Negotiating Dissolution A Study on Resettlement, Power and Place among the Iraqi Refugee Community in Jordan

Mirjam A. Twigt March 2013

II Wageningen University - Department of Social Sciences Chair Group Disaster Studies

Negotiating Dissolution A Study on Resettlement, Power and Place among the Iraqi Refugee Community in Jordan

March 2013

Mirjam A. Twigt St. nr: 850207846020

Thesis supervision: Bram J. Jansen, PhD Chair group Disaster Studies Wageningen University

Course code: RDS-80733

Cover photo was taken by the author in 2012: Iraqi Chaldean Church in Amman, Jordan

III IV Abstract

This thesis presents how urban refugee management establishes Jordan as a formal transit place. It is a qualitative study on the effects of third country resettlement on ideas of place and belonging, among Iraqi refugees who are not accepted for this particular durable solution. The dissertation is based upon three months of fieldwork in Amman, Jordan, during which data was collected by in-depth interviews and participant observation. The practices of the international community are set against the perspectives and activities of the Iraqi refugees. In reaction to the role the UNHCR has taken upon itself and in relation to the legal and social marginalization associated with life in Amman, Iraq’s displaced population has put all its trust upon the international community as it continues to hold on to the idea that life in Jordan is only transitory. It seems that resettlement for parts of a refugee population, reinforces the uprootedness of the refugees who stay behind. The option for resettlement has created a disruption in social order, as it divides families and selection criteria are gendered. It disconnects the refugees from a life in Jordan, as the focus is continuously on somewhere else and later. The emergence of an Iraqi diaspora further reinforces the idea of a life in limbo and a distinct Iraqi identity in exile. An extensive resettlement policy has established a sense of entitlement and longing for this particular solution. These social realities of the refugees influence the outcome of humanitarian interventions that are focused upon self-sufficiency, as these programs do not correspond with what the refugees themselves see as their interest. UNHCR’s policy is build upon a narrow and static understanding of protection and solutions, whereas the refugees themselves hold on to transnational connections and find hope in the idea that life in Jordan is only temporary. With this idea in mind they continue to look for strategies for a future elsewhere.

Key words: third country resettlement, durable solutions, urban refugee management, belonging, transnationalism, Iraqi refugees, Jordan.

V

VI To love. To be loved. To never forget your own insignificance. To never get used to the unspeakable violence and the vulgar disparity of life around you. To seek joy in the saddest places. To pursue beauty to its lair. To never simplify what is complicated or complicate what is simple. To respect strength, never power. Above all, to watch. To try and understand. To never look away. And never, never, to forget. (Arundhati Roy, 1999)

Liberty is a practice… The liberty of men is never assured by the institutions and laws that are intended to guarantee them. That is why almost all of these laws and institutions are quite capable of being turned around. (Foucault, 1984: 245)

VII VIII Table of contents

Acknowledgements XII

Glossary and Abbreviations XIII

Map 1 – Map of Amman XV

Chapter One: The Origins of Jordan as a Temporary Refuge 1

A Short Introduction to Iraq’s Modern History 3 Aim of the Study – Problem Statement 4 International Protection of Iraqi Refugees in Jordan 7 Protection, Protraction and Durable Solution 9 The Iraqi Refugee Population in Jordan: Urban Displacement and Demographics 11 Methodology: An Urban Ethnography 13 Negotiating Access in Amman 15 Mahmoud’s Case: Research in a Humanitarian Economy 17 Reflexivity and situated knowledge 18 Structure of the Thesis 20

Chapter Two: Theoretical framework 23 The Actor-oriented Approach 23 The Role of Structure in an Actor-oriented Approach 24 Governance, Governmentality and Power 25 Pseudo-governance and Global Governance 26 Bureaucratic Labeling 27 Displacement and the Production of Place 29 Transnationalism 31 The Creation of Limbo 33 Conclusion 34

Chapter Three: The Politics of Resettlement 35 The Formalities behind the Resettlement Program 35 Resettlement as a Durable Solution for the Iraqi Refugee Situation 36 The US Refugee Admission Program Part 1: The Interview 38 The Results of the Resettlement Interview - The Day That Everyone Got Accepted 39 The US Refugee Admission Program Part 2: Further Steps Including Waiting 40

IX Concluding Remarks on the Procedures of the Resettlement Process 41 Resettlement, Selection and Rejection 41 Not Selected for Resettlement – the ‘Excluded Category’ 41 Rejection for Resettlement 42 Dealing with Disappointment – The First Negotiations 43 Pseudo-Governance: The Logic of Exclusion and a Growing Sense of Entitlement 45 The Politics of a Surrogate State 46 Political Considerations behind Resettlement 47 Negotiating Protection Space 50 Concluding Remarks 51

Chapter Four: Resources within the Resettlement Context 54 Humanitarian Resources 54 Resources within the Urban Economy 57 Gendered Resources 59 Blurring Boundaries between the Humanitarian Economy and the Urban Economy 60 ‘Volunteering’ 61 Vocational Trainings 62 A Debate on Dependency, Self-sufficiency and Agency 64 Tapping into Vulnerability 65 Local Integration: Curing Dependency or Ruining your Chances? 66 Strategies and Alternatives to Counter Local Integration 68 Wasta and Reconsideration for Resettlement 69 Conclusion 71

Chapter five: Is a Near Neighbor Better than a Distant Cousin? 72 Transnational Relations and the Creation of Limbo A Longing for Resettlement 72 Resettlement as Disruption 74 Friendships in Exile 74 Effects on Familial Relations: Negotiating Gender and Generational Roles 76 Loss and Belonging – The Creation of a Diasporic People 77 The Invention of Iraqiness 78 Transnational Networks 80

X The Transnational Process of Resisting Marginalization: a Notes on Displacement 82 Conclusion 83

Conclusion: Resettlement and the Persistence of Temporariness 85

Bibliography 90

Appendices Appendix 1: List of Informants 98 Appendix 2: Iraqi Refugees Use Social Media to Cry out for Help 101 Appendix 3: Letter of Deferral 102 Appendix 4: Notice of Ineligibility for Resettlement 103

List of Figures Figure 1: Overview of Amman. 22 Figure 2: UNHCR’s Selection criteria for eligibility for resettlement for Iraqi refugees 37 Figure 3: Breakdown of Submitted Cases and Departures Worldwide 38 Figure 4: Swimming at the Mahatta Church 53

XI Acknowledgements

I would like to thank all of you who have made this research rewarding, enjoyable and fun. First of all, I want to thank the entire staff of the Disaster Studies Group for its flexibility and inspiration to find a place and position in which I could challenge myself. A special thanks goes out to Prof. dr. Georg Frerks, as my second reader, and dr. Bram J. Jansen, for being such a committed supervisor. I appreciate your unceasing support, your expertise and your encouraging reactions on my endless ambitions. You taught me how to kill my darlings and to write paragraphs instead of stories. I really enjoyed working with you. My warm regards go out to the IOM Jordan staff, and in particular to Mohaned Warq. I am grateful for the time spent at IOM’s office and for the lessons I learned there. My deep thanks goes out the entire Iraqi community in Amman, Jordan, as I felt at home in your temporary houses. I would like to thank Fusayo and Schwan, Sasha and Ghazwan, Jody Miller and Lorna Rodd, as their commitment for the Iraqi refugees was an inspiration to me. Without your cooperation I would not have been able to conduct this research. Thank you so much! With this thesis and my time in Jordan, I have expanded my own transnational network. I met a lot of great people in Amman, and some of my informants became true friends. Um Omar, Savannah, Mohammed al Kurdi. Ramez, Mimi, Abu Thaer and Besma, Russel, Thaer and Ibrahim: thank you so much for all your love, support and fun! Lindsay, Sarah, Rivdah, Murad and Sabrina: Amman was a rollercoaster, and it was a thrill to ride it with you. Meghan, you are the best roommate ever! I hope you will send me chocolate, sooner rather than later. Thanks to the friends I found back in Holland, and in particular to Elze and Stef, who have kept me sane in difficult times. For Ernst-Jan, for encouraging me to continue my studies. And to my beloved fellow students as writing my thesis would not have been so much fun without you. A special thanks to Vera, Claudette, Afke and Evi, for proofreading sections of my thesis. Many thanks to my family for their unceasing support. You have proven – now, more than ever – to be a steady base. Most of all, I would like to thank and dedicate this thesis to my beloved translator. Upon his request, he will remain anonymous in this study and will be referred to as Moe. Three months ago Moe was resettled to the US. Being a refugee does not simply start with crossing a border, nor does it come to an ending when you reach the safe haven you have longed for so long. His journey continues on, as he is getting to know the country he now calls home. I call you my brother, as your real family is far away – mentally as well as physically. Do not ever believe anyone who says that you should be different, as it is your difference that makes you special. Thank you for who you are!

XII Glossary and List of Abbreviations

Glossary

Abu Father Al-hamdulilah Praise God, Thank God. Duyuf Guest Haram Morally wrong Insh’allah If God wants it to, if God will provide it Iqama Residence permit Nargilleh Waterpipe Um Mother Wasta Clientelistic ties or the right connections Ya3teek il 3afyeh A common Jordanian-Arabic expression meaning may God give you health. Commonly used to express one’s thankfulness.

List of abbreviations

CRP An American-funded NGO called Collateral Repair Program DHHS US Department of Health and Human Services DHS US Department of Homeland Security DoS US Department of State EU European Union GOJ The Government of Jordan ICG International Crisis Group IDPs Internal Displaced Persons IO International Organization IOM International Organization for Migration IRAP An American-funded NGO called Iraqi Refugee Assistance Project JOD Jordanian Dinar NGO Non-Governmental Organization MoU Memorandum of Understanding OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs RSC Resettlement Support Centre UN United Nations

XIII UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees US(A) The United States of America USRAP United States Refugee Admissions Program

XIV

Map 1 – Map of Amman

XV Chapter One: Introducing Jordan as a Temporary Place of Refuge

It is a cold February morning at the office of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in Amman, Jordan. Approximately 25 people have gathered in the Cultural Orientation classroom. Two of the attendees are Somali refugees, the rest of the participants are Iraqi. They are about to start ‘their’ Cultural Orientation: a four-day training on American culture and one of the last steps to undertake before being resettled to the United States (US). The room is filled with suspense. The fact that they are called to enter this particular course means almost definitely that they will soon depart for America. Initially, the participants are reluctant to speak up in a big group. Introduction games and the friendly nature of the Jordanian teacher put them more at ease. She asks everyone to introduce himself or herself shortly. In their introductions the refugees emphasize where they come from, but even more to which American state they are going, including California, Maryland and Michigan. One of the attendees, an older Iraqi woman, asks me where I am going. I smile and tell her I am a Dutch researcher-in-training, interested in the resettlement process of the Iraqi refugees in Jordan. I will participate in the course and will make notes on things that catch my attention.

The participation in this Cultural Orientation class was part of a research on the effects of third country resettlement, conducted in the first half of 2012 among the Iraqi refugee population in Jordan. In the beginning of 2012 at least 30.000 Iraqi refugees were residing in the capital of Jordan, Amman (UNHCR, 2012a). They sought refuge in Jordan after the US-led invasion of 2003 and its violent aftermath. By the end of 2012, more than 40 per cent of the Iraqi refugee population has remained in the host country for over five years, making them urban refugees in a protracted situation (OCHA, 2012a; UNHCR, 2004a). In order to provide a solution for the Iraqi refugees, UNHCR established a resettlement program. Resettlement is the act of being settled to a so-called third country. It is commonly referred to as one of the three durable solutions that would enable refugees to “rebuild their lives in dignity and peace” (UNHCR, 2013). The two others are local integration in the host country, and voluntary repatriation to the country of origin. UNHCR Jordan considers voluntary repatriation or return to Iraq to be unviable, since the situation in Iraq continues to be unstable (UNHCR, 2012a). The Jordanian Government (GoJ) restricts the integration of most Iraqi refugees (Chatty and Mansour, 2011). This means that the overwhelming majority of the Iraqis in Jordan are waiting for resettlement to a western country that is willing to accept and integrate

1 them. The criteria for resettlement selection are specific and the number of slots open per country is limited, leaving those refugees who are not selected or rejected for resettlement in a legal limbo (Sadek, 2010).

This is a study on what I will call the ‘stranded’ Iraqi refugees in Jordan. It aims to provide insight into some of the effects of the existence of a durable solution for some, but not for all. The research views resettlement as a significant event in the lives of Iraqi refugees, even if this dream fails to materialize. In this thesis I explore how the option for resettlement influences ideas on place and belonging as the refugees who are not accepted for resettlement continue their protracted refugee life. The Iraqi refugees continuously negotiate their position in Jordan, in relation the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) - in its role as a pseudo- government -, their uncertain legal status and to the images attributed to a life in the west. As a result the Iraqi refugees continue to see Jordan as a transit country and hold on to the idea that life in Jordan is only temporary.

The Iraqi refugees attending the cultural orientation course are seen as the ‘lucky ones’ as they are about to leave for the US. They finished all the necessary steps of the resettlement process and passed the security check. The goal of cultural orientation is to provide refugees with the necessary information, skills and attitudes towards life in a new country. The main message is positive and according to the liberal ideal of the American dream: life is what you make of it. The teacher emphasizes that as Iraqi and Somali refugees you are able to become an American citizen and to make a good life, as long as you are willing to work hard. She writes down the following formula: Opportunity + HARD WORK = Success. In the months to follow I would gain a thorough understanding of the expectations that are raised among the Iraqi refugee community because of the possibility for resettlement. Beliefs and expectations like the one’s of the attendees are rooted in past and place.

Displacement from Iraq to Jordan is a not new phenomenon: in the last twenty years several episodes of forced migration have taken place, following armed conflicts (the Iran-Iraq war in 1980 - 1988, the 1990-1991 Gulf war) and internal political unrest (Chatelard, 2002; Al-Ali, 2007). Much of the ‘refugeeness’ (Malkki, 1992) - the process of becoming a refugee - of the current Iraqi population in in Jordan is however related to what happened in Iraq after the US invasion in 2003. In the next section I will therefore provide a brief overview of Iraq’s most recent history.

2 A Short Introduction to Iraq’s Modern History

On the 20th of March 2003 ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’ was launched. A US-led coalition invaded Iraq with the official reason that Iraq had failed to dismantle its nuclear and chemical weapons development program. The US further justified the invasion by stating the desire to remove an oppressive regime. The Iraqi forces were crushed in view of the firepower of the allied forces and there was remarkably little resistance. Yet, in the days following the capture of Baghdad and the other major cities widespread looting took place. Schools, universities and museums were ransacked, while the allied forces concentrated on their own security (Tripp, 2007: 274-275; Al- Ali, 2007: 223-225).

Although the military campaign was meticulously planned in the Pentagon, little effort had been made to think about the politics of Iraq in the aftermath of the fall of the regime (Tripp, 2007: 278-282). Following the invasion, the US sent Paul Bremer to run the transitional government. One of his first orders was de-Ba’athification: the dissolution and banning all members of the Ba’ath party, the major political party, above a certain rank from holding public positions. The second order was dissolving the entire Iraqi army and security apparatus. In one stroke 300.000 young men were out of work (Idem: 282 - 285). Sovereignty was formally handed over in June 2004 to the Iraqi Interim Government, its members being appointed by Bremer. An elected government took its place in October 2005. After an electoral victory by Shi’a and Kurdish political parties the previously empowered Sunni community began to feel increasingly marginalized (Tripp, 2007).

Throughout 2005 the security situation in the country continued to deteriorate. Violence was increasingly inspired by sectarianism. Bombs in Shi’ite neighborhoods triggered reprisal in Sunni mosques causing a vicious circle of violence and revenge. Violence further eroded following the February 2006 bombings of the Al Askari Shi’a Shrine in Samarra. Militias linked to political parties and terrorist groups sought to establish sectarian boundaries across what had previously been mixed neighborhoods. Many civilians became targets for bomb attacks or kidnappings. A sharp increase in criminality, a general lawlessness and the rapidly worsening living conditions all became part of the insecurity of everyday life (Al-Ali, 2007; Tripp, 2007). Due to the pervasive violence and a rapid regression of social and human security, many Iraqi civilians decided to flee to Iraq’s neighboring countries. While exact numbers are not available it is believed that since 2003 about two and a half million Iraqis took refuge within the country as Internally Displaced

3 Persons (IDPs). Another two and a half million have left Iraq to find security elsewhere, mainly in Syria, Jordan or Lebanon (Chatty and Mansour, 2011; ICG, 2008).

In 2007, a US military surge and the ceasefire of one of the main Shi’ite militias resulted in a decline in violence. However, Iraq was and still is fragmented along sectarian lines and even though the number of casualties has fallen significantly in 2009, violence remains endemic. Attacks in 2011 targeted against individuals and the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq at the end of 2011, leaves questions about the stability and security of the country, and therefore also for the possibility for refugees to return to the country (UNHCR, 2012; Economist 2012abc).

Aim of the Study: Problem Statement

Nine years after the US led invasion, I was an intern at IOM Jordan as part of a graduate program in International Development Studies. From January until April 2012 I was based in its office in Jordan’s capital, Amman. This internship was followed by three months of fieldwork on urban refugee management, and took mostly place in East-Amman (see Map 1). My work at IOM consisted mostly of assisting with Direct Assistance projects for ‘vulnerable’ Iraqi refugees who were living in Jordan. Most of the work at IOM Jordan however is focused on resettlement supporting activities, since the organization is assigned by the American government to run the US Resettlement Support Centre (RSC) in the Middle East. In this position it processes the cases of refugees in Jordan, Syria, Egypt and Iraq who are considered for resettlement to the United States.

My internship at IOM gave me particular insight into the everyday practices of this international organization (IO), specialized in the field of migration. It provided access to information, people and events such as the above mentioned cultural orientation session. IOM and its donors emphasize the success of resettlement measured in numbers leaving the country. Little attention is given to the influence of resettlement on the lives of the people who are not accepted for this durable solution and who find themselves in protracted displacement.

IOM’s role in Jordan should be understood within Jordan’s local context: a complicating factor of refugee life in Jordan is that the government does not recognize international refugee law. As a result, the refugees in Jordan came to rely upon UN agencies for their protections, just like in dozens of other countries in the Middle East, Africa and Asia (Kagan, 2011).

4 In-depth research on protracted urban refugee situations in countries that do not recognize international refugee law has been conducted, in African as well as Middle-Eastern settings (Campbell, 2006; Jacobsen, 2006; Grabska, 2006; Chatelard, El-Abed and Washington, 2009), but the focus of these studies goes out to livelihoods and urbanity, and not so much to the effects of humanitarian interventions on the lives and perspectives of urban displaced. Until now, there has been little academic attention to the ideas of urban refugees on durable solutions, or how these thoughts are affected by UNHCR’s refugee management. In her research Sandvick (2011; 2012) shows how urban refugees and legal protection officers from UNHCR in Kampala, Uganda, compete over the distribution of resettlement slots, the definition of the present and ways to manage the past. I draw upon her work, as the aim of this study is to provide more insight in the effects of urban refugee policy as it can disrupt and reshape social order, and the creative abilities of refugees to react, and subsequently negotiate their position.

At present, one of UNHCR’s priorities – in Jordan as well a worldwide - is to find strategies to deal with the ‘residual case load’: refugees for whom no solution is available (Crisp, 2003). Policies and studies on this matter mainly explore the possibilities for local integration in a host country, but without fully considering the perspective of the refugee (Idem; Jacobsen, 2001). In protracted refugee settings de facto integration does take place, yet it is too easily assumed that ‘stranded’ refugees themselves would embrace just any solution (Crisp, 2004). From a policy perspective it is crucial to come to a better understanding of the ideas of these refugees on durable solutions, as these thoughts influence the outcome of interventions. The humanitarian complex is composed of many actors that all have impact on the outcomes and quality of the assistance (Hilhorst, 2002). Research among Liberian refugees in Ghana for instance, has shown that refugees might disagree with humanitarian ideas. After the conflict ended, they stayed put in Ghana in order to be resettled, contradicting the idea that return the country of origin is the best solution (Essuman-Johnson, 2011).

The situation of displaced Iraqi population in the Middle East is unusual in many ways for the majority of the refugees are urban, educated and belong to the (former) middle class. Moreover, just because they come form a middle-income country that used to be socialistic, they were used to high levels of pubic services even though the quality declined in the last thirty years (Chatelard, 2011). Dodd (2010) argues: “This is a refugee influx of a population with first-world aspirations rather than a third-world tolerance of vulnerability.” Research on return to Iraq or to request for resettlement has already been conducted (ICG, 2008; Riller, 2009; Chatty and Mansour, 2011),

5 but no ethnographic study has been done on the perspectives of the refugees for whom resettlement is no longer an option. This is a study on how this particular refugee group negotiates with the international community and copes with its vulnerabilities, if their aspirations for the ‘first world’ fail to materialize.

The central question was formulated as: How does the option for resettlement influence ideas on place and belonging of Iraqi refugees in Amman, Jordan, who are either rejected for or never considered for resettlement?

The sub questions are: - What is the influence of the option for resettlement on the lives of Iraqi refugees in Amman, Jordan? - What role do international organizations have in regard to rejection for resettlement and its potential follow-up, and how do the refugees, for whom resettlement is not a viable option, perceive this role? - What possibilities are there for Iraqis in Jordan who are rejected for resettlement to make a living and to establish and/or maintain social networks? - In what ways does the option of resettlement and rejection affect ideas about building up a life in Jordan and notions of belonging?

To find answers to my research question I used ethnography to explore how ideas on place and power are transformed in practice. Longstanding logics are renegotiated in their new local context. Long’s actor-oriented approach (2001) enabled me to consider the negotiations between the refugees, governments and international organizations.

This is a study on rejection for resettlement and its influence on the lives of displaced Iraqis in Jordan. Crisp et al. (2009: 22) cite in this regard an employer of UNHCR: “Unless you get your registration right, you get everything else wrong.” This research will focus on the lives of those Iraqis refugee who got their registration ‘wrong’: this can mean that a refugee is either never selected by UNHCR for resettlement or that a refugee is rejected during the resettlement procedures put in place by receiving countries. The focus of this research is not on why they are rejected, but on the impact of the resettlement process and the rejection on their ongoing lives in Jordan. According to Sadek (2010: 44) many Iraqis have no choice but to pursue a degree of local integration at least in the short term “because of the danger of return and the unlikeliness of

6 resettlement.” I however argue that the option for a better future elsewhere has reinforced the uprootedness of the refugees who stay behind and their idea that Jordan is only a transit place. Resettlement is regarded as one of the three durable solutions for refugees. The term ‘solution’ implies an ending to a difficult puzzle. This idealized and political notion seems to forget that the lives of Iraqi refugees should be regarded in a continuum: refugees are individuals with a past, a present, and a future. Refugee issues are not simply solved by migrating to another country. This research shows that the possibility for resettlement is neither simply positive nor negative: It creates hope for a better future and the possibility to rebuild their broken lives. At the same time it divides families and it shifts the attention from Jordan to somewhere else and later. Longing for resettlement can cause that refugees are no longer ready to invest in their present situation (Horst, 2003: 36). In addition, the idealized image of migration may cause major disappointments: for those who are rejected as well as for the ones that experience that life in the west was not as expected.

I will outline the methodology in greater detail in a later section of this chapter and the theoretical framework in the next chapter. First, I will consider the contextual background of this research subject. I provide an outline of the surrogate legal framework of refugee protection in Jordan and the urban context of the Iraqi refugee situation in Jordan.

Protection of Iraqi Refugees in Jordan

The 1951 Geneva Convention for the Status of Refugees and the related 1967 protocol are the key documents for international refugee law. It defines people as refugees when they can prove a well-founded fear of persecution and established the legal protection and social rights, refugees are entitled to from states that have signed up to it. The Government of Jordan is however not a signatory of this 1951 Convention nor did the country develop a legal framework to deal with an influx of refugees. This is often regarded as an effect of the Palestinian issue: Jordan hosts the largest number of Palestinian displaced1. It

1United National Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) estimated that in 2000 there were 1.6 million Palestinian refugees in Jordan in comparison to a total population of 5 million (UNRWA, 2012). This UN-organ was created to assist the displaced from the Arab-Israeli wars. UNRWA defines a Palestinian refugee as ‘a person whose normal place of residence was Palestine between June 1946 and May 1948, and who lost both their homes and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 and 1967 conflicts’ (UNRWA, 2012). Palestinian refugees do not fall under the international refugee law regime as long as they receive assistance from UNRWA. Most Arab states resisted naturalization or resettlement as a solution for the Palestinian refugee problem (Shiblak, 1996). Jordan was an

7 is presumed that the Jordanian government is reluctant to designate Iraqis as refugees, since this would imply that Iraq will not recover political stability before long and that its refugees may remain in Jordan for the long term as is the case with the majority of the Palestinians (Chatelard, 2002; Weiss Fagen, 2007: 2). Just like other countries in the Middle East, Jordan has instead adopted a regime that tolerates Arabic migrants with restricted rights. As fellow Arabs they are not considered as illegal migrants but as duyuf – temporary guests. Access to employment is restricted and it formally means they have to re-enter the country every three months (Chatelard, 2010). Overstaying without a residency comes down to a fine of 1.5 Jordanian Dinar (JOD) a day2. Iraqis can apply for residency (iqama) if they can provide proof of substantial funds (JOD 25.000) in Jordan, if they are students at one of the Jordanian universities or if they can secure work residence permits. The latter is very difficult to obtain as the costs are very high, it requires a national employer as guarantor and the permits are limited to certain employment sectors, such as construction work (Chatty and Mansour, 2011). The majority of Iraqi refugees have not been able to claim residency.

UNHCR’s core mandate is the protection of refugees. ‘Refugee protection’ refers to activities to assist refugees, as legal right holders as well as beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance (Jansen, 2011: 40). In absence of a legal framework binding the Jordanian government, the displaced Iraqis put their trust upon the UNHCR and expect little from the host government (Evans- Barnes, 2009: 1). In 1998 UNHCR signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Jordanian Government enabling the UN Refugee Agency to ensure what it considers as critical elements for the protection of displaced Iraqis. These include the access to safety, services and non- refoulement – the principle that ensures that refugees will not be forcefully returned to a place if they fear persecution (Evans-Barnes, 2009). The agency has taken registration and status determination of the refugees, as well as education, health and social welfare programs for the Iraqi displaced upon itself. Iraqis from South and Central Iraq who are unable or unwilling to return are recognized by UNHCR as prima facie3 refugees. The Iraqis who have fled from the exception, granting Palestinian refugees Jordanian citizenship in 1948. However, ongoing warfare resulted in the flight of more Palestinians who have not been granted citizenship and who are until today stateless. 2 1 Jordanian Dinar (JOD) equals 1.05 Euros or 1.41 US Dollar. 3 During mass movements UNHCR does not have the capacity to conduct individual asylum interviews for everyone. According to UNHCR this is also usually not necessary, since ‘in such circumstances it is generally evident why they have fled. As a result they are immediately recognized as refugees (UNHCR, 2012b)

8 three provinces of northern Iraq, under control of the Kurdish Regional Government, have to apply for a refugee status (UNHCR, 2007). While the UNHCR acts as a near sovereign, it does not have the capacity to fully substitute or bypass the host government. Protection is restricted and does not encompass the right to work (Kagan, 2011). Moreover, the UN agency has committed itself to find durable solutions outside of Jordan, as the 1998 MoU mandates recognized refugees only a maximum stay of six months (UNHCR, 2012). Many Iraqi refugees have been in Jordan for years, overstaying this designated period. The Government of Jordan refrains most of the time from sending them back to Iraq, but also insist that they do not intend to be a ‘dumping ground’ for refugees who are not accepted for resettlement (Zaiotti, 2006).

Protection, Protraction and Durable Solutions

After recognizing refugee status, the next step in the UNHCR’s protection framework is the search for a durable solution. As the High Commissioner has emphasized that there can be no meaningful protection without the prospect of a durable solution (UNHCR, 2004: 5). The three durable solutions for protracted refugees issues, identified by UNHCR, are: voluntary repatriation, local integration and third country resettlement. They are solutions since they would provide an end to refugees’ suffering, their need for international protection and dependency on humanitarian assistance (Black and Koser, 1999).

Voluntary Repatriation entails the voluntary decision to return to the country of origin. UNHCR considers repatriation as the most preferable solution, and the UN agency maintains that the largest number of refugees ‘want to go home’ (UNHCR, 2011a). Within the international refugee regime there is no clear definition of what a successful repatriation is, nor is there agreement on what ‘home’ actually means. The assumption that a refugee wants to and simply can return can be questioned. Moreover, voluntary repatriation requires the cooperation of the government of the country of origin. Political support for return is not self-evident (Black and Koster, 1999: 7). If Voluntary Repatriation is not a viable option, UNHCR recognizes local integration as a durable solution: “finding a home in the country of asylum and integrating into the local community to their plight and the opportunity of a new life” (UNHCR, 2013). Formally, only in situations where it is impossible for a person to go back home or to integrate in the host country, resettlement to a third country becomes an option. Resettlement is the UNHCR’s last resort for finding a solution and is considered as act of burden sharing: to

9 demonstrate solidarity towards first asylum countries and in order to act in the interest of protection for refugees (UNHCR, 2004).

The present policy of UNHCR Jordan is not to advocate return to Iraq as the country’s situation continues to be unstable (UNHCR, 2012). Moreover the willingness of the Iraqi refugees in Jordan to return to Iraq seems to be little. In a study by UNHCR (2008) 90 per cent of the Iraqi refugees said they thought they would never return. Most probably the numbers of people going back is higher, but Iraqis often choose not to ask for help of the UNHCR because they want to be able to return to Jordan and to keep their options open. This discrepancy between the formal, bureaucratic practices of UNHCR and IOM and the social realities of the people themselves is important to consider. The refugees do not think in terms of closure and solutions, but carefully outweigh their possibilities and keep their options open. Many of my informants mentioned they had been back to sell property, to bury a family member, to obtain necessary documents to proof persecution, or to see for themselves whether they actually want to return.

In this thesis I will reflect on the policy and powers regarding resettlement, and consequently on the legal limbo in which Iraqi refugees negotiate their positions. Since 2007 resettlement to a third-country became a realistic option for many refugees, because the international community was showing a sign of willingness to ‘share the burden’ (Chatelard, 2011). In line with an increasing donor fatigue, there has been a dramatic decrease in the willingness of countries to accept Iraqi refugees. At present the US is the only country that receives new Iraqi applicants, but the strict security procedures can stall the resettlement process for years. Thousands of refugees are still waiting. Roughly 2.800 Iraqis have received a rejection letter after they underwent this lengthy process. 4 Other Iraqi refugees fail to meet the selection criteria of UNHCR or are never considered for resettlement because of an alleged (war or political) past. The Government of Jordan is firmly opposed to the integration of the Iraqi refugees in Jordan who are not accepted for resettlement, formally eliminating local integration as an option. The 1998 MoU even starts with the explicit statement that Jordan is a transit country only (Evans-Barnes, 2009). Local integration is denied on a national level, but at a local level the boundaries between long-term humanitarian assistance and integration are blurred. This results in a de facto integration, as a continuous process of assistance and accommodation is taking place (Chatty and Mansour,

4 Program Manager IOM Resettlement Support Centre, interview 25th of June 2012

10 2011). In 2007 the GoJ granted free access to public primary and secondary schools to Iraqi children in Jordan, regardless their legal status, and access to primary health care likewise to non- insured Jordanians (Women’s Refugee Commission, 2009; Chatelard et al., 2009). It is however unclear whether Jordan will continue its leniency, as international support is declining (ICG, 2008). Especially since the government is coping with a Syrian refugee influx, many Iraqis in Jordan fear they will be forgotten or even send back to Iraq.

The Iraqi Refugee Population in Amman – Urban Displacement and Demographics

UNHCR distinguishes the Iraqi refugee situation in Amman as ‘the urban context’ of refugee protection to contrast it with refugee situations in camps. Urbanity can cause challenges for humanitarian interventions, as it is more difficult to distinguish the humanitarian population. The Iraqi refugees do not locate their ‘refugeeness’ inside the political and social spaces of Jordan, and instead focus on other aspects of their identity such as being Arab, Muslim or Sunni (Chatelard, 2009). Jacobsen and Furst Nichols (2011) argue that aid workers and researchers can best distinguish urban refugees by using the 1951 refugee criteria: in their opinion a refugee is a person who crossed international borders for reasons of individual persecution or a situation of armed conflict. But not all of those Iraqis registered at UNHCR left their country because of this reason. Some of my respondents showed a remarkable resemblance to economic migrants. Other people who did flee out of fear for their lives chose not to register and this was legally possible due to their status as ‘guests’. According to Leenders many former Ba’ath party members and businessmen, who started to invest in Jordan, did not opt for registration (Leenders, 2008). They had their own means or capacities to find solutions or they were aware that they did not stand a chance for resettlement. There has been much debate about the official number of Iraqi refugees in Jordan. An extensive survey in 2007 showed that there were around 161.000 Iraqi in Jordan, but the Jordanian Government contested this figure. 5 Upon their request the Norwegian research institute Fafo (2007) finally came to the conclusion that in 2007 a questionable number of 450.000 to 500.000 Iraqis were in Jordan. These figures are often quoted, but are also vigorously debated by scholars and policy makers (Chatty and Mansour, 2011; ICG, 2008). The GoJ still

5 The Jordanian government argued that the number of Iraqis who had registered for a telephone subscription were much higher. During my fieldwork I learned that most of the Jordanians and Iraqi I know actually have two or more telephone subscriptions.

11 used this number in their official documents, but at present UNHCR solely relies on the number of registered Iraqis (UNHCR, 2012a). This research focused on Iraqis who are registered at UNHCR and as such are recognized as refugees, since it are only those displaced Iraqis that are selected for resettlement. Many of my informants registered for three reasons: legal protection, cash assistance and the possibility for resettlement. Well-off Iraqis were often registered at UN for resettlement purposes only. The decision to register – hence to being labeled as a refugee - is thus much related to the expected benefits, and less so to the reason of displacement. The first half of 2012 saw a first drop in the Iraqi refugee population registered with UNHCR: from 30.388 individuals in January to 29.191 in May. This decrease is attributed to a lower rate of new registrations, an increased inactivation of files of refugees who are thought to have departed from Jordan and a slight rise in resettlement departures (OCHA, 2012b). Nonetheless, the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) assumes that a substantial number of Iraqis are set to remain in Jordan, including those Iraqis who are still waiting for resettlement (Idem).

Fafo (2007) showed there is a relatively equal gender distribution in the Iraqi population. However, according to UNHCR (2009) more men than women were registered although no percentages are provided. According to the Fafo survey (2007) 68 per cent of the Iraqi community in Jordan is Sunni Muslim, 17 per cent is Shi’ite Muslim and 12 per cent is Christian. The distinction of different ethnic or religious affiliations – Sunni, Shi’ite, Kurd or Christian – is a relatively new classifying paradigm. Until recently differences were mainly experienced in relation to education, class, the urban/rural divide and generations (Al-Ali, 2007). Within this thesis I will only mention ethnic or religious affiliation when I think it is of relevance for the narratives or views presented. Interestingly, while we see an increasing sectarian divide within Iraq and many of the Iraqi refugees left their country because of sectarian violence, those who fled – Sunni as well as Shi’ite – often emphasized that this label meant little to them and even negated that it was of importance in present Iraq. And although many of them had links with the former Sunni regime, they did not link this connection to their denomination. This is in line with what the International Crisis Group (2008: 2) wrote: “Many refugees … fled because they were non-sectarian and unaffiliated with any militia, therefore lacking the necessary protection (in Iraq).”

12 City-life is what most Iraqi refugees are used to, as the majority comes from Baghdad. It is associated with characteristics that might be beneficial for refugees in order to build up their lives and livelihoods: the informal job market, space and anonymity, relative free movement, individuality, contact with the host population and modern information techniques. However, the distinction between what is camp refugee life and what is an urban refugee setting, is increasingly blurred. Refugees who are living in camps are just as well connected to the local context of the host society and to global flows of information, money, ideas and people (Horst, 2003; Campbell 2006; Jansen, 2011). Moreover, according to Diken and Laustsen (2005) life in urban Amman might not take place in a physical camp, but it has the ‘logic of the camp’ since formally, refugees are deterred from working and live on small amounts of support. A city provides economic and social opportunities, yet many of the Iraqi refugees remain (partially) dependent on savings, assistance of NGOs and IOs and remittances. The protractedness of the Iraqi crisis in combination with a lack of secure job opportunities for Iraqis means that even those who used to be rich became increasingly impoverished and dependent on assistance (Chatty and Mansour, 2011: 68). You can see this slope also in regard to the changing demographic spreading of the Iraqi refugees living in Amman (see Map 1). Originally many Iraqis were able to afford apartments or houses in middle and upper class areas in West-Amman. But the money is drying up and many Iraqis who used to be well-off, feel forced to move to East-Amman, where impoverished Jordanians, Iraqis and Palestinian people live in small cramped apartments, and the streets are busy and buzzing. Jody Miller, an American minister who runs a church for Iraqi refugees, told me: “I once met a guy. He told me: “First I lived in Abdoun, then in Rabia, then in Jabal-al- Hussein and now I am here, asking you for help finding a place in Mahatta. I am at the bottom.”

Methodology: An Urban Ethnography

An ethnographic approach regards conflict and subsequently displacement as a contextual and dynamic process (Richards, 2007). This research is focused on people who are rejected for resettlement, but considers resettlement and its selection process as a broader phenomenon that influences the lives of those people who are able to leave Jordan, those who are still waiting and those that stay behind – either in Iraq or Jordan. To come to a closer understanding of the influence of resettlement and rejection on the lives of the Iraqi refugees, I use an ethnographic approach. Ethnography ‘involves the researcher participating, overtly or covertly, in people’s daily lives for an extended period of time, watching

13 what happens, listening to what is said, and/or asking questions through informal and formal interviews, collecting document and artifacts – in fact gathering whatever data are available to throw light on the issues that are the emerging focus of inquiry (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007: 3).’ The main methods used for this research are in-depth interviews and participant observations. I also used existing documents and literature as well as webpages. The study is descriptive and interpretative in nature, as it will attempt to represent the life-worlds of Iraqi refugees and centers on the sense making of these representations (Ashworth, 1997: 223). In line with Haraway (1989) I believe I can only arrive at a partial understanding of the world we are part of by investigating the detailed and different pictures of that particular world. Knowledge is created in a dialogical communication process, in which every participant including myself exerts power (Schrijvers, 1991 in Horst, 2003: 10). This replaces the idea that there is one objective ‘truth’ about resettlement by a vision that there are many different constructed and conflicting truths about this particular durable solution.

I conducted interviews with a wide variety of people, including refugees who are rejected or not selected for resettlement, refugees whose case were still pending, IOM- and UNHCR staff members, aid workers and clergy men. In total I conducted 38 in-depth interviews with Iraqi refugees and 8 interviews with aid-workers (see Appendix 1 – List of informants). These include twenty-three semi-structured interviews with refugees who have received a rejection from the US government on their request for resettlement and six interviews with Iraqi refugees who – in spite of having been in Jordan for years – have never been selected for resettlement. In total I have interviewed seven married couples, eighteen single men and four single women, who were either rejected for resettlement or never selected for this durable solution. I also interviewed nine Iraqi - mostly female - refugees whose cases where still pending in order to understand the gendered distribution of rejection for resettlement. These semi-structured interviews were guided by a topic list, addressing the resettlement process, the role of IOs, the possibilities for life in Jordan, the importance of social networks and – more abstract – questions on belonging and identity. My inability to speak Arabic fluently posed a limitation to my fieldwork, which was overcome by using a translator. My interpreter Moe is a 27-year old man from Baghdad. Besides from being my translator, he became one of my key informants, as he was also waiting for resettlement. My translator and I were able to build rapport and trust with the Iraqi refugees. `Some respondents we visited more than once, which enabled me to crosscheck statements or to

14 ask additional information. Yet I also have to acknowledge that Moe’s presence and interpretations will have had influence on my research results.

Participant observation enhanced the interpretation of the data gathered during interviews. I involved myself in the Iraqi community by participating and observing during daily and nightly events, such as smoking nargileh, queuing for aid and preparing dinner. Participant observation is “a method in which a researcher takes part in the daily activities, rituals, interactions, and events of a group of people as one of the means of learning the explicit and tacit aspects of their life routines and their culture” (De Walt and De Walt, 2002: 1). It helped me to build trust with my informants, enhanced the quality of the data observed and provided me with new data (Idem: 8). Observing and hanging around in cafés and homes helped me to make sense of the answers and the data I collected. It enabled me to come to partially understand why people would emphasize certain elements in their story and would leave out other aspects. Participant observation is an oxymoron of two processes: it implies closeness and distance at the same time (De Walt and De Walt, 2002; Horst, 2003: 27). Involving oneself provides important and necessary information that enabled me to understand the actions of others. My roles varied from a western aid worker or middle-(wo)man (between the refugees and the UNHCR), to an expert or comforting listener or even as potential sexual partner (Horst, 2003: 9). My perceptions and interpretations are shaped by my own past, locations, values and interests, and are continuously reshaped by what I see, do and experience. I am part of the social world I study and, reversely, my informants also locate me – the ethnographer – within the social landscape they know (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007: 63). As a western young woman conducting research on refugee issues I am therefore automatically linked to the International Refugee Regime. This means that I have to acknowledge that Iraqi refugees will use some of the strategies that they use with IOs and NGOs in their interactions with me.

Negotiating Access in Amman

Amman is an estranging city: you can easily lose yourself in its small alleys, yet it is wide and dispersed, geographically as well a socially. The city was originally built upon seven hills, but now spans over an area of nineteen hills (See also Map 1 and Figure 1). It was quite a challenge to find Iraqi refugees who are not accepted for resettlement in a city that houses over 2.9 million people. An important methodological question concerned negotiating access to the daily lives of the Iraqi people living in Amman. Urban displaced,

15 including refugees, are often difficult to reach because they tend to live amongst the local populations (Jacobsen and Furst Nichols, 2012: 7). Cities contain a concentration of cultural complexities and a great intensity of flows of people, information and possibilities. Even the old Palestinian camps within Amman are now incorporated within the city and are inhabited by Jordanians, Jordanians with a Palestinian background, Palestinian refugees, displaced Iraqis and newly arriving Syrians. Meanwhile life often takes place behind closed doors. I needed to find not only where those doors were, but also how to open them. Another factor that made contact with urban displaced populations difficult concerns the presence of the state (Jacobsen and Furst Nichols, 2011: 7). Since refugees in Jordan are legally prohibited from working, labor often takes place in the shadows. Their visibility is diminished and therefore contact is less easy.

Originally it was my plan to move to East-Amman because I thought that moving to the neighborhood would help me to build relationships and rapport in the areas where most of the Iraqi refugees are living: Hashmi Shmali, Marka and Jabal-Al-Taj (Calhoun, 2010: 5, see map 1). However, I had my personal doubts about moving: whether I would feel secure but even more so whether I would be welcome. In more traditional East-Amman it might have been interpreted as inappropriate or haram – morally wrong - for a young woman to live on her own. Moving could have had the opposite effect: Instead of building trust, I could have created distrust. I decided to stay in my own neighborhood, Jabal-al-Webdeih, when I realized that a large proportion of the Iraqi community were actually residing on this hill, as well as Downtown and in Jabal-al-Hussein (Ibid.). I got entrance to many of my informants through the various NGOs that are active in East-Amman. Subsequently I used the snowball-method to find more informants: I asked my interviewees if they knew people who were rejected for resettlement. This became fruitful when I met some Iraqis who were also volunteering for the NGOs within the Iraqi community: they operated as cultural brokers and helped me to connect to people with different backgrounds, genders and from different religions.

Access is much more than simply a physical presence (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007: 43) within homes, cafés and community development centers. It has to do with how I am perceived, by whom I am introduced and by whom I am received. Although IOM provided me with entrances to people and events, after three months of interning at the organization I decided to ‘disembed’ myself. Most of the research on the Iraqi community has been done in coordination

16 with one or more NGOs, while research has shown that many Iraqis have difficulties to trust the people working at these organizations (Chatty and Mansour, 2011). Moreover online sources showed me how IOM was perceived and that a connection to such an organization could cause turmoil (see Appendix 3). Although some organizations did help me to gain access to informants and I interviewed multiple field officers to discover more about the multiple truths of resettlement, this research is and was not linked to any NGO or IO. Yet I write ‘disembed’ between brackets, as I was almost always associated with Amman’s humanitarian economy.

Mahmoud’s Case: Research in the Humanitarian Economy

My assumed connection to the humanitarian economy necessarily meant that I was often asked to function as a broker. I took me great efforts to balance my sense of responsibility with my role of a researcher-in-training. The idea that I indeed had the power and abilities to help them was proposed with an overwhelming certainty. And rightfully so: opposed to most Iraqi refugee I had access to UN- and IOM-officers, which is more than most of the Iraqis have. I often felt uncomfortable when I was trying to explain what I was doing: that I could not help them individually, yet I was hoping my research would eventually contribute to better refugee policies. Most of the western people they had spoken to had offered something: resettlement opportunities, legal or financial support, vocational trainings, discounts on medical bills. Although this often led to broken promises and disappointment, the rumor that it had been successful for some was a reason to persevere.

The guilt-ridden promise I made to the 28-year old Mahmoud is a good example of how rumors can become ‘real’. I met Mahmoud one day before I had a meeting with the program manager of IOM’s Resettlement Support Centre. Mahmoud told me that his brother was accepted for resettlement, but he himself was rejected even though they had the same case: their father was killed and the two brothers had received multiple death threats. That specific day, Mahmoud’s brother had left to the US. Mahmoud told me that he had appealed against the verdict, but he did not receive a reaction. He asked me whether I could ask IOM about the progress. And I said “yes”, most of all because I felt sorry for him. At the IOM office I found out that there was indeed news about Mahmoud’s case: his file was reconsidered and his case was accepted. He could go to the United States! Although this was of course very good news for Mahmoud and his family, it turned out that Mahmoud’s neighbors and friends attributed this news to me. My translator was called multiple times with the question whether I could also help them. And I

17 myself was contacted via an email with a cry for help: “please please, please.” I had become actively involved before I realized it and confirmed the idea that I actually have the ability to improve their situation. Yet my involvement also learned me more about the strategies, about performances and about the agency of the refugees. Their own questions regarding practical advice or the future plans of IOM and UN, taught me not only what concerned the Iraqis, but also on how I was perceived.

Diphoorn (2012: 28) argues that the emotional experiences that accompany participant observation should also be analyzed as crucial components of data: “participation obliges us to experience emotions – and when understanding them, reflecting on them, and analyzing them - we acquire a more enriched grasp of the research setting.” Feelings of guilt - about not being able to help – and sadness about the hopelessness of the situation were common during this process of doing research. In this regard participant observation – attending dinners, weddings or just hanging out – was a necessary antidote: to see that the Iraqis in Jordan also found ways to enjoy life.

Reflexivity and situated knowledge

The concept of reflexivity helps me to understand the strategies and narratives of refugees within their context. Knowledge is situated: “The only way for a researcher to find a larger vision is by being somewhere in particular, and by locating ones partial and critically situated knowledge” (Haraway, 1991: 190). Whereas I try to explore the creative capacities of refugees, it might actually be more in the refugees’ interest to show that they indeed need external assistance. Knowledge and knowledge production can shape reality and that the way I portray the stories of the Iraqi refugees, can shape actions or even political decisions (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007: 15). This seems hopeful, because it could mean that my work would be able to improve policy and the lives of Iraqi refugees. Then again, there are many conflicting ideas about what would be (most) in their interest. What can be hopeful or durable for some Iraqis can be dreadful for others. One of the questions I often asked my informants was whether the Iraqis would be willing to stay in Jordan if the Jordanian government would give them permission to work. One of my informants, dr. Mohammed, replied: ‘Please don’t say we should stay here if our job opportunities look like this. Like those of he Palestinians.’ This remark struck me because I apparently it was in his interest that I would present his life as a problem rather than as one of agency.

18 In the current western political climate that emphasizes the negative dimensions of migration in combination with a fear for Islam, I should be careful that the accounts of the Iraqis and that my interpretations are not misused. This awareness comes with a responsibility: how can I best capture the narratives of my informants, with their human characteristics of person, place and history (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007: 11)? And how can I best do justice to the agency that is so striking in their struggles for life (Idem: 10)? People use their identities strategically, depending on the circumstances. Refugees are not merely ‘vulnerable victims’ or ‘cunning crooks’: they are both at the same time and much more than that (Horst, 2003).

In reaction to the Iraqi refugee situation in the Middle East, UNHCR adopted a needs-based approach, which rendered the Iraqi refugees into vulnerable aid recipients. Subsequently policy recommendations focused on a rights-based approach that emphasizes the role of states in providing legal recognition. None of these approaches however considered that Iraqi refugees are resourceful individuals who are not isolated from their host community or transnational networks (Chatelard, 2008a). In this study I counter the simplified images of refugees as victims as I recognize that the ‘stranded’ Iraqi refugees negotiate their position and place in Jordan (Horst, 2003). This research has an emphasis on human agency in the context of institutional structures and social relations, and a focus on the interpretations of the refugees of their life in Jordan. Their stories are full of ‘if onlys’’ and ‘what ifs’: “What if I had told a different story?” “What if I wouldn’t have been there that day?” People try to make sense of their lost opportunities (Al-Ali, 2007: 260). While their accounts are shaped by the past and present, they are also linked to aspirations for the future. Iraqi refugees continue their search for a better life with the options available. These include financial and humanitarian resources and knowledge, but also social networks, victimization and gender-related possibilities.

According to the UN, worldwide, of every 100 refugees in need of resettlement only 10 are resettled each year. This leaves a significant gap between resettlement needs and UNHCR’s capacity to meet them (UNHCR, 2011a). It is my intention to show the impact of a policy that stimulates hope and agency among refugee populations, but that can also cause frustration and disorder if dreams are not realized. I recognize that UNHCR’s abilities are restricted and dependent on the good-will of nation states: for those who are denied access to the US by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) resettlement is at the moment simply not an option, since there are no other

19 receiving countries. A UNHCR Resettlement Officer told me: “Our core mandate is protection. There is no country called UNHCR where we can send you to.”6 It is not my intention to libel about the UNHCR or associated organizations. As a critical researcher-in-training, I do argue that resettlement has disruptive effects and creates social reordering. Among the refugees who are not accepted for resettlement, this humanitarian intervention creates uprootedness and limbo, rather than that it provides a solution.

Structure of the thesis

In this introductory chapter I have addressed some important aspects of refugee life in Jordan and necessary background information: why are there Iraqi refugees in Jordan? What is their legal status in Jordan? And which possible solutions are there available? Subsequently I have addressed the methodology and some of the challenges of ethnographic research with urban refugees.

In Chapter Two, I will provide insight in my theoretical approach. Previous work with Sudanese refugees taught me to consider the ‘multi-faceted and fluid humanness that characterized the individual refugees I got to know’ (Horst, 2003: 10). I was struck by the ability and creativity of human beings dealing with inhuman situations. I therefore have chosen for an actor-oriented approach. This approach assumes that human beings are actively involved in the construction of social relations, discourses and even structures (Long, 2001: 16-17). Even in the worst conditions people create their own narratives of history and prospects of their future (Giddens, 1984). Social ordering is a result of negotiations of power, place and identity.

Chapter Three until Chapter Five presents the empirical findings of this research. Chapter Three starts with background information on the formalities and the process of resettlement. The chapter shows how humanitarian actors and nation-states have contributed to the creation of hope and a sense of entitlement for resettlement. The role of governance, politics and power behind the resettlement program are subsequently analyzed, as it entails the structural setting in which the international community as well as the Iraqi refugees negotiate their position. In Chapter Four, I analyze how the Iraqi refugees build up a temporary life in Jordan and find ways to negotiate decisions that are made. They actively maneuver between the urban and the humanitarian economy. As the Iraqis are formally excluded from Jordan’s labor market, they find other means to make a living. These include remittances and work out of sight of the law.

6 UNHCR’s BO Amman, Resettlement Officer, Interview, 28th of June 2012.

20 Even if they are rejected for resettlement, the Iraqi refugees do not let go of their idea that their future is elsewhere. They continue to put most of their trust and efforts on the humanitarian context and on finding strategies to travel to the west, while they hardly invest in life in Jordan. Chapter Five shows how the longing for resettlement can create disruption within social order, but also creativity to negotiate. Gender and generational roles are reconsidered in regard to the possibilities for resettlement. The Iraqi refugees continuously outweigh their choices, not just for themselves, but also for their entire family. Transnational networks and the creation of an Iraqi diaspora with a distinct Iraqi identity further reinforce the creation of limbo: the idea that the Iraqi refugees do not belong in Jordan, nor do they belong in present Iraq.

Chapter Six is the conclusion of this thesis. I argue that – in response to the option for resettlement and in combination with feelings of insecurity - as legal and social marginalization persist have started to consider Jordan as a transit place. The Iraqi refugees persist in their idea that life in Jordan is only temporary. They refrain from investing in a life in Jordan and instead connect to the Iraqi diaspora worldwide, further disconnecting themselves from the local context. In reaction to UNHCR’s urban refugee management and the Jordanian Government, the Iraqi refugees did not anchor themselves in Amman, as they prefer to hold on to a life in limbo.

21 Figure 1 – Picture of Amman.

Photo by Laurie Visser

22 Chapter Two: Theoretical Framework

In the introductory chapter I asserted that refugees are individuals that are actively involved in the construction of their lives in transit. This assumption builds upon the actor-oriented approach that enabled me to comprehend the interplay between people’s agency and structure. I will expand on this approach in the upcoming chapter. Subsequently, this chapter provides an extensive overview of the concepts that were essential for my understanding of the multiple realities of refugees and other actors with regard to life in Amman, Jordan. These concepts are power and governmentality and place and place making.

The Actor-oriented Approach

The actor-oriented approach of Long (2001:49) is based upon the assumption that people have the capacity to process their own and others’ experiences and to act upon them. It starts with the premise that people are social actors who have agency and interpret their context, their needs and their own role as well as those of the others. Refugees are - just like every human being - actors who have knowledge and capabilities to act: “The notion of agency attributes to the individual actor the capacity to process social experience and to devise ways of coping with life, even under the most extreme forms of coercion” (Idem: 16). Flight always entails some form of choice: the decision to leave Iraq was for most of my informants a carefully out-weighed decision. In policy and media a distinction is often made between labor migrants, representing the economic aspects of migration, and refugees representing the political aspects. However for many of the Iraqis the decision to flee was based on mixed motivations. Even in the harshest circumstances – war, violence, and continuous insecurity – there is a variance in behavior and interpretations: whether to leave Iraq or to stay, to register at UNHCR or to stay anonymous, to emphasize your strength or your vulnerability. People operate within the limitations of structural constraints, but these constraints are often man-made and only become effective through interpreting actors (Hilhorst, 2003: 5).

Practices are driven by various and changing notions and motives, that are shaped by the actor’s interpretation of the situation and in interaction with others. Language plays a pivotal role in this (Hilhorst and Jansen, 2010: 1120). The actor-oriented approach pays much attention to the existence of multiple discourses. “Discourses are more or less coherent sets of references that

23 frame the way we understand and act upon the world around us” (Hilhorst, 2003: 8). There is the tendency to reduce complex issues to simple explanatory schemes that tend to exacerbate problems rather than contribute to solutions (Frerks, 2007: 40). The consequence of a particular discourse is that particular ways of understanding society gain authority, including its way to organize and distribute power. But there are always parallel discourses at work. Social life never builds upon a single type of discourse. “However restricted their choice, actors always face alternative ways of formulating their objectives deploying modes of action and giving reasons for their behavior” (Long and Long, 1992: 25). In order to understand how multiple discourses can exist next to each other and how these are (re)shaped in everyday practices, the concept of the social interface is helpful. Social interfaces are the intersections in which different discourses meet, and where different life worlds cross. The social interface explores how “discrepancies of social interest, cultural interpretations, knowledge and power are mediated and perpetuated or transformed at critical points of linkage of confrontations” (Long, 2001: 50). Interfaces change everyday lives and experiences and in return everyday life affects the interface. Especially when interests clash, for instance in families and relationships, social negotiations take place and become visible (Jansen, 2011: 41). It is at these interfaces that power differences and differences in knowledge and ideas are most clearly identified (Van Dijkhorst, 2011: 33). In this thesis I will show that among the Iraqi refugees, negotiations take place and social changes occur at the interfaces with the international community, the Jordanian host society and the emerging Iraqi diaspora.

The Role of Structure in an Actor-oriented Approach

Long (2001) has developed the actor-oriented approach in line with Giddens’ structuration theory (1976; 1979). In this theory the connection between the structural elements of a society and human action plays a central role. Structure is produced and reproduced by human agency and vice versa. A central element is the duality of structure: society is enabling and constraining and people continuously reshape society but are also restricted by it. As Giddens argues “the production of society is brought about by the active constituting skills of its members” (Giddens, 1976: 226). The social world is not a “pre-given universe of objects.” It is constituted and produced by active subjects who transform nature and themselves. Agency, as Giddens sees it, is related to the idea that the agent ‘could have done otherwise’ (Ibid.).

24 Our social world is produced by men and women who are historically located actors and who draw upon the available resources and conditions - of which they are not always aware (Giddens, 1976: 227-229). Most of the time human beings are engaged in routine practices, guided by the standardized stocks of mutual knowledge (Ibid.). Only in retrospect, when changes occur, or in reference to the behavior of someone else, we become aware of our own interpretative schemes. Experiences and desires are reflexively interpreted and internalized. Through reflexive monitoring of our practices, but also by unintended consequences or unacknowledged conditions of actions, structures can change.

The aim of an actor perspective is to clarify the sets of intersecting relationships, social practices and the notions of the actors, that all penetrate the multiple symbolic, social and geographical spaces (Long and Long, 2001: 50). To understand how resettlement affects the lives of Iraqi refugees, this study considers structural elements, such as the role of the UNHCR and governments, as well as the negotiations that take place as these powers are contested. I will analyze how multiple actors interact, contest and influence the place of this particular displaced population.

Governance, Governmentality and Power

I draw upon Giddens’ understanding of power: the capability to make accounts count (Giddens, 1979: 104-113 in Davis, 2003: 214). Human agency is bounded by social norms and rules. Yet the continuous social production of rules and resources creates patterns of social systems in time and space. The most deep-layered systems are institutions: governments, agencies, families, marriages (Giddens, 1979: 235 – 236). When these institutions encounter one another, social reordering takes place. At the interface, rules are negotiated. Foucault sees governance as the form of power ‘by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects’ – a generalized and accepted form of power that seeks to control and shape the self and others (Foucault, 1984: 221). In line with Foucault I do not see power and governance only as forms of control. It is also as a productive force that can change ideas, create confusion and produce limbo. Governance is more than territorial control and entails the control over a ‘complex’ of men and things that constitute a population (Idem). It applies to the exercise of power in a variety of institutional contexts, in order to direct, control and regulate activities in the interest of a population.

25 By studying ‘governmentality’ I will explore the practices and programs that are aimed on shaping and governing behavior of the Iraqi refugee population, but also on the aims and aspirations behind these steering processes. Mentalities and rationalities are framed within so- called ‘regimes of truth’ (Huxley, 2007: 187). People govern (themselves and others) by production of ‘truth’, yet these ‘truths’ about what and who should be governed, how and by whom can differ. Power and therefore truths are heterogeneous and localized in historical and geographical specificity (Elden and Crampton, 2007: 6). Spaces take a vital place in the battle for control, but as Elden and Crampton state: “it is a battle and not a question of domination” (Idem: 2). Governance and the rationalities behind this control are contested.

Pseudo-governance and Global Governance

In Jordan there is a de facto transfer of responsibility for managing refugee policy from the Jordanian government to the UN agencies. This is what Kagan (2011) describes as the responsibility shift. The Iraqi refugees become subject to the international community which functions as surrogate state. By carrying out functions such as registration, status determination and services the UN performs the role of the state but without the capacity to fully substitute or bypass the host government: it becomes a pseudo-government. According to Kagan the origins of this responsibility shift derive from inequality between the global north and south and is the result from a compromise on refugee policy. Developed nations of the north only accept small asylum burdens, while the majority of refugees remain in the global south. Meanwhile the international community takes over the burden of caring for the refugee population. There is a growing influence of non-territorial global governance, bringing together governments, international organization, private companies and military establishments. This does not mean that nation-states have become weaker, but that authority and power has changed (Duffield, 2001). Cosmopolitan politic-thinkers such as Kaldor uphold the view that global networks will come to embody universal shared values and responsibilities by assuming the role of an international state that can uphold the rule of law (2007). Yet according to Duffield (2001) regional networks – or ‘strategic complexes of liberal peace’ - are part of an already existing system of global liberal governance (Idem: 258). Via a complex interface of participation, aid and partnership the north engages selectively in the south (Ibid.). The logic of exclusion informs north-south relations, reinforcing the power of the north over the south. This becomes especially visible at the borders or global governance. These border areas are as much social as they are territorial. Duffield (2001:4) describes the present refugee

26 regime as one of ‘return rather than asylum’. Methods of population containment and ‘safe area’ policies are aimed to keep ‘dangerous’ strangers and poor people from going to the north. This idea of exclusion however should not be taken too literally: besides closing doors, exclusion is also a subordinating relationship that is embodied in new types of restrictions (Idem: 5). Exclusion also implies the existence of criteria of inclusion: many of the Iraqi refugees are for instance accepted for resettlement. This inclusion under global liberal governance is discerning and selective, as I will further disclose in Chapter Three. The thickening of networks that links UN agencies and NGOs with governments and companies, makes it increasingly difficult to separate the humanitarian activities of UN-related agencies from the logic of nation-states. While humanitarian agents hold on to the notion of a ‘humanitarian space’ in which services are provided according to the principles they uphold, a multitude of actors – with their own considerations and interests - shape the everyday practices of policy and implementation. (Hilhorst and Jansen, 2010).

Bureaucratic Labeling

How displaced populations are categorized and labeled by different parties – governments, UNHCR, media, the Iraqis themselves - is of great importance because it enables and assists people to classify, to justify action and to govern. Concepts and categories are not only shaped within a social reality. They impact the discourse within that reality and thus shape actions and reality itself. Existing ideas affect the daily lives of refugees. The GoJ’s depiction of refugees as guests releases them from the responsibility to take care of the Iraqis in their country. Yet in the media the refugee-label often takes on a standardized shape of either criminality or helplessness: of victims without any power, place or personality. Parallel to that latter image the international refugee regime and governments have taken over an institutional label that determines entitlements: protection, aid and resettlement (Horst, 2003: 11). Many of the present complexities with regard to refugee aid are grounded in these simplified labels and the motives for refugee assistance. Refugee aid is often motivated in terms of humanitarianism or charity, based on the principle that relief should be provided to human suffering. People deserve assistance if they are helpless victims, living in extreme circumstances. Refugee aid de-historicizes and de-politicizes the situation and denies that refugee creation and assistance is also determined by global political and economic factors (Horst, 2003: 236). In many ways this resembles what happens in development aid. In Ferguson’s (1990) description of

27 development aid as the anti-politics machine the author shows how the simplified images of underdevelopment leads to an enormous apparatus of aid that by economic modernization strives for evolutionary betterment. Technical solutions should help under-developed countries to alleviate poverty and to reach modernity, but as Ferguson shows: these almost always fail. Yet, as Ferguson argues, these failures should not be seen as mistakes: the actual outcomes become instrumental to other, mostly political, processes. What matters are the effects of specific concepts and labels and the way the system functions, and not so much the intentionality of the structures.

Labeling involves defining people in stereotypical ways and those that are defined as the most ‘vulnerable’ receive the most attention. Ones assumed vulnerability defines access. Inclusion also requires that you conform to the system, and you adapt your story so that it fits the bureaucratic dictates: “the system requires refugees to do what it accuses it of: making up stories” (Horst, 2003: 13). Becoming a refugee is a continuous and dynamic social process and not simply the result of crossing a national border. Malkki (1995: 114) refers to this process as ‘refugeeness’. It is a gradual transformation, throughout which refugees learn from each other, the international community and the host country government how to become and behave as refugees. This mean that refugees might use their label and what is expected from them in strategic manners (Kibreab, 2004). For instance, prioritizing assistance and resettlement for women – merely based on the assumption that ‘women matter’ and are ‘vulnerable’ – has unintended consequences: married couples might file for a divorce, because single mothers are more easily selected for resettlement. This is an example of what Utas (2005) calls victimcy. Victimcy is ‘a form of self- representation by which agency may be effectively exercised under trying, uncertain and disempowering circumstances’ (Idem: 408). With this concept Utas reveals the complexity of roles and strategies under conflicting opportunities and challenges. A perspective that renders refugees exclusively into victims creates a framework in which he or she is not seen as person but as someone against whom violence is done. However, the tendency to emphasize agency in every action also creates difficulties, since “agency is highly dependent on specific social situations” (Idem: 407).

28 Displacement and the Production of Place

This study is an exploration on how years of displacement and dissolution have influenced the production of a transit place and a life in limbo. The term displacement seems to assume that refugees are “matter out of place” (Douglas, 1966). It is based on the assumption that ‘a given population has its proper place, territory and homeland’ and that there is a fundamental relationship between people and place (Allen and Thurnton, 1996: 10). People would belong to the specific nation-states they originally come from: discrete spatial divisions of territory (Malkki, 1992: 34). The majority of the Iraqis who have left their home country however sold everything they had with the impression that they would never return. They detached themselves from Iraq, and left with the notion that there would be a better place for them (Chatelard, 2008b). Moreover many Iraqis living in Jordan feel abandoned by the current Iraqi government state and feel a deep sense of alienation from present Iraq (Crisp et al, 2009: 53).

In line with Gupta and Ferguson (1992) I assume that space and place are not given, because human beings are not naturally anchored in space. A space achieves a distinctive identity as place by the people who live in it and who adhere meaning to it (Idem: 8). Space is inscribed by cultural differences, historical memory and societal organization. People are mobile and ‘displaced’, and invent homes and homelands in absence of national or territorial base, through claims on and memories of places they no longer physically inhabit (Mallki, 1992: 24). This does not mean that place is not of importance for the construction of identities, but it should be seen in a broader and less fixed context. “To plot only “places of birth” and “degrees of nativeness” is to blind oneself of the multiplicity of attachments that people form to places through living, remembering and imagining them” (Idem: 38). Place is continuously produced and reproduced by the experiences and expectations of life in Jordan and elsewhere. Moreover, places can acquire meaning over time and these meanings can change in relation to global and local developments. For most Iraqis Jordan was a temporary haven at first in order to wait to go back to Iraq. But after a few years in exile the host country has become a place of transit to a western country and preferably to the US.

The concept liminality enables me to come to a better understanding of a life in transit. Turner (1967) defined liminality as a state in which a person is out of its structural context, making their position in time and place rather ambiguous. The metaphor of the ‘being betwixt and between’ is well suited for the position of refugees: one is detached from an old status and has not yet

29 incorporated a new one. A refugee is in a process of transitions from a past that was known, to a future that is new, unknown and unpredictable (Malkki, 1995; Alitolppa-Niitamo, 2001). But what happens if that future continues to be unknown as is the case among the refugees for whom resettlement is not a viable option? A protracted life in limbo might cause feelings of distress, anxiety and depression (Ten Holder, 2012; Kloosterboer, 2009). A life in transit can however also create a space to (re)negotiate social order, to contest previously existing power structures and to order the temporary. Malkki’s ethnography on “displacement and deterritorialization” (1995: 1) shows how collective histories and identities of refugees are embedded in and emerge from local circumstances. In her ethnography on “two different conditions for social production and invention” she describes two groups of refugees: the first group consists of Hutu refugees living in refugee camp in rural Tanzania while the second group comprises what Malkki describes as “town refugees” living in the Tanzanian township Kigoma. She discusses how a variety of situations and contexts can account for variance in narratives and the place of refugees within the ‘order of nation states’ (Idem: 252). For the Hutu refugees in the refugee camp history and memories served as anchor of hope while living in exile. They were continuously engaged in the construction and reconstruction of themselves as an essentialized ‘people’ as they saw themselves as a nation in exile. Their hardships would empower them to reclaim their ‘homeland’. This ‘homeland’ is not merely a territorial destination, but a moral destiny. The urban refugees had a more pragmatic approach towards their history and continuously sought ways to assimilate their multiple identities that were situational rather than moral or essential. While the ‘camp refugees’ live their lives in a past and memorized Burundi, the ‘town refugees’ were living in the present circumstances of Tanzania (Malkki, 1992: 34-36).

Someone’s abilities and willingness to blend in or to move on, depends on much more than whether a displaced person is living in a town or in a camp. There are many differences within the refugee community that can influence how uprooted or ‘at home’ a person feels. Over time the engrained knowledge of the Iraqi refugees on what home is or how the ‘home country’ is proof no longer adequate since transformations have taken place, both ‘here’ and ‘there’ and on a personal and societal level. Many of the Iraqis have the tendency to elevate or even to glorify the past and argue that the place they left behind is no longer the same. In many accounts melancholy and nostalgia prevail. It seems that every historical period was followed by a time of greater difficulties and increased hardships. As Al-Ali puts it: “any positive nostalgia for the

30 period before the invasion is largely a measure of the extent to which living conditions have deteriorated since 2003” (Al-Ali, 2007: 261). Nor do most Iraqi refugees in Jordan feel at home in Jordan. Home is more than a physical place, and is associated with family, safety and community. Home is a memory of a place with functioning social relationships and proper values (Al-Ali and Koser, 2002: 8). On-going insecurity, legal restriction and social marginalization are all part of what is not home and is associated with life in Jordan. Meanwhile the urban refugee setting enables the Iraqis to resort to multiple survival strategies in order to comes to terms with the difficult conditions they find themselves in (Crisp, 2003). Whether or not an Iraqi refugee finds strategies to make life in Jordan successful depends much on one’s personal characteristics. In Jordan access to opportunities and the risks attributed to life in Jordan are gendered. Therefore socially constructed roles and relationships change due to this life in exile. Protracted displacement results into social reordering. Another important factor that influences how life in Jordan is perceived, are the social networks maintained within and outside of Jordan. Connections with fellow Iraqis create a sense of unity and enable opportunities to leave Jordan. Fellow Iraqis are companions while waiting for resettlement and friends to share your mutual past with. Just because Iraqi refugees find themselves in limbo, the necessity to link up with people and information across the world has gained significance: mobility and modern media enable transnational networks.

Transnationalism

Despite distances, many forms of association take place in a worldwide arena, speeding up historical processes and establishing new forms of interaction (Al-Ali and Koser, 2002:2). The concept transnationalism enabled me to understand how images, policies, actions and interaction with and within the sending country (Iraq), the transit country (Jordan) and finally in different receiving countries in particular the United States - continue to impinge on the ‘uprooted’ everyday lives in Jordan. A transnational perspective “calls into question the common assumption that sedentary life is the ‘natural’ state of society” (Horst, 2003: 37). While there is overlap between globalization and transnationalism, the main difference is that global processes are decentered from specific nation-states while transnational processes are actually anchored but transcend national territories (Al-Ali and Koser, 2002: 2). Al-Ali and Koser (Ibid.) make a distinction between ‘transnationalism from above’ that is very much likened to globalization and macroeconomic processes, and ‘transnationalism from below’. The latter

31 examines relationships that originate and bridge at least two nation-states and people and their ‘everyday practices’ are central.

Within the transnational approach, migration is regarded as a continuous flow of people money, goods, and ideas that transcends national boundaries and therefore connects different physical, political, social and economic spaces (Mazzucato et al, 2003). A person’s connection to an ‘imagined community’ (Anderson, 1983) is not confined to national borders. A particular aspect of transnationalism is the reappraisal of a deterritorialised nation-state (Al-Ali and Koser, 2002). While most of the Iraqi refugees do not consider going back to Iraq, their nationality and country of origin continues to play a central role in their lives. Family members and friends are still living in Iraq, their Jordanians neighbors emphasize their non-Jordanianness and being an Iraqi also creates a feeling of entitlement for resettlement. In many of the Iraqi household the television continuously shows Iraqi news-channels and the houses are decorated with Iraqi flags and other national attributes. One of the first family’s visited had a massive picture of Saddam Hussein hanging in their living room. I must admit that I had some difficulties enjoying my lunch while facing the smile of this – in my eyes – cruel dictator, although I recognize that this interpretation is mostly based on what Appadurai would call ‘media-scapes’: the repertoires and images I have often seen portrayed in the news (Appadurai, 1990: 590). The technological expansion of communication and transport has according to Appadurai (1986) led to new conditions for neighborliness amongst people. An increased circulation of information, people, ideas and commodities enables interactions that are less time- and place-bound. Appadurai (1990) uses scapes to refer to the fluid character of realities that are not given but constructed – they are building blocks of what he calls the “imagined world”, that is, the multiple worlds that are constituted by the historically situated imaginations of people and groups spread around the world. ‘Media-scapes’ are in his view very important, because they provide ‘repertoires of images and narratives’ (Idem: 590) to viewers throughout the world in which the distinction between realistic and fictional is increasingly blurred. They produce images of the lives of others and the possible lives that can be lived. Diasporas are intrinsically linked to transnationalism: “a diaspora is a transnational organization or community of a particular kind” (Horst, 2003: 35) and is originally connected to ‘exile’. In this meaning it relates to traumatic experiences, forceful displacement and the not feeling at home of diasporic people in the place where they have settled. While the Iraqi dispersal – as well as before the 2003 Invasion and after – is mostly tragic, there are also stories of success. Some of the early Iraqi migrants who fled because of repression and violence are now living in

32 well-off suburbs: having arrived from Iraq without almost anything, they had managed to accumulate considerable wealth. Their American dream became real (Al-Ali, 2007: 32). Pictures of and stories on a western welfare that cannot be achieved local Jordanian or Iraqi standard can highlight inequality. But they can also stimulate the agency to move on. Imagines of a better future elsewhere provide hope in a hopeless situation and a reason to hold on to the temporariness of life in Jordan.

The Creation of Limbo

One’s linkage to a place and whether one feels at ‘home’ is connected to order and governance. Iraqi refugees can stay in Amman, but only temporarily and as long as they do not integrate. Yet what was supposed to be transitory – an exceptional time in an exceptional place – might become for those refugees who are not accepted for resettlement a permanent location. While I use transnationalism as a concept to understand how a life in limbo in Jordan is shaped and negotiated, this does not mean that I believe that nation-state has lost their abilities to exert power. In most cases transnationalism has reinforced state control rather than empower refugees (Koser, 2007). What I like to emphasize in this thesis is the production of limbo as a result of and in interaction with structural elements, like governments. Andreas Wimmer (2002) argues that while the binding principles of the nation-state allowed inclusion of large sections of a population, it also provided space for new forms of exclusion. This is what he calls the shadows of modernity. The modern state governs in the name of a people who are defined as its nation. It is an inclusive and accountable form of politics except for those who are kept outside the doors of this socially constructed national home and for those who are not recognized as belonging to it. Every form of social organization has its price: inclusion of a national community of equals goes hand in hand in with the exclusion of those who are not considered to be its ‘true’ members: they become classified as foreigners, guests or refugees (Idem, 4). The refugee is excluded from the domain of law, yet remains subject to it. They are in the country, but not of the country, and they are abandoned, only to be included in the domain of power (Diken and Lausten, 2005:81). Nation-states can shape, hinder or encourage transnational practices, and gain especially significance if migrants feel marginalized (Al-Ali and Koser, 2007: 5) Power and governance influence the importance of transnational flows of money and ideas. With their restriction on local integration and in particular to employment, the Jordanian government partially forces Iraqi refugees in Jordan to rely upon the incomes of others who are either in their old home country

33 or in the United States. Western countries select who are eligible for resettlement and who are not. Meanwhile because many Iraqi refugees are successfully resettled an Iraqi diaspora emerges that remains connected to those who are left behind. These connections feed into the idea of temporariness. This is an example of the duality of structure: the society enables and constrains, while people maneuver, negotiate and reorder their position within it. With this, they restructure the very society itself. Migrants, and refugees in that same manner, are not anchored in their place of origin or in their place of destination. They develop new hybrid identities. What is important in regard to analyzing ideas on place and belonging among ‘stranded’ Iraqi refugees, is that there are more parties involved than only a ‘receiving and sending country’ as Jordan is continuously perceived as a transit country. Social formations not only span the borders between Jordan and Iraq but also between Jordan, the United States, the UK, Canada, the Gulf and Syria, and are also shaped by the UNHCR as pseudo-government (Kagan, 2011). Many of the Iraqis perceive Jordan as a country for transit and therefore they consciously or subconsciously refrain from anchoring themselves: their lives takes part in the past as well as in the future, but not in the present. There is a multiplicity of ‘there’s’ and a dread for being ‘here’.

Conclusion

For this thesis I draw upon the actor-oriented approach, as it assumes that refugees are human agents who negotiate power, place and identity. The notion of agency attributes to people the individual capacities to process social experiences and to create their own narratives, even in the worst conditions. The duality of structure shows how at the interface between structural elements – governance and power - and the refugees, social realities are negotiated and changed. The concepts ‘power’ and ‘place’ are the main points of departure for this actor-oriented analysis on the impact of the resettlement process and rejection. These concepts are essential for an understanding of the production of limbo. Policies of governments and the international community, as pseudo-government, control the behavior of the Iraqi refugees in Jordan, but only to a certain extent as these powers are contested. In this case ‘place’ has much to do with one’s physical but also one’s mental space to maneuver and to belong: the ability to respond to a new life depends for a great deal on the experienced structural restrictions or opportunities.

34 Chapter Three: The Politics of Resettlement

In this chapter I will give an overview of the resettlement process, set up for the Iraqi refugees in Jordan. An exploration of the formal structures behind resettlement and a rather factual explanation of the resettlement program are followed by a description of the role of power and politics involved. In this chapter I will dissect and analyze the roles of the different governments, including the UNCHR as a pseudo-government in regard to resettlement. This includes the different practices and programs aimed to govern over the Iraqi refugees, but also the rationalities behind these policies. Chapters Four and Five will discuss in great detail how the refugees react and negotiate their position in relation to the politics of resettlement.

The Formalities behind the Resettlement Program

In order to provide a durable solution for refugees unable to return or to remain in the first country of asylum, UNHCR established an extensive resettlement policy. The formal definition of resettlement is “the selection and transfer of refugees from a State in which they have sought protection to a third State which has agreed to admit them – as refugees - with permanent residence status” (UNHCR, 2004b: 1). In the context of international refugee law, resettlement is understood as a mechanism to achieve three equally important goals: refugee protection, a durable solution and as an element of burden sharing with host countries (Idem: 2). The latter goal is a demonstration of solidarity towards first asylum countries. In the 1970s and 1980s Thailand and Malaysia were persuaded to offer protection to hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese refugees, only because they were assured that western countries would accept them for resettlement (Van Selm, 2003). The bureaucratic notion that refugees are a burden on hosting countries also legitimizes the call of host governments for international assistance and for resettlement programs (Chatelard, 2008b). The actual mechanism of the resettlement process is largely unregulated by the 1951 Refugee Convention and is a discretionary response on the part of UNHCR and receiving states. Since the mid-1990s, the administration of resettlement is governed by a UNHCR-produced soft- law framework that is formally nonbinding: guidelines, procedures, a code of conduct and most importantly, the Resettlement Handbook. The Resettlement Handbook was set up to clarify the standards and to streamline procedures for resettlement in UNHCR field offices. These include case assessment and verification (UNHCR, 2011). A refugees’ eligibility for resettlement is based upon fixed criteria and a comprehensive effort is put on the determination of credibility. If a case

35 is accepted by a UNHCR field officer, it is submitted to a potential resettlement country (Sandwich, 2011: 15). The underlying premise is that, by adding a set of formal procedures, a global consistency, transparency and accountability can be achieved (Sandvik, 2011). In her study on urban refugee management in Uganda, Sandvik (2011) shows however that these non-bindings frameworks and guidelines can be used as a key tool by which Western governments both seek to manage migration and legitimize their own efforts to do so. This is in her view partly the case because this soft-law regularization is not what it claims to be, namely “an instrument for upholding individual rights” (Idem: 16). The push for efficiency has produced institutionalized stereotypes. Urban refugee governance is produced through regulatory practices, legal diversity and politics of exclusion. At the interface between nation-states, humanitarian actors and refugees, rules and ideas on resettlement are negotiated ((Idem: 21). Regularization is accompanied by ‘the production of locality’ (Appadurai, 1995: 208).

Resettlement as a Durable Solution for the Iraqi Refugee Situation

After the fall of Saddam Hussein regime in 2003 a normalization of the situation in Iraq stayed out. On contrary, Iraq’s security environment further deteriorated in 2006. In addition to a growing influx of Iraqi refugees, UNHCR had to deal with the 1998 MoU, containing the unrealistic expectation that a durable solution should be found for all recognized refugees within six months. In 2007, this resulted in a cohesive resettlement program for Iraqis from Central and South Iraq.

UNHCR started to encourage several nation-states to consider resettling Iraqi refugees who were ‘stranded’ in Jordan and Syria. By 31 December 2007 UNHCR planned to submit at least 20.000 Iraqi refugees for resettlement (UNHCR, 2007; Cochetel, 2007). Resettlement would only be an option for a limited amount of refugees and therefore they established 11 criteria to identify the most ‘vulnerable’ Iraqis (see figure 2). UNHCR determines whether it refers a case for resettlement using their selection criteria and the requirements of accepting countries. In lengthy interviews they determine whether a refugee is eligible for resettlement and whether a story is credible. This assessment is mostly based on the information the refugees provide themselves.7 At the International Conference on the Humanitarian Needs of Iraqi Refugees in 2007 the UN High Commissioner for Refugees Antonio Guterres stated that resettlement to a third

7 UNHCR BO Amman resettlement officer, interview, 28th of June 2012

36 country would only be an answer for the most vulnerable. He argued: “Obviously, the best solution for the overwhelming majority of Iraqi refugees will be their voluntary return in safety and dignity – once conditions allow” (Cochetel, 2007). Five years later, official UNCHR policy is still that repatriation is no viable option for most Iraqis and only a limited number of Iraqis expressed their desire for a long-term return to Iraq.8

Figure 2. UNHCR’s Selection criteria for eligibility for resettlement for Iraqi refugees • Victims of severe trauma (including sexual and gender-based violence), detention abduction, or torture by state or non-state entities in the country of origin • Members of minority groups and/or individuals who are/have been targeted in the country of origin owing to their religious/ethnic background • Women at risk in the country of asylum • Unaccompanied or separated children, and children as principal applicants • Dependents of refugees living in resettlement countries • Older persons at risk • Medical cases and refugees with disabilities with no effective treatment available in the country of origin • High-profile cases and/or their family members • Iraqis who fled as a result of their association with the multinational forces, coalition provisional forces, the UN, foreign countries, international and foreign institutions or companies, and members of the press. • Stateless persons from Iraq • Iraqis at immediate risk of refoulement (forced return to country of origin).

Source: UNHCR, 2007

Throughout the Middle East a total of 130.000 Iraqi individuals have been submitted to resettlement countries since 2007 (OCHA, 2012). Figure 3 shows – after an initial rise in 2007, 2008 and 2009 – a decline in submitted Iraqi cases, and in particular from Jordan. According to UNHCR’s resettlement officer UNHCR Jordan has submitted the cases of more than 30.000 displaced Iraqis for resettlement.9 UNHCR’s Jordan target for 2012 is set on the resettlement of

8 UNHCR BO Amman resettlement officer, interview, 28th of June 2012. 9 Idem

37 2.500 Iraqi individuals in 2012 in comparison to 3.600 Iraqi individuals in 2011 (OCHA, 2011; OCHA, 2012). Whether this constitutes only a small fraction of the total Iraqi displaced population in Jordan or a relatively large segment is debatable, as the GoJ and the UNHCR continue to disagree on the actual size of the Iraqi refugee population

Figure 3. Breakdown of Submitted Cases and Departures Worldwide 2009 2010 2011 Submitted Departur Submitted Departur Submitted Departur cases es cases es cases es Country of Origin - Iraq 36.067 23.098 26.746 16.014 19.994 8.677 Country of Asylum – Jordan 8.920 5.625 6.383 3.630 3.552 1.050 Source: UNHCR 2010; 2011b; 2012b

Figure 3 also shows a disjuncture between the number of submitted cases and the actual departures. Lengthy security checks and the times it takes for states to process resettlement procedures have led to delays in the departures. In 2009, 73 per cent of the Iraqi cases and in 2011, 91.3 per cent of the Iraqi cases submitted by UNHCR were eventually accepted by resettlement countries (UNHCR 2010; UNHCR 2012b). In 2008 and 2009 many western countries including the UK, France, Germany and Australia offered ad hoc resettlement places for Iraqi refugees. But countries cannot be legally obliged to become resettlement countries nor does UNHCR have the power to force countries to accept refugees from a country of first asylum. The willingness to receive Iraqi refugees has dramatically declined in the last few years.10 At present the United States is the only country accepting new applications. Australia and Canada are still processing some pending cases.

The US Refugee Admission Program Part 1: The Interview

While most of the cases IOM works with are referred by UNHCR, there is also a direct entrance mechanism to the US Refugee Admission Program (USRAP). Since 2008, Iraqi refugees who have been employed by the US government or US affiliated organizations are considered to be P2-cases: Specific groups of special concern that are identified by the Department of State (DoS) in consultation with NGOs, UNHCR and the DHS. Spouses, parents and unmarried children of US citizens can also request for family re-unification (USCIS, 2012; Bruno et al, 2009). These so-

10 UNHCR BO Amman resettlement officer, interview, 28th of June 2012.

38 called P3-cases were suspended since 2008 due to indications of high rates of fraud, yet have been re-installed as of 15 October 2012 and now encompass a DNA-test to proof biological families ties (IOM, 2013). IOM prepares the refugees for their interviews, schedules the interviews and provides information on the process. According to IOM’s RSC program manager it is among other things IOM’s role to point out in advance the inconsistencies in the stories of the refugees so they are well prepared for the actual interview.11 The determining interview takes place with an officer of the DHS in a secluded area and a translator. The DHS is a cabinet department of the US government, created in response to 9/11 and with the primary responsibility to protect the US from terrorist attacks. The Iraqi refugees are thoroughly screened on their past, the reason to flee and their credibility.

The Results of the Resettlement Interview - The Day That Everyone Got Accepted

Two months after I finished my internship at the IOM, I visit the organization once again but with different intentions: I join the Iraqi refugees in their search for resettlement. More than two hundred Iraqi refugees are waiting in front of IOM’s waiting room. All of them have been interviewed by DHS and today they will get the results. When your name is called, you can come forward to collect your personal letter, written in American English. There are two different letters you can receive. One letter contains four paragraphs, indicating in a rather juridical tone that you are accepted for resettlement but that the US Government still has the last-minute right to decline your entrance to the country. This confuses me, because according to the Iraqis that are present this letter means you are exempted from or have passed the security check and will soon depart to the US. The other letter contains only one sentence: you are not rejected, but your case is deferred, meaning you have to wait for the security check. Subsequently a box is tagged implying you need to wait until further notice (see Appendix 4). At the IOM office there is excitement and confusion among the refugees, but not about the content of the letters. Although most Iraqis are not able to read their letters, rumors have spread about what letter you can receive. Everyone around me seems to know that a long letter is good as it means most definitely you will leave soon. A short letter is good enough: you are accepted if you pass the strict security clearance. This means that you have to wait longer and there is still a chance on rejection. But at least you are one step further in the resettlement process.

11 Program Manager IOM Resettlement Support Centre, interview 25th of June 2012

39 It turns out that everyone who was ordered to come to IOM Jordan on this particular day has received a (provisional) acceptance letter. The refugees who are rejected for resettlement have received a phone call and can come by another day to collect their personal letter. This good news for those who are present, but some people are confused: adult children have received a long letter, while their parents have to wait for the security check. One elderly couple is outraged: As it turns out they received the same deferral letter last year. My translator, who is also waiting for resettlement, tells me: “I have received a short letter almost a year ago. And I am still here. I will only be happy when I am in America.” Receiving an acceptance letter – either the short or long version – is one step ahead in the resettlement process, but the chance for rejection remains.

The US Refugee Admission Program Part 2: Further Steps Including Waiting

If – after the DHS interview – a refugee is approved for resettlement, four more steps must be completed before a refugee can actually depart to the U.S. These steps can take place in any order and include a sponsorship assurance for life in the US, half-yearly medical examinations, a cultural orientation course as described in the introduction and finally the security check (IOM, 2010). The latter step is for most Iraqi refugees the most stressful: while the other steps can also delay the process, the latter can take up months and can actually result in a rejection. The most thorough measures are used, including biographic and biometric data in order to prevent ‘dangerous individuals’ or ‘criminals’ from entering the US (IOM, 2010). According to IOM’s program manager a total of 26.000 Iraqi refugees in Jordan have received an approval for going to the United States since 2007.12 He assumes that in 2012 a total of 3.000 to 3.200 Iraqi refugees will be accepted for resettlement, while there are still 7.200 Iraqi individuals in IOM’s pipeline: they have received an acceptance letter but are still waiting for their departure.13 In opinion of IOM’s RSC Program Manager what creates more frustration than a straightforward rejection - as I will consider in the next section - is the insecurity during this waiting period. 14 My respondent Nabila confirms his idea: “We are always waiting. Every Thursday I dread because another week has passed and it is weekend for the UN and the IOM.” Jody Miller argues however the duration of the waiting period for resettlement should be looked at with a bit more nuance, since he recognizes improvement. It used to take four to seven years

12 Program Manager IOM Resettlement Support Centre, interview 25th of June 2012 13 Idem 14 Idem

40 before a refugee was resettled. Before February 2011 the process at IOM would take approximately eight to ten months from the time of referral from UNHCR.

Concluding Remarks on the Procedures of the Resettlement Process

Not knowing is experienced as extremely stressful, yet for many Iraqi refugees the waiting will be finally rewarded. A relative large proportion of the Iraqi refugee community in Jordan has been successfully resettled to the US and other western countries, especially if you compare this refugee group with other refugees worldwide (UNHCR, 2011a; UNCHR, 2012b). However, this is not a study on resettlement, but on the lives of those Iraqi refugees who have been rejected for resettlement and the effects of the resettlement program. At the interface between state actors, humanitarian actors and refugees, expectations are created and social realities are changed. The departure of friends and family also affects those who stay behind, and influences ideas on life in Jordan and on the role of UNHCR. In the following section, I will first consider how Iraqi refugees are selected and rejected for resettlement. This will serve as the context for the analysis of governance and power.

Resettlement, Selection and Rejection

Not Selected for Resettlement – the ‘Excluded Category’

Six of my respondents have been in Jordan for years. Formally, most of them would qualify for UNHCR’s resettlement criteria as they say they have left Iraq after they experienced torture, abduction or detention (see figure 2). Yet they have never been selected for resettlement, nor were they informed about this decision. Most of my respondents eventually found out that they were simply not selected for resettlement by UNHCR, but only some know the reason why. It was quite difficult to obtain official information on those Iraqis that are never considered for resettlement by UNHCR, even if one of the eleven conditions is met. Lorna Rodd, an NGO-worker who works with refugees who are rejected for resettlement, told me about the existence of an ‘excluded category’.15 The UNHCR-officer in charge denied that there was a term like this one. She did confirm that there are people who have “profiles we simply cannot submit for resettlement.” 16 UNHCR does not submit cases of which they know that it

15 Lorna Rodd, Hope and Trust, interview, 28th of June 16 UNHCR BO Amman resettlement officer, interview, 28th of June 2012

41 will cause ‘trouble’ with receiving countries. This is because of the relationship they have with the receiving countries and the reputation they uphold. “It has to do with our quality, because this also influences the willingness of those countries to accept other refugees.”17 In UNHCR’s defense the responsible officer argued: “We have a very high threshold. The only cases we exclude are obviously suspect. This is a different story for the US. They have a much lower threshold. They can refuse people only on a hunch.”18 A former UNHCR-employee had told Lorna that they do not inform the excluded refugees about their status: “They don’t want to upset them. They are afraid of their connections and the threat they might impose.”19 The refugees themselves refer to this decision as ‘rejection’ for resettlement, even though they were never selected in the first place. An appeal for not being selected is formally not possible. Having the right connections might however enable that a case is reconsidered for resettlement, as I will further disclose in Chapter Four.

Rejection for Resettlement

Approximately 2.800 Iraqis have received a letter from the US Government stating that their request for resettlement was rejected.20 This letter contains one or more ticked boxes explaining the reason why. The reasons are not further specified. In ninety per cent of the cases the box ‘credibility’ is tagged. This might mean that the officer in charge believes all but a small yet significant part of the story for instance on one’s role in the army. A further five per cent is refused, because the DHS officer has reason to believe that the refugee himself21 was persecuting others. Often this refers to one’s military or political past and in particular to compliance to the Al Anfal Campaign in Kurdistan22 during which 50.000 to 200.000 Kurdish people have been killed (Hilterman, 2007). The last five per cent is rejected because of a wide variety of reasons. After a rejection, a refugee has 90 days to appeal towards the decision made by the US Officer in charge. According to IOM’s program manager 20 to 30 per cent of the cases is overturned in response to an appeal letter.23

17 UNHCR BO Amman resettlement officer, interview, 28th of June 2012 18 Idem 19 Lorna Rodd, Hope and Trust, interview, 28th of June 20 Program Manager IOM Resettlement Support Centre, interview 25th of June 2012 21 I use this personal pronoun, since mostly men are rejected for this reason as it is associated with one’s army past. 22 Program Manager IOM Resettlement Support Centre, interview 25th of June 2012 23 Idem

42 Writing an appeal is not easy, partially because it involves guesswork on the reason why. Hardly any of my Iraqi respondents knows how to read English. They have to go to one of Amman’s translations offices to get the letter translated. Often mistakes are made in the translation. Some Iraqis are so upset about their rejection that they do not even get their letter translated. My respondent Faisal explains: “I was so upset. I did not read it. I just kept it. I heard that many people get many boxes ticked. So they have many faults. I just have one. Why did they refuse me?” Twenty-eight year old Yusuf received a ‘Notice of Ineligibility for Resettlement’ (see appendix 5) one year and three months after he had received the short ‘acceptance letter’: he was rejected because he had failed the security check. The reason mentioned in the letter is: ‘After a review of all evidence concerning your case including testimony supporting documentation, background checks, country conditions and other available information as a matter of discretion, your application for refugee resettlement under Section 207 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) has been denied.’ While this motive is utterly vague, Yusuf thinks he knows the reason why. During the insurgency in 2006 Yusuf was arrested because he was present when gunfire killed an American soldier. He was imprisoned for eleven days. Yusuf came to Jordan because as a Christian who had worked for an American organization he felt no longer safe. Even though this is one of UNHCR’s categories for resettlement, these can be overruled by security concerns of the US.

Previously if a refugee would be rejected by the US or by one of countries that used to receive Iraqi refugees, UNHCR would resubmit his or her case to another country. This is no longer an option since the US is the only country available.24 Some of my respondents were rejected for resettlement by other receiving countries, when these countries were still receiving Iraqi refugees. Yet these governments have not provided a reason for this decision.

Dealing with Disappointment – The First Negotiations

Almost every Iraqi refugee who was not accepted for resettlement recalls the disappointment and the frustration after the request for resettlement was denied. From a practical point of view life continues much as it was before, yet years after the decision was made the option for resettlement continues to consume the lives, minds and conversations of the ‘stranded’ Iraqi refugees in Jordan. They ruminate about the reasons why they were rejected and continuously

24 UNHCR BO Amman resettlement officer, interview, 28th of June 2012

43 compare their cases with accepted relatives and friends, hoping to find a loophole in the system. Many of the Iraqis think they are rejected because of their own or their husband’s army past. Yet they are also puzzled whether and how come this is the reason, because due to the conscription every grown-op man born before 1985 has served in the Iraqi army. Likewise was almost every highly educated Iraqi, member to Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath party.25 Some blame the interpreter or the DHS-officer in charge. Many of my respondents were surprised that the DHS put so much focus on what they consider as unnecessary details from years ago. Or they express anger that the US governments doubts whether they are persecuted.

Both IOM and UN claim that the options to contact the organization are abundantly and that there is ample opportunity for counseling.26 Yet the organizations are difficult to reach, via telephone, the Internet or physically. The offices are far away meaning that a refugee has to invest time and money for commute while there is a high risk of coming back empty-handed (see Map 1). Limiting access to UNHCR staff is a common measure in refugee management and was recommended in the Resettlement Handbook to in order to keep disappointed refugees at a distance. Yet this distance can, by the refugees be seen as a symbol of disengagement (UNHCR, 2004b; Sandvik, 2011). The difficulty to reach UNCHR or IOM is an example of bunkerization: the tendency of aid organizations to cloister their offices into walled compounds. This approach would create division and reinforce the perception that humanitarians are harboring a western agenda or that they are controlling the refugee population (OCHA, 2011). It is difficult to get through to the responsible organizations, but it is even more difficult to find out who is accountable for decisions made: the many different players obscure whether there is actually someone who is responsible. In their search for answers and solutions, the Iraqis are confused about the different players and their different roles in the process. They do not know where and how to express their anger and despair, as they are sent from pillar to post while IOM and UN point at each other. Because of the limited information provision, contradicting rumors start to live their own lives. At the time of this research IOM was finally catching up on their backlog, meaning that instead of a usual 100 to 300 approximately 400 to 500 Iraqis were leaving monthly. This created

25 The Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party seized power in Iraq in 1968. Iraqis were encouraged and later on pressured to become party members, and certain career paths including that of teachers were only available to people who had affirmed loyalty to the party (Al-Ali, 2007; Tripp, 2007). According to most of the Iraqis interviewed almost everyone was a member. Um Yusra told me: ‘Even a taxi driver had to become a member.’ 26 UNHCR BO Amman resettlement officer, interview, 28th of June 2012, Program Manager IOM Resettlement Support Centre, interview 25th of June 2012

44 disturbance among the Iraqi community: Rumors go that IOM would be closing down, leaving the refugees in Jordan behind. At the same time, many respondents are convinced that options to go to Canada, Australia or Europe are or will be available.

Pseudo-Governance: The Logic of Exclusion and a Growing Sense of Entitlement

UNHCR established both a logic of exclusion and created a sense of entitlement by using standardized criteria to guide the appropriateness or necessity for resettlement. With its resettlement program, UNHCR reinforced and formalized the dream for a life in the west. Resettlement shaped the behavior and identities of the refugees who wanted to be included. In the last few years Iraqis have started to define their experiences more and more in a label that gained currency among the IOs and NGOs, as inclusion requires conformity (Chatelard, 2009). At the interface, those who find themselves displaced in Jordan recast their experiences as refugees and victims from conflict and violence.

Established criteria, based upon vulnerability, determine whether a refugee is selected for resettlement. This might leave out individuals who are in need, but who do not fall into any of these fixed categories. One’s assumed past and credibility also determine inclusion. Those who were not selected by UNHCR for resettlement automatically became a “residual case load” whereas these refugees themselves were not informed.27 The Iraqi refugees have come to rely on the international community and feel let down, just because for many of the Iraqi refugees resettlement was the main reason to label themselves as refugees. With its Resettlement Program, the UNHCR shaped and governed the behavior of the Iraqi refugees and unintentionally reinforced the uprootedness of Iraqi refugees as they started to consider themselves as a distinct group. Exclusion implies criteria of inclusion. Under global liberal governance this inclusion is selective and discerning (Duffield, 2001:5). The US Government – and IOM as its representative - provides more information on its reasons for not accepting refugees. The main reason for rejection was ‘credibility’ showing that the officers and the refugees might have contesting ideas of what they consider as ‘truth’ and the importance they attribute to some events in the past. The US government holds on to the right to withhold resettlement until the last minute, and excludes people with a contested past.

27 UNHCR BO Amman resettlement officer, interview, 28th of June 2012

45 The Iraqi refugees started to consider resettlement as a right and the UNHCR and the IOM as the responsible organizations that can make this happen. UNHCR’s resettlement officer confirms that most of the Iraqi refugees expect resettlement: “Most refugees seem to think: if I hold on long enough, you will be resettled. We do tell people that at this moment resettlement is not an option. Resettlement is not a right. Our core mandate is protection.”28 This sense of entitlement is a result of the role the international community has taken upon itself: as a surrogate state within Jordan the UNHCR has taken responsibility for registered refugees and has committed itself to provide a durable solution for its ‘constituents’.

UNHCR’s resettlement officer thinks that the expectations of the Iraqis with regard to resettlement are simply too high. She feels the ‘stranded’ refugees have to come to terms with a new ‘reality’29. But the UNHCR and the refugees have different understandings of what this ‘reality’ is. The UN agency has told to the ones who have been rejected by the US government, that they have to wait, since there are no other countries available. This is a cause for disappointment, yet more significantly: it keeps the dream alive that someday there will be another option for resettlement. UNHCR’s resettlement officer argued: “We can’t predict what will happen in the future, so we can’t give them a definitive no.”30 Just because the UNHCR is empty-handed in providing another durable solution, the organization refrains from being clear about the future of the Iraqi refugees. This creates hope and is one of the main reasons why the Iraqi refugees who are not accepted for resettlement hold on to a future elsewhere.

The Politics of a Surrogate State

In absence of a Jordanian Refugee Law, UNHCR gained executive power over the Iraqi refugees and became a surrogate state within a state (Kagan, 2011). But especially in relation to the refugees who are rejected for resettlement it became visible that the UNHCR does not have the capacity to bypass nation-states. The UN agency has to balance its work within its constrictions and in favor of the goodwill of hosting and receiving countries, as it is dependent on nation- states to provide funding and territory for protection. Refugee creation and subsequently the provided assistance are always determined by global political-economic factors, limiting the protection organizations such as UNCHR can provide. Neither UNHCR nor IOM have access

28 UNHCR BO Amman resettlement officer, interview, 12rh of July, 2012 29 Idem 30 Idem

46 to land where ‘stranded’ Iraqi refugees can go if all other options fail.

By UNHCR’s definition the Iraqi refugee situation has reached its protracted phase: after years of exile refugees’ lives are not at risks, but some of their basic rights and essential needs remain unfulfilled. UNHCR acknowledges that “Protracted refugee situations stem from political impasses (UNHCR, 2004; Chatelard, 2011).' A closer look at the politics behind the assistance including resettlement options for the Iraqi refugees shows a rather difficult and diffuse interplay of the involved countries, the international community and the refugees whose lives and futures are at stake. The reasons for states to contribute are highly political.

Political Considerations behind Resettlement

Berman (2010) has compared the resettlement efforts of the US and European countries and recognized that both deploy their refugee aid in order to minimize the scale and control the character of the Iraqi refugees who are leaving the Middle East. While the formal aim of the resettlement program is to share the burden of the Iraqi refugee crisis, the Western countries are only accepting those without an incriminating history and the potential to contribute. In line with Duffield’s argument, global liberal governance is increasingly focused on containment and return of poor people and dangerous strangers (Duffield, 2001: 5). Both the US and the European Union (EU) are increasingly aiming for containment via financial assistance to the host-country and seem to have a preference for regional solutions. Moreover, more and more European countries are returning rejected asylum seekers to Iraq even though UNHCR Jordan still considers the country is unsafe to promote return (Berman, 2010).

Cohen (2008) argues that there is also reluctance among many countries because the displacement of Iraqis is largely considered to be problem of US-making and the US should therefore ‘fix’ it.31 Jody Miller, who is an American citizen, saw an increasing interest of the US in the Iraqi refugee issue towards the end of the Bush Administration and thinks they somehow wanted to make up for their involvement in Iraq. In comparison to other conflicts around the world, the US has been relatively cooperative in receiving a refugee load. However, refugee admission works on the country’s own terms, leaving doubts about the humanitarian aspect of refugee relief and only accepting those refugees who are able to prove that they were helpless victims of Saddam Hussein’s regime and its violent aftermath.

31 UNHCR BO Amman resettlement officer, interview, 12rh of July, 2012

47 The US Government especially seems to feel responsible for those Iraqis that are associated with US efforts in Iraq. I wonder how long the country’s responsibility will last, even though IOM’s Program Manager emphasizes that the RSC program for Iraqis will continue for at least the upcoming five years.32 The US Army has already drawn back its troops from Iraq, US- funds for local assistance to Iraqi refugees are drying up and more recent conflicts create new flows of refugees in need of assistance.

Meanwhile Jordan33 is the US’ and EU’s best alley in the Middle East. As a result there was for instance an uneven allocation of aid between Syria and Jordan. Compared to Syria, Jordan hosts a small number of refugees, yet it received a much larger aid package (Berman, 2010). The Jordanian Government has managed to exert control on the assistance provided: sixty-one per cent of UNHCR Jordan’s operational budget was given directly to the Ministries of Health and Education and the GoJ insisted that poor Jordanians should also be included in the programs for Iraqis (Chatelard, 2008b). Originally the Jordanian authorities claimed that there were even more than 750.000 Iraqis in Jordan, and based on this number international donations were made. Yet it were the international and non-governmental organizations that took on this issue of the Iraqi refugee crisis as part of their discourse on the illegitimacy and failure of the US intervention in Iraqi and reproduced uncritically the inflated figures of the Jordanian Government (Chatelard (2008b, 2010a). An attempt of IOM Jordan and US Aid to re-issue a survey in 2011 was cancelled because of a conflict with the Jordanian Government.34 As an alley of the west, Jordan until now agreed to contain the ‘stranded’ refugees – be it under Jordanian restrictions. This willingness is precarious: after the suicide bombs in 2005 by Iraqi nationals in Jordan the authorities began to restrict entry and in 2007 the borders were largely closed. In this period the Jordanian Government also started to deport some Iraqis. And while at present the situation of the Iraqis in Jordan is relatively stable, it remains insecure. Jordan, as well as the other Middle Eastern countries, has remained cautious about asylum. While their concerns are often expressed in relation to the unresolved Palestinian question, other

32 Program Manager IOM Resettlement Support Centre, interview 25th of June 2012 33 For this study I did not manage to speak to Jordanian officials who could respond on my questions on the country’s refugee policy. Officially you need permission to conduct research in Jordan, and since I thought my research might be contested by the Jordanian authorities, I chose not to follow the official path nor to disclose myself. The information I have gathered on Jordanian’s refugee policy is based on literature research and in-depth interviews with UNCHR, IOM and aid-workers. 34 Project officer IOM, personal communication, 25th of July 2012

48 concerns might be just as important: limited resources, political unrest within the region and anxiety that unwanted refugees will be simply discarded in Jordan. Local integration remains a sensitive issue, also in regard to the on going disagreement about the actual size of Iraqis in Jordan: it makes a huge difference whether 25.000 or 3000.000 Iraqis have to be integrated35.

The role of the Iraqi government as a political entity in this power play seems to be almost absent. According to the International Crisis Group the Iraqi refugees in the Middle East charged the Iraqi government of apathy and neglect towards the fate of their citizens abroad. They argue that that the Iraqi government should take care of its citizens (ICG, 2008). Cohen states that it is the Iraq’s biding attitude towards it displaced population that has contributed to an international unwillingness to extent support (Cohen, 2008). The Iraqi ministry of displacement and migration has offered 850 dollars for those refugees willing to return. Yet according to my respondents, friends and relatives who returned under these conditions have not seen the money yet.

In the negotiations on resettlement, I recognize the heterogeneity of power. There is a battle for control between governments, humanitarian agencies and the refugees. At the interface, rationalities and interests are contested. The major donors of the international community plead for local integration in Jordan, while they simultaneously close down their own borders. Meanwhile the Jordanian government holds on to the 1998 MoU in which UNHCR has bound itself to find a durable solution, outside the borders of Jordan for the recognized refugees. The ‘stranded’ Iraqis hold either UNHCR or IOM responsible the politics of countries. Those who were rejected for resettlement by the US Government often blame IOM (see appendix 3). IOM’s RSC Program manager does recognize the confusion about the roles and responsibilities of the UN, the IOM and the US Government. He thinks this is actually one of the main reasons why the US has contracted IOM Jordan: to make sure that not all the refugees turn up at the gates of the US Embassy and the US does not take the blame.36 IOM’s Program Manager tries to emphasize IOM’s independent and impartial position, yet he also told me that ‘IOM is “hand in glove” with the US Government. Yet he reacts indignant when I tell him, many refugees negate the humanitarian character of the international community. He responds: “Many refugees see us as if we are there for them. They don’t understand the politics involved. Our works is constrained by the laws and rules of countries and

35 UNHCR BO Amman resettlement officer, interview, 12rh of July, 2012 36 Program Manager IOM Resettlement Support Centre, interview 25th of June 2012

49 the willingness of them to help.”37 Within their limits both the international community and the refugees try to improve the lives of the Iraqis, yet they disagree on how far UNHCR’s responsibility and power reach and on what is in the refugees’ interest.

Negotiating Protection Space

At UNHCR they are convinced that the resettlement program not only helps those who have departed to a western country, but also improves the lives of the refugees who stay behind. UNHCR’s resettlement officer argues that the protection space for Iraqi refugees has increased, as “there has been a drop in the number of deportations.”38

According to Evans Barnes (2009) the use of the term ‘Protection Space’ seems to be limited to the context of resettlement and to countries hesitant to be seen as a country of asylum. She defines protection space as ”an environment that enables the delivery of protection activities and within which the prospect of providing protection is optimized” (Idem: 11). With her argument that the protection space for Iraqi refugees has improved because of a drop in the number of deportations, UNHCR’s resettlement officer shows a rather limited interpretation of protection. Protection is often understood broader, and includes social and economic rights as well as the option for a durable solution (Evans-Barnes, 2010).

Deportation is an extreme step to remove foreigners who are violating the Jordanian laws from the country. The persons most likely to be deported are men who are caught working illegally. Normally UNHCR intervenes on behalf of refugees to halt these deportation orders, at it is the agency’s mandate to protect persons of its concern.39 In 2011 there were a total of eight deportations in comparison to fifteen deportations in the first five months of 2010 (OCHA, 2011; OCHA, 2012). The resettlement officer thinks this drop is related to the resettlement program because the Jordanian government actually sees people leaving rather than arriving.40 If UNHCR is not in a position to halt a deportation order, the agency may resort to emergency resettlement to a third country. “If someone truly is at risk, for instance if there is a fight with Jordanians, we push the case. The US is no option because the security screening takes

37 Idem. 38 UNHCR BO Amman resettlement officer, interview, 28th of June 2012 39 UNHCR BO Amman Protection Associate, personal communication, 18th of August, 2012 40 UNHCR BO Amman resettlement officer, interview, 12rh of July, 2012

50 too long. We often send them to the Scandinavian countries.”41 These countries have slots available in the case of emergencies. The threat of refoulement can therefore also be used as a strategy to make resettlement happen. UNHCR’s resettlement officer confirms: “I actually know cases who were pushed by friends in Jordanian intelligence.”42

Barnes (2009) links the notion of protection space to humanitarian space: a physical or symbolic environment where humanitarians would be able to work without hindrance and according to the principles they uphold: neutrality, impartiality and humanity. In practice however economical and political considerations play an important role. The protection space of the international community has its limits just because it works within the constraints of modern society in a world divided by nation-states (Wimmer, 2002). The RSC Program Manager argued that IOM’s work is humanitarian, but his statement was contested by the refugees as well a by his colleague: "Resettlement is not fun, it is being humanitarian about a non-humanitarian issues: it’s a business-issue.’43 This business-orientation also means that the organization becomes donor-minded. In a psychological training session – organized for the Iraqis in the Direct Assistance program – it became clear that the continuous insecurity and the possibility of being rejected for resettlement caused severe stress among the Iraqi population. Yet this finding was not communicated towards the donors, because it would create confusion. Hilhorst and Jansen (2010) maintain that humanitarian space is actually an arena where a multitude of actors, including the aid recipients, negotiate the everyday realities of humanitarian action. Likewise ‘protection space’ can be seen as an arena in which different actors, including the refugees, shape their own experiences and ambitions. As the UN refugee agency holds on to rather narrow definition of protection space it forgets that this space is inhabited by actors who transform it: policy makers, aid workers and governments and just as well the Iraqi refugees. Refugees inhabit the protection space, negotiate it and alter it, as I will further disclose in the upcoming chapters. These transformations do not always match with the ideas of humanitarian actors or governments. There is a disjuncture between the goals and intentions of UNHCR and the ideas of the refugees, resulting in negotiations on space and the production of a transit place.

41 UNHCR BO Amman resettlement officer, interview, 28th of June 2012 42 UNHCR BO Amman resettlement officer, interview, 28th of June 2012 43 Program Manager IOM, conversation, end of February 2012

51 Concluding Remarks

In this chapter I have provided an overview of the resettlement process. This information served as the context for the analysis on power and governance in regard to this durable solution. Almost all rejections seem more or less political in nature, aimed at resettling those who are considered to be the most vulnerable while containing those refugees who are acclaimed to be troublesome. The refugees, for whom resettlement is not a viable option, hold the international community accountable for the state they are in and hold on to the hope that resettlement is their right. This is related to the role the international community has taken upon itself. A as a surrogate state within Jordan the UN has taken on responsibility for the refugees, disguising the politics at stake but without the actual capacity to bypass governments. In the midst of political unrest, both the international community and the Iraqi refugees negotiate their space. Whereas some actors strive for an enlarged protection space and containment of refugees in developing countries, both the displaced Iraqis as well as the Jordanian Government hold on to the idea that Jordan is merely a temporary place of refuge. Power differentials, bureaucratization and confusion about responsibilities make it difficult to negotiate decisions that are made.

At the interface the Iraqi refugees are creative and find strategies to hold on to this idea of a future elsewhere. I will show in the next chapters that the use of vulnerability, identity and networks are essential resources. UNHCR might consider some aspects of the refugees’ behavior as lying or fraud. Yet most of the Iraqi refugees feel that UNHCR has actually lied to them on at least one occasion, as the promise for resettlement has failed to materialize. Some Iraqi refugees are actually convinced that the UN is actually deliberately helping people that lie during the process. For instance, my respondent Um Rajan is convinced that almost every Iraqi that has left for the US is a liar: “They made pictures of dead people and say: look, these are my relatives.” As a matter of fact, several interviewed Iraqis expressed that they feel they are entitled to resettlement just because they did not lie. Which also seems to imply a regret: what if they would have lied? Lying is tempting and seems implicitly even to be encouraged, just to fit within the fixed criteria used to determine selection for resettlement. In the upcoming chapters I will disclose how urban and humanitarian resources, a distinct Iraqi identity and transnational networks enables the Iraqis to further negotiate their position, as they continue to perceive Jordan as a transit place only.

52

Iraqi boy eats a hamburger, while his parents continue their American dream

Figure 4 – Swimming with the Mahatta Church Pastor Millers’ Mahatta church organises weekly swimming outings for families. It is the minister’s aim to distract the refugees from their everyday worries that are almost always centred on resettlement: what bonds the rejected Iraqis the most is their nonstop quest for resettlement.

53 Chapter Four: Resources within the Resettlement Context

In the upcoming chapter I will discuss how the Iraqi refugees in Jordan make a living in exile, while they hold on to the idea that life in Jordan is only temporary. The ‘stranded’ Iraqi refugees continue to await resettlement, as they draw upon multiple resources. To analyze the resources available to Iraqi refugees in Jordan I will make a differentiation between the humanitarian economy and the urban economy. These two economies are interlinked and hardly any Iraqi refugee confines him- or herself to only one ‘economy’. After this section I will examine the linkages between both economies, and I will argue in a debate on dependency and agency that the Iraqi refugees actively deploy their capabilities within the humanitarian economy. The persistence for resettlement makes the Iraqi refugees reluctant to invest in a life in Jordan. The chapter ends with a section on the strategies that refugees, who are not accepted for third country resettlement, deploy to make a future in the west possible. These strategies – for instance tapping into one’s vulnerability – shows much resemblance to the means used within humanitarian economy.

Humanitarian Resources

Displacement has been a feature of Iraq, long before the removal of Saddam Hussein’s regime. However, only since 2003 did humanitarian actions start to focus on Iraqi refugees fleeing the country. Besides status determination and looking for durable solution, UNHCR - in its role as pseudo-government - started to provide services. In the last chapter I have shown the influence of politics on resettlement and the contested role of the surrogate state. In this chapter I will focus upon the available resources, and how perceptions on place influence economic considerations. Under pressure of the international community, the Jordanian authorities made the public schools and public health systems formally accessible to all Iraqis in 2007. In the same year, the UN agency started to distribute financial assistance to what they recognized as the most vulnerable cases and families. In 2008 this was replaced for a system of direct financial assistance via Automated Teller Machines (ATMs). Debit cards were distributed among the recipients of cash assistance (UNHCR, 2009). UNHCR perceives this assistance as a dignified way to provide refugees with supplementary support: beneficiaries can make their own choices about what they need and would “gain a deep sense of empowerment and the freedom to prioritize”(Nyce, 2009).

54 Fourteen out of a total of thirty-eight respondents reported that they were still receiving what they refer to as a ‘salary’ of UNHCR. A single person receives 75 JOD (or 83 Euros) a month and a household of four receives 210 JOD (or 231 Euros) a month. This ‘salary’ is hardly enough to pay for rent and some utilities. According to the World Bank’s parameters – that take into account the costs of shelter, health care and minimum caloric intake - the poverty line in Jordan is 55 JOD a month (Tabbaa, 2011). For the Iraqis the poverty line is probably higher. Already before the 2003 invasion the housing rents for Iraqis in Jordan were on average 1,5 times higher than those of their Jordanian neighbors as these prices are not fixed and landlords might try to profit from the insecure situation Iraqis are in (Chatelard, 2002). Fafo’s survey (2007) showed a median monthly rent of 179 JOD (195 euros), but with large variations. This is more or less in line with the figures my respondents gave me of their rents, showing a range between 25 JOD and 300 JOD a month.

Eligibility for financial assistance is – like resettlement is - determined by one’s vulnerability, which is measured by set criteria. Women are more likely to receive cash assistance (UNHCR, 2009). Besides UNHCR, organizations such as Care and IOM provide non-cash assistance, including food kits and household items. Other organizations provide one-off financial assistance in case of an emergency. Just like UNHCR these organizations use criteria to determine vulnerability and therefore one’s eligibility for aid. My respondent Ahmed was frustrated by UNHCR’s bureaucratic procedures to determine his eligibility for aid: he is suffering from a slipped spinal disc, but they told him his illness is not severe enough. At present Ahmed works as a home-based mechanic, out of sight of the official entities. Ahmed comments cynically: “If I stay longer in Jordan I will get a heart disease and I will get assistance.” What is more likely is, that the longer Ahmed stays in Jordan, the lesser assistance will be available for Iraqi refugees because the financial funds for this refugee group in Jordan are drying up. Due to waning donor interests, sustaining financial assistance will be increasingly difficult (Crisp et al, 2009; Chatelard, 2011). This challenge is reflected in the decreasing numbers of refugees receiving assistance. A total of approximately 4.000 households were receiving cash assistance in 2011 in contrast to a total of 6.000 Iraqi families (17.779 individuals) in 2009 (UNHCR, 2009). The 2012 Regional Response Plan expected a further reduction to 2.500 cases by January 2012 (OCHA, 2012). Five interviewees experienced UNHCR’s aid reduction. Mostafa’s salary was cut after a visit of the International Relief and Development (IRD), the agency that is contracted by UNHCR to conduct home visits to (re)consider who is eligible for assistance. It is not the budget

55 cuts per se, but the lack of information and communication about the budget cut that bothers involved NGO-workers: ‘I know a mother whose budget has been cut without having been informed. The mother had just spent all her money on new school cloths for her kids. If she had known she would have saved the money so she could feed her kids.44 One’s vulnerability is also measured by whether one has additional income: Iraqis who have another source of income (for instance a ‘volunteer’ job or remittances) have a lower ‘vulnerability score’ and therefore risk the chance of being excluded from assistance. Some Iraqis even claimed there monthly assistance of UNHCR was cut, just because they were doing odd jobs and earned some cash money. This claims was however not confirmed by other sources. Those refugees who still receive financial assistance see it as their main source of income, even though they supplement their income with remittances and income from odd jobs. Aid is considered to be essential for their living and fear to loose it prevails. Their anxiety is not purely economical; it reflects the continuous insecurity in which the Iraqi refugees find themselves. Almost all Iraqi refugees – the ones who are still waiting for resettlement as well as the ones for whom resettlement is not a viable option – are scared for being left behind in Jordan. They consider the budget cuts of UNHCR as well as the influx of a new priority case, the Syrian refugees, as omens: if the source for the humanitarian economy for Iraqis runs dry, the UN will forget about them and they will become outlaws. Where will they belong if even their pseudo- government is not taking care of them?

A challenge of the urban refugee setting within Amman would be the difficulty to identify and to reach out to beneficiaries, who are scattered out over neighborhoods, densely populated by Jordanians and other non-refugees. It is true that the refugees within the urban context might be less easy to identify. However, this also provides the refugees with the abilities and power to actively negotiate their identity, while the UNHCR as a surrogate state might have more difficulties to protect or to maintain control over their ‘constituents’. Just because life takes place in the city and is not a de facto separate entity, the power to govern is contested. Amman is a place in which the refugees can maneuver themselves in relative anonymity between different spaces and between different identity groups. The conditions for aid – being vulnerable – and the risks associated with working declines the incentive to find a job or at least, to be open about it. Many of my respondents were reluctant to tell me about all their income opportunities. Their additional livelihood activities take place out of sight of UNHCR, and also partly out of my sight because

44 CRP, interview, 25th of May 2012

56 they saw me sometimes as part of the same humanitarian economy. A refugee is able to keep silent about his or her activities because of the spacious character of the city.

Resources within the Urban Economy

Urbanity enables the refugees to draw upon multiple resources, as city life is characterized by anonymity, opportunities and discrepancies in income. Since working is officially prohibited by the Jordanian refugee policy, many Iraqis are engaged in all sorts of informal income generating activities. This informality in Jordan is not specific to the refugee household: forty-four per cent of the Jordanian work force is working in the informal economy (Azzeh, 2012). The Iraqi livelihood activities are not bound to one locality or one place. People meet at the queues of the agencies or tell each other about economic opportunities – in the urban as well as the humanitarian sectors – over mobile phone. Mostafa is dependent on people that call him for a job and every week is insecure. He has done all sorts of odd jobs varying from working on a farm to being a supporting actor in an Iraqi-Jordanian movie. Muez’ friend is a film director. Muez’ job is to be sort of a broker: he has to find the supporting actors and for every person he finds, he earns 2 JOD. Many of the single women have found their jobs through the NGOs or through befriended Iraqis who have businesses in Amman or even Jordanians who are willing to help a woman on her own. Obviously it is difficult to obtain official information on the size and characteristics of the informal economy in Amman – especially since the number of Iraqis in Jordan is contested. There are some figures: in 2007 approximately 20% of the Iraqi population reported that they were employed (Fafo, 2007). The informal job opportunities are mostly ‘urban’ in nature: services, factory work, cleaning. Pavanello and Haysom (2012) estimated in their report on urban displacement in Amman that workers in the informal economy earn around 200 to 250 JOD, which comes down to 229 to 287 euro.

However, most of my informants including Iraqi and non-Iraqi NGO-workers told me this is often less. According to my translator this is one of the reasons why some Iraqi refugees do not work: If you earn 150 JOD a month for working 12 hours a day and 6 days a week you might as well not work. Why take the risk of being arrested or even deported for such a small amount of money? Moreover, a common experience of my informants was that those Iraqis working illegally were without rights. It regularly happened that employers simply refused to pay a salary after one-

57 month work and only received a thank you or a “ya3teek il 3afyeh”45. And if they complain their employer threatens that they will report them to the police. The purpose of an internationally recognized legal status is to ensure that refugees are not placed outside of the law (Agier, 2003). When their rights are violated or they feel that they are treated unfairly, they have almost no ground to stand on. Misunderstandings and confrontations between Iraqi refugees and Jordanian citizens made this visible, as – according to the refugees – the Jordanian police and authorities favor the rights of Jordanian citizens over those of the Iraqis. Social and legal marginalization is the flipside of urban life: loneliness, limited protection, a restricted legal position and decreased visibility.

An additional source of income is (reversed) remittances. Forty-two per cent of the Iraqi household in Jordan received part of their income via money transfers out of Iraq. Another twenty-two per cent received money from outside Iraq or Jordan (Fafo, 2007). Many of my respondents mentioned that their families in Iraq were supporting them, rather then the other way around. Six of my respondents told me that remittances from Iraq are their main source of income. Only three of my respondents mentioned they received remittances from family members outside of Iraq. Whether a refugee receives remittances depends on a variety of conditions, including one’s position in the family. My respondent Abu Haya told me: ‘I am the oldest. They won’t send me money. I have to send them money.’ Other families hold less strong onto these customs.

Some of the Iraqis used to be well off. The idea that Jordan was merely a transit country, made them decide to use their savings to overcome the temporariness of Amman. However, what was supposed to be temporary - first because they thought they would return and then because of the option for resettlement – has become protracted. Life in Jordan continues, as they find themselves destitute. Selling the house they left behind in Iraq – which is quite an ordeal because returning temporarily is a risky venture – or gold is by many seen as a last resort. In Islam gold or money is given to the bride at the time of a wedding, for her own exclusive use. The amount has to be sufficient for the woman to be able to survive if her husband dies or divorces her.

45 a common Jordanian expression meaning may God give you health. Commonly used to express one’s thankfulness.

58 Gendered Resources

Life in exile affects men and women differently in many ways. Urban refugees adapt to displacement and the breakdown of old social orders and ways of life in gender-specific ways. Kibreab (2004) describes a gendered resilience among the Eritrean refugees that shows resemblance to the efforts of the Iraqi refugees: the Eritrean refugee women waste no time to engage in economic activities to obtain their daily bread, while men often react in a confused and defeatist manner. The behavior of Iraqi refugees in Jordan is often likewise. As Jody Miller said: “I know women who work very hard, while her husband and her sons just sit, drink and smoke all the time. To be honest: most guys are useless. They say: I would give anything for a job, but I don’t buy that. For women it seems to be easier to take on any job.” These gender-specific ways of coping are also established or reinforced by the classifications of vulnerability by the international community, the policy by the Jordanian government and customs of the Arab community, embedded in Islam.

Iraqi women are considered to be vulnerable - within the humanitarian economy as well as in the urban economy – but it seems that the Iraqi women in Jordan actually have more opportunities than men have. Men are more likely to be rejected for resettlement because of their army past, less likely to receive humanitarian assistance and run a much higher risk for being deported. Women are rendered to helpless victims, a stereotype that in this case is empowering since it increases one’s chances for resettlement, assistance, mobility, employment, relationships and trust. Iraqi men are depicted as terrorists or war criminals, while the women are rendered as victims who need to be protected. This simplification shapes the social ordering process of life in Jordan and the gendered access to livelihoods. In general it is safer and easier for women to work. Many of my male informants have experienced one or more arrests because they were caught working illegally. My informant Abdullah was caught working, and was deported to Iraq. He came back, but is still terrified of being arrested again. Many other men are anxious about working in Jordan even though the general opinion is that it is much safer then it used to be. Yet the feelings of anxiety persevere, especially among the single Iraqi males. What is interesting is that the men who have been in Jordan since 2002 or 2003 recall that during their first years in Jordan it was actually safe to work, because the Jordanian authorities turned a blind eye to the informal activities of Iraqis. UNHCR now formally provides them with protection and legal assistance, yet it actually restricts their opportunities. The state of exception has provided the GoJ with a legal framework to take

59 measures, such as detention and deportation. These gendered opportunities and risks require a changing mind-set. Especially the more conservative families – and the men as well as the women - hold on to the idea that a husband should be the provider as the wife runs the household. For some these gender roles are only reinforced as life in Jordan is perceived as insecure, and mothers and daughters stay housebound. Other women do find informal employment or manage to find an income by drawing on various humanitarian resources. A life in exile results in shifting power relations between men and women. In their review of UNHCR’s operations for Iraqi refugees in urban areas Crisp et al. (2009: 27) state that Iraqi men in Jordan feel they have lost their role as family provider and therefore feel that their masculinity is undermined. According to the authors, these feelings can contribute to a situation in which refugee women and children are increasingly at risk for domestic violence and sexual exploitation (Idem). Two of my female respondents have filed for a divorce of their Iraqi husband during their stay in Jordan. The reason provided was that their husband was not doing anything to provide an income. Fights and domestic violence were related to this apathy. A report by IOM (2009) shows an increase in domestic violence due to men’s inabilities to provide for their families. Two married women told me their husband beats them, but that they understand his despair and anxiety.

A related gendered resource to draw on is the wedding market or even prostitution: two of the six single women I have interviewed had been married to Jordanians, who were willing to take care of them. They got married because of what they call ‘mutual benefits’. Um Reema married a Jordanian man whom she met in one of the workshops and who promised to take care of her. “My heart is locked but I wanted to live a good life.” Being a woman can create opportunities, but also entails risks. One of my female respondents told me she was sexually exploited. The possibility of sexual harassment is for many families a reason to keep their daughters at home. For Iraqi men the chances for getting married in exile are actually much more limited. Lacking employment opportunities and income, means a grim future without money for the dowry let alone to provide for a family.

Blurring boundaries between the humanitarian economy and the urban economy

The distinction between the formal and the informal economies is not so clear-cut. The Iraqi refugees draw upon many different sources to make a living in Jordan. In order to do so, they

60 engage in formal and informal activities and continuously shift between the urban and the humanitarian. The refugees are however not the only actors that cross this divide. The Jordanian people and its Government also tap into the resources of the humanitarian sector: in exchange for their willingness to welcome Iraqi refugees, it was a requirement of the Jordanian authorities to the international community that poor Jordanians would be included in the programs set up for Iraqi refugees. The international community did two significant attempts to make a bridge to the urban economy, and to indirectly encourage the process towards local integration. The first one is ‘volunteering’ or as Jansen (2011) calls it ‘incentive work’: working for one of the many NGOs present in Amman. The second attempt is capacity building and assistance with finding employment including the promise of a work permit in Jordan.

‘Volunteering’

Despite or perhaps because of the legal restrictions on employment, many NGOs have started to hire Iraqi ‘volunteers’ who work as translators and program coordinators. This temporary position includes a monthly stipend between 100 and 200 JOD. Usually these ‘volunteers’ are women, not only because they are ‘vulnerable’ but also because they are more easily than men welcomed into the homes of families and single women. I interviewed four Iraqi women and two Iraqi men who were rejected for resettlement and who were working as volunteer for NGOs. Positions were often temporary, but once an Iraqi has experience in the refugee-industry, he or she was, until recently, able to find another temporary job at another NGO. Yet the volunteers I spoke to do not have legally binding contracts and feel they can be dismissed at any time. Working as a volunteer is regarded as a prestigious job that provides a refugee not only with a rather fixed income. It also provides with the right connections. Their job position turns them into what Hilhorst (2003) refers to as ‘interface experts’: people who are knowledgeable about the actors involved and the different systems of governance. They are somehow able to navigate themselves at the interface where the systems meet. All of them have in common that they are able to liaise within agencies, churches, with the Jordanians in their neighborhood as well as with the Iraqi community. This explains why my translator was highly surprised to see that even ‘those people’ were rejected for resettlement. Apparently simply having the right relations is no guarantee for resettlement. On behalf of IRD, ‘volunteer’ Um Abdel visits approximately 30 families a month to consider their eligibility for assistance. She has become part of the

61 institutionalized mechanism that decides who is in- or excluded. Yet she herself was also excluded by the same system. She was rejected for resettlement in 2009. The ‘volunteers’ themselves consider their work as way to become productive members of the Iraqi community in Amman. However, at the end of the day, they are in the same limbo as the people they work with. They are struggling with their different roles: that of a professional, helping other Iraqis in their resettlement process, and that of a ‘stranded’ refugee, looking for their own options to leave Jordan. This can cause resentment. Um Abdel states: “Some of them make up real good stories and they are resettled. And we, we have to stay here.” Working as a ‘volunteer’ however also creates the opportunity to improve chances for resettlement, as I will show later in this chapter. Working for one of the many NGOs can also create a backlash, that starts with jealousy and slander and can eventually result in threats. Besides her work for IRD, Um Abdel also worked for Care Jordan. Because the resilience she showed at Care, they put her life story in a leaflet without telling her so. She argues that it was because of this publication that she started to receive threats from Iraq. Ferhat also said he got threatened in Amman. Ferhat works for an NGO that provides assistance for vulnerable Iraqis and got threatened because he had denied assistance to an Iraqi refugee.

Vocational Trainings

One of UNHCR’s Strategic Objectives for 2012 is “To identify the groups of Iraqis who are not likely to be able to return or resettle in the medium-term and identify appropriate means of support or self-reliance for them.” The UN Agency sees capacity building as one of the means to reach this objective. IRD has received funding from UNHCR and the US Government to implement vocational trainings and to search for employment opportunities. Originally, as IRD’s country director - who is himself from Dagestan - told me, the aim of the project was to provide Iraqi men and women with some skills for the future, be it in Iraq, Jordan or somewhere else. Soon it became the country director’s objective not only to provide the tools. He also wanted to provide the Iraqis with a way to make a living in Jordan. IRD works together with local partners and there are a wide variety of classes mostly focused on handicraft and technology.46 Many of the Iraqis want to participate in one of the vocational trainings. The classes are very popular: there is more demand than supply.

46 IRD’s country director, interview, 21st of June 2012

62 Upon completion of the vocational training, participants receive a package that can help them to improve their skills and even to start up their own business. The most committed students are offered a paid internship. The final step in this process is job placement. This includes a work permit, which is arranged by IRD and UNHCR in cooperation with the Jordanian Government in order to work legally in Jordan.47 The latter step surprised me as it contradicts with the country’s policy to prohibit local integration. It would imply that local integration legally and economically would become an option, at least for those who have finished their course and who have found employment. As a pseudo-government UNHCR cannot bypass the host government, but it does try to negotiate its room to maneuver. During our first interview IRD’s country director told me that IRD had managed to bestow thirty-four work permits by the Jordanian Ministry of Labor. At our second meeting the director told me that the moegabaraat, the Jordanian secret police, had declined all requests.48 Political considerations obstruct the search for legal means to earn a living in Jordan and hampers UNHCR’s attempt to make local integration in Jordan possible. This is a setback, but as it turns out the surrogate state is also willing to contribute to work in the shadows. IRD’s country director told me they look for businesses to work with. If the business owner is willing to employ an Iraqi, yet is not willing to pay for the work permit, they can find a compromise. He tells me that it is fine if both parties agree that the work will be informal49. This means the international community is more or less complicit to the violation of the Jordanian law. For those Iraqis who do not want to be employed, IRD also offers a follow-up course in small business development. Because there are only limited slots available, potential participants are intensively screened.50 Starting one’s own business in Jordan is difficult (Moradian, 2009). Therefore IRD only provides funds for simple home-based projects out of sight of the authorities. Three out of my twenty-nine respondents were running small home-based business.

The international community might consider its capacity building projects as a means to make local integration possible, but the Iraqis refugees have a different understanding of these courses: as income-generating activities, while they are in transit. Moradian’s study (2009) on economic coping mechanisms of female headed households shows that some of the Iraqi women

47 IRD’s country director, interview, 21st of June 2012 48 Idem 49 Idem 50 Idem

63 interviewed were primarily interested in attending courses, because they saw the travel stipend as a source of additional income. My respondent Abu Haya has been following many courses including one for survivors of torture. When I asked him whether he was tortured he explained to me: “No, I went there because of the money. Because of the transportation fee.” The application of this specific project illustrates how the humanitarian economy is negotiated at the interface: people interpret and use humanitarian assets in their own ways. Rather than passive victims, the refugees are active agents who interpret and negotiate the means that are at their disposal (Horst, 2003: 347). Their behavior however is misunderstood as a sign of dependency as the Iraqi refugees seem to be idle.

A Debate on Dependency, Self-sufficiency and Agency

Relief is often formulated as a universal humane project of quick fixes, but in practice often fails its aims as “in most protracted refugee situations refugees continue to depend on international assistance for years” (Horst, 2003: 250). Often this protracted dependency on aid is assumed to be caused by the so-called ‘refugee dependency syndrome’. Harrell-Bond (1986) observed the tendency among aid workers to attribute this syndrome to refugees. Symptoms associated with the syndrome are apathy, frustration and violence. Through long-term assistance, refugees would over time become incapable of taking care of themselves and become dependent on indefinite support from outside (Idem; Horst, 2003). The label of a ‘vulnerable refugee’ can be degrading and damaging since people’s own resources, capabilities and views are disregarded. Refugees might feel the need to conform to the ascribed label and are discouraged from taking own initiatives (Horst, 2003: 14-15). In her ethnography on refugee camp Dadaad, Horst negates the relevance of a dependency syndrome: it is not a syndrome, but real dependency since ‘there are no viable means to become self- sufficient.’ (2003: 252). Jansen contests her opinion: “are not all forms of self-sufficiency always dependent on external resources (oil, fertile soil, water, clientele, etc.)?” (Jansen, 2011: 133). Kibreab (2004) shows that displaced populations might use their label, and the means that adhered to it, in strategic manners. At the interface between agencies and the refugees and between the refugees and the Jordanian community, ideas and expectations are continuously negotiated. Refugees might feel the need to maximize the available assistance, just because they find themselves in difficult positions. This might require exaggeration or simulation that can be interpreted as cunningness of the refugees. It can also be seen as a creative response to a rigid refugee regime.

64 Tapping into Vulnerability

In line with Jansen (2011) I see aid as one of the resources that refugees render into livelihoods. He compares aid to a natural resource of a humanitarian economy. Aid is more than just a handout: it is a resource that people can build on and can compete for until the source runs dry. Jansen describes the search and competition for assistance as ‘digging aid’. Aid is considered as one among other livelihood assets and resources, including access to the formal and informal economy and transnational connections. Refugees receive financial and in-kind assistance, but supplement or bypass this dependency by engaging in income generating economies and by finding other sources of income. Aid then, in combination with other financial resources, forms an important basis of the Iraqi urban community in Jordan. I argue that the Iraqi refugees actively employ their capabilities in the humanitarian economy. While they are indeed dependent on the humanitarian economy, they are simultaneously entrepreneurial as they are using all available resources: labels, identities and the refugee hosting system (Jansen, 2011: 137). Refugees have the power to negotiate their position and entitlements, after agencies set norms and expectations. Labeling can lead to policies that in fact make refugees comply with the victim label and that make it worthwhile to portray victimhood. Especially for (single) women assistance is prioritized. Jody Miller: states: “For some Iraqi women visiting the different organizations that provide assistance is their day job. They go from one place to another.” This is a striking example of the active pursuit of digging aid. It is not that they do not need assistance; they actively seek for it. Pastor Miller thinks that women also get more assistance because they can become emotional and therefore exacerbate their vulnerability. These women have the possibility of tapping into one’s assumed vulnerability (Jansen, 2011). My translator was such a good companion to me, that I sometimes forgot that he was a refugee himself. Due to this research he was becoming an interface expert. Besides his translator work, he had a second job: to visit organizations that could provide him with additional assistance. While he ‘dug’ aid, he often did not tell me about his sideline activities. His behavior contrasted with the accounts of most Iraqi respondents who were much more frank about their needs. As I was associated with the humanitarian community, I might have had the right connections to help. They nurtured their image of vulnerability, as this is the basic rule of the humanitarian economy. While most of my visits to my respondents were only one-off, the contact with my translator was much more in-depth and provided me with valuable nuances and insights in Iraqi refugee life in Jordan.

65 Local Integration: Curing Dependency or Ruining your Chances?

UN’s main reason to set up capacity building projects was to support the self-sufficiency of the Iraqi refugees in Jordan. A few years after the program has started, IRD’s country director is openly frustrated about what he calls “the Iraqi mentality”.51 During our second interview I join the director at one of the vocational training centers. Most of the women present tell me they were planning to look for a job after the course. The country director shrugs when he hears this answer: “Two years ago I believed they wanted to work, but I don’t believe it anymore. They always find a reason not to accept a job.”52 He explains that IRD has undertaken a lot of efforts to provide the Iraqis with jobs. Somehow the offer of IRD does not match the desires of the Iraqis. A woman tells us that she would like to apply for an office job. IRD’s country director reacts frankly that this will not be possible because of Jordan’s unemployment rate: “An office job will be possible in the US. Here you have to work as a cleaner or a cook.”53 With these words the country director implies that life in de US is better than in Jordan, or at least that there are better job opportunities there. Yet he also feels that most Iraqis have too high expectations of a life in the west. He relates the mismatch between IRD’s program and the behavior of the refugees to resettlement. The possibility of a life elsewhere would impede what he considers as their “progress” especially if it turns out that, after five or six years waiting they actually have to stay here. He further argues that it is related to the UNHCR’s financial assistance: “Many refugees prefer to depend on UNHCR but this assistance will not be forever.”54 He feels that the assistance should be cut so Iraqis will be more inclined to actually work. I wonder whether this theory holds: many of my respondents who have been rejected for resettlement and whose assistance has been cut, were still reluctant to work as they also continued to hold on to the idea that life in Jordan was only temporary.

The country director also tells me that many Iraqis feel reluctant to take on low-skilled jobs or they feel it pays too little55. My respondent Mohammed, who is an engineer by training, told me about his experiences with IRD: “They had jobs for us in a battery factory and they would give us 175 JD a month. But I refused: the chemicals are bad for you and you have to work nine hours per day, six days a week.”

51 IRD’s country director, interview, 21st of June 2012 52 Idem 53 Idem 54 Idem 55 Idem

66 An important consideration in the decision to obtain a work permit is whether it would enable the Iraqi refugees to find a ‘good’ job. Many refugees belonged to Iraq's qualified middle class and are now stuck in professional stagnation. The Iraqis who are employed often work below their skills and many express a deep desire to use the skills they obtained in Iraq. According to Chatelard (2011) squandering refugees’ productive capacities diminishes their chance of successful reintegration or resettlement whenever it may occur or wherever it may be. This should also be viewed within the context of Iraq’s modern history: while the Iraqis feel tired, frustrated and lethargic about their life in limbo, many grew up in a country, that was torn apart by wars and economic sanctions. Although the UN sanctions were officially intended to contain Saddam Hussein’s power, it actually strengthened the regime while the majority of the Iraqi people had to pay the price. Malnutrition, poverty and unemployment were widespread in the last two decades. None of the Iraqis related the UNHCR to the same UN that put the sanctions over Iraq. Life in Jordan does show some similarities with regard to their former lives in Iraq: life continues to be insecure and employment opportunities remain scarce. As Salaam recalls: “I was sitting at home for three years. No work, no jobs.”

UNHCR’s Resettlement Officer wonders whether, because the Iraqis used to live in a socialist regime, they are used to being taken care of. The colloquial term used by the Iraqi refugees for the monthly assistance is ‘salary’ which – according to the resettlement officer - assumes that they actually have a right to cash assistance. She feels this attitude keeps them from integrating. She argues: “being a refugee is never easy, but sometimes you just have to adjust. See how and where you can work.” Which is interesting since many of the UN-registered Iraqi refugees claim they are not working just because UNHCR advised against it, out of risking the chance of being detained and deported. Their behavior corresponds with UNHCR’s advice as they recall it, and message justifies feelings of anxiety about employment in Jordan. The Iraqi refugees feel that the international community continuously provides conflicting messages: about the option for resettlement, about the safety of working in Jordan and the consequences of an additional income. The pseudo-government exerts control on the refugees and influences ideas on ‘proper’ refugee behavior, identity and place. Just because UNHCR’s power is contested and is dependent on the leniency of governments and funding, the message of the UN agency has changed. Yet prior messages of the UNHCR have shaped how the Iraqi refugees interpret life in Jordan, as it has restructured how they consider the role of the UN, insecurity in Jordan and their chances and possibilities for life elsewhere.

67 For many Iraqi refugees, engaging in low skilled labor would indeed diminish their sense of pride, but many other factors play a part in the consideration for a work permit. They question whether and how formal employment would improve their situation. A work permit is not considered to fix the legal and social difficulties. It entails risks: the risk that your assistance is cut, but more importantly, to ruin your chance for resettlement. Obtaining a work permit means giving up on UNHCR. They would settle for a marginalized life in Jordan, and even more important, they would provide the UN agency with an incentive to cut loose their acclaimed responsibility, as the refugees would be able to take care of themselves. The Iraqi refugees reject local integration in Jordan, as they associate life in Jordan with social and legal marginalization and as they prefer to hold on to the idea that Jordan is a transit place. They cling to the international community and their acclaimed entitlement for resettlement, as they continue to search for strategies and alternatives to make a future elsewhere possible.

Strategies and Alternatives to Counter Local Integration

Over the years, the Iraqis have obtained a good grasp of the resettlement procedures and the selection criteria. In order to negotiate the decisions made, some refugees hold on to their assumed victimhood or try to anticipate on a possible rejection. One of the strategies to resettle the family step by step is to become more ‘vulnerable’: a divorce or pretending that a husband has died can heighten one’s chances: a ‘single woman’ is more easily accepted for resettlement than a spouse of a man with a contested past. Those who stayed behind keep in mind that one day, they will be able to unite and set their hopes on those family members who have left for the US or one of the other western countries.

Family re-unification seems to be a feasible alternative for resettlement, but the process can take years. The presence of one or more naturalized family members enables in some countries, including the US, the travel of family-members. Among the Iraqis this option makes a case for the splitting up of families, because it implies that families can be eventually re-united. Another alternative is to marry an Iraqi who has citizenship in one of the western countries. Some of my interviewees had siblings who were now living in the US, Germany or Canada because of transnational marriages. Um Reema already has a plan B in case her hope for resettlement fails to materialize: her brother in Germany will arrange a marriage for her with a Germanized Iraqi. Um Reema idealizes this possibility without having sight for any of the bureaucratic drawbacks. She thinks that her twenty-year old daughter will be allowed to move

68 with her to Germany if she gets married.

Since Christians are recognized as persecuted minority in Iraq, I started to wonder whether conversion was also used as a strategy for resettlement. My Chaldean informant Boutros argued rightfully: Christian Iraqis were also members of the Ba’ath party and part of the army, and would therefore be just as likely to receive a rejection for resettlement. While some Christians are indeed rejected for resettlement, Pastor Jody Miller thinks that Christian Iraqis have a higher chance of being accepted for resettlement. This idea is also common among the non-Christian Iraqis. One of my respondents Mahmoud, who thinks his case is still in process, told me: “I wish I could tell I was a Christian but you already recognize by my name that I am Muslim.” Jody Miller sometimes receives telephone calls of people who say they want to convert. He beliefs this is a trick to get to the US. Actual conversion in his opinion takes months or years.56

Many of the rejected Iraqis have thought about travelling illegally to another country, but hardly anyone seems to consider this as a viable or desired option at this very moment. Rumors have it that border controls around Europe are tightened and Iraqis in Sweden and the Netherlands are being sent back to Iraq. In comparison to risks and the stories of illegal persons in Europe they prefer to stay in Jordan. Resettlement is seen as a way to get out of a liminal position, while travelling illegally to Europe is not. Liminality is not place-bound but is determined by one’s legal status. The ‘stranded’ Iraqi refugees must therefore follow the legal path in order to find a way out of Jordan, for instance through the reconsideration of a case for resettlement.

Wasta and the Reconsideration for Resettlement

A final option for travelling to the west is the reconsideration of a case, which requires the right contact. In Arabic this is called wasta, a word that can be loosely translated as clientelistic ties or the right connections. Preferably your wasta works in one of the bigger international organizations, but your wasta could also be a foreign NGO-worker or a minister. Some of my respondents were convinced that people at UN are corrupt: they would use wasta and accept money. I could not find any proof whether this is truly the case. It did seem that UNHCR was much more inclined to listen to western NGO-workers than to the Iraqi refugees themselves. It is difficult for the refugees to get access and insight into their own files, while this is possible for outsiders. These outsiders can even bring about

56 Jody Miller, interview, 2d of July 2012.

69 reconsideration for a refugees’ case for resettlement. Wasta can take on a transnational character as the brokers and the communication with these brokers can cross territorial borders. Family members and NGOs can hire American attorneys or visit UN-offices abroad.

The idea that wasta matters can makes a refugee dependent of others. This is obvious in how my respondent Abdul-Karim expressed his needs: “I really need someone to solve my problems.” Lorna Rodd told me that Australia might still be an option for resettlement, since the Australian government works with a worldwide quota system with a limited amount of slots available, instead of a referral system via UNHCR.57 When I heard that an application for resettlement to Australia contains 27 pages, I recognized that Abdul-Karim might be right, because in order to fill in such a form he did need assistance. There are two small organizations put in place by internationals professionals who are concerned with those Iraqi refugees who are rejected for resettlement: the Iraqi Refugee Assistance Program (IRAP) and the Hope and Trust Fund. IRAP was founded in 2008 by a group of American law students, seeking to provide legal assistance to refugees applying for resettlement. This American NGO helps refugees who are rejected for resettlement with a second appeal, if the first one is denied. IRAP accepts their clients via word of mouth or through referrals from other organizations, including IOM and UNHCR.58 An American friend and former volunteer for IRAP recalls multiple cases that were accepted after IRAP had helped to appeal.59 The Hope and Trust Fund was set up by the Anglican Church and provides similar services: besides helping with the appeal they also help the ‘stranded’ Iraqis to apply for a refugee status in Australia. At present they do not take on new cases due to a re-evaluation in regard to the Syrian refugee influx.60

Working as a ‘volunteer’ can have yet another advantage, since it can provide access to the right networks and the necessary legal assistance. The two female respondents that were receiving legal assistance from IRAP, were both working as ‘volunteers’. ‘Volunteers’ can need their own wasta and are themselves in need of networks. Until now both women are still waiting and are often asked to provide wasta themselves.

57 Lorna Rodd, Hope and Trust, interview, 28th of June 58 Interview, former intern IRAP, 19th of June 2012 and 24th of August 2012. 59 Interview, former volunteer IRAP, 25th of May 2012. 60 Interview, Hope and Trust, 28th of Jun 2012.

70 A methodological consideration to conclude this chapter is that I also needed my own wasta to conduct research: I had to negotiate access to the refugees who were not accepted for resettlement. This required the cooperation of gatekeepers. My first troublesome attempts were suddenly ‘solved’ when an NGO-worker provided me with contact details and background stories of 30 refugees, all rejected for resettlement. Information that I see as highly confidential was shared with me by one mouse-click. Moreover, as I have show in the introduction, my access to Iraqi households was much determined by the idea that I myself could provide wasta.

Conclusion

The opinion of UNHCR’s resettlement officers and IRD’s country director fits well in the dependency discourse. They picture the refugees as apathetic and idle. If only the refugees were willing to work and integrate, they would ‘fit’ in Jordan. However, I think that ‘reality’ is much more complex, and that this so-called ‘refugee mentality’ is a stereotype portraying limited parts of the story. The Iraqi refugees are not helpless victims. Rather they find ways to actively pursue what they consider to be in their interest. They draw upon different humanitarian and urban resources to make ends meet, as life and livelihoods in Jordan remain insecure. Due to their attributed vulnerability, women actually have more chances within the urban and the humanitarian economy. This gendered access to livelihoods results in shifting power relations and conflicts between men and women. The divide between humanitarian and urban resources is blurred, as is visible in the attempts from the international community to support self-sufficiency of Iraqi refugees. Yet the Iraqi refugees themselves consider these trainings as income-generating activities, while they are in transit. A work permit in Jordan is considered as giving up on UNHCR and on the possibility for resettlement. This does not mean that the refugees do not want to be self-sufficient. It means that the refugees do not want to be self-sufficient under the present circumstances. Instead they hold on to a life in the margins while they are entrepreneurial in their use of labels, identities and the refugee hosting system. The refugees refrain from investing in the local context, as they continue to pursue multiple ways to travel to the west and hold on to prior messages of the UN. Strategies are often family-oriented, and involve negotiations on identity and vulnerability. In the next chapter I will disclose how a continuous longing for resettlement and the unwillingness to invest in Jordan have contributed to the creation of a limbo. Transnational networks and a distinct Iraqi identity have gained significance in exile and further reinforce the idea that life in Jordan is only transitory.

71 Chapter Five: Is a Near Neighbor Better Than a Distant Cousin? The Resettlement Process and the Creation of Limbo

In this chapter I will disclose how a protracted refugee life in Jordan, in combination with the existence of a durable solution and the emergence of an Iraqi diaspora, has contributed to the transformation of place: Jordan changed from a welcoming country to a space of transit. The chapter starts with a section on how refugee management has created a longing for resettlement. Subsequently, I regard resettlement as a disruption as it causes a detachment from Jordan, distrust and the departure of friends and loved ones. In response to the exempted status provided for by UNHCR and the marginalization experienced in Jordan, the Iraqi refugees claim a liminal and privileged position for themselves. A distinct Iraqi identity and transnational networks with the emerging Iraqi diaspora further reinforce the longing for resettlement.

The existence of resettlement as durable solution for parts of the Iraqi refugee population has influenced the perceptions of those who have stayed behind. Resettlement is not just a solution for isolated cases, but has effect on the entire Iraqi refugee community. The social networks, which the Iraqis maintain with fellow Iraqis, in Jordan as well as outside of Jordan, play an important part in this process. Transnational networks enable the Iraqi refugees to find strategies to make it to the west, and also play an important role with regard to identity formation and sense of belonging. I perceive identity as a dynamic process of becoming. It is an ever-changing view of the self and the other that constantly acquires new meanings and is formed through interactions (Giddens: 1991 cited in Ghorashi, 2005). In Jordan a de facto integration does take place and changes occur – in personal lives as well as in Iraq - causing that many of the Iraqi refugees feel they no longer fit in Iraq nor do they feel welcome in Jordan. Most of the Iraqis in Jordan feel they live in limbo in a place that is neither ‘here’ nor ‘there.’ I argue that the option for resettlement for many, but not for all, has disruptive and disordering effects on the social relations of the ‘stranded’ Iraqis and on their notions on identity, belonging and place.

A Longing for Resettlement

In her ethnography on refugee life in Kenya, Horst (2003) introduces the concept buufis, a term that is frequently used in refugee camp Dadaab, referring mainly to someone’s hope and longing for resettlement. Horst argues that this dreaming of a future elsewhere is important in order not to lose hope. However, at the same time it refrains the refugees from making investments within

72 the local context and rejection for resettlement can cause huge disappointments. Moreover, those who manage to get resettled often find that their images of life in Western countries do not match reality. While the word buufis is only used in the Somali context, I see much overlap in regard to the ideas on resettlement among the Iraqi refugee community in Jordan. Local integration or return to Iraq is not considered as an option, since the Iraqi refugees hold on their acclaimed right for resettlement. The longing for settlement in a western country is only increased by the experiences of friends and family abroad. The Iraqi refugees increasingly see their lives through the prism of the emerging Iraqi diaspora. This makes them reflect upon what they see as the bareness of their lives. My interpreter often told me that my interviewees said they were ‘bored of their situation.’ Although I did recognize that Iraqi refugees life consists mostly of waiting, I paid no further attention to this statement until I read Diken and Laustsen’s book on the culture of exception. These scholars define boredom “as the most fundamental human condition.” Not having a plan or a purpose is in their view the essential experience of boredom (Diken and Laustsen, 2005: 3). Some of the Iraqis who I have interviewed were expressing their misery as they realized the hopelessness of their situation or because they were hoping for my sympathy. But most of them still have a purpose: this purpose is travelling to the west. Resettlement produces a purpose, a hope and until that time a life in transit.

Within the limits of the protection space and through the connections with Iraqis worldwide, the Iraqi refugees negotiate their position and their identity, and further reinforce their idea that Jordan is only a transit place. The refugees’ understanding of a solution is not placed in Jordan, nor is it set in Iraq. None of my respondents told me they were thinking of returning to Iraq. Their refusal to return ‘home’ has a variety of reasons, including the on-going insecurity, social and political developments that have taken place in Iraq and personal changes in Jordan. Returning to Iraq is also discarded, because of the fine for overstaying the three-months period that is formally allowed and the negative experiences of others.61 An important role in their

61Besides their UNHCR Refugee Document many Iraqi refugees also have an Iraqi passport that signifies when the refugee entered the country. Officially Iraqis are allowed to stay for three months in Jordan. The UNHCR refugee document gives Iraqi refugees the right to stay put in Jordan, but when the refugee crosses the Jordan-Iraq borders he or she is fined for overstaying the three-month period. Given that most Iraqi refugees have been in Jordan for years, these fines can add up to thousands of euros. The Jordanian government exempts returnees to Iraq from these debts, but this is only under the condition that a stamp stating that you will not be allowed back in Jordan for the upcoming five years will be put into their passports. This makes return to Jordan legally impossible. If life in Iraq disappoints, which many deem likely, there no longer is a new escape.

73 deliberations is the on going wish for a future elsewhere – where it is safe and where there are chances for employment and education. Moreover, the passing of time after a rejection does not seem to make a significant difference in one’s decision and attempts to ‘root’ in Jordan. Those Iraqis who have been rejected for resettlement but who have established a somewhat stable social network in Jordan and who are doing reasonably well, seem to show more willingness to stay in Jordan. Yet even they would only consider it, if they were completely sure that resettlement to a western country is not an option. They would accept Jordanian residency or nationality in order to secure their legal and economic position. Moreover, they would be more inclined to accept Jordanian residency if it would enable them to travel, back and forth between Iraq to the relatives they have left behind and maybe even to the west. Most respondents confessed that they would much rather prefer to go to a western country and feel they give up on their chances if they settle for Jordan. Life in Jordan is rejected as it is associated with marginalization, discrimination and conservatism that is related to the Middle-Eastern region.

Resettlement as Disruption

After a rejection, much of refugee life continues as it was before: those who work continue their activities and those who get assistance often still receive assistance. Children go to school, and the waiting continues as they hold on to the idea that resettlement is still an option. On a social level I do recognize the impact of rejection as it disrupts and changes social ordering. Whereas resettlement creates hope for a future, it also creates disturbances and dissolution.

Friendships in Exile

Some of the effects of rejection are related to refugee life in Jordan and the relations that refugees uphold in exile. The longer I was in Amman, the more I started to recognize the Iraqi people and after a few months I could distinguish their Iraqi-Arabic accent. I submerged into the Iraqi community in Jordan and my new Iraqi friends took me to ‘their’ coffee bars, ‘their’ dinner parties, ‘their’ weddings. While it started to feel that the Iraqis were everywhere, on the streets of Amman most Iraqis are continuously on their guard. Some have taught themselves to talk with a Jordanian-Arabic accent. They live their lives in the shadows, trying to keep out of sight as much as possible, as they are always aware of their tenuous legal position. Calhoun (2010) showed that

74 many Iraqis have friendships with Jordanians, but most of my respondents told me that their social contacts with Jordanians were limited.

It is mostly at NGOs, community centers and churches that the Iraqis meet their new friends. They meet fellow Iraqis whilst standing in the queue for aid, whilst attending courses or at the soccer matches organized for Iraqis only. The single men share their frustrations about being rejected for resettlement and their anxieties about working illegally, while playing card games in one of the Iraqi-owned cafes in the city centers. Single women and families meet each other in their houses, as life outside of the house is costly and less secure. It was in these houses that most of the interviews took place. Some of my female Muslim respondents told me they regularly went to the church, because they find comfort, company and assistance there. In two of the three Iraqi churches I visited, Christian and non-Christians62 gathered to attend services and to receive assistance of the church. The Chaldean Church in Jordan is an exception, since the Iraqi Chaldean community is a relatively confined religious group.

The possibility for resettlement for some, but not for all, has a disruptive effect on friendships. The friendships with fellow Iraqis in Jordan continue to have a fragile and distanced character. The common ground of their friendship is the nonstop quest for resettlement. My respondent Mahmoud told me: “We talk 24/7 about resettlement. This is all what is on our mind.” Iraqi refugees who initially did not want to go to the US are convinced to opt for resettlement by the pending departures and experiences of friends and family. Every Iraqi keeps in mind that their newly made friends will eventually leave. The Iraqis in Jordan are always on their guard and there is a continuous suspicion among those who are rejected for resettlement as well as among those who are still in the process. Many of my respondents experienced that an Iraqi ‘friend’ broke their trust, for instance by telling UNHCR that he or she was working. This is why some issues are kept secret for everyone but close family. Nobody in her circle of friends knew that my informant Um Reema used to be married to a Jordanian. During the time of my research my translator Moe was still waiting for resettlement. In the process of writing this thesis he left for the United States. He did not tell any of his very good Iraqi friends in Jordan that he was leaving, just because he was scared that someone would steal his passport and go on his behalf. He only told them once he had arrived in America.

62 I could recognize non-Christian women by their veils - the hijabs - they were wearing.

75 Effects on Familial Relations: Negotiating Gender and Generational Roles

Families, as compared to single refugees, in particular abstain from investing in social relations in Jordan. Due to on-going insecurity and distrust they feel they can only be reliant on the small nuclear family for comfort and support. However, even the family bonds to which the Iraqis hold on are at risk. Resettlement can imply that only some family members can go to the US, leaving the others behind. This is yet another disruptive effect of resettlement: the durable solution divides families and therefore changes the social order. Moreover, disagreement about strategies for resettlement can create conflicts between the different genders and generations.

UN as well as IOM use a rather western-oriented understanding of family. Some ‘stranded’ Iraqis have difficulties with grasping the interpretations of the agencies as parents are separated from their children, and brothers from their sisters. UNHCR’s resettlement officer states that the organization beliefs in the ‘unity of family’ and it is the American government that splits families up based on maturity: those children that are 21 years or older get their own case.63 According to many of my informants, UNHCR also enables grown-up children to demand that their cases are considered separately. My respondent Muez feels his family is fractured, three of his sons are now living in the US, whereas he was rejected for resettlement. Other families use this disruption to improve their chances for resettlement: they separate their cases. While there are discussions at UN-level about the splitting up of families, there seem to be just as much debate and even conflict about this within the household, between spouses and generations. Breaking up for resettlement purposes or sending the children ahead to the US is never an easy decision.

The options and selection criteria for resettlement can be seen as the cause of conflicts within the family. Um Osama has three grown-up sons. She likes to stay in Jordan because she feels life in Jordan is fine, but also because she wants to keep her family together. Two of her sons however want to go back to Iraq, while her eldest son would like to go the US. This causes tensions within the family and as researcher-in-training focusing on this theme I felt I aggravated these by talking about the subject. What concerns her the most about life in the US are the potential bad influences on her children and her loss of control. “There are a lot of opportunities to be a bad person. Drugs, alcohol, nightclubs. And if I slap them. they can go to the police. We cannot use our own customs there.”

63 UNHCR BO Amman Resettlement Officer, interview, 28 June, 2012

76 The young Iraqis continue to reject a life in Jordan and blame their parents for being stuck in Jordan. They have seen friends and relatives depart to the US and other western countries, keep in touch by Internet and are attracted by the western media-scapes. Music, television series and the English classes provided for by several NGOs enable them to relate to the Iraqi diaspora in the west. Moreover, especially among youngsters in Jordan – Jordanian as well as Iraqi – the unemployment rate is relatively high, meaning that even if they would obtain Jordanian residency or nationality their chances for a successful future in Jordan remain rather grim. Instead they wait until they can apply for resettlement themselves, while they do not invest in a life in Jordan. Abdel, the eighteen-year old son of Abu and Um Abdel, even quit school because he feels it will not be of use in the US. Gender and generational roles are vigorously debated as the different options are thoroughly explored. Some families hold on to assigned gender roles: many of my respondents were upset that young girls are allowed to go to the US by themselves or that single women are left behind. Um Reema is a beautiful 40-year old single mother, but even in her case her family did not find it appropriate to go ‘alone’. Her mother Lulu was convinced that resettlement was not an option for her daughter: “In 2009 they called her for resettlement. But I took on the phone, and it was me who refused it for her. I love my daughter and I am afraid of what will happen to her.” Somehow the history of this woman seems to repeat itself. Yet the roles are reversed. Like her mother, Um Reema has difficulties letting her twenty-year old daughter go. “In your country they teach you about independence. We are Arabs; we have another cultural tradition. When Reema was in school one guy played with her mind. He told her: you can get your own passport and you can run away. But my daughter, she loves me and she has morals. Al Hamdullilah64, she didn’t listen to him.”

Loss and Belonging – The Creation of a Diasporic People

Many of the Iraqis I have interviewed are middle-class, Sunni and from Baghdad. Their past contrasts sharply to current lives. Some of them told me they used to own multiple cars, but now they cannot afford a taxi ride to visit UNHCR’s field office. Probably those people, who were used to such a wealth, have the most difficulties adjusting to this new life. Experiences result in melancholia of what is lost and an idealization of the past. The Iraqi refugees continuously put their lives in Jordan into the perspective of their loss: the loss of a secure and safe life back in Iraq, as long as you walked the regime’s line, but just as

64 Arabic for Praise God.

77 well the loss of a realistic chance to build up a new and secure future. As I have shown before the refugees are neither helpless nor hopeless. Instead they hold on to what they see as their interest. In their minds, Jordan remains a place of transit where they do not belong. This idea reinforces the significance of a distinct Iraqi identity and transnational networks, and shape social reality as these networks further disconnect the Iraqi refugees from life in Jordan.

The Invention of Iraqiness

The Iraqis self-chosen seclusion among themselves and fellow refugees separates the Iraqis further from their host society and reinforces their Iraqi identity in exile. This identity changes because of the everyday realities of life in Jordan. New diasporic identities are formed on the basis of shared experiences and new bonds emerge out of the hardships the Iraqis in Jordan face together.

Jordan has received the Iraqis as guests, but among the poor Jordanians in particular the Iraqis did not always experience a warm welcome. Since 2003, the prices of real estate, rent and food increased tremendously and jobs became scarce. Some blame the Iraqis for Jordan’s social and economic ills, even though research has shown that the presence of Iraqi refugees is not the cause (Saif and DeBartolo). Especially the Shi’ite Iraqis in Jordan who are rejected for resettlement feel isolated and unwelcome in Jordan. This is their main reason to discard staying in the country, even if a full legal position would be possible. All the Shi’ite respondents do not like living in Jordan because they feels that Jordanians continuously make the sectarian divide between Shi’ite and Sunni. They feel continuously discriminated against. Meanwhile they state that the Iraqis in Jordan do not make the same distinction. It seems that what divides them in present Iraq – sects and sectarian violence – is what connects them in Jordan: being a fellow Iraqi refugee. This finding is in line with the International Crisis Group’s assumption that many Iraqi refugees who had fled were relatively non-sectarian (ICG, 2008). The Shi’ite Iraqis have Sunni friends and vice versa the Sunni Iraqis told me the label means little to them. Ali told me that in 2004, just after the invasion he did not know whether he was Sunni or Shi’ite and had to ask his father.

At the interface with the Jordanian host society, social changes occur and social realities change: the Iraqi refugees might feel discriminated against, but they also isolate themselves. Their urban, middle-class background makes them into a group with “first-world aspirations” and they seem

78 to have difficulties letting go of that idea (Dodd, 2010). As they are formerly middle class and highly educated, the Iraqi refugees antagonize themselves to the poor Jordanians who are living in the same neighborhood. They discard these Jordanians as ‘illiterates’, confirming that the Iraqis in Jordan hold on to classifying differences that were significant in Iraq prior to the US invasion in 2003: background, education, social class (Al-Ali, 2007). Some based their entitlement for resettlement upon their assumed qualifications and expressed their astonishment that uneducated men from rural Iraq were accepted for resettlement, while they were rejected. The Palestinians who had been living in Iraq since 1948 did not have Iraqi citizenship and many respondents find it unjust that some of those Palestinian refugees are resettled to the US, while as one interviewee said: ‘real Iraqis have to stay here’. A life in the margins in combination with a sense of entitlement for resettlement has made that many of the Iraqi refugees seem to feel privileged over the poor Jordanians. Even those who received a rejection for resettlement assume they still have the right to go to North America, Europe or Australia whereas the poor Jordanians have to stay in Jordan. The state in a state – the UNHCR as near sovereign – has transformed the Iraqi refugee community into a privileged group who would be ‘uplifted’ to the western countries.

The Iraqi refugees remain connected to their homeland in multiple ways: financially, through the remittances sent by families and relatives; by telephone calls, e-mails and television; in their memories of what they recall as Iraq; and by visits of family members who have been able to obtain a visa. Even family ties are preserved via long-distance marriages between cousins. Their idea of Iraq is continuously produced and reproduced in the lives of Iraqis in Jordan. Um Reema’s brother for instance is moving from Baghdad to Amman, because there are no eligible bachelors left who can marry his daughters. Most Iraqis in Jordan are visibly proud of their Iraqi identity. Their small houses are decorated with flags and other Iraqi knick-knacks. In the Iraqi-refugee household a photo of Saddam Hussein is not uncommon, often positioned next to a picture of the Jordanian king Abdullah II. And especially when the Iraqi football team is playing there is a seeming outburst of Iraqi pride in the Ammani neighborhoods. Many of the ‘stranded’ refugees however also feel that they no longer belong in Iraq. They believe that present Iraq is ‘Iran-ized’ and has taken over the identity of what was once regarded as the enemy. Especially the Sunni Iraqis in Jordan have difficulties with the political transformations in Iraq and blame the Shi’ite Iraqis who sought their refuge in Iran back in the days of Saddam for the on-going violence. The Sunni Iraqis in Jordan doubt the loyalty of these

79 former refugees who have returned after the fall of Saddam Hussein and who became involved in politics. They feel that Iraq is currently governed by what they consider to be Iranian politicians. When I asked 45-year old Ahmed whether he still considers Iraq as his home country, he was surprised: “Of course I do! I will never give that up for any reason. It is my pleasure to be an Iraqi, and my honor to be an Iraqi. I have been in many countries, but I have not seen people better than us.” This Iraqi pride fascinates me, as it seems to contradict with his persistence that he will never return to Iraq. While most of the ‘stranded’ Iraqis follow almost obsessively what is happening back home and, like Ahmed, are proud of their Iraqi nationality, at the same time they feel detached of what is current Iraq. It is this confusion or these mixed feelings towards Iraq that I recognized frequently among my respondents: their ideas of what being an Iraqi entails no longer fit into present Iraq. The refugees have changed and the situation in Iraq has changed. Malkki’s ethnography (1995) on refugees takes place in a completely different and much more isolated setting, but the narratives of the Hutu ‘camp’ refugees in Burundi show some resemblance to those of the (Sunni) Iraqis in Jordan. Displacement and ‘deterritorialization’ have shaped and constructed their Iraqi nationennes, history and identity. I refer to this process as Iraqi-ness. Being an Iraqi refugee somehow has gotten a rooted status, and even more so because they do not consider integration in Jordan. They become isolated, as they no longer fit into present Iraq, nor do they belong in Jordan. As a matter of fact they hold on to their ‘unbelonging’ in Jordan.

Transnational Networks

The Iraqi-ness of the displaced Iraqi population is not only located in Jordan. An important element is its transnational character. As the Iraqi refugees connect themselves to the worldwide Iraqi diaspora, they disconnect themselves increasingly from the physical place they find themselves in. While the Iraqi refugee situation in Jordan has taken on a protracted character – especially in the case of the refugees that are either rejected or never considered for resettlement - their lives are only partially situated in Amman. The friendships they have built up for the last years now take place upon the World Wide Web, because their friends have moved to the other side of the world. Amman has become a nodal point that connects the lives of those who have stayed in Iraq, the ones that remain in Jordan as well the lives of those who moved on. It is a place that is accessible for both Iraqi citizens as well as for naturalized Iraqi-Americans. However, the movement of the ‘stranded’ Iraqi refugees in Jordan remains limited. An important consideration in the refugees’ deliberation on solutions is mobility: return to Iraq and integration

80 in Jordan are discarded, because both static options would restrict their freedom of movement and disables them from travelling to other nation-states. Campbell’s study on Congolese refugees in Nairobi shows that the more people are resettled, the more integrated the urban refugees in Kenya become because of the additional incomes they receive (Campbell, 2006). This is not the case for the Iraqi refugees in Jordan, who continue to feel ‘matter out of place’ (Douglas, 1966). It seems that just because such a large proportion of the Iraqi refugee population is resettled to the United States and because they stay connected to the refugees that stay behind a deep longing for resettlement has developed. The experiences of friends and families abroad makes the Iraqis reflect on their own situation in Jordan. My respondent Ibrahim’s friend was resettled to the US. After his departure he told Ibrahim: ‘We were living in the shit, in a very bad situation, we were death in Jordan.’ Ever since Ibrahim considers his life in that way. He stated: “In Jordan, I am a body without a soul.” When Hassan’s boyfriend left for the US they split up, yet they stayed in touch. Since Hassan heard stories about life in New York, he is even more eager to go there, as he believes America is worldwide the most respecting country towards homosexuals. If you ask the Iraqi refugees why they want to go to the United States or to any western country, there are three things they emphasize: freedom, education and security. In the past it rarely happened that every family member, including one’s siblings, was resettled to the same country. This was helpful because it enabled them to compare the benefits of every country that was available. Sweden was a long-time favorite because of the country’s social services. At present all hope is set on the US, as it is the most viable option.

When I started this research it was my assumption that the Iraqi refugees would experience mixed emotions and ideas about the possibility of going to America: a country in which they would be able to build up new lives, but also the country that could be blamed for the current situation in Iraq. Yet hostility in reference to the US involvement in Iraq or reluctance to go there was hardly expressed. The people who were very outspoken against Iraqis who had worked for the US army were at the same time dreaming of a life in the US and emphasized the wealth and freedom of their family members abroad. Some recognized that life in the US might be difficult, but most of them were convinced that it would be better than life in Jordan.

81 The Transnational Process of Resisting Marginalization: a Note on Displacement

The Iraqi refugees who are accepted for resettlement often find that the images they had of the west do not match reality. They arrive without any capital, are dependent on grants and are only allowed to do low-skilled work (Chaterlard, 2011). While the Iraqis in Jordan lack a legal status and the possibility to obtain one, in other host societies they are legally included, yet they feel economically and culturally marginalized. This might eventually result in the decision to move back to Jordan. Some families return to Jordan after they have been resettled in the US because the social and financial constraints for rehabilitation were simply too high (Chatelard, 2011) Pastor Miller advices the Iraqis, who are resettled, to only come back to Jordan once they have obtained a passport. “If you come back before, you are once again refugees. If you come back with an American passport, you are treated as a VIP.”65 They will receive this ‘VIP-status’ not because they are have changed, but because their legal status has changed.

Mobility, transnational ties and networks become part of a process of resisting marginalization in one country and achieving varying degrees of participation and acceptance in several host societies. I recognize among the Iraqis in Jordan a transnational process of resisting marginalization. Al-Sharmani (2003) proposes to look at displacement and movement as a larger process of resistance of people against different forms of marginalization and discrimination in different nation-states. Legal, social and economic realities of the various host societies leads to a transnational life in which people “move and dwell between different host societies in order to have more security, stability and acceptability as individuals, families, and as communities” (Al- Shermani, 2003: 2). Resettlement of some not only creates a longing among those who have stayed behind. Those refugees who have been successfully resettled also continue to experience some form of uprootedness, as they continue to search for a place where their rights are most fully recognized. The Iraqi refugees are active agents who continue to reject a life in the margins, be it in Jordan, the US or elsewhere. The connections refugees uphold enable them to hold on to their dream, but also means that their current lives have a temporary and unbounded character. A durable solution aims to put an end to refugees’ suffering, their need for international protection and dependency on humanitarian assistance (Black and Koser, 1999). Resettled refugees are just as well often still in need of assistance, and troubled by their past. Resettlement

65 Jody Miller, interview, 2d of July 2012

82 seems to imply that those that are accepted for this solution - because they have the ability to start over somewhere new - will once again fit into the ‘natural order of things’: a world constructed of nation-states (Malkki, 1995). Whereas in formal and political terms, third country resettlement is indeed a solution to a complex refugee issue, I argue that socially, resettlement is an opportunity but not a final solution. Refugees are not isolated and cannot simply discard their past or their experiences as they cross borders.

Moreover, third country resettlement for some can increase feelings of dissolution among those who stay behind. The Iraqi refugees in Jordan hold on to the idea that they are ‘matter out of place’ (Douglas, 1966). Amman is not the place they want to be, but there is one place they much rather not want to be: modern-day Iraq. They would be out of place in Iraq and not so much in Jordan. This makes me wonder how I should understand the notion of ‘displacement’. The Iraqis I have interviewed did feel excluded and out of place, because they feel they belong in Europe, North America or Australia and not because they want to go back to Iraq. Maybe the Iraqis who stayed in Iraq or the poor Jordanians who are not included in migration programs are the ones that are truly excluded? According to Andreas Wimmer anthropology is about looking at the larger society from its margins (Wimmer, 2002). But it is the anthropologist who decides who these marginalized people are. A poor life in the United States is prioritized over a poor life in Jordan, yet an insecure life in Jordan is regarded as an improvement over an insecure life in Iraq. This is one of the main features I recognize in many refugees: they remain hopeful about the future. Even though – or just because - they are considered to be out of place, they continue to believe that there is place for them.

Conclusion

In reaction to the contesting policies of UNHCR as a pseudo-government and the Jordanian Government a longing for a place elsewhere has been created. The implementation of a resettlement policy has had disruptive effects on the social order and gender roles. It divided families, while other families chose to separate their cases themselves in the hope that they will be reunited in the future. The option for resettlement has created conflicts, as well as opportunities as the refugees find means to negotiate their liminal position. Life in Jordan is associated with legal insecurity and social marginalization, as this is increasingly recognized in comparison to the lives of Iraqis who did make it to the west.

83 Connections to transnational networks further disconnect them from life in Jordan. The rise of an Iraqi diaspora and a distinct ‘Iraqiness’ reinforce feelings of isolation, and the idea that they do not belong in Jordan or in present Iraq. Instead they continue to long for an idealized place somewhere else. The chapter ends with notes on displacement and the process of transnational marginalization. As the Iraqi diaspora is widespread and connected, displaced Iraqis continuously compare where refugee life is best or the least marginalized. As their feelings of up-rootedness and non-belonging last, the ‘stranded’ refugees in Jordan in particular continue their search for a place where they belong and outweigh the options of different societies. The policy of UNHCR and governments is build upon a static understanding of solutions, yet the refugees themselves hold on to transnational connections and mobility and view solutions within that perspective.

84 Conclusion: Resettlement and The Persistence of Temporariness

Sasha Crow, the founder of an Amman-based NGO concerned with Iraqi refugees, has been working with Iraqi refugees for years. She told me: “One Iraqi un-educated guy went to the United States. He has told the people in Amman that he is now a professor and that he is flown around in a helicopter… And they believe that story”!66 This study provides a comprehension of why the Iraqis in Jordan choose to believe and hold on to stories like this one. In this study resettlement was approached as a nearly mystified phenomenon, as I was fascinated by the persistence, the dreams and mirages the Iraqi refugees related to this particular durable solution.

To understand the negotiations in and ambivalence towards a life in Jordan, this thesis builds upon earlier work on governance and power, place and transnationalism. Long’s actor-oriented approach was used to consider how multiple actors negotiate ideas on place and belonging and how these ideas can change at the interface (Long, 2001). Three months is a short period for an extensive research, meaning that choices about a focus were made. This focus was put on the refugees who feel excluded because resettlement is no viable option for them. But even if there had not been time constraints, knowledge is always situated in the world you place yourself in. I can only find a larger vision, by focusing myself on something particular and by placing myself in the world of others (Haraway, 1991). The individual narratives of Iraqi refugees were placed within the global political economy by using ethnography.

A few years ago Jordan’s capital became a hotspot for resettlement for Iraqi refugees. Ever since the willingness of western countries to receive Iraq’s displaced population has declined dramatically. A group of refugees is left behind who are either not selected for resettlement or who have been rejected for this option. The aim of this study was twofold: First, to provide insight in the influence of resettlement on the lives of refugees who are not accepted for this particular durable solution and who find themselves in protracted displacement in Jordan. Second, to explore how negotiations - between these refugees, urban refugee management and the host population - shape ideas on refugee life, place and belonging. This research started off with the research question: How does the option for resettlement influence ideas on place and belonging among Iraqi refugees in Jordan who are rejected for or who are not considered

66 CRP, interview, the 25th of May

85 for resettlement? I will reflect upon each sub question as formulated in the problem statement in four different sections, as they enabled me to draw final conclusions and to reflect upon the aim of this study.

The option for resettlement reinforced the refugeeness of Iraq’s displaced community, as well as the idea that Jordan is a transit place only. For many displaced Iraqis, the possibility for resettlement was the main reason to label themselves as refugees. Third country resettlement provided hope for a new start elsewhere as integration in Jordan was restricted. Through interactions with the international community, the Iraqi refugees learned how to become and behave as refugees. Established criteria - based upon past, vulnerability and credibility – determined whether you were included for aid and for resettlement. The hope for this particular solution, as it was associated with live in a free and wealthy country, and the departure of friends and family has reinforced the idea among the Iraqi refugees that their stay in Amman was only short-term. It transformed Jordan from a temporary haven back to Iraq to a transit place on to a western country. This idea has rooted, as the refugees who are not accepted for resettlement hold on their liminal position. A longing for resettlement has set in the minds of the ‘stranded’ refugees. As a result they feel restrained from connecting to the Jordan.

The refugees who are not accepted for resettlement hold the international community responsible for their rejection. They feel that the UN should provide them with another country to go to. This sense of entitlement results from the role the UNHCR has taken upon. As a surrogate state within Jordan the UN agency has taken on responsibility over the refugees. Ever since, the organization provided as sense of security, resources and for thousands the possibility to find a future elsewhere. The refugees have put their trust on the pseudo-government and continue to hold on to their acclaimed right for resettlement. Meanwhile, the international community holds on to its mandate for providing protection for Iraqi refugees. This protection has its limits, as the UN is dependent on countries to provide funding or space. Within these constraints, the UNHCR searches for alternative but static solutions for the ‘residual case load’. Programs for local integration are however met with hindrance, not from the refugee per se, but from the host country restrictions, social and legal insecurity associated with life in Jordan, transnational networks, and most of all: due to the Iraqis’ persistence for resettlement.

86 The urban refugee setting of Amman enables the displaced Iraqis to draw upon multiple resources to make a living in exile. The city provides economic opportunities, whereas many refugees also draw on remittances and humanitarian assistance. The notion that life in Jordan is only temporary, as was implied by their status as guest and refugee, was further reinforced by messages of the UNHCR in which the agency advised against employment in Jordan and was unclear about the future prospects of refugees. This made the Iraqi refugees reluctant to invest in Jordan or to build up social relations with host population. Instead they made use of their savings to overcome the temporariness of life in Jordan. The Iraqi refugees rather depend on the UNHCR than on the Jordanian Government, as life in Jordan is associated with social and legal marginalization. This behavior might be interpreted as an expression of idleness and could be misdiagnosed as the dependency syndrome. As I elaborated in chapter four, I argue that the Iraqi refugees actively deploy their capabilities within the humanitarian economy, and even nurture their vulnerability. Displaying self-sufficiency entails the risk that UNHCR cuts loose its responsibility. Rather than settling for a marginalized life in Jordan, the Iraqi refugees choose to “to reject the rejection” as one of my respondents stated. Selective opportunities in both the humanitarian as well as the urban economy create a disruption in social order. Longing for resettlement continuously disrupts social relations within Jordan: friendships remain precarious and distanced. Resettlement divides families, and family relations are renegotiated in relation to the gendered and generational criteria for resettlement. The departure of friends and family member reinforces the idea that the ‘stranded refugees’ are left behind, yet it also creates opportunities to travel and has resulted in the emergence of an Iraqi diaspora.

The option for resettlement has affected ideas on belonging, as it reinforced feelings of uprootedness among the Iraqi refugees in Jordan and continues to do so, even after a formal rejection. The Iraqi refugees feel they do not belong in Jordan, or in Iraq as they feel the country has changed since their departure. A longing for a better future elsewhere is a way of coping with the experienced loss of status, safety and security. It provides hope, yet it shifts the focus from Jordan to somewhere else. The Iraqis self-chosen seclusion separates them from their host society and only increases their unbelonging. Instead they hold on to a distinct Iraqi identity in exile. This Iraqi-ness has gotten a transnational character, as resettlement has increased the mobility of many refugees. Modern communication techniques enable connections with the emerging Iraqi diaspora. Flows of money, information and ideas link the lives and livelihoods of

87 Iraqi refugees with those of resettled relatives, reinforcing the dream of going to the west and further disconnecting them from life in Jordan.

This thesis reveals the complexity of power, place and identity in regard to resettlement. Whereas the sub questions can be answered separately, the answers show overlap as there is a complex and diffuse interplay between the activities and intentions of the international community, the policy of the Jordanian government, the emergence of a diaspora and the ideas of the Iraqi refugees on place and belonging. They strengthen each other, yet also evolve and change separately. The ‘stranded’ refugees are interpreting actors, who internalize and reflect upon contesting experiences and messages, and who subsequently interact, contest and influence structures. Social ordering takes place at the interface, as rules are negotiated and a limbo is created. At the interface, refugees reconstruct their ideas on place and displacement. The persistence of the refugees for resettlement was created and at the same time reinforced by the role UNHCR took upon itself as pseudo-government, social and legal marginalization, the emergence of a transnational networks and experiences of life in Iraq. The ‘stranded’ Iraqi refugees refuse to accept that resettlement is not an option and persist – against all odds - in their search for a future in the west. Individual and collective experiences reinforce the idea that Jordan is a transit place, and further disconnects the refugees from life in Jordan.

This study provides insight into some of the possible effects of the existence of a durable solution for some, but not for all. Resettlement enables a hope and a purpose and until that time, creates a life in exile. While politically, resettlement is a solution to a complex refugee issue, I have shown in this thesis that this solution for some can create limbo and dissolution for others. A solution for the ‘residual case load’ is not a quick fix, as these refugees have shaped their own ideas of what a solution is and because they are people with a history and with social relations. While the Iraqis might feel isolated and lost in Jordan, they do not live in isolation and are affected by the experiences of others. Humanitarian interventions – such as resettlement - can have disrupting and disordering effects, as the Iraqi refugees are not helpless victims and have capabilities to react and to devise ways of coping with life in exile. These ideas and activities might contrast with the expectations and ideas of humanitarian actors. The refugees interpret the structural constraints put up by governments and the international community and find means to renegotiate their position. Within their limitation of protection space, the Iraqi refugees have interpreted and reshaped a

88 society in which they actively reject local integration as a durable solution as they prefer a future elsewhere. Persistence for resettlement has proven to be worthwhile, as there are refugees who find successful strategies to travel to the west.

Those who are able to travel however often find that their idealized images do not correspond with reality, and continue to search and long for a place where they feel home. In line with the transnational approach I question whether a sedentary life is what is normal, and in particular for refugees who have been have been uprooted. Humanitarian actors build upon this assumption as they hold on the idea that a solution should be static and localized. Yet creative and less static could match more closely with the perceptions and social realities of refugees, and might be worthwhile to explore. Among the Iraqi refugees I recognize the importance of border crossing activities as these continuously shape local realities. The legal, social and economic opportunities within various host countries - and the ability for refugees to remain connected with those who leave - influence the thoughts of Iraqi refugees on place, identity and belonging. I argue – in line with Chatelard (2009b) that the possibility of cross-border mobility should gain more attention and analysis. Mobility reduces dependency, enables refugees to pursue border-crossing livelihoods, maintain social ties, to check on or sell properties and even to evaluate the possibility of return. Since a durable solution is not possible for everyone, it might be interesting to consider how transnational connection can contribute to a workable situation for most refugees.

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97 Appendix 1 - List of informants cited in the text by pseudonyms

Below is a list of the people that appear in different parts of the text, to help the reader keep track of who is who. All the names of the participants in this research are pseudonyms, in order to respect the confidentiality, security and privacy of my informants. In this list the reader can also find some of their characteristics in reference to their rejection for resettlement. This is not a complete list of informants: the list only includes those Iraqi refugees that were cited throughout the text. Informants that were referred to by their positions or function are referred to at the place of citation.

Abdullah Single man, 30 years. Has been in Jordan for more than ten years but was never considered for resettlement. Was deported to Iraq and came back to Jordan without his passport. Abdul-Karim Single man, 32 years old. Has been in Jordan since 2004. Was never considered for resettlement. Abd-el-Rahman Single man, 33 years. Has been in Jordan since 2004. Was rejected for resettlement by the US government. Abu and Um Abdel Couple, Abu Abdel is Shi’ite, while Um Abdel is Sunni. Were rejected for resettlement by the US government. Um Abdel is working as ‘volunteer’; Abu Abdel is no longer working since, as a Shi’ite, he feels continuously discriminated against. Abu Haya Married, 40 years old. Was never considered for resettlement. His sister and mother were accepted for resettlement. Abu and Um Kareem Couple. Have been rejected for resettlement by the US Government because Abu Kareem could not proof that he deserted the army. Abu and Um Omar Couple. Have never been considered for resettlement and is still waiting. Abu Omar was a member of the Fedayeen, a private military of Saddam Hussein. Abu and Um Yasid Couple. Found out through an NGO-worker that they were never considered for resettlement. Ahmed Man, 50 years old. Is married, but left his wife and family back in Iraq. Has been in Syria since 2004 and only came to Jordan in 2011. Was rejected for resettlement by the American government in Syria.

98 Boutros Single man, 24 years old. Christian. Came to Jordan with his mother and two sisters. His father is already living in the US. Waiting for resettlement. Ferhat Single Kurdish man, 25 years old. Was rejected for resettlement by the US Government because Kurdistan considered safe. He himself also blames the translator for his rejection. Works as a ‘volunteer’. Hanan Single woman, 53 years old. She is a single mother and used to be married to a Jordanian. Feels that UNHCR has promised to help her if she divorced, but the help stayed out. Hassan Single man, 31 years old. He says he fled Iraq because of his sexual orientation. Is convinced that he was rejected by UNHCR. Hussein Single man, 31 years old. Has been in Jordan since 2005. Suffers from eczema, and feels only in the US they can cure disease. Says he ‘doesn’t know where his case is.’ Ibrahim Single man, 35 years old, Shi’ite. Has been rejected for resettlement by the US Government. dr. Mohammed Man, 45 years old, married and father of four children. Used to be a professor and entrepreneur. He was rejected by the US government. Mahmoud Single man, 28 years old. He was rejected by the US government while his brother who had the same refuge story was accepted. Moe Single man, 27 years old, left Iraq because of his sexual orientation. Was my translator, and his case was in progress at the time of research. At present, Moe is successfully resettled and lives in the United States. Mostafa Man, 45 years old. Was rejected for resettlement by the US government, while his Iraqi girlfriend was accepted. Mostafa is Shi’ite and does not feel welcome in Jordan. Muez Man, 59 years old. Father of five children. Three of them are now living in the United States. He and his wife were rejected for resettlement by the US government. Nabila Woman, 51 years old. She is in need of a long transplantation because of protracted TBC and is still waiting for resettlement. Ra’ed Single man, 31 years old. Shi’ite and feels continuously unsafe because he does not have a passport. Salaam Married man, 44 years old. Was never considered for resettlement. Works as a ‘volunteer’.

99 Sara Married woman, 22 years old. She is married to Osama, Um Osama’s son and only moved to Jordan recently to join her husband and his family. Thaer Single man, 42 years old. Is hopeful that he will be resettled, but has been waiting for more than four years and was not yet referred to IOM. Um Abbas Married woman, 45 years old, mother of eight children. Her husband was rejected for resettlement, but according to her, UNHCR has told her that she and her children can go separately. Um Farid Single mother, 40 years old. Mother of two children. Got divorced in Jordan. Was twice rejected for resettlement: by the Australian and the US government. Um Kareem Married woman, Wife of Abu Kareem, mother of five children. Um Osama Widow, single mother, 42 years old, has three grown-up sons. Came to Jordan, for the cancer-treatment of her late husband. Is reluctant to go to the US as she feels that as a single mother she will not be able to control her children. Um Rajan Single mother, 43 years old, Kurdish. Was rejected for resettlement by the US Government. Got divorced in Jordan. Works as a volunteer. Um Reema Woman, 41 years old, mother of Reema. Um Reema’s mother told UNHCR that Um Reema was not interested in resettlement. Um Yakub Elderly woman, widow. Mother of Yakub, a mentally retarded man who was rejected for resettlement to Australia, whereas she was accepted. Um Yakub came back to Jordan to take care of her son, and to enable his resettlement. Um Yusra Woman, 45 years old, mother of three children. She refuses resettlement to the United States, because she prefers to join her brothers who are living in Germany. Works for multiple NGOs. Yusuf Married man, 28 years old, father of a daughter. Yusuf was accepted for resettlement, but failed to pass the security check.

100 Appendix 2 – Iraqi Refugees Use Social Media to Cry out for Help

101 Appendix 3 – Letter of deferral

102 Appendix 4 – Notice of Ineligibility for Resettlement

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