Lida’s side of the story

A CASE STUDY OF NATIONAL IDENTITY IN BELARUS

Master Thesis Russian and Eurasian Studies Daphne Steenbergen

Supervisor: Dr. M. Bader 16 June 2020 Word count: 20.897

Lida’s side of the story

Table of contents List of abbreviations 1 Introduction 2 Chapter 1 | Nationalism and national identity 3 National identity 3 National identity in Belarus 6 Chapter 2 | National identity in official political rhetoric 8 Belarus as a geopolitically predetermined nation 8 Belarus as a neutral and self-sufficient nation 10 Belarus as a European nation 12 Chapter 3 | National identity in Lida 13 History 13 Local initiatives 15 Cultural Capital 2020 15 Statue of Grand Duke Gediminas 15 Renaming Sverdlov street 16 Assessment 17 Chapter 4 | Lida from a broader perspective 18 Belarusian national identity 18 Two or three forms of Belarusianness? 20 Impact of 2014 on Belarus’ political boundaries 23 Conclusion 27 Bibliography 29 Appendix 41

List of abbreviations BNF – Belarusian National Front BPR – Belarusian People’s Republic BSSR – Belarusian Socialist Soviet Republic BY – Belarus GDL – Grand Duchy of Lithuania GPW – Great Patriotic War

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A case study of national identity in Belarus

Introduction The year 2014, which saw the annexation of Crimea and the start of Russian presence in the Donbas, is widely regarded as a geopolitical critical juncture (Astapenia and Balkunets 2016, 6; Van der Togt 2017, 2). However, its consequences are not limited to the geopolitical stage. Due to the threat the annexation of Crimea posed on Belarusian sovereignty, the regime had to reconsider its priorities. They started to focus on the maintenance of statehood and national security (Wilson 2017, 78). In 2015, Belarus’ president Aljaksandr Lukashenka1 addressed the new priorities when he stated in his annual address to the nation that “the situation in Belarus and around it urgently requires the activation of ideological work.”2 Therefore, the regime began to actively promote Belarusian national identity, culture and language (Lennon and Becker 2019, 323). This new focus of the national policy is called ‘soft Belarusization’ (Mojeiko 2015). One of the aspects of the new policy is leniency towards local initiatives which involve a mythical notion of Belarus’ European past (Golesnik 2014). The events of 2014 made Lukashenka realize that the sovereignty of Belarus could not be built only on the historical foundation of the Belarusian Socialist Soviet Republic (BSSR) (Shrajbman 2018). Still, the government made the a choice in the 1990s to use this history as a foundation of the regime and the Belarusian people confirmed this choice in a referendum in 1995. It is therefore not easy to discard this foundation (Frear 2019, Belarus under Lukashenka, 80). Therefore, since 2014, the national government has not actively promoted European history of the country but they allowed four cities to erect statues dedicated to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (GDL), which makes up an important part of Belarusian European history (Bekus 2019, 262). These four cities are Minsk, Vitebsk, Slonim and Lida. Minsk is located in the centre of the country and Vitebsk is in the north-east, close to the Russian border. Lida and Slonim, on the other hand, are in the west of the country, close to the Lithuanian border. This geographic spread is important because it shows that the strong connection to the Lithuanian past is not confined to the regions closest to Lithuania. Nevertheless, a city in close proximity to Lithuania is chosen as a case study because Lida is the only city of the four which is founded by a Lithuanian Grand Duke. In the fourteenth century, Grand Duke Gediminas ordered the construction of a fortress in order to protect the central lands of the GDL (Arteaga 2020). This marked the founding of the city of Lida. On 7 September 2019, the Grand Duke was reunited with his castle when a bronze statue of him was unveiled in front of the fortress during a grand ceremony (Kozyrev 7 sentjabrja 2019). The establishment of the four statues is an interesting phenomenon because, in the early 2000s, Bekus (2008) and Snyder (2003) stated that Belarus’ European history needs to have a central role in Belarus’ nation-forming myth (5; 284). So, it seems that with the policy of ‘soft Belarusization’, the government allows the European aspects of history to be highlighted. Therefore, as Bekus (2008) and Snyder (2003) predicted, European history currently has a significant role in the construction of national identity. However, there is a lack of research on the consequences of the events in 2014 on the development of Belarusian national identity in society. Most of the articles written about Belarus focus on the geopolitical consequences of the critical juncture (Astapenia and Balkunets 2016; Bekus 2017; Podhol 2017; Preiherman 2014; Van der Togt 2017). This thesis aims to fill this gap in the literature with a case study of Lida. The research question is: how do local initiatives regarding national identity in the city of Lida relate to the official political rhetoric about national identity? The aim of the thesis is to

1 In text, the name of the President of Belarus, Aljaksandr Lukashenka, is transliterated from the Belarusian spelling. In the references, the name is transliterated from the Russian spelling because Russian sources have been used. 2 Author’s translation of: Внутренняя, внешняя обстановка вокруг Беларуси настоятельно требует активизации идеологической работы.

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give a solid picture of recent developments of national identity in Belarusian society. The hypothesis is that the form of Belarusian identity present in Lida’s society is further developed along the lines of Bekus’ and Snyder’s prediction than the ideas about Belarusian national identity voiced in the political rhetoric. The thesis consists of four chapters. The first chapter gives a concise overview of the literature about national identity in general and about Belarusian national identity. With this knowledge, a solid analysis of the developments in Belarusian society can be made. After that, an analysis of Lukashenka's annual speeches is conducted in chapter two. The chapter aims to show the change of message concerning national identity before and after 2014. To this end, annual speeches from 2011 up to and including 2020 are analysed to get a clear view of recent ideas of the government regarding Belarusian national identity. 2011 is a good starting point because in December 2010, the last presidential elections before 2014 were being held. Additionally, in the words of Lukashenka: “2010 was a landmark year in the development of the Belarusian political system. It placed a line under a whole period in the history of the country and marked new prospects” (2011, Poslanie belorusskomu narodu).3 The third chapter is dedicated to the city of Lida. This chapter contains the history of the city as well as recent cases of local initiatives regarding national identity. The aim of the chapter is to determine which form of Belarusian identity is present in Lida’s society through focussing on the local initiatives and making connections to Lida’s past. In the final chapter, the case study of Lida is put in the broader perspective of Belarusian society. Whereas chapters two and three concentrate on recent developments, chapter four explains how the ideas about Belarusian identity in Lida can exist side to side with the official line regarding Belarusianness. This is done by looking at the differences of history between the Grodno region, in which Lida is located, and the rest of Belarus. The aim of this chapter is to answer the research question. In the conclusion, a concise overview of the findings is presented alongside expectations for the further development of national identity in Belarus.

Chapter 1 | Nationalism and national identity According to Greenfeld (1992) is national identity one of the concepts located under the big umbrella of nationalism (3). In the past decades, nationalism has proven to be a hot topic among scholars. The first part of this chapter will give a concise overview of the classic key works on both nationalism and national identity. Especially in the 1980s and 1990s, much has been written about the topics and these works still have a profound influence on the articles which are published today. The second part of the chapter will look into the literature written on national identity in Belarus. While a lot of key books exist on national identity, this is not the case with Belarusian national identity. Nonetheless, several articles have been written on the phenomenon of Belarusian national identity. This chapter aims to establish an academic framework in which the analyses of the following chapters can be conducted. National identity Before focussing on national identity, an understanding of the term nationalism has to be established. One of the most used definitions of nationalism is the one given by Gellner (1983). He says that “nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent” (1). Moreover, nationalism is “the organisation of human groups into large, centrally educated, culturally homogeneous units” (Gellner 1983, 34). Hobsbawm (1992, Nations and Nationalism) adds to this definition that political duty is the most important obligation a citizen of a nation-state has and it is specifically this political duty what

3 Author’s translation of: 2010 год стал знаковым в развитии белорусской политической системы. Он подвел черту под целым периодом в истории страны и обозначил новые перспективы. 3

A case study of national identity in Belarus

makes modern nationalism unique (9). Additionally, he stresses that it is not the nation which creates nationalism but that it is nationalism which creates the nation (10). Brubaker (1996) explains nationalism as “a heterogeneous set of ‘nation’-oriented idioms, practices and possibilities that are continuously available or ‘endemic’ in modern cultural and political life” (10). These idioms, practices and possibilities bring us in the sphere of definitions of nationalism which are important to the study of national identity. Greenfeld (1992) states that “nationalism locates the source of individual identity with a ‘people’, which is seen as the bearer of sovereignty, the central object of loyalty, and the basis of collective solidarity” (4). Anderson (1983) claims that nationality is a cultural artefact (4) and that the nation is “an imagined political community” (6). Especially the definitions of Anderson, Greenfeld and Brubaker are important to this study of Belarusian national identity. Greenfeld’s explanation of nationalism can be used as a measuring stick of Belarusian nationalism. Moreover, when applied to the cases, the definitions of nationalism given by Anderson and Brubaker unveil the differences between Lida’s Belarusian identity and the Belarusian identity voiced by the authorities. Next to varying definitions of nationalism, several approaches to nationalism and national identity have been created over time. Smith (2001) distinguishes five approaches: modernism, perennialism, primordialism, ethno-symbolism and instrumentalism. The main approach of those five is modernism. According to Smith (2001) “modernism represents the dominant orthodoxy of scholarship in nationalism. For many, the modernity of nations, national states and nationalism is simply assumed” (49). Modernists claim that industrialization and therefore modernization led to nationalism and nations (Smith 2001, 47). This in contrast to the view of perennialists, who claim that nations have existed for a long time (Smith 2001, 50). The focus of the third approach, primordialism, is not on the historical aspect of nationalism and nations but the foundation of nations: "primordialism holds that ethnic groups and nations are formed based on attachments to the 'cultural givens' of social existence” (Smith 2001, 52-3). The fourth approach, ethno-symbolism, focuses on the endurance of ethnies, the impact of nationalism and the formation of nations (Smith 2001, 57). Lastly, Smith (2001) states that instrumentalism is the approach which undermines all the others, except modernism. Rationality, modernity and politics are the recurrent themes in instrumentalism which serve as the closure of argument (56). For the study on national identity in Belarus, the constructivist strand of modernism is the most useful approach. This specific approach focuses on the socially constructed character of the nation (Smith 2001, 48). Identity itself is a constructed concept. Therefore, a constructivist modernist approach to the nation complements the concept of identity and leads to important insights. Two very influential scholars of constructivist modernism are Anderson and Hobsbawm. Anderson’s (1983) main contribution is his concept of ‘imagined communities,’ which entails that nations are social constructs. An inhabitant of Minsk may feel like he belongs to the nation of Belarus just as an inhabitant of Lida may feel this. They belong to the same imagined nation of Belarus. The glue which holds those two Belarusians, and therefore the Belarusian imagined community, together exists of national symbols, such as the national flag, the national emblem and statues. This is of interest for the study of Belarusian national identity because of the changes regarding the official state symbols that took place in the 1990s (Frear 2019, Belarus under Lukashenka, 7). According to Anderson (1983), a nation is imagined in three ways: limited, sovereign and as a community. It is imagined as limited because a nation will always have boundaries: a nation cannot encompass the whole world and the whole of mankind. A nation is imagined as sovereign because the concept of the nation was born in the time of Enlightenment and Revolution, when the legitimacy of a divinely-chosen ruler was being destroyed. Lastly, a nation is imagined as a community because “the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship” (7). This gives an extra dimension to the example of the inhabitant of Minsk and Lida. Due to the fact that they belong to the same

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imagined community, they feel connected to each other like comrades even though they have never met each other. Hobsbawm (1992, “Introduction”) contribution to the constructivist modernist approach to nationalism is his concept of the ‘invention of tradition.’ In the words of Hobsbawm: ‘Invented tradition’ is taken to mean a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past (1). So he means that invented traditions are a construct which connect the past with he present while at the same time they convey norms and values. This is a powerful tool which can be exploited by the government to spread their ideas about the nation. Hobsbawm distinguishes between three types of invented traditions: the first type of traditions creates social coherence between the members of the group. This tradition establishes what Anderson (1983) calls the “deep, horizontal comradeship” (7). The second type forms the legitimation of the state. The third and last type aims to establish socialization: “the inculcation of beliefs, value systems and conventions of behaviour” (Hobsbawm 1992, “Introduction”, 9). Invented traditions lead to social cohesion, socialisation and they can legitimise institutions. Additionally, they have important social and political functions. Invented traditions would not exist if they did not have such functions (Hobsbawm 1992, “Mass-Producing Traditions”, 307). This is important to the study of national identity in Belarus as there is a difference in how the state and other members of society see Belarusian identity (Bekus 2010). To understand the situation regarding national identity in Belarus, we also have to look at ideas on the formation of nation states because of the the short history of Republic of Belarus. Ioffe (2007) points out that because of the lack of one national idea of Belarus, the nation-building process is delayed (349). As Hobsbawm (1992, Nations and Nationalism) states, nationalism comes before the nation (10), so when nationalism is not yet fully grown, the nation cannot be established. For that reason, the concepts of nationalism proposed by Brubaker (1996) are useful to the study to Belarusian identity. He distinguishes three types of nationalisms: nationalising nationalisms, homeland nationalisms and minority nationalisms. The main idea behind nationalising nationalisms is an ethnoculturally defined 'core nation' or 'core nationality' which claims to be the 'owner' of the state. However, being an owner of the state does not mean that the core nation is strong. Its position within the state is characterized by a weak culture, economy and demographics (5). In direct opposition to the nationalising nationalisms are the homeland nationalisms of which the main characteristic is to “protect the interests of ‘their’ ethnonational kin in other states” (Brubaker 1996, 5). In this type of nationalism, the state is central. This type of nationalism is relevant in areas where borders have shifted a lot. The cultural or political elites who adhere to homeland nationalism see certain inhabitants of other states as co-nationals and as members of the same nation (Brubaker 1996, 5). The political elites of the BSSR after the Polish-Soviet War (1919 – 1921) provide an example of this because they saw the territory of west-Belarus, which had become part of Poland, as part of the BSSR. The last form of nationalism, proposed by Brubaker, is minority nationalism. This entails the “demand for state recognition of their distinct ethnocultural nationality, and the assertion of certain collective, nationality-based cultural or political rights” (6). The three types of nationalism that Brubaker distinguishes are relevant to the study on Belarusian national identity as we can detect these different forms in Belarusian society. This will be explained in the next section.

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A case study of national identity in Belarus

National identity in Belarus Ioffe (2003) distinguishes between two ideas of Belarusianness, namely Westernisers and people with a pro-Moscow orientation. In line with this is the distinction that Astapova (2016), Goujon (2010) and Marples (2014) make between the oppositional European idea of Belarusian identity and the official state ideology which is founded on the Soviet era. Bekus (2010), however, claims that there are three, rather than two, different forms of Belarusianness present in Belarusian society: Belarus as a European nation, Belarus as a neutral and self- sufficient nation and Belarus as a geopolitically predetermined nation. Already before Bekus’ book in which she set out the three ideas of Belarusianness, Ioffe (2007) reconsidered his claim that there are two ideas of Belarusianness, as he was taken aback by the view that there are three national projects. He concludes that "even two is one too many" (354) as in all three projects Belarus is an independent nation (355). Although, he does not dismiss the existence of three different national identity projects. This shift of Ioffe’s opinion shows how difficult the study of Belarusian identity is. This is because identities can change over time. For the sake of clarity, Bekus' (2010) distinction of three projects of national identity will be used in this study of national identity in contemporary Belarusian society. Especially in the light of the events of 2014, it is necessary to discern more than two ideas to not give a polarized image of the situation. The idea of Belarus as a European nation entails that Belarus’ European past is stressed. The alternative historiography connected to this idea makes a strong claim for Belarus as a European nation (Bekus 2010, 198). This historiography mainly focuses on the history of Belarus in the GDL and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth because the differences between Russians and Belarusians are evident in those histories. Both states were not only independent from Muscovy and Russia but also frequently at war with it. Additionally, the GDL was among the most influential countries of Europe (Wilson 2011, 19). Another goal of the focus on this particular history is the return of Belarus to Europe (Bekus 2010, 202). In the words of Ioffe (2007), this turn to Europe is perceived as “Belarus’s liberation from the shackles of Russian colonialism and rediscovering its (Belarus’s) true European roots” (355). The strength of this idea is that the nationalists who adhere to it are strongly connected to each other because of the conscious use of the Belarusian language and their devotion to fight "Russian cultural colonialism" (Ioffe 2007, 370). A weakness of this version of Belarusianness is that history is the only instrument used to express it (Bekus 2010, 202). Another weakness is that this idea mainly resonates among the elites of the political opposition. Many of them live in exile and are therefore closed off from Belarusian society (Ioffe 2007, 369). The idea of Belarus as a neutral and self-sufficient nation is not a contradiction to the idea of Belarus as a European nation. Rather, the former idea stands in between the ideas of Belarus as a European nation and as a geopolitically predetermined nation. The central notion of this understanding of Belarusianness is that Belarus belongs to itself, and therefore not to Europe and not to Russia (Bekus 2010, 204). The adherents of this idea see Switzerland as the perfect example (Bekus 2008, 8). Ioffe (2007) calls this idea the muscovite liberal idea and it is characterized by a belief in Belarus’ sovereignty although the supporters of this idea speak Russian (358). This leads to more resonance among society because the Russian language is perceived as the cultural norm in Belarus (Astapova 2016, 715). This is in line with Smith’s (1986) observation that “where (…) meanings, myths and symbols cease to strike a responsive chord – because of other competing ones – there [lie] the cultural boundaries of the nation” (136). The use of Russian strikes a responsive chord in Belarusian society and therefore the idea of Belarus as a neutral and self-sufficient nation lies within the cultural boundaries. However, this idea also has a weakness. Because of the focus of the idea on the fact that Belarus does not belong to one of the greater powers surrounding it, history cannot be used to validate this idea. The history of independent Belarus is extremely short: only ten months of

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independence as the Belarusian People’s Republic (BPR) in the interbellum and from 1991 onwards as the Republic of Belarus (Ioffe 2007, 372). The history of Belarus belonging to one of the great powers surrounding it, however, is much longer. The last idea, proposed by Bekus (2010), is the idea of Belarus as a geopolitically predetermined nation. This idea focuses on Belarus' ties with Russia, especially its historical ties. It counteracts the image of Russian colonialism (Bekus 2017, 11). Here, Belarusian tradition is historically linked with the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. The time when Belarusians shared a state with the Poles and Lithuanians is perceived as alien to the Belarusian tradition (Bekus 2010, 2018). Ioffe (2007) calls this idea ‘creole’ and he says that it “is essentially a pre-national consciousness” (366) as the sovereignty of the own state is not valued as much. The Great Patriotic War (GPW) is seen as the most important historical event (Goujon 2010, 7), which strengthened the bond between Russia and Belarus (Ioffe 2007, 366- 7). Everything connected to the memory of the GPW is politicized as the current regime is built on this idea. Marples (2014) points out that "the war provided a source of legitimacy to the president” (25). We can also see the politicisation of this idea of Belarusianness in president Lukashenka. He is, in the words of Ioffe (2007), “the president of creoles” (366). His policies are mainly founded on the principles that “all good things in the past have come from the East” and that there is a natural connection between Belarusians and Russians (Marples 1999, “National awakening”, 570). As the state controls the media, monuments, historic sights and educational books and determines when commemorative events take place, the idea of Belarus as tied to Russia is widespread in society. This means that the formation of historical memory and identity is a top-down process (Marples 2012, 437). The differences between the three ideas on Belarusianness can also be classified in Brubaker's (1996) terms. The idea of Belarus as a geopolitically predetermined nation can be regarded as a nationalising nationalism. First and foremost because the nationalists of this idea claim to be the owner of the state since they are leading it. Next to that, a characteristic of the core nation is that is has a weak culture, economy and demographics (5). The fact that this idea of Belarusianness only uses the GPW as its historical foundation points to the weak culture of the idea. However, because the state does have all the institutional instruments to spread their ideology (Marples 2012, 437), their ideas seem to resonance quite well in society. Additionally, the economy of the core nation is weak because it relies on Russian energy subsidies (Frear 2019, Belarus under Lukashenka, 8). Lastly, since 1996, the Belarusian population has been shrinking (Belstat 2020). Lukashenka pointed out this problem in the address to the nation in 2015, when he said that “we do not have enough people in the country. Our main goal is people. We need a population of at least twenty million people.”4 Homeland nationalism can be connected to the idea of Belarus as a European nation. The weakness of Belarus as a European nation is that it mainly resonates among a select, elite group, disconnected from society. The “protection of interests of ‘their’ ethnonational kin in other states” (Brubaker 1996, 5) does apply to that elite group because they are disconnected from the state due to exile. For example, Zjanon Paz’njak, the leader of the political party Belarusian National Front (BNF), has been living in exile since 1996 but this does not stop him from spreading the idea of European Belarus (Marples 1999, Belarus, xii-xiii). However, the divide between nationalising nationalism and homeland nationalism in Belarus is not ethnicity, but ideology. Minority nationalism is not very applicable to the contemporary case of Belarus as the titular national identity in Belarus is rather strong (Frear 2019, “Evolution and Adaptation”, 232). Nonetheless, during the interbellum, the Belarusians in west-Belarus experienced aggressive minority policies imposed on them by the Poles. The consequence

4 Author’s translation of: Нам людей не хватает в стране. Главная наша цель – люди. Нам надо 20 миллионов минимум населения. 7

A case study of national identity in Belarus

was that the Belarusians were not able to function as proper citizens of the Polish state without clashes with the authorities (Bekus 2017, 7). Especially for the case study, this short period of oppression of west-Belarusians is relevant because minority nationalism means that the minority is aware of their distinct ethnocultural nationality (Brubaker 1996, 6). All in all, those three forms of nationalism give a more thorough understanding of the complicated case of Belarusian national identity.

Chapter 2 | National identity in official political rhetoric The events of 2014 “touch upon multiple hot-button issues in the mentality of the Belarusian authorities” (Preiherman 2014, 16). Among others, this is reflected in the speeches given by Lukashenka (Yakouchyk 2016, 216). This chapter aims to grasp the change in the mentality of the authorities after 2014 through an analysis of several annual speeches of Lukashenka. Ideas on national identity are not just expressed in political rhetoric, but can also be found in other fields of society, such as historiography and state symbols. Nonetheless, changes in the official national ideology first emerge in political rhetoric before they appear in other fields of society since it takes time to adjust schoolbooks and statues to the new line of thinking. The speeches relevant to the study of national identity are the annual addresses to the nation, the speeches given at the ceremonies on Victory Day (9 May) and Independence Day (3 July) and the New Year’s speeches. The addresses to the nation set out the goals of the government for the near future (Lukashenko 2016, Obrashhenie s ezhegodnym Poslaniem) and show the most recent line of the official ideology regarding national identity. The New Year’s speeches look back on the year and emphasize the societal priorities of the government. Naturally, the GPW has a central role in the speeches given on May 9th and July 3rd. All of the speeches are given annually which means that they can be compared and that they can tell us something about the change in attitude towards national identity. The analysis will be conducted qualitatively through using direct quotes from the speeches (see Svarin 2016, 130). Next to that, the conclusions of the qualitative research will be backed up by a quantitative perspective regarding the frequencies of words in the annual addresses to the nation (see Frear and Mazepus 2017, 12). The qualitative analysis will be done in the framework of the three forms of Belarusianness as proposed by Bekus (2010): Belarus as a geopolitical predetermined nation, Belarus as a neutral and self-sufficient nation and Belarus as a European nation. The first hypothesis of this chapter is that the government does not purely pursue the idea of Belarus as a geopolitically predetermined nation but that there is spill-over from the other two forms of Belarusianness. The second hypothesis is that this spill- over has increased since 2014. Belarus as a geopolitically predetermined nation According to Bekus (2010), the form of Belarusianness that the authorities primarily adhere to is built on the idea of Belarusian succession to the Soviet Union. The traditions are therefore focused on the Soviet era and Belarusian history on the GPW (219). Accordingly, this form of Belarusianness is in favour of Slavic unity and is based on Russian culture (215). Lukashenka’s focus on Belarus’ Soviet history became visible in the address to the nation of 2015, when he said that “the unfading glory of the victorious heroes, the pride we take in them are the unshakable pillars of our national identity.”5 The significance of the GPW for Belarusian national identity is further stressed in the speeches given on Independence Day and Victory Day. In the Victory Day speech of 2018, for example, Lukashenka stated that “we, Belarusians,

5 Author’s translation of: Неувядающая слава героев-победителей, гордость за них являются незыблемыми опорами нашего национального самосознания. 8

Lida’s side of the story

have always fought to prevent the distortion of history, especially the history of the Great Patriotic War”6 and also in the speech of Independence Day 2014: In the history of every nation are dates of destiny that become the starting point of a new stage in history. They cause the greatest spiritual advancement and unity of the citizens of the country. For Belarus such a significant date is the day of the liberation of the capital of our Motherland from fascist aggressors. Today we solemnly celebrate the 70th anniversary of this day. Precisely this historical event became, by the will of the Belarusian people, Independence Day. This day brings together the holy words and connecting for all of us the holy words and concepts – Freedom and Independence.7 On Victory Day 2020, Belarus was the only country in the post-Soviet space where a military parade was held. All the others were cancelled on that day due to the global COVID-19 pandemic that was taking place at that time. The parade in Minsk went through because, according to Lukashenka, “even the idea of changing the traditions, which have been glorifying the history of the Great Heroism of the victors for 75 years, is unacceptable to us.”8 The Soviet mentality of the authorities is mainly displayed in the New Year’s speeches. For example, when Lukashenka said in 2013: “I bow to you, children, who give the country a future. Children are the basis of our independence, happiness and prosperity.”9 This mentality has not been changed by the events of 2014. Also after 2014, Lukashenka often stresses the importance of women and children. In the New Year’s speech of 2015 Lukashenka paid tribute to Belarusian women: “our wonderful women, who, equally sharing the burden of work and care with men, remain tender and beautiful.”10 Lukashenka went on with this tribute in the speech on 1 January 2016: “my special congratulations to our loved, unique Belarusian women. Let your beauty, charm and warmth of hearts light us up every minute.”11 In the same speech, he stated that "every day a miracle happens: children are born. And with them – new hopes and a new future."12 These are noteworthy examples of the Soviet mentality of the current government because in the Soviet Union, a mother who raised several children was seen as an admirable woman. There even existed awards for those who brought up at least five children. In April 1995, Belarus reintroduced these awards as the first post-Soviet country (Rudling 2017, 88). The government rewards mothers who give birth to and raise at least five children (Prezident Respublika Belarus'. b. d. «Ordena Respubliki Belarus'»). All in all, when it comes to the memory of the GPW or the Sovietness of the regime, it is still present in the political rhetoric after 2014. The GPW continues to be the most important

6 Author’s translation of: Мы, белорусы, всегда боролись за недопущение искажения истории, особенно истории Великой Отечественной войны. 7 Author’s translation of: В жизни каждого народа есть судьбоносные даты, которые становятся точкой отсчета нового этапа истории. Они вызывают наивысший духовный подъем и единение граждан страны. Для Беларуси такой вехой стал день освобождения столицы нашей Родины от фашистских захватчиков, 70- летие которого мы торжественно отмечаем. Именно это историческое событие по воле белорусского народа стало Днем Независимости, связав для всех нас святые слова и понятия - Свобода и Независимость. 8 Author’s translation of: Даже мысль изменить традициям, которые вот уже 75 лет прославяют историю Великого Подвига победителей, для нас недопустима. 9 Author’s translation of: Я преклоняюсь перед вами, подарившими стране будущее – детей. Они – основа нашей независимости, благополучия и процветания. 10 Author’s translation of: Наших удивительных женщин, которые, поровну разделяя с мужчинами груз трудов и забот, остаются нежными и прекрасными. 11 Author’s translation of: Мои особые поздравления нашим любимым, неповторимым белорусским женщинам. Пусть ваши красота, обаяние и тепло сердец озаряют нас каждую минуту. 12 Author’s translation of: Каждый день происходит чудо: рождаются дети. А с ними – новые надежды и новое будущее. 9

A case study of national identity in Belarus

historical event for Belarusian national identity. Additionally, the same qualities in women that were rewarded during the Soviet Union are praised in current-day Belarus. The relation between Russia and Belarus is another frequent topic of the annual addresses to the nation. In 2011, Lukashenka claimed that “thorough cooperation with Russia is one of the pillars of our sovereignty and economic growth.”13 The Slavic unity, in particular, was stressed in 2013: “Russia, the Russian people and Belarusians, are one whole, they are one tree.”14 Surprisingly, in the addresses of 2014 and after, the strong connection to Russia is still stressed, even though the Russian annexation of Crimea posed a direct threat on Belarusian sovereignty (Astapenia and Balkunets 2016, 6). In the address of 2014, the historical connection between Belarus, Russia and Ukraine was pointed out: “our three people are united by a common historical memory, by common great victories, by a Slavic Orthodox tradition.”15 Additionally, the importance of Russia for both Belarus’ past and future was stressed in 2015 when Lukashenka stated that I want to emphasize that we and Russia are no strangers to each other. We are connected by a centuries-old history, by common spiritual values and by our mentality. We defended our native land from fascist enslavement together, we achieved the Great Victory and we built our future with joint efforts, collaborating and strengthening our sovereign states.16 In the same speech, the president pointed out that “we highly value the great Russian culture and do not separate it from ours: we are part of this culture.”17 When we look at how often Russia is referred to in the annual addresses to the nation after 2014, compared to those before 2014, we can also see that the annexation of Crimea did not influence Lukashenka’s vision. We can actually see a rise of how often Russia is mentioned in 2015 (see appendix). The quotes above from the address to the nation of 2015 shows that the peak of mentions does not imply the rejection of Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Rather, the peak of mentions is because Lukashenka aims to explain the strong bonds between the two nations, despite the annexation. Belarus as a neutral and self-sufficient nation Before 2014 not only the idea of Belarus as a geopolitically predetermined nation was present in the official political rhetoric. Also the idea of Belarus as a neutral and self-sufficient nation was voiced. In the address to the nation of 2011, Lukashenka stated that “Belarus has its own place in Europe, which determines the necessity of a balanced interaction with the two centres of power.”18 Moreover, in the address of 2012, it was stated that “Belarus has no geopolitical ambitions. But we must clearly see our place in the world and uphold our national interests by all means.”19 This idea has won ground in the official political rhetoric after 2014 because Belarus has taken a neutral position in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine (Astapenia

13 Author’s translation of: Всестороннее сотрудничество с Россией является одной из опор нашего суверенитета и экономического развития. 14 Author’s translation of: Россия, русский народ и белорусы — это единое целое, это одно древо. 15 Author’s translation of: Три наших народа объединены общей исторической памятью, общими великими победами, общей православной духовной традицией. 16 Author’s translation of: Хочу подчеркнуть, что мы с Россией не чужие друг другу. Нас связывают многовековая история, общие духовные ценности и народная ментальность. Мы вместе защищали родную землю от фашистского порабощения и завоевали Великую Победу. И свое будущее строим совместными усилиями, сотрудничая и укрепляя наши суверенные государства. 17 Author’s translation of: Мы высоко ценим великую русскую культуру и не отделяем её от нашей, мы – часть этой культуры. 18 Author’s translation of: У Беларуси свое место в Европе, которое определяет необходимость сбалансированного взаиможействия с двумя центрами силы. 19 Author’s translation of: У Беларуси нет геополитических амбиций. Но мы должны ясно видеть свое место в мире отстаивать всеми спомобами наши национальные интересы.

10

Lida’s side of the story

2020). So, after 2014, the idea of Belarus as a neutral and self-sufficient nation has been amplified in the political rhetoric rather than implemented. The core of the idea of Belarus as a neutral and self-sufficient nation is that the nation can only be properly built without an alliance to either East or West (Bekus 2010). In the address of 2019, Lukashenka argued that the repeated redrawing of Belarus’ borders and division of its people “makes us highly value today’s unity and territorial integrity.”20 Therefore, “the main task of all power structures is to guarantee the inviolability of our Motherland, its territorial integrity and constitutional order” (Lukashenko 2016, Obrashhenie s ezhegodnym Poslaniem).21 “I, as Head of State, declare with all responsibility: we will do all we can to ensure that no one will ever undermine the foundation of our state building – the freedom and independence of the Republic of Belarus!” (Lukashenko 2017).22 These quotes combined show the message of Belarusian neutrality, unity and sovereignty voiced by Lukashenka since 2014. Another aspect of the idea of Belarus as a neutral and self-sufficient nation is that it focuses on Belarus’ mentality to unite cultures (Bekus 2017, 11). Since 2014, the president has touched upon this distinct mentality several times, for example in the address to the nation of 2014: "Belarus is a unique country in its own way. In Belarus, the Eastern and Western branches of Christianity (Orthodoxy and Catholicism) meet and Belarusians, Russians, Ukrainians, Jews, Poles and Tatars all live on the same land."23 The address of 2017 had a similar message, when Lukashenka said that “historically, Belarus has become a hospitable home where you can get acquainted with the culture and customs of many nations.”24 When it comes to Belarus’ foreign relations after 2014, we can detect a more nuanced message. Since 2014, Lukashenka stresses how Belarus does not choose between East and West. This is in line with the idea of Belarus as a neutral and self-sufficient nation. For example in the address of 2015, the message was conveyed that “Belarus is a reliable link, connecting East and West. Belarus’ multi-vector foreign policy is evidence of this as it is aimed at developing mutually beneficial relations with various countries of the world.”25 These new nuances sometimes lead to contradictions as the idea of Belarus as a geopolitically predetermined nation also remains in speeches after 2014. In the address to the nation of 2014, Belarus’ non-alignment in the Ukraine crisis was emphasized with the words "we are not pro-Russian, not pro-Ukrainian and not pro-Polish, we are not Russians, we are Belarusians!"26 However, in the same speech, Lukashenka said that “the Russian Federation has always been and remains our strategic ally, our brother.”27 Moreover, one of Lukashenka’s favourite metaphors about Belarus’ international relations is that of Russia and Belarus as residents of the same building: we want to live in our own apartment, in a multi-storey building. You [Russia], have a large apartment, a penthouse there, or whatever it is called, and we have a small

20 Author’s translation of: Заставляет нас высоко ценить сегодняшнее единство и территориальную целостность. 21 Author’s translation of: Главная задача всех силовых структур – обеспечивать неприкосновенность нашей Родины, её территориальную целостность и конституционный порядок. 22 Author’s translation of: Я как Глава государства со всей ответственностью заявляю: будет сделано все, чтобы никто и никогда не смог подточить фундамент нашего государственного здания – свободу и независимость Республики Беларусь! 23 Author’s translation of: Беларусь – по-своему уникальная страна. В ней сходятся восточная и западная ветви христиантсва (православие и католицизм), на одной землу живут белорусы, русские, украинцы, евреи, поляки, татары... 24 Author’s translation of: Исторически сложилось так, что Беларусь стала гостеприинмый домом, где можно познакомиться с культурой, обычаями многих народов. 25 Author’s translation of: Беларусь – это надежное звено, связующее Восток и Запад. Об этом свидетельствует многовекторность внешнеполитического курса Беларуси, направленного на развитие взаимовыгодных отношений с различными странами мира. 26 Author’s translation of: Мы не пророссийские, не проукраинские и не пропольские, мы — не русские, мы — белорусские! 27 Author’s translation of: Российская Федерация всегда была и остается нашим стратегическим союзником, нашими братьями. 11

A case study of national identity in Belarus

apartment in the same house, but our own apartment. (…) And if someone assumes, not just in Russia but also in other places, that we can be deprived of this – never! Never! We are a sovereign, independent state that does not create problems for anyone (Lukashenko 2015, Obrashhenie s Poslaniem).28 Also in the address to the nation of 2016, the president said that “I wish the Russians would understand, especially Russia’s leaders, that we will not be “errand boys”. We are an independent, sovereign state, living with you in the same house, but in our own apartment. It is small, not big, but it is our apartment.”29 Another sign that the idea of Belarus as a neutral and self-sufficient nation has become more important in the official ideology of the government, is that the multi-vector character of Belarus’ foreign policy has been mentioned every year since 2014 (see appendix). Thus, from 2014 onwards, Lukashenka has put an emphasis on Belarus’ sovereignty and neutrality whereas before 2014 it had a much less significant place in the official political rhetoric. Belarus as a European nation Some see Belarus as a European nation because of common history and shared political and moral values (Bekus 2010, 198). Lukashenka underlined this idea in the address of 2011: we do not need to be persuaded to go to Europe. We are located in it. We never rushed to keep ourselves out of those values, from everything good and progressive that developed in the Western European states, in the European Union. Moreover, we fully share the democratic ideas, which guide these countries. Many of these values have historically been developed by our people, on our territory.30 Another aspect of the idea of Belarus as a European nation is that its supporters hold the Belarusian language dear (Ioffe 2007, 357). While before 2014, Lukashenka took a negative position towards the Belarusian language (Frear 2019, Belarus under Lukashenka, 80), he has since then started to express the importance of the Belarusian language. For example, in the address of 2014 the president said that “if we forget how to speak the Belarusian language, we will cease to be a nation.”31 However, in the same speech he stated that “if we lose the Russian language, we will lose our mind!”32 the latter is, of course, more aligned with the other two ideas than with Belarus as a European nation. Nonetheless, "our expressive language is dear to us and it must be cared for, studied and developed" (Lukashenko 2017).33 The focus on the importance of the Belarusian language contradicts both the ideas of Belarus as a geopolitically predetermined nation and Belarus as a neutral and self-sufficient nation because the main language of both ideas is Russian. Still, the idea of Belarus as a geopolitically predetermined nation has never been explicitly rejected in the speeches, not even in or after 2014. The idea of Belarus as a European country,

28 Author’s translation of: Но мы хотим жить в своей квартире, в многоэтажном доме. У вас [Россия] большая квартира, пентхаус там, или как она называется, а у нас небольшая в одном дому, но своя квартира. (...) И если кто-то полагает, не только в России, но и в других местах, что нас этого можно лишить – никогда! Никогда! Мы суверенное, независимое государство, никому не созающее проблем. 29 Author’s translation of: Я хочу, чтобы россияне понимали, особенно руководство России, что мы не будем «мальчиками на побегушках.» Мы – самостоятельное, суверенное государство, живущее с вами в одном дому, но имеющее свою квартиру, пусть маленькую, небольшую, но свою квартиру. 30 Author’s translation of: Нас не надо уговаривать идти в Европу. Мы в ней находимся. И никогда не стремились отгородиться от тех ценностей, от всего хорошего и прогрессивного, что наработано в западноевропейских государствах, в Евросоюзе. Более того, мы вполне разделяем те демократические идеи, которыми руководствуются эти страны. Многие из этих ценностей исторически наработаны и нашим народом, на нашей территории. 31 Author’s translation of: Если мы разучимся говорить на белорусской мове – мы перестанем быть нацией. The word for “language” is Belarusian, whereas the rest of the quote is in Russian. All Belarusian words quotes are translated by Dasha Brusnikava unless stated otherwise. 32 Author’s translation of: Если мы потеряем русский язык – мы лишимся ума! 33 Author’s translation of: Нам дорог наш выразительный язык, который надо беречь, изучать, развивать. 12

Lida’s side of the story

however, was plainly rejected in the address of 2016 when Lukashenka emphasized that “we will never live outside this so-called cultural world, which created the Russian, Belarusian and Ukrainian, this Slavic world! This is our strong conviction!”34 Nonetheless, the qualitative perspective shows that from the addresses to the nation from 2017 onwards, Europe and the European Union combined have been mentioned more often than Russia (see appendix). This does not necessarily mean that the regime sees Belarus as a European nation. It indicates that the regime focuses more and more on Europe in the international arena. In conclusion, the idea of Belarus as a geopolitically predetermined nation has a prominent place in the speeches analysed. However, already before 2014, there was spill-over from the other two ideas, mainly from the idea of Belarus as a neutral and self-sufficient nation. This spill-over has increased since 2014. This means that in the official ideology regarding Belarusianness, Belarus has never been posed purely as a geopolitically predetermined nation. Before 2014, the idea of Belarus as a geopolitically predetermined nation was the most pronounced, while the idea of Belarus as a neutral and self-sufficient nation was also influential, although to a lesser extent. Those two ideas made up the hybrid voiced by the government before 2014. The idea of Belarus as a European nation only became truly relevant after 2014, as before this year, it was referred to only sporadically. Additionally, after 2014, the idea of Belarus as a geopolitically predetermined nation lost some ground to the idea that Belarus is a neutral and self-sufficient nation. So, since 2014, all three forms of Belarusianness make up the hybrid expressed by the government.

Chapter 3 | National identity in Lida Modern Belarusian nationalism, if it arrives, will probably involve a mythical notion of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (Snyder 2003, 284). Even though Snyder made this remark quite some time before this thesis was written, it is still relevant. The previous chapter has shown that some aspects of the idea of Belarus as a European nation occurred in political rhetoric, especially after 2014. This may be the beginning of "modern Belarusian nationalism". This chapter hypothesizes that in Lida, the development of "modern Belarusian nationalism" is in a further stage than it is in official political rhetoric. Since the idea of Belarus as a European nation only really started to occur more frequently in Lukashenka’s speeches after 2014, this chapter focuses on recent projects and events in Lida. These projects and events are analysed along the lines of the three forms of Belarusianness proposed by Bekus (2010). This way, the ideas about Belarusian identity voiced by the authorities can be compared to the form of Belarusian identity present in Lida’s society. History At the beginning of the fourteenth century, the first Lithuanian Grand Duke Gediminas (1275 – 1341) arrived in the north-west region of current-day Belarus. He decided to build a fortress to guard the Belarusian-Lithuanian lands against crusaders (Arteaga 2020). In 1323 constructions started and a few years later, the castle was ready. A garrison was stationed at the castle. To clothe and feed the garrison, tailors, shoemakers and blacksmiths settled down close to the fortress. This led to the birth of the city of Lida. Regarding the name of the city, the legend goes that the daughter of Gediminas, Lida, was in love with a local shepherd. Gediminas, however, wanted Lida to marry an elderly, very influential prince but Lida refused. To separate Lida and the shepherd, Gediminas imprisoned his daughter in one of the towers of the castle. From there, Lida jumped down into the river. Realizing his mistake, Gediminas

34 Author’s translation of: Мы никогда не будем жить вне этого так называемого культурного мира, который создал русский, белорус и украинец, этого славянского мира! Это наша твердая убежденность! 13

A case study of national identity in Belarus

ordered to name the area surrounding the fortress in honour of his daughter Lida and to name the river Lideika (Kapcevich 2018). Under Gediminas and his son Algirdas, the GDL expanded considerably. The GDL incorporated much of the lands of Kievan Rus': from Vilnius to Kyiv, from the Baltic to the Black Sea. The most eastern Lithuanian posts were only a hundred kilometres away from Moscow (Vakar 1956, 43). The Gedimid dynasty adopted Ruthenian culture and allowed the Ruthenian duchies to keep their Orthodox faith. This way, they turned the GDL into a major power (Frost 2015, 389). According to a local Lidchan journalist, Ol’ga Kapcevich, the name of Gediminas is “written with golden letters in the history of Lithuania, Belarus, Russia and Ukraine” (2019).35 From the end of the fourteenth century until the beginning of the sixteenth century, Lida was a grand-princely city (Lavresh 2001). Its political importance cannot be understated. Many significant events took place within the walls of the Lida fortress – such as the gathering of a militia to fight in the Battle of Grunwald in 1410. The Lida garrison took part in this battle. The participation of the Lida garrison ended in disaster when all of the soldiers died on the battlefield. Nevertheless, they were immortalized in Lida’s coat of arms: the lion depicts how they fought like lions. Together with the coat of arms, Sigismund III of Poland (1566 – 1632) granted Lida the Magdeburg Rights in September 1590. A few years after the Battle of Grunwald, in 1422, the marriage of King Władysław Jagiełło (1352 – 1434) and Sophia of Halshany (1405 – 1461) was celebrated in the Lida fortress. Sophia is known as the mother of the Jagiełłonian dynasty (Ulitenok i Lihodedov 2019). Additionally, the great-great-grandson of Gediminas and grandson of Sophia, the King of Poland and Grand Duke of Lithuania Alexander I (1461 – 1506), wrote his dying testament in the Lida castle. Lida lost its strategic importance when the Swedes destroyed the fortress during the Great Northern War (1700 – 1721) (Orehvo 21 dekabrja 2017). Nonetheless, the castle remained important for society. During the nineteenth century, social life in Lida was centered around the fortress. In its ruins, mass was celebrated, films were shown, competitions were organized and motorcycle rallies were held (Arteaga 2020). Later on, during the interbellum, the castle was the centre of social, cultural and sports life in Lida. The castle was used, among other purposes, as a soccer stadium (Budaj 2017). The Lublin Union of 1569 merged the GDL with the Polish Kingdom. Together they formed the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. After almost two hundred years of belonging to the Commonwealth, Lida became part of the Russian Empire in 1795, as a consequence of the third Polish Partition. While the establishment of the Commonwealth had led to Polonization in Lida, the incorporation of the city in the Russian empire did not lead to Russification as the region was too remote from Saint-Petersburg (Wilson 2011, 59). Paradoxically, this remoteness led to further Polonization, as the Russian government sought the support of the already existing gentry, who were either Polish or Polonized (Vakar 1956, 66). After the First World War, Belarus gained independence as the BPR, which only existed for ten months (Wilson 2011, 93-6). According to Bekus (2017), the BPR was more an idea of the political elites than a real country. Additionally, it lacked international recognition (6). During the remainder of the interbellum, west-Belarus was part of Poland, which was re-established after Germany’s defeat in the First World War. During this time, policies of Polonization were again carried out in Lida (Frear 2019, Belarus under Lukashenka, 5). At the beginning of the Second World War, east- and west-Belarus were reunited through the Soviet occupation of west-Belarus (Vakar 1956, 156). With the start of Operation Barbarossa in 1941, Belarus was route number one for the Nazis to invade the USSR. Lida came under German occupation

35 Author’s translation of: Золотыми буквами вписано в историю Литвы, Беларуси, России и Украины. 14

Lida’s side of the story

(Wilson 2011, 108). During the war, most of the Lidchan Jews were executed (Ackermann 2016, 415). Many of the other indigenous Lidchans were either murdered or died from other causes or emigrated to Poland. This meant that after the liberation in 1944 by the Soviets, Lida appeared as a “normal Soviet”36 city (Lavresh 2001). The last country shift of Lida happened in 1991 when the Soviet Union dissolved and the Republic of Belarus was established. Local initiatives Lida has an active civil society and many citizens eagerly participate in the public life of the city and the region (Petrulevich 2019, 7 sentjabrja 2019). Many of these citizens are passionate about Lida's history and culture (Arteaga 2020). So, local initiatives in Lida shop us the importance Lidchans attach to Lida’s medieval heritage. Important symbols of Lida are the fortress, statue, weapon and name. They are the symbols which Figure 1, source: ministerstvo glue Lida's imagined community together. An example of the svjazi i informatizacii Respubliki relevance of these symbols is the postcard in figure one that was Belarus' created in honour of Lida as Belarus’ Cultural Capital of 2020. Cultural Capital 2020 Lida was elected as the Belarusian Cultural Capital of 2020. While the project of Cultural Capital is a national one, the form in which it takes place is decided by the local authorities and citizens. Therefore, this project gives a good picture of what is important for Lida’s society and how Lidchans want to present themselves to visitors. In the election as Cultural Capital, the castle and the statue of Gediminas played an important role as did the high level of participation of Lidchans in many local events (Petrulevich 26 aprelja 2019). The program of the events in the framework of Cultural Capital was put together by the cultural department of the Executive Committee, but the involvement of the citizens of the city was welcomed. Lidchans could propose ideas for events and artists have the opportunity to perform during the events (Petrulevich 16 ijulja 2019). Many of the events are dedicated to Lida’s Lithuanian past (Lozhachnik 2020). This is because the goal of the events is to present the city’s cultural identity. Moreover, the aim of the events is to develop and popularize the traditions and achievements of the national culture (Petrulevich 26 aprelja 2019). This leads to a high level of cultural cooperation with Lithuania, in particular with the city Trakai, which is a sister city of Lida (Bibikova 2020). One of the projects broadened for Cultural Capital is Zamkavy gastsinets (“Castle Road”). This is a cultural-touristic project that was established in 2017. In the light of this project, every week, a medieval activity is organised in the city (Orehvo 14 ijunja 2017). This project stimulates the development of the cultural environment of the city (Orehvo 10 janvarja 2019). The Lidchan community has been actively involved in this project as the diversity of the activities directly depend on the interest and visits of the citizens of Lida (Orehvo 14 ijunja 2017). Activities planned for the Cultural Capital in the framework of Zamkavy gastsinets are a fire festival in which “the audience will plunge into the atmosphere of a medieval castle” (Petrulevich 16 ijulja 2019).37 Additionally, a knightly tournament will be held which coincides with City Day and the Hops, Malt and Water Festival. Statue of Grand Duke Gediminas On 7 September 2019, during City Day, a statue of Grand Duke Gediminas was revealed next to the fortress. A lot of people were involved in the project and therefore, according to

36 Author’s translation of: Нормальный советский 37 Author’s translation of: Зрители окунутся в атмосферу средневекового замка. 15

A case study of national identity in Belarus

Kapcevich (2019) is the project “an example of love for their motherland, history and roots.”38 Leonid Lavresh, a writer and local historian, stated that all self-respecting cities erect monuments of their founders. For that reason, he applauds that Lida has erected a statue of Gediminas (in Orehvo 28 oktjabrja 2017). Next to Lavresh, Stanislav Sudnik, the editor of the local history and art magazine “Lida Chronicler”, claimed that Lida is the only city in Belarus that has the right to erect a monument of Grand Duke Gediminas. Moreover, he stated that Gediminas’ historical significance is underestimated in Belarus (in Orehvo 21 oktjabrja 2017). The project started in 2017 when the citizens of Lida proposed the idea to erect a monument in honour of the founder of the city (Kapcevich 2019). A competition was held in which the Lida District Executive Committee asked for preliminary designs for the monument of the Grand Duke. The most important requirement of the sketches was that the monument should be worthy of its hero: “in no case must one save money on a monument” (Orehvo 21 oktjabrja 2017).39 The winning sketch was made by Sergey Oganov and Olga Nechay (Orehvo 19 fevralja 2019). Oganov was raised in Lida. He would have therefore understood the importance of the monument for the city and the weight of the project. To ensure the historical accuracy of the monument, a group of historical experts assisted the sculptors. While this historical accuracy is significant, Oganov believes that the most important aim of the statue is to convey an emotional message (in Poznjak 2019). This emotional message connects the citizens of Lida and is therefore the glue of the “deep, horizontal comradeship” (Anderson 1983, 7), characteristic to the imagined community. The emphasis of the statue is on the significance of Gediminas as a statesman – the statue is placed in such a way that it appears to protect the castle and the city (Charovskaja 2019). Various companies also understood the societal importance of the project. They therefore provided financial aid for the establishment of the monument (Serafinovich 25 fevralja 2019). Another way in which the project was financed, and in how the community was involved, was through voluntary subbotniks. These are community working days, a heritage of the Soviet Union (Redakcija 2018). Aside from obtaining financial means, the aim of the subbotniks was the promotion of the historical and cultural heritage of Lida (Orehvo 9 nojabrja 2017). In this way, with the use of a Soviet legacy, Lida’s medieval heritage is popularized. Renaming Sverdlov street Another local initiative regarding the heritage of the GDL is the discussion of renaming Sverdlov street. This street is one of the oldest streets of Lida. Originally, the street was called Vilenskaja street as it was the road to Vilnius. In 1940, Vilenskaja street was turned into Sverdlovskaja street (Orehvo 24 dekabrja 2017) and in 1965 the street simply became Sverdlov street. In 2018, the street was turned into a wide avenue. The street does not just connect Lida to the new, growing districts just outside the city, but it is also part of the highway to Lithuania. Because the street is the “entrance gate”40 of the city, it was argued that the street should have an appropriate name (Pinevskaja 2018).41 Therefore, in 2017, a discussion arose in society to change the name of Sverdlov street. The most popular proposal for the new name was the revival of the street’s historical name, Vilenskaja street (Pinevskaja 11 dekabrja 2017). The name change is a topic of discussion among the Lidchans. In favour of the name change is Jedvard Zinovich, who was born in 1935 and who has lived in Lida his whole life. He is in favour of the name Vilenskaja street because Lida already has some streets which indicate a direction to a major city, such as Moskovskaja street (in Pinevskaja 16 dekabrja 2017). Cheslav

38 Author’s translation of: Есть пример любви к своей Родине, истории, корням. 39 Author’s translation of: На монументе ни в коем случае нельзя экономить. 40 Author’s translation of: Въездных ворот. 41 Author’s translation of: Название ее должно быть соответствующим. 16

Lida’s side of the story

Gorbach is also in favour of Vilenskaja street because the city was founded in the GDL Moreover, he believes that the name Sverdlov should be in a history book and not be used as a street name. Aleksander Gorbach agrees with Ch. Gorbach and Zinovich because the street is in the centre of the city where Lida’s history was created. The combination of Gediminas, the castle and Vilenskaja street sounds beautiful, according to A. Gorbach (in Pinevskaja 29 dekabrja 2017). There are also a number of people that oppose the name change. One of them is Veslav Gabrilovich, who points out that in Lithuania, a monument of a Soviet soldier was destroyed, which he finds shameful. He does not understand that also in Lida, there are people who want to destroy the Soviet past, the history of their fathers and grandfathers. Sergei Galaburda brings up a rather practical reason against the name change: he says that the residents will keep on calling and remembering the street as Sverdlov and therefore it is useless to change the name (in Pinevskaja 16 dekabrja 2017). Sergey Met’ko is also against the renaming of the street. He draws a parallel to the changing of street names in Ukraine and expresses his sadness that there are people in Belarus who do not appreciate the independence of the country, as they do not accept that Sverdlov was part of Belarus’ history (in Pinevskaja 29 dekabrja 2017). In 2019 the discussion flared up again. Lidchans appealed to the Executive Committee to change Sverdlov street into Vilenskaja street. They argued that with the installation of the Gediminas monument, it would be a logical step to rename the street to its old name (Serafinovich 10 ijunja 2019). At the time of writing, however, Sverdlov street is still Sverdlov street. Assessment The three local initiatives described in this chapter are all aligned with the idea of Belarus as a European nation. Connected to this idea is the alternative historiography which highlights Belarus' history in the GDL. This historiography focuses on the similarities between Belarus and Europe and the need for Belarus to return to Europe (Bekus 2010, 202). Because of the local character of the initiatives, it is difficult to determine whether there is a desire among Lida’s population to return to Europe. Nonetheless, the city maintains neighbourly relations with Poland and Lithuania (Orehvo 2016). Especially in the project of Cultural Capital, there is intense cooperation with Lithuania (Bibikova 2020). Additionally, earlier in the 2010s, Lida has actively participated in the European Cross Border Cooperation programme between Latvia, Lithuania and Belarus. The local initiatives reveal how much the GDL past is cherished in Lida and how it lives in society. Especially the ongoing discussion to rename Sverdlov street shows that the heritage of the GDL is very much alive in Lida’s society. However, the main motivation of the projects regarding the Lithuanian past are not solely a love for the history of the city: it is also an effort to broaden the touristic potential of Lida. This is especially visible in the project of Cultural Capital. In this way, the local authorities can exploit the heritage of the GDL to its full potential. But it is certainly not just about economic benefits: the contribution of a big part of the community to the installation of the monument and the large number of people that attend the medieval events show the emotional attachment of the people to their past. It is also important to acknowledge that not only the idea of Belarus as a European nation is present in Lida’s society: the other two ideas of Belarusianness are also important to the Lidchans. Especially in the arguments to keep the name of Sverdlov street, we can see the emotional attachment of the respondents to the GPW, which confirms the presence of the idea of Belarus as a geopolitically predetermined nation. To recall, according to this idea, the historical orientation is towards the east rather than the west and the GPW is regarded as most important historic event (Ioffe 2007, 2018). The idea of Belarus as a neutral and self-sufficient nation comes forth in Met’ko’s argument in favour of the preservation of the name Sverdlov 17

A case study of national identity in Belarus

street as he connects it to Belarusian independence (in Pinevskaja 29 dekabrja 2017). This independence is central to the idea of Belarus as a neutral and self-sufficient nation (Bekus 2010, 204). Concludingly, also in Lida a hybrid of the three forms of Belarusianness exist. However, the focus in the Lida hybrid is on the idea of Belarus as a European nation whereas the focus in the hybrid of the authorities is on the idea of Belarus as a geopolitically predetermined nation. Therefore, the development of “modern Belarusian nationalism” (Snyder 2003, 284) is in a further stage in Lida that it is in official political rhetoric. Whereas in the rhetoric the idea of Belarus as a European nation is least mentioned of the three ideas, in Lida the idea can be found throughout society because Lida’s society keeps its Lithuanian heritage alive.

Chapter 4 | Lida from a broader perspective While 2014 was a critical juncture for the national authorities, reflected in the political rhetoric on national identity, it was not for the local authorities in Lida. The fortress and Lithuanian heritage have always been central to Lida’s society. Already before 2014, many festivals with a medieval touch were organized in Lida. For example, the first international festival of medieval tradition and culture “Gediminas Castle” was held in 2005 (Grinkevich 2005). In 2009 it was the theatrical re-enactment of the wedding between Władysław and Sophia which attracted tourists to Lida (Belarus’ Segodnja 2009). These are only two of many examples of how Lida’s GDL past has been used for a long time, even before 2014. The aim of this chapter is to explain how Lida could have adhered to the oppositional idea of Belarus as a European country before 2014, as well as how the shift in the political rhetoric from 2014 onwards affected the situation in Lida. In this way, this chapter investigates how Lida's form of nationalism relates to the official political rhetoric and thus to the official form of nationalism. The chapter is divided into three parts. In the first part, the historical struggle for Belarusian nationalism, both locally and nationally, will be described. In the second part, the focus is on the differences and similarities in the imagined communities and invented traditions between Belarus as a whole and Lida. The last part elaborates on the consequences of the events of 2014 for Lida and the political boundaries of Belarusian society. Belarusian national identity One of the assumptions of this thesis is that Belarusian national identity exists. This is apparent in the hypothesis: the form of Belarusian national identity present in Lida is further developed than the ideas about Belarusian national identity voiced in the political rhetoric. However, this is not a general assumption in the academic literature on national identity in Belarus. Belarus has often been called a ‘denationalised’ or ‘anti-national’ nation (Bekus 2008, 7; Buhr et al 2011, 437; Marples 1999, Belarus; Plokhy 2006, 361). These terms imply a lack of awareness and a lack of interest in Belarusian national identity among the political elites and population (Buhr et al 2011, 437). Bekus (2008) claims that the process of denationalisation started in 1995, when “the idea of European Belarus appeared to be supplanted to the margins of cultural and political life” (7). The event which placed the idea of Belarus as a European country at the border of society in 1995, was the nation-wide referendum in which people voted in favour of the reinstallation of Soviet symbols. The referendum was a fulfilment of the promise, made by Lukashenka during the campaign for the presidential elections of 1994, to return to Russia’s orbit (Wilson 1996, 121). So, according to Bekus, the choice of Lukashenka to reject the idea of Belarus as a European nation and to base his regime on the idea of Belarus as a geopolitically determined nation led to the denationalization of Belarus. The referendum of 1995 points out that the Belarusian population agreed with this denationalization.

18

Lida’s side of the story

When looking at the 1990s, the idea of a denationalized Belarus is plausible: next to the referendum, the Union State of Russia and Belarus was established in 1999 (Frear 2019, Belarus under Lukashenka, 7). However, when we look at Belarusian geopolitics from the beginning of this century onwards, it is clear that Minsk only half-heartedly favours good relations with Russia. Several gas and trade wars happened between the two countries (Korosteleva 2011, 570-1) and it became clear that with Putin, there was no space anymore for Lukashenka to become a powerful president of the Union State (Frear 2019, “Evolution and Adaptation”, 238). Moreover, since 2005, the Belarusian law states that the main goal of Belarusian foreign policy is the “protection of state sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Belarus” (zakon No. 60-Z).42 Additionally, the analysis of chapter two shows that before 2014, the official rhetoric has not been completely pro-Russian as Lukashenka has made several remarks which underline the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Belarus. Finally, since Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, Lukashenka has voiced the idea of Belarus as a neutral and self-sufficient nation more. This shows that Lukashenka has, at least since the turn of the century, been keen on preserving Belarusian sovereignty. Hence, Belarus is not a denationalized nation. Rather, Belarusian nationalism is weak because it does not exist in a single form. As showed in chapter two, the government pursues a hybrid form of Belarusianness. Therefore, the message spread about national identity is sometimes contradictory. Additionally, in chapter three it has been pointed out that in Lida also a hybrid form of Belarusianness exists, but the focus in the Lida hybrid differs from the focus in the government hybrid. Nationalism can manifest itself in many different ways. Brubaker (1996) explains that nationalism is “a heterogeneous set of ‘nation’-oriented idioms, practices and possibilities that are continuously available or ‘endemic’ in modern cultural and political life” (10). The main idioms, practices and possibilities in Lida differ from the national ones: the dominant form of Belarusianness in Lida’s society is Belarus as a European nation, while the authorities use the idea of Belarus as a geopolitically predetermined nation as a foundation of the state. The official practices and possibilities concerning national identity evolve around the GPW. This becomes especially visible during the ceremonies on Independence Day and Victory Day. The practices and possibilities regarding national identity in Lida, however, evolve around Grand Duke Gediminas, simply because the has been central to Lida’s society for centuries. This shows that Belarus is indeed not a denationalized nation; different forms of nationalism are present in Belarusian society. However, the different forms are weak because the political and cultural boundaries are not congruent (Gellner 1983, 1). In this thesis, the political boundaries are the boundaries of the political rhetoric as described in chapter two. Even though these boundaries have been stretching since 2014, they are not congruent with the cultural boundaries of Lida’s society as described in chapter three. The cultural boundaries are broader than the political boundaries because the European history of Belarus plays a much more significant role in the cultural sphere of Belarusian society than it does in the political sphere. What makes Belarusian nationalism even weaker is that “nationalism locates the source of individual identity with a ‘people’, which is seen as the bearer of sovereignty, the central object of loyalty, and the basis of collective solidarity” (Greenfeld 1992, 4). Because of the short history of the Republic of Belarus, the Belarusian people have not had much time to create a solid, common national identity. As Bely (1997) points out: “the name, the language, the capital – all matters of crucial significance for any sense of national identity – experienced repeated disruption in continuity in Belarus” (4). Additionally, Belarusians have endured different policies of Russification and Polonization which have obstructed the formation of national

42 Author’s translation of: Защита государственного суверенитета и территориальной целостности Республики Беларусь. 19

A case study of national identity in Belarus

consciousness (Ackermann 2016, 423). Polish and Russian were the languages of privilege that represented opposing policies but both languages are similar to Belarusian. Therefore, if a Belarusian speaker was disillusioned by Russian policies, he would turn to the Polish language, and to Russian if there was dissatisfaction with Polish policies (Lewis 2019, 5). Language is often regarded as an essential marker of national identity (Simpson 2007 ,1). For that reason, the linguistic flexibility of the Belarusians and the resulting capability to consciously choose a national identity caused critical losses of Belarusian national identity (Bekus 2017, 16). The low prestige of the Belarusian language also has consequences for the interpretation of history. Normally a national language connects the past to the present (Fabrykant 2019, 117). Especially in the case of Belarus, language could have strengthened nationalism as the Belarusian language is many centuries old. Already in 1517, the Bible had been translated into a Belarusian version of Church Slavonic (Snyder 2003, 19). Historically, a national identity has barely existed in Belarus, because it did not have the space to develop itself. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Belarusians used local identities along the lines of the concepts of krayovtsi and tuteishiya. The term krayovtsi contains the word kray, which means ‘territory’. According to the idea of krayovtsi, local ethnicities should collaborate in the interest of a particular territory (Wilson 2011, 61). In 1914, the movement of the krayovtsi resonated particularly among Catholics and supporters could mainly be found in the regions of Vilnius and Grodno (Wilson 2011, 87-8). Also after the Second World War, local identities still resonated in the Grodno region (Ackermann 2016, 419). The idea of krayovtsi is therefore historically strong in Lida. Tuteishiya depicts something similar as krayovtsi: it literally means ‘from here’. In the 1950s, some Belarusians still introduced themselves as tuteishiya (Ioffe 2003, 1244-5). A reason for those enduring local identities could be that, especially at the beginning of the twentieth century, people belonged to different countries due to territorial shifts. Therefore, national identities could not develop properly. Next to that, the importance of local identities in the history of the Belarusian lands can also be an explanation for the differences between Lida’s local identity and the national identity pursued by the authorities. Bekus (2017) also observed that “after 25 years of state independence (…) ‘localising’ practices [are] the most appropriate and efficient way to define Belarusians’ identity” (12). Two or three forms of Belarusianness? When independence was imposed on the Republic of Belarus, the first task of the government was to define the state by creating new symbols, self-image, historical and cultural traditions and to decide on the state language (Marples 2014, 21). The first government of the independent Republic of Belarus decided to reinstall the flag and emblem of the GDL, which had also been used by the BPR. This was a conscious orientation to the West and turning away from the Soviet style of remembering the GPW. The standard interpretation of the Second World War in Eastern Europe was adopted and the war was seen as a series of Nazi and Soviet occupations. Belarusian became the only official state language and the Soviet period was proclaimed as “damned years” (Nosovich 2017, 70-1).43 However, this course turned out to be too radical for Belarusian society (Wilson 2011, 154). In 1994 everything changed when Lukashenka entered the political stage and unexpectedly won the elections (Frear 2019, Belarus under Lukashenka, 7). His campaign was built on the promise of returning to Russia's orbit, since that would solve the political and economic problems the country was facing (Wilson 1996, 121). This promise was kept in the referendum of 1995, in which the majority of the people were in favour of changing the language and national symbols of Belarus to Soviet-style symbols (Central’naja komissija Respubliki Belarus’ 1995).

43 Author’s translation of: Проклятыми годами. 20

Lida’s side of the story

The election of Lukashenka and the referendum show that the Belarusians were willing to orientate towards Russia and cherish the Soviet history. It became clear that Belarusian society was not ready for an anti-Russian orientation in which Soviet history was rejected (Astapova 2016, 716). The strong connection to Russia was established by the Soviets’ nationalities policy of korenizacija, which literally means ‘to take root’ (Plokhy 2017, 303). This policy was carried out in east-Belarus in the 1920s and it created the ideological foundation on which the Belarusian nation could be built. This in contrast to the repressing policy of Polonization carried out in west-Belarus. The main pillar of the foundation of national identity established during korenizacija was the fraternal bond between Russia and Belarus (Bekus 2017, 6-7). Lukashenka founded his regime on this idea, rejecting the view of Belarus as a European nation. While the first government attempted to break away from the Soviet past, Lukashenka tried to get rid of the pre-BSSR history (Ritter 2008, 77-8) and connected the national symbols of the first government of the Republic of Belarus to the opposition (Kulakevich 2014, 891). This radical break worked because the Soviet past was located within the confines of Belarusian culture whereas the BPR and GDL had less resonance among society. Nevertheless, even though Lukashenka tried to eradicate the idea of Belarus as a European nation, it continued to exist locally. Invented traditions and state symbols are important for the “deep, horizontal comradeship” of Belarusian society and its imagined community (Anderson 1983, 7). An example of a national invented tradition is Lukashenka’s decision to change the date of Independence Day. In 1996, he moved this date from 27 July to 3 July. The former date is the day that Belarus declared independence in 1990, while the latter refers to the liberation of Minsk from the Nazis (Goujon 2010, 8). Belarus’ main state symbols, which are the flag, emblem and anthem (Prezident Respubliki Belarus’ b.d., «Gosudarstvennaja simbolika») are still in Soviet-style. This shows that the national imagined community of Belarus is glued together by Soviet history, memory and remembrance. The GPW has a special place in this remembrance (Goujon 2010). Connected to the reminiscence of the GPW is "patriotic conservatism" which entails that the GPW was seen as the main founding myth of the Soviet Union, rather than the October Revolution of 1917. This “patriotic conservatism” was not imposed on the people but came from below – the veterans and Soviet population at large adopted and initiated it (Markwick 2012, 693-4). This underpins the importance of the GPW for Soviet, and therefore also for Belarusian society and imagined community. The Belarusian myth connected to the GPW is that Belarusians are victorious people that defeated fascism because they were part of a single Soviet people (Nosovich 2017, 18). This myth still lies at the basis of Belarusian national mythology (Nosovich 2017, 24), which is confirmed by Lukashenka in his political rhetoric. While it seems that the myth underlines the strong bonds with Russia, Waligórska (2015) claims that the myth is committed to the national independence of Belarus (21). Therefore, the adoption of the GPW as the main historical event does not directly mean a dedication to strong relations with Russia. This is an explanation of why the GPW remembrance does align with the geopolitics pursued by the Lukashenka regime since the turn of the century and especially after 2014. Moreover, Waligórska’s observation also confirms the conclusion of chapter two that before 2014, the official form of Belarusianness was at least a hybrid of the idea of Belarus as a geopolitically predetermined nation and Belarus as a neutral and self-sufficient. Complementary to these national symbols and invented traditions, Lida has its own symbols and traditions. Grand Duke Gediminas and his fortress are seen as the main symbols of Lida which glue the imagined community of the Lidchans together and around which many events evolve. According to Renata Senkevich, a student of Lida College, the statue of the Grand Duke represents the history of the region and contributes to the patriotic education of the youth

21

A case study of national identity in Belarus

of Lida (in Orehvo 28 oktjabrja 2017). An important invented tradition of Lida is the City Day on 7 September. On this date, it is celebrated that Lida was granted the Magdeburg Rights in 1590. It also marks the day that the city received the right to brew beer, which is celebrated with the Festival of Hops, Malt and Water since 2014 (Poznjak 2016). Historical events of the middle ages form the basis for the symbols and invented traditions of the city. This also becomes evident from the attention that Lida’s cultural institutions pay to the preservation and popularization of Belarusian traditional culture. Some examples of this are the project of Zamkavy gastsinets, which provides a framework for weekly medieval activities, and Belarus – maja mova i pesnja which means “Belarus – my language and song”. The latter project popularizes Belarusian language and culture (Mіnіstjerstva kul'tury rjespublіkі Belarus' 2019). This project in particular can be connected to the oppositionists who made up the first government of the Republic and thus against the current government as the latter eliminated all the efforts the former put in state-building at the beginning of the 1990s. The importance of Lida’s medieval history is also evident in the street names. An example here is the renaming of Chapaev street into the Prince Gediminas Boulevard, already at the beginning of the 2010s (Orehvo 2013). We can also recall the discussion on the renaming of Sverdlov street, which indicates that the history of the GDL lives among the Lidchans. As discussed in the previous chapter, the events surrounding the name change show that both the ideas of Belarus as a geopolitically predetermined nation and Belarus as a neutral and self- sufficient nation persist in Lida’s society. The name has not yet been changed officially because not everyone agrees. Therefore, in line with the conclusion of chapter three, a hybrid model of all three ideas of Belarusianness exists in Lida. The hybrid form of ideas regarding Belarusianness present in Lida’s society and the hybrid voiced by the authorities bring us back to the difficulty of Belarusian identity. We can recall the shift Ioffe made in his articles, from two to three forms of Belarusianness (Ioffe 2007). Looking at the case of Lida in combination with the analysis of political rhetoric, it has to be concluded that there are only two hybrid forms. Those two forms encompass all three forms of Belarusianness proposed by Bekus (2010). The dominant idea in the official hybrid is that Belarus is a geopolitically predetermined nation whereas the focus in Lida's hybrid is on Belarus as a European nation. The existence of the two hybrid forms can be explained by the fact that there is no cultural homogeneity in Belarusian society. According to both Brubaker (1996) and Gellner (1983), such homogeneity is necessary for nationalism to develop (10; 34). In Belarus, cultural homogeneity is lacking because the regime rejected the European past in the 1990s. In Lida, this history has a central place in society, as discussed in chapter three. Its influence is strong in the national identity of the Lidchans. Additionally, the official line of national identity also has its place in Lida, as it is taught in schools and broadcasted on television. The question remains, however, how these two opposing hybrids can harmoniously exist in one country. Samuel Huntington's (1993) cultural division of Europe provides an explanation. He argues that this cultural division runs right through Belarus. The western half of Belarus belongs to Western Christianity (Catholicism) while the eastern half of Belarus belongs to Orthodox Christianity (29). A consequence of this split is that the identity of Belarus cannot be easily defined (Huntington 1993, 44). Whereas Huntington sees the cultural division as a consequence of the end of the Cold War (23), Wilson (2011) draws attention to the religious split that took place after 1863. The Catholics were situated in the far west, while central and east-Belarus was predominantly Orthodox. Wilson draws his line similarly to Huntington: north- west of Minsk (65). A characteristic of the eastern, Orthodox part of Belarus is that it is oriented towards Russia, while the western and predominantly Catholic part is focused on the West (Ioffe 2003, 1267). Historically, the heritage of the GDL has been cherished among the

22

Lida’s side of the story

Catholics until after the Polish Rebellion of 1863-4 (Wilson 2011, 61). Later on, at the beginning of the twentieth century, the national idea of Belarus evolved in the literary circle Nasha Niva. This circle was solely composed of Belarusian speaking Catholics (Ioffe 2003, 1247). According to the results of a survey executed in 2017, 73 percent of Belarusians identify as Orthodox, and twelve percent as Catholic (Pew Research Center 2017, 5). Of those who identify as Orthodox, only twelve per cent attend church weekly, whereas those who identify themselves as Catholic, 25 percent weekly goes to church (Pew Research Center 2017, 11). In the Grodno region, there is a high concentration of Catholics: in 2013, they made up over half the population (Diocese of Grodno, n.d.; catholic.by, n.d.). Despite the lack of numeric evidence regarding Lida, we can assume that the percentage of the city is similar to that of the region. This assumption is based on the number and size of the parishes in Lida (catholic.by, n.d.), there are five in total, one of which has 4000 members (Poznjak 2020). Moreover, in the Lida district are seventeen Catholic churches against eighteen Russian Orthodox Churches (Lidskij rajonnyj ispolnitel'nyj komitet). The high proportion of Catholics in Lida and the Grodno region, is another indication of the prevalence of the idea of Belarus as a European nation. In conclusion, east-Belarusians faced the policy of korenizacija during the interbellum. This resulted in an orientation towards Russia (Bekus 2017, 7). This in contrast to the Belarusians in the west, who became more aware of their distinct ethnocultural nationality because of the repressive policy of Polonization (Bekus 2017, 7; Brubaker 1996, 6). The former strengthened the idea of Belarus as a geopolitically predetermined nation while the latter underlined the importance of local identities. Huntington’s (1993) cultural division of Belarus provides an explanation to the current-day division concerning national identity. Especially because religion and national identity are closely related to each other in Belarusian society (Pew Research Center 2017, 5). The differences in the ideas of Belarusianness of the authorities and Lida can be partly explained by the fact that Catholics in west-Belarus have always been more focused the idea of Belarus as a European nation whereas the preference of the authorities was often more towards the Orthodox, Russophile part in the east and thus with Belarus as a geopolitically predetermined nation (Wilson 2011, 65). Impact of 2014 on Belarus’ political boundaries Figure two shows a simplification of the cultural boundaries of Belarusian society before 2014. At the core is the idea of Belarus as a neutral and self-sufficient nation, depicted as “BY”. This core is small because its influence on society was not that substantial compared to the idea of Belarus as a geopolitically predetermined nation. The idea of Belarus as a neutral and self-sufficient nation was mainly present in the law and political rhetoric, albeit only half-heartedly. Still, the idea is at the core because since the turn of the century, the political rhetoric and foreign policy have moved away from Russia and Figure 2 thus from the idea of Belarus as a geopolitically predetermined nation. The authorities seem to be more and more convinced that Belarus is a neutral country as opposed to being strongly connected to Russia. The several gas and trade wars between Russia and Belarus made the authorities realize that not all good things come from the East but that good things can also be found within Belarus itself, in particular when it comes to national identity. The shell "BSSR" stands for the idea of Belarus as a geopolitically predetermined nation. This shell is the biggest one because the state symbols and invented traditions of the Republic of Belarus are based on the BSSR and these have much influence in Belarusian society. The size of the shell is also justified by how well this idea resonated in society: it were the people 23

A case study of national identity in Belarus

that voted for the Soviet-style national symbols. The main holidays of Belarus are connected to the GPW and many street names, especially in Minsk, are based on the Soviet past of Belarus. In other words, Belarus’ imagined community was primarily founded on the history of the BSSR. Together with the small core “BY”, this shell forms the hybrid model of Belarusianness pursued by the government. Both the core and the “BSSR” shell encompass the political boundaries of Belarusian society as both ideas are present in the rhetoric and beliefs of the government regarding national identity. Finally, the idea of Belarus as a European nation is located in the outer shell of the circle in figure two. While the ideas of the other two shells were located within the political boundaries, the idea of this outer shell only lied within the cultural boundaries. The referendum of 1995 showed that the majority of the people favoured the idea of Belarus as a geopolitically predetermined nation and rejected the idea of Belarus as a geopolitically predetermined nation. However, in the Grodno region and the city of Minsk, there were the least people in favour of the changes proposed in the referendum (Central’naja komissija Respubliki Belarus’ 1995). This shows that the idea regarding national identity pursued by the first government of the Republic of Belarus resonated well in those regions. The statues dedicated to the GDL in Minsk, Slonim and Lida show that the idea of Belarus as a European nation lived on after the referendum at the figurative edges of society, as the “GDL” shell depicts. All three shells together make up the hybrid model of Belarusianness, present in Lida’s society. This hybrid encompasses both the political and cultural boundaries of Belarusian society. As previously noted, the political boundaries include the ideas connected to the “BY” and the “BSSR” shell. Chapter two has shown that the idea of Belarus as a European nation did not have a relevant place in the political rhetoric before 2014. Therefore, it is not included in the political boundaries before 2014. The cultural boundaries stretch beyond the political boundaries because the idea of the “GDL” shell is included in the cultural boundaries. Chapter three has shown that the idea of Belarus as a European nation has had a central role in Lida’s society already before 2014. In conclusion, figure two depicts the relation between the local initiatives regarding national identity in the city of Lida and the official political rhetoric about national identity before 2014. The political boundaries of figure two, however, have changed after the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Frear (2019) points out that “since Crimea, Minsk has become even more vocal in claiming that it is a sovereign country with inviable border” (“Evolution and Adaptation”, 241). Additionally, Bekus (2019) observes that “the course of events in post-Maidan Ukraine has prompted the Lukashenko regime to rethink not only its handling of ethnonationalism but also the importance of a clear boundary between Belarusians and Russians” (263). Therefore, the regime started to actively promote Belarusian national identity, culture and language after 2014 (Lennon and Becker 2019, 323). An example of this active promotion is the choices made regarding street names. In the micro-districts on the outskirts of Minsk, street names are appearing that refer to prominent persons of the GDL. This shows that the authorities are giving Belarus’ pre-Soviet history a place in the capital. However, the street names of Minsk’s centre are still predominantly referring to Soviet times. In contrast to this, some of Lida’s most prominent streets refer to the GDL (Bekus 2019, 260). This observation confirms that the idea of Belarus as a European nation has continued to exist locally after the referendum in 1995. Moreover, the observation also confirms that the political boundaries are getting more congruent with the cultural boundaries because even in the city where the government is seated, Belarus’ European history is slowly emerging. The installation of monuments like the one of Grand Duke Gediminas in Lida is also a trend of post-2014. Already in 2014, the first two statues dedicated to Belarus’ medieval heritage were installed. The first one is a memorial in Upper Town Minsk, devoted to the historical event when Minsk received the Magdeburg Rights in 1499 from Grand Duke Alexander I of Lithuania

24

Lida’s side of the story

(Bekus 2019, 262). The second memorial is a statue of Grand Duke Algirdas, the son of Gediminas, erected in Vitebsk. The idea for this statue already arose in 2010 among the local authorities in Vitebsk. At the national level, however, the authorities did not approve of the plan. This changed at the end of 2013, at the same time when Putin pressured Yanukovych to opt- out of the Association Agreement with the EU (Raam op Rusland 2016). Eight months later, in June 2014, the statue of Grand Duke Algirdas was revealed in Vitebsk (Golesnik 2014). In 2019, two statues were added to this list of GDL memorials. The first statue of 2019 is of Great Secretary Lew Sapieha, which was erected in Slonim. The second one is Lida’s statue of Grand Duke Gediminas. Vladimir Kravcov, the chairman of the Executive Committee of the Grodno region, stressed the importance of the two monuments in Slonim and Lida by calling them “spiritual bread” (in Kozyrev 21 sentjabrja 2019).44 The four statues are only the beginning of a new trend. Snezhana Kuratchik, the deputy head of the cultural department of the region of Grodno, hinted during the ceremony in which the statue of Gediminas was revealed that soon another statue will be erected somewhere in the region (in Kozyrev 7 sentjabrja 2019). According to Bekus (2019), the erection of those memorials show the support of the government for the European history of Belarus, in particular the history of the GDL (262). As the case of Vitebsk shows, this support started at the time that the tensions between Russia and Ukraine were building up in 2013. The Ukraine crisis has not only influenced the position of the Belarusian government regarding national identity, but also that of Belarusian society. A survey of 2017 shows that Belarusians increasingly identify themselves with contemporary Europeans. The percentage of Belarusians who see themselves as modern Europeans is much higher than for Russians and Ukrainians (Frear 2019, “Evolution and Adaptation”, 243). Moreover, while in Russia, 57 percent of the people consider being Orthodox as part of their identity, in Belarus only 45 percent perceive being Orthodox as a sign of their identity. Of the Orthodox countries in central- and eastern Europe, Belarus is the only country in which less than half of the people say that Orthodoxy is a sign of their nationality (Pew Research Center 2017, 12). Orthodoxy is connected to non- European values (Huntington 1993, 30-1) and thus this disconnection of Orthodoxy with nationality points at identification with Europe. However, the main problem is that the idea of Belarus as a European nation can never become prominent under Lukashenka because his regime is founded on the rejection of the idea of Belarus as a European nation. Additionally, the government has to keep in mind that, on the one hand, a fully developed ethnic Belarusian identity can lead to people demanding democracy and overthrow the current regime. On the other hand, completely adopting a Russian identity can endanger the independence of Belarus and therefore Lukashenka’s grip on power (Astapova 2016, 41). The approval that the national authorities gave to local governments to establish statues which refer to Belarus’ European heritage can be interpreted as an attempt to preserve power by giving the people what they want. It does not mean that the regime adopted the ideas of the first government of the Republic (Frear 2019, “Evolution and Adaptation”, 245). Nonetheless, the statues and street names can also be seen as an indicator that the authorities have started to use the “markers of identity” which were previously claimed by the opposition. One of the reasons for this adoption of the oppositional “markers of identity” is the threat which Russia poses on Belarusian sovereignty since 2014 (Bekus 2019, 263). In political rhetoric, these “markers of identity” become apparent in statements such as “Belarus is a reliable link, connecting the East and the West. This is evidenced by the multi- vector foreign policy of Belarus, aimed at developing mutually beneficial relations with various

44 Author’s translation of: Хлебе духовном 25

A case study of national identity in Belarus

countries of the world” (Lukashenko 2015, Obrashhenie s Poslaniem).45 However, when looking further into it, the focus in the rhetoric is on Belarus as the geographical centre of Europe, which is seen as the reason why Belarus belongs to Europe (Frear 2019, “Evolution and Adaptation”, 234). This is more aligned with the idea of Belarus as a neutral and self- sufficient nation than with Belarus as a European nation, as the message of the rhetoric is not that Belarus belongs to Europe because of shared values but because of the location of the country in Europe. In conclusion, I interpret the statues as an attempt to satisfy the desire of the people to keep them in check rather than an actual, genuine adoption of these “markers of identity” by the government. There are two ways in which the use of the Belarusian language can be interpreted. In chapter two, I argued that Lukashenka’s cherishing use of the Belarusian language in his speeches is connected to the idea of Belarus as a European nation. In this idea, the Belarusian language takes up a significant place. Additionally, the emphasis on the Belarusian language can also be a simple way to stress Belarus' neutrality and disassociate the country from Russia. So, on the one hand, by stressing the importance of the Belarusian language the government shows some openness on the ideas of the first government of the Republic. On the other hand, the language is used as a means to stress Belarusian sovereignty. This is a demonstration of the balancing act the government has been doing since 2014. The Ukraine crisis led to an even more complicated situation in Belarus regarding nationalism. There was a need for a new national identity that had to be both in sympathy and tension with the Soviet legacy (Bekus 2019, 258). Figure three depicts the change which happened in connection to the political boundaries of the Belarusian state. Before 2014, the government ensured that statues and other national symbols were connected to the idea of Belarus as a geopolitically predetermined nation. After 2014, however, there was more freedom with regard to which ideas of Belarusianness was Figure 3 depicted in the public space. With regard to Lida, this freedom led to the establishment of the statue of Grand Duke Gediminas and the other statues throughout Belarus, even in traditionally Orthodox parts of the country. Moreover, in Lida, the freedom was also used to establish projects and new events such as the Hops, Malt and Water Festival, Zamkavy gastsinets and Belarus – maya mova i pesnya. We can see here that the communities which were located in the outer “GDL” shell before 2014, now had more opportunities to focus on their local identities, rather than the official form of national identity. These local identities are located both within the political and cultural boundaries of Belarusian society. Moreover, the idea of Belarus as a neutral and self-sufficient nation has become much more prevalent in society because Lukashenka has been more vocal about Belarus’ sovereignty since 2014. The prime example of this is Lukashenka’s statement “we are not Russian, we are Belarusian!” (Lukashenko 2014).46 The weakness of this form of Belarusianness is that it has no history to build on. There are no national symbols, such as street names and statues, related to this idea. Therefore, this idea has been limited to the rhetoric only. Nonetheless, as

45 Author’s translation of: Беларусь – это надежное звено, связующее Восток и Запад. Об этом свидетельствует многовекторность внешнеполитического курса Беларуси, направленного на развитие взаимовыгодных отношений с различными странами мира. 46 Author’s translation of: Мы — не русские, мы — белорусские! 26

Lida’s side of the story

pointed out earlier in this chapter, Belarus' Soviet history has been used as a historical foundation for the idea of Belarus as a neutral and self-sufficient nation. The third circle of this figure depicts the idea of Belarus as a geopolitically predetermined nation. This idea still has the upper hand when it comes to national symbols and invented traditions. The impact of the idea, however, has diminished after 2014 because the government allowed the other forms of Belarusianness to grow. This is the reason why in figure three all circles have the same size: because of the decrease of importance of the “BSSR” shell, the other two shells got the room to grow. It must be noted, however, that figure three is a simplification. In reality the influence of all three ideas are not exactly the same. Nonetheless, after 2014, there is no obvious dominant idea anymore with regard to political rhetoric, national symbols and local forms of national identity. All three circles can exist together in society because, as Frear (2019) points out, there has been an evolution of strategic culture and “in this evolution (…), Belarusian sovereignty and European heritage was not a rejection of Russia per se, but rather an additional factor alongside close relations with Moscow that could be used when diversifying ties or defending Minsk’s interests” (“Evolution and Adaptation”, 239). In other words, Belarusian society has evolved in a way that the ideas of Belarus as a European nation and Belarus as a neutral and self-sufficient nation do not reject the idea of Belarus as a geopolitically predetermined nation anymore. In conclusion, figure three depicts the current-day relation between the local initiatives regarding national identity in the city of Lida and the official political rhetoric about national identity. The problem remains, however, that the political and the cultural boundaries are not congruent (Gellner 1983, 1), as the political elite cannot adopt the idea of Belarus as a European nation. This idea does, however, resonate in cultural society and therefore the cultural boundaries of Belarusian society are broader than the political boundaries. This incongruence became clear in the opening of Lida as Cultural Capital 2020 when the deputy minister of culture referred to the 75th anniversary of the Great Victory, while the head of the Executive Committee of the Lida referred to the folk traditions and rich heritage of the city (Kapcevich 2020). Therefore, following Gellners (1983) argument, nationalism in Belarus has not yet matured. Nonetheless, the very centre of figure three, where all three ideas come together, depicts a strong form of future nationalism in Belarus which still has to grow and evolve in society at large. A form of nationalism in which a "mythical notion" of the GDL is involved (Snyder 2003, 284), which includes a patriotic defence of Belarusian sovereignty (Frear 2019, Belarus under Lukashenka, 63) and in which Soviet history is remembered in a way that it strengthens Belarusian independence (Goujon 2010, 8). In Lida, this future form of Belarusian nationalism already exists.

Conclusion It has been researched how the local initiatives regarding national identity in the city of Lida relate to the political rhetoric about national identity. The answer is that there is a discrepancy in Belarusian society regarding the official form of national identity and local forms. The regime has been built on the idea of close relations with Russia and the rejection of the European history of Belarus. Therefore, this is at the core of the official stance regarding national identity. Nevertheless, since the turn of the century, the loyalty of the authorities towards Russia has been decreasing and since 2014 the authorities have become more vocal about Belarus’ sovereignty. This means that the official idea of national identity is a hybrid of Belarus as a geopolitically predetermined nation and Belarus as a neutral and self-sufficient nation. Since 2014 a few aspects of Belarus as a European nation have been added to this hybrid.

27

A case study of national identity in Belarus

The local form of national identity in Lida, however, has always been centred around the European past of Belarus. Nonetheless, as the authorities have a monopoly on the most important means to spread national identity, the official hybrid of ideas can also be found in Lida. Therefore, Lida's local hybrid form of the ideas about national identity encompasses all three forms of Belarusianness, as proposed by Bekus (2010). The dominant idea in Lida's hybrid is Belarus as a European nation. So, the relation between the local initiatives in Lida regarding national identity and the official political rhetoric is that the local initiatives use official means, such as the national project Cultural Capital, to stress their own European identity. The consequence of this discrepancy between Lida's local and the national form of Belarusianness is that national identity is weak in Belarus. This weakness is explained by the fact that the cultural and political boundaries in Belarus are incongruent. Only when those two boundaries are congruent, national identity and nationalism can mature (Gellner 1983, 1). For further research it is recommended to go to Lida and speak to the people there about national identity. That was the initial plan for this thesis, however the global COVID-19 pandemic caught up with this idea and therefore the thesis has been written without field-work in Lida. Additionally, research on the other cities in which statues dedicated to the GDL are erected is also recommended. In particular research on Vitebsk and Minsk is suggested as they both are located in the Orthodox part of Belarus (Huntington 1993, 29). Lastly, a lot is going on in Belarusian society with regard to national identity. Therefore, Belarusian national identity remains a hot topic and research about Belarusian national identity remains important. To conclude, the future form of Belarusianness is already present in Lida as it encompasses both the cultural and political boundaries of Belarusian society. Those boundaries can only become congruent when the authorities choose to actively promote the idea of Belarus as a European nation. It is unlikely that the current regime will start to do this as the regime is built on the rejection of this idea. Therefore, Belarusian national identity can only mature when Lukashenka's power has come to an end and a new leader has come forth. A leader which may inherit the system, but also a leader who did not build the regime himself and did not write out a referendum in order to reject the idea of Belarus as a European nation. Until then, hopefully, more and more local identities will develop into the future form of nationalism so the new leader will have a strong support base to reform Belarusian society and to give Belarusian nationalism the room to mature. The main aspect of this future form of nationalism is Belarusian independence. Hence, it must be concluded that Ioffe (2007) was right when he stated that even two forms of Belarusianness is one too many (354-5) because in the end, Belarusian independence is something all the three forms of Belarusianness agree on.

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Lida’s side of the story

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Korosteleva, Elena. 2011. “Belarusian Foreign Policy in a Time of Crisis.” Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 27(3-4): 566 – 586. Kozyrev, Vladimir. 2019 g. «Grodnenskaja oblast' vstrechaet 75-letnij jubilej s dostojnymi pokazateljami v social'no-jekonomicheskoj sfere.» Belarus' Segodnja, 21 sentjabrja 2019 g. Dostup 22 aprelja 2020 g. https://www.sb.by/articles/nemanskiy-kray-vse- kraski-yubileya.html. Козырев, Владимир. 2019 г. «Гродненская область встречает 75-летний юбилей с достойными показателями в социально-экономической сфере.» Беларусь Сегодня, 21 сентября 2019 г. Доступ 22 апреля 2020 г. https://www.sb.by/articles/nemanskiy-kray-vse-kraski-yubileya.html. Kozyrev, Vladimir. 2019 g. «V Lide otkryli pamjatnik osnovatelju goroda – knjazju Gediminu.» Belarus' Segodnja, 7 sentjabrja 2019 g. Dostup 22 aprelja 2020 g. https://www.sb.by/articles/v-lide-v-torzhestvennoy-obstanovke-otkryli-pamyatnik- osnovatelyu-goroda-knyazyu-gediminu-.html. Козырев, Владимир. 2019 г. «В Лиде открыли памятник основателю города – князю Гедимину.» Беларусь Сегодня, 7 сентября 2019 г. Доступ 22 апреля 2020 г. https://www.sb.by/articles/v-lide-v- torzhestvennoy-obstanovke-otkryli-pamyatnik-osnovatelyu-goroda-knyazyu-gediminu- .html. Kulakevich, Tatsiana. 2014. “Twenty Years in the Making: Understanding the Difficulty for Change in Belarus.” East European politics and Societies and Cultures 28(4): 887-901. Lavresh, Leonid. 2001 g. «Istorija goroda». Pawet, 23 marta 2001 g. Dostup 26 marta 2020 g. http://pawet.net/library/history/bel_history/_books/lida/02/%D0%98%D1%81%D1%82 %D0%BE%D1%80%D0%B8%D1%8F_%D0%B3%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%BE%D0% B4%D0%B0.html. Лавреш, Леонид. 2001 г. «История города». Pawet, 23 марта 2001 г. Доступ 26 марта 2020 г. http://pawet.net/library/history/bel_history/_books/lida/02/%D0%98%D1%81%D1%82 %D0%BE%D1%80%D0%B8%D1%8F_%D0%B3%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%BE%D0% B4%D0%B0.html. Lennon, Olena and Aemin Becker. 2019. “Belarus at the United Nations: An Analysis of Belarus’s Global Policy Alignment Following the Maidan Revolution in Ukraine.” Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization 27(3): 319 – 348. Lewis, Simon. 2019. Belarus – Alternative Visions. Nation, Memory and Cosmopolitanism. New York and London: Routledge. Lidskij rajonnyj ispolnitel'nyj komitet. b. d. Harakteristika rajona. Dostup 12 maja 2020 g. http://lida.by/ru/xarakteristika-rayona-ru/. Лидский районный исполнительный комитет. б. д. Характеристика района. Доступ 12 мая 2020 г. http://lida.by/ru/xarakteristika-rayona-ru/. Lozhachnіk, S.V. 2020 g. «PRAGRAMA kul'turnyh merapryemstvaў». Dostup 6 aprelja 2020 g. http://lida.by/uploads/files/Pragrama-merapryemstvau-Kulturnaja-stalitsa-2020.pdf. Ложачнік, С.В. 2020 г. «ПРАГРАМА культурных мерапрыемстваў». Доступ 6 апреля 2020 г. http://lida.by/uploads/files/Pragrama-merapryemstvau-Kulturnaja- stalitsa-2020.pdf. Lukashenko, A. G. 2011 g. Poslanie belorusskomu narodu i Nacional'nomu sobraniju. 21 aprelja 2011 g. Dostup 11 fevralja 2020 g. http://president.gov.by/ru/news_ru/view/poslanie-belorusskomu-narodu-i- natsionalnomu-sobraniju-5804/. Лукашенко, А. Г. 2011 г. Послание белорусскому народу и Национальному собранию. 21 апреля 2011 г. Доступ 11 февраля 2020 г.

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http://president.gov.by/ru/news_ru/view/poslanie-belorusskomu-narodu-i- natsionalnomu-sobraniju-5804/. Lukashenko, A. G. 2012 g. Poslanie Prezidenta belorusskomu narodu i Nacional'nomu sobraniju. 8 maja 2012 g. Dostup 15 fevralja 2020 g. http://president.gov.by/ru/news_ru/view/poslanie-prezidenta-belorusskomu-narodu-i- natsionalnomu-sobraniju-5798/. Лукашенко, А. Г. 2012 г. Послание Президента белорусскому народу и Национальному собранию. 8 мая 2012 г. Доступ 15 февраля 2020 г. http://president.gov.by/ru/news_ru/view/poslanie-prezidenta- belorusskomu-narodu-i-natsionalnomu-sobraniju-5798/. Lukashenko, A. G. 2013 g. Novogodnee obrashhenie Prezidenta Respudliki Belarus' Aleksandra Lukashenko k belorusskomu narodu. 1 janvarja 2013. Dostup 15 fevralja 2020 g. http://president.gov.by/ru/news_ru/view/novogodnee-obraschenie-prezidenta- respubliki-belarus-aleksandra-lukashenko-k-belorusskomu-narodu-5772/. Лукашенко, А. Г. 2013 г. Новогоднее обращение Президента Респудлики Беларусь Александра Лукашенко к белорусскому народу. 1 января 2013. Доступ 15 февраля 2020 г. http://president.gov.by/ru/news_ru/view/novogodnee-obraschenie- prezidenta-respubliki-belarus-aleksandra-lukashenko-k-belorusskomu-narodu-5772/. Lukashenko, A. G. 2013 g. Poslanie k beloruskomu narodu i Nacional'nomu sobraniju. 19 prelja 2013 g. Dostup 13 fevralja 2020 g. http://president.gov.by/ru/news_ru/view/poslanie-k-belorusskomu-narodu-i- natsionalnomu-sobraniju-8567/. Лукашенко, А. Г. 2013 г. Послание к белорускому народу и Национальному собранию. 19 преля 2013 г. Доступ 13 февраля 2020 г. http://president.gov.by/ru/news_ru/view/poslanie-k-belorusskomu-narodu-i- natsionalnomu-sobraniju-8567/. Lukashenko, A. G. 2014 g. Poslanie Prezidenta belorusskomu narodu i Nacional'nomu sobraniju. 22 aprelja 2014 g. Dostup 13 fevralja 2020 g. http://president.gov.by/ru/news_ru/view/aleksandr-lukashenko-obraschaetsja-s- ezhegodnym-poslaniem-k-belorusskomu-narodu-i-natsionalnomu-sobraniju-8549/. Лукашенко, А. Г. 2014 г. Послание Президента белорусскому народу и Национальному собранию. 22 апреля 2014 г. Доступ 13 февраля 2020 г. http://president.gov.by/ru/news_ru/view/aleksandr-lukashenko-obraschaetsja-s- ezhegodnym-poslaniem-k-belorusskomu-narodu-i-natsionalnomu-sobraniju-8549/. Lukashenko, A. G. 2015 g. Novogodnee obrashhenie Prezidenta Respubliki Belarus' Aleksandra Lukashenko k belorusskomu narodu. 1 janvarja 2015 g. Dostup 15 fevralja 2020 g. http://president.gov.by/ru/news_ru/view/novogodnee-pozdravlenie-prezidenta- respubliki-belarus-aglukashenko-k-belorusskomu-narodu-10575/. Лукашенко, А. Г. 2015 г. Новогоднее обращение Президента Республики Беларусь Александра Лукашенко к белорусскому народу. 1 января 2015 г. Доступ 15 февраля 2020 г. http://president.gov.by/ru/news_ru/view/novogodnee-pozdravlenie-prezidenta- respubliki-belarus-aglukashenko-k-belorusskomu-narodu-10575/. Lukashenko, A. G. 2015 g. Obrashhenie s Poslaniem k belorusskomu narodu i Nacional'nomu sobraniju. 29 aprelja 2015 g. Dostup 15 fevralja 2020 g. http://president.gov.by/ru/news_ru/view/obraschenie-s-poslaniem-k-belorusskomu- narodu-i-natsionalnomu-sobraniju-11301/. Лукашенко, А. Г. 2015 г. Обращение с Посланием к белорусскому народу и Национальному собранию. 29 апреля 2015 г. Доступ 15 февраля 2020 г. http://president.gov.by/ru/news_ru/view/obraschenie-s- poslaniem-k-belorusskomu-narodu-i-natsionalnomu-sobraniju-11301/.

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Lukashenko, A. G. 2016 g. NOVOGODNEE OBRASHHENIE. 1 janvarja 2016 g. Dostup 15 fevralja 2020 g. http://president.gov.by/ru/news_ru/view/novogodnee-obraschenie- prezidenta-respubliki-belarus-aglukashenko-k-belorusskomu-narodu-12840/. Лукашенко, А. Г. 2016 г. НОВОГОДНЕЕ ОБРАЩЕНИЕ. 1 января 2016 г. Доступ 15 февраля 2020 г. http://president.gov.by/ru/news_ru/view/novogodnee-obraschenie- prezidenta-respubliki-belarus-aglukashenko-k-belorusskomu-narodu-12840/. Lukashenko, A. G. 2016 g. Obrashhenie s ezhegodnym Poslaniem k belorusskomu narodu i Nacional'nomu sobraniju. 21 aprelja 2016 g. Dostup 9 fevralja 2020 g. http://president.gov.by/ru/news_ru/view/aleksandr-lukashenko-21-aprelja-obratitsja-s- ezhegodnym-poslaniem-k-belorusskomu-narodu-i-natsionalnomu-13517/. Лукашенко, А. Г. 2016 г. Обращение с ежегодным Посланием к белорусскому народу и Национальному собранию. 21 апреля 2016 г. Доступ 9 февраля 2020 г. http://president.gov.by/ru/news_ru/view/aleksandr-lukashenko-21-aprelja-obratitsja-s- ezhegodnym-poslaniem-k-belorusskomu-narodu-i-natsionalnomu-13517/. Lukashenko, A. G. 2017 g. Poslanie belorusskomu narodu i Nacional'nomu sobraniju. 21 aprelja 2017 g. Dostup 8 fevralja 2020 g. http://president.gov.by/ru/news_ru/view/ezhegodnoe-poslanie-k-belorusskomu- narodu-i-natsionalnomu-sobraniju-16059/. Лукашенко, А. Г. 2017 г. Послание белорусскому народу и Национальному собранию. 21 апреля 2017 г. Доступ 8 февраля 2020 г. http://president.gov.by/ru/news_ru/view/ezhegodnoe-poslanie-k- belorusskomu-narodu-i-natsionalnomu-sobraniju-16059/. Lukashenko, A. G. 2018 g. Vystuplenie na ceremonii vozlozhenija venkov k monumentov Pobedy po sluchaju 73-j godovshhiny Velikoj Pobedy. 9 maja 2018. Dostup 16 fevralja 2020. http://president.gov.by/ru/news_ru/view/vystuplenie-na-tseremonii-vozlozhenija- venkov-k-monumentu-pobedy-po-sluchaju-73-j-godovschiny-velikoj-pobedy-18676/. Лукашенко, А. Г. 2018 г. Выступление на церемонии возложения венков к монументов Победы по случаю 73-й годовщины Великой Победы. 9 мая 2018. Доступ 16 февраля 2020. http://president.gov.by/ru/news_ru/view/vystuplenie-na- tseremonii-vozlozhenija-venkov-k-monumentu-pobedy-po-sluchaju-73-j-godovschiny- velikoj-pobedy-18676/. Lukashenko, A. G. 2019 g. Poslanie belorusskomu narodu i Nacional'nomu sobraniju. 19 aprelja 2019 g. Dostup 12 fevralja 2020 g. http://president.gov.by/ru/news_ru/view/poslanie-belorusskomu-narodu-i- natsionalnomu-sobraniju-20903/. Лукашенко, А. Г. 2019 г. Послание белорусскому народу и Национальному собранию. 19 апреля 2019 г. Доступ 12 февраля 2020 г. http://president.gov.by/ru/news_ru/view/poslanie-belorusskomu-narodu-i- natsionalnomu-sobraniju-20903/. Lukashenko, A. G. 2020 g. Vystuplenie na voennom parade v oznamenovanie 75-j godovshhiny Pobedy sovetskogo naroda v Velikoj Otechestvennoj vojne. 9 maja 2020 g. Dostup 11 maja 2020 g. http://president.gov.by/ru/news_ru/view/vystuplenie-na- voennom-parade-v-oznamenovanie-75-j-godovschiny-pobedy-sovetskogo-naroda-v- velikoj-23580/. Лукашенко, А. Г. 2020 г. Выступление на военном параде в ознаменование 75-й годовщины Победы советского народа в Великой Отечественной войне. 9 мая 2020 г. Доступ 11 мая 2020 г. http://president.gov.by/ru/news_ru/view/vystuplenie-na-voennom-parade-v- oznamenovanie-75-j-godovschiny-pobedy-sovetskogo-naroda-v-velikoj-23580/.

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A case study of national identity in Belarus

Orehvo, Evgenij. 2017 g. «Lidskij rajonnyj ispolnitel'nyj komitet ob"javil konkurs na sozdanie jeskiznyh proektov pamjatnika knjazju Gediminu.» Lіdskaja Gazeta, 21 oktjabrja 2017 g. Dostup 3 aprelja 2020 g. http://lidanews.by/news/life/8917news.html?sphrase_id=19360. Орехво, Евгений. 2017 г. «Расширение железнодорожного переезда и подземный переход. Какие еще пожелания жителей улицы Свердлова и микрорайона Идустриальный будут выполнены в следующем году?» Лідская Газета, 24 декабря 2017 г. Доступ 7 апреля 2020 г. http://lidanews.by/news/life/8917news.html?sphrase_id=19360. Orehvo, Evgenij. 2017 g. «Lidskij zamok – muzejnyj kompleks s interaktivnym programmami.» Lіdskaja Gazeta, 21 dekabrja 2017 g. Dostup 27 marta 2020 g. http://lidanews.by/news/sport/8890news.html?sphrase_id=7527. Орехво, Евгений. 2017 г. «Лидский замок – музейный комплекс с интерактивным программами.» Лідская Газета, 21 декабря 2017 г. Доступ 27 марта 2020 г. http://lidanews.by/news/sport/8890news.html?sphrase_id=7527. Orehvo, Evgenij. 2017 g. «Pochemu Zamkovaja perestala byt' peshehodnoj i zachem vozle Lidskogo zamka postavjat fortepiano?» Lіdskaja Gazeta, 14 ijunija 2017 g. Dostup 3 aprelja 2020 g. http://lidanews.by/news/culture/7963news.html?sphrase_id=19193. Орехво, Евгений, 2017 г. «Почему Замковая перестала быть пешеходной и зачем возле Лидского замка поставят фортепиано?» Лідская Газета, 14 июния 2017 г. Доступ 3 апреля 2020 г. http://lidanews.by/news/culture/7963news.html?sphrase_id=19193. Orehvo, Evgenij. 2017 g. «Subbotnij opros. Pamjatnik knjazju Gediminu ukrepit turisticheskij potencial goroda.» Lіdskaja Gazeta, 28 oktjabrja 2017 g. Dostup 6 aprelja 2020 g. http://lidanews.by/news/life/8590news.html?sphrase_id=7527. Орехво, Евгений. 2017 г. «Субботний опрос. Памятник князю Гедимину укрепит туристический потенциал города.» Лідская Газета, 28 октября 2017 г. Доступ 6 апреля 2020 г. http://lidanews.by/news/life/8590news.html?sphrase_id=7527. Orehvo, Evgenij. 2019 g. «Skul'ptor, po proektu kotorogo v Lide ustanovjat pamjatnik Gediminu, stal pobelitelem respublikanskogo konkursa «Chelovek goda v sfere kul'tury». Lіdskaja Gazeta, 19 fevralja 2019 g. Dostup 3 aprelja 2020 g. http://lidanews.by/news/culture/16144news.html?sphrase_id=7527. Орехво, Евгений. 2019 г. «Скульптор, по проекту которого в Лиде установят памятник Гедимину, стал побелителем республиканского конкурса «Человек года в сфере культуры». Лідская Газета, 19 февраля 2019 г. Доступ 3 апреля 2020 г. http://lidanews.by/news/culture/16144news.html?sphrase_id=7527. Orehvo, Evgenij. 2019 g. «V kalendar' samyh znachimyh turisticheskih sobytij Belarusi voshli i tri proekta, realizuemye v Lide.» Lіdskaja Gazeta, 10 janvarja 2019 g. Dostup 3 aprelja 2020 g. http://lidanews.by/news/sport/15777news.html?sphrase_id=19193. Орехво, Евгений. 2019 г. «В календарь самых значимых туристических событий Беларуси вошли и три проекта, реализуемые в Лиде.» Лідская Газета, 10 января 2019 г. Доступ 3 апреля 2020 г. http://lidanews.by/news/sport/15777news.html?sphrase_id=19193. Petrulevich, Ljudmila. 2019 g. ««Ljubimiyj serdcu gorod». S torzhestvennogo meroprijatija nachalas' prazdnichnaja programmu v Lide.» Lіdskaja Gazeta, 7 sentjabrja 2019 g. Dostup 2 aprelja 2020 g. http://lidanews.by/news/life/17747news.html?sphrase_id=19084. Петрулевич, Людмила. 2019 г. ««Любимиый сердцу город». С торжественного мероприятия

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Appendix 2011 2012 2013 Belarusian identity 20 (0,118%) 24 (0,193%) 10 (0,082%) Belarusian people (белорусский народ) 11 (0,065%) 15 (0,120%) 2 (0,016%) History (история) 9 (0,053%) 9 (0,072%) 8 (0,066%) Belarusian language (белорусский язык) - - - International relations 25 (0,148%) 33 (0,265%) 32 (0,264%) Multi-vector (многовекторность) 1 (0,006%) - - Russia (Россия) 14 (0,083%) 16 (0,128%) 20 (0,165%) Europe/European Union (Европа/Европейский Союз) 10 (0,059%) 17 (0,136%) 12 (0,099%) Total words in document 16945 12456 12130

2014 2015 2016 Belarusian identity 36 (0,260%) 13 (0,149%) 11 (0,117%) Belarusian people (белорусский народ) 18 (0,130%) 9 (0,103%) 6 (0,064%) History (история) 17 (0,123%) 1 (0,011%) 5 (0,053%) Belarusian language (белорусский язык) 1 (0,007%) 3 (0,034%) - International relations 37 (0,267%) 42 (0,482%) 36 (0,382%) Multi-vector (многовекторность) - 2 (0,023%) 3 (0,032%) Russia (Россия) 24 (0,173%) 28 (0,321%) 25 (0,265%) Europe/European Union (Европа/Европейский Союз) 13 (0,094%) 12 (0,138%) 8 (0,085%) Total words in document 13838 8713 9418

2017 2018 2019 Belarusian identity 25 (0,179%) 9 (0,107%) 21 (0,191%) Belarusian people (белорусский народ) 18 (0,129%) 6 (0,071%) 11 (0,100%) History (история) 6 (0,043%) 3 (0,036%) 7 (0,064%) Belarusian language (белорусский язык) 1 (0,007%) - 3 (0,027%) International relations 47 (0,336%) 26 (0,309%) 16 (0,146%) Multi-vector (многовекторность) 1 (0,007%) 1 (0,012%) 1 (0,009%) Russia (Россия) 22 (0,157%) 12 (0,142%) 4 (0,036%) Europe/European Union (Европа/Европейский Союз) 24 (0,171%) 13 (0,154%) 11 (0,100%) Total words in document 14005 8417 10981

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