants Incountries Incrisis

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Migrants Incountries Incrisis MIGRANTS IN COUNTRIES IN CRISIS SOUTH AFRICA CASE STUDY The Double Crisis – Mass Migration From Zimbabwe And Xenophobic Violence in South Africa Jonathan Crush, Godfrey Tawodzera, Abel Chikanda, Sujata Ramachandran & Daniel Tevera Project funded by the European Union Project implemented by ICMPD In partnership with IMI Southern African Migration Programme International Migration Institute IMI Migrants in Countries in Crisis (MICIC) South Africa Case Study: The Double Crisis – Mass Migration From Zimbabwe And Xenophobic Violence in South Africa Jonathan Crush, Godfrey Tawodzera, Abel Chikanda, Sujata Ramachandran & Daniel Tevera Prepared on behalf of the International Centre for Migration Policy Development, Vienna - Austria Commissioned and funded by the European Union, Brussels – Belgium International Centre for Migration Policy Development • 2017 i Authors Jonathan Crush is the CIGI Chair in Global Migration and Development at the Balsillie School of International Affairs, Waterloo, and Director of the Southern African Migration Programme (SAMP). Godfrey Tawodzera is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Geography and Environmental Science, University of Limpopo, Polokwane, South Africa. Abel Chikanda is Assistant Professor of Geography and African and African-American Studies, University of Kansas. Sujata Ramachandran is a Senior Researcher with the Southern African Migration Programme (SAMP). Daniel Tevera is Professor in the Department of Geography and Environmental Studies, University of Western Cape, Cape Town, South Africa. ii Acknowledgements The authors gratefully acknowledge the review and input provided by colleagues at the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), the International Migration Institute (IMI) and the European Commission (EC). International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) Gonzagagasse 1 A-1010 Vienna Austria www.icmpd.org International Centre for Migration Policy Development & Southern African Migration Programme All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission of the copyright owners. This publication has been produced with the assistance of the European Union. The contents of this publication are the sole responsibility of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of ICMPD, SAMP, IMI or the University of Oxford, nor can they in any way be taken to reflect the views of the European Union. iii Table of Contents Authors ................................................................................................................................................ ii Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................................. iii List of Figures .......................................................................................................................................... vi List of Tables .......................................................................................................................................... vii List of Acronyms .................................................................................................................................... viii Executive Summary ................................................................................................................................. ix 1. Introduction ....................................................................................................................................... 1 2. Research Methodology .................................................................................................................... 6 3. The Crisis in Zimbabwe .................................................................................................................... 7 3.1. Political Persecution, Economic Collapse ........................................................................... 7 3.2. Migrating Out of Crisis ....................................................................................................... 10 3.3. South African Policy Responses to Crisis Migration ......................................................... 17 4. The Crisis of Xenophobia in South Africa....................................................................................... 21 4.1. Xenophobic Violence in 2008 ........................................................................................... 21 4.2. Xenophobic Violence in the Informal Economy ................................................................ 23 4.3. Xenophobic Violence in 2015 ........................................................................................... 25 4.4. Explanations for Xenophobic Violence ............................................................................. 26 5. Zimbabweans in the South African Informal Economy .................................................................. 28 5.1. Migration Profile ................................................................................................................ 28 5.2. Drivers of Migration to South Africa .................................................................................. 29 5.3. Business Ownership and Expansion ................................................................................ 34 5.4. Remitting to Zimbabwe ..................................................................................................... 37 6. Zimbabweans and the Crisis of Extreme Xenophobia ................................................................... 41 6.1. Experiencing May 2008..................................................................................................... 41 6.2. Narratives of Xenophobic Violence ................................................................................... 42 6.3. Zimbabwean Migrant Reactions to Xenophobic Violence ................................................ 46 7. Stakeholder Responses to Xenophobic Violence .......................................................................... 49 7.1. Migrant Perceptions of Government (In)action ................................................................. 49 7.2. Response of Zimbabwean Government ........................................................................... 50 7.3. Response of South African Government .......................................................................... 51 7.3.1. Responses to May 2008 .................................................................................................... 51 7.3.2. Responses to 2015 Attacks ............................................................................................... 53 7.3.3. Operation Fiela .................................................................................................................. 56 7.4. Responses of South African Police to Xenophobia .......................................................... 61 7.5. Responses of Other South African Stakeholders ............................................................. 64 7.5.1. NGO Views Concerning Xenophobic Violence ................................................................. 64 7.5.2. South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) ........................................................ 66 7.5.3. Consortium for Refugees and Migrants in South Africa (CoRMSA) ................................. 67 7.5.4. Lawyers for Human Rights (LHR) – South Africa ............................................................. 67 7.5.5. People’s Coalition Against Xenophobia (PCAX) ............................................................... 68 7.5.6. Other South African CSOs ................................................................................................ 68 7.6. Responses of International Stakeholders ......................................................................... 70 7.6.1. UNHCR .............................................................................................................................. 70 7.6.2. International Organization for Migration (IOM) – South Africa .......................................... 70 7.6.3. International Labour Organization (ILO) ............................................................................ 72 iv 7.6.4. Amnesty International – South Africa ................................................................................ 72 7.6.5. European Union................................................................................................................. 72 7.6.6. African Union ..................................................................................................................... 72 8. Conclusions and Recommendations .............................................................................................. 74 9. Reference List ................................................................................................................................ 76 10. Annexes .......................................................................................................................................... 89 Annex A: Interviews with Zimbabwean Migrants ............................................................................ 89 Annex B: Key Informant Interviews ................................................................................................ 91 v List of Figures Figure
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Constitutional Authority and Its Limitations: the Politics of Sexuality in South Africa
    South Africa Constitutional Authority and its Limitations: The Politics of Sexuality in South Africa Belinda Beresford Helen Schneider Robert Sember Vagner Almeida “While the newly enfranchised have much to gain by supporting their government, they also have much to lose.” Adebe Zegeye (2001) A history of the future: Constitutional rights South Africa’s Constitutional Court is housed in an architecturally innovative complex on Constitution Hill, a 100-acre site in central Johannesburg. The site is adjacent to Hillbrow, a neighborhood of high-rise apartment buildings into which are crowded thousands of mi- grants from across the country and the continent. This is one of the country’s most densely populated, cosmopolitan and severely blighted urban areas. From its position atop Constitu- tion Hill, the Court offers views of Hillbrow’s high-rises and the distant northern suburbs where the established white elite and increasing numbers of newly affluent non-white South Africans live. Thus, while the light-filled, colorful and contemporary Constitutional Court buildings reflect the progressive and optimistic vision of post-apartheid South Africa the lo- cation is a reminder of the deeply entrenched inequalities that continue to define the rights of the majority of people in the country and the continent. CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY AND ITS LIMITATIONS: THE POLITICS OF SEXUALITY IN SOUTH AFRICA 197 From the late 1800s to 1983 Constitution Hill was the location of Johannesburg’s central prison, the remains of which now lie in the shadow of the new court buildings. Former prison buildings include a fort built by the Boers (descendents of Dutch settlers) in the late 1800s to defend themselves against the thousands of men and women who arrived following the discovery of the area’s expansive gold deposits.
    [Show full text]
  • CCS Anti-Xenophobia Research and Community Outreach
    CCS Anti-Xenophobia research and community outreach Documentation, 2010 CCS anti-xenophobia research workshop, 27 February 2010 ANTI-XENOPHOBIA RESEARCH/ACTION WORKSHOP CENTRE FOR CIVIL SOCIETY, STRATEGY&TACTICS and DURBAN CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS DATE: 27 FEBRUARY 2010 TIME: 9AM-3:30PM VENUE: MEMORIAL TOWER BUILDING L2 (in tallest building at Howard College) Research papers Xenophobia in Bottlebrush: An investigation into the reasons behind the attacks on African immigrants in an informal settlement in Durban. Xenophobia and Civil Society: Durban’s Structured Social Divisions Agenda 9:00-09:30 Tea with muffin + film screening 9:30-09:45 Welcome: Patrick Bond, Introduction to Durban Case Study: Baruti Amisi, Faith ka Manzi, Sheperd Zvavanhu, Orlean Naidoo, Nokuthula Cele, Trevor Ngwane 9:40-10:30 Presentation of Durban Case Study (1) Patrick Bond: Overview of Durban Case Study (2) Trevor Ngwane: Bottlebrush (3) Baruti Amisi: Migrant Voices 10:30-11:00 Presentation by Nobi Dube, Ramaphosa Case study and Summary of recommendations from national case studies by Jenny Parsley 11:00-12:00 Discussion 12:00-12:15 Presentation of themes from research and ways forward, with Trevor 12:15-13:00 Breakaway Groups (geographic areas and interests) with Amisi and Trevor 13:00-14:00 Lunch 14:00-14:30 Presentations by Breakaway Groups 14:30-15:00 Discussion and anti-xenophobia strategies facilitated by Amisi and Trevor 15:00-15:15 Concluding Remarks: Patrick Bond 15:15 Vote of thanks: Baruti Amisi Workshop Themes: 1) Civil society, social movements,
    [Show full text]
  • Economic Ascendance Is/As Moral Rightness: the New Religious Political Right in Post-Apartheid South Africa Part
    Economic Ascendance is/as Moral Rightness: The New Religious Political Right in Post-apartheid South Africa Part One: The Political Introduction If one were to go by the paucity of academic scholarship on the broad New Right in the post-apartheid South African context, one would not be remiss for thinking that the country is immune from this global phenomenon. I say broad because there is some academic scholarship that deals only with the existence of right wing organisations at the end of the apartheid era (du Toit 1991, Grobbelaar et al. 1989, Schönteich 2004, Schönteich and Boshoff 2003, van Rooyen 1994, Visser 2007, Welsh 1988, 1989,1995, Zille 1988). In this older context, this work focuses on a number of white Right organisations, including their ideas of nationalism, the role of Christianity in their ideologies, as well as their opposition to reform in South Africa, especially the significance of the idea of partition in these organisations. Helen Zille’s list, for example, includes the Herstigte Nasionale Party, Conservative Party, Afrikaner People’s Guard, South African Bureau of Racial Affairs (SABRA), Society of Orange Workers, Forum for the Future, Stallard Foundation, Afrikaner Resistance Movement (AWB), and the White Liberation Movement (BBB). There is also literature that deals with New Right ideology and its impact on South African education in the transition era by drawing on the broader literature on how the New Right was using education as a primary battleground globally (Fataar 1997, Kallaway 1989). Moreover, another narrow and newer literature exists that continues the focus on primarily extreme right organisations in South Africa that have found resonance in the global context of the rise of the so-called Alternative Right that rejects mainstream conservatism.
    [Show full text]
  • Mozambique Zambia South Africa Zimbabwe Tanzania
    UNITED NATIONS MOZAMBIQUE Geospatial 30°E 35°E 40°E L a k UNITED REPUBLIC OF 10°S e 10°S Chinsali M a l a w TANZANIA Palma i Mocimboa da Praia R ovuma Mueda ^! Lua Mecula pu la ZAMBIA L a Quissanga k e NIASSA N Metangula y CABO DELGADO a Chiconono DEM. REP. OF s a Ancuabe Pemba THE CONGO Lichinga Montepuez Marrupa Chipata MALAWI Maúa Lilongwe Namuno Namapa a ^! gw n Mandimba Memba a io u Vila úr L L Mecubúri Nacala Kabwe Gamito Cuamba Vila Ribáué MecontaMonapo Mossuril Fingoè FurancungoCoutinho ^! Nampula 15°S Vila ^! 15°S Lago de NAMPULA TETE Junqueiro ^! Lusaka ZumboCahora Bassa Murrupula Mogincual K Nametil o afu ezi Namarrói Erego e b Mágoè Tete GiléL am i Z Moatize Milange g Angoche Lugela o Z n l a h m a bez e i ZAMBEZIA Vila n azoe Changara da Moma n M a Lake Chemba Morrumbala Maganja Bindura Guro h Kariba Pebane C Namacurra e Chinhoyi Harare Vila Quelimane u ^! Fontes iq Marondera Mopeia Marromeu b am Inhaminga Velha oz P M úngu Chinde Be ni n è SOFALA t of ManicaChimoio o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o gh ZIMBABWE o Bi Mutare Sussundenga Dondo Gweru Masvingo Beira I NDI A N Bulawayo Chibabava 20°S 20°S Espungabera Nova OCE A N Mambone Gwanda MANICA e Sav Inhassôro Vilanculos Chicualacuala Mabote Mapai INHAMBANE Lim Massinga p o p GAZA o Morrumbene Homoíne Massingir Panda ^! National capital SOUTH Inhambane Administrative capital Polokwane Guijá Inharrime Town, village o Chibuto Major airport Magude MaciaManjacazeQuissico International boundary AFRICA Administrative boundary MAPUTO Xai-Xai 25°S Nelspruit Main road 25°S Moamba Manhiça Railway Pretoria MatolaMaputo ^! ^! 0 100 200km Mbabane^!Namaacha Boane 0 50 100mi !\ Bela Johannesburg Lobamba Vista ESWATINI Map No.
    [Show full text]
  • Political Contestations Within South African Migration Governance
    Political Contestations within South African Migration Governance Khangelani Moyo & Franzisca Zanker December 2020 KEY POINTS South African migration governance has adopted an increasingly securitised approach which also blurs the boundaries between refugees and migrants. Refugee protection is increasingly fragmented, enveloped by an exclusive immigration system and a weak regional approach in terms of free movement. There are a number of political stakes related to refugee and migration governance: o Migration governance is used as leverage in domestic politics. Xenophobic violence against migrant and refugee communities continues routinely. The exclusionary approach works particularly well as a form of leverage in scapegoating the governments failures to address poverty and job creation. A focus on securitisation further concretises an anti-refugee and anti-migrant stance in policy. o The exclusionary approach contrasts to visions of free movement and Pan-Africanism as well as the benefits of “skilled” migration. In practice however, domestic imperatives are still more important and are often strengthened by the approach to foreign policy, such as quiet diplomacy in neighbouring Zimbabwe. More recently, they have resulted in diplomatic tensions with other African countries. o The Department of Home Affairs has a performative relationship with civil society who try to keep them in check. Refugee activists are side-lined where possible and given a negative portrayal. Social xenophobic rhetoric is based on the premises of identity-construction through othering as well as being linked to economic deprivation. These discourses are reinforced both through rhetoric by politicians and the media. o The border town of Musina shows that such rhetoric is not ubiquitous and a more proactive role for political and community leaders to change the public discourse on the contributions made by migrants to communities is possible.
    [Show full text]
  • Jacob Zuma: the Man of the Moment Or the Man for the Moment? Alex Michael & James Montagu
    Research & Assessment Branch African Series Jacob Zuma: The Man of the Moment or the Man for the Moment? Alex Michael & James Montagu 09/08 Jacob Zuma: The Man of the Moment or the Man for the Moment? Alex Michael & James Montagu Key Findings • Zuma is a pragmatist, forging alliances based on necessity rather than ideology. His enlarged but inclusive cabinet, rewards key allies with significant positions, giving minor roles to the leftist SACP and COSATU. • Long-term ANC allies now hold key Justice, Police and State Security ministerial positions, reducing the likelihood of legal charges against him resurfacing. • The blurring of party and state to the detriment of public institutions, which began under Mbeki, looks set to continue under Zuma. • Zuma realises that South Africa relies too heavily on foreign investment, but no real change in economic policy could well alienate much of his populist support base and be decisive in the longer term. 09/08 Jacob Zuma: The Man of the Moment or the Man for the Moment? Alex Michael & James Montagu INTRODUCTION Jacob Zuma, the new President of the Republic of South Africa and the African National Congress (ANC), is a man who divides opinion. He has been described by different groups as the next Mandela and the next Mugabe. He is a former goatherd from what is now called KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) with no formal education and a long career in the ANC, which included a 10 year spell at Robben Island and 14 years of exile in Mozambique, Swaziland and Zambia. Like most ANC leaders, his record is not a clean one and his role in identifying and eliminating government spies within the ranks of the ANC is well documented.
    [Show full text]
  • Sitting(Link Is External)
    1 THURSDAY, 10 MAY 2018 PROCEEDINGS OF THE WESTERN CAPE PROVINCIAL PARLIAMENT The sign † indicates the original language and [ ] directly thereafter indicates a translation. The House met at 14:15 The Deputy Speaker took the Chair and read the prayer. The DEPUTY SPEAKER: You may be seated. [Interjections.] Order! I see the Chief Whip first. (Notice of Motion) Mr M G E WILEY: Thank you, Mr Deputy Speaker. I give notice that I shall move: That, notwithstanding the provisions of Rule 198, precedence be given to the Subject for Discussion. Thank you. The DEPUTY SPEAKER: Thank you. No objection to that? Agreed to. 2 We will then start with the Subject for Discussion in the name of the hon member Gillion. I see the hon Gillion. †Mnr Q R DYANTYI: Hoor-hoor! [Mr Q R DYANTYI: Hear-hear!] Ms M N GILLION: Mr Deputy Speaker, 2018 marks the tail -end of this administration’s term and the DA’s decade of misrule is representative of a period of regression in service delivery for the poor. Reality is that th is protracted period of disservice to our people has been marked by the deteriorating living conditions for the poor and marginalised, which forced thousands of people to take to the streets on Freedom Day, calling on the DA Government to break with the past and focus on service delivery. The most pressing challenges faced by the people in this province include inadequate living conditions, crime, poverty, dread diseases and unemployment. These challenges seem to be colour -conscious as they affect the black majority, while the minority is well taken care of.
    [Show full text]
  • Hate Crimes Against Black Lesbian South Africans: Where Race, Sexual Orientation and Gender Collide (Part Ii)
    HATE CRIMES AGAINST BLACK LESBIAN SOUTH AFRICANS: WHERE RACE, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND GENDER COLLIDE (PART II) Kamban Naidoo BA LLB LLM Senior Lecturer, Criminal and Procedural Law University of South Africa (UNISA) Michelle Karels LLB LLM Senior Lecturer, Criminal and Procedural Law University of South Africa (UNISA) SUMMARY This article, which is the second of a two-part submission, examines the South African legal position pertaining to sexual offences and murder as a continuation of the theme introduced in Part One. The authors then examine the concept of motive before providing a brief overview of hate crime legislation and/or policy in the United States of America and Germany. The core of the article examines three possible routes for South Africa to curb hate crime. Firstly, the creation of substantive hate crime law in the form of legislation, secondly, the amendment of current legislation to incorporate protection against this form of crime and thirdly, the retention of the current status quo coupled with the roll-out of civil society initiatives to curb hate- motivated crime. The conclusion of the article provides recommendations from a civil society and criminal justice perspective. A INTRODUCTION This article seeks to extend the foundational framework laid in Part I within the context of criminal legal doctrine generally and the potential for hate- crime legislation in South Africa specifically. At the time of writing, the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development had appointed a task team to investigate hate-crime legislation and to submit proposals with regard to such legislation in South Africa. 1 The research is, however, still in 1 Anonymous “Speech by Deputy Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development, Mr Andries Nel, MP, on the occasion of the official opening of the first networking session of the national task team on LGTBI Crime-related issues” October 2011 http://www.info.
    [Show full text]
  • ISO Country Codes
    COUNTRY SHORT NAME DESCRIPTION CODE AD Andorra Principality of Andorra AE United Arab Emirates United Arab Emirates AF Afghanistan The Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan AG Antigua and Barbuda Antigua and Barbuda (includes Redonda Island) AI Anguilla Anguilla AL Albania Republic of Albania AM Armenia Republic of Armenia Netherlands Antilles (includes Bonaire, Curacao, AN Netherlands Antilles Saba, St. Eustatius, and Southern St. Martin) AO Angola Republic of Angola (includes Cabinda) AQ Antarctica Territory south of 60 degrees south latitude AR Argentina Argentine Republic America Samoa (principal island Tutuila and AS American Samoa includes Swain's Island) AT Austria Republic of Austria Australia (includes Lord Howe Island, Macquarie Islands, Ashmore Islands and Cartier Island, and Coral Sea Islands are Australian external AU Australia territories) AW Aruba Aruba AX Aland Islands Aland Islands AZ Azerbaijan Republic of Azerbaijan BA Bosnia and Herzegovina Bosnia and Herzegovina BB Barbados Barbados BD Bangladesh People's Republic of Bangladesh BE Belgium Kingdom of Belgium BF Burkina Faso Burkina Faso BG Bulgaria Republic of Bulgaria BH Bahrain Kingdom of Bahrain BI Burundi Republic of Burundi BJ Benin Republic of Benin BL Saint Barthelemy Saint Barthelemy BM Bermuda Bermuda BN Brunei Darussalam Brunei Darussalam BO Bolivia Republic of Bolivia Federative Republic of Brazil (includes Fernando de Noronha Island, Martim Vaz Islands, and BR Brazil Trindade Island) BS Bahamas Commonwealth of the Bahamas BT Bhutan Kingdom of Bhutan
    [Show full text]
  • South Africa February 2013
    Blind Alleys PART II Country Findings: South Africa February 2013 The Unseen Struggles of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Intersex Urban Refugees in Mexico, Uganda and South Africa Acknowledgements This project was conceived and directed by Neil Grungras and was brought to completion by Cara Hughes and Kevin Lo. Editing, and project management were provided by Steven Heller, Kori Weinberger, Peter Stark, Eunice Lee, Ian Renner, and Max Niedzwiecki. In South Africa, we thank Liesl Theron of Gender DynamiX, Father Russell Pollitt and Dumisani Dube of Holy Trinity Catholic Church in Braamfontein, Johannesburg, Kaajal Ramjathan-Keogh of Lawyers for Human Rights, and Braam Hanekom and Guillain KoKo of PASSOP (People Against Suffering, Oppression and Poverty) who gave us advice and essential access to its cli- ents. We thank Charmaine Hedding, Sibusiso Kheswa, Siobhan McGuirk, Tara Ngwato Polzer, Sanjula Weerasinghe, and Rachel Levitan for their work coordinating and conducting the field research. Expert feedback and editing was provided by Libby Johnston and Melanie Nathan. We are particularly grateful to Anahid Bazarjani, Nicholas Hersh, Lucie Leblond, Minjae Lee, Darren Miller, John Odle, Odessa Powers, Peter Stark, and Anna von Herrmann. These dedi- cated interns and volunteers conducted significant amounts of desk research and pored over thou- sands of pages of interview transcripts over the course of months, assuring that every word and every comment by interviewees were meticulously taken into account in this report. These pages would be blank but for the refugees who bravely recounted their sagas seeking pro- tection, as well as the dedicated UNHCR, NGO, and government staff who so earnestly shared their experiences and understandings of the refugees we all seek to protect.
    [Show full text]
  • International Tourism Statistics Report 2013
    FALKLAND ISLANDS International Tourism Statistics Report 2013 2 3 4 Tourism Statistics 2013 TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE INTRODUCTION 6 KEY FACTS AND FIGURES 7 INBOUND TOURISM (OVERNIGHT VISITORS) 8 TOURIST ARRIVALS 8 Tourist Arrivals by Purpose of Visit (2000-2013) 8 Tourist Arrivals by Country of Residence (2000-2013) 10 Top 10 Tourist Arrivals by Country of Residence 12 Top 6 Leisure Tourist Arrivals by Country of Residence 12 Tourist Arrivals by Mode of Transport (2000-2013) 13 Average Length of Stay by Purpose of Visit (2000-2013) 14 Country of Residence by Purpose of Visit (2012 and 2013) 15 Gender by Purpose of Visit (2012 and 2013) 17 Purpose of Visit by Month (2013) 18 Leisure Tourists Arrivals by Season 20 TRIP CHARACTERISTICS 21 Previous Visits to the Falklands (2010-2013) 21 Timing of the Booking of Leisure Trips (2011-2013) 22 Sources of Information about the Falklands (2013) 23 Accommodation Utilised (2013) 24 Evaluation of Stay in the Falklands (2010-2013) 26 Interest in Visiting the Falklands Again (2010-2013) 27 Value for Money (2010-2013) 28 What Leisure Tourists Liked 29 What Leisure Tourists Think Could Be Improved 30 TOURIST EXPENDITURE 31 Average Spend per Person per Night (2010-2013) 31 Tourist Expenditure per Annum (2010-2013) 32 CRUISE TOURISM (DAY VISITORS) 33 CRUISE ARRIVALS 33 Passenger Arrivals (1995-2014) 33 TRIP CHARACTERISTICS 34 Age of Cruise Passengers (2010-2014) 34 Previous Visits to the Falkland Islands (2010-2014) 35 Shore Excursions (2014) 36 Evaluation of Visit (2010-2014) 37 Likelihood of Visiting Again (2010-2014) 38 Desire to take a Land Based Holiday in the Falklands (2010-2014) 39 Evaluation of Length of Stay on the Islands (2010-2014) 40 Importance of the Falklands Islands in the Cruise Itinerary (2010-2014) 41 CRUISE PASSENGER EXPENDITURE 42 Average Spend per Passenger (2009-2011) 42 Cruise Passenger Spend (2008-2014) 43 5 Tourism Statistics 2013 INTRODUCTION When measuring tourism, the Falkland Islands Tourist Board (FITB) follows United Nations World Tourism Organization (UNWTO) definitions.
    [Show full text]
  • “The Long Walk Is Not Yet Over” a Study of Collective Actors´ Political Capacities Within the Domestic Service in South Africa
    “The Long Walk is not yet over” A Study of Collective Actors´ Political Capacities within the Domestic Service in South Africa Camilla Rodø Master´s Thesis in Political Science Department of Political Science UNIVERSITY OF OSLO Spring 2016 I II “The Long Walk is not yet over” A Study of Collective Actors´ Political Capacities within the Domestic Service in South Africa III © Camilla Rodø 2016 The Long Walk is not yet over: A Study of Collective Actors´ Political Capacities within the Domestic Service in South Africa Camilla Rodø http://www.duo.uio.no Word Count: 41 052 Print: Grafisk Senter AS, Oslo IV Abstract One should not take for granted that the various institutions are democratic, that formal laws automatically lead to improvement. Instead one needs to consider the actors´ capacities to use these institutions. This master dissertation analyses why the legal institutions that came with the democratic transition in South Africa haven´t given better results for the domestic workers. Furthermore, a more profound discussion is given regarding the question; how can collective actors´ level of political capacities serve as an explanation to the perceived challenges with domestic workers´ labour laws. Findings from the study indicate that there have been extensive improvements with the implementation of the domestic workers´ labour laws. However, despite these improvements, the domestic workers are still struggling. And the reason why, may be explained in light of enforcement and content of the laws. The study suggests that the South African Domestic Service and Allied Workers Union´s low level of political capacities to some extent may explain why the legal institutions that came with the democratic transition in South Africa haven´t given better results for the domestic workers.
    [Show full text]