VysokáMetropolitan škola veřejné správy Universitya mezinárodních vztahů Prague v Praze VolumeVolume 2 / 1Issue / Issue 2 / November2 / November 2008 2007 CentralCentral European European Journal Journal of of International & Security Studies Volume 2 Issue 2 November 2008 Contents Editor’s Note . .5 Research Articles Miroslava Filipović / Cross-Cutting Issues in International Capital . 11 David Erkomaishvili / Collective Security and Unilateral Decisions – Security Prospects for the post-Soviet Space . 28 Liyan Hu and Ter-Shing Cheng / China’s Energy Security and Geo-Economic Interests in Central Asia 42 Scott Romaniuk / The Russian Minority in Post-Communist Politics: a Case Study of Ukraine, Moldova and Chechnya . 56 Šárka Matějková / Establishing the Norm of Humanitarian Intervention in International Relations . 76 Abubakar Siddique / Pakistan at 61: An Assessment of Challenges and Opportunities . 92 Mohammed T . Obidallah / Water and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict . 103 Comment & Analysis Patrycja Podrazik / Who Really Lost the Georgian War? . 119 Marie Homerova / Personal Experiences from the Years of ‘Late Normalization,’ 1980s .1 23 Book Reviews . .129–136 Notes on Contributors . 137 CEJISS Contact Information . .139 5 Editor’s Note: CE JISS InAs readying CEJISS thereleases content its of fourth Volume issue, 1 Issue international 2 of CEJISS, relations I was restsstruck uncom by the- growingfortably onsupport the brink this journal. The international has received atmosphere within many resembles scholarly a andmixture profes- of sionalpre-WWI quarters. over-confidence Building on among the success the great of thepowers rst (particularlyissue, CEJISS the has US, man- Rus- agedsia and to China)extend itsand readership post-WWI to global the universities economic and instability institutions . The ofresult a number of these of countriesdangerous both ingredients in the EU is uncertain,and internationally. though there It is is truly much a topleasure consider, to watchespecially this projectas recent take events on a lifeseem of toits signal own and the provide return ofits thereaders political with overcutting-edge the economic analy- . sisDespite of current current political headlines affairs. indicating I would economic like to take collapse this opportunity – which is increasinglyto thank our readersbecoming for atheir reality constructive – the international criticism, commentspolitical dynamics and continued at play support. deserve at- tentionMuch . has changed in the 6 months since CEJISS was rst launched. I would likeAt to presentintroduce there this isissue a movement with a brief in commentarythe US, and regardingto a lesser the extent tense the atmos- EU, phereto ‘bail-out’ currently or cloudingnationalise Israeli-Syrian faltering financial relations. corporations. There is growing This concernmay appear of clandestine,as a standard actual economic or potential question WMD – whether procurement a state in should the greater bankroll Middle a national Eastern region,company which whose has collapse (rightly) couldattracted undermine the attention the economic of scholars and and wellbeing policy makers. of its citizens.On 6 However,September the 2007, decision it was has reported more to that do withIsraeli politics air force than jets economics, violated Syrianparticularly airspace, in the and case after of thebeing US, engaged which pridesby Syrian itself anti-aircraft as a prototype batteries of Smith’s were forcedinvisible back hand to moretheory friendly that limits skies. a government’s Since the initial intervention reports were in themade economy public, . itThe has actions become of clear the US that signal Israel’s the actions beginning were of not the accidental end of free-market but rather partsystems of a deliberatein practise, strategy implying to dealthat withthe political potential structures Syrian nuclear which weapons encourage (or andmaterials) main- acquisition,tain free-market purportedly systems fromare also North eroding Korea. This Two is likelyimportant to have issues wide-reaching have been raised:implications rstly, to the US continued domestic dangerspolitics ofand, WMD by extension, proliferation its role in the in internationalMiddle East and,affairs. possible If the waysUS can of nocountering longer cope such with proliferation. unrestrained market forces, then its abilityWhile to ‘sell’Israel’s the nuclearliberal-economic programmes model have abroad been isthe greatly subject hampered of much . Thisdebate is –coupled especially with as the Israel fact refuses that as tomore allow than IAEA $ 1 inspectorstrilion (USD) to assess of tax its paying nuclear money sites andwas capabilitiesallocated to –some the fact of the remains US’s largestthat Israel corporations, is a (largely) US responsiblecitizens rightly state ask in whichthe question there are of whymany they checks are andnot morebalances adequately to prevent cared the fordeployment with for example,of WMD inhealth a wanton care . manner.This question Unfortunately, was partially in most answered other Middle by the Eastern election states of Barak such checksObama andto President balances ofare the absent. US in This November compounds 2008. the problem of WMD devel- opmentConceivably, as regimes the which US under control Obama internal will and be external more introspective; security policy indicating without signia return, cant of oversight sorts, to area form likely of to isolationism utilise WMD whereby (particularly the US nuclear deploys weapons) ad hoc asalliances a strategically on a case-by-case deployable basisweapon to insteadsecure itsof adoptingmaterial interests(as most otherwhile nuclear reduc- statesing its have) more a enduring strategic internationalview of WMD commitments as residual; not. While a security this policy mantle-piece. approach mayIf be the logical accusations given levelled the credibility against deficitSyria – regardingcurrently itsplaguing acquisition the US,of nuclearit could weaponsnot come (or at amaterial) worse time from for North the EU,Korea which – are relies accurate, heavily then on it the con US rms for theits worstsecurity. fears Together of Israeli the (and economic international) crisis and security the failing analysts: credibility that despite of the intenseUS on internationalthe international pressures level underscores and investigations an essential which tension attempt in totransatlantic dissuade WMD relations, de- velopmentone that has and not smuggling, been lost on such the weapons EU’s greatest may be geopolitical acquired with challenge, relative Russia.ease. Israel’sOf the manymilitary political reaction crises to the and Syria conflicts acquisition in current was a internationalnecessary and affairs, even encouragingfew will have response. longer implications It demonstrated for thea willingness security of to the unilaterally EU than therespond August to aconflict nuclear betweenprovocation Georgia with maturity.and Russia. It targetedThat conflict, non-civilian it seems, sites andhad lessfocused to do itswith attention dissuading only the on Georgiansthe source fromof danger. asserting The theirdeployment sovereignty of special in Abkhazia ground forcesand South which Ossetia directed and Israelimore to warplanes do with limiting to their Western target was influence, dangerous particularly though 6 | Editor’s Note the EU’s and NATO’s, in the post-Soviet space. If the target audience of the August conflict was the EU and NATO, what were the messages Russia sought to convey? Russia is signalling its return to great power politics . It demonstrated, through its actions, that there are new costs for Western states and institutions to bear in mind when considering relations in the post-Soviet/post-Czarist states of the Black Sea, the Caspian Sea, Central Asia and even the Baltic Sea areas. In practical terms Russia is reasserting itself in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Moldova, Ukraine, and Belarus. These states have, at one time or another, since their independence, flirted with the EU; attempting to initiate favoured nation status to gain access to the lucrative EU market-place. With time however, most of the states in the post-Soviet sphere have selected – for practical reasons associated to growing Russian power – a return to alignment with Russia rather than the EU. The only exceptions are the three Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia which are now full-fledged members of the EU and NATO, a fact that has limited, though not eradicated Russian influence in that region. Indeed, at every opportunity, Russia exploits EU vulnerabilities and, using its energy leverage, attempts to ‘blackmail’ concessions . Russia’s conflict with Georgia must be viewed as a direct challenge to EU security. This stems from the self-perception of the Union (together with the US) as a defender of democratic states, no matter their size or distance. Georgia is a democratic state which had been engaged in negotiations for NATO mem- bership . This would have brought NATO to the unstable South Caucuses and provided a forward defence platform for the EU. However, seeing the reluctance of many EU members to bear responsibility for souring EU-Russian relations by including Georgia (and Ukraine) in NATO, Russia acted to undermine Geor- gian independence and increase its regional and international isolation . After all, the EU is unlikely to support Georgia’s NATO candidacy if conflict could erupt there again – forcing NATO