Review, Bad Apples, Bad Lawyers Or Bad Decisionmaking: Lessons from Psychology and from Lawyers in the Dock
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
University of Connecticut OpenCommons@UConn Faculty Articles and Papers School of Law 2009 Review, Bad Apples, Bad Lawyers or Bad Decisionmaking: Lessons from Psychology and from Lawyers in the Dock Leslie Levin University of Connecticut School of Law Follow this and additional works at: https://opencommons.uconn.edu/law_papers Part of the Legal Profession Commons Recommended Citation Levin, Leslie, "Review, Bad Apples, Bad Lawyers or Bad Decisionmaking: Lessons from Psychology and from Lawyers in the Dock" (2009). Faculty Articles and Papers. 423. https://opencommons.uconn.edu/law_papers/423 BOOK REVIEW ESSAYS Bad Apples, Bad Lawyers or Bad Decisionmaking: Lessons from Psychology and from Lawyers in the Dock REVIEW OF Lawyers in the Dock: Learning from Attorney Disciplinary Proceedings, by Richard Abel LESLIE C. LEVIN* There has been no shortage of efforts to improve the ethical conduct of U.S. lawyers. Ethics rules are continuously revised to better guide lawyers' conduct. Bar applicants are required to pass the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination in virtually every jurisdiction.' State con- tinuing legal education requirements invariably include an ethics compo- nent. 2 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, Sarbanes-Oxley and other legis- lation have been enacted to make lawyers more accountable for their conduct. Insurers have become more involved in risk management to help lawyers avoid ethical problems. 3 Large law firms have hired full-time ethics counsel to help them resolve ethical questions.4 Conflicts checking and calendar management software are used even in the smallest firms to help avoid ethical lapses.5 And the list goes on. * Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law. I am grateful to Jeremy Blumenthal for introducing me to the psychological literature on situationism and for his comments on a draft of this article. I would also like to thank Richard Abel, Milton Regan, and James Stark for their thoughtful comments on an earlier draft of this article. 1. National Conference of Bar Examiners: MPRE, http://www.ncbex.org/multistate-tests/mpre/ (last visited May 28, 2009). 2. Am. Bar Ass'n, Center for Continuing Legal Education, Summary of MCLE Jurisdiction Requirements, http://www.abanet.org/cle/mcleview.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2009). 3. See, e.g., George M. Cohen, Legal MalpracticeInsurance and Loss Prevention: A ComparativeAnalysis of Economic Institutions,4 CONN. INs. L.J. 305, 326-27 (1997/1998). 4. Elizabeth Chambliss, The Professionalizationof Law Firm In-House Counsel, 84 N.C. L. REv. 1515 (2006). 5. AM. BAR Ass'N LEGAL TECHNOLOGY REsoURcE CENTER,2008 LEGAL TECHNOLOGY SURVEY REPORT: LAW OFFICE TECHNOLOGY (Vol. II), at 41 (2008). 1549 1550 THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHmcs [Vol. 22:1549 Intuitively, it would seem that some of these efforts must be having some positive effects. As an empirical question, however, it is unclear whether any of these efforts significantly improve lawyers' conduct. In 2007, almost 120,000 discipline complaints were made against the more than 1.4 million lawyers with active licenses in the U.S. 6 Since complaints are made for both legitimate and illegitimate reasons-and much lawyer misconduct is underreported or unde- tected-this number provides little meaningful information about how much lawyer misconduct actually occurs.7 Likewise, because disciplinary agencies will not pursue complaints about certain types of misconduct,8 and discipline often is private or not imposed at all,9 discipline statistics convey only limited informa- tion about the nature and extent of lawyer misconduct. In his new book, Lawyers in the Dock: Learningfrom Attorney Disciplinary Proceedings, Richard Abel looks at lawyer deviance from a different perspec- tive.1° He directly examines the records of New York disciplinary proceedings, which "offer an underutilized window on lawyer misconduct."1 He uses six case studies (involving seven lawyers) to explore the social, psychological and structural conditions of lawyer deviance. By carefully examining these discipline matters, Abel reveals the circumstances and -motivations that led these lawyers into trouble and the manner in which they conducted themselves once they were caught. He draws heavily on thousands of pages of transcripts, written submissions, and disciplinary opinions, as well as interviews with some of the disciplined lawyers. Reading the record in some of the cases is like viewing an impending train wreck-obvious to the observer, horrible to watch, but too mesmerizing to avert the eyes. The cases he describes admittedly are not representative of the typical case on the disciplinary docket: Abel deliberately chose "extreme cases" which 6. ABA Center for Professional Responsibility, 2007 SURVEY ON LAWYER DISCIPLINE SYSTEMS, Chart 1 (2008), availableat http://www.abanet.org/cpr/discipline/sold (last visited May 28, 2009) [hereinafter SOLD]. This figure underreports the number of complaints actually received, as the chart reflects that many complaints to state discipline agencies were ultimately handled by consumer assistance programs and were excluded from the number of reported complaints. 7. Leslie C. Levin, The Emperor's Clothes and Other Tales About the Standards for Imposing Lawyer DisciplineSanctions, 48 Am. U. L. REV.1, 7-8 n.29 (1998). It is also not possible to discern this information from malpractice claims. Data collected by the National Malpractice Data Center indicate that legal malpractice claims are on the rise. Martha Neil, As Real Estate Market Sank, Legal Malpractice Claims Rose, A.B.A. J., Sept 30, 2008, available at http'/abajoumal.con/news/as realestate_marketsank_legaLmalpraciceclaimsjrose (last visited May 28, 2009). The data only reflect the claims reported by insurers and do not reflect the claims against uninsured lawyers. Susan Saab Fortney & Vincent R. Johnson, LEGAL MALPRACTICE LAW: PROBLEMS AND PREVENTION 11 (2008). The data also do not indicate the number of claims that were actually meritorious. 8. Leslie C. Levin, The Casefor Less Secrecy in Lawyer Discipline,20 GEo. J.LEGAL Evrscs 1, 18 (2007). 9. Levin, supra note 7, at 8. 10. RICHARD L. ABEL, LAWYERS IN THE DOCK: LEARNING FROM Ar'ORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS (2008). 11. Id. at 53. The cases were all decided in the First Department, which includes Manhattan and the Bronx. Id. at 56. 20091 LESSONS FROM LAWYERS IN THE DOCK 1551 ' 1 3 were more dramatic.1 2 Such cases are arguably "more revealing of motivation, but this choice limits the ability to generalize from the case studies. Abel recognizes that many more case studies would be needed "before drawing even a tentative map" of the terrain of lawyer misconduct.14 Nevertheless, as he notes, in several respects the lawyers he studies are very much like the average attorney upon whom discipline is imposed. The similarities between the lawyers Abel studies and the average disciplined lawyer are that Abel's attorneys are male, white and mostly middle-aged. The lawyers he studies, like most disciplined lawyers, predominantly practice in solo and small firms and represent individuals or small businesses rather than large organizations. 15 Lawyers who are disciplined often report serious stress in their lives due to personal or financial problems 16 and in half of Abel's cases, the attorneys suffered from serious physical illness, family problems, or significant financial concerns. Some of the lawyers Abel describes, like other disciplined 17 lawyers, had previously been subject to disciplinary sanctions. There are, however, some differences between Abel's cases and the typical discipline matter. Unlike most discipline cases, the cases Abel describes are not simply instances of neglect of client matters or failure to communicate, which are the most common reasons for complaints. 18 Although three of the case studies involve neglect of client matters, the lawyers also engaged in other serious malfeasance. Unlike most discipline cases where sanctions are imposed, which typically result in private admonitions or public reprimands,' 9 the lawyers Abel describes received more serious sanctions. Unlike the typical discipline case, most of the disciplinary matters that Abel studies were prolonged, in large part because the lawyers would not--or could not-acknowledge wrongdoing. Abel provides a rich and textured account of the lives of these lawyers, how they got into trouble, and how they dealt with their situations once others learned what the lawyers had done. Three of the lawyers neglected client matters. David Kreitzer had a volume personal injury practice in which he not only neglected cases, but also engaged in a fraudulent "ten percenter" scheme in which he paid kickbacks to insurance adjusters in order to expedite payment of claims. 20 Joseph Muto neglected immigration cases which had been prepared by "travel agencies" 12. Id. at 57. 13. Id. 14. Id. at 55. 15. Id. at 54-56. 16. See ABA STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS § 9.32 COmMENTARY (1991). 17. Recidivism among lawyers who receive discipline sanctions is not uncommon, but the actual rate of recidivism is not known. Levin, supra note 8, at 2-3. Among the lawyers Abel studies, one had received four prior admonitions, one had six prior admonitions, and one had received an admonition and had previously been suspended from practice. ABEL,supra note 10, at 91, 161-62, 264-65. 18. ABEL, supra note 10, at 57. 19. See SOLD, supra note 6, at Chart H. 20. Abel, supranote 10, at 71 passim. 1552 THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL